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PLATO'S REPUBLIC

JOWETT AND CAMPBELL

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

LONDON, EDINBURGH, AND NEW YORK

PLATO'S REPUBLIC

THE GREEK TEXT

EDITED, WITH NOTES AND ESSAYS

BY THE LATE

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ST. ANDREWS

IN THREE VOLUMES

VOL. I. TEXT

WITH A FACSIMILE

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CONTENTS OF VOL. I

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PREFACE

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lectured as a College Tutor, and which he had made the subject of his first course of lectures before the University. The Commentary had been well begun when the demand for the second edition of his work on St. Paul's Epistles and the publication of *Essays and Reviews* diverted his energies for a time. When he resumed his notes on the *Republic*, about the year 1863, his design, as often happened with him, had expanded:—

> 'Greek puts already on either side
> Such a branch-work forth as soon extends
> To a vista opening far and wide.'

The text and notes were to be accompanied not only with an Essay on Textual Criticism, but with a complete analysis of Plato's writings. This had in fact been executed and laboriously revised, when (about 1865) Prof. Jowett became dissatisfied with the plan, and resolved that there must be not only an analysis, but a translation, at least of the *Republic*. Before this had far advanced he had conceived a new design, that of a complete translation of the Platonic Dialogues, which was completed, with the Introductions, in 1871. Thus the outgrowth superseded the original work, and the task of translation occupied the years from 1865 to 1870, when Professor Jowett became Master of Balliol. Having successfully translated one Greek Classic, he could not refrain from applying his skill to Thucydides and Aristotle. Both occupied him far longer than he anticipated.

Meanwhile the Commentary on the *Republic* remained more or less in abeyance. But it was never wholly abandoned, and had been copied and revised, and again copied more than once, when in the year 1875 he took me into partnership with a view to completing the edition. Both before and after this the Commentary passed several times between us. A plan was now agreed upon for the preparation of a series of Essays. The text, with select various readings, was printed after the proofs had been submitted to the Master, the notes were once more written out and criticized on both sides, and he revised them with a view to final transcription. He had all but completed this revision in the summer before he died, and in September 1893, he solemnly gave the work into my hands.

In endeavouring to carry out Professor Jowett's last wishes, I have used what I hope is not too bold a discretion. I have not in every case left the notes exactly as I found them. Some things which he had cancelled I have ventured to restore; in a few cases, where it seemed worth while, adding my own initials. In other places where our opinions differed, I have left a duplicate note, again subjoining the initials. Such differences chiefly turn, as might be expected, on points of textual criticism. Professor Jowett's attitude on this subject is well known. To the last he was keenly desirous to get rid of the 'curse of conjectural emendation.' While sharing his distrust

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of *adversaria*, and quite ready to face the obloquy which he anticipated as a consequence of his views, I have been led to draw the line of probability not quite so close to the consent of the MSS. The Essays on this subject in vol. ii. pages iii to xxix, and 67 to 131, will make our relative positions clear. Professor Jowett's Essay was unfortunately never completed. It is printed as he left it, together with some brief excursuses or digressions which had grown out of the Commentary, and would have been expanded into finished essays if he had lived. For the remainder of the second volume I am mainly responsible, but the Essays were undertaken at Professor Jowett's instance, and have been revised in the light of his criticisms.

The text had been mostly printed off before I had an opportunity of personally confronting the chief MS., Paris. 1807 (Bekker's A). There is consequently some discrepancy between the various readings selected from Bekker, Schneider, Stallbaum, and Baiter, and the exact readings of Par. A, a collation of which will be found on pp. 132–145 of vol. ii. For this inequality, which has been inevitable under all the circumstances, I have to crave the indulgence of the reader. Professor Jowett's Commentary was originally founded on that of Stallbaum, with frequent reference to Schneider, but, as time went on, he relied more and more upon his own judgement and familiarity with Plato. As the notes now stand, it is impossible

to say how much is due in substance to either editor, but the form is chiefly Professor Jowett's; and the general remarks on philosophy and life are almost without exception the Master's own.

For a collation of the two Venetian MSS. Π and Ξ thanks are due to Signor Castellani, and for that of the Cesena MS. (M), not previously collated, to Signor E. Rostagno. See vol. ii. pp. 152–164.

Special thanks are also due to M. Omont, of the National Library, Paris, for his prompt kindness in permitting a photograph to be taken of the page of the chief MS., which is reproduced on the frontispiece of this volume. It corresponds to a portion of pp. 503 A–504 B of the edition of Stephanus, and is of the exact size of the original. A few remarks upon this page by way of an 'object-lesson' for students may be not unacceptable.—I regret to have to call attention in the first place to some lead-pencil marks with which the margin has been disfigured. They are the work of some collator who has studiously collected all peculiarities of breathing and accentuation. One of Sheridan's characters says of a fellow-subscriber to a circulating library, 'she has a most observing thumb.' My precursor's pencil had a most observing point. Neglecting these eyesores, consider the horizontal mark occurring here and there on the left-hand margin of each column. This is the *paragraphus*, which in drama and dialogue indicates a new speaker.

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Passing the eye along the line you will find a corresponding mark like a colon (:); these are the notes by which every change of speakers is distinguished. Where there are two changes in one line, there are two of the colon-marks, but only one marginal indication.—Next to be considered are the readings in this passage—

(1) vi. 503 A παρακαλυπτομένου (col. 1, ll. 5 and 6). Bekker's quotation is 'παρακάμπτεσθαι fortasse A.' Dübner in correcting Bekker repeated a part of his mistake, by asserting that A read παρακαλύπτεσθαι not παρακάμπτεσθαι. The division of the word between two lines may have occasioned this as well as some other errors of collation. Such division is made frequent by the narrowness of the column, holding only from seventeen to twenty-two letters.

(2) 503 B (col. 1, ll. 21 and 22) διεσπασμένη. Cobet unaccountably asserted that Par. A here read διεσπασμένα. This latter is the reading of Stephanus (misled by Ficinus), but amongst MSS. appears to be confined to *v a*, both late and of inferior authority.

(3) 504 B (col. 2, ll. 42 and 43) ἐλλειπῇ. A constant itacism, which collators have not thought worth noticing.

Breathings and Accentuation. Col. 1, l. 3 ἄθλα not ἆθλα. Ib. l. 4 ἄττα (*sic*): perhaps the scribe understood this to be the relative to ἄθλα = 'Such rewards as those that were spoken of.' The punctuation indicates this; but the scribe has not ventured to change τ' to θ'.

Ib. l. 33 ἅπαν not ἄπαν—a slip corrected by the second hand. Initial ὑ is marked ὑ̔, col. 1, ll. 31, 44. Double ρ is marked with breathings ῤῥ in col. 2, ll. 30, 31, 40, 41, but possibly not by the first hand.

Col. 2, l. 1 ὅτ' ἄν τι. This is quite usual. Col. 1, l. 27 νεανικοί τε. Here the accentuation follows the ordinary rule, as the final syllable of νεανικοί is accented. But in col. 1, l. 44 ὕπνου τὲ, col. 2, l. 12 πόνοις τὲ, and ib. ll. 25, 26 δικαιοσύνης τὲ, τέ is accented, because the final syllable of the preceding word is unaccented. In col. 2, l. 4 εὖ τὲ, a second hand seems to have thought it necessary to accent τέ, the circumflex being equivalent to an acute followed by a grave. But in the preceding line γε following δέ is unaccented, and in l. 11 τε is unaccented, having thrown back its accent upon ἐν. The difference between the smooth breathing ⌐ and the coronis ' is worth noticing. From not perceiving this, editors have misquoted the reading παιῶν' ἐπευφήμησεν in ii. 383 B.

One other mark should be noticed in passing. In col. 1, ll. 27, 28 μεγαλοπρεπεῖς : the curved line under οπ signifies that these two letters belong to the same word. The reason for its use in this instance is not clearly apparent. The compendium for ν (~) occurs three times, always at the end of a line. On inspecting it in col. 1, ll. 33 and 41, it is evident how easily this might be mistaken for a breathing (see v. rr. on i. 351 A). The punctuation is mainly by the first hand; but the commas seem to have been added afterwards, and A²

has also marked interrogation by placing a comma beneath a colon in col. 1, l. 26, and col. 2, l. 31.

We pass now to the other work of the diorthotes. In col. 1, l. 33, he has corrected ἄπαν to ἅπαν without erasure, by clubbing somewhat clumsily the fine point of the smooth breathing. In col. 2, l. 1, he has changed ἐμπίπλανται to ἐμπίμπλανται by inserting a second μ above the line; and in col. 2, ll. 18, 19, ὥσπερ, he has altered the work of the first hand by erasing σ before π in l. 19, and inserting it after the ω in l. 18. The same person was probably responsible for the two early scholia, one on ὄκνος in col. 1, l. 9, ἀνάδυσις, εὐλάβεια, ἀναβολή, and one on δυνατή in col. 2, l. 17, ἡ τῶν ἀρχόντων φύσις. A simple dot marks the reference in either case. Two other notes by a later hand appear on the margin of col. 1, ση- = σημαντέον, opposite l. 33, and one opposite l. 40, ση- τί λέγει περὶ τῶν ἠθῶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων. The dot referring to this is over δυσκίνητα.

The page is less corrected than some others, but is on the whole a fair specimen of the work of the scribe. The preparation of the surface with the ruler is perceptible in the photograph. The two columns marked out with double vertical lines to the right and left of each, and the forty-four horizontal lines *beneath* which the letters are mainly formed, can easily be discerned. There is also a double vertical line at the limit of the left-hand margin.

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I have to thank Mr. J. Solomon for some acute suggestions, and my friend the Provost of Oriel for help in passages referring to number, music, and metre. 'Let us refer these things to Damon,' the Master used to say. If our notes in such places are still to seek, it is not Damon's fault.

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ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΓΛΑΥΚΩΝ, ΠΟΛΕΜΑΡΧΟΣ, ΘΡΑΣΥΜΑΧΟΣ, ΑΔΕΙΜΑΝΤΟΣ, ΚΕΦΑΛΟΣ.

Republic I.

SOCRATES, GLAUCON, ADEIMANTUS, POLEMARCHUS.

Ed. Steph. p. 327.

ΚΑΤΕΒΗΝ χθὲς εἰς Πειραιᾶ μετὰ Γλαύκωνος τοῦ Ἀρίστωνος προσευξόμενός τε τῇ θεῷ καὶ ἅμα τὴν ἑορτὴν βουλόμενος θεάσασθαι τίνα τρόπον ποιήσουσιν ἅτε νῦν πρῶτον ἄγοντες. καλὴ μὲν οὖν μοι καὶ ἡ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων πομπὴ ἔδοξεν εἶναι, οὐ μέντοι ἧττον ἐφαίνετο πρέπειν ἣν οἱ Θρᾶκες ἔπεμπον. B προσευξάμενοι δὲ καὶ θεωρήσαντες ἀπῇμεν πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ.

Meeting of Socrates and Glaucon with Polemarchus at the Bendidean festival.

κατιδὼν οὖν πόρρωθεν ἡμᾶς οἴκαδε ὡρμημένους Πολέμαρχος ὁ Κεφάλου ἐκέλευσε δραμόντα τὸν παῖδα περιμεῖναί ἑ κελεῦσαι. καί μου ὄπισθεν ὁ παῖς λαβόμενος τοῦ ἱματίου, Κελεύει ὑμᾶς, ἔφη, Πολέμαρχος περιμεῖναι. Καὶ ἐγὼ μετεστράφην τε καὶ ἠρόμην ὅπου αὐτὸς εἴη. Οὗτος, ἔφη, ὄπισθεν προσέρχεται· ἀλλὰ περιμένετε.

Ἀλλὰ περιμενοῦμεν, ἦ δ᾽ ὃς ὁ Γλαύκων. Καὶ ὀλίγῳ C ὕστερον ὅ τε Πολέμαρχος ἧκε καὶ Ἀδείμαντος ὁ τοῦ Γλαύκωνος ἀδελφὸς καὶ Νικήρατος ὁ Νικίου καὶ ἄλλοι τινές, ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς πομπῆς.

Ὁ οὖν Πολέμαρχος ἔφη Ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖτέ μοι πρὸς ἄστυ ὡρμῆσθαι ὡς ἀπιόντες.

18. ὡς AM : om. Π.

ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΓΛΑΥΚΩΝ, ΠΟΛΕΜΑΡΧΟΣ, ΘΡΑΣΥΜΑΧΟΣ, ΑΔΕΙΜΑΝΤΟΣ, ΚΕΦΑΛΟΣ.

Republic I.

Socrates, Glaucon, Adeimantus, Polemarchus.

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Republic I.

Socrates, Polemarchus, Glaucon, Cephalus.

Οὐ γὰρ κακῶς δοξάζεις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. p. 327.

Ὁρᾷς οὖν ἡμᾶς, ἔφη, ὅσοι ἐσμέν;

Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Ἢ τοίνυν τούτων, ἔφη, κρείττους γένεσθε ἢ μένετ' αὐτοῦ.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔτι ἓν λείπεται, τὸ ἢν πείσωμεν ὑμᾶς ὡς χρὴ ἡμᾶς ἀφεῖναι.

Ἦ καὶ δύναισθ' ἄν, ἦ δ' ὅς, πεῖσαι μὴ ἀκούοντας;

Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων.

Ὡς τοίνυν μὴ ἀκουσομένων, οὕτω διανοεῖσθε.

The equestrian torch-race.

Καὶ ὁ Ἀδείμαντος, Ἆρά γε, | ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐδ' ἴστε ὅτι p. 328.
λαμπὰς ἔσται πρὸς ἑσπέραν ἀφ' ἵππων τῇ θεῷ;

Ἀφ' ἵππων; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· καινόν γε τοῦτο. λαμπάδια ἔχοντες διαδώσουσιν ἀλλήλοις ἁμιλλώμενοι τοῖς ἵπποις; ἢ πῶς λέγεις;

Οὕτως, ἔφη ὁ Πολέμαρχος· καὶ πρός γε παννυχίδα ποιήσουσιν, ἣν ἄξιον θεάσασθαι· ἐξαναστησόμεθα γὰρ μετὰ τὸ δεῖπνον καὶ τὴν παννυχίδα θεασόμεθα, καὶ ξυνεσόμεθά τε πολλοῖς τῶν νέων αὐτόθι καὶ δια-
λεξόμεθα· ἀλλὰ μένετε καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖτε. B

Καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων, Ἔοικεν, ἔφη, μενετέον εἶναι.

Ἀλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὕτω χρὴ ποιεῖν.

The gathering of friends at the house of Cephalus.

Ἤιμεν οὖν οἴκαδε εἰς τοῦ Πολεμάρχου, καὶ Λυσίαν τε αὐτόθι κατελάβομεν καὶ Εὐθύδημον, τοὺς τοῦ Πολεμάρχου ἀδελφούς, καὶ δὴ καὶ Θρασύμαχον τὸν Χαλκηδόνιον καὶ Χαρμαντίδην τὸν Παιανιέα καὶ Κλειτοφῶντα τὸν Ἀριστωνύμου· ἦν δ' ἔνδον καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ὁ τοῦ Πολεμάρχου Κέφαλος· καὶ μάλα πρεσβύτης μοι
ἔδοξεν εἶναι· διὰ χρόνου γὰρ καὶ ἑωράκη αὐτόν. C

6. ἓν λείπεται A² mg. M mg. ἐλλείπεται ΑΠΜ. 25. χαλκηδόνιον Π : καλχηδόνιον Α : καρχηδόνιον Μ.

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p. 328. καθῆστο δὲ ἐστεφανωμένος ἐπί τινος προσκεφαλαίου τε καὶ δίφρου· τεθυκὼς γὰρ ἐτύγχανεν ἐν τῇ αὐλῇ. ἐκαθεζόμεθα οὖν παρ' αὐτόν· ἔκειντο γὰρ δίφροι τινὲς αὐτόθι κύκλῳ.

Εὐθὺς οὖν με ἰδὼν ὁ Κέφαλος ἠσπάζετό τε καὶ εἶπεν Ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ δὲ θαμίζεις ἡμῖν καταβαίνων εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ· χρῆν μέντοι. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐγὼ ἔτι ἐν δυνάμει ἦν τοῦ ῥᾳδίως πορεύεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ, οὐδὲν D ἂν σε ἔδει δεῦρο ἰέναι, ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς ἂν παρὰ σὲ ᾖμεν· νῦν δέ σε χρὴ πυκνότερον δεῦρο ἰέναι· ὡς εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ἔμοιγε ὅσον αἱ ἄλλαι αἱ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἡδοναὶ ἀπομαραίνονται, τοσοῦτον αὔξονται αἱ περὶ τοὺς λόγους ἐπιθυμίαι τε καὶ ἡδοναί. μὴ οὖν ἄλλως ποίει, ἀλλὰ τοῖσδέ τε τοῖς νεανίαις ξύνισθι καὶ δεῦρο παρ' ἡμᾶς φοίτα ὡς παρὰ φίλους τε καὶ πάνυ οἰκείους.

Καὶ μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Κέφαλε, χαίρω γε διαλεγόE μενος τοῖς σφόδρα πρεσβύταις. δοκεῖ γάρ μοι χρῆναι παρ' αὐτῶν πυνθάνεσθαι, ὥσπερ τινὰ ὁδὸν προεληλυθότων, ἣν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἴσως δεήσει πορεύεσθαι, ποία τίς ἐστι, τραχεῖα καὶ χαλεπή, ἢ ῥᾳδία καὶ εὔπορος. καὶ δὴ καὶ σοῦ ἡδέως ἂν πυθοίμην ὅ τί σοι φαίνεται τοῦτο, ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα ἤδη εἶ τῆς ἡλικίας, ὃ δὴ ἐπὶ γήραος οὐδῷ φασὶν εἶναι οἱ ποιηταί, πότερον χαλεπὸν τοῦ βίου, ἢ πῶς σὺ αὐτὸ ἐξαγγέλλεις.

Old age is not to blame for the troubles of old men.

p. 329. Ἐγώ σοι ἔφη, νὴ τὸν Δία ἐρῶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, | οἷόν γέ μοι φαίνεται. πολλάκις γὰρ συνερχόμεθά τινες εἰς ταὐτὸ παραπλησίαν ἡλικίαν ἔχοντες, διασῴζοντες τὴν παλαιὰν παροιμίαν. οἱ οὖν πλεῖστοι ἡμῶν ὀλοφύρονται ξυνιόντες, τὰς ἐν τῇ νεότητι ἡδονὰς ποθοῦν-

14. νεανίαις AM: νεανίσκοις Π. 16. χαίρω γε Π: χαίρω AM.
29. ξυνιόντες MSS.: ξυνόντες cj. Buttmann.

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τες καὶ ἀναμιμνησκόμενοι περί τε τἀφροδίσια καὶ περὶ p. 329. πότους καὶ εὐωχίας καὶ ἄλλ' ἄττα ἃ τῶν τοιούτων ἔχεται, καὶ ἀγανακτοῦσιν ὡς μεγάλων τινῶν ἀπεστερημένοι καὶ τότε μὲν εὖ ζῶντες, νῦν δὲ οὐδὲ ζῶντες. ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ τὰς τῶν οἰκείων προπηλακίσεις τοῦ γήρως B ὀδύρονται, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ δὴ τὸ γῆρας ὑμνοῦσιν ὅσων κακῶν σφίσιν αἴτιον. ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκοῦσιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὗτοι οὐ τὸ αἴτιον αἰτιᾶσθαι. εἰ γὰρ ἦν τοῦτ' αἴτιον, κἂν ἐγὼ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐπεπόνθη ἕνεκά γε γήρως καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὅσοι ἐνταῦθα ἦλθον ἡλικίας. νῦν δ' ἔγωγε ἤδη ἐντετύχηκα οὐχ οὕτως ἔχουσι καὶ ἄλλοις, καὶ δὴ καὶ Σοφοκλεῖ ποτε τῷ ποιητῇ παρεγενόμην ἐρωτωμένῳ ὑπό τινος Πῶς, ἔφη, ὦ Σοφόκλεις, ἔχεις C πρὸς τἀφροδίσια; ἔτι οἷός τε εἶ γυναικὶ συγγίγνεσθαι; Καὶ ὅς, Εὐφήμει, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνθρωπε· ἀσμενέστατα μέντοι αὐτὸ ἀπέφυγον, ὥσπερ λυττῶντά τινα καὶ ἄγριον δεσπότην ἀποφυγών. Εὖ οὖν μοι καὶ τότε ἔδοξεν ἐκεῖνος εἰπεῖν, καὶ νῦν οὐχ ἧττον. παντάπασι γὰρ τῶν γε τοιούτων ἐν τῷ γήρᾳ πολλὴ εἰρήνη γίγνεται καὶ ἐλευθερία, ἐπειδὰν αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι παύσωνται κατατείνουσαι καὶ χαλάσωσι, παντάπασι τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους γίγνεται, δεσποτῶν πάνυ πολλῶν ἔστι D καὶ μαινομένων ἀπηλλάχθαι. ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων πέρι καὶ τῶν γε πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους μία τις αἰτία ἐστίν, οὐ τὸ γῆρας, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ὁ τρόπος τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἂν μὲν γὰρ κόσμιοι καὶ εὔκολοι ὦσι, καὶ τὸ γῆρας μετρίως ἐστὶν ἐπίπονον· εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ γῆρας, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ νεότης χαλεπὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ ξυμβαίνει.

The excellent saying of Sophocles.

It is admitted that

Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀγασθεὶς αὐτοῦ εἰπόντος ταῦτα, βουλό-

15. ἀσμενέστατα AM: ἀσμεναίτατα Π. 20. ἐπειδὰν ΑΠ: ἐπειδὰν γὰρ M.

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p. 329. *μενος ἔτι λέγειν αὐτὸν ἐκίνουν καὶ εἶπον* Ὦ Κέφαλε, E οἶμαί σου τοὺς πολλούς, ὅταν ταῦτα λέγῃς, οὐκ ἀποδέχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἡγεῖσθαί σε ῥᾳδίως τὸ γῆρας φέρειν οὐ διὰ τὸν τρόπον ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πολλὴν οὐσίαν κεκτῆσθαι· τοῖς γὰρ πλουσίοις πολλὰ παραμύθιά φασιν εἶναι.

the old, if they are to be comfortable, must have a fair share of external goods; neither virtue alone nor riches alone can make an old man happy.

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις· οὐ γὰρ ἀποδέχονται. καὶ λέγουσί μέν τι, οὐ μέντοι γε ὅσον οἴονται, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ Θεμιστοκλέους εὖ ἔχει, ὃς τῷ Σεριφίῳ λοιδορουμένῳ καὶ λέγοντι, ὅτι οὐ δι' αὐτὸν | p. 330. ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν πόλιν εὐδοκιμοῖ, ἀπεκρίνατο ὅτι οὔτ' ἂν αὐτὸς Σερίφιος ὢν ὀνομαστὸς ἐγένετο οὔτ' ἐκεῖνος Ἀθηναῖος. καὶ τοῖς δὴ μὴ πλουσίοις, χαλεπῶς δὲ τὸ γῆρας φέρουσιν, εὖ ἔχει ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, ὅτι οὔτ' ἂν ὁ ἐπιεικὴς πάνυ τι ῥᾳδίως γῆρας μετὰ πενίας ἐνέγκοι οὔθ' ὁ μὴ ἐπιεικὴς πλουτήσας εὔκολός ποτ' ἂν ἑαυτῷ γένοιτο.

Πότερον δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Κέφαλε, ὧν κέκτησαι τὰ πλέω παρέλαβες ἢ ἐπεκτήσω;

B Ποῖ' ἐπεκτησάμην, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες; μέσος τις γέγονα χρηματιστὴς τοῦ τε πάππου καὶ τοῦ πατρός. ὁ μὲν γὰρ πάππος τε καὶ ὁμώνυμος ἐμοὶ σχεδόν τι ὅσην ἐγὼ νῦν οὐσίαν κέκτημαι παραλαβὼν πολλάκις τοσαύτην ἐποίησε, Λυσανίας δὲ ὁ πατὴρ ἔτι ἐλάττω αὐτὴν ἐποίησε τῆς νῦν οὔσης· ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγαπῶ, ἐὰν μὴ ἐλάττω καταλίπω τουτοισί, ἀλλὰ βραχεῖ γέ τινι πλείω ἢ παρέλαβον.

Οὗ τοι ἕνεκα ἠρόμην, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι μοι ἔδοξας C οὐ σφόδρα ἀγαπᾶν τὰ χρήματα. τοῦτο δὲ ποιοῦσιν ὡς τὸ πολὺ οἳ ἂν μὴ αὐτοὶ κτήσωνται· οἱ δὲ κτησά-

Cephalus has inherited rather than made a for-

26. τουτοισί cj. Bekker.: τούτοισιν ΑΠΜ. 28. οὗ τοι b: οὗτοι Π: οὗτοι ΑΜ.

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tune; he is therefore indifferent to money.

μενοι διπλῇ ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀσπάζονται αὐτά. ὥσπερ p. 330. γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ τὰ αὑτῶν ποιήματα καὶ οἱ πατέρες τοὺς παῖδας ἀγαπῶσι, ταύτῃ τε δὴ καὶ οἱ χρηματισάμενοι περὶ τὰ χρήματα σπουδάζουσιν ὡς ἔργον ἑαυτῶν, καὶ κατὰ τὴν χρείαν, ᾗπερ οἱ ἄλλοι. χαλεποὶ οὖν καὶ ξυγγενέσθαι εἰσίν, οὐδὲν ἐθέλοντες ἐπαινεῖν ἀλλ' ἢ τὸν πλοῦτον.

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

The advantages of wealth.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἀλλά μοι ἔτι τοσόνδε D εἰπέ. τί μέγιστον οἴει ἀγαθὸν ἀπολελαυκέναι τοῦ πολλὴν οὐσίαν κεκτῆσθαι;

The fear of death and the consciousness of sin become more vivid in old age; and to be rich frees a man from many temptations.

Ὅ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἴσως οὐκ ἂν πολλοὺς πείσαιμι λέγων. εὖ γὰρ ἴσθι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι, ἐπειδάν τις ἐγγὺς ᾖ τοῦ οἴεσθαι τελευτήσειν, εἰσέρχεται αὐτῷ δέος καὶ φροντὶς περὶ ὧν ἔμπροσθεν οὐκ εἰσῄει. οἵ τε γὰρ λεγόμενοι μῦθοι περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου, ὡς τὸν ἐνθάδε ἀδικήσαντα δεῖ ἐκεῖ διδόναι δίκην, καταγελώμενοι τέως, τότε δὴ στρέφουσιν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν μὴ E ἀληθεῖς ὦσι· καὶ αὐτὸς ἤτοι ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ γήρως ἀσθενείας ἢ καὶ ὥσπερ ἤδη ἐγγυτέρω ὢν τῶν ἐκεῖ μᾶλλόν τι καθορᾷ αὐτά—ὑποψίας δ' οὖν καὶ δείματος μεστὸς γίγνεται καὶ ἀναλογίζεται ἤδη καὶ σκοπεῖ, εἴ τινά τι ἠδίκηκεν. ὁ μὲν οὖν εὑρίσκων ἑαυτοῦ ἐν τῷ βίῳ πολλὰ ἀδικήματα καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὕπνων, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, θαμὰ ἐγειρόμενος δειμαίνει καὶ ζῇ μετὰ κακῆς ἐλπίδος· τῷ | δὲ μηδὲν ἑαυτῷ p. 331. ἄδικον ξυνειδότι ἡδεῖα ἐλπὶς ἀεὶ πάρεστι καὶ ἀγαθὴ γηροτρόφος, ὡς καὶ Πίνδαρος λέγει.

The admirable strain of Pindar.

χαριέντως γάρ τοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτ' ἐκεῖνος εἶπεν, ὅτι ὃς ἂν δικαίως καὶ ὁσίως τὸν βίον διαγάγῃ, γλυκεῖά οἱ καρ-

5. ᾗπερ ΠΜ: ἤπερ A.

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CEPHALUS, SOCRATES, POLEMARCHUS.

p. 331. δίαν ἀτάλλοισα γηροτρόφος συναορεῖ ἐλπίς, ἃ μάλιστα θνατῶν πολύστροφον γνώμαν κυβερνᾷ. εὖ οὖν λέγει θαυμαστῶς ὡς σφόδρα. πρὸς δὴ τοῦτ' ἔγωγε τίθημι τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτῆσιν B πλείστου ἀξίαν εἶναι, οὔ τι παντὶ ἀνδρὶ ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ. τὸ γὰρ μηδὲ ἄκοντά τινα ἐξαπατῆσαι ἢ ψεύσασθαι, μηδ' αὖ ὀφείλοντα ἢ θεῷ θυσίας τινὰς ἢ ἀνθρώπῳ χρήματα ἔπειτα ἐκεῖσε ἀπιέναι δεδιότα, μέγα μέρος εἰς τοῦτο ἡ τῶν χρημάτων κτῆσις συμβάλλεται. ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἄλλας χρείας πολλάς· ἀλλά γε ἓν ἀνθ' ἑνὸς οὐκ ἐλάχιστον ἔγωγε θείην ἂν εἰς τοῦτο ἀνδρὶ νοῦν ἔχοντι, ὦ Σώκρατες, πλοῦτον χρησιμώτατον εἶναι.

Justice to speak truth and pay your debts.

C Παγκάλως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις, ὦ Κέφαλε. τοῦτο δ' αὐτό, τὴν δικαιοσύνην, πότερα τὴν ἀλήθειαν αὐτὸ φήσομεν εἶναι ἁπλῶς οὕτως καὶ τὸ ἀποδιδόναι, ἄν τίς τι παρά του λάβῃ, ἢ καὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἔστιν ἐνίοτε μὲν δικαίως, ἐνίοτε δὲ ἀδίκως ποιεῖν; οἷον τοιόνδε λέγω· πᾶς ἄν που εἴποι, εἴ τις λάβοι παρὰ φίλου ἀνδρὸς σωφρονοῦντος ὅπλα, εἰ μανεὶς ἀπαιτοῖ, ὅτι οὔτε χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποδιδόναι, οὔτε δίκαιος ἂν εἴη ὁ ἀποδιδούς, οὐδ' αὖ πρὸς τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα πάντα ἐθέλων τἀληθῆ λέγειν.

D Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Οὐκ ἄρα οὗτος ὅρος ἐστὶ δικαιοσύνης, ἀληθῆ τε λέγειν καὶ ἃ ἂν λάβῃ τις ἀποδιδόναι.

This is the definition of Simonides.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Πολέμαρχος, εἴπερ γέ τι χρὴ Σιμωνίδῃ πείθεσθαι.

Καὶ μέντοι, ἔφη ὁ Κέφαλος, καὶ παραδίδωμι ὑμῖν τὸν λόγον. δεῖ γάρ με ἤδη τῶν ἱερῶν ἐπιμεληθῆναι.

10. ἀλλά γε ἓν MSS.: ἀλλ' ἕν γε Stobaeus.

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tune; he is therefore indifferent to money.

μενοι διπλῇ ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀσπάζονται αὐτά. ὥσπερ [p. 330.] γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ τὰ αὑτῶν ποιήματα καὶ οἱ πατέρες τοὺς παῖδας ἀγαπῶσι, ταύτῃ τε δὴ καὶ οἱ χρηματισάμενοι περὶ τὰ χρήματα σπουδάζουσιν ὡς ἔργον ἑαυτῶν, καὶ κατὰ τὴν χρείαν, ᾗπερ οἱ ἄλλοι. χαλεποὶ οὖν καὶ ξυγγενέσθαι εἰσίν, οὐδὲν ἐθέλοντες ἐπαινεῖν ἀλλ' ἢ τὸν πλοῦτον.

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

The advantages of wealth.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἀλλά μοι ἔτι τοσόνδε [D] εἰπέ. τί μέγιστον οἴει ἀγαθὸν ἀπολελαυκέναι τοῦ πολλὴν οὐσίαν κεκτῆσθαι;

The fear of death and the consciousness of sin become more vivid in old age; and to be rich frees a man from many temptations.

Ὅ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἴσως οὐκ ἂν πολλοὺς πείσαιμι λέγων. εὖ γὰρ ἴσθι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι, ἐπειδάν τις ἐγγὺς ᾖ τοῦ οἴεσθαι τελευτήσειν, εἰσέρχεται αὐτῷ δέος καὶ φροντὶς περὶ ὧν ἔμπροσθεν οὐκ εἰσῄει. οἵ τε γὰρ λεγόμενοι μῦθοι περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου, ὡς τὸν ἐνθάδε ἀδικήσαντα δεῖ ἐκεῖ διδόναι δίκην, καταγελώμενοι τέως, τότε δὴ στρέφουσιν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν μὴ [E] ἀληθεῖς ὦσι· καὶ αὐτὸς ἤτοι ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ γήρως ἀσθενείας ἢ καὶ ὥσπερ ἤδη ἐγγυτέρω ὢν τῶν ἐκεῖ μᾶλλόν τι καθορᾷ αὐτά—ὑποψίας δ' οὖν καὶ δείματος μεστὸς γίγνεται καὶ ἀναλογίζεται ἤδη καὶ σκοπεῖ, εἴ τινά τι ἠδίκηκεν. ὁ μὲν οὖν εὑρίσκων ἑαυτοῦ ἐν τῷ βίῳ πολλὰ ἀδικήματα καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὕπνων, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, θαμὰ ἐγειρόμενος δειμαίνει καὶ ζῇ μετὰ κακῆς ἐλπίδος· τῷ | [p. 331.] δὲ μηδὲν ἑαυτῷ ἄδικον ξυνειδότι ἡδεῖα ἐλπὶς ἀεὶ πάρεστι καὶ ἀγαθὴ γηροτρόφος, ὡς καὶ Πίνδαρος λέγει. χαριέντως γάρ τοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτ' ἐκεῖνος εἶπεν, ὅτι ὃς ἂν δικαίως καὶ ὁσίως τὸν βίον διαγάγῃ, γλυκεῖά οἱ καρ-

The admirable strain of Pindar.

5. ᾗπερ ΠΜ: ἧπερ A.

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p. 331. δίαν ἀτάλλοισα γηροτρόφος συναορεῖ ἐλπίς, ἃ μάλιστα θνατῶν πολύστροφον γνώμαν κυβερνᾷ. εὖ οὖν λέγει θαυμαστῶς ὡς σφόδρα. πρὸς δὴ τοῦτ᾽ ἔγωγε τίθημι τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτῆσιν B πλείστου ἀξίαν εἶναι, οὔ τι παντὶ ἀνδρὶ ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ. τὸ γὰρ μηδὲ ἄκοντά τινα ἐξαπατῆσαι ἢ ψεύσασθαι, μηδ᾽ αὖ ὀφείλοντα ἢ θεῷ θυσίας τινὰς ἢ ἀνθρώπῳ χρήματα ἔπειτα ἐκεῖσε ἀπιέναι δεδιότα, μέγα μέρος εἰς τοῦτο ἡ τῶν χρημάτων κτῆσις συμβάλλεται. ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἄλλας χρείας πολλάς· ἀλλά γε ἓν ἀνθ᾽ ἑνὸς οὐκ ἐλάχιστον ἔγωγε θείην ἂν εἰς τοῦτο ἀνδρὶ νοῦν ἔχοντι, ὦ Σώκρατες, πλοῦτον χρησιμώτατον εἶναι.

Justice to speak truth and pay your debts.

C Παγκάλως, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, λέγεις, ὦ Κέφαλε. τοῦτο δ᾽ αὐτό, τὴν δικαιοσύνην, πότερα τὴν ἀλήθειαν αὐτὸ φήσομεν εἶναι ἁπλῶς οὕτως καὶ τὸ ἀποδιδόναι, ἄν τίς τι παρά του λάβῃ, ἢ καὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἔστιν ἐνίοτε μὲν δικαίως, ἐνίοτε δὲ ἀδίκως ποιεῖν; οἷον τοιόνδε λέγω· πᾶς ἄν που εἴποι, εἴ τις λάβοι παρὰ φίλου ἀνδρὸς σωφρονοῦντος ὅπλα, εἰ μανεὶς ἀπαιτοῖ, ὅτι οὔτε χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποδιδόναι, οὔτε δίκαιος ἂν εἴη ὁ ἀποδιδούς, οὐδ᾽ αὖ πρὸς τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα πάντα ἐθέλων τἀληθῆ λέγειν.

D Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Οὐκ ἄρα οὗτος ὅρος ἐστὶ δικαιοσύνης, ἀληθῆ τε λέγειν καὶ ἃ ἂν λάβῃ τις ἀποδιδόναι.

This is the definition of Simonides.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Πολέμαρχος, εἴπερ γέ τι χρὴ Σιμωνίδῃ πείθεσθαι.

Καὶ μέντοι, ἔφη ὁ Κέφαλος, καὶ παραδίδωμι ὑμῖν τὸν λόγον. δεῖ γάρ με ἤδη τῶν ἱερῶν ἐπιμεληθῆναι.

10. ἀλλά γε ἓν MSS.: ἀλλ᾽ ἕν γε Stobaeus.

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Οὐκοῦν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὁ Πολέμαρχος τῶν γε σῶν p. 331. κληρονόμος;

Πάνυ γε, ἦ δ᾽ ὃς γελάσας, καὶ ἅμα ᾔει πρὸς τὰ ἱερά.

Λέγε δή, εἶπον ἐγώ, σὺ ὁ τοῦ λόγου κληρονόμος, E τί φῂς τὸν Σιμωνίδην λέγοντα ὀρθῶς λέγειν περὶ δικαιοσύνης;

Ὅτι, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἑκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι δίκαιόν ἐστι. τοῦτο λέγων δοκεῖ ἔμοιγε καλῶς λέγειν.

Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, Σιμωνίδῃ γε οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἀπιστεῖν· σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ θεῖος ἀνήρ· τοῦτο μέντοι ὅ τί ποτε λέγει, σὺ μέν, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, ἴσως γιγνώσκεις, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγνοῶ· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐ τοῦτο λέγει, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, τό τινος παρακαταθεμένου τι ὁτῳοῦν μὴ σωφρόνως ἀπαιτοῦντι ἀποδιδόναι· καίτοι γε | ὀφειλόμενόν πού ἐστι τοῦτο, ὃ παρακατέθετο· p. 332. ἢ γάρ;

But you ought not on all occasions to do either. What then was his meaning?

Ναί.

Ἀποδοτέον δέ γε οὐδ᾽ ὁπωστιοῦν τότε ὁπότε τις μὴ σωφρόνως ἀπαιτοῖ;

Ἀληθῆ, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς.

Ἄλλο δή τι ἢ τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὡς ἔοικε, λέγει Σιμωνίδης τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα δίκαιον εἶναι ἀποδιδόναι.

Ἄλλο μέντοι νὴ Δί᾽, ἔφη. τοῖς γὰρ φίλοις οἴεται ὀφείλειν τοὺς φίλους ἀγαθὸν μέν τι δρᾶν, κακὸν δὲ μηδέν.

Μανθάνω, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ· ὅτι οὐ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἀποδίδωσιν ὃς ἂν τῷ χρυσίον ἀποδῷ παρακαταθεμένῳ, ἐάνπερ ἡ ἀπόδοσις καὶ ἡ λῆψις βλαβερὰ γίγνηται, B

1. ἔφην ἐγὼ Ξ: ἔφη ἐγὼ ΑΠΜ.

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p. 332. φίλοι δὲ ὦσιν ὅ τε ἀπολαμβάνων καὶ ὁ ἀποδιδούς· οὐχ οὕτω λέγειν φῂς τὸν Σιμωνίδην;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Τί δέ; τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἀποδοτέον ὅ τι ἂν τύχῃ ὀφειλόμενον;

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὅ γε ὀφείλεται αὐτοῖς. ὀφείλεται δέ γε, οἶμαι, παρά γε τοῦ ἐχθροῦ τῷ ἐχθρῷ ὅπερ καὶ προσήκει, κακόν τι.

Ἠινίξατο ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ Σιμωνίδης C ποιητικῶς τὸ δίκαιον ὃ εἴη. διενοεῖτο μὲν γάρ, ὡς φαίνεται, ὅτι τοῦτ' εἴη δίκαιον, τὸ προσῆκον ἑκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι, τοῦτο δὲ ὠνόμασεν ὀφειλόμενον.

He may have meant to say that justice gives to friends what is good, and to enemies what is evil.

Ἀλλὰ τί οἴει; ἔφη.

Ὦ πρὸς Διός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ οὖν τις αὐτὸν ἤρετο Ὦ Σιμωνίδη, ἡ τίσιν οὖν τί ἀποδιδοῦσα ὀφειλόμενον καὶ προσῆκον τέχνη ἰατρικὴ καλεῖται; τί ἂν οἴει ἡμῖν αὐτὸν ἀποκρίνασθαι;

Δῆλον ὅτι, ἔφη, ἡ σώμασι φάρμακά τε καὶ σιτία καὶ ποτά.

Ἡ δὲ τίσι τί ἀποδιδοῦσα ὀφειλόμενον καὶ προσῆκον τέχνη μαγειρικὴ καλεῖται;

D Ἡ τοῖς ὄψοις τὰ ἡδύσματα.

Εἶεν· ἡ οὖν δὴ τίσι τί ἀποδιδοῦσα τέχνη δικαιοσύνη ἂν καλοῖτο;

Εἰ μέν τι, ἔφη, δεῖ ἀκολουθεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένοις, ἡ τοῖς φίλοις τε καὶ ἐχθροῖς ὠφελίας τε καὶ βλάβας ἀποδιδοῦσα.

Τὸ τοὺς φίλους ἄρα εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς κακῶς δικαιοσύνην λέγει;

13. Ἀλλὰ τί οἴει; ἔφη. Ὦ πρὸς A: ἀλλὰ τί οἴει ἔφη πρὸς ΠΜ: ἀλλὰ τί οἴει; Ἔφη. Ὦ πρὸς cj. Madvig.

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Πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὃς γελάσας, καὶ ἅμα ᾔει πρὸς τὰ ἱερά.

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Ὅτι, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἑκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι δίκαιόν ἐστι. τοῦτο λέγων δοκεῖ ἔμοιγε καλῶς λέγειν.

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Ἄλλο δή τι ἢ τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὡς ἔοικε, λέγει Σιμωνίδης τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα δίκαιον εἶναι ἀποδιδόναι.

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D Ἡ τοῖς ὄψοις τὰ ἡδύσματα.

Εἶεν· ἡ οὖν δὴ τίσι τί ἀποδιδοῦσα τέχνη δικαιοσύνη ἂν καλοῖτο;

Εἰ μέν τι, ἔφη, δεῖ ἀκολουθεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένοις, ἡ τοῖς φίλοις τε καὶ ἐχθροῖς ὠφελίας τε καὶ βλάβας ἀποδιδοῦσα.

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Δοκεῖ μοι. p. 332.

Τίς οὖν δυνατώτατος κάμνοντας φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ ἐχθροὺς κακῶς πρὸς νόσον καὶ ὑγίειαν;

Ἰατρός.

Τίς δὲ πλέοντας πρὸς τὸν τῆς θαλάττης κίνδυνον; E

Κυβερνήτης.

Τί δὲ ὁ δίκαιος; ἐν τίνι πράξει καὶ πρὸς τί ἔργον δυνατώτατος φίλους ὠφελεῖν καὶ ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν;

Ἐν τῷ προσπολεμεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ξυμμαχεῖν, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Εἶεν· μὴ κάμνουσί γε μήν, ὦ φίλε Πολέμαρχε, ἰατρὸς ἄχρηστος.

Ἀληθῆ.

Καὶ μὴ πλέουσι δὴ κυβερνήτης.

Ναί.

Ἆρα καὶ τοῖς μὴ πολεμοῦσιν ὁ δίκαιος ἄχρηστος;

Οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο.

Χρήσιμον ἄρα καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ δικαιοσύνη;

Χρήσιμον. p. 333.

Καὶ γὰρ γεωργία· ἢ οὔ;

Ναί.

Πρός γε καρποῦ κτῆσιν.

Ναί.

Καὶ μὴν καὶ σκυτοτομική;

Ναί.

Πρός γε ὑποδημάτων ἄν, οἶμαι, φαίης κτῆσιν.

Πάνυ γε.

Τί δὲ δή; τὴν δικαιοσύνην πρὸς τίνος χρείαν ἢ κτῆσιν ἐν εἰρήνῃ φαίης ἂν χρήσιμον εἶναι;

Justice is useful in contracts,

Πρὸς τὰ ξυμβόλαια, ὦ Σώκρατες.

9. καὶ ἐν τῷ ΑΠ : καὶ Μ.

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p. 333. Ξυμβόλαια δὲ λέγεις κοινωνήματα, ἤ τι ἄλλο;

Κοινωνήματα δῆτα.

B ᾿Αρ᾿ οὖν ὁ δίκαιος ἀγαθὸς καὶ χρήσιμος κοινωνὸς εἰς πεττῶν θέσιν, ἢ ὁ πεττευτικός;

῾Ο πεττευτικός.

᾿Αλλ᾿ εἰς πλίνθων καὶ λίθων θέσιν ὁ δίκαιος χρησιμώτερός τε καὶ ἀμείνων κοινωνὸς τοῦ οἰκοδομικοῦ;

Οὐδαμῶς.

᾿Αλλ᾿ εἰς τίνα δὴ κοινωνίαν ὁ δίκαιος ἀμείνων κοινωνὸς τοῦ κιθαριστικοῦ, ὥσπερ ὁ κιθαριστικὸς τοῦ δικαίου εἰς κρουμάτων;

Εἰς ἀργυρίου, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Πλήν γ᾿ ἴσως, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι ἀργυρίῳ, ὅταν δέῃ ἀργυρίου κοινῇ πρίασθαι ἢ ἀπο-
C δόσθαι ἵππον· τότε δέ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ὁ ἱππικός. ἢ γάρ;

Φαίνεται.

Καὶ μὴν ὅταν γε πλοῖον, ὁ ναυπηγὸς ἢ ὁ κυβερνήτης.

῎Εοικεν.

῞Οταν οὖν τί δέῃ ἀργυρίῳ ἢ χρυσίῳ κοινῇ χρῆσθαι, ὁ δίκαιος χρησιμώτερος τῶν ἄλλων;

῞Οταν παρακαταθέσθαι καὶ σῶν εἶναι, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Οὐκοῦν λέγεις, ὅταν μηδὲν δέῃ αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι ἀλλὰ κεῖσθαι;

Πάνυ γε.

῞Οταν ἄρα ἄχρηστον ᾖ ἀργύριον, τότε χρήσιμος
D ἐπ᾿ αὐτῷ ἡ δικαιοσύνη;

Κινδυνεύει.

Καὶ ὅταν δὴ δρέπανον δέῃ φυλάττειν, ἡ δικαιοσύνη

especially in the safe keeping of deposits. But not in the use of money; and if so, justice is only useful when money or anything else is useless.

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Δοκεῖ μοι. p. 332.

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Εἶεν· μὴ κάμνουσί γε μήν, ὦ φίλε Πολέμαρχε, ἰατρὸς ἄχρηστος.

Ἀληθῆ.

Καὶ μὴ πλέουσι δὴ κυβερνήτης.

Ναί.

Ἆρα καὶ τοῖς μὴ πολεμοῦσιν ὁ δίκαιος ἄχρηστος;

Οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο.

Χρήσιμον ἄρα καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ δικαιοσύνη;

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SOCRATES, POLEMARCHUS.

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Ἀλλ' εἰς πλίνθων καὶ λίθων θέσιν ὁ δίκαιος χρησιμώτερός τε καὶ ἀμείνων κοινωνὸς τοῦ οἰκοδομικοῦ;

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Φαίνεται.

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Ἔοικεν.

Ὅταν οὖν τί δέῃ ἀργυρίῳ ἢ χρυσίῳ κοινῇ χρῆσθαι, ὁ δίκαιος χρησιμώτερος τῶν ἄλλων;

Ὅταν παρακαταθέσθαι καὶ σῶν εἶναι, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Οὐκοῦν λέγεις, ὅταν μηδὲν δέῃ αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι ἀλλὰ κεῖσθαι;

Πάνυ γε.

Ὅταν ἄρα ἄχρηστον ᾖ ἀργύριον, τότε χρήσιμος
D ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἡ δικαιοσύνη;

Κινδυνεύει.

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Φαίνεται.

Φήσεις δὲ καὶ ἀσπίδα καὶ λύραν ὅταν δέῃ φυλάττειν καὶ μηδὲν χρῆσθαι, χρήσιμον εἶναι τὴν δικαιοσύνην, ὅταν δὲ χρῆσθαι, τὴν ὁπλιτικὴν καὶ τὴν μουσικήν;

Ἀνάγκη.

Καὶ περὶ τἆλλα δὴ πάντα ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἑκάστου ἐν μὲν χρήσει ἄχρηστος, ἐν δὲ ἀχρηστίᾳ χρήσιμος;

Κινδυνεύει.

Οὐκ ἂν οὖν, ὦ φίλε, πάνυ γέ τι σπουδαῖον εἴη ἡ E
δικαιοσύνη, εἰ πρὸς τὰ ἄχρηστα χρήσιμον ὂν τυγχάνει. τόδε δὲ σκεψώμεθα. ἆρ' οὐχ ὁ πατάξαι δεινότατος ἐν μάχῃ εἴτε πυκτικῇ εἴτε τινὶ καὶ ἄλλῃ, οὗτος καὶ φυλάξασθαι;

A new point of view: Is not he who is best able to do good best able to do evil?

Πάνυ γε.

Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ νόσον ὅστις δεινὸς φυλάξασθαι, καὶ λαθεῖν οὗτος δεινότατος ἐμποιῆσαι;

Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν στρατοπέδου | γε ὁ αὐτὸς φύλαξ ἀγα- p. 334.
θός, ὅσπερ καὶ τὰ τῶν πολεμίων κλέψαι καὶ βουλεύματα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις.

Πάνυ γε.

Ὅτου τις ἄρα δεινὸς φύλαξ, τούτου καὶ φὼρ δεινός.

Ἔοικεν.

Εἰ ἄρα ὁ δίκαιος ἀργύριον δεινὸς φυλάττειν, καὶ κλέπτειν δεινός.

5. μηδὲν ΑΠ² : μὴ ΠΜ. 12. οὐκ ἂν οὖν A² mg.? Ξ : οὐκοῦν ΑΠΜ. 13. χρήσιμον ὂν MSS. : χρήσιμον μόνον cj. Baiter. 18. φυλάξασθαι καὶ λαθεῖν ΑΠΜ : φυλάξασθαι καὶ μὴ παθεῖν *q*. 19. ἐμποιῆσαι ΑΠΜ : καὶ ἐμποιῆσαι Π² : ἐμποιήσας cj. Schneider.

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SOCRATES, POLEMARCHUS.

p. 334. Ὡς γοῦν ὁ λόγος, ἔφη, σημαίνει.

Κλέπτης ἄρα τις ὁ δίκαιος, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀναπέφανται· καὶ κινδυνεύεις παρ' Ὁμήρου μεμαθηκέναι αὐτό· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος τὸν τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως πρὸς B μητρὸς πάππον Αὐτόλυκον ἀγαπᾷ τε καί φησιν αὐτὸν πάντας ἀνθρώπους κεκάσθαι κλεπτοσύνῃ θ' ὅρκῳ τε. ἔοικεν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ κατὰ σὲ καὶ καθ' Ὅμηρον καὶ κατὰ Σιμωνίδην κλεπτική τις εἶναι, ἐπ' ὠφελίᾳ μέντοι τῶν φίλων καὶ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τῶν ἐχθρῶν. οὐχ οὕτως ἔλεγες;

Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη, ἀλλ' οὐκέτι οἶδα ἔγωγε ὅ τι ἔλεγον. τοῦτο μέντοι ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἔτι, ὠφελεῖν μὲν τοὺς φίλους ἡ δικαιοσύνη, βλάπτειν δὲ τοὺς ἐχθρούς.

C Φίλους δὲ λέγεις εἶναι πότερον τοὺς δοκοῦντας ἑκάστῳ χρηστοὺς εἶναι, ἢ τοὺς ὄντας, κἂν μὴ δοκῶσι, καὶ ἐχθροὺς ὡσαύτως;

Justice an art of theft to be practised for the good of friends and the harm of enemies. But who are friends and enemies?

Εἰκὸς μέν, ἔφη, οὓς ἄν τις ἡγῆται χρηστοὺς φιλεῖν, οὓς δ' ἂν πονηροὺς μισεῖν.

Ἆρ' οὖν οὐχ ἁμαρτάνουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι περὶ τοῦτο, ὥστε δοκεῖν αὐτοῖς πολλοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς εἶναι μὴ ὄντας, πολλοὺς δὲ τοὐναντίον;

Ἁμαρτάνουσιν.

Τούτοις ἄρα οἱ μὲν ἀγαθοὶ ἐχθροί, οἱ δὲ κακοὶ φίλοι;

Πάνυ γε.

Ἀλλ' ὅμως δίκαιον τότε τούτοις τοὺς μὲν πονη-D ροὺς ὠφελεῖν, τοὺς δ' ἀγαθοὺς βλάπτειν.

Φαίνεται.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἵ γε ἀγαθοὶ δίκαιοί τε καὶ οἷοι μὴ ἀδικεῖν.

Ἀληθῆ.

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Socrates, Polemarchus.

Κατὰ δὴ τὸν σὸν λόγον τοὺς μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντας p. 334. δίκαιον κακῶς ποιεῖν.

Μηδαμῶς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες· πονηρὸς γὰρ ἔοικεν εἶναι ὁ λόγος.

Τοὺς ἀδίκους ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δίκαιον βλάπτειν, τοὺς δὲ δικαίους ὠφελεῖν.

Οὗτος ἐκείνου καλλίων φαίνεται.

Mistakes will sometimes happen.

Πολλοῖς ἄρα, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, ξυμβήσεται, ὅσοι διημαρτήκασι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, δίκαιον εἶναι τοὺς μὲν E φίλους βλάπτειν· πονηροὶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰσίν· τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς ὠφελεῖν· ἀγαθοὶ γάρ. καὶ οὕτως ἐροῦμεν αὐτὸ τοὐναντίον ἢ τὸν Σιμωνίδην ἔφαμεν λέγειν.

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, οὕτω ξυμβαίνει. ἀλλὰ μεταθώμεθα· κινδυνεύομεν γὰρ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὸν φίλον καὶ ἐχθρὸν θέσθαι.

Πῶς θέμενοι, ὦ Πολέμαρχε;

Τὸν δοκοῦντα χρηστόν, τοῦτον φίλον εἶναι.

Νῦν δὲ πῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μεταθώμεθα;

Correction of the definition.

Τὸν δοκοῦντά τε, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ τὸν ὄντα χρηστὸν φίλον· τὸν δὲ δοκοῦντα | μέν, ὄντα δὲ μή, δοκεῖν p. 335. ἀλλὰ μὴ εἶναι φίλον. καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἐχθροῦ δὲ ἡ αὐτὴ θέσις.

Φίλος μὲν δή, ὡς ἔοικε, τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἔσται, ἐχθρὸς δὲ ὁ πονηρός.

Ναί.

To appearance we must add reality. He is a friend who 'is' as well as 'seems' good. And

Κελεύεις δὴ ἡμᾶς προσθεῖναι τῷ δικαίῳ ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ἐλέγομεν, λέγοντες δίκαιον εἶναι τὸν μὲν φίλον εὖ ποιεῖν, τὸν δὲ ἐχθρὸν κακῶς, νῦν πρὸς τούτῳ ὧδε λέγειν, ὅτι ἔστι δίκαιον τὸν μὲν φίλον ἀγαθὸν ὄντα εὖ ποιεῖν, τὸν δ' ἐχθρὸν κακὸν ὄντα βλάπτειν;

26. ἢ ὡς MSS.: ὡς cj. Faesi.

SOCRATES, POLEMARCHUS.

we should do good to our good friends and harm to our bad enemies.

p. 335. B Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, οὕτως ἄν μοι δοκεῖ καλῶς λέγεσθαι.

Ἔστιν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δικαίου ἀνδρὸς βλάπτειν καὶ ὀντινοῦν ἀνθρώπων;

Καὶ πάνυ γε, ἔφη, τούς γε πονηρούς τε καὶ ἐχθροὺς δεῖ βλάπτειν.

Βλαπτόμενοι δ' ἵπποι βελτίους ἢ χείρους γίγνονται;

Χείρους.

Ἆρα εἰς τὴν τῶν κυνῶν ἀρετήν, ἢ εἰς τὴν τῶν ἵππων;

Εἰς τὴν τῶν ἵππων.

Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ κύνες βλαπτόμενοι χείρους γίγνονται εἰς τὴν τῶν κυνῶν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰς τὴν τῶν ἵππων ἀρετήν;

Ἀνάγκη.

To harm men is to injure them; and to injure them is to make them unjust. But justice cannot produce injustice.

C Ἀνθρώπους δέ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, μὴ οὕτω φῶμεν βλαπτομένους εἰς τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν ἀρετὴν χείρους γίγνεσθαι;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Ἀλλ' ἡ δικαιοσύνη οὐκ ἀνθρωπεία ἀρετή;

Καὶ τοῦτ' ἀνάγκη.

Καὶ τοὺς βλαπτομένους ἄρα, ὦ φίλε, τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀνάγκη ἀδικωτέρους γίγνεσθαι.

Ἔοικεν.

Ἆρ' οὖν τῇ μουσικῇ οἱ μουσικοὶ ἀμούσους δύνανται ποιεῖν;

Ἀδύνατον.

Ἀλλὰ τῇ ἱππικῇ οἱ ἱππικοὶ ἀφίππους;

Οὐκ ἔστιν.

Ἀλλὰ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ δὴ οἱ δίκαιοι ἀδίκους; ἢ D καὶ ξυλλήβδην ἀρετῇ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ κακούς;

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SOCRATES, POLEMARCHUS.

Ἀλλὰ ἀδύνατον. p. 335.

Οὐ γὰρ θερμότητος, οἶμαι, ἔργον ψύχειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου.

Ναί.

Οὐδὲ ξηρότητος ὑγραίνειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου.

Illustrations.

Πάνυ γε.

Οὐδὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ βλάπτειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου.

Φαίνεται.

Ὁ δέ γε δίκαιος ἀγαθός;

Πάνυ γε.

Οὐκ ἄρα τοῦ δικαίου βλάπτειν ἔργον, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, οὔτε φίλον οὔτ᾽ ἄλλον οὐδένα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου, τοῦ ἀδίκου.

Παντάπασί μοι δοκεῖς ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώ- E κρατες.

Εἰ ἄρα τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἑκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι φησί τις δίκαιον εἶναι, τοῦτο δὲ δὴ νοεῖ αὐτῷ τοῖς μὲν ἐχθροῖς βλάβην ὀφείλεσθαι παρὰ τοῦ δικαίου ἀνδρός, τοῖς δὲ φίλοις ὠφελίαν, οὐκ ἦν σοφὸς ὁ ταῦτα εἰπών. οὐ γὰρ ἀληθῆ ἔλεγεν· οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ δίκαιον οὐδένα ἡμῖν ἐφάνη ὂν βλάπτειν.

The saying however explained is not to be attributed to any good or wise man.

Συγχωρῶ, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς. Μαχούμεθα ἄρα, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, κοινῇ ἐγώ τε καὶ σύ, ἐάν τις αὐτὸ φῇ ἢ Σιμωνίδην ἢ Βίαντα ἢ Πιττακὸν εἰρηκέναι ἤ τιν᾽ ἄλλον τῶν σοφῶν τε καὶ μακαρίων ἀνδρῶν.

Ἔγωγ᾽ οὖν, ἔφη, ἕτοιμός εἰμι κοινωνεῖν τῆς μάχης.

Ἀλλ᾽ οἶσθα, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, | οὗ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ p. 336. ῥῆμα, τὸ φάναι δίκαιον εἶναι τοὺς μὲν φίλους ὠφελεῖν, τοὺς δ᾽ ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν;

12. βλάπτειν ἔργον ΑΠ : βλάπτειν Μ : ἔργον βλάπτειν b.

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SOCRATES, THRASYMACHUS.

p. 336. Τίνος; ἔφη.

Οἶμαι αὐτὸ Περιάνδρου εἶναι ἢ Περδίκκου ἢ Ξέρξου ἢ Ἰσμηνίου τοῦ Θηβαίου ἤ τινος ἄλλου μέγα οἰομένου δύνασθαι πλουσίου ἀνδρός.

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἐφάνη ἡ δικαιοσύνη ὂν οὐδὲ τὸ δίκαιον, τί ἂν ἄλλο τις αὐτὸ φαίη εἶναι;

The brutality of Thrasymachus.

B Καὶ ὁ Θρασύμαχος πολλάκις μὲν καὶ διαλεγομένων ἡμῶν μεταξὺ ὥρμα ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου, ἔπειτα ὑπὸ τῶν παρακαθημένων διεκωλύετο βουλομένων διακοῦσαι τὸν λόγον· ὡς δὲ διεπαυσάμεθα καὶ ἐγὼ ταῦτ' εἶπον, οὐκέτι ἡσυχίαν ἦγεν, ἀλλὰ συστρέψας ἑαυτὸν ὥσπερ θηρίον ἧκεν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ὡς διαρπασόμενος.

Καὶ ἐγώ τε καὶ ὁ Πολέμαρχος δείσαντες διεπτοήθημεν· ὁ δ' εἰς τὸ μέσον φθεγξάμενος Τίς, ἔφη, C ὑμᾶς πάλαι φλυαρία ἔχει, ὦ Σώκρατες; καὶ τί εὐηθίζεσθε πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὑποκατακλινόμενοι ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς; ἀλλ' εἴπερ ὡς ἀληθῶς βούλει εἰδέναι τὸ δίκαιον ὅ τι ἔστι, μὴ μόνον ἐρώτα μηδὲ φιλοτιμοῦ ἐλέγχων, ἐπειδάν τίς τι ἀποκρίνηται, ἐγνωκὼς τοῦτο, ὅτι ῥᾷον ἐρωτᾶν ἢ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπόκριναι καὶ εἰπὲ D τί φῂς εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον· καὶ ὅπως μοι μὴ ἐρεῖς, ὅτι τὸ δέον ἐστὶ μηδ' ὅτι τὸ ὠφέλιμον μηδ' ὅτι τὸ λυσιτελοῦν μηδ' ὅτι τὸ κερδαλέον μηδ' ὅτι τὸ ξυμφέρον· ἀλλὰ σαφῶς μοι καὶ ἀκριβῶς λέγε ὅ τι ἂν λέγῃς· ὡς ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀποδέξομαι, ἐὰν ὕθλους τοιούτους λέγῃς.

Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἐξεπλάγην καὶ προσβλέπων

12. διεπαυσάμεθα MSS.: δὴ ἐπαυσάμεθα cj. Cobet.
15. διαρπασόμενος MSS.: διασπασόμενος cj. Cobet.

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Socrates, Polemarchus.

'Αλλὰ ἀδύνατον. p. 335.

Οὐ γὰρ θερμότητος, οἶμαι, ἔργον ψύχειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου.

Ναί.

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Illustrations.

Πάνυ γε.

Οὐδὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ βλάπτειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου.

Φαίνεται.

Ὁ δέ γε δίκαιος ἀγαθός;

Πάνυ γε.

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SOCRATES, THRASYMACHUS.

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D τί φῂς εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον· καὶ ὅπως μοι μὴ ἐρεῖς, ὅτι τὸ δέον ἐστὶ μηδ' ὅτι τὸ ὠφέλιμον μηδ' ὅτι τὸ λυσιτελοῦν μηδ' ὅτι τὸ κερδαλέον μηδ' ὅτι τὸ ξυμφέρον· ἀλλὰ σαφῶς μοι καὶ ἀκριβῶς λέγε ὅ τι ἂν λέγῃς· ὡς ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀποδέξομαι, ἐὰν ὕθλους τοιούτους λέγῃς.

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SOCRATES, THRASYMACHUS.

αὐτὸν ἐφοβούμην, καί μοι δοκῶ, εἰ μὴ πρότερος p. 336. ἑωράκη αὐτὸν ἢ ἐκεῖνος ἐμέ, ἄφωνος ἂν γενέσθαι. νῦν δὲ ἡνίκα ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου ἤρχετο ἐξαγριαίνεσθαι, προσέβλεψα αὐτὸν πρότερος, ὥστε αὐτῷ οἷός τ' ἐγε- E νόμην ἀποκρίνασθαι, καὶ εἶπον ὑποτρέμων Ὦ Θρασύμαχε, μὴ χαλεπὸς ἡμῖν ἴσθι· εἰ γὰρ ἐξαμαρτάνομεν ἐν τῇ τῶν λόγων σκέψει ἐγώ τε καὶ ὅδε, εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ἄκοντες ἁμαρτάνομεν. μὴ γὰρ δὴ οἴου, εἰ μὲν χρυσίον ἐζητοῦμεν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἡμᾶς ἑκόντας εἶναι ὑποκατακλίνεσθαι ἀλλήλοις ἐν τῇ ζητήσει καὶ διαφθείρειν τὴν εὕρεσιν αὐτοῦ, δικαιοσύνην δὲ ζητοῦντας, πρᾶγμα πολλῶν χρυσίων τιμιώτερον, ἔπειθ' οὕτως ἀνοήτως ὑπείκειν ἀλλήλοις καὶ οὐ σπουδάζειν ὅ τι μάλιστα φανῆναι αὐτό. οἴου γε σύ, ὦ φίλε· ἀλλ', οἶμαι, οὐ δυνάμεθα. ἐλεεῖσθαι οὖν ἡμᾶς πολὺ μᾶλλον εἰκός ἐστί | που ὑπὸ ὑμῶν τῶν δεινῶν ἢ χαλεπαίνεσθαι. p. 337.

The irony of Socrates.

Καὶ ὃς ἀκούσας ἀνεκάγχασέ τε μάλα σαρδάνιον καὶ εἶπεν Ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ἔφη, αὕτη 'κείνη ἡ εἰωθυῖα εἰρωνεία Σωκράτους, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐγὼ ᾔδη τε καὶ τούτοις προὔλεγον, ὅτι σὺ ἀποκρίνασθαι μὲν οὐκ ἐθελήσοις, εἰρωνεύσοιο δὲ καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ποιήσοις ἢ ἀποκρινοῖο, εἴ τίς τί σε ἐρωτᾷ.

Socrates cannot give any answer if all true answers are excluded.

Σοφὸς γὰρ εἶ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε. εὖ οὖν ᾔδησθα ὅτι εἴ τινα ἔροιο ὁπόσα ἐστὶ τὰ δώδεκα, καὶ ἐρόμενος προείποις αὐτῷ Ὅπως μοι, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, μὴ B ἐρεῖς, ὅτι ἔστι τὰ δώδεκα δὶς ἓξ μηδ' ὅτι τρὶς τέτταρα μηδ' ὅτι ἑξάκις δύο μηδ' ὅτι τετράκις τρία· ὡς οὐκ ἀποδέξομαί σου, ἐὰν τοιαῦτα φλυαρῇς· δῆλον οἶμαί σοι ἦν ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἀποκρινοῖτο τῷ οὕτω πυνθανομένῳ. ἀλλ'

6. εἰ γάρ ΑΜ : εἰ γάρ τι Π. 14. οἴου γε σὺ Bekker : οἴου τε σὺ ΑΠΜ : οἷόν γε ἐστὶν (*sic*) Ξ.

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p. 337. εἴ σοι εἶπεν Ὦ Θρασύμαχε, πῶς λέγεις; μὴ ἀποκρίνωμαι ὧν προεῖπες μηδέν; πότερον, ὦ θαυμάσιε, μηδ᾽ εἰ τούτων τι τυγχάνει ὄν, ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερον εἴπω τι C τοῦ ἀληθοῦς; ἢ πῶς λέγεις; τί ἂν αὐτῷ εἶπες πρὸς ταῦτα;

Thrasymachus is assailed with his own weapons.

Εἶεν, ἔφη· ὡς δὴ ὅμοιον τοῦτο ἐκείνῳ.

Οὐδέν γε κωλύει, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ· εἰ δ᾽ οὖν καὶ μὴ ἔστιν ὅμοιον, φαίνεται δὲ τῷ ἐρωτηθέντι τοιοῦτον, ἧττόν τι αὐτὸν οἴει ἀποκρινεῖσθαι τὸ φαινόμενον ἑαυτῷ, ἐάν τε ἡμεῖς ἀπαγορεύωμεν ἐάν τε μή;

Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἔφη, καὶ σὺ οὕτω ποιήσεις; ὧν ἐγὼ ἀπεῖπον, τούτων τι ἀποκρινεῖ;

Οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, εἴ μοι σκεψαμένῳ οὕτω δόξειεν.

D Τί οὖν, ἔφη, ἂν ἐγὼ δείξω ἑτέραν ἀπόκρισιν παρὰ πάσας ταύτας περὶ δικαιοσύνης, βελτίω τούτων; τί ἀξιοῖς παθεῖν;

Τί ἄλλο, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἢ ὅπερ προσήκει πάσχειν τῷ μὴ εἰδότι; προσήκει δέ που μαθεῖν παρὰ τοῦ εἰδότος· καὶ ἐγὼ οὖν τοῦτο ἀξιῶ παθεῖν.

The Sophist demands payment for his instructions. The company are very willing to contribute.

Ἡδὺς γὰρ εἶ, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τῷ μαθεῖν καὶ ἀπότισον ἀργύριον.

Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδάν μοι γένηται, εἶπον.

Ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων· ἀλλ᾽ ἕνεκα ἀργυρίου, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, λέγε· πάντες γὰρ ἡμεῖς Σωκράτει εἰσοίσομεν.

E Πάνυ γε, οἶμαι, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ἵνα Σωκράτης τὸ εἰωθὸς διαπράξηται, αὐτὸς μὲν μὴ ἀποκρίνηται, ἄλλου δ᾽ ἀποκρινομένου λαμβάνῃ λόγον καὶ ἐλέγχῃ.

Socrates

Πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ βέλτιστε, τὶς ἀποκρίναιτο

4. ἢ A²ΠΜ : (·) A. 9. ἀποκρινεῖσθαι Π : ἀποκρίνεσθαι AM.

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knows little or nothing: how can he answer? And he is also deterred by the interdict of Thrasymachus.

πρῶτον μὲν μὴ εἰδὼς μηδὲ φάσκων εἰδέναι, ἔπειτα, εἴ p. 337. τι καὶ οἴεται περὶ τούτων, ἀπειρημένον αὐτῷ εἴη, ὅπως μηδὲν ἐρεῖ ὧν ἡγεῖται, ὑπ' ἀνδρὸς οὐ φαύλου; ἀλλὰ σὲ δὴ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς λέγειν· σὺ γὰρ δὴ | φῂς εἰδέναι p. 338. καὶ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν. μὴ οὖν ἄλλως ποίει, ἀλλὰ ἐμοί τε χαρίζου ἀποκρινόμενος καὶ μὴ φθονήσῃς καὶ Γλαύκωνα τόνδε διδάξαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους.

Εἰπόντος δέ μου ταῦτα, ὅ τε Γλαύκων καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐδέοντο αὐτοῦ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖν. καὶ ὁ Θρασύμαχος φανερὸς μὲν ἦν ἐπιθυμῶν εἰπεῖν, ἵν' εὐδοκιμήσειεν, ἡγούμενος ἔχειν ἀπόκρισιν παγκάλην· προσεποιεῖτο δὲ φιλονεικεῖν πρὸς τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον. τελευτῶν δὲ ξυνεχώρησε, κἄπειτα Αὕτη δή, ἔφη, ἡ B Σωκράτους σοφία, αὐτὸν μὲν μὴ ἐθέλειν διδάσκειν, παρὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων περιιόντα μανθάνειν καὶ τούτων μηδὲ χάριν ἀποδιδόναι.

Ὅτι μέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μανθάνω παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀληθῆ εἶπες, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ὅτι δὲ οὔ με φῂς χάριν ἐκτίνειν, ψεύδει· ἐκτίνω γὰρ ὅσην δύναμαι. δύναμαι δὲ ἐπαινεῖν μόνον· χρήματα γὰρ οὐκ ἔχω. ὡς δὲ προθύμως τοῦτο δρῶ, ἐάν τίς μοι δοκῇ εὖ λέγειν, εὖ εἴσει αὐτίκα δὴ μάλα, ἐπειδὰν ἀποκρίνῃ· οἶμαι γάρ σε εὖ ἐρεῖν. C

The definition of Thrasymachus: Justice is the interest of the stronger or ruler.

Ἄκουε δή, ἦ δ' ὅς. φημὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον. ἀλλὰ τί οὐκ ἐπαινεῖς; ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐθελήσεις.

Ἐὰν μάθω γε πρῶτον, ἔφην, τί λέγεις· νῦν γὰρ οὔπω οἶδα. τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος φῂς ξυμφέρον δίκαιον εἶναι. καὶ τοῦτο, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, τί ποτε λέγεις; οὐ γάρ που τό γε τοιόνδε φῄς· εἰ Πουλυδάμας ἡμῶν

8. δέ μου AM : δ' ἐμοῦ Π. 12. φιλονεικεῖν ΑΠΜ : φιλονικεῖν Baiter.

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p. 338. κρείττων ὁ παγκρατιαστὴς καὶ αὐτῷ ξυμφέρει τὰ βόεια D κρέα πρὸς τὸ σῶμα, τοῦτο τὸ σιτίον εἶναι καὶ ἡμῖν τοῖς ἥττοσιν ἐκείνου ξυμφέρον ἅμα καὶ δίκαιον.

Βδελυρὸς γὰρ εἶ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ταύτῃ ὑπολαμβάνεις, ᾗ ἂν κακουργήσαις μάλιστα τὸν λόγον.

Socrates compels Thrasymachus to explain his meaning.

Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ ἄριστε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἀλλὰ σαφέστερον εἰπὲ τί λέγεις.

Εἶτ' οὐκ οἶσθα, ἔφη, ὅτι τῶν πόλεων αἱ μὲν τυραννοῦνται, αἱ δὲ δημοκρατοῦνται, αἱ δὲ ἀριστοκρατοῦνται;

Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο κρατεῖ ἐν ἑκάστῃ πόλει, τὸ ἄρχον;

Πάνυ γε.

E Τίθεται δέ γε τοὺς νόμους ἑκάστη ἡ ἀρχὴ πρὸς τὸ αὑτῇ ξυμφέρον, δημοκρατία μὲν δημοκρατικούς, τυραννὶς δὲ τυραννικούς, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι οὕτω· θέμεναι δὲ ἀπέφηναν τοῦτο δίκαιον τοῖς ἀρχομένοις εἶναι, τὸ σφίσι ξυμφέρον, καὶ τὸν τούτου ἐκβαίνοντα κολάζουσιν ὡς παρανομοῦντά τε καὶ ἀδικοῦντα. τοῦτ' οὖν ἐστίν, ὦ βέλτιστε, ὃ λέγω, ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς p. 339. | πόλεσι ταὐτὸν εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸ τῆς καθεστηκυίας ἀρχῆς ξυμφέρον· αὕτη δέ που κρατεῖ, ὥστε ξυμβαίνει τῷ ὀρθῶς λογιζομένῳ πανταχοῦ εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον.

Νῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔμαθον ὃ λέγεις· εἰ δὲ ἀληθὲς ἢ μή, πειράσομαι μαθεῖν. τὸ ξυμφέρον μὲν οὖν, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, καὶ σὺ ἀπεκρίνω δίκαιον εἶναι· καίτοι ἔμοιγε ἀπηγόρευες ὅπως μὴ τοῦτο ἀποκρινοίμην· B πρόσεστι δὲ δὴ αὐτόθι τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος.

Σμικρά γε ἴσως, ἔφη, προσθήκη.

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Οὔπω δῆλον οὐδ' εἰ μεγάλη· ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν τοῦτο p. 339. σκεπτέον εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγεις, δῆλον. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ξυμφέρον γέ τι εἶναι καὶ ἐγὼ ὁμολογῶ τὸ δίκαιον, σὺ δὲ προστίθης καὶ αὐτὸ φῂς εἶναι τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγνοῶ, σκεπτέον δή.

Σκόπει, ἔφη.

He is dissatisfied with the explanation; for rulers may err.

Ταῦτ' ἔσται, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. καί μοι εἰπέ· οὐ καὶ πείθεσθαι μέντοι τοῖς ἄρχουσι δίκαιον φῂς εἶναι;

Ἔγωγε.

Πότερον δὲ ἀναμάρτητοί εἰσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες ἐν ταῖς C πόλεσιν ἑκάσταις ἢ οἷοί τι καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν;

Πάντως που, ἔφη, οἷοί τι καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν.

Οὐκοῦν ἐπιχειροῦντες νόμους τιθέναι τοὺς μὲν ὀρθῶς τιθέασι, τοὺς δέ τινας οὐκ ὀρθῶς; Οἶμαι ἔγωγε. Τὸ δὲ ὀρθῶς ἆρα τὸ τὰ ξυμφέροντά ἐστι τίθεσθαι ἑαυτοῖς, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὀρθῶς ἀξύμφορα; ἢ πῶς λέγεις;

Οὕτως.

Ἃ δ' ἂν θῶνται, ποιητέον τοῖς ἀρχομένοις, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ δίκαιον;

Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

And the justice which makes a mistake will then turn out to be the reverse of the interest of the stronger.

Οὐ μόνον ἄρα δίκαιόν ἐστι κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον τὸ D τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὐναντίον, τὸ μὴ ξυμφέρον.

Τί λέγεις σύ; ἔφη.

Ἃ σὺ λέγεις, ἔμοιγε δοκῶ· σκοπῶμεν δὲ βέλτιον. οὐχ ὡμολόγηται τοὺς ἄρχοντας τοῖς ἀρχομένοις προστάττοντας ποιεῖν ἄττα ἐνίοτε διαμαρτάνειν τοῦ ἑαυτοῖς βελτίστου, ἃ δ' ἂν προστάττωσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες

4. αὐτὸ A²ΠΜ : αὐτὸ(σ) A. 8. δίκαιον φῂς ΠΜ : καὶ δίκαιον φῇς A. 26. δὲ Μ : δὴ ΑΠ.

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p. 339. δίκαιον εἶναι τοῖς ἀρχομένοις ποιεῖν; ταῦτ' οὐχ ὡμολόγηται;

Οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ἔφη.

E Οἴου τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τὸ ἀξύμφορα ποιεῖν τοῖς ἄρχουσί τε καὶ κρείττοσι δίκαιον εἶναι ὡμολογῆσθαί σοι, ὅταν οἱ μὲν ἄρχοντες ἄκοντες κακὰ αὑτοῖς προστάττωσι, τοῖς δὲ δίκαιον εἶναι φῂς ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἃ ἐκεῖνοι προσέταξαν· ἆρα τότε, ὦ σοφώτατε Θρασύμαχε, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον συμβαίνειν αὐτὸ οὑτωσὶ δίκαιον εἶναι ποιεῖν τοὐναντίον ἢ ὃ σὺ λέγεις; τὸ γὰρ τοῦ κρείττονος ἀξύμφορον δήπου προστάττεται τοῖς ἥττοσι ποιεῖν.

p. 340. Ναὶ | μὰ Δί', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Πολέμαρχος, σαφέστατά γε.

Ἐὰν σύ γ', ἔφη, αὐτῷ μαρτυρήσῃς, ὁ Κλειτοφῶν ὑπολαβών.

Καὶ τί, ἔφη, δεῖται μάρτυρος; αὐτὸς γὰρ Θρασύμαχος ὁμολογεῖ τοὺς μὲν ἄρχοντας ἐνίοτε ἑαυτοῖς κακὰ προστάττειν, τοῖς δὲ ἀρχομένοις δίκαιον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν.

Cleitophon tries to make a way of escape for Thrasymachus by inserting the words 'thought to be.'

Τὸ γὰρ τὰ κελευόμενα ποιεῖν, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων δίκαιον εἶναι ἔθετο Θρασύμαχος.

Καὶ γὰρ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος, ὦ Κλειτοφῶν, συμ-
B φέρον δίκαιον εἶναι ἔθετο. ταῦτα δὲ ἀμφότερα θέμενος ὡμολόγησεν αὖ ἐνίοτε τοὺς κρείττους τὰ αὑτοῖς ἀξύμφορα κελεύειν τοὺς ἥττους τε καὶ ἀρχομένους ποιεῖν. ἐκ δὲ τούτων τῶν ὁμολογιῶν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον δίκαιον ἂν εἴη ἢ τὸ μὴ ξυμφέρον.

9. οὑτωσὶ δίκαιον Madvig: οὑτωσί, δίκαιον vulgo.
17. γὰρ ΑΠ: om. M.

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Ἀλλ', ἔφη ὁ Κλειτοφῶν, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον ἔλεγεν ὃ ἡγοῖτο ὁ κρείττων αὑτῷ ξυμφέρειν, τοῦτο ποιητέον εἶναι τῷ ἥττονι, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτο ἐτίθετο. p. 340.

Ἀλλ' οὐχ οὕτως, ἦ δ' ὃς ὁ Πολέμαρχος, ἐλέγετο.

Οὐδέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, διαφέρει, ἀλλ' εἰ νῦν οὕτω λέγει Θρασύμαχος, οὕτως αὐτοῦ ἀποδεχώμεθα. Καί μοι εἰπέ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε· τοῦτο ἦν ὃ ἐβούλου λέγειν τὸ δίκαιον, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον δοκοῦν εἶναι τῷ κρείττονι, ἐάν τε ξυμφέρῃ ἐάν τε μή; οὕτω σε φῶμεν λέγειν; C

Ἥκιστά γ', ἔφη· ἀλλὰ κρείττω με οἴει καλεῖν τὸν ἐξαμαρτάνοντα, ὅταν ἐξαμαρτάνῃ;

Ἔγωγε, εἶπον, ᾤμην σε τοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτε τοὺς ἄρχοντας ὡμολόγεις οὐκ ἀναμαρτήτους εἶναι ἀλλά τι καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνειν. D

This evasion is repudiated by Thrasymachus; who adopts another line of defence: 'No artist or ruler is ever mistaken *quâ* artist or ruler.'

Συκοφάντης γὰρ εἶ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τοῖς λόγοις· ἐπεὶ αὐτίκα ἰατρὸν καλεῖς σὺ τὸν ἐξαμαρτάνοντα περὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὃ ἐξαμαρτάνει; ἢ λογιστικόν, ὃς ἂν ἐν λογισμῷ ἁμαρτάνῃ, τότε ὅταν ἁμαρτάνῃ, κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἁμαρτίαν; ἀλλ', οἶμαι, λέγομεν τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως, ὅτι ὁ ἰατρὸς ἐξήμαρτε καὶ ὁ λογιστὴς ἐξήμαρτε καὶ ὁ γραμματιστής· τὸ δ', οἶμαι, ἕκαστος τούτων, καθ' ὅσον τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ προσαγορεύομεν αὐτόν, οὐδέποτε ἁμαρτάνει· ὥστε κατὰ τὸν ἀκριβῆ λόγον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ ἀκριβολογεῖ, οὐδεὶς τῶν δημιουργῶν ἁμαρτάνει. ἐπιλιπούσης γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ὁ ἁμαρτάνων ἁμαρτάνει, ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἔστι δημιουργός· ὥστε δημιουργὸς ἢ σοφὸς ἢ ἄρχων οὐδεὶς ἁμαρτάνει τότε ὅταν ἄρχων ᾖ, ἀλλὰ πᾶς γ' ἂν E

27. ἐπιλιπούσης ΑΠ: ἐπιλειπούσης A²M.

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p. 340. εἴποι ὅτι ὁ ἰατρὸς ἥμαρτε καὶ ὁ ἄρχων ἥμαρτε.
τοιοῦτον οὖν δή σοι καὶ ἐμὲ ὑπόλαβε νῦν δὴ ἀποκρί-
νεσθαι. τὸ δὲ ἀκριβέστατον ἐκεῖνο τυγχάνει ὄν, τὸν
p. 341. ἄρχοντα, καθ' ὅσον | ἄρχων ἐστί, μὴ ἁμαρτάνειν, μὴ
ἁμαρτάνοντα δὲ τὸ αὑτῷ βέλτιστον τίθεσθαι, τοῦτο
δὲ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ ποιητέον· ὥστε, ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς
ἔλεγον, δίκαιον λέγω τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ποιεῖν συμ-
φέρον.

Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε· δοκῶ σοι συκοφαντεῖν;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Οἴει γάρ με ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κακουργοῦντά σε ἐρέσθαι ὡς ἠρόμην;

Εὖ μὲν οὖν οἶδα, ἔφη. καὶ οὐδέν γέ σοι πλέον
B ἔσται· οὔτε γὰρ ἄν με λάθοις κακουργῶν, οὔτε μὴ
λαθὼν βιάσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ δύναιο.

The essential meaning of words distinguished from their attributes.

Οὐδέ γ' ἂν ἐπιχειρήσαιμι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ μακάριε. ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ αὖθις ἡμῖν τοιοῦτον ἐγγένηται, διόρισαι ποτέρως λέγεις τὸν ἄρχοντά τε καὶ τὸν κρείττονα, τὸν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ, *ὃν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες, οὗ τὸ ξυμφέρον κρείττονος ὄντος δίκαιον ἔσται τῷ ἥττονι ποιεῖν.

Τὸν τῷ ἀκριβεστάτῳ, ἔφη, λόγῳ ἄρχοντα ὄντα.
πρὸς ταῦτα κακούργει καὶ συκοφάντει, εἴ τι δύνασαι·
C οὐδέν σου παρίεμαι· ἀλλ' οὐ μὴ οἷός τ' ἦς.

Οἴει γὰρ ἄν με, εἶπον, οὕτω μανῆναι, ὥστε ξυρεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖν λέοντα καὶ συκοφαντεῖν Θρασύμαχον;

Νῦν γοῦν, ἔφη, ἐπεχείρησας, οὐδὲν ὢν καὶ ταῦτα.

Ἅδην, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τῶν τοιούτων. ἀλλ' εἰπέ μοι· ὁ τῷ ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ ἰατρός, ὃν ἄρτι ἔλεγες, πότερον

20. ὃν νῦν cj. Benedictus: ὃ νῦν ΑΠΜ.

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χρηματιστής ἐστιν ἢ τῶν καμνόντων θεραπευτής; καὶ λέγε τὸν τῷ ὄντι ἰατρὸν ὄντα. p. 341.

Τῶν καμνόντων, ἔφη, θεραπευτής.

Τί δὲ κυβερνήτης; ὁ ὀρθῶς κυβερνήτης ναυτῶν ἄρχων ἐστὶν ἢ ναύτης;

Ναυτῶν ἄρχων. D

Οὐδέν, οἶμαι, τοῦτο ὑπολογιστέον, ὅτι πλεῖ ἐν τῇ νηΐ, οὐδ᾽ ἐστὶ κλητέος ναύτης· οὐ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ πλεῖν κυβερνήτης καλεῖται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην καὶ τὴν τῶν ναυτῶν ἀρχήν.

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν ἑκάστῳ τούτων ἔστι τι ξυμφέρον;

Πάνυ γε.

Οὐ καὶ ἡ τέχνη, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἐπὶ τούτῳ πέφυκεν, ἐπὶ τῷ τὸ ξυμφέρον ἑκάστῳ ζητεῖν τε καὶ ἐκπορίζειν;

Ἐπὶ τούτῳ, ἔφη.

Ἆρ᾽ οὖν καὶ ἑκάστῃ τῶν τεχνῶν ἔστι τι ξυμφέρον ἄλλο ἢ ὅ τι μάλιστα τελέαν εἶναι;

Πῶς τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς; E

Ὥσπερ, ἔφην ἐγώ, εἴ με ἔροιο, εἰ ἐξαρκεῖ σώματι εἶναι σώματι ἢ προσδεῖταί τινος, εἴποιμ᾽ ἂν ὅτι Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν προσδεῖται. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ τέχνη ἐστὶν ἡ ἰατρικὴ νῦν εὑρημένη, ὅτι σῶμά ἐστι πονηρὸν καὶ οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖ αὐτῷ τοιούτῳ εἶναι. τούτῳ οὖν ὅπως ἐκπορίζῃ τὰ ξυμφέροντα, ἐπὶ τούτῳ παρεσκευάσθη ἡ τέχνη. ἦ ὀρθῶς σοι δοκῶ, ἔφην, ἂν εἰπεῖν οὕτω λέγων, ἢ οὔ;

Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη. p. 342.

Art has no imperfection to be

Τί δὲ δή; αὐτὴ ἡ ἰατρική ἐστι πονηρά, ἢ ἄλλη τις τέχνη ἔσθ᾽ ὅ τι προσδεῖταί τινος ἀρετῆς, ὥσπερ

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p. 342. ὀφθαλμοὶ ὄψεως καὶ ὦτα ἀκοῆς καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἐπ'
αὐτοῖς δεῖ τινος τέχνης τῆς τὸ ξυμφέρον εἰς ταῦτα
σκεψομένης τε καὶ ἐκποριζούσης; ἆρα καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ
τῇ τέχνῃ ἔνι τις πονηρία, καὶ δεῖ ἑκάστῃ τέχνῃ ἄλλης
τέχνης, ἥτις αὑτῇ τὸ ξυμφέρον σκέψεται, καὶ τῇ
σκοπουμένῃ ἑτέρας αὖ τοιαύτης, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἀπέ-
B ραντον; ἢ αὐτὴ αὑτῇ τὸ ξυμφέρον σκέψεται; ἢ οὔτε
αὑτῆς οὔτε ἄλλης προσδεῖται ἐπὶ τὴν αὑτῆς πονηρίαν
τὸ ξυμφέρον σκοπεῖν· οὔτε γὰρ πονηρία οὔτε ἁμαρτία
οὐδεμία οὐδεμιᾷ τέχνῃ πάρεστιν, οὐδὲ προσήκει τέχνῃ
ἄλλῳ τὸ ξυμφέρον ζητεῖν ἢ ἐκείνῳ οὗ τέχνη ἐστίν,
αὐτὴ δὲ ἀβλαβὴς καὶ ἀκέραιός ἐστιν ὀρθὴ οὖσα,
ἕωσπερ ἂν ᾖ ἑκάστη ἀκριβὴς ὅλη ἥπερ ἐστί; καὶ
σκόπει ἐκείνῳ τῷ ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ· οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως
ἔχει;

corrected, and therefore no extraneous interest.

Οὕτως, ἔφη, φαίνεται.

C Οὐκ ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἰατρικὴ ἰατρικῇ τὸ ξυμφέρον σκοπεῖ ἀλλὰ σώματι.

Illustrations.

Ναί, ἔφη.

Οὐδὲ ἱππικὴ ἱππικῇ ἀλλ' ἵπποις. οὐδὲ ἄλλη τέχνη οὐδεμία ἑαυτῇ, οὐδὲ γὰρ προσδεῖται, ἀλλ' ἐκείνῳ οὗ τέχνη ἐστίν.

Φαίνεται, ἔφη, οὕτως.

Ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἄρχουσί γε αἱ τέχναι καὶ κρατοῦσιν ἐκείνου οὗπέρ εἰσι τέχναι.

Συνεχώρησεν ἐνταῦθα καὶ μάλα μόγις.

Οὐκ ἄρα ἐπιστήμη γε οὐδεμία τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον σκοπεῖ οὐδ' ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ ἥττονός
D τε καὶ ἀρχομένου ὑπὸ ἑαυτῆς.

Ξυνωμολόγησε μὲν καὶ ταῦτα τελευτῶν, ἐπεχείρει

4. δεῖ ΠΜ: δεῖ ἀεὶ A.

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δὲ περὶ αὐτὰ μάχεσθαι. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὡμολόγησεν, p. 342. Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐδὲ ἰατρὸς οὐδείς, καθ' ὅσον ἰατρός, τὸ τῷ ἰατρῷ ξυμφέρον σκοπεῖ οὐδ' ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῷ κάμνοντι; ὡμολόγηται γὰρ ὁ ἀκριβὴς ἰατρὸς σωμάτων εἶναι ἄρχων ἀλλ' οὐ χρηματιστής. ἢ οὐχ ὡμολόγηται;

Ξυνέφη.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ κυβερνήτης ὁ ἀκριβὴς ναυτῶν εἶναι ἄρχων ἀλλ' οὐ ναύτης; E

Ὡμολόγηται.

Οὐκ ἄρα ὅ γε τοιοῦτος κυβερνήτης τε καὶ ἄρχων τὸ τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ξυμφέρον σκέψεταί τε καὶ προστάξει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῷ ναύτῃ τε καὶ ἀρχομένῳ.

Ξυνέφησε μόγις.

The disinterestedness of rulers.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, οὐδ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ ἀρχῇ, καθ' ὅσον ἄρχων ἐστί, τὸ αὑτῷ ξυμφέρον σκοπεῖ οὐδ' ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ καὶ ᾧ ἂν αὐτὸς δημιουργῇ, καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο βλέπων καὶ τὸ ἐκείνῳ ξυμφέρον καὶ πρέπον καὶ λέγει ἃ λέγει καὶ ποιεῖ ἃ ποιεῖ ἅπαντα.

Ἐπειδὴ | οὖν ἐνταῦθα ἦμεν τοῦ λόγου καὶ πᾶσι p. 343. καταφανὲς ἦν ὅτι ὁ τοῦ δικαίου λόγος εἰς τοὐναντίον περιειστήκει, ὁ Θρασύμαχος ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τίτθη σοι ἔστιν;

Τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. οὐκ ἀποκρίνεσθαι χρῆν μᾶλλον ἢ τοιαῦτα ἐρωτᾶν;

The impudence of Thrasymachus.

Ὅτι τοί σε, ἔφη, κορυζῶντα περιορᾷ καὶ οὐκ ἀπομύττει δεόμενον, ὅς γε αὐτῇ οὐδὲ πρόβατα οὐδὲ ποιμένα γιγνώσκεις.

Ὅτι δὴ τί μάλιστα; ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

18. ἐκεῖνο ΑΠΜ : ἐκεῖνον r.

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THRASYMACHUS.

Thrasymachus dilates upon the advantages of injustice,

p. 343. B Ὅτι οἴει τοὺς ποιμένας ἢ τοὺς βουκόλους τὸ τῶν προβάτων ἢ τὸ τῶν βοῶν ἀγαθὸν σκοπεῖν καὶ παχύνειν αὐτοὺς καὶ θεραπεύειν πρὸς ἄλλο τι βλέποντας ἢ τὸ τῶν δεσποτῶν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ αὑτῶν, καὶ δὴ καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄρχοντας, οἳ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρχουσιν, ἄλλως πως ἡγεῖ διανοεῖσθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχομένους ἢ ὥσπερ ἄν τις πρὸς πρόβατα διατεθείη, καὶ ἄλλο τι σκοπεῖν αὐτοὺς διὰ νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας ἢ τοῦτο ὅθεν C αὐτοὶ ὠφελήσονται. καὶ οὕτω πόρρω εἶ περί τε τοῦ δικαίου καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδίκου τε καὶ ἀδικίας, ὥστε ἀγνοεῖς, ὅτι ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν τῷ ὄντι, τοῦ κρείττονός τε καὶ ἄρχοντος ξυμφέρον, οἰκεία δὲ τοῦ πειθομένου τε καὶ ὑπηρετοῦντος βλάβη, ἡ δὲ ἀδικία τοὐναντίον, καὶ ἄρχει τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐηθικῶν τε καὶ δικαίων, οἱ δ' ἀρχόμενοι ποιοῦσι τὸ ἐκείνου ξυμφέρον κρείττονος ὄντος, καὶ εὐδαίμονα ἐκεῖνον ποιοῦσιν ὑπηρετοῦντες D αὐτῷ, ἑαυτοὺς δὲ οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν. σκοπεῖσθαι δέ, ὦ εὐηθέστατε Σώκρατες, οὑτωσὶ χρή, ὅτι δίκαιος ἀνὴρ ἀδίκου πανταχοῦ ἔλαττον ἔχει. πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ξυμβολαίοις, ὅπου ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος τῷ τοιούτῳ κοινωνήσῃ, οὐδαμοῦ ἂν εὕροις ἐν τῇ διαλύσει τῆς κοινωνίας πλέον ἔχοντα τὸν δίκαιον τοῦ ἀδίκου ἀλλ' ἔλαττον· ἔπειτα ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ὅταν τέ τινες εἰσφοραὶ ὦσιν, ὁ μὲν δίκαιος ἀπὸ τῶν ἴσων πλέον εἰσφέρει, ὁ δ' ἔλαττον, ὅταν τε λήψεις, E ὁ μὲν οὐδέν, ὁ δὲ πολλὰ κερδαίνει· καὶ γὰρ ὅταν ἀρχήν τινα ἄρχῃ ἑκάτερος, τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ ὑπάρχει καὶ εἰ μηδεμία ἄλλη ζημία, τά γε οἰκεῖα δι' ἀμέλειαν

6. διανοεῖσθαι MSS.: διακεῖσθαι cj. Faesi.
9. ὠφελήσονται ΑΠ: ὠφεληθήσονται M.

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especially when pursued on a great scale.

μοχθηροτέρως ἔχειν, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ δημοσίου μηδὲν ὠφε- p. 343 λεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἀπέχθεσθαι τοῖς τε οἰκείοις καὶ τοῖς γνωρίμοις, ὅταν μηδὲν ἐθέλῃ αὐτοῖς ὑπηρετεῖν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον· τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ πάντα τούτων τἀναντία ὑπάρχει. λέγω γὰρ ὅνπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, τὸν μεγάλα | δυνάμενον πλεονεκτεῖν. p. 344 τοῦτον οὖν σκόπει, εἴπερ βούλει κρίνειν ὅσῳ μᾶλλον ξυμφέρει ἰδίᾳ αὐτῷ ἄδικον εἶναι ἢ τὸ δίκαιον. πάντων δὲ ῥᾷστα μαθήσει, ἐὰν ἐπὶ τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀδικίαν ἔλθῃς, ἣ τὸν μὲν ἀδικήσαντα εὐδαιμονέστατον ποιεῖ, τοὺς δὲ ἀδικηθέντας καὶ ἀδικῆσαι οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοντας ἀθλιωτάτους.

Tyranny.

ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τυραννίς, ἣ οὐ κατὰ σμικρὸν τἀλλότρια καὶ λάθρᾳ καὶ βίᾳ ἀφαιρεῖται, καὶ ἱερὰ καὶ ὅσια καὶ ἴδια καὶ δημόσια, ἀλλὰ ξυλλήβδην. ὧν ἐφ' B ἑκάστῳ μέρει ὅταν τις ἀδικήσας μὴ λάθῃ, ζημιοῦταί τε καὶ ὀνείδη ἔχει τὰ μέγιστα· καὶ γὰρ ἱερόσυλοι καὶ ἀνδραποδισταὶ καὶ τοιχωρύχοι καὶ ἀποστερηταὶ καὶ κλέπται οἱ κατὰ μέρη ἀδικοῦντες τῶν τοιούτων κακουργημάτων καλοῦνται. ἐπειδὰν δέ τις πρὸς τοῖς τῶν πολιτῶν χρήμασι καὶ αὐτοὺς ἀνδραποδισάμενος δουλώσηται, ἀντὶ τούτων τῶν αἰσχρῶν ὀνομάτων εὐδαίμονες καὶ μακάριοι κέκληνται, οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀλλὰ C καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσοι ἂν πύθωνται αὐτὸν τὴν ὅλην ἀδικίαν ἠδικηκότα. οὐ γὰρ τὸ ποιεῖν τὰ ἄδικα ἀλλὰ τὸ πάσχειν φοβούμενοι ὀνειδίζουσιν οἱ ὀνειδίζοντες τὴν ἀδικίαν. οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἰσχυρότερον καὶ ἐλευθεριώτερον καὶ δεσποτικώτερον ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης ἐστὶν ἱκανῶς γιγνομένη, καὶ ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλεγον, τὸ μὲν τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον τὸ δίκαιον τυγχάνει ὄν, τὸ δ' ἄδικον ἑαυτῷ λυσιτελοῦν τε καὶ ξυμφέρον.

Ταῦτα εἰπὼν ὁ Θρασύμαχος ἐν νῷ εἶχεν ἀπιέναι, D

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Thrasymachus having made his speech wants to run away, but is detained by the company.

p. 344. ὥσπερ βαλανεὺς ἡμῶν καταντλήσας κατὰ τῶν ὤτων
ἁθρόον καὶ πολὺν τὸν λόγον. οὐ μὴν εἴασάν γε αὐτὸν
οἱ παρόντες, ἀλλ᾽ ἠνάγκασαν ὑπομεῖναί τε καὶ παρα-
σχεῖν τῶν εἰρημένων λόγον. καὶ δὴ ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτὸς
πάνυ ἐδεόμην τε καὶ εἶπον Ὦ δαιμόνιε Θρασύμαχε,
οἷον ἐμβαλὼν λόγον ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἀπιέναι, πρὶν διδάξαι
ἱκανῶς ἢ μαθεῖν εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως ἔχει; ἢ σμικ-
E ρὸν οἴει ἐπιχειρεῖν πρᾶγμα διορίζεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ βίου
διαγωγήν, ᾗ ἂν διαγόμενος ἕκαστος ἡμῶν λυσιτελε-
στάτην ζωὴν ζῴη;

Ἐγὼ γὰρ οἶμαι, ἔφη ὁ Θρασύμαχος, τουτὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν.

Ἔοικας, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἤτοι ἡμῶν γε οὐδὲν κήδεσθαι,
οὐδέ τι φροντίζειν εἴτε χεῖρον εἴτε βέλτιον βιωσόμεθα
ἀγνοοῦντες ὃ σὺ φῂς εἰδέναι. ἀλλ᾽, ὦ ᾽γαθέ, προθυ-
p. 345. μοῦ καὶ ἡμῖν ἐνδείξασθαι· οὔτοι κακῶς | σοι κείσεται
ὅ τι ἂν ἡμᾶς τοσούσδε ὄντας εὐεργετήσῃς. ἐγὼ γὰρ
δή σοι λέγω τό γ᾽ ἐμόν, ὅτι οὐ πείθομαι οὐδ᾽ οἶμαι
ἀδικίαν δικαιοσύνης κερδαλεώτερον εἶναι, οὐδ᾽ ἐὰν ἐᾷ
τις αὐτὴν καὶ μὴ διακωλύῃ πράττειν ἃ βούλεται.
ἀλλ᾽, ὦ ᾽γαθέ, ἔστω μὲν ἄδικος, δυνάσθω δὲ ἀδικεῖν
ἢ τῷ λανθάνειν ἢ τῷ διαμάχεσθαι· ὅμως ἐμέ γε οὐ
πείθει ὡς ἔστι τῆς δικαιοσύνης κερδαλεώτερον. ταῦτ᾽
B οὖν καὶ ἕτερος ἴσως τις ἡμῶν πέπονθεν, οὐ μόνος
ἐγώ. πεῖσον οὖν, ὦ μακάριε, ἱκανῶς ἡμᾶς ὅτι οὐκ
ὀρθῶς βουλευόμεθα δικαιοσύνην ἀδικίας περὶ πλείονος
ποιούμενοι.

The swagger of Thrasymachus.

Καὶ πῶς, ἔφη, σὲ πείσω; εἰ γὰρ οἷς νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον μὴ πέπεισαι, τί σοι ἔτι ποιήσω; ἢ εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν φέρων ἐνθῶ τὸν λόγον;

23. πείθει ΑΠΜ : *mihi suades* Ficinus.

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Socrates, Thrasymachus.

Μὰ Δί’, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, μὴ σύ γε· ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μέν, p. 345.
ἃ ἂν εἴπῃς, ἔμμενε τούτοις, ἢ ἐὰν μετατιθῇ, φανερῶς
μετατίθεσο καὶ ἡμᾶς μὴ ἐξαπάτα. νῦν δὲ ὁρᾷς, ὦ
Θρασύμαχε, ἔτι γὰρ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ἐπισκεψώμεθα, C
ὅτι τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἰατρὸν τὸ πρῶτον ὁριζόμενος τὸν
ὡς ἀληθῶς ποιμένα οὐκέτι ᾤου δεῖν ὕστερον ἀκριβῶς
φυλάξαι, ἀλλὰ ποιμαίνειν οἴει αὐτὸν τὰ πρόβατα,
καθ’ ὅσον ποιμήν ἐστιν, οὐ πρὸς τὸ τῶν προβάτων
βέλτιστον βλέποντα, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ δαιτυμόνα τινὰ καὶ
μέλλοντα ἑστιάσεσθαι πρὸς τὴν εὐωχίαν, ἢ αὖ πρὸς
τὸ ἀποδόσθαι, ὥσπερ χρηματιστὴν ἀλλ’ οὐ ποιμένα. D
τῇ δὲ ποιμενικῇ οὐ δήπου ἄλλου του μέλει ἢ ἐφ’ ᾧ
τέτακται, ὅπως τούτῳ τὸ βέλτιστον ἐκποριεῖ· ἐπεὶ τά
γε αὐτῆς ὥστ’ εἶναι βελτίστη, ἱκανῶς δήπου ἐκπεπό-
ρισται, ἕως γ’ ἂν μηδὲν ἐνδέῃ τοῦ ποιμενικὴ εἶναι·
οὕτω δὲ ᾤμην ἔγωγε νῦν δὴ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἡμῖν
ὁμολογεῖν πᾶσαν ἀρχήν, καθ’ ὅσον ἀρχή, μηδενὶ
ἄλλῳ τὸ βέλτιστον σκοπεῖσθαι ἢ ἐκείνῳ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ
τε καὶ θεραπευομένῳ, ἔν τε πολιτικῇ καὶ ἰδιωτικῇ E
ἀρχῇ. σὺ δὲ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, τοὺς
ἀληθῶς ἄρχοντας, ἑκόντας οἴει ἄρχειν;

Μὰ Δί’ οὔκ, ἔφη, ἀλλ’ εὖ οἶδα.

Τί δέ; ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς
οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἐθέλει ἄρχειν ἑκών, ἀλλὰ μισ-
θὸν αἰτοῦσιν, ὡς οὐχὶ αὐτοῖσιν ὠφελίαν ἐσομένην ἐκ
τοῦ ἄρχειν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀρχομένοις; | ἐπεὶ τοσόνδε p. 346.
εἰπέ. οὐχὶ ἑκάστην μέντοι φαμὲν ἑκάστοτε τῶν
τεχνῶν τούτῳ ἑτέραν εἶναι, τῷ ἑτέραν τὴν δύναμιν
ἔχειν; καί, ὦ μακάριε, μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ἀποκρίνου,
ἵνα τι καὶ περαίνωμεν.

The arts have different functions and are not to

7. ποιμαίνειν Amg. ΠΜ : πιαίνειν A.

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SOCRATES, THRASYMACHUS.

be confounded with the art of payment which is common to them all.

p. 346. Ἀλλὰ τούτῳ, ἔφη, ἑτέρα.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὠφελίαν ἑκάστη ἰδίαν τινὰ ἡμῖν παρέχεται, ἀλλ' οὐ κοινήν, οἷον ἰατρικὴ μὲν ὑγίειαν, κυβερνητικὴ δὲ σωτηρίαν ἐν τῷ πλεῖν, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι οὕτως;

Πάνυ γε.

B Οὐκοῦν καὶ μισθωτικὴ μισθόν; αὕτη γὰρ αὐτῆς ἡ δύναμις. ἢ τὴν ἰατρικὴν σὺ καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικὴν τὴν αὐτὴν καλεῖς; ἢ ἐάνπερ βούλῃ ἀκριβῶς διορίζειν, ὥσπερ ὑπέθου, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον, ἐάν τις κυβερνῶν ὑγιὴς γίγνηται διὰ τὸ ξυμφέρειν αὐτῷ πλεῖν ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ, ἕνεκα τούτου καλεῖς μᾶλλον αὐτὴν ἰατρικήν;

Οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη.

Οὐδέ γ', οἶμαι, τὴν μισθωτικήν, ἐὰν ὑγιαίνῃ τις μισθαρνῶν.

Οὐ δῆτα.

Τί δέ; τὴν ἰατρικὴν μισθαρνητικήν, ἐὰν ἰώμενός τις μισθαρνῇ;

C Οὔκ, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν τήν γε ὠφελίαν ἑκάστης τῆς τέχνης ἰδίαν ὡμολογήσαμεν εἶναι;

Ἔστω, ἔφη.

Ἥντινα ἄρα ὠφελίαν κοινῇ ὠφελοῦνται πάντες οἱ δημιουργοί, δῆλον ὅτι κοινῇ τινὶ τῷ αὐτῷ προσχρώμενοι ἀπ' ἐκείνου ὠφελοῦνται.

Ἔοικεν, ἔφη.

Φαμὲν δέ γε τὸ μισθὸν ἀρνυμένους ὠφελεῖσθαι τοὺς δημιουργοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ προσχρῆσθαι τῇ μισθωτικῇ τέχνῃ γίγνεσθαι αὐτοῖς.

3. οἷον A^{2}ΠΜ : οἷοι Apr. 11. ξυμφέρειν Ξ^{2}q : ξυμφέρον ΑΠΜ. 17. μισθαρνητικὴν ΑΠ : μισθαρνικὴν Μ.

D

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Ξυνέφη μόγις. p. 346.

Οὐκ ἄρα ἀπὸ τῆς αὑτοῦ τέχνης ἑκάστῳ αὕτη ἡ D ὠφελία ἐστίν, ἡ τοῦ μισθοῦ λῆψις, ἀλλ', εἰ δεῖ ἀκριβῶς σκοπεῖσθαι, ἡ μὲν ἰατρικὴ ὑγίειαν ποιεῖ, ἡ δὲ μισθαρνητικὴ μισθόν, καὶ ἡ μὲν οἰκοδομικὴ οἰκίαν, ἡ δὲ μισθαρνητικὴ αὐτῇ ἑπομένη μισθόν, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι πᾶσαι οὕτω τὸ αὑτῆς ἑκάστη ἔργον ἐργάζεται καὶ ὠφελεῖ ἐκεῖνο ἐφ' ᾧ τέτακται. ἐὰν δὲ μὴ μισθὸς αὐτῇ προσγίγνηται, ἔσθ' ὅ τι ὠφελεῖται ὁ δημιουργὸς ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης;

Οὐ φαίνεται, ἔφη.

Ἆρ' οὖν οὐδ' ὠφελεῖ τότε, ὅταν προῖκα ἐργά- E ζηται;

Οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

The true ruler or artist seeks, not his own advantage, but the perfection of his art; and therefore he must be paid. Three modes of paying rulers, money, honour, and a penalty for refusing to rule.

Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, τοῦτο ἤδη δῆλον, ὅτι οὐδεμία τέχνη οὐδὲ ἀρχὴ τὸ αὑτῇ ὠφέλιμον παρασκευάζει, ἀλλ', ὅπερ πάλαι ἐλέγομεν, τὸ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ καὶ παρασκευάζει καὶ ἐπιτάττει, τὸ ἐκείνου ξυμφέρον ἥττονος ὄντος σκοποῦσα, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος. διὰ δὴ ταῦτα ἔγωγε, ὦ φίλε Θρασύμαχε, καὶ ἄρτι ἔλεγον μηδένα ἐθέλειν ἑκόντα ἄρχειν καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια κακὰ μεταχειρίζεσθαι ἀνορθοῦντα, ἀλλὰ μισθὸν αἰτεῖν, ὅτι ὁ μέλλων καλῶς τῇ τέχνῃ | πράξειν οὐδέποτε p. 347. αὑτῷ τὸ βέλτιστον πράττει οὐδ' ἐπιτάττει κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἐπιτάττων, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ· ὧν δὴ ἕνεκα, ὡς ἔοικε, μισθὸν δεῖν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἐθελήσειν ἄρχειν, ἢ ἀργύριον ἢ τιμήν, ἢ ζημίαν, ἐὰν μὴ ἄρχῃ.

Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων.

3. ἡ τοῦ μισθοῦ λῆψις ΑΠΜmg. : om. Mpr. 5, 6. μισθαρνητικὴ ΑΠ : μισθαρνικὴ Μ. 25. ὧν Μ : ὧι Α : οὗ Π : ὧν οὗ Ξ.

p. 347. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ δύο μισθοὺς γιγνώσκω· τὴν δὲ ζημίαν ἥντινα λέγεις καὶ ὡς ἐν μισθοῦ μέρει εἴρηκας, οὐ ξυνῆκα.

Τὸν τῶν βελτίστων ἄρα μισθόν, ἔφην, οὐ ξυνίης, B δι' ὃν ἄρχουσιν οἱ ἐπιεικέστατοι, ὅταν ἐθέλωσιν ἄρχειν. ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα, ὅτι τὸ φιλότιμόν τε καὶ φιλάργυρον εἶναι ὄνειδος λέγεταί τε καὶ ἔστιν;

Ἔγωγε, ἔφη.

The penalty is the evil of being ruled by an inferior.

Διὰ ταῦτα τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὔτε χρημάτων ἕνεκα ἐθέλουσιν ἄρχειν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ οὔτε τιμῆς· οὔτε γὰρ φανερῶς πραττόμενοι τῆς ἀρχῆς ἕνεκα μισθὸν μισθωτοὶ βούλονται κεκλῆσθαι, οὔτε λάθρᾳ αὐτοὶ ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς λαμβάνοντες κλέπται. οὐδ' αὖ τιμῆς ἕνεκα· C οὐ γάρ εἰσι φιλότιμοι. δεῖ δὴ αὐτοῖς ἀνάγκην προσεῖναι καὶ ζημίαν, εἰ μέλλουσιν ἐθέλειν ἄρχειν· ὅθεν κινδυνεύει τὸ ἑκόντα ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν ἰέναι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀνάγκην περιμένειν αἰσχρὸν νενομίσθαι. τῆς δὲ ζημίας μεγίστη τὸ ὑπὸ πονηροτέρου ἄρχεσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ αὐτὸς ἐθέλῃ ἄρχειν. ἣν δείσαντές μοι φαίνονται ἄρχειν, ὅταν ἄρχωσιν, οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς, καὶ τότε ἔρχονται ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν οὐχ ὡς ἐπ' ἀγαθόν τι ἰόντες οὐδ' ὡς εὐπαθήσοντες ἐν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπ' ἀναγκαῖον καὶ D οὐκ ἔχοντες ἑαυτῶν βελτίοσιν ἐπιτρέψαι οὐδὲ ὁμοίοις.

In a city composed wholly of good men there would be a great unwillingness to rule.

ἐπεὶ κινδυνεύει, πόλις ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν εἰ γένοιτο, περιμάχητον ἂν εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἄρχειν, ὥσπερ νυνὶ τὸ ἄρχειν, καὶ ἐνταῦθ' ἂν καταφανὲς γενέσθαι ὅτι τῷ ὄντι ἀληθινὸς ἄρχων οὐ πέφυκε τὸ αὐτῷ ξυμφέρον σκοπεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ τὸ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ· ὥστε πᾶς ἂν ὁ γιγνώσκων τὸ ὠφελεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἕλοιτο ὑπ' ἄλλου ἢ ἄλλον ὠφελῶν πράγματα ἔχειν. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε οὐ-

14. δὴ ΠΜ : δὲ A.

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Thrasymachus maintains that the life of the unjust is more profitable than the life of the just;

δαμῇ συγχωρῶ Θρασυμάχῳ, ὡς τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι τὸ p. 347. τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ καὶ E εἰσαῦθις σκεψόμεθα· πολὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖ μεῖζον εἶναι ὃ νῦν λέγει Θρασύμαχος, τὸν τοῦ ἀδίκου βίον φάσκων εἶναι κρείττω ἢ τὸν τοῦ δικαίου. σὺ οὖν ποτέρως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, αἱρεῖ; καὶ πότερον ἀληθεστέρως δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι;

Τὸν τοῦ δικαίου ἔγωγε, ἔφη, λυσιτελέστερον βίον εἶναι.

Ἤκουσας, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, | ὅσα ἄρτι Θρασύμαχος p. 348. ἀγαθὰ διῆλθε τῷ τοῦ ἀδίκου;

Ἤκουσα, ἔφη, ἀλλ' οὐ πείθομαι.

Βούλει οὖν αὐτὸν πείθωμεν, ἂν δυνώμεθά πῃ ἐξευρεῖν, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει;

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ βούλομαι; ἦ δ' ὅς.

Ἂν μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀντικατατείναντες λέγωμεν αὐτῷ λόγον παρὰ λόγον, ὅσα αὖ ἀγαθὰ ἔχει τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ αὖθις οὗτος, καὶ ἄλλον ἡμεῖς, ἀριθμεῖν δεήσει τἀγαθὰ καὶ μετρεῖν ὅσα ἑκάτεροι ἐν B ἑκατέρῳ λέγομεν, καὶ ἤδη δικαστῶν τινῶν τῶν διακρινούντων δεησόμεθα· ἂν δὲ ὥσπερ ἄρτι ἀνομολογούμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους σκοπῶμεν, ἅμα αὐτοί τε δικασταὶ καὶ ῥήτορες ἐσόμεθα.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Ὁποτέρως οὖν σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀρέσκει;

Οὕτως, ἔφη.

Ἴθι δή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἀπόκριναι ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς. τὴν τελέαν ἀδικίαν τελέας οὔσης δικαιοσύνης λυσιτελεστέραν φῂς εἶναι;

5. ποτέρως ΑΠΜ : πότερον cj. Ast. 6. πότερον Μ : πότερον ὡς ΑΠ : ποτέρως cj. Ast. 25. ὁποτέρως ΑΠΜ : ποτέρως Vind. F pr.

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and a paradox still more extreme, that injustice is virtue,

p. 348. C Πάνυ μὲν οὖν καὶ φημί, ἔφη, καὶ δι' ἅ, εἴρηκα.

Φέρε δή, τὸ τοιόνδε περὶ αὐτῶν πῶς λέγεις; τὸ μέν που ἀρετὴν αὐτοῖν καλεῖς, τὸ δὲ κακίαν;

Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν δικαιοσύνην ἀρετήν, τὴν δὲ ἀδικίαν κακίαν;

Εἰκός γ', ἔφη, ὦ ἥδιστε, ἐπειδὴ καὶ λέγω ἀδικίαν μὲν λυσιτελεῖν, δικαιοσύνην δ' οὔ.

'Αλλὰ τί μήν;

Τοὐναντίον, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Ἦ τὴν δικαιοσύνην κακίαν;

D Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ πάνυ γενναίαν εὐήθειαν.

Τὴν ἀδικίαν ἄρα κακοήθειαν καλεῖς;

Οὔκ, ἀλλ' εὐβουλίαν, ἔφη.

Ἦ καὶ φρόνιμοί σοι, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἄδικοι;

Οἵ γε τελέως, ἔφη, οἷοί τε ἀδικεῖν, πόλεις τε καὶ ἔθνη δυνάμενοι ἀνθρώπων ὑφ' ἑαυτοὺς ποιεῖσθαι. σὺ δὲ οἴει με ἴσως τοὺς τὰ βαλλάντια ἀποτέμνοντας λέγειν. λυσιτελεῖ μὲν οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐάνπερ λανθάνῃ· ἔστι δὲ οὐκ ἄξια λόγου, ἀλλ' ἃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον.

E Τοῦτο μέντοι, ἔφην, οὐκ ἀγνοῶ ὅ τι βούλει λέγειν· ἀλλὰ τόδε ἐθαύμασα, εἰ ἐν ἀρετῆς καὶ σοφίας τίθης μέρει τὴν ἀδικίαν, τὴν δὲ δικαιοσύνην ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις.

'Αλλὰ πάνυ οὕτω τίθημι.

Τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἤδη στερεώτερον, ὦ ἑταῖρε, καὶ

20, 21. σὺ ... λέγειν: Socrati haec verba tribuit Baiter; et sic etiam, ut videtur, A.

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οὐκέτι ῥᾴδιον ἔχειν ὅ τί τις εἴπῃ. εἰ γὰρ λυσιτελεῖν p. 348. μὲν τὴν ἀδικίαν ἐτίθεσο, κακίαν μέντοι ἢ αἰσχρὸν αὐτὸ ὡμολόγεις εἶναι ὥσπερ ἄλλοι τινές, εἴχομεν ἄν τι λέγειν κατὰ τὰ νομιζόμενα λέγοντες· νῦν δὲ δῆλος εἶ ὅτι φήσεις αὐτὸ καὶ καλὸν καὶ ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι καὶ τἆλλα αὐτῷ πάντα προσθήσεις, | ἃ ἡμεῖς τῷ δικαίῳ p. 349. προσετίθεμεν, ἐπειδή γε καὶ ἐν ἀρετῇ αὐτὸ καὶ σοφίᾳ ἐτόλμησας θεῖναι.

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, μαντεύει.

Ἀλλ' οὐ μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀποκνητέον γε τῷ λόγῳ ἐπεξελθεῖν σκοπούμενον, ἕως ἄν σε ὑπολαμβάνω λέγειν ἅπερ διανοεῖ. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖς σύ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἀτεχνῶς νῦν οὐ σκώπτειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας λέγειν.

Τί δέ σοι, ἔφη, τοῦτο διαφέρει, εἴτε μοι δοκεῖ εἴτε μή, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν λόγον ἐλέγχεις;

which is refuted by the analogy of the arts.

Οὐδέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἀλλὰ τόδε μοι πειρῶ ἔτι πρὸς B τούτοις ἀποκρίνασθαι· ὁ δίκαιος τοῦ δικαίου δοκεῖ τί σοι ἂν ἐθέλειν πλέον ἔχειν;

Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἀστεῖος, ὥσπερ νῦν, καὶ εὐήθης.

The just tries to obtain an advantage over the unjust, but not over the just; the unjust over both just and unjust.

Τί δέ; τῆς δικαίας πράξεως;

Οὐδὲ τῆς δικαίας, ἔφη.

Τοῦ δὲ ἀδίκου πότερον ἀξιοῖ ἂν πλεονεκτεῖν καὶ ἡγοῖτο δίκαιον εἶναι, ἢ οὐκ ἂν ἡγοῖτο δίκαιον;

Ἡγοῖτ' ἄν, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ ἀξιοῖ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο.

Ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦ μὲν δικαίου μὴ ἀξιοῖ πλέον ἔχειν μηδὲ βούλεται ὁ δίκαιος, C τοῦ δὲ ἀδίκου;

1. ῥᾴδιον x : ῥᾶιον ΑΠΜ.

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p. 349. Ἀλλ᾽ οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔχει.

Τί δὲ δὴ ὁ ἄδικος; ἆρα ἀξιοῖ τοῦ δικαίου πλεονεκτεῖν καὶ τῆς δικαίας πράξεως;

Πῶς γὰρ οὔκ; ἔφη, ὅς γε πάντων πλέον ἔχειν ἀξιοῖ.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀδίκου ἀνθρώπου τε καὶ πράξεως ὁ ἄδικος πλεονεκτήσει καὶ ἁμιλλήσεται ὡς ἁπάντων πλεῖστον αὐτὸς λάβῃ;

Ἔστι ταῦτα.

Ὧδε δὴ λέγωμεν, ἔφην· ὁ δίκαιος τοῦ μὲν ὁμοίου οὐ πλεονεκτεῖ, τοῦ δὲ ἀνομοίου, ὁ δὲ ἄδικος τοῦ τε
D ὁμοίου καὶ τοῦ ἀνομοίου.

Ἄριστα, ἔφη, εἴρηκας.

Ἔστι δέ γε, ἔφην, φρόνιμός τε καὶ ἀγαθὸς ὁ ἄδικος, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος οὐδέτερα.

Καὶ τοῦτ᾽, ἔφη, εὖ.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ ἔοικε τῷ φρονίμῳ καὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ ὁ ἄδικος, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος οὐκ ἔοικεν;

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει, ἔφη, ὁ τοιοῦτος ὢν καὶ ἐοικέναι τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὁ δὲ μὴ μὴ ἐοικέναι;

Καλῶς. τοιοῦτος ἄρα ἐστὶν ἑκάτερος αὐτῶν οἷσπερ ἔοικεν. Ἀλλὰ τί μέλλει; ἔφη.

Illustrations.

Εἶεν, ὦ Θρασύμαχε· μουσικὸν δέ τινα λέγεις,
E ἕτερον δὲ ἄμουσον;

Ἔγωγε.

Πότερον φρόνιμον καὶ πότερον ἄφρονα;

Τὸν μὲν μουσικὸν δήπου φρόνιμον, τὸν δὲ ἄμουσον ἄφρονα.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἅπερ φρόνιμον, ἀγαθόν, ἃ δὲ ἄφρονα, κακόν;

Ναί.

19. ὁ δὲ μὴ μὴ *xq* : ὁ δὲ μὴ ΑΠΜ.

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Τί δὲ ἰατρικόν; οὐχ οὕτως; p. 349.

Οὕτως.

Δοκεῖ ἂν οὖν τίς σοι, ὦ ἄριστε, μουσικὸς ἀνὴρ ἁρμοττόμενος λύραν ἐθέλειν μουσικοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐν τῇ ἐπιτάσει καὶ ἀνέσει τῶν χορδῶν πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ ἀξιοῦν πλέον ἔχειν;

Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

Τί δέ; ἀμούσου;

Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

Τί δὲ ἰατρικός; | ἐν τῇ ἐδωδῇ ἢ πόσει ἐθέλειν ἄν p. 350. τι ἰατρικοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ ἀνδρὸς ἢ πράγματος;

Οὐ δῆτα.

But the true artist remains within the limits of his art;

Μὴ ἰατρικοῦ δέ;

Ναί.

Περὶ πάσης δὲ ὅρα ἐπιστήμης τε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης, εἴ τίς σοι δοκεῖ ἐπιστήμων ὁστισοῦν πλείω ἂν ἐθέλειν αἱρεῖσθαι ἢ ὅσα ἄλλος ἐπιστήμων ἢ πράττειν ἢ λέγειν, καὶ οὐ ταὐτὰ τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἑαυτῷ εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν πρᾶξιν.

Ἀλλ' ἴσως, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη τοῦτό γε οὕτως ἔχειν.

Τί δὲ ὁ ἀνεπιστήμων; οὐχὶ ὁμοίως μὲν ἐπιστήμονος πλεονεκτήσειεν ἄν, ὁμοίως δὲ ἀνεπιστήμονος; B

Ἴσως.

Ὁ δὲ ἐπιστήμων σοφός;

Φημί.

Ὁ δὲ σοφὸς ἀγαθός;

Φημί.

Ὁ ἄρα ἀγαθός τε καὶ σοφὸς τοῦ μὲν ὁμοίου οὐκ ἐθελήσει πλεονεκτεῖν, τοῦ δὲ ἀνομοίου τε καὶ ἐναντίου.

Ἔοικεν, ἔφη.

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p. 350. Ὁ δὲ κακός τε καὶ ἀμαθὴς τοῦ τε ὁμοίου καὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου.

Φαίνεται.

Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ ἄδικος ἡμῖν τοῦ ἀνομοίου τε καὶ ὁμοίου πλεονεκτεῖ; ἢ οὐχ οὕτως ἔλεγες;

Ἔγωγε, ἔφη.

C Ὁ δέ γε δίκαιος τοῦ μὲν ὁμοίου οὐ πλεονεκτήσει, τοῦ δὲ ἀνομοίου;

and similarly the just man does not exceed the limits of other just men.

Ναί.

Ἔοικεν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ μὲν δίκαιος τῷ σοφῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ, ὁ δὲ ἄδικος τῷ κακῷ καὶ ἀμαθεῖ.

Κινδυνεύει.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὡμολογοῦμεν, ᾧ γε ὅμοιος ἑκάτερος εἴη, τοιοῦτον καὶ ἑκάτερον εἶναι.

Ὡμολογοῦμεν γάρ.

Ὁ μὲν ἄρα δίκαιος ἡμῖν ἀναπέφανται ὢν ἀγαθός τε καὶ σοφός, ὁ δὲ ἄδικος ἀμαθής τε καὶ κακός.

Thrasymachus perspiring and even blushing.

Ὁ δὴ Θρασύμαχος ὡμολόγησε μὲν πάντα ταῦτα, D οὐχ ὡς ἐγὼ νῦν ῥᾳδίως λέγω, ἀλλ' ἑλκόμενος καὶ μόγις, μετὰ ἱδρῶτος θαυμαστοῦ ὅσου, ἅτε καὶ θέρους ὄντος· τότε καὶ εἶδον ἐγώ, πρότερον δὲ οὔπω, Θρασύμαχον ἐρυθριῶντα. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὖν διωμολογησάμεθα τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ σοφίαν, τὴν δὲ ἀδικίαν κακίαν τε καὶ ἀμαθίαν, Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦτο μὲν ἡμῖν οὕτω κείσθω, ἔφαμεν δὲ δὴ καὶ ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι τὴν ἀδικίαν. ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι, ὦ Θρασύμαχε;

Μέμνημαι, ἔφη· ἀλλ' ἔμοιγε οὐδὲ ἃ νῦν λέγεις ἀρέσκει, καὶ ἔχω περὶ αὐτῶν λέγειν. εἰ οὖν λέγοιμι, E εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι δημηγορεῖν ἄν με φαίης. ἢ οὖν ἔα με

19. δὴ ΑΠ: δὲ Μ. 22. ·τότε Π: post τότε punctum habent ΑΜ.

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εἰπεῖν ὅσα βούλομαι, ἤ, εἰ βούλει ἐρωτᾶν, ἐρώτα· ἐγὼ p. 350.
δέ σοι, ὥσπερ ταῖς γραυσὶ ταῖς τοὺς μύθους λεγούσαις, εἶεν ἐρῶ καὶ κατανεύσομαι καὶ ἀνανεύσομαι.

Μηδαμῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, παρά γε τὴν σαυτοῦ δόξαν.

Ὥστε σοί, ἔφη, ἀρέσκειν, ἐπειδήπερ οὐκ ἐᾷς λέγειν. καίτοι τί ἄλλο βούλει;

Οὐδὲν μὰ Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλ' εἴπερ τοῦτο ποιήσεις, ποίει· ἐγὼ δὲ ἐρωτήσω.

Ἐρώτα δή.

Τοῦτο τοίνυν ἐρωτῶ, ὅπερ ἄρτι, ἵνα καὶ ἑξῆς διασκεψώμεθα | τὸν λόγον, ὁποῖόν τι τυγχάνει ὂν δικαιο- p. 351.
σύνη πρὸς ἀδικίαν. ἐλέχθη γάρ που, ὅτι καὶ δυνατώτερον καὶ ἰσχυρότερον εἴη ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης· νῦν δέ γ', ἔφην, εἴπερ σοφία τε καὶ ἀρετή ἐστι δικαιοσύνη, ῥᾳδίως, οἶμαι, φανήσεται καὶ ἰσχυρότερον ἀδικίας, ἐπειδήπερ ἐστὶν ἀμαθία ἡ ἀδικία· οὐδεὶς ἂν ἔτι τοῦτο

A new turn given to the argument.

ἀγνοήσειεν. ἀλλ' οὔ τι οὕτως ἁπλῶς, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἔγωγε ἐπιθυμῶ, ἀλλὰ τῇδέ πῃ σκέψασθαι· πόλιν φαίης ἂν ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ ἄλλας πόλεις ἐπιχει- B
ρεῖν δουλοῦσθαι ἀδίκως καὶ καταδεδουλῶσθαι, πολλὰς δὲ καὶ ὑφ' ἑαυτῇ ἔχειν δουλωσαμένην;

Πῶς γὰρ οὔκ; ἔφη. καὶ τοῦτό γε ἡ ἀρίστη μάλιστα ποιήσει καὶ τελεώτατα οὖσα ἄδικος.

Μανθάνω, ἔφην, ὅτι σὸς οὗτος ἦν ὁ λόγος. ἀλλὰ τόδε περὶ αὐτοῦ σκοπῶ. πότερον ἡ κρείττων γιγνομένη πόλις πόλεως ἄνευ δικαιοσύνης τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην ἕξει, ἢ ἀνάγκη αὐτῇ μετὰ δικαιοσύνης;

At this point the temper of Thrasymachus begins

Εἰ μέν, ἔφη, ὡς σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες, ἔχει, ἡ δικαιοσύνη C
σοφία, μετὰ δικαιοσύνης· εἰ δ' ὡς ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, μετὰ ἀδικίας.

14. ἔφην qx : ἔφη ΑΠΜ. 28. ἔχει ΑΠΜ : ἔστιν Ξ : ἔχει, εἰ cj. Baiter.

p. 351. Πάνυ ἄγαμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπινεύεις μόνον καὶ ἀνανεύεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀποκρίνει πάνυ καλῶς.

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Σοὶ γάρ, ἔφη, χαρίζομαι.

Εὖ γε σὺ ποιῶν· ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ τόδε μοι χάρισαι καὶ λέγε· δοκεῖς ἂν ἢ πόλιν ἢ στρατόπεδον ἢ λῃστὰς ἢ κλέπτας ἢ ἄλλο τι ἔθνος, ὅσα κοινῇ ἐπί τι ἔρχεται ἀδίκως, πρᾶξαι ἄν τι δύνασθαι, εἰ ἀδικοῖεν ἀλλήλους;

to improve. Cp. V. 450 A and VI. 498 C.

D Οὐ δῆτα, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Τί δ' εἰ μὴ ἀδικοῖεν; οὐ μᾶλλον;

Πάνυ γε.

Στάσεις γάρ που, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἥ γε ἀδικία καὶ μίση καὶ μάχας ἐν ἀλλήλοις παρέχει, ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη ὁμόνοιαν καὶ φιλίαν· ἦ γάρ;

Ἔστω, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἵνα σοι μὴ διαφέρωμαι.

Perfect injustice, whether in state or individuals, is destructive to them.

Ἀλλ' εὖ γε σὺ ποιῶν, ὦ ἄριστε. τόδε δέ μοι λέγε· ἆρα εἰ τοῦτο ἔργον ἀδικίας, μῖσος ἐμποιεῖν ὅπου ἂν ἐνῇ, οὐ καὶ ἐν ἐλευθέροις τε καὶ δούλοις ἐγγιγνομένη μισεῖν ποιήσει ἀλλήλους καὶ στασιάζειν E καὶ ἀδυνάτους εἶναι κοινῇ μετ' ἀλλήλων πράττειν;

Πάνυ γε.

Τί δέ, ἂν ἐν δυοῖν ἐγγένηται; οὐ διοίσονται καὶ μισήσουσι καὶ ἐχθροὶ ἔσονται ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις;

Ἔσονται, ἔφη.

Ἐὰν δὲ δή, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ἐν ἑνὶ ἐγγένηται ἀδικία, μῶν μὴ ἀπολεῖ τὴν αὑτῆς δύναμιν, ἢ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἕξει;

Μηδὲν ἧττον ἐχέτω, ἔφη.

5. σὺ Amg. Π : σοι AM. 16. διαφέρωμαι ΠΞ : διαφέρωμεν AM.

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Οὐκοῦν τοιάνδε τινὰ φαίνεται ἔχουσα τὴν δύναμιν, οἵαν, ᾧ ἂν ἐγγένηται, εἴτε πόλει τινὶ εἴτε γένει εἴτε στρατοπέδῳ εἴτε ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν, πρῶτον μὲν ἀδύνατον | αὐτὸ ποιεῖ[ν] πράττειν μεθ' αὑτοῦ διὰ τὸ στασιάζειν καὶ διαφέρεσθαι, ἔτι δ' ἐχθρὸν εἶναι ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ παντὶ καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ; οὐχ οὕτως; p. 351. p. 352.

Πάνυ γε.

Καὶ ἐν ἑνὶ δή, οἶμαι, ἐνοῦσα ταῦτα πάντα ποιήσει, ἅπερ πέφυκεν ἐργάζεσθαι· πρῶτον μὲν ἀδύνατον αὐτὸν πράττειν ποιήσει στασιάζοντα καὶ οὐχ ὁμονοοῦντα αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ, ἔπειτα ἐχθρὸν καὶ ἑαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις· ἦ γάρ;

Ναί.

Δίκαιοι δέ γ' εἰσίν, ὦ φίλε, καὶ οἱ θεοί;

Ἔστωσαν, ἔφη. B

Καὶ θεοῖς ἄρα ἐχθρὸς ἔσται ὁ ἄδικος, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος φίλος.

Εὐωχοῦ τοῦ λόγου, ἔφη, θαρρῶν. οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγέ σοι ἐναντιώσομαι, ἵνα μὴ τοῖσδε ἀπέχθωμαι.

Recapitulation.

Ἴθι δή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τὰ λοιπά μοι τῆς ἑστιάσεως ἀποπλήρωσον ἀποκρινόμενος ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ καὶ σοφώτεροι καὶ ἀμείνους καὶ δυνατώτεροι πράττειν οἱ δίκαιοι φαίνονται, οἱ δὲ ἄδικοι οὐδὲ[ν] πράττειν μετ' ἀλλήλων οἷοί τε, ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ οὓς C φαμεν ἐρρωμένως πώποτέ τι μετ' ἀλλήλων κοινῇ πρᾶξαι ἀδίκους ὄντας, τοῦτο οὐ παντάπασιν ἀληθὲς λέγομεν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπείχοντο ἀλλήλων κομιδῇ ὄντες ἄδικοι, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι ἐνῆν τις αὐτοῖς δικαιοσύνη, ἣ αὐτοὺς ἐποίει μήτοι καὶ ἀλλήλους γε καὶ ἐφ' οὓς ᾖεσαν ἅμα ἀδικεῖν, δι' ἣν ἔπραξαν ἃ ἔπραξαν, ὥρμη-

4. ποιεῖν Π : ποιεῖ AM. 23. οὐδὲν ΑΠ : οὐδὲ M.

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p. 352. σαν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄδικα ἀδικίᾳ ἡμιμόχθηροι ὄντες, ἐπεὶ D οἵ γε παμπόνηροι καὶ τελέως ἄδικοι τελέως εἰσὶ καὶ πράττειν ἀδύνατοι· ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει μανθάνω, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς σὺ τὸ πρῶτον ἐτίθεσο. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἄμεινον ζῶσιν οἱ δίκαιοι τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ εὐδαιμονέστεροί εἰσιν, ὅπερ τὸ ὕστερον προὐθέμεθα σκέψασθαι, σκεπτέον. φαίνονται μὲν οὖν καὶ νῦν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἐξ ὧν εἰρήκαμεν· ὅμως δ' ἔτι βέλτιον σκεπτέον. οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ὅντινα τρόπον χρὴ ζῆν.

Σκόπει δή, ἔφη.

Illustrations of ends and excellences preparatory to the enquiry into the end and excellence of the soul.

Σκοπῶ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. καί μοι λέγε· δοκεῖ τί σοι εἶναι ἵππου ἔργον;

E Ἔμοιγε.

Ἆρ' οὖν τοῦτο ἂν θείης καὶ ἵππου καὶ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν ἔργον, ὃ ἂν ἢ μόνῳ ἐκείνῳ ποιῇ τις ἢ ἄριστα;

Οὐ μανθάνω, ἔφη.

Ἀλλ' ὧδε· ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἂν ἄλλῳ ἴδοις ἢ ὀφθαλμοῖς;

Οὐ δῆτα.

Τί δέ; ἀκούσαις ἄλλῳ ἢ ὠσίν;

Οὐδαμῶς.

Οὐκοῦν δικαίως ἂν ταῦτα τούτων φαῖμεν ἔργα εἶναι;

Πάνυ γε.

p. 353. Τί δέ; | μαχαίρᾳ [ἂν] ἀμπέλου κλῆμα ἀποτέμοις καὶ σμίλῃ καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς;

Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Ἀλλ' οὐδενί γ' ἄν, οἶμαι, οὕτω καλῶς, ὡς δρεπάνῳ τῷ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἐργασθέντι.

Ἀληθῆ.

7. ὡς ἐμοὶ A : ὥς γέ μοι ΠΜ. 8. δ' ἔτι Ξ : δέ τι ΑΠΜ.
22. φαῖμεν Stephanus : φαμὲν MSS. 24. ἂν x : om. ΑΠΜ.

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Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ τοῦτο τούτου ἔργον θήσομεν; p. 353.

Θήσομεν μὲν οὖν.

Νῦν δή, οἶμαι, ἄμεινον ἂν μάθοις ὃ ἄρτι ἠρώτων πυνθανόμενος, εἰ οὐ τοῦτο ἑκάστου εἴη ἔργον, ὃ ἂν ἢ μόνον τι ἢ κάλλιστα τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεργάζηται.

/ Ἀλλά, ἔφη, μανθάνω τε καί μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο ἑκάστου πράγματος ἔργον εἶναι. B

Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετὴ δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἑκάστῳ, ᾧπερ καὶ ἔργον τι προστέτακται; ἴωμεν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ πάλιν· ὀφθαλμῶν, φαμέν, ἔστιν ἔργον;

All things which have ends have also virtues and excellences by which they fulfil those ends.

Ἔστιν.

Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ ἀρετὴ ὀφθαλμῶν ἔστιν;

Καὶ ἀρετή.

Τί δέ; ὤτων ἦν τι ἔργον;

Ναί.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετή;

Καὶ ἀρετή.

Τί δὲ πάντων πέρι τῶν ἄλλων; οὐχ οὕτω;

Οὕτω.

Ἔχε δή· ἆρ' ἄν ποτε ὄμματα τὸ αὑτῶν ἔργον καλῶς ἀπεργάσαιντο μὴ ἔχοντα τὴν αὑτῶν οἰκείαν C ἀρετήν, ἀλλ' ἀντὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς κακίαν;

Καὶ πῶς ἄν; ἔφη· τυφλότητα γὰρ ἴσως λέγεις ἀντὶ τῆς ὄψεως.

Ἥτις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὐτῶν ἡ ἀρετή· οὐ γάρ πω τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλ' εἰ τῇ οἰκείᾳ μὲν ἀρετῇ τὸ αὑτῶν ἔργον εὖ ἐργάσεται τὰ ἐργαζόμενα, κακίᾳ δὲ κακῶς.

Ἀληθές, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε λέγεις.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὦτα στερόμενα τῆς αὑτῶν ἀρετῆς κακῶς τὸ αὑτῶν ἔργον ἀπεργάσεται;

21. ἀπεργάσαιντο ΑΠΜ: ἀπεργάσαιτο cj. Heindorf.

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p. 353. Πάνυ γε.

D Τίθεμεν οὖν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον;

Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Ἴθι δή, μετὰ ταῦτα τόδε σκέψαι. ψυχῆς ἔστι τι ἔργον, ὃ ἄλλῳ τῶν ὄντων οὐδ' ἂν ἑνὶ πράξαις, οἷον τὸ τοιόνδε· τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἄλλῳ ἢ ψυχῇ δικαίως ἂν αὐτὰ ἀποδοῖμεν καὶ φαῖμεν ἴδια ἐκείνης εἶναι;

And the soul has a virtue and an end—the virtue justice, the end happiness.

Οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ.

Τί δ' αὖ τὸ ζῆν; ψυχῆς φήσομεν ἔργον εἶναι;

Μάλιστά γ', ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετήν φαμέν τινα ψυχῆς εἶναι;

Φαμέν.

E Ἆρ' οὖν ποτέ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ψυχὴ τὰ αὑτῆς ἔργα εὖ ἀπεργάσεται στερομένη τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς, ἢ ἀδύνατον;

Ἀδύνατον.

Ἀνάγκη ἄρα κακῇ ψυχῇ κακῶς ἄρχειν καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, τῇ δὲ ἀγαθῇ πάντα ταῦτα εὖ πράττειν.

Ἀνάγκη.

Hence justice and happiness are necessarily connected.

Οὐκοῦν ἀρετήν γε συνεχωρήσαμεν ψυχῆς εἶναι δικαιοσύνην, κακίαν δὲ ἀδικίαν;

Συνεχωρήσαμεν γάρ.

Ἡ μὲν ἄρα δικαία ψυχὴ καὶ ὁ δίκαιος ἀνὴρ εὖ βιώσεται, κακῶς δὲ ὁ ἄδικος.

Φαίνεται, ἔφη, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον.

p. 354. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅ γε εὖ ζῶν μακάριός τε καὶ εὐδαίμων, ὁ δὲ μὴ τἀναντία.

6. πράξαις ΠΜ : πράξαις A.

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Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; p. 354.

Ὁ μὲν δίκαιος ἄρα εὐδαίμων, ὁ δ' ἄδικος ἄθλιος.

Ἔστωσαν, ἔφη.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἄθλιόν γε εἶναι οὐ λυσιτελεῖ, εὐδαίμονα δέ.

Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Οὐδέποτ' ἄρα, ὦ μακάριε Θρασύμαχε, λυσιτελέστερον ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης.

Ταῦτα δή σοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰστιάσθω ἐν τοῖς Βενδιδείοις.

Socrates is displeased with himself and with the argument.

Ὑπὸ σοῦ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἐπειδή μοι πρᾶος ἐγένου καὶ χαλεπαίνων ἐπαύσω. οὐ μέντοι καλῶς γε εἰστίαμαι, δι' ἐμαυτόν, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ σέ· B ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ λίχνοι τοῦ ἀεὶ παραφερομένου ἀπογεύονται ἁρπάζοντες, πρὶν τοῦ προτέρου μετρίως ἀπολαῦσαι, καὶ ἐγώ μοι δοκῶ οὕτω, πρὶν ὃ τὸ πρῶτον ἐσκοποῦμεν εὑρεῖν, τὸ δίκαιον ὅ τί ποτ' ἐστίν, ἀφέμενος ἐκείνου ὁρμῆσαι ἐπὶ τὸ σκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ, εἴτε κακία ἐστὶ καὶ ἀμαθία, εἴτε σοφία καὶ ἀρετή, καὶ ἐμπεσόντος αὖ ὕστερον λόγου, ὅτι λυσιτελέστερον ἡ ἀδικία τῆς δικαιοσύνης, οὐκ ἀπεσχόμην τὸ μὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἐλθεῖν ἀπ' ἐκείνου, ὥστε μοι νυνὶ γέγονεν C ἐκ τοῦ διαλόγου μηδὲν εἰδέναι· ὁπότε γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον μὴ οἶδα ὅ ἐστι, σχολῇ εἴσομαι εἴτε ἀρετή τις οὖσα τυγχάνει εἴτε καὶ οὔ, καὶ πότερον ὁ ἔχων αὐτὸ οὐκ εὐδαίμων ἐστὶν ἢ εὐδαίμων.

16. ἐγώ μοι r: ἐγῶμαι ΑΠΜ.

B.

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p. 357. Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα εἰπὼν ᾤμην λόγου ἀπηλλάχθαι· τὸ δ' ἦν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, προοίμιον. ὁ γὰρ Γλαύκων ἀεί τε ἀνδρειότατος ὢν τυγχάνει πρὸς ἅπαντα, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε τοῦ Θρασυμάχου τὴν ἀπόρρησιν οὐκ ἀπεδέξατο, ἀλλ' ἔφη· Ὦ Σώκρατες, πότερον B ἡμᾶς βούλει δοκεῖν πεπεικέναι ἢ ὡς ἀληθῶς πεῖσαι ὅτι παντὶ τρόπῳ ἄμεινόν ἐστι δίκαιον εἶναι ἢ ἄδικον;

Ὡς ἀληθῶς, εἶπον, ἔγωγ' ἂν ἑλοίμην, εἰ ἐπ' ἐμοὶ εἴη.

The threefold division of goods.

Οὐ τοίνυν, ἔφη, ποιεῖς ὃ βούλει. λέγε γάρ μοι· ἆρά σοι δοκεῖ τοιόνδε τι εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ὃ δεξαίμεθ' ἂν ἔχειν οὐ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων ἐφιέμενοι, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα ἀσπαζόμενοι; οἷον τὸ χαίρειν καὶ αἱ ἡδοναὶ ὅσαι ἀβλαβεῖς καὶ μηδὲν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον διὰ ταύτας γίγνεται ἄλλο ἢ χαίρειν ἔχοντα.

Ἔμοιγε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δοκεῖ τι εἶναι τοιοῦτον.

C Τί δέ; ὃ αὐτό τε αὑτοῦ χάριν ἀγαπῶμεν καὶ τῶν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γιγνομένων; οἷον αὖ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ ὁρᾶν καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν· τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτά που δι' ἀμφότερα ἀσπαζόμεθα.

Ναί, εἶπον.

Τρίτον δὲ ὁρᾷς τι, ἔφη, εἶδος ἀγαθοῦ, ἐν ᾧ τὸ

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γυμνάζεσθαι καὶ τὸ κάμνοντα ἰατρεύεσθαι καὶ ἰάτρευ- p. 357.
σίς τε καὶ ὁ ἄλλος χρηματισμός; ταῦτα γὰρ ἐπίπονα
φαῖμεν ἄν, ὠφελεῖν δὲ ἡμᾶς, καὶ αὐτὰ μὲν ἑαυτῶν
ἕνεκα οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμεθα ἔχειν, τῶν δὲ μισθῶν τε χάριν D
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα γίγνεται ἀπ' αὐτῶν.

Ἔστι γὰρ οὖν, ἔφην, καὶ τοῦτο τρίτον. ἀλλὰ τί δή;

Ἐν ποίῳ, ἔφη, τούτων τὴν δικαιοσύνην τίθης;

Ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, | ἐν τῷ καλλίστῳ, ὃ p. 358.
καὶ δι' αὐτὸ καὶ διὰ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἀγαπητέον τῷ μέλλοντι μακαρίῳ ἔσεσθαι.

Οὐ τοίνυν δοκεῖ, ἔφη, τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐπιπόνου εἴδους, ὃ μισθῶν θ' ἕνεκα καὶ εὐδοκιμήσεων διὰ δόξαν ἐπιτηδευτέον, αὐτὸ δὲ δι' αὐτὸ φευκτέον ὡς ὂν χαλεπόν.

Οἶδα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι δοκεῖ οὕτω, καὶ πάλαι ὑπὸ Θρασυμάχου ὡς τοιοῦτον ὂν ψέγεται, ἀδικία δ' ἐπαινεῖται· ἀλλ' ἐγώ τις, ὡς ἔοικε, δυσμαθής.

Three heads of the argument:— 1. The nature of justice: 2. Justice a necessity, but not a good: 3. The reasonableness of this notion.

Ἴθι δή, ἔφη, ἄκουσον καὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐάν σοι ταὐτὰ B
δοκῇ. Θρασύμαχος γάρ μοι φαίνεται πρωιαίτερον τοῦ δέοντος ὑπὸ σοῦ ὥσπερ ὄφις κηληθῆναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ οὔπω κατὰ νοῦν ἡ ἀπόδειξις γέγονε περὶ ἑκατέρου· ἐπιθυμῶ γὰρ ἀκοῦσαι τί τ' ἔστιν ἑκάτερον καὶ τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ ἐνὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τοὺς δὲ μισθοὺς καὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἐᾶσαι χαίρειν. οὑτωσὶ οὖν ποιήσω, ἐὰν καὶ σοὶ δοκῇ· ἐπαναεώσομαι τὸν Θρασυμάχου λόγον, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἐρῶ δικαιο- C
σύνην οἷον εἶναί φασι καὶ ὅθεν γεγονέναι· δεύτερον δὲ ὅτι πάντες αὐτὸ οἱ ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἄκοντες ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς ἀγαθόν· τρίτον

17. ἀδικία δ' ἐπαινεῖται ΠΜ: om. A.

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p. 358. δὲ ὅτι εἰκότως αὐτὸ δρῶσι· πολὺ γὰρ ἀμείνων ἄρα ὁ τοῦ ἀδίκου ἢ ὁ τοῦ δικαίου βίος, ὡς λέγουσιν. ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὔ τι δοκεῖ οὕτως. ἀπορῶ μέντοι διατεθρυλημένος τὰ ὦτα, ἀκούων Θρασυμάχου καὶ μυρίων ἄλλων, τὸν δὲ ὑπὲρ τῆς δικαιοσύνης D λόγον, ὡς ἄμεινον ἀδικίας, οὐδενός πω ἀκήκοα ὡς βούλομαι· βούλομαι δὲ αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ ἐγκωμιαζόμενον ἀκοῦσαι. μάλιστα δ' οἶμαι ἂν σοῦ πυθέσθαι. διὸ κατατείνας ἐρῶ τὸν ἄδικον βίον ἐπαινῶν, εἰπὼν δὲ ἐνδείξομαί σοι ὃν τρόπον αὖ βούλομαι καὶ σοῦ ἀκούειν ἀδικίαν μὲν ψέγοντος, δικαιοσύνην δὲ ἐπαινοῦντος. ἀλλ' ὅρα, εἴ σοι βουλομένῳ ἃ λέγω. Πάντων μά-E λιστα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· περὶ γὰρ τίνος ἂν μᾶλλον πολλάκις τις νοῦν ἔχων χαίροι λέγων καὶ ἀκούων; Κάλλιστα, ἔφη, λέγεις· καὶ ὃ πρῶτον ἔφην ἐρεῖν, περὶ τούτου ἄκουε, οἷόν τε καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε δικαιοσύνη.

Justice a compromise between doing and suffering evil.

Πεφυκέναι γὰρ δή φασι τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖσθαι κακόν, πλέονι δὲ κακῷ ὑπερβάλλειν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀγαθῷ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ὥστ' ἐπειδὰν ἀλλήλους ἀδικῶσί τε καὶ ἀδικῶνται καὶ ἀμφοτέρων γεύων-p. 359. ται, τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις τὸ μὲν ἐκφεύγειν | τὸ δὲ αἱρεῖν δοκεῖ λυσιτελεῖν ξυνθέσθαι ἀλλήλοις μήτ' ἀδικεῖν μήτ' ἀδικεῖσθαι· καὶ ἐντεῦθεν δὴ ἄρξασθαι νόμους τίθεσθαι καὶ ξυνθήκας αὑτῶν, καὶ ὀνομάσαι τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἐπίταγμα νόμιμόν τε καὶ δίκαιον· καὶ εἶναι δὴ ταύτην γένεσίν τε καὶ οὐσίαν δικαιοσύνης, μεταξὺ οὖσαν τοῦ μὲν ἀρίστου ὄντος, ἐὰν ἀδικῶν μὴ διδῷ δίκην, τοῦ δὲ κακίστου, ἐὰν ἀδικούμενος τιμωρεῖσθαι ἀδύνατος ᾖ· τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ἐν μέσῳ

16. οἷόν τε x : τί οἷόντε Π : τί ὄν τε AM. 18. πλέονι A : πλέον ΠMpr. Ξpr. 22. δοκεῖ AΠM : δοκεῖν cj. Ast.

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ὂν τούτων ἀμφοτέρων ἀγαπᾶσθαι οὐχ ὡς ἀγαθόν, p. 359. ἀλλ' ὡς ἀρρωστίᾳ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν τιμώμενον· ἐπεὶ τὸν B δυνάμενον αὐτὸ ποιεῖν καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνδρα οὐδ' ἂν ἑνί ποτε ξυνθέσθαι τὸ μήτε ἀδικεῖν μήτε ἀδικεῖσθαι· μαίνεσθαι γὰρ ἄν. ἡ μὲν οὖν δὴ φύσις δικαιοσύνης, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὕτη τε καὶ τοιαύτη, καὶ ἐξ ὧν πέφυκε τοιαῦτα, ὡς ὁ λόγος.

Ὡς δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἀδυναμίᾳ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν ἄκοντες αὐτὸ ἐπιτηδεύουσι, μάλιστ' ἂν αἰσθοίμεθα, εἰ τοιόνδε ποιήσαιμεν τῇ διανοίᾳ· δόντες ἐξουσίαν C ἑκατέρῳ ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἂν βούληται, τῷ τε δικαίῳ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ, εἶτ' ἐπακολουθήσαιμεν θεώμενοι ποῖ ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἑκάτερον ἄξει. ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ οὖν λάβοιμεν ἂν τὸν δίκαιον τῷ ἀδίκῳ εἰς ταὐτὸν ἰόντα διὰ τὴν πλεονεξίαν, ὃ πᾶσα φύσις διώκειν πέφυκεν ὡς ἀγαθόν, νόμῳ δὲ βίᾳ παράγεται ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἴσου τιμήν.

The story of Gyges.

εἴη δ' ἂν ἡ ἐξουσία ἣν λέγω τοιάδε μάλιστα, εἰ αὐτοῖς γένοιτο οἵαν ποτέ φασι δύναμιν τῷ [Γύγου] τοῦ D Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ γενέσθαι. εἶναι μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν ποιμένα θητεύοντα παρὰ τῷ τότε Λυδίας ἄρχοντι, ὄμβρου δὲ πολλοῦ γενομένου καὶ σεισμοῦ ῥαγῆναί τι τῆς γῆς καὶ γενέσθαι χάσμα κατὰ τὸν τόπον ᾗ ἔνεμεν. ἰδόντα δὲ καὶ θαυμάσαντα καταβῆναι καὶ ἰδεῖν ἄλλα τε δὴ [ἃ] μυθολογοῦσι θαυμαστὰ καὶ ἵππον χαλκοῦν κοῖλον, θυρίδας ἔχοντα, καθ' ἃς ἐγκύψαντα ἰδεῖν ἐνόντα νεκρόν, ὡς φαίνεσθαι, μείζω ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον. τοῦτον δὲ ἄλλο μὲν [ἔχειν] οὐδέν, περὶ δὲ τῇ χειρὶ E χρυσοῦν δακτύλιον, ὃν περιελόμενον ἐκβῆναι. συλλόγου δὲ γενομένου τοῖς ποιμέσιν εἰωθότος, ἵν' ἐξαγ-

16. βίᾳ A : καὶ βίᾳ ΠΜ. 18. Γύγου MSS. : del. Herm. : Γύγῃ x Fic.
24. ἃ μυθολογοῦσι ΠΜ : μυθολογοῦσι A. 27. ἔχειν οὐδέν ΠΜ : οὐδέν A.

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p. 359. γέλλοιεν κατὰ μῆνα τῷ βασιλεῖ τὰ περὶ τὰ ποίμνια,
ἀφικέσθαι καὶ ἐκεῖνον ἔχοντα τὸν δακτύλιον. καθή-
μενον οὖν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων τυχεῖν τὴν σφενδόνην τοῦ
δακτυλίου περιαγαγόντα πρὸς ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὸ εἴσω τῆς
χειρός. τούτου δὲ γενομένου ἀφανῆ αὐτὸν γενέ-
p. 360. σθαι | τοῖς παρακαθημένοις, καὶ διαλέγεσθαι ὡς περὶ
οἰχομένου. καὶ τὸν θαυμάζειν τε καὶ πάλιν ἐπιψη-
λαφῶντα τὸν δακτύλιον στρέψαι ἔξω τὴν σφενδόνην,
καὶ στρέψαντα φανερὸν γενέσθαι. καὶ τοῦτο ἐν-
νοήσαντα ἀποπειρᾶσθαι τοῦ δακτυλίου εἰ ταύτην ἔχοι
τὴν δύναμιν, καὶ αὐτῷ οὕτω ξυμβαίνειν, στρέφοντι
μὲν εἴσω τὴν σφενδόνην ἀδήλῳ γίγνεσθαι, ἔξω δὲ
δήλῳ. αἰσθόμενον δὲ εὐθὺς διαπράξασθαι τῶν ἀγ-
B γέλων γενέσθαι τῶν παρὰ τὸν βασιλέα. ἐλθόντα δὲ
καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ μοιχεύσαντα, μετ᾽ ἐκείνης
ἐπιθέμενον τῷ βασιλεῖ ἀποκτεῖναι καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν
κατασχεῖν. εἰ οὖν δύο τοιούτω δακτυλίω γενοίσθην,
καὶ τὸν μὲν ὁ δίκαιος περιθεῖτο, τὸν δὲ ὁ ἄδικος, οὐ-
δεὶς ἂν γένοιτο, ὡς δόξειεν, οὕτως ἀδαμάντινος, ὃς
ἂν μείνειεν ἐν τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τολμήσειεν ἀπέχε-
σθαι τῶν ἀλλοτρίων καὶ μὴ ἅπτεσθαι, ἐξὸν αὐτῷ καὶ
ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἀδεῶς ὅ τι βούλοιτο λαμβάνειν, καὶ
C εἰσιόντι εἰς τὰς οἰκίας συγγίγνεσθαι ὅτῳ βούλοιτο καὶ
ἀποκτιννύναι καὶ ἐκ δεσμῶν λύειν οὕστινας βούλοιτο,
καὶ τἆλλα πράττειν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἰσόθεον ὄντα.
οὕτω δὲ δρῶν οὐδὲν ἂν διάφορον τοῦ ἑτέρου ποιοῖ,
ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ ταὐτὸν ἴοιεν ἀμφότεροι. καίτοι μέγα τοῦτο
τεκμήριον ἂν φαίη τις ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν δίκαιος ἀλλ᾽
ἀναγκαζόμενος, ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδίᾳ ὄντος, ἐπεὶ ὅπου
γ᾽ ἂν οἴηται ἕκαστος οἷός τε ἔσεσθαι ἀδικεῖν, ἀδικεῖν.

The application of the story of Gyges.

26. διάφορον AM : διαφέρον Π. 27. ταὐτὸν AM : ταῦτ᾽ ἂν Π.

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λυσιτελεῖν γὰρ δὴ οἴεται πᾶς ἀνὴρ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἰδίᾳ p. 360. τὴν ἀδικίαν τῆς δικαιοσύνης, ἀληθῆ οἰόμενος, ὡς D φήσει ὁ περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου λέγων· ἐπεὶ εἴ τις τοιαύτης ἐξουσίας ἐπιλαβόμενος μηδέν ποτε ἐθέλοι ἀδικῆσαι μηδὲ ἅψαιτο τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, ἀθλιώτατος μὲν ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι τοῖς αἰσθανομένοις καὶ ἀνοητότατος, ἐπαινοῖεν δ' ἂν αὐτὸν ἀλλήλων ἐναντίον ἐξαπατῶντες ἀλλήλους διὰ τὸν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι φόβον. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δὴ οὕτω.

Τὴν δὲ κρίσιν αὐτὴν τοῦ βίου πέρι ὧν λέγομεν, E ἐὰν διαστησώμεθα τόν τε δικαιότατον καὶ τὸν ἀδικώτατον, οἷοί τ' ἐσόμεθα κρῖναι ὀρθῶς· εἰ δὲ μή, οὔ. τίς οὖν δὴ ἡ διάστασις; ἥδε· μηδὲν ἀφαιρῶμεν μήτε τοῦ ἀδίκου ἀπὸ τῆς ἀδικίας, μήτε τοῦ δικαίου ἀπὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης, ἀλλὰ τέλεον ἑκάτερον εἰς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιτήδευμα τιθῶμεν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὁ ἄδικος ὥσπερ οἱ δεινοὶ δημιουργοὶ ποιείτω· οἷον κυβερνήτης ἄκρος ἢ ἰατρὸς τά τε ἀδύνατα ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ καὶ τὰ δυνατὰ διαισθάνεται, καὶ | τοῖς μὲν ἐπιχειρεῖ, τὰ δὲ ἐᾷ· ἔτι p. 361. δὲ ἐὰν ἄρα πῃ σφαλῇ, ἱκανὸς ἐπανορθοῦσθαι· οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἄδικος ἐπιχειρῶν ὀρθῶς τοῖς ἀδικήμασι λανθανέτω, εἰ μέλλει σφόδρα ἄδικος εἶναι. τὸν ἁλισκόμενον δὲ φαῦλον ἡγητέον· ἐσχάτη γὰρ ἀδικία δοκεῖν δίκαιον εἶναι μὴ ὄντα. δοτέον οὖν τῷ τελέως ἀδίκῳ τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀδικίαν, καὶ οὐκ ἀφαιρετέον, ἀλλ' ἐατέον τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικοῦντα τὴν μεγίστην δόξαν αὐτῷ παρεσκευακέναι εἰς δικαιοσύνην, καὶ ἐὰν ἄρα B σφάλληταί τι, ἐπανορθοῦσθαι δυνατῷ εἶναι, λέγειν τε ἱκανῷ ὄντι πρὸς τὸ πείθειν, ἐάν τι μηνύηται τῶν ἀδικημάτων, καὶ βιάσασθαι ὅσα ἂν βίας δέηται, διά

The unjust to be clothed with power and reputation.

3. φησὶν M. 13. τίς οὖν ΠΜ : τί οὖν A. 15. ἑαυτοῦ ΠΜ : ἑαυτῷ A.

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The just to be unclothed of all but his virtue.

p. 361. τε ἀνδρείαν καὶ ῥώμην καὶ διὰ παρασκευὴν φίλων καὶ οὐσίας. τοῦτον δὲ τοιοῦτον θέντες τὸν δίκαιον παρ' αὐτὸν ἱστῶμεν τῷ λόγῳ, ἄνδρα ἁπλοῦν καὶ γενναῖον, κατ' Αἰσχύλον οὐ δοκεῖν ἀλλ' εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἐθέλοντα. ἀφαιρετέον δὴ τὸ δοκεῖν. εἰ γὰρ δόξει C δίκαιος εἶναι, ἔσονται αὐτῷ τιμαὶ καὶ δωρεαὶ δοκοῦντι τοιούτῳ εἶναι. ἄδηλον οὖν εἴτε τοῦ δικαίου εἴτε τῶν δωρεῶν τε καὶ τιμῶν ἕνεκα τοιοῦτος εἴη. γυμνωτέος δὴ πάντων πλὴν δικαιοσύνης καὶ ποιητέος ἐναντίως διακείμενος τῷ προτέρῳ· μηδὲν γὰρ ἀδικῶν δόξαν ἐχέτω τὴν μεγίστην ἀδικίας, ἵνα ᾖ βεβασανισμένος εἰς δικαιοσύνην τῷ μὴ τέγγεσθαι ὑπὸ κακοδοξίας καὶ τῶν ἀπ' αὐτῆς γιγνομένων· ἀλλὰ ἴτω ἀμετάστατος D μέχρι θανάτου, δοκῶν μὲν εἶναι ἄδικος διὰ βίου, ὢν δὲ δίκαιος, ἵνα ἀμφότεροι εἰς τὸ ἔσχατον ἐληλυθότες, ὁ μὲν δικαιοσύνης, ὁ δὲ ἀδικίας, κρίνωνται ὁπότερος αὐτοῖν εὐδαιμονέστερος.

Βαβαί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, ὡς ἐρρωμένως ἑκάτερον, ὥσπερ ἀνδριάντα, εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἐκκαθαίρεις τοῖν ἀνδροῖν.

Ὡς μάλιστ', ἔφη, δύναμαι. ὄντοιν δὲ τοιούτοιν, οὐδὲν ἔτι, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, χαλεπὸν ἐπεξελθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ E οἷος ἑκάτερον βίος ἐπιμένει. λεκτέον οὖν· καὶ δὴ κἂν ἀγροικοτέρως λέγηται, μὴ ἐμὲ οἴου λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας πρὸ δικαιοσύνης ἀδικίαν. ἐροῦσι δὲ τάδε, ὅτι οὕτω διακείμενος ὁ δίκαιος μαστιγώσεται, στρεβλώσεται, δεδήσεται, p. 362. ἐκκαυθήσεται τὠφθαλμώ, | τελευτῶν πάντα κακὰ παθὼν ἀνασχινδυλευθήσεται καὶ γνώσεται ὅτι οὐκ

The just man will learn by

13. ἀπ' Eusebius et Theodoretus: ὑπ' MSS. ἴτω cj. Neukirch: ἤτω AM: ἔστω γ Euseb. Theod.: ἠτῶ Π. 28. ἐκκοφθήσεται M.

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each experience that he ought to seem and not to be just.

εἶναι δίκαιον ἀλλὰ δοκεῖν δεῖ ἐθέλειν. τὸ δὲ τοῦ p. 362. Αἰσχύλου πολὺ ἦν ἄρα ὀρθότερον λέγειν κατὰ τοῦ ἀδίκου. τῷ ὄντι γὰρ φήσουσι τὸν ἄδικον, ἅτε ἐπιτηδεύοντα πρᾶγμα ἀληθείας ἐχόμενον καὶ οὐ πρὸς δόξαν ζῶντα, οὐ δοκεῖν ἄδικον ἀλλ' εἶναι ἐθέλειν,

βαθεῖαν ἄλοκα διὰ φρενὸς καρπούμενον,
ἐξ ἧς τὰ κεδνὰ βλαστάνει βουλεύματα, B

πρῶτον μὲν ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ πόλει δοκοῦντι δικαίῳ εἶναι, ἔπειτα γαμεῖν ὁπόθεν ἂν βούληται, ἐκδιδόναι εἰς οὓς ἂν βούληται, ξυμβάλλειν, κοινωνεῖν οἷς ἂν ἐθέλῃ, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ὠφελεῖσθαι κερδαίνοντα τῷ μὴ δυσχεραίνειν τὸ ἀδικεῖν· εἰς ἀγῶνας τοίνυν ἰόντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ περιγίγνεσθαι καὶ πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν ἐχθρῶν, πλεονεκτοῦντα δὲ πλουτεῖν καὶ τούς τε φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν, καὶ C θεοῖς θυσίας καὶ ἀναθήματα ἱκανῶς καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς θύειν τε καὶ ἀνατιθέναι, καὶ θεραπεύειν τοῦ δικαίου πολὺ ἄμεινον τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὓς ἂν βούληται, ὥστε καὶ θεοφιλέστερον αὐτὸν εἶναι μᾶλλον προσήκειν ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων ἢ τὸν δίκαιον. οὕτω φασίν, ὦ Σώκρατες, παρὰ θεῶν καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώπων τῷ ἀδίκῳ παρεσκευάσθαι τὸν βίον ἄμεινον ἢ τῷ δικαίῳ.

The unjust who appears just will attain every sort of prosperity.

Adeimantus takes up the argument.

Ταῦτ' εἰπόντος τοῦ Γλαύκωνος ἐγὼ μὲν ἐν νῷ εἶχόν D τι λέγειν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὁ δὲ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Ἀδείμαντος, Οὔ τί που οἴει, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἱκανῶς εἰρῆσθαι περὶ τοῦ λόγου;

Ἀλλὰ τί μήν; εἶπον.

Αὐτό, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐκ εἴρηται ὃ μάλιστα ἔδει ῥηθῆναι.

26. ἔφη Π : om. AM.

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p. 362. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ λεγόμενον, ἀδελφὸς ἀνδρὶ παρείη, ὥστε καὶ σύ, εἴ τι ὅδε ἐλλείπει, ἐπάμυνε. καίτοι ἐμέ γε ἱκανὰ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τούτου ῥηθέντα καταπαλαῖσαι καὶ ἀδύνατον ποιῆσαι βοηθεῖν δικαιοσύνῃ.

Justice is praised and injustice is blamed, but only out of regard to their consequences.

E Καὶ ὅς, Οὐδέν, ἔφη, λέγεις, ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ τάδε ἄκουε. δεῖ γὰρ διελθεῖν ἡμᾶς καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους λόγους ὧν ὅδε εἶπεν, οἳ δικαιοσύνην μὲν ἐπαινοῦσιν, ἀδικίαν δὲ ψέγουσιν, ἵν' ᾖ σαφέστερον ὅ μοι δοκεῖ βούλεσθαι Γλαύκων. λέγουσι δέ που καὶ παρακελεύονται πατέρες τε υἱέσι καὶ πάντες οἱ τινῶν κηδό-
p. 363. μενοι, ὡς χρὴ δίκαιον | εἶναι, οὐκ αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην ἐπαινοῦντες, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῆς εὐδοκιμήσεις, ἵνα δοκοῦντι δικαίῳ εἶναι γίγνηται ἀπὸ τῆς δόξης ἀρχαί τε καὶ γάμοι καὶ ὅσαπερ Γλαύκων διῆλθεν ἄρτι ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν ὄντα τῷ ἀδίκῳ. ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ οὗτοι τὰ τῶν δοξῶν λέγουσι· τὰς γὰρ παρὰ θεῶν εὐδοκιμήσεις ἐμβάλλοντες ἄφθονα ἔχουσι λέγειν ἀγαθά, τοῖς ὁσίοις ἅ φασι θεοὺς διδόναι, ὥσπερ ὁ γενναῖος
B Ἡσίοδός τε καὶ Ὅμηρός φασιν, ὁ μὲν τὰς δρῦς τοῖς δικαίοις τοὺς θεοὺς ποιεῖν

ἄκρας μέν τε φέρειν βαλάνους, μέσσας δὲ μελίσσας·
εἰροπόκοι δ' ὄϊες, φησίν, μαλλοῖς καταβεβρίθασι,

καὶ ἄλλα δὴ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα. παραπλήσια δὲ καὶ ὁ ἕτερος· ὥστε τευ γάρ φησιν

ἤ βασιλῆος ἀμύμονος ὅστε θεουδὴς
εὐδικίας ἀνέχῃσι, φέρῃσι δὲ γαῖα μέλαινα
C πυροὺς καὶ κριθάς, βρίθῃσι δὲ δένδρεα καρπῷ,
τίκτῃ δ' ἔμπεδα μῆλα, θάλασσα δὲ παρέχῃ ἰχθῦς.

16. τῷ ἀδίκῳ cj. Muretus, et sic x *q* : τῷ δικαίῳ ΑΠΜ : om. K : delet Madvig.

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ADEIMANTUS.

The rewards and punishments of another life.

Μουσαῖος δὲ τούτων νεανικώτερα τἀγαθὰ καὶ ὁ υἱὸς p. 363.
αὐτοῦ παρὰ θεῶν διδόασι τοῖς δικαίοις· εἰς Ἅιδου γὰρ
ἀγαγόντες τῷ λόγῳ καὶ κατακλίναντες καὶ συμπόσιον
τῶν ὁσίων κατασκευάσαντες ἐστεφανωμένους ποιοῦσι
τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον ἤδη διάγειν μεθύοντας, ἡγησά- D
μενοι κάλλιστον ἀρετῆς μισθὸν μέθην αἰώνιον. οἱ δ᾽
ἔτι τούτων μακροτέρους ἀποτείνουσι μισθοὺς παρὰ
θεῶν· παῖδας γὰρ παίδων φασὶ καὶ γένος κατόπισθεν
λείπεσθαι τοῦ ὁσίου καὶ εὐόρκου. ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἄλλα
τοιαῦτα ἐγκωμιάζουσι δικαιοσύνην. τοὺς δὲ ἀνοσίους
αὖ καὶ ἀδίκους εἰς πηλόν τινα κατορύττουσιν ἐν
Ἅιδου καὶ κοσκίνῳ ὕδωρ ἀναγκάζουσι φέρειν· ἔτι τε
ζῶντας εἰς κακὰς δόξας ἄγοντες, ἅπερ Γλαύκων περὶ E
τῶν δικαίων δοξαζομένων δὲ ἀδίκων διῆλθε τιμωρή-
ματα, ταῦτα περὶ τῶν ἀδίκων λέγουσιν, ἄλλα δὲ οὐκ
ἔχουσιν. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἔπαινος καὶ ὁ ψόγος οὗτος ἑκα-
τέρων.

Men are always repeating that virtue is painful and vice pleasant.

Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις σκέψαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο αὖ
εἶδος λόγων περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας ἰδίᾳ τε
λεγόμενον καὶ ὑπὸ ποιητῶν. | πάντες γὰρ ἐξ ἑνὸς p. 364.
στόματος ὑμνοῦσιν, ὡς καλὸν μὲν ἡ σωφροσύνη τε
καὶ δικαιοσύνη, χαλεπὸν μέντοι καὶ ἐπίπονον· ἀκο-
λασία δὲ καὶ ἀδικία ἡδὺ μὲν καὶ εὐπετὲς κτήσασθαι,
δόξῃ δὲ μόνον καὶ νόμῳ αἰσχρόν. λυσιτελέστερα
δὲ τῶν δικαίων τὰ ἄδικα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος λέγουσι,
καὶ πονηροὺς πλουσίους καὶ ἄλλας δυνάμεις ἔχοντας
εὐδαιμονίζειν καὶ τιμᾶν εὐχερῶς ἐθέλουσι δημοσίᾳ τε
καὶ ἰδίᾳ, τοὺς δὲ ἀτιμάζειν καὶ ὑπερορᾶν, οἳ ἄν πῃ
ἀσθενεῖς τε καὶ πένητες ὦσιν, ὁμολογοῦντες αὐτοὺς B
ἀμείνους εἶναι τῶν ἑτέρων. τούτων δὲ πάντων οἱ

21. τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη ΠΜ: om. A.

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p. 364. περὶ θεῶν τε λόγοι καὶ ἀρετῆς θαυμασιώτατοι λέγονται, ὡς ἄρα καὶ θεοὶ πολλοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς δυστυχίας τε καὶ βίον κακὸν ἔνειμαν, τοῖς δ' ἐναντίοις ἐναντίαν μοῖραν. ἀγύρται δὲ καὶ μάντεις ἐπὶ πλουσίων θύρας ἰόντες πείθουσιν ὡς ἔστι παρὰ σφίσι δύναμις ἐκ θεῶν ποριζομένη θυσίαις τε καὶ ἐπῳδαῖς, εἴτε τι
C ἀδίκημά του γέγονεν αὐτοῦ ἢ προγόνων, ἀκεῖσθαι μεθ' ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἑορτῶν, ἐάν τέ τινα ἐχθρὸν πημῆναι ἐθέλῃ, μετὰ σμικρῶν δαπανῶν ὁμοίως δίκαιον ἀδίκῳ βλάψει, ἐπαγωγαῖς τισὶ καὶ καταδέσμοις τοὺς θεούς, ὥς φασι, πείθοντές σφισιν ὑπηρετεῖν. τούτοις δὲ πᾶσι τοῖς λόγοις μάρτυρας ποιητὰς ἐπάγονται, οἱ μὲν κακίας πέρι εὐπετείας διδόντες,

ὡς τὴν μὲν κακότητα καὶ ἰλαδὸν ἔστιν ἑλέσθαι
D ῥηϊδίως· λείη μὲν ὁδός, μάλα δ' ἐγγύθι ναίει·
τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἱδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν ἔθηκαν

καί τινα ὁδὸν μακράν τε καὶ ἀνάντη· οἱ δὲ τῆς τῶν θεῶν ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων παραγωγῆς τὸν Ὅμηρον μαρτύρονται, ὅτι καὶ ἐκεῖνος εἶπε

στρεπτοὶ δέ τε καὶ θεοὶ αὐτοί,
καὶ τοὺς μὲν θυσίαισι καὶ εὐχωλαῖς ἀγαναῖσιν
E λοιβῇ τε κνίσῃ τε παρατρωπῶσ' ἄνθρωποι
λισσόμενοι, ὅτε κέν τις ὑπερβήῃ καὶ ἁμάρτῃ.

They are taught that sins may be easily expiated.

βίβλων δὲ ὅμαδον παρέχονται Μουσαίου καὶ Ὀρφέως, Σελήνης τε καὶ Μουσῶν ἐγγόνων, ὥς φασι, καθ' ἃς θυηπολοῦσι, πείθοντες οὐ μόνον ἰδιώτας ἀλλὰ καὶ πόλεις, ὡς ἄρα λύσεις τε καὶ καθαρμοὶ ἀδικημάτων

10. βλάψει ΑΠΜ : βλάψειν *q* : βλάψαι cj. Muretus.
13. διδόντες MSS. : ᾄδοντες cj. Muretus. 20. στρεπτοὶ δέ τε ΠΜ : λιστοὶ δὲ στρεπτοί τε Α : λιστοὶ δὲ στρεπτοὶ δέ τε Α² : λιστοὶ στρεπτοὶ δέ τε Π². 25. ἐγγόνων MSS. : ἐκγόνων cj. Ast.

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διὰ θυσιῶν καὶ παιδιᾶς ἡδονῶν εἰσὶ μὲν ἔτι ζῶσιν, p. 364. | εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ τελευτήσασιν, ἃς δὴ τελετὰς καλοῦσιν, p. 365. αἳ τῶν ἐκεῖ κακῶν ἀπολύουσιν ἡμᾶς, μὴ θύσαντας δὲ δεινὰ περιμένει.

The effects of all this upon the youthful mind.

Ταῦτα πάντα, ἔφη, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες, τοιαῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτα λεγόμενα ἀρετῆς πέρι καὶ κακίας, ὡς ἄνθρωποι καὶ θεοὶ περὶ αὐτὰ ἔχουσι τιμῆς, τί οἰόμεθα ἀκουούσας νέων ψυχὰς ποιεῖν, ὅσοι εὐφυεῖς καὶ ἱκανοὶ ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα ὥσπερ ἐπιπτόμενοι συλλογίσασθαι ἐξ αὐτῶν, ποῖός τις ἂν ὢν καὶ πῇ B πορευθεὶς τὸν βίον ὡς ἄριστα διέλθοι; λέγοι γὰρ ἂν ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων πρὸς αὑτὸν κατὰ Πίνδαρον ἐκεῖνο τὸ Πότερον δίκᾳ τεῖχος ὕψιον ἢ σκολιαῖς ἀπάταις ἀναβὰς καὶ ἐμαυτὸν οὕτω περιφράξας διαβιῶ; τὰ μὲν γὰρ λεγόμενα δικαίῳ μὲν ὄντι μοι, ἐὰν καὶ μὴ δοκῶ, ὄφελος οὐδέν φασιν εἶναι, πόνους δὲ καὶ ζημίας φανεράς· ἀδίκῳ δὲ δόξαν δικαιοσύνης παρασκευασαμένῳ θεσπέσιος βίος λέγεται. οὐκοῦν, ἐπειδὴ τὸ C δοκεῖν, ὡς δηλοῦσί μοι οἱ σοφοί, καὶ τὰν ἀλάθειαν βιᾶται καὶ κύριον εὐδαιμονίας, ἐπὶ τοῦτο δὴ τρεπτέον ὅλως· πρόθυρα μὲν καὶ σχῆμα κύκλῳ περὶ ἐμαυτὸν σκιαγραφίαν ἀρετῆς περιγραπτέον, τὴν δὲ τοῦ σοφωτάτου Ἀρχιλόχου ἀλώπεκα ἑλκτέον ἐξόπισθεν κερδαλέαν καὶ ποικίλην. ἀλλὰ γάρ, φησί τις, οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἀεὶ λανθάνειν κακὸν ὄντα. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλο οὐδὲν εὐπετές, φήσομεν, τῶν μεγάλων· ἀλλ' ὅμως, εἰ μέλλομεν D εὐδαιμονήσειν, ταύτῃ ἰτέον, ὡς τὰ ἴχνη τῶν λόγων φέρει. ἐπὶ γὰρ τὸ λανθάνειν ξυνωμοσίας τε καὶ ἑταιρείας συνάξομεν, εἰσί τε πειθοῦς διδάσκαλοι

15. ἐὰν καὶ μὴ ΑΠΜ : ἐὰν μὴ καὶ x.
17. παρασκευασαμένῳ ΑΠ : παρεσκευασμένῳ M.

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p. 365. σοφίαν δημηγορικήν τε καὶ δικανικὴν διδόντες, ἐξ ὧν τὰ μὲν πείσομεν, τὰ δὲ βιασόμεθα, ὡς πλεονεκτοῦντες δίκην μὴ διδόναι. ἀλλὰ δὴ θεοὺς οὔτε λανθάνειν οὔτε βιάσασθαι δυνατόν. οὐκοῦν, εἰ μὲν μὴ εἰσὶν ἢ μηδὲν αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων μέλει, οὐδ' E ἡμῖν μελητέον τοῦ λανθάνειν· εἰ δὲ εἰσί τε καὶ ἐπιμελοῦνται, οὐκ ἄλλοθέν τοι αὐτοὺς ἴσμεν ἢ ἀκηκόαμεν ἢ ἔκ τε τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν γενεαλογησάντων ποιητῶν· οἱ δὲ αὐτοὶ οὗτοι λέγουσιν ὡς εἰσὶν οἷοι θυσίαις τε καὶ εὐχωλαῖς ἀγανῇσι καὶ ἀναθήμασι παράγεσθαι ἀναπειθόμενοι· οἷς ἢ ἀμφότερα ἢ οὐδέτερα πειστέον. εἰ δ' οὖν πειστέον, ἀδικητέον καὶ θυτέον ἀπὸ τῶν p. 366. ἀδικημάτων. | δίκαιοι μὲν γὰρ ὄντες ἀζήμιοι * μὲν ὑπὸ θεῶν ἐσόμεθα, τὰ δ' ἐξ ἀδικίας κέρδη ἀπωσόμεθα· ἄδικοι δὲ κερδανοῦμέν τε καὶ λισσόμενοι ὑπερβαίνοντες καὶ ἁμαρτάνοντες, πείθοντες αὐτοὺς ἀζήμιοι ἀπαλλάξομεν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐν Ἅιδου δίκην δώσομεν ὧν ἂν ἐνθάδε ἀδικήσωμεν, ἢ αὐτοὶ ἢ παῖδες παίδων. ἀλλ', ὦ φίλε, φήσει λογιζόμενος, αἱ τελεταὶ αὖ μέγα B δύνανται καὶ οἱ λύσιοι θεοί, ὡς αἱ μέγισται πόλεις λέγουσι καὶ οἱ θεῶν παῖδες ποιηταὶ καὶ προφῆται τῶν θεῶν γενόμενοι, οἳ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν μηνύουσιν.

The existence of the gods is only known to us through the poets, who likewise assure us that they may be bribed and that they are very ready to forgive.

Κατὰ τίνα οὖν ἔτι λόγον δικαιοσύνην ἂν πρὸ μεγίστης ἀδικίας αἱροίμεθ' ἄν; ἣν ἐὰν μετ' εὐσχημοσύνης κιβδήλου κτησώμεθα, καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρ'

5. οὐδ' q : καὶ ΑΠΜ b : τί καὶ x.
6. μελητέον ΑΠΜ : ἀμελητέον cj. Baiter (καὶ ἡμῖν ἀμ.) οὐ μελητέον b.
13. μὲν cj. Muretus : μόνον ΠΜ: om. A.
19. ἀλλ', ὦ φίλε, φήσει λογιζόμενος, αἱ MSS. : ἀλλ' ὠφελήσουσιν ἁγνιζομένους αἱ cj. Herm. : ἀλλ' ὠφελήσουσιν αἱ νομιζόμεναι Vermehren. ibid. αὖ μέγα δύνανται ΠΞ : om. AM (et del. Herm., Vermehren).

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All this, even if not absolutely true, affords great excuse for doing wrong.

ἀνθρώποις πράξομεν κατὰ νοῦν ζῶντές τε καὶ τελευτήσαντες, ὡς ὁ τῶν πολλῶν τε καὶ ἄκρων λεγόμενος λόγος. ἐκ δὴ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων τίς μηχανή, ὦ Σώκρατες, δικαιοσύνην τιμᾶν ἐθέλειν ᾧ τις δύναμις ὑπάρχει ψυχῆς ἢ χρημάτων ἢ σώματος ἢ γένους, ἀλλὰ μὴ γελᾶν ἐπαινουμένης ἀκούοντα; ὡς δή τοι εἴ τις ἔχει ψευδῆ μὲν ἀποφῆναι ἃ εἰρήκαμεν, ἱκανῶς δὲ ἔγνωκεν ὅτι ἄριστον δικαιοσύνη, πολλήν που συγγνώμην ἔχει καὶ οὐκ ὀργίζεται τοῖς ἀδίκοις, ἀλλ' οἶδεν ὅτι πλὴν εἴ τις θείᾳ φύσει δυσχεραίνων τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἐπιστήμην λαβὼν ἀπέχεται αὐτοῦ, τῶν γε ἄλλων οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν δίκαιος, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ ἀνανδρίας ἢ γήρως ἤ τινος ἄλλης ἀσθενείας ψέγει τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἀδυνατῶν αὐτὸ δρᾶν. ὡς δέ, δῆλον· ὁ γὰρ πρῶτος τῶν τοιούτων εἰς δύναμιν ἐλθὼν πρῶτος ἀδικεῖ, καθ' ὅσον ἂν οἷός τ' ᾖ.

p. 366. C D

Καὶ τούτων ἁπάντων οὐδὲν ἄλλο αἴτιον ἢ ἐκεῖνο, ὅθενπερ ἅπας ὁ λόγος οὗτος ὥρμησε καὶ τῷδε καὶ ἐμοὶ πρὸς σέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπεῖν, ὅτι Ὦ θαυμάσιε, πάντων ὑμῶν, ὅσοι ἐπαινέται φατὲ δικαιοσύνης εἶναι, ἀπὸ τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἡρώων ἀρξάμενοι, ὅσων λόγοι λελειμμένοι, μέχρι τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἔψεξεν ἀδικίαν οὐδ' ἐπῄνεσε δικαιοσύνην ἄλλως ἢ δόξας τε καὶ τιμὰς καὶ δωρεὰς τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γιγνομένας· αὐτὸ δ' ἑκάτερον τῇ αὑτοῦ δυνάμει ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἔχοντος ψυχῇ ἐνὸν καὶ λανθάνον θεούς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὔτ' ἐν ποιήσει οὔτ' ἐν ἰδίοις λόγοις ἐπεξῆλθεν ἱκανῶς τῷ λόγῳ, ὡς τὸ μὲν μέγι-

E

5. ψυχῆς ΑΠ : τύχης Amg. Π²ΜΞ 14. ὡς δὲ Α²ΠΜ : ὧδε Α. 19. εἰπεῖν ΠΜ : εἶπεν Α. 20. ὑμῶν . . . φατὲ ΑΜ : ἡμῶν . . . φαμεν τὲ Π. εἶναι Π : om. ΑΜ.

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Men should be taught that justice is in itself the greatest good and injustice the greatest evil.

p. 366. στον κακῶν ὅσα ἴσχει ψυχὴ ἐν αὑτῇ, δικαιοσύνη δὲ p. 367. μέγιστον ἀγαθόν. εἰ | γὰρ οὕτως ἐλέγετο ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπὸ πάντων ὑμῶν καὶ ἐκ νέων ἡμᾶς ἐπείθετε, οὐκ ἂν ἀλλήλους ἐφυλάττομεν μὴ ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ ἦν ἕκαστος φύλαξ, δεδιὼς μὴ ἀδικῶν τῷ μεγίστῳ κακῷ ξύνοικος ᾖ. ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἔτι τούτων πλείω Θρασύμαχός τε καὶ ἄλλος πού τις ὑπὲρ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας λέγοιεν ἄν, μεταστρέφοντες αὐτοῖν τὴν δύναμιν φορτικῶς, ὥς γ' ἐμοὶ B δοκεῖ. ἀλλ' ἐγώ, οὐδὲν γάρ σε δέομαι ἀποκρύπτεσθαι, σοῦ ἐπιθυμῶν ἀκοῦσαι τἀναντία, ὡς δύναμαι μάλιστα κατατείνας λέγω. μὴ οὖν ἡμῖν μόνον ἐνδείξῃ τῷ λόγῳ ὅτι δικαιοσύνη ἀδικίας κρεῖττον, ἀλλὰ τί ποιοῦσα ἑκατέρα τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτὴ δι' αὑτὴν ἡ μὲν κακόν, ἡ δὲ ἀγαθόν ἐστι· τὰς δὲ δόξας ἀφαίρει, ὥσπερ Γλαύκων διεκελεύσατο. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀφαιρήσεις ἑκατέρωθεν τὰς ἀληθεῖς, τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς προσθήσεις, οὐ τὸ δίκαιον φήσομεν ἐπαινεῖν σε ἀλλὰ τὸ C δοκεῖν, οὐδὲ τὸ ἄδικον εἶναι ψέγειν ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν, καὶ παρακελεύεσθαι ἄδικον ὄντα λανθάνειν, καὶ ὁμολογεῖν Θρασυμάχῳ, ὅτι τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν, ξυμφέρον τοῦ κρείττονος, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον αὑτῷ μὲν ξυμφέρον καὶ λυσιτελοῦν, τῷ δὲ ἥττονι ἀξύμφορον. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ὡμολόγησας τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν εἶναι δικαιοσύνην, ἃ τῶν τε ἀποβαινόντων ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἕνεκα ἄξια κεκτῆσθαι, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον αὐτὰ αὑτῶν, οἷον ὁρᾶν, ἀκούειν, φρονεῖν, καὶ ὑγιαίνειν δή, D καὶ ὅσ' ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ γόνιμα τῇ αὑτῶν φύσει ἀλλ' οὐ δόξῃ ἐστί, τοῦτ' οὖν αὐτὸ ἐπαίνεσον δικαιοσύνης, ὃ αὐτὴ δι' αὑτὴν τὸν ἔχοντα ὀνίνησι καὶ ἀδικία βλάπτει·

6. ξύνοικος ᾖ AM : ξυνοικοίη Π. 9. γ' ἐμοὶ Π x : γέ μοι AM.

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ADEIMANTUS, SOCRATES.

μισθοὺς δὲ καὶ δόξας πάρες ἄλλοις ἐπαινεῖν· ὡς ἐγὼ p. 367. τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἀνασχοίμην ἂν οὕτως ἐπαινούντων δικαιοσύνην καὶ ψεγόντων ἀδικίαν, δόξας τε περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ μισθοὺς ἐγκωμιαζόντων καὶ λοιδορούντων, σοῦ δὲ οὐκ ἄν, εἰ μὴ σὺ κελεύεις, διότι πάντα τὸν βίον οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπῶν διελήλυθας ἢ τοῦτο. μὴ E οὖν ἡμῖν ἐνδείξῃ μόνον τῷ λόγῳ ὅτι δικαιοσύνη ἀδικίας κρεῖττον, ἀλλὰ τί ποιοῦσα ἑκατέρα τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτὴ δι' αὑτήν, ἐάν τε λανθάνῃ ἐάν τε μὴ θεούς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους, ἡ μὲν ἀγαθόν, ἡ δὲ κακόν ἐστιν.

Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας, ἀεὶ μὲν δὴ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ τε Γλαύκωνος καὶ τοῦ Ἀδειμάντου ἠγάμην, ἀτὰρ οὖν καὶ τότε πάνυ γε ἥσθην | καὶ εἶπον· Οὐ κακῶς εἰς p. 368. ὑμᾶς, ὦ παῖδες ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός, τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν ἐλεγείων ἐποίησεν ὁ Γλαύκωνος ἐραστής, εὐδοκιμήσαντας περὶ τὴν Μεγαροῖ μάχην, εἰπών·

παῖδες Ἀρίστωνος, κλεινοῦ θεῖον γένος ἀνδρός·

Glaucon and Adeimantus able to argue so well, but unconvinced by their own arguments.

τοῦτό μοι, ὦ φίλοι, εὖ δοκεῖ ἔχειν· πάνυ γὰρ θεῖον πεπόνθατε, εἰ μὴ πέπεισθε ἀδικίαν δικαιοσύνης ἄμεινον εἶναι, οὕτω δυνάμενοι εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ. δοκεῖτε δή μοι ὡς ἀληθῶς οὐ πεπεῖσθαι. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἐκ B τοῦ ἄλλου τοῦ ὑμετέρου τρόπου, ἐπεὶ κατά γε αὐτοὺς τοὺς λόγους ἠπίστουν ἂν ὑμῖν· ὅσῳ δὲ μᾶλλον πιστεύω, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ἀπορῶ ὅ τι χρήσωμαι· οὔτε γὰρ ὅπως βοηθῶ ἔχω· δοκῶ γάρ μοι ἀδύνατος εἶναι· σημεῖον δέ μοι, ὅτι ἃ πρὸς Θρασύμαχον λέγων ᾤμην ἀποφαίνειν, ὡς ἄμεινον δικαιοσύνη ἀδικίας, οὐκ ἀπεδέξασθέ μου· οὔτ' αὖ ὅπως μὴ βοηθήσω ἔχω· δέ-

2. ἀνασχοίμην Ξ schol. et Fic. (*sustinerem*): ἀποσχοίμην γρ. ἀποδεχοίμην AM: ἀποδεχοίμην Π. 5. κελεύοις A^{2}M. 9. αὐτὴ M: αὐτὴν AΠ.

p. 368. δοικα γὰρ μὴ οὐδ' ὅσιον ᾖ παραγενόμενον δικαιοσύνῃ C κακηγορουμένῃ ἀπαγορεύειν καὶ μὴ βοηθεῖν ἔτι ἐμπνέοντα καὶ δυνάμενον φθέγγεσθαι. κράτιστον οὖν οὕτως, ὅπως δύναμαι, ἐπικουρεῖν αὐτῇ. Ὅ τε οὖν Γλαύκων καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐδέοντο παντὶ τρόπῳ βοηθῆσαι καὶ μὴ ἀνεῖναι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ διερευνήσασθαι τί τε ἔστιν ἑκάτερον καὶ περὶ τῆς ὠφελίας αὐτοῖν τἀληθὲς ποτέρως ἔχει. εἶπον οὖν ὅπερ ἐμοὶ ἔδοξεν, ὅτι τὸ ζήτημα ᾧ ἐπιχειροῦμεν οὐ φαῦλον ἀλλ' ὀξὺ βλέ- D ποντος, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἡμεῖς οὐ δεινοί, δοκεῖ μοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοιαύτην ποιήσασθαι ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ, οἵανπερ ἂν εἰ προσέταξέ τις γράμματα σμικρὰ πόρρωθεν ἀναγνῶναι μὴ πάνυ ὀξὺ βλέπουσιν, ἔπειτά τις ἐνενόησεν, ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ γράμματα ἔστι που καὶ ἄλλοθι μείζω τε καὶ ἐν μείζονι, ἕρμαιον ἂν ἐφάνη, οἶμαι, ἐκεῖνα πρῶτον ἀναγνόντας οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖν τὰ ἐλάττω, εἰ τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει.

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The large letters.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Ἀδείμαντος· ἀλλὰ τί τοιοῦτον, E ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῇ περὶ τὸ δίκαιον ζητήσει καθορᾷς;

Ἐγώ σοι, ἔφην, ἐρῶ. δικαιοσύνη, φαμέν, ἔστι μὲν ἀνδρὸς ἑνός, ἔστι δέ που καὶ ὅλης πόλεως;

Πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Οὐκοῦν μεῖζον πόλις ἑνὸς ἀνδρός;

Μεῖζον, ἔφη.

Ἴσως τοίνυν πλείων ἂν δικαιοσύνη ἐν τῷ μείζονι ἐνείη καὶ ῥᾴων καταμαθεῖν. εἰ οὖν βούλεσθε, πρῶτον p. 369. ἐν | ταῖς πόλεσι ζητήσωμεν ποῖόν τί ἐστιν· ἔπειτα οὕτως ἐπισκεψώμεθα καὶ ἐν ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ, τὴν τοῦ μείζονος ὁμοιότητα ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἐλάττονος ἰδέᾳ ἐπισκοποῦντες.

Justice to be seen in the State more easily than in the individual.

Ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη, καλῶς λέγειν.

23, 24. μεῖζον (bis) ΑΠΜ: μείζων A².

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p. 369. Ἀρ᾽ οὖν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, εἰ γιγνομένην πόλιν θεασαίμεθα λόγῳ, καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην αὐτῆς ἴδοιμεν ἂν γιγνομένην καὶ τὴν ἀδικίαν;

Τάχ᾽ ἄν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς.

Οὐκοῦν γενομένου αὐτοῦ ἐλπὶς εὐπετέστερον ἰδεῖν ὃ ζητοῦμεν;

Πολύ γε. B

Δοκεῖ οὖν χρῆναι ἐπιχειρῆσαι περαίνειν; οἶμαι μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ὀλίγον ἔργον αὐτὸ εἶναι· σκοπεῖτε οὖν.

Ἔσκεπται, ἔφη ὁ Ἀδείμαντος· ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει.

The State arises out of the wants of men.

Γίγνεται τοίνυν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, πόλις, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνει ἡμῶν ἕκαστος οὐκ αὐτάρκης, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν ἐνδεής· ἢ τίν᾽ οἴει ἀρχὴν ἄλλην πόλιν οἰκίζειν;

Οὐδεμίαν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς.

C Οὕτω δὴ ἄρα παραλαμβάνων ἄλλος ἄλλον ἐπ᾽ ἄλλου, τὸν δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἄλλου χρείᾳ, πολλῶν δεόμενοι, πολλοὺς εἰς μίαν οἴκησιν ἀγείραντες κοινωνούς τε καὶ βοηθούς, ταύτῃ τῇ ξυνοικίᾳ ἐθέμεθα πόλιν ὄνομα· ἦ γάρ;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Μεταδίδωσι δὴ ἄλλος ἄλλῳ, εἴ τι μεταδίδωσιν, ἢ μεταλαμβάνει, οἰόμενος αὑτῷ ἄμεινον εἶναι.

Πάνυ γε.

Ἴθι δή, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τῷ λόγῳ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ποιῶμεν πόλιν· ποιήσει δὲ αὐτήν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ ἡμετέρα χρεία.

Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;

The four or five greater needs of

D Ἀλλὰ μὴν πρώτη γε καὶ μεγίστη τῶν χρειῶν ἡ τῆς τροφῆς παρασκευὴ τοῦ εἶναί τε καὶ ζῆν ἕνεκα.

Παντάπασί γε.

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p. 369. Δευτέρα δὴ οἰκήσεως, τρίτη δὲ ἐσθῆτος καὶ τῶν τοιούτων.

Ἔστι ταῦτα.

Φέρε δή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πῶς ἡ πόλις ἀρκέσει ἐπὶ τοσαύτην παρασκευήν; ἄλλο τι γεωργὸς μὲν εἷς, ὁ δὲ οἰκοδόμος, ἄλλος δέ τις ὑφάντης; ἢ καὶ σκυτοτόμον αὐτόσε προσθήσομεν ἤ τιν' ἄλλον τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπευτήν;

life, and the four or five kinds of citizens who correspond to them.

Πάνυ γε.

Εἴη δ' ἂν ἥ γε ἀναγκαιοτάτη πόλις ἐκ τεττάρων ἢ πέντε ἀνδρῶν.

E Φαίνεται.

Τί δὴ οὖν; ἕνα ἕκαστον τούτων δεῖ τὸ αὑτοῦ ἔργον ἅπασι κοινὸν κατατιθέναι, οἷον τὸν γεωργὸν ἕνα ὄντα παρασκευάζειν σιτία τέτταρσι καὶ τετραπλάσιον χρόνον τε καὶ πόνον ἀναλίσκειν ἐπὶ σίτου παρασκευῇ καὶ ἄλλοις κοινωνεῖν, ἢ ἀμελήσαντα p. 370. ἑαυτῷ μόνον τέταρτον μέρος ποιεῖν τούτου τοῦ | σίτου ἐν τετάρτῳ μέρει τοῦ χρόνου, τὰ δὲ τρία, τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ τῆς οἰκίας παρασκευῇ διατρίβειν, τὸ δὲ ἱματίου, τὸ δὲ ὑποδημάτων, καὶ μὴ ἄλλοις κοινωνοῦντα πράγματα ἔχειν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν δι' αὑτὸν τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν;

The division of labour.

Καὶ ὁ Ἀδείμαντος ἔφη Ἀλλ' ἴσως, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω ῥᾷον ἢ 'κείνως.

Οὐδέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μὰ Δία ἄτοπον. ἐννοῶ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς εἰπόντος σοῦ, ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν φύεται ἕκαστος B οὐ πάνυ ὅμοιος ἑκάστῳ, ἀλλὰ διαφέρων τὴν φύσιν, ἄλλος ἐπ' ἄλλου ἔργου πρᾶξιν. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι;

18. σίτου A: σιτίου A²ΠΜ. 25. ῥᾷον q: ῥᾴδιον ΑΠΜ.
27. μὲν ἡμῶν Π. 29. πράξει Μ.

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Ἔμοιγε. p. 370.

Τί δέ; πότερον κάλλιον πράττοι ἄν τις εἷς ὢν πολλὰς τέχνας ἐργαζόμενος, ἢ ὅταν μίαν εἷς;

Ὅταν, ἦ δ' ὅς, εἷς μίαν.

Ἀλλὰ μήν, οἶμαι, καὶ τόδε δῆλον, ὡς, ἐάν τίς τινος παρῇ ἔργου καιρόν, διόλλυται.

Δῆλον γάρ.

Οὐ γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐθέλει τὸ πραττόμενον τὴν τοῦ πράττοντος σχολὴν περιμένειν, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη τὸν πράττοντα τῷ πραττομένῳ ἐπακολουθεῖν μὴ ἐν παρ- C έργου μέρει.

Ἀνάγκη.

Ἐκ δὴ τούτων πλείω τε ἕκαστα γίγνεται καὶ κάλλιον καὶ ῥᾷον, ὅταν εἷς ἓν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἐν καιρῷ, σχολὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄγων, πράττῃ.

The first citizens are:—1. a husbandman, 2. a builder, 3. a weaver, 4. a shoemaker. To these must be added:—5. a carpenter, 6. a smith, etc., 7. merchants, 8. retailers.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

Πλειόνων δή, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, δεῖ πολιτῶν ἢ τεττάρων ἐπὶ τὰς παρασκευὰς ὧν ἐλέγομεν. ὁ γὰρ γεωργός, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ αὐτὸς ποιήσεται ἑαυτῷ τὸ ἄροτρον, εἰ μέλλει καλὸν εἶναι, οὐδὲ σμινύην, οὐδὲ τἆλλα ὄρ- D γανα ὅσα περὶ γεωργίαν. οὐδ' αὖ ὁ οἰκοδόμος· πολλῶν δὲ καὶ τούτῳ δεῖ. ὡσαύτως δ' ὁ ὑφάντης τε καὶ ὁ σκυτοτόμος.

Ἀληθῆ.

Τέκτονες δὴ καὶ χαλκῆς καὶ τοιοῦτοί τινες πολλοὶ δημιουργοί, κοινωνοὶ ἡμῖν τοῦ πολιχνίου γιγνόμενοι, συχνὸν αὐτὸ ποιοῦσιν.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄν πω πάνυ γε μέγα τι εἴη, εἰ αὐτοῖς

2. τί δέ ΑΠΜ : τί δαί A² (et saepius).
14. εἷς ἓν ΠΜ : εἰς ἓν A.

p. 370. βουκόλους τε καὶ ποιμένας τούς τε ἄλλους νομέας
E προσθεῖμεν, ἵνα οἵ τε γεωργοὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀροῦν ἔχοιεν βοῦς, οἵ τε οἰκοδόμοι πρὸς τὰς ἀγωγὰς μετὰ τῶν γεωργῶν χρῆσθαι ὑποζυγίοις, ὑφάνται δὲ καὶ σκυτοτόμοι δέρμασί τε καὶ ἐρίοις.

Οὐδέ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς, σμικρὰ πόλις ἂν εἴη ἔχουσα πάντα ταῦτα.

Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κατοικίσαι γε αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον, οὗ ἐπεισαγωγίμων μὴ δεήσεται, σχεδόν τι ἀδύνατον.

Ἀδύνατον γάρ.

Προσδεήσει ἄρα ἔτι καὶ ἄλλων, οἳ ἐξ ἄλλης πόλεως αὐτῇ κομίσουσιν ὧν δεῖται.

Δεήσει.

Καὶ μὴν κενὸς ἂν ἴῃ ὁ διάκονος, μηδὲν ἄγων ὧν ἐκεῖνοι δέονται παρ' ὧν ἂν κομίζωνται ὧν ἂν αὐ-
p. 371. τοῖς | χρεία, κενὸς ἄπεισιν. ἦ γάρ;

Δοκεῖ μοι.

Δεῖ δὴ τὰ οἴκοι μὴ μόνον ἑαυτοῖς ποιεῖν ἱκανά, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἷα καὶ ὅσα ἐκείνοις ὧν ἂν δέωνται.

Δεῖ γάρ.

Πλειόνων δὴ γεωργῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δημιουργῶν δεῖ ἡμῖν τῇ πόλει.

Πλειόνων γάρ.

Καὶ δὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων διακόνων που τῶν τε εἰσαξόντων καὶ ἐξαξόντων ἕκαστα. οὗτοι δέ εἰσιν ἔμποροι· ἦ γάρ;

Ναί.

Καὶ ἐμπόρων δὴ δεησόμεθα.

Πάνυ γε.

13. κομισοῦσιν Π: κομιοῦσιν x. 15. ἴῃ q: εἴη ΑΠΜ.

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Socrates, Adeimantus.

Καὶ ἐὰν μέν γε κατὰ θάλατταν ἡ ἐμπορία γίγνηται, p. 371. συχνῶν καὶ ἄλλων προσδεήσεται τῶν ἐπιστημόνων B τῆς περὶ τὴν θάλατταν ἐργασίας.

Συχνῶν μέντοι.

Τί δὲ δή; ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει πῶς ἀλλήλοις μεταδώσουσιν ὧν ἂν ἕκαστοι ἐργάζωνται; ὧν δὴ ἕνεκα καὶ κοινωνίαν ποιησάμενοι πόλιν ᾠκίσαμεν.

Δῆλον δή, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὅτι πωλοῦντες καὶ ὠνούμενοι.

Ἀγορὰ δὴ ἡμῖν καὶ νόμισμα ξύμβολον τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἕνεκα γενήσεται ἐκ τούτου.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

The origin of retail trade.

Ἂν οὖν κομίσας ὁ γεωργὸς εἰς τὴν ἀγοράν τι ὧν C ποιεῖ ἤ τις ἄλλος τῶν δημιουργῶν μὴ εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ἥκῃ τοῖς δεομένοις τὰ παρ' αὐτοῦ ἀλλάξασθαι, ἀργήσει τῆς αὐτοῦ δημιουργίας καθήμενος ἐν ἀγορᾷ;

Οὐδαμῶς, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἀλλὰ εἰσὶν οἳ τοῦτο ὁρῶντες ἑαυτοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν διακονίαν τάττουσι ταύτην, ἐν μὲν ταῖς ὀρθῶς οἰκουμέναις πόλεσι σχεδόν τι οἱ ἀσθενέστατοι τὰ σώματα καὶ ἀχρεῖοί τι ἄλλο ἔργον πράττειν. αὐτοῦ γὰρ δεῖ μένοντας αὐτοὺς περὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν τὰ μὲν ἀντ' ἀργυρίου ἀλλάξασθαι τοῖς τι δεομένοις D ἀποδόσθαι, τοῖς δὲ ἀντὶ αὖ ἀργυρίου διαλλάττειν ὅσοι τι δέονται πρίασθαι.

Αὕτη ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ χρεία καπήλων ἡμῖν γένεσιν ἐμποιεῖ τῇ πόλει. ἢ οὐ καπήλους καλοῦμεν τοὺς πρὸς ὠνήν τε καὶ πρᾶσιν διακονοῦντας ἱδρυμένους ἐν ἀγορᾷ, τοὺς δὲ πλάνητας ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις ἐμπόρους;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

28. πλάνητας AΞKr: πλανήτας ΠΜ.

p. 371. E Ἔτι δή τινες, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, εἰσὶ καὶ ἄλλοι διάκονοι, οἳ ἂν τὰ μὲν τῆς διανοίας μὴ πάνυ ἀξιοκοινώνητοι ὦσι, τὴν δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἰσχὺν ἱκανὴν ἐπὶ τοὺς πόνους ἔχωσιν· οἳ δὴ πωλοῦντες τὴν τῆς ἰσχύος χρείαν, τὴν τιμὴν ταύτην μισθὸν καλοῦντες, κέκληνται, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, μισθωτοί· ἦ γάρ;

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Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Πλήρωμα δὴ πόλεώς εἰσιν, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ μισθωτοί.

Δοκεῖ μοι.

Ἆρ' οὖν, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, ἤδη ἡμῖν ηὔξηται ἡ πόλις, ὥστ' εἶναι τελέα;

Ἴσως.

Ποῦ οὖν ἄν ποτε ἐν αὐτῇ εἴη ἥ τε δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀδικία; καὶ τίνι ἅμα ἐγγενομένη ὧν ἐσκέμμεθα;

p. 372. Ἐγὼ μέν, ἔφη, | οὐκ ἐννοῶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ μή που ἐν αὐτῶν τούτων χρείᾳ τινὶ τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

Ἀλλ' ἴσως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καλῶς λέγεις· καὶ σκεπτέον γε καὶ οὐκ ἀποκνητέον.

A picture of primitive life.

Πρῶτον οὖν σκεψώμεθα, τίνα τρόπον διαιτήσονται οἱ οὕτω παρεσκευασμένοι. ἄλλο τι ἢ σῖτόν τε ποιοῦντες καὶ οἶνον καὶ ἱμάτια καὶ ὑποδήματα, καὶ οἰκοδομησάμενοι οἰκίας, θέρους μὲν τὰ πολλὰ γυμνοί τε καὶ ἀνυπόδητοι ἐργάσονται, τοῦ δὲ χειμῶνος ἠμφιεB σμένοι τε καὶ ὑποδεδεμένοι ἱκανῶς; θρέψονται δὲ ἐκ μὲν τῶν κριθῶν ἄλφιτα σκευαζόμενοι, ἐκ δὲ τῶν πυρῶν ἄλευρα, τὰ μὲν πέψαντες, τὰ δὲ μάξαντες, μάζας γενναίας καὶ ἄρτους ἐπὶ κάλαμόν τινα παραβαλλόμενοι ἢ φύλλα καθαρά, κατακλινέντες ἐπὶ στιβάδων ἐστρωμένων μίλακί τε καὶ μυρρίναις, εὐωχήσονται αὐτοί τε καὶ τὰ παιδία, ἐπιπίνοντες τοῦ

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οἴνου, ἐστεφανωμένοι καὶ ὑμνοῦντες τοὺς θεούς, ἡδέως ξυνόντες ἀλλήλοις, οὐχ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν ποιούμενοι τοὺς παῖδας, εὐλαβούμενοι πενίαν ἢ πόλεμον; p. 372. C

Καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων ὑπολαβών, Ἄνευ ὄψου, ἔφη, ὡς ἔοικας, ποιεῖς τοὺς ἄνδρας ἑστιωμένους.

Ἀληθῆ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις. ἐπελαθόμην ὅτι καὶ ὄψον ἕξουσιν· ἅλας τε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐλάας καὶ τυρόν, καὶ βολβοὺς καὶ λάχανα, οἷα δὴ ἐν ἀγροῖς ἑψήματα, ἑψήσονται· καὶ τραγήματά που παραθήσομεν αὐτοῖς τῶν τε σύκων καὶ ἐρεβίνθων καὶ κυάμων, καὶ μύρτα καὶ φηγοὺς σποδιοῦσι πρὸς τὸ πῦρ, μετρίως ὑποπίνοντες· καὶ οὕτω διάγοντες τὸν βίον ἐν εἰρήνῃ μετὰ ὑγιείας, ὡς εἰκός, γηραιοὶ τελευτῶντες ἄλλον τοιοῦτον βίον τοῖς ἐκγόνοις παραδώσουσιν. D

Καὶ ὅς, Εἰ δὲ ὑῶν πόλιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, κατεσκεύαζες, τί ἂν αὐτὰς ἄλλο ἢ ταῦτα ἐχόρταζες;

Ἀλλὰ πῶς χρή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων;

Ἅπερ νομίζεται, ἔφη· ἐπί τε κλινῶν κατακεῖσθαι, οἶμαι, τοὺς μέλλοντας μὴ ταλαιπωρεῖσθαι, καὶ ἀπὸ τραπεζῶν δειπνεῖν, καὶ ὄψα ἅπερ καὶ οἱ νῦν ἔχουσι, καὶ τραγήματα. E

A luxurious state must be called into existence,

Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· μανθάνω. οὐ πόλιν, ὡς ἔοικε, σκοποῦμεν μόνον ὅπως γίγνεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τρυφῶσαν πόλιν. ἴσως οὖν οὐδὲ κακῶς ἔχει· σκοποῦντες γὰρ καὶ τοιαύτην τάχ' ἂν κατίδοιμεν τήν τε δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἀδικίαν ὅπῃ ποτὲ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐμφύονται. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀληθινὴ πόλις δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι ἣν διεληλύθαμεν, ὥσπερ ὑγιής τις· εἰ δ' αὖ βούλεσθε καὶ φλεγμαίνουσαν πόλιν θεωρήσωμεν, οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει. ταῦτα γὰρ

11. σύκων ΜΞt: συκῶν ΑΠ.

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p. 373. δή τισιν, ὡς δοκεῖ, | οὐκ ἐξαρκέσει, οὐδ' αὕτη ἡ δίαιτα, ἀλλὰ κλῖναί τε προσέσονται καὶ τράπεζαι καὶ τἆλλα σκεύη, καὶ ὄψα δὴ καὶ μύρα καὶ θυμιάματα καὶ ἑταῖραι καὶ πέμματα, ἕκαστα τούτων παντοδαπά. καὶ δὴ καὶ ἃ τὸ πρῶτον ἐλέγομεν οὐκέτι τὰ ἀναγκαῖα θετέον, οἰκίας τε καὶ ἱμάτια καὶ ὑποδήματα, ἀλλὰ τήν τε ζωγραφίαν κινητέον καὶ τὴν ποικιλίαν, καὶ χρυσὸν καὶ ἐλέφαντα καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα κτητέον. ἦ γάρ;

B Ναί, ἔφη.

and in this many new callings will be required.

Οὐκοῦν μείζονά τε αὖ τὴν πόλιν δεῖ ποιεῖν· ἐκείνη γὰρ ἡ ὑγιεινὴ οὐκέτι ἱκανή, ἀλλ' ἤδη ὄγκου ἐμπληστέα καὶ πλήθους, ἃ οὐκέτι τοῦ ἀναγκαίου ἕνεκά ἐστιν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, οἷον οἵ τε θηρευταὶ πάντες, οἵ τε μιμηταί, πολλοὶ μὲν οἱ περὶ τὰ σχήματά τε καὶ χρώματα, πολλοὶ δὲ οἱ περὶ μουσικήν, ποιηταί τε καὶ τούτων ὑπηρέται, ῥαψῳδοί, ὑποκριταί, χορευταί, ἐργολάβοι, σκευῶν τε παντοδαπῶν δημιουργοί, τῶν τε
C ἄλλων καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸν γυναικεῖον κόσμον. καὶ δὴ καὶ διακόνων πλειόνων δεησόμεθα· ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ δεήσειν παιδαγωγῶν, τιτθῶν, τροφῶν, κομμωτριῶν, κουρέων, καὶ αὖ ὀψοποιῶν τε καὶ μαγείρων; ἔτι δὲ καὶ συβωτῶν προσδεησόμεθα. τοῦτο γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ πόλει οὐκ ἐνῆν· ἔδει γὰρ οὐδέν· ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ καὶ τούτου προσδεήσει. δεήσει δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων βοσκημάτων παμπόλλων, εἴ τις αὐτὰ ἔδεται. ἦ γάρ;

Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

1. αὕτη Bekker: αὐτὴ MSS. 2. κλῖναί 𝔪: κλίναι ΑΠΜ. 4. ἑταῖραι MSS.: ἐσχαρῖται cj. Madvig: ἀθῆραι cj. Nitsch: ἐραῖα cj. J. Richter. 7. καὶ τὴν ποικιλίαν Π: om. AM. 11. αὖ τὴν ΠΜ: αὐτὴν A.

Republic II.

SOCRATES, GLAUCON.

The territory of our State must be enlarged, and hence will arise war between us and our neighbours.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἰατρῶν ἐν χρείαις ἐσόμεθα πολὺ μᾶλ- p. 373. D
λον οὕτω διαιτώμενοι ἢ ὡς τὸ πρότερον;

Πολύ γε.

Καὶ ἡ χώρα που ἡ τότε ἱκανὴ τρέφειν τοὺς τότε σμικρὰ δὴ ἐξ ἱκανῆς ἔσται. ἢ πῶς λέγωμεν;

Οὕτως, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν τῆς τῶν πλησίον χώρας ἡμῖν ἀποτμητέον, εἰ μέλλομεν ἱκανὴν ἕξειν νέμειν τε καὶ ἀροῦν, καὶ ἐκείνοις αὖ τῆς ἡμετέρας, ἐὰν καὶ ἐκεῖνοι ἀφῶσιν αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ χρημάτων κτῆσιν ἄπειρον, ὑπερβάντες τὸν
τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὅρον; E

Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Πολεμήσομεν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὦ Γλαύκων· ἢ πῶς ἔσται;

Οὕτως, ἔφη.

Καὶ μηδέν γέ πω λέγωμεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μήτ' εἴ τι κακὸν μήτ' εἰ ἀγαθὸν ὁ πόλεμος ἐργάζεται, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον μόνον, ὅτι πολέμου αὖ γένεσιν εὑρήκαμεν, ἐξ ὧν μάλιστα ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ κακὰ γίγνεται, ὅταν γίγνηται.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Ἔτι δή, ὦ φίλε, μείζονος τῆς πόλεως δεῖ οὔτι
σμικρῷ, ἀλλ' ὅλῳ στρατοπέδῳ, | ὃ ἐξελθὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς p. 374.
οὐσίας ἁπάσης καὶ ὑπὲρ ὧν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν διαμαχεῖται τοῖς ἐπιοῦσιν.

Τί δέ; ἦ δ' ὅς· αὐτοὶ οὐχ ἱκανοί;

War is an art, and no art can be pursued with success unless a man's

Οὔκ, εἰ σύ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἅπαντες ὡμολογήσαμεν καλῶς, ἡνίκα ἐπλάττομεν τὴν πόλιν· ὡμολογοῦμεν δέ που, εἰ μέμνησαι, ἀδύνατον ἕνα πολλὰς καλῶς ἐργάζεσθαι τέχνας.

5. λέγομεν A^2ΠΜ. 26. ἱκανοὶ διαμάχεσθαι Π. 30. καλῶς om. Μ.

Republic II.

SOCRATES, GLAUCON.

p. 374. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη.

B Τί οὖν; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἡ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἀγωνία οὐ τεχνικὴ δοκεῖ εἶναι;

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

whole attention is devoted to it; a soldier cannot be allowed to exercise any calling but his own.

Ἦ οὖν τι σκυτικῆς δεῖ μᾶλλον κήδεσθαι ἢ πολεμικῆς;

Οὐδαμῶς.

Ἀλλ' ἄρα τὸν μὲν σκυτοτόμον διεκωλύομεν μήτε γεωργὸν ἐπιχειρεῖν εἶναι ἅμα μήτε ὑφάντην μήτε οἰκοδόμον, ἵνα δὴ ἡμῖν τὸ τῆς σκυτικῆς ἔργον καλῶς γίγνοιτο, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ ὡσαύτως ἓν ἀπεδίδομεν, πρὸς ὃ πεφύκει ἕκαστος καὶ ἐφ' ᾧ ἔμελλε C τῶν ἄλλων σχολὴν ἄγων διὰ βίου αὐτὸ ἐργαζόμενος οὐ παριεὶς τοὺς καιροὺς καλῶς ἀπεργάζεσθαι· τὰ δὲ δὴ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον πότερον οὐ περὶ πλείστου ἐστὶν εὖ ἀπεργασθέντα; ἢ οὕτω ῥᾴδιον, ὥστε καὶ γεωργῶν τις ἅμα πολεμικὸς ἔσται καὶ σκυτοτομῶν καὶ ἄλλην τέχνην ἡντινοῦν ἐργαζόμενος, πεττευτικὸς δὲ ἢ κυβευτικὸς ἱκανῶς οὐδ' ἂν εἷς γένοιτο μὴ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐκ παιδὸς ἐπιτηδεύων, ἀλλὰ παρέργῳ χρώμενος; καὶ D ἀσπίδα μὲν λαβὼν ἤ τι ἄλλο τῶν πολεμικῶν ὅπλων τε καὶ ὀργάνων αὐθημερὸν ὁπλιτικῆς ἤ τινος ἄλλης μάχης τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον ἱκανὸς ἔσται ἀγωνιστής, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ὀργάνων οὐδὲν οὐδένα δημιουργὸν οὐδὲ ἀθλητὴν ληφθὲν ποιήσει, οὐδ' ἔσται χρήσιμον τῷ μήτε τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἑκάστου λαβόντι μήτε τὴν μελέτην ἱκανὴν παρασχομένῳ;

The warrior's art requires a long apprenticeship and many natural gifts.

Πολλοῦ γὰρ ἄν, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὰ ὄργανα ἦν ἄξια.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅσῳ μέγιστον τὸ τῶν φυλάκων

10. ἀλλὰ σκυτοτόμον post οἰκοδόμον add. Π, post γίγνοιτο (11.) M.
17. σκυτοτομῶν ΠΜ : σκυτοτόμων A.

Republic II.

SOCRATES, GLAUCON.

The territory of our State must be enlarged, and hence will arise war between us and our neighbours.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἰατρῶν ἐν χρείαις ἐσόμεθα πολὺ μᾶλλον οὕτω διαιτώμενοι ἢ ὡς τὸ πρότερον; p. 373. D

Πολύ γε.

Καὶ ἡ χώρα που ἡ τότε ἱκανὴ τρέφειν τοὺς τότε σμικρὰ δὴ ἐξ ἱκανῆς ἔσται. ἢ πῶς λέγωμεν;

Οὕτως, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν τῆς τῶν πλησίον χώρας ἡμῖν ἀποτμητέον, εἰ μέλλομεν ἱκανὴν ἕξειν νέμειν τε καὶ ἀροῦν, καὶ ἐκείνοις αὖ τῆς ἡμετέρας, ἐὰν καὶ ἐκεῖνοι ἀφῶσιν αὑτοὺς ἐπὶ χρημάτων κτῆσιν ἄπειρον, ὑπερβάντες τὸν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὅρον; E

Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Πολεμήσομεν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὦ Γλαύκων· ἢ πῶς ἔσται;

Οὕτως, ἔφη.

Καὶ μηδέν γέ πω λέγωμεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μήτ' εἴ τι κακὸν μήτ' εἰ ἀγαθὸν ὁ πόλεμος ἐργάζεται, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον μόνον, ὅτι πολέμου αὖ γένεσιν εὑρήκαμεν, ἐξ ὧν μάλιστα ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ κακὰ γίγνεται, ὅταν γίγνηται.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Ἔτι δή, ὦ φίλε, μείζονος τῆς πόλεως δεῖ οὔτι σμικρῷ, ἀλλ' ὅλῳ στρατοπέδῳ, | ὃ ἐξελθὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς p. 374. οὐσίας ἁπάσης καὶ ὑπὲρ ὧν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν διαμαχεῖται τοῖς ἐπιοῦσιν.

Τί δέ; ἦ δ' ὅς· αὐτοὶ οὐχ ἱκανοί;

War is an art, and no art can be pursued with success unless a man's

Οὔκ, εἰ σύ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἅπαντες ὡμολογήσαμεν καλῶς, ἡνίκα ἐπλάττομεν τὴν πόλιν· ὡμολογοῦμεν δέ που, εἰ μέμνησαι, ἀδύνατον ἕνα πολλὰς καλῶς ἐργάζεσθαι τέχνας.

5. λέγομεν A²ΠΜ. 26. ἱκανοὶ διαμάχεσθαι Π. 30. καλῶς om. M.

Republic II.

Socrates, Glaucon.

p. 374. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη.

B Τί οὖν; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἡ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἀγωνία οὐ τεχνικὴ δοκεῖ εἶναι;

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

Ἦ οὖν τι σκυτικῆς δεῖ μᾶλλον κήδεσθαι ἢ πολεμικῆς;

Οὐδαμῶς.

whole attention is devoted to it; a soldier cannot be allowed to exercise any calling but his own.

Ἀλλ' ἄρα τὸν μὲν σκυτοτόμον διεκωλύομεν μήτε γεωργὸν ἐπιχειρεῖν εἶναι ἅμα μήτε ὑφάντην μήτε οἰκοδόμον, ἵνα δὴ ἡμῖν τὸ τῆς σκυτικῆς ἔργον καλῶς γίγνοιτο, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ ὡσαύτως ἓν ἀπεδίδομεν, πρὸς ὃ πεφύκει ἕκαστος καὶ ἐφ' ᾧ ἔμελλε
C τῶν ἄλλων σχολὴν ἄγων διὰ βίου αὐτὸ ἐργαζόμενος οὐ παριεὶς τοὺς καιροὺς καλῶς ἀπεργάζεσθαι· τὰ δὲ δὴ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον πότερον οὐ περὶ πλείστου ἐστὶν εὖ ἀπεργασθέντα; ἢ οὕτω ῥᾴδιον, ὥστε καὶ γεωργῶν τις ἅμα πολεμικὸς ἔσται καὶ σκυτοτομῶν καὶ ἄλλην τέχνην ἡντινοῦν ἐργαζόμενος, πεττευτικὸς δὲ ἢ κυβευτικὸς ἱκανῶς οὐδ' ἂν εἷς γένοιτο μὴ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐκ παιδὸς ἐπιτηδεύων, ἀλλὰ παρέργῳ χρώμενος; καὶ
D ἀσπίδα μὲν λαβὼν ἤ τι ἄλλο τῶν πολεμικῶν ὅπλων τε καὶ ὀργάνων αὐθημερὸν ὁπλιτικῆς ἤ τινος ἄλλης μάχης τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον ἱκανὸς ἔσται ἀγωνιστής, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ὀργάνων οὐδὲν οὐδένα δημιουργὸν οὐδὲ ἀθλητὴν ληφθὲν ποιήσει, οὐδ' ἔσται χρήσιμον τῷ μήτε τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἑκάστου λαβόντι μήτε τὴν μελέτην ἱκανὴν παρασχομένῳ;

The warrior's art requires a long apprenticeship and many natural gifts.

Πολλοῦ γὰρ ἄν, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὰ ὄργανα ἦν ἄξια.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅσῳ μέγιστον τὸ τῶν φυλάκων

10. ἀλλὰ σκυτοτόμον post οἰκοδόμον add. Π, post γίγνοιτο (11.) M.
17. σκυτοτομῶν ΠΜ : σκυτοτόμων A.

Republic II.

SOCRATES, GLAUCON.

ἔργον, τοσούτῳ σχολῆς τε τῶν ἄλλων πλείστης ἂν p. 374 E εἴη καὶ αὖ τέχνης τε καὶ ἐπιμελείας μεγίστης δεόμενον.

Οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ἢ δ' ὅς.

Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ φύσεως ἐπιτηδείας εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα;

The selection of guardians.

Πῶς δ' οὔ;

Ἡμέτερον δὴ ἔργον ἂν εἴη, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἴπερ οἷοί τ' ἐσμέν, ἐκλέξασθαι τίνες τε καὶ ποῖαι φύσεις ἐπιτήδειαι εἰς πόλεως φυλακήν.

Ἡμέτερον μέντοι.

Μὰ Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐκ ἄρα φαῦλον πρᾶγμα ἠράμεθα· ὅμως δὲ οὐκ ἀποδειλιατέον, ὅσον γ' ἂν δύναμις παρείκῃ.

| Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη. p. 375.

Οἴει οὖν τι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διαφέρειν φύσιν γενναίου σκύλακος εἰς φυλακὴν νεανίσκου εὐγενοῦς;

Τὸ ποῖον λέγεις;

Οἷον ὀξύν τέ που δεῖ αὐτοῖν ἑκάτερον εἶναι πρὸς αἴσθησιν καὶ ἐλαφρὸν πρὸς τὸ αἰσθανόμενον διωκάθειν, καὶ ἰσχυρὸν αὖ, ἐὰν δέῃ ἑλόντα διαμάχεσθαι.

Δεῖ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη, πάντων τούτων.

Καὶ μὴν ἀνδρεῖόν γε, εἴπερ εὖ μαχεῖται.

Πῶς δ' οὔ;

Ἀνδρεῖος δὲ εἶναι ἆρα ἐθελήσει ὁ μὴ θυμοειδὴς εἴτε ἵππος εἴτε κύων ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν ζῷον; ἢ οὐκ ἐννενόηκας, ὡς ἄμαχόν τε καὶ ἀνίκητον θυμός, οὗ B παρόντος ψυχὴ πᾶσα πρὸς πάντα ἄφοβός τέ ἐστι καὶ ἀήττητος;

Ἐννενόηκα.

28. ἐστι om. Π.

Republic II.

SOCRATES, GLAUCON.

p. 375. Τὰ μὲν τοίνυν τοῦ σώματος οἷον δεῖ τὸν φύλακα εἶναι, δῆλα.

Ναί.

Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅτι γε θυμοειδῆ.

Καὶ τοῦτο.

Πῶς οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, οὐκ ἄγριοι ἀλλήλοις ἔσονται καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις, ὄντες τοιοῦτοι τὰς φύσεις;

Μὰ Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐ ῥᾳδίως.

The guardian must unite the opposite qualities of gentleness and spirit.

C Ἀλλὰ μέντοι δεῖ γε πρὸς μὲν τοὺς οἰκείους πράους αὐτοὺς εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς πολεμίους χαλεπούς. εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ περιμενοῦσιν ἄλλους σφᾶς διολέσαι, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ φθήσονται αὐτὸ δράσαντες.

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.

Τί οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ποιήσομεν; πόθεν ἅμα πρᾶον καὶ μεγαλόθυμον ἦθος εὑρήσομεν; ἐναντία γάρ που θυμοειδεῖ πραεῖα φύσις.

Φαίνεται.

Ἀλλὰ μέντοι τούτων ὁποτέρου ἂν στέρηται, φύλαξ D ἀγαθὸς οὐ μὴ γένηται. ταῦτα δὲ ἀδυνάτοις ἔοικε, καὶ οὕτω δὴ ξυμβαίνει ἀγαθὸν φύλακα ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι.

Κινδυνεύει, ἔφη.

Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀπορήσας τε καὶ ἐπισκεψάμενος τὰ ἔμπροσθεν, Δικαίως γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, ἀποροῦμεν· ἧς γὰρ προὐθέμεθα εἰκόνος ἀπελείφθημεν.

Πῶς λέγεις;

Οὐκ ἐνενοήσαμεν, ὅτι εἰσὶν ἄρα φύσεις, οἵας ἡμεῖς οὐκ ᾠήθημεν, ἔχουσαι τἀναντία ταῦτα.

Ποῦ δή;

7. ἄλλοις Kqx: ἀλλοτρίοις ΑΠΜ.
27. ἐνενοήσαμεν q: ἐνοήσαμεν ΑΠΜ: ἐνενοήκαμεν x.

Republic II.

SOCRATES, GLAUCON.

Such a combination may be observed in the dog.

Ἴδοι μὲν ἂν τις καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ζῴοις, οὐ μέντ' ἂν p. 375. ἥκιστα ἐν ᾧ ἡμεῖς παρεβάλλομεν τῷ φύλακι. οἶσθα E γάρ που τῶν γενναίων κυνῶν, ὅτι τοῦτο φύσει αὐτῶν τὸ ἦθος, πρὸς μὲν τοὺς συνήθεις τε καὶ γνωρίμους ὡς οἷόν τε πραοτάτους εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀγνῶτας τοὐναντίον.

Οἶδα μέντοι.

Τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δυνατόν, καὶ οὐ παρὰ φύσιν ζητοῦμεν τοιοῦτον εἶναι τὸν φύλακα.

Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

Ἆρ' οὖν σοι δοκεῖ ἔτι τοῦδε προσδεῖσθαι ὁ φυλακικὸς ἐσόμενος, πρὸς τῷ θυμοειδεῖ ἔτι προσγενέσθαι φιλόσοφος τὴν φύσιν;

Πῶς δή; ἔφη· οὐ γὰρ | ἐννοῶ. p. 376.

Καὶ τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν τοῖς κυσὶ κατόψει, ὃ καὶ ἄξιον θαυμάσαι τοῦ θηρίου.

The dog distinguishes friend and enemy by the criterion of knowing and not knowing:

Τὸ ποῖον;

Ὃν μὲν ἂν ἴδῃ ἀγνῶτα, χαλεπαίνει, οὐδὲν δὴ κακὸν προπεπονθώς· ὃν δ' ἂν γνώριμον, ἀσπάζεται, κἂν μηδὲν πώποτε ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὸν πεπόνθῃ. ἢ οὔπω τοῦτο ἐθαύμασας;

Οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη, μέχρι τούτου προσέσχον τὸν νοῦν· ὅτι δέ που δρᾷ ταῦτα, δῆλον.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν κομψόν γε φαίνεται τὸ πάθος αὐτοῦ τῆς φύσεως καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφον. B

whereby he is shown to be a philosopher.

Πῇ δή;

Ἧι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὄψιν οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ φίλην καὶ ἐχθρὰν διακρίνει ἢ τῷ τὴν μὲν καταμαθεῖν, τὴν δὲ ἀγνοῆσαι. καίτοι πῶς οὐκ ἂν φιλομαθὲς εἴη συνέσει τε καὶ ἀγνοίᾳ ὁριζόμενον τό τε οἰκεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀλλότριον;

18. δὴ *q*DK: δὲ ΑΠΜ: γε Ξ: om. *v*. 20. μηδὲν A^{2}Π: μηδὲ AM.

Republic II.

SOCRATES, GLAUCON, ADEIMANTUS.

p. 376. Οὐδαμῶς, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὅπως οὔ.

Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, εἶπον ἐγώ, τό γε φιλομαθὲς καὶ φιλόσοφον ταὐτόν;

Ταὐτὸν γάρ, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν θαρροῦντες τιθῶμεν καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ, εἰ C μέλλει πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους καὶ γνωρίμους πρᾶός τις ἔσεσθαι, φύσει φιλόσοφον καὶ φιλομαθῆ αὐτὸν δεῖν εἶναι;

Τιθῶμεν, ἔφη.

Φιλόσοφος δὴ καὶ θυμοειδὴς καὶ ταχὺς καὶ ἰσχυρὸς ἡμῖν τὴν φύσιν ἔσται ὁ μέλλων καλὸς κἀγαθὸς ἔσεσθαι φύλαξ πόλεως;

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

How are our citizens to be reared and educated?

Οὗτος μὲν δὴ ἂν οὕτως ὑπάρχοι. θρέψονται δὲ δὴ ἡμῖν οὗτοι καὶ παιδευθήσονται τίνα τρόπον; καὶ D ἆρά τι προὔργου ἡμῖν ἐστὶν αὐτὸ σκοποῦσι πρὸς τὸ κατιδεῖν οὗπερ ἕνεκα πάντα σκοποῦμεν, δικαιοσύνην τε καὶ ἀδικίαν τίνα τρόπον ἐν πόλει γίγνεται; ἵνα μὴ ἐῶμεν ἱκανὸν λόγον ἢ συχνὸν διεξίωμεν.

Καὶ ὁ τοῦ Γλαύκωνος ἀδελφὸς Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἔγωγε προσδοκῶ προὔργου εἶναι εἰς τοῦτο ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν.

Μὰ Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε Ἀδείμαντε, οὐκ ἄρα ἀφετέον, οὐδ' εἰ μακροτέρα τυγχάνει οὖσα.

Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

Ἴθι οὖν, ὥσπερ ἐν μύθῳ μυθολογοῦντές τε καὶ E σχολὴν ἄγοντες λόγῳ παιδεύωμεν τοὺς ἄνδρας.

Ἀλλὰ χρή.

Τίς οὖν ἡ παιδεία; ἢ χαλεπὸν εὑρεῖν βελτίω τῆς

18. ἵνα μὴ . . . διεξιῶμεν (sic) ΠΜ: om. Apr. μὴ A^2ΠΜ: ἢ *q*.
19. ἱκανὸν A^2ΠΜ: συχνὸν x. συχνὸν A^2ΠΜ: ἱκανὸν x.

Republic II.

SOCRATES, ADEIMANTUS.

ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ χρόνου εὑρημένης; ἔστι δέ που p. 376. ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ σώμασι γυμναστική, ἡ δ' ἐπὶ ψυχῇ μουσική.

Ἔστι γάρ.

Education divided into gymnastic for the body and music for the soul. Music includes literature, which may be true or false.

Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ μουσικῇ πρότερον ἀρξόμεθα παιδεύοντες ἢ γυμναστικῇ;

Πῶς δ' οὔ;

Μουσικῆς δ' εἰπὼν τίθης λόγους, ἢ οὔ;

Ἔγωγε.

Λόγων δὲ διττὸν εἶδος, τὸ μὲν ἀληθές, ψεῦδος δ' ἕτερον;

Ναί.

Παιδευτέον δ' | ἐν ἀμφοτέροις, πρότερον δ' ἐν τοῖς p. 377. ψευδέσιν;

Οὐ μανθάνω, ἔφη, πῶς λέγεις.

Οὐ μανθάνεις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι πρῶτον τοῖς παιδίοις μύθους λέγομεν; τοῦτο δέ που ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν ψεῦδος, ἔνι δὲ καὶ ἀληθῆ. πρότερον δὲ μύθοις πρὸς τὰ παιδία ἢ γυμνασίοις χρώμεθα.

Ἔστι ταῦτα.

Τοῦτο δὴ ἔλεγον, ὅτι μουσικῆς πρότερον ἁπτέον ἢ γυμναστικῆς.

Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.

The beginning the most important part of education.

Οὐκοῦν οἶσθ' ὅτι ἀρχὴ παντὸς ἔργου μέγιστον, ἄλλως τε καὶ νέῳ καὶ ἁπαλῷ ὁτῳοῦν; μάλιστα γὰρ B δὴ τότε πλάττεται, καὶ ἐνδύεται τύπος, ὃν ἄν τις βούληται ἐνσημήνασθαι ἑκάστῳ.

Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

Ἆρ' οὖν ῥᾳδίως οὕτω παρήσομεν τοὺς ἐπιτυχόντας ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων μύθους πλασθέντας ἀκούειν

8. εἰπὼν ΑΠΜ : εἶπον Vind. F a *v*. 14. ψεύδεσιν (sic) Π.

p. 377. τοὺς παῖδας καὶ λαμβάνειν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐναντίας δόξας ἐκείναις, ἅς, ἐπειδὰν τελεωθῶσιν, ἔχειν οἰησόμεθα δεῖν αὐτούς;

Republic II.

Socrates, Adeimantus.

Works of fiction to be placed under a censorship.

Οὐδ᾽ ὁπωστιοῦν παρήσομεν.

Πρῶτον δὴ ἡμῖν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπιστατητέον τοῖς C μυθοποιοῖς, καὶ ὃν μὲν ἂν καλὸν ποιήσωσιν, ἐγκριτέον, ὃν δ᾽ ἂν μή, ἀποκριτέον. τοὺς δ᾽ ἐγκριθέντας πείσομεν τὰς τροφούς τε καὶ μητέρας λέγειν τοῖς παισί, καὶ πλάττειν τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τοῖς μύθοις πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ σώματα ταῖς χερσίν· ὧν δὲ νῦν λέγουσι τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκβλητέον.

Ποίους δή; ἔφη.

Ἐν τοῖς μείζοσιν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, μύθοις ὀψόμεθα καὶ τοὺς ἐλάττους. δεῖ γὰρ δὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τύπον εἶναι D καὶ ταὐτὸν δύνασθαι τούς τε μείζους καὶ τοὺς ἐλάττους. ἢ οὐκ οἴει;

Ἔγωγ᾽, ἔφη· ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐννοῶ οὐδὲ τοὺς μείζους τίνας λέγεις.

Οὓς Ἡσίοδός τε, εἶπον, καὶ Ὅμηρος ἡμῖν ἐλεγέτην καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταί. οὗτοι γάρ που μύθους τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ψευδεῖς συντιθέντες ἔλεγόν τε καὶ λέγουσιν.

Homer and Hesiod are tellers of bad lies, that is to say, they give false representations of the gods,

Ποίους δή, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, καὶ τί αὐτῶν μεμφόμενος λέγεις;

Ὅπερ, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, χρὴ καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα μέμφεσθαι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐάν τις μὴ καλῶς ψεύδηται.

E Τί τοῦτο;

Ὅταν εἰκάζῃ τις κακῶς τῷ λόγῳ περὶ θεῶν τε καὶ

6. καλὸν AM: καλὸν μῦθον Π.
29. κακῶς AM: κακῶς οὐσίαν Π.

Republic II.

SOCRATES, ADEIMANTUS.

ἡρώων οἷοί εἰσιν, ὥσπερ γραφεὺς μηδὲν ἐοικότα γρά- p. 377. φων οἷς ἂν ὅμοια βουληθῇ γράψαι.

Καὶ γάρ, ἔφη, ὀρθῶς ἔχει τά γε τοιαῦτα μέμφεσθαι. ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγομεν καὶ ποῖα;

Πρῶτον μέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ μέγιστον καὶ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ψεῦδος ὁ εἰπὼν οὐ καλῶς ἐψεύσατο, ὡς Οὐρανός τε εἰργάσατο ἅ φησι δρᾶσαι αὐτὸν Ἡσίοδος, ὅ τε αὖ Κρόνος ὡς ἐτιμωρήσατο αὐτόν. τὰ δὲ δὴ | τοῦ Κρόνου ἔργα καὶ πάθη ὑπὸ τοῦ υἱέος, οὐδ' p. 378. ἂν εἰ ἦν ἀληθῆ ᾤμην δεῖν ῥᾳδίως οὕτω λέγεσθαι πρὸς ἄφρονάς τε καὶ νέους, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μὲν σιγᾶσθαι, εἰ δὲ ἀνάγκη τις ἦν λέγειν, δι' ἀπορρήτων ἀκούειν ὡς ὀλιγίστους, θυσαμένους οὐ χοῖρον ἀλλά τι μέγα καὶ ἄπορον θῦμα, ὅπως ὅ τι ἐλαχίστοις συνέβη ἀκοῦσαι.

which have a bad effect on the minds of youth.

Καὶ γάρ, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὗτοί γε οἱ λόγοι χαλεποί.

Καὶ οὐ λεκτέοι γ', ἔφην, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, ἐν τῇ B ἡμετέρᾳ πόλει. οὐδὲ λεκτέον νέῳ ἀκούοντι, ὡς ἀδικῶν τὰ ἔσχατα οὐδὲν ἂν θαυμαστὸν ποιοῖ, οὐδ' αὖ ἀδικοῦντα πατέρα κολάζων παντὶ τρόπῳ, ἀλλὰ δρῴη ἂν ὅπερ θεῶν οἱ πρῶτοί τε καὶ μέγιστοι.

Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐδὲ αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ ἐπιτήδεια εἶναι λέγειν.

The stories about the quarrels of the gods and their evil behaviour to one another are untrue.

Οὐδέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ παράπαν ὡς θεοὶ θεοῖς πολεμοῦσί τε καὶ ἐπιβουλεύουσι καὶ μάχονται—οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀληθῆ —, εἴ γε δεῖ ἡμῖν τοὺς μέλλοντας τὴν C πόλιν φυλάξειν αἴσχιστον νομίζειν τὸ ῥᾳδίως ἀλλήλοις ἀπεχθάνεσθαι· πολλοῦ δεῖ γιγαντομαχίας τε μυθολογητέον αὐτοῖς καὶ ποικιλτέον, καὶ ἄλλας ἔχθρας πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς θεῶν τε καὶ ἡρώων

22. δοκεῖ mx Ficinus: δοκῶ ΑΠΜΞ.

Republic II.

SOCRATES, ADEIMANTUS.

p. 378. πρὸς συγγενεῖς τε καὶ οἰκείους αὐτῶν· ἀλλ' εἴ πως μέλλομεν πείσειν, ὡς οὐδεὶς πώποτε πολίτης ἕτερος ἑτέρῳ ἀπήχθετο οὐδ' ἔστι τοῦτο ὅσιον, τοιαῦτα D λεκτέα μᾶλλον πρὸς τὰ παιδία εὐθὺς καὶ γέρουσι καὶ γραυσί, καὶ πρεσβυτέροις γιγνομένοις καὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς ἐγγὺς τούτων ἀναγκαστέον λογοποιεῖν.

And allegorical interpretations of them are not understood by the young.

Ἥρας δὲ δεσμοὺς ὑπὸ υἱέος καὶ Ἡφαίστου ῥίψεις ὑπὸ πατρός, μέλλοντος τῇ μητρὶ τυπτομένῃ ἀμύνειν, καὶ θεομαχίας ὅσας Ὅμηρος πεποίηκεν οὐ παραδεκτέον εἰς τὴν πόλιν, οὔτ' ἐν ὑπονοίαις πεποιημένας οὔτε ἄνευ ὑπονοιῶν. ὁ γὰρ νέος οὐχ οἷός τε κρίνειν ὅ τί τε ὑπόνοια καὶ ὃ μή, ἀλλ' ἃ ἂν τηλικοῦτος ὢν E λάβῃ ἐν ταῖς δόξαις δυσέκνιπτά τε καὶ ἀμετάστατα φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι. ὧν δὴ ἴσως ἕνεκα περὶ παντὸς ποιητέον ἃ πρῶτα ἀκούουσιν ὅ τι κάλλιστα μεμυθολογημένα πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀκούειν.

Ἔχει γάρ, ἔφη, λόγον. ἀλλ' εἴ τις αὖ καὶ ταῦτα ἐρωτῴη ἡμᾶς, ταῦτα ἅττα ἐστὶ καὶ τίνες οἱ μῦθοι, τίνας ἂν φαῖμεν;

Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· Ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, οὐκ ἐσμὲν ποιηταὶ p. 379. ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ ἐν τῷ παρόντι, | ἀλλ' οἰκισταὶ πόλεως. οἰκισταῖς δὲ τοὺς μὲν τύπους προσήκει εἰδέναι ἐν οἷς δεῖ μυθολογεῖν τοὺς ποιητάς, παρ' οὓς ἐὰν ποιῶσιν οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτέον, οὐ μὴν αὐτοῖς γε ποιητέον μύθους.

Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη· ἀλλ' αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο, οἱ τύποι περὶ θεολογίας τίνες ἂν εἶεν;

God is to be represented as he truly is.

Τοιοίδε πού τινες, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οἷος τυγχάνει ὁ θεὸς ὤν, ἀεὶ δήπου ἀποδοτέον, ἐάν τέ τις αὐτὸν ἐν ἔπεσι ποιῇ [ἐάν τε ἐν μέλεσιν] ἐάν τε ἐν τραγῳδίᾳ.

4. λεκτέα ΠΜ: om. A. 5. καὶ τοὺς MSS.: τοὺς Madvig.
18. ταῦτα AM: αὐτὰ Π. 29. ἐάν τε ἐν μέλεσιν Π: om. AM.

Republic II.

SOCRATES, ADEIMANTUS.

Δεῖ γάρ. p. 379.

Οὐκοῦν ἀγαθὸς ὅ γε θεὸς τῷ ὄντι τε καὶ λεκτέον B οὕτως;

Τί μήν;

Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδέν γε τῶν ἀγαθῶν βλαβερόν· ἢ γάρ;

Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.

Ἆρ' οὖν ὃ μὴ βλαβερὸν βλάπτει;

Οὐδαμῶς.

Ὃ δὲ μὴ βλάπτει κακόν τι ποιεῖ;

Οὐδὲ τοῦτο.

Ὃ δέ γε μηδὲν κακὸν ποιεῖ, οὐδ' ἄν τινος εἴη κακοῦ αἴτιον;

Πῶς γάρ;

Τί δέ; ὠφέλιμον τὸ ἀγαθόν;

Ναί.

Αἴτιον ἄρα εὐπραγίας;

Ναί.

Οὐκ ἄρα πάντων γε αἴτιον τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν εὖ ἐχόντων αἴτιον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀναίτιον.

Παντελῶς γ', ἔφη. C

God, if he be good, is the author of good only.

Οὐδ' ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ θεός, ἐπειδὴ ἀγαθός, πάντων ἂν εἴη αἴτιος, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ ὀλίγων μὲν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἴτιος, πολλῶν δὲ ἀναίτιος· πολὺ γὰρ ἐλάττω τἀγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν ἡμῖν. καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν οὐδένα ἄλλον αἰτιατέον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἄλλ' ἄττα δεῖ ζητεῖν τὰ αἴτια, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν θεόν.

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν.

The fictions of the poets.

Οὐκ ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀποδεκτέον οὔτε Ὁμήρου οὔτ' ἄλλου ποιητοῦ ταύτην τὴν ἁμαρτίαν περὶ τοὺς D

2. γε om. Π. 21. γ' ΑΠ: γὰρ Π²Μ.

Republic II.

SOCRATES, ADEIMANTUS.

p. 379. θεοὺς ἀνοήτως ἁμαρτάνοντος καὶ λέγοντος, ὡς δοιοὶ πίθοι

κατακείαται ἐν Διὸς οὔδει
κηρῶν ἔμπλειοι, ὁ μὲν ἐσθλῶν, αὐτὰρ ὁ δειλῶν·

καὶ ᾧ μὲν ἂν μίξας ὁ Ζεὺς δῷ ἀμφοτέρων,
ἄλλοτε μέν τε κακῷ ὅ γε κύρεται, ἄλλοτε δ' ἐσθλῷ·
ᾧ δ' ἂν μή, ἀλλ' ἄκρατα τὰ ἕτερα, τὸν δὲ
κακὴ βούβρωστις ἐπὶ χθόνα δῖαν ἐλαύνει.

E οὐδ' ὡς ταμίας ἡμῖν Ζεὺς
ἀγαθῶν τε κακῶν τε τέτυκται.

Τὴν δὲ τῶν ὅρκων καὶ σπονδῶν σύγχυσιν, ἣν ὁ Πάνδαρος συνέχεεν, ἐάν τις φῇ δι' Ἀθηνᾶς τε καὶ Διὸς γεγονέναι, οὐκ ἐπαινεσόμεθα· οὐδὲ θεῶν ἔριν τε
p. 380. καὶ κρίσιν | διὰ Θέμιτός τε καὶ Διός· οὐδ' αὖ, ὡς Αἰσχύλος λέγει, ἐατέον ἀκούειν τοὺς νέους, ὅτι

θεὸς μὲν αἰτίαν φύει βροτοῖς,
ὅταν κακῶσαι δῶμα παμπήδην θέλῃ.

ἀλλ' ἐάν τις ποιῇ ἐν οἷς ταῦτα τὰ ἰαμβεῖα ἔνεστι, τὰ τῆς Νιόβης πάθη, ἢ τὰ Πελοπιδῶν ἢ τὰ Τρωϊκὰ ἤ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, ἢ οὐ θεοῦ ἔργα ἐατέον αὐτὰ λέγειν, ἢ εἰ θεοῦ, ἐξευρετέον αὐτοῖς σχεδὸν ὃν νῦν ἡμεῖς λόγον ζητοῦμεν, καὶ λεκτέον, ὡς ὁ μὲν θεὸς
B δίκαιά τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ εἰργάζετο, οἱ δὲ ὠνίναντο κολαζόμενοι· ὡς δὲ ἄθλιοι μὲν οἱ δίκην διδόντες, ἦν δὲ δὴ ὁ δρῶν ταῦτα θεός, οὐκ ἐατέον λέγειν τὸν ποιητήν. ἀλλ', εἰ μὲν ὅτι ἐδεήθησαν κολάσεως λέγοιεν, ὡς ἄθλιοι οἱ κακοί, διδόντες δὲ δίκην ὠφελοῦντο ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἐατέον· κακῶν δὲ αἴτιον φάναι θεόν τινι γίγνεσθαι ἀγαθὸν ὄντα, διαμαχητέον παντὶ τρόπῳ

Only that evil which is of the nature of punishment to be attributed to God.

Republic II.

Socrates, Adeimantus.

μήτε τινὰ λέγειν ταῦτα ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ πόλει, εἰ μέλλει p. 380.
εὐνομήσεσθαι, μήτε τινὰ ἀκούειν, μήτε νεώτερον μήτε πρεσβύτερον, μήτε ἐν μέτρῳ μήτε ἄνευ μέτ- C
ρου μυθολογοῦντα, ὡς οὔτε ὅσια ἂν λεγόμενα, εἰ λέγοιτο, οὔτε ξύμφορα ἡμῖν οὔτε σύμφωνα αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς.

Σύμψηφός σοί εἰμι, ἔφη, τούτου τοῦ νόμου, καί μοι ἀρέσκει.

Οὗτος μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἷς ἂν εἴη τῶν περὶ θεοὺς νόμων τε καὶ τύπων, ἐν ᾧ δεήσει τοὺς λέγοντας λέγειν καὶ τοὺς ποιοῦντας ποιεῖν, μὴ πάντων αἴτιον τὸν θεὸν ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν.

Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, ἀπόχρη.

Τί δὲ δὴ ὁ δεύτερος ὅδε; ἆρα γόητα τὸν θεὸν οἴει D
εἶναι καὶ οἷον ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς φαντάζεσθαι ἄλλοτε ἐν ἄλλαις ἰδέαις, τοτὲ μὲν αὐτὸν γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀλλάττοντα τὸ αὑτοῦ εἶδος εἰς πολλὰς μορφάς, τοτὲ δὲ ἡμᾶς ἀπατῶντα καὶ ποιοῦντα περὶ αὑτοῦ τοιαῦτα δοκεῖν, ἢ ἁπλοῦν τε εἶναι καὶ πάντων ἥκιστα τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἰδέας ἐκβαίνειν;

Οὐκ ἔχω, ἔφη, νῦν γε οὕτως εἰπεῖν.

Things must be changed either by another or by themselves.

Τί δὲ τόδε; οὐκ ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ τι ἐξίσταιτο τῆς αὑτοῦ ἰδέας, ἢ αὐτὸ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ μεθίστασθαι ἢ ὑπ' E
ἄλλου;

Ἀνάγκη.

Οὐκοῦν ὑπὸ μὲν ἄλλου τὰ ἄριστα ἔχοντα ἥκιστα ἀλλοιοῦταί τε καὶ κινεῖται; οἷον σῶμα ὑπὸ σιτίων τε καὶ ποτῶν καὶ πόνων, καὶ πᾶν φυτὸν ὑπὸ εἱλήσεών τε καὶ ἀνέμων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων,

3. *μήτε ἐν* Π : *μὴ ἐν* AM.
10. *τοὺς* ΑΠΜ : *τούς τε* x Euseb. Theod.

p. 381. οὐ τὸ ὑγιέστατον καὶ ἰσχυρότατον ἥκιστα | ἀλλοιοῦται;

Πῶς δ' οὔ;

Ψυχὴν δὲ οὐ τὴν ἀνδρειοτάτην καὶ φρονιμωτάτην ἥκιστ' ἄν τι ἔξωθεν πάθος ταράξειέ τε καὶ ἀλλοιώσειεν;

Ναί.

Καὶ μήν που καὶ τά γε ξύνθετα πάντα σκεύη τε καὶ οἰκοδομήματα καὶ ἀμφιέσματα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον τὰ εὖ εἰργασμένα καὶ εὖ ἔχοντα ὑπὸ χρόνου τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων ἥκιστα ἀλλοιοῦται.

Ἔστι δὴ ταῦτα.

B Πᾶν δὴ τὸ καλῶς ἔχον ἢ φύσει ἢ τέχνῃ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ἐλαχίστην μεταβολὴν ὑπ' ἄλλου ἐνδέχεται.

Ἔοικεν.

But God cannot be changed by other; and will not be changed by himself.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ θεός γε καὶ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ πάντῃ ἄριστα ἔχει.

Πῶς δ' οὔ;

Ταύτῃ μὲν δὴ ἥκιστα ἂν πολλὰς μορφὰς ἴσχοι ὁ θεός.

Ἥκιστα δῆτα.

Ἀλλ' ἆρα αὐτὸς αὑτὸν μεταβάλλοι ἂν καὶ ἀλλοιοῖ;

Δῆλον, ἔφη, ὅτι, εἴπερ ἀλλοιοῦται.

Πότερον οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιόν τε καὶ κάλλιον μεταβάλλει ἑαυτὸν ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ τὸ αἴσχιον ἑαυτοῦ;

C Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον, εἴπερ ἀλλοιοῦται· οὐ

1. οὐ Π: οὗ AM. 4. οὐ τὴν AM: αὐτὴν Π.
9. καὶ ἀμφιέσματα Π: om. AM. 17. γε Π: τε AM.

Republic II.

SOCRATES, ADEIMANTUS.

γάρ που ἐνδεᾶ γε φήσομεν τὸν θεὸν κάλλους ἢ ἀρετῆς εἶναι. p. 381.

Ὀρθότατα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις. καὶ οὕτως ἔχοντος δοκεῖ ἄν τίς σοι, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, ἑκὼν αὑτὸν χείρω ποιεῖν ὁπῃοῦν ἢ θεῶν ἢ ἀνθρώπων;

Ἀδύνατον, ἔφη.

Ἀδύνατον ἄρα, ἔφην, καὶ θεῷ ἐθέλειν αὑτὸν ἀλλοιοῦν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἔοικε, κάλλιστος καὶ ἄριστος ὢν εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἕκαστος αὐτῶν μένει ἀεὶ ἁπλῶς ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ μορφῇ.

Ἅπασα, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Μηδεὶς ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ ἄριστε, λεγέτω ἡμῖν D τῶν ποιητῶν, ὡς

θεοὶ ξείνοισιν ἐοικότες ἀλλοδαποῖσι,
παντοῖοι τελέθοντες, ἐπιστρωφῶσι πόληας·

μηδὲ Πρωτέως καὶ Θέτιδος καταψευδέσθω μηδείς, μηδ' ἐν τραγῳδίαις μηδ' ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιήμασιν εἰσαγέτω Ἥραν ἠλλοιωμένην ὡς ἱέρειαν ἀγείρουσαν

Ἰνάχου Ἀργείου ποταμοῦ παισὶν βιοδώροις·

καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλὰ μὴ ἡμῖν ψευδέσθωσαν. E μηδ' αὖ ὑπὸ τούτων ἀναπειθόμεναι αἱ μητέρες τὰ παιδία ἐκδειματούντων, λέγουσαι τοὺς μύθους κακῶς, ὡς ἄρα θεοί τινες περιέρχονται νύκτωρ πολλοῖς ξένοις καὶ παντοδαποῖς ἰνδαλλόμενοι, ἵνα μὴ ἅμα μὲν εἰς θεοὺς βλασφημῶσιν, ἅμα δὲ τοὺς παῖδας ἀπεργάζωνται δειλοτέρους.

Μὴ γάρ, ἔφη.

Nor will he make any false representation of himself.

Ἀλλ' ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὐτοὶ μὲν οἱ θεοί εἰσιν οἷοι μὴ μεταβάλλειν, ἡμῖν δὲ ποιοῦσι δοκεῖν σφᾶς παντοδαποὺς φαίνεσθαι, ἐξαπατῶντες καὶ γοητεύοντες;

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p. 381. Ἴσως, ἔφη.

p. 382. Τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ψεύδεσθαι | θεὸς ἐθέλοι ἂν ἢ λόγῳ ἢ ἔργῳ φάντασμα προτείνων;

Οὐκ οἶδα, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Οὐκ οἶσθα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι τό γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος, εἰ οἷόν τε τοῦτο εἰπεῖν, πάντες θεοί τε καὶ ἄνθρωποι μισοῦσιν;

Πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις;

Οὕτως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι τῷ κυριωτάτῳ που ἑαυτῶν ψεύδεσθαι καὶ περὶ τὰ κυριώτατα οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἐθέλει, ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα φοβεῖται ἐκεῖ αὐτὸ κεκτῆσθαι.

Οὐδὲ νῦν πω, ἦ δ' ὅς, μανθάνω.

B Οἴει γάρ τί με, ἔφην, σεμνὸν λέγειν· ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὅτι τῇ ψυχῇ περὶ τὰ ὄντα ψεύδεσθαί τε καὶ ἐψεῦσθαι καὶ ἀμαθῆ εἶναι καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἔχειν τε καὶ κεκτῆσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος πάντες ἥκιστα ἂν δέξαιντο, καὶ μισοῦσι μάλιστα αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ.

Πολύ γε, ἔφη.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὀρθότατά γ' ἄν, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, τοῦτο ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος καλοῖτο, ἡ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἄγνοια ἡ τοῦ ἐψευσμένου· ἐπεὶ τό γε ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μίμημά τι τοῦ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐστὶ παθήματος καὶ ὕστερον γε-

C γονὸς εἴδωλον, οὐ πάνυ ἄκρατον ψεῦδος. ἢ οὐχ οὕτω;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Τὸ μὲν δὴ τῷ ὄντι ψεῦδος οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ θεῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων μισεῖται.

The true lie is equally hated both by gods and men.

Δοκεῖ μοι.

Τί δὲ δή; τὸ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ψεῦδος πότε καὶ τῷ χρήσιμον, ὥστε μὴ ἄξιον εἶναι μίσους; ἆρ' οὐ πρός

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The remedial or preventive lie is comparatively innocent, but God can have no need of it.

τε τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ τῶν καλουμένων φίλων, ὅταν p. 382. διὰ μανίαν ἤ τινα ἄνοιαν κακόν τι ἐπιχειρῶσι πράττειν, τότε ἀποτροπῆς ἕνεκα ὡς φάρμακον χρήσιμον γίγνεται; καὶ ἐν αἷς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν ταῖς μυθολογίαις D διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι ὅπῃ τἀληθὲς ἔχει περὶ τῶν παλαιῶν, ἀφομοιοῦντες τῷ ἀληθεῖ τὸ ψεῦδος ὅ τι μάλιστα, οὕτω χρήσιμον ποιοῦμεν;

Καὶ μάλα, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, οὕτως ἔχει.

Κατὰ τί δὴ οὖν τούτων τῷ θεῷ τὸ ψεῦδος χρήσιμον; πότερον διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι τὰ παλαιὰ ἀφομοιῶν ἂν ψεύδοιτο;

Γελοῖον μέντ᾽ ἂν εἴη, ἔφη.

Ποιητὴς μὲν ἄρα ψευδὴς ἐν θεῷ οὐκ ἔνι.

Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.

Ἀλλὰ δεδιὼς τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ψεύδοιτο; E

Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ.

Ἀλλὰ δι᾽ οἰκείων ἄνοιαν ἢ μανίαν;

Ἀλλ᾽ οὐδείς, ἔφη, τῶν ἀνοήτων καὶ μαινομένων θεοφιλής.

Οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν οὗ ἕνεκα ἂν θεὸς ψεύδοιτο.

Οὐκ ἔστιν.

Πάντῃ ἄρα ἀψευδὲς τὸ δαιμόνιόν τε καὶ τὸ θεῖον.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Κομιδῇ ἄρα ὁ θεὸς ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἀληθὲς ἔν τε ἔργῳ καὶ ἐν λόγῳ, καὶ οὔτε αὐτὸς μεθίσταται οὔτε ἄλλους ἐξαπατᾷ, [οὔτε κατὰ φαντασίας] οὔτε κατὰ λόγους οὔτε κατὰ σημείων πομπάς, οὔθ᾽ ὕπαρ οὔτ᾽ ὄναρ.

| Οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ φαίνεται σοῦ λέ- p. 383. γοντος.

Συγχωρεῖς ἄρα, ἔφην, τοῦτον δεύτερον τύπον εἶναι,

1. ὅταν MSS: οἳ ἂν cj. Herm. 26. οὔτε κατὰ φαντασίας Π: om. AM.

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Socrates, Adeimantus.

Away then with the falsehoods of the poets!

p. 383. ἐν ᾧ δεῖ περὶ θεῶν καὶ λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν, ὡς μήτε αὐτοὺς γόητας ὄντας τῷ μεταβάλλειν ἑαυτοὺς μήτε ἡμᾶς ψεύδεσι παράγειν ἐν λόγῳ ἢ ἐν ἔργῳ;

Συγχωρῶ.

Πολλὰ ἄρα Ὁμήρου ἐπαινοῦντες ἄλλα τοῦτο οὐκ ἐπαινεσόμεθα, τὴν τοῦ ἐνυπνίου πομπὴν ὑπὸ Διὸς τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι· οὐδὲ Αἰσχύλου, ὅταν φῇ ἡ Θέτις τὸν
B Ἀπόλλω ἐν τοῖς αὑτῆς γάμοις ᾄδοντα ἐνδατεῖσθαι τὰς ἑὰς εὐπαιδίας

νόσων τ' ἀπείρους καὶ μακραίωνας βίους,
ξύμπαντά τ' εἰπὼν θεοφιλεῖς ἐμὰς τύχας
παιῶν' ἐπευφήμησεν, εὐθυμῶν ἐμέ.
κἀγὼ τὸ Φοίβου θεῖον ἀψευδὲς στόμα
ἤλπιζον εἶναι, μαντικῇ βρύον τέχνῃ.
ὁ δ', αὐτὸς ὑμνῶν, αὐτὸς ἐν θοίνῃ παρών,
αὐτὸς τάδ' εἰπών, αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ κτανὼν
τὸν παῖδα τὸν ἐμόν.

C ὅταν τις τοιαῦτα λέγῃ περὶ θεῶν, χαλεπανοῦμέν τε καὶ χορὸν οὐ δώσομεν, οὐδὲ τοὺς διδασκάλους ἐάσομεν ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ χρῆσθαι τῶν νέων, εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ φύλακες θεοσεβεῖς τε καὶ θεῖοι γίγνεσθαι, καθ' ὅσον ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον οἷόν τε.

Παντάπασιν, ἔφη, ἔγωγε τοὺς τύπους τούτους συγχωρῶ, καὶ ὡς νόμοις ἂν χρῴμην.

2. ὄντας ΠΜ : om. A. 8. αὐτῆς (sic) ΠΜ : αὐτοῖς A.
ib. ἐνδατεῖσθαι A^2 Π : ἐνδυτεῖσθαι Apr. $M\Pi^2$.
12. παιῶν' ΜΞ : παιὼν ΑΠ.

Γ.

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Τὰ μὲν δὴ περὶ θεούς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοιαῦτ' ἄττα, p. 386. ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀκουστέον τε καὶ οὐκ ἀκουστέον εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων τοῖς θεούς τε τιμήσουσι καὶ γονέας τήν τε ἀλλήλων φιλίαν μὴ περὶ σμικροῦ ποιησομένοις.

Καὶ οἶμαί γ', ἔφη, ὀρθῶς ἡμῖν φαίνεσθαι.

The discouraging lessons of mythology.

Τί δὲ δή; εἰ μέλλουσιν εἶναι ἀνδρεῖοι, ἆρα οὐ ταῦτά τε λεκτέον καὶ οἷα αὐτοὺς ποιῆσαι ἥκιστα τὸν θάνατον δεδιέναι; ἢ ἡγεῖ τινά ποτ' ἂν γενέσθαι ἀν- B δρεῖον ἔχοντα ἐν αὑτῷ τοῦτο τὸ δεῖμα;

Μὰ Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐκ ἔγωγε.

Τί δέ; τἀν Ἅιδου ἡγούμενον εἶναί τε καὶ δεινὰ εἶναι οἴει τινὰ θανάτου ἀδεῆ ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις αἱρήσεσθαι πρὸ ἥττης τε καὶ δουλείας θάνατον;

Οὐδαμῶς.

The description of the world below in Homer.

Δεῖ δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡμᾶς ἐπιστατεῖν καὶ περὶ τούτων τῶν μύθων τοῖς ἐπιχειροῦσι λέγειν, καὶ δεῖσθαι μὴ λοιδορεῖν ἁπλῶς οὕτως τὰ ἐν Ἅιδου ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐπαινεῖν, ὡς οὔτε ἀληθῆ λέγοντας οὔτ' ὠφέλιμα τοῖς C μέλλουσι μαχίμοις ἔσεσθαι.

Δεῖ μέντοι, ἔφη.

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p. 386. Ἐξαλείψομεν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀπὸ τοῦδε τοῦ ἔπους ἀρξάμενοι πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα,

βουλοίμην κ' ἐπάρουρος ἐὼν θητευέμεν ἄλλῳ
ἀνδρὶ παρ' ἀκλήρῳ, [ᾧ μὴ βίοτος πολὺς εἴη,]
ἢ πᾶσιν νεκύεσσι καταφθιμένοισιν ἀνάσσειν·

καὶ τὸ

D οἰκία δὲ θνητοῖσι καὶ ἀθανάτοισι φανείη
σμερδαλέ', εὐρώεντα, τά τε στυγέουσι θεοί περ·

καὶ

ὢ πόποι, ἦ ῥά τις ἔστι καὶ εἰν Ἀΐδαο δόμοισι
ψυχὴ καὶ εἴδωλον, ἀτὰρ φρένες οὐκ ἔνι πάμπαν·

καὶ τὸ

οἴῳ πεπνῦσθαι, ταὶ δὲ σκιαὶ ἀΐσσουσι·

καὶ

ψυχὴ δ' ἐκ ῥεθέων πταμένη Ἄϊδόσδε βεβήκει,
ὃν πότμον γοόωσα, λιποῦσ' ἀνδροτῆτα καὶ ἥβην·

p. 387. καὶ τὸ

ψυχὴ δὲ κατὰ χθονός, ἠΰτε καπνός,
ᾤχετο τετριγυῖα·

καὶ

ὡς δ' ὅτε νυκτερίδες μυχῷ ἄντρου θεσπεσίοιο
τρίζουσαι ποτέονται, ἐπεί κέ τις ἀποπέσῃσιν
ὁρμαθοῦ ἐκ πέτρης, ἀνά τ' ἀλλήλῃσιν ἔχονται,
ὣς αἱ τετριγυῖαι ἅμ' ᾔεσαν.

Such tales to be rejected.

B ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα παραιτησόμεθα Ὅμηρόν τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιητὰς μὴ χαλεπαίνειν ἂν διαγράφωμεν, οὐχ ὡς οὐ ποιητικὰ καὶ ἡδέα τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀκούειν, ἀλλ' ὅσῳ ποιητικώτερα, τοσούτῳ ἧττον ἀκουστέον παισὶ καὶ ἀνδράσιν, οὓς δεῖ ἐλευθέρους εἶναι, δουλείαν θανάτου μᾶλλον πεφοβημένους.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

4. ᾧ—εἴη Π : om. AM.

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Οὐκοῦν ἔτι καὶ τὰ περὶ ταῦτα ὀνόματα πάντα τὰ δεινά τε καὶ φοβερὰ ἀποβλητέα, Κωκυτούς τε καὶ Στύγας καὶ ἐνέρους καὶ ἀλίβαντας, καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα τούτου τοῦ τύπου ὀνομαζόμενα φρίττειν δὴ ποιεῖ ὡς οἷόν τε πάντας τοὺς ἀκούοντας. καὶ ἴσως εὖ ἔχει πρὸς ἄλλο τι· ἡμεῖς δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν φυλάκων φοβούμεθα, μὴ ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης φρίκης θερμότεροι καὶ μαλακώτεροι τοῦ δέοντος γένωνται ἡμῖν. p. 387. C

Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἔφη, φοβούμεθα.

Ἀφαιρετέα ἄρα;

Ναί.

Τὸν δὲ ἐναντίον τύπον τούτοις λεκτέον τε καὶ ποιητέον;

Δῆλα δή.

Καὶ τοὺς ὀδυρμοὺς ἄρα ἐξαιρήσομεν καὶ τοὺς οἴκτους τοὺς τῶν ἐλλογίμων ἀνδρῶν; D

Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, εἴπερ καὶ τὰ πρότερα.

The effeminate and pitiful strains of famous men, and yet more of the gods, must also be banished.

Σκόπει δή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ ὀρθῶς ἐξαιρήσομεν ἢ οὔ. φαμὲν δὲ δή, ὅτι ὁ ἐπιεικὴς ἀνὴρ τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ, οὗπερ καὶ ἑταῖρός ἐστι, τὸ τεθνάναι οὐ δεινὸν ἡγήσεται.

Φαμὲν γάρ.

Οὐκ ἄρα ὑπέρ γ' ἐκείνου ὡς δεινόν τι πεπονθότος ὀδύροιτ' ἄν.

Οὐ δῆτα.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε λέγομεν, ὡς ὁ τοιοῦτος μάλιστα αὐτὸς αὑτῷ αὐτάρκης πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἥκιστα ἑτέρου προσδεῖται. E

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.

4. ὡς οἷόν τε *q* : ὡς οἴεται ΑΠΜ : ὅσα ἔτη cj. Herm. : an ὡς ἐτεά? 6. ὑπὲρ ΠΜ : ὑπὸ Α.

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p. 387. Ἥκιστα ἄρ' αὐτῷ δεινὸν στερηθῆναι υἱέος ἢ ἀδελφοῦ ἢ χρημάτων ἢ ἄλλου του τῶν τοιούτων.

Ἥκιστα μέντοι.

Ἥκιστ' ἄρα καὶ ὀδύρεσθαι, φέρειν δὲ ὡς πραότατα, ὅταν τις αὐτὸν τοιαύτη ξυμφορὰ καταλάβῃ.

Πολύ γε.

Ὀρθῶς ἄρ' ἂν ἐξαιροῖμεν τοὺς θρήνους τῶν ὀνομαστῶν ἀνδρῶν, γυναιξὶ δὲ ἀποδιδοῖμεν, καὶ οὐδὲ
p. 388. ταύταις σπουδαίαις, καὶ | ὅσοι κακοὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ἵνα ἡμῖν δυσχεραίνωσιν ὅμοια τούτοις ποιεῖν οὓς δή φαμεν ἐπὶ φυλακῇ τῆς χώρας τρέφειν.

Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.

Such are the laments of Achilles, and Priam,

Πάλιν δὴ Ὁμήρου τε δεησόμεθα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ποιητῶν μὴ ποιεῖν Ἀχιλλέα θεᾶς παῖδα ἄλλοτ' ἐπὶ πλευρᾶς κατακείμενον, ἄλλοτε δ' αὖτε ὕπτιον, ἄλλοτε δὲ πρηνῆ, τοτὲ δ' ὀρθὸν ἀναστάντα πλωΐζοντ' ἀλύοντ' ἐπὶ θῖν' ἁλὸς ἀτρυγέτοιο,
B μηδὲ ἀμφοτέρῃσι χερσὶν ἑλόντα κόνιν αἰθαλόεσσαν χευάμενον κὰκ κεφαλῆς, μηδὲ ἄλλα κλαίοντά τε καὶ ὀδυρόμενον ὅσα καὶ οἷα ἐκεῖνος ἐποίησε· μηδὲ Πρίαμον ἐγγὺς θεῶν γεγονότα λιτανεύοντά τε καὶ

κυλινδόμενον κατὰ κόπρον,
ἐξονομακλήδην ὀνομάζοντ' ἄνδρα ἕκαστον.

πολὺ δ' ἔτι τούτων μᾶλλον δεησόμεθα μήτοι θεούς γε ποιεῖν ὀδυρομένους καὶ λέγοντας

C ὤμοι ἐγὼ δειλή, ὤμοι δυσαριστοτόκεια·

εἰ δ' οὖν θεούς, μήτοι τόν γε μέγιστον τῶν θεῶν τολμῆσαι οὕτως ἀνομοίως μιμήσασθαι, ὥστε

7. ἆρ' ἂν ΠΜ : ἄρα A.
17. πλώζοντ' Πpr. : πλώζοντα M : πλάζοντ' γx : πρωΐζοντ' cj. Heyn.

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and of Zeus, when he beholds the fate of Hector or Sarpedon.

ὢ πόποι, φάναι, ἦ φίλον ἄνδρα διωκόμενον περὶ ἄστυ p. 388.
ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ὁρῶμαι, ἐμὸν δ' ὀλοφύρεται ἦτορ·

καὶ

αἲ αἲ ἐγών, ὅτε μοι Σαρπηδόνα φίλτατον ἀνδρῶν
μοῖρ' ὑπὸ Πατρόκλοιο Μενοιτιάδαο δαμῆναι. D

εἰ γάρ, ὦ φίλε Ἀδείμαντε, τὰ τοιαῦτα ἡμῖν οἱ νέοι σπουδῇ ἀκούοιεν καὶ μὴ καταγελῷεν ὡς ἀναξίως λεγομένων, σχολῇ ἂν ἑαυτόν γέ τις ἄνθρωπον ὄντα ἀνάξιον ἡγήσαιτο τούτων καὶ ἐπιπλήξειεν, εἰ καὶ ἐπίοι αὐτῷ τοιοῦτον ἢ λέγειν ἢ ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αἰσχυνόμενος οὐδὲ καρτερῶν πολλοὺς ἐπὶ σμικροῖσι παθήμασι θρήνους ἂν ᾄδοι καὶ ὀδυρμούς.

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις. E

Δεῖ δέ γε οὔχ, ὡς ἄρτι ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ἐσήμαινεν· ᾧ πειστέον, ἕως ἄν τις ἡμᾶς ἄλλῳ καλλίονι πείσῃ.

Οὐ γὰρ οὖν δεῖ.

Neither are the guardians to be encouraged to laugh by the example of the gods.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ φιλογέλωτάς γε δεῖ εἶναι. σχεδὸν γὰρ ὅταν τις ἐφῇ ἰσχυρῷ γέλωτι, ἰσχυρὰν καὶ μεταβολὴν ζητεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον.

Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη.

Οὔτε ἄρα ἀνθρώπους ἀξίους λόγου κρατουμένους ὑπὸ γέλωτος ἄν τις ποιῇ, | ἀποδεκτέον, πολὺ δὲ p. 389 ἧττον, ἐὰν θεούς.

Πολὺ μέντοι, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Οὐκοῦν Ὁμήρου οὐδὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποδεξόμεθα περὶ θεῶν,

ἄσβεστος δ' ἄρ' ἐνῶρτο γέλως μακάρεσσι θεοῖσιν,
ὡς ἴδον Ἥφαιστον διὰ δώματα ποιπνύοντα·

οὐκ ἀποδεκτέον κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον.

19. ἐφῇ cj. Hermann (et sic Vind.Dmg.): ἔφην AM: ἔφη Π: ἐφίῃ Ξ (ἔφην ἰσχυρῷ γέλωτι ἀλῷ rMcorr.) 26. Οὔκουν Hermann.

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p. 389. Εἰ σύ, ἔφη, βούλει ἐμὸν τιθέναι· οὐ γὰρ οὖν δὴ B ἀποδεκτέον.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀλήθειάν γε περὶ πολλοῦ ποιητέον. εἰ γὰρ ὀρθῶς ἐλέγομεν ἄρτι, καὶ τῷ ὄντι θεοῖσι μὲν ἄχρηστον ψεῦδος, ἀνθρώποις δὲ χρήσιμον ὡς ἐν φαρμάκου εἴδει, δῆλον, ὅτι τό γε τοιοῦτον ἰατροῖς δοτέον, ἰδιώταις δὲ οὐχ ἁπτέον.

Our youth must be truthful,

Δῆλον, ἔφη.

Τοῖς ἄρχουσι δὴ τῆς πόλεως, εἴπερ τισὶν ἄλλοις, προσήκει ψεύδεσθαι ἢ πολεμίων ἢ πολιτῶν ἕνεκα ἐπ' C ὠφελίᾳ τῆς πόλεως· τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις πᾶσιν οὐχ ἁπτέον τοῦ τοιούτου, ἀλλὰ πρός γε δὴ τοὺς τοιούτους ἄρχοντας ἰδιώτῃ ψεύσασθαι ταὐτὸν καὶ μεῖζον ἁμάρτημα φήσομεν ἢ κάμνοντι πρὸς ἰατρὸν ἢ ἀσκοῦντι πρὸς παιδοτρίβην περὶ τῶν τοῦ αὑτοῦ σώματος παθημάτων μὴ τἀληθῆ λέγειν, ἢ πρὸς κυβερνήτην περὶ τῆς νεώς τε καὶ τῶν ναυτῶν μὴ τὰ ὄντα λέγοντι, ὅπως ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ τις τῶν ξυνναυτῶν πράξεως ἔχει.

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

Ἂν ἄρ' ἄλλον τινὰ λαμβάνῃ ψευδόμενον ἐν τῇ D πόλει

τῶν οἳ δημιοεργοὶ ἔασι,
μάντιν ἢ ἰητῆρα κακῶν ἢ τέκτονα δούρων,

κολάσει ὡς ἐπιτήδευμα εἰσάγοντα πόλεως ὥσπερ νεὼς ἀνατρεπτικόν τε καὶ ὀλέθριον.

Ἐάν γε, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἐπί γε λόγῳ ἔργα τελῆται.

Τί δέ; σωφροσύνης ἆρα οὐ δεήσει ἡμῖν τοῖς νεανίαις;

and also temperate.

Πῶς δ' οὔ;

23. δημιουργοὶ ΑΠΜ. 25. κολάσει ὡς Π : κολάσεως Α : κολάσαι ὡς Μ.

Σωφροσύνης δὲ ὡς πλήθει οὐ τὰ τοιάδε μέγιστα, p. 389. ἀρχόντων μὲν ὑπηκόους εἶναι, αὐτοὺς δὲ ἄρχοντας τῶν περὶ πότους καὶ ἀφροδίσια καὶ περὶ ἐδωδὰς ἡδονῶν; E

Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Τὰ δὴ τοιάδε φήσομεν, οἶμαι, καλῶς λέγεσθαι, οἷα καὶ Ὁμήρῳ Διομήδης λέγει,

τέττα, σιωπῇ ἧσο, ἐμῷ δ' ἐπιπείθεο μύθῳ,

καὶ τὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα, τὰ

ἴσαν μένεα πνείοντες Ἀχαιοί,
σιγῇ δειδιότες σημάντορας,

καὶ ὅσ' ἄλλα τοιαῦτα.

Καλῶς.

Τί δέ; τὰ τοιάδε

οἰνοβαρές, κυνὸς ὄμματ' ἔχων, κραδίην δ' ἐλάφοιο

| καὶ τὰ τούτων ἑξῆς ἆρα καλῶς, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τις p. 390. ἐν λόγῳ ἢ ἐν ποιήσει εἴρηκε νεανιεύματα ἰδιωτῶν εἰς ἄρχοντας;

Οὐ καλῶς.

Οὐ γάρ, οἶμαι, εἴς γε σωφροσύνην νέοις ἐπιτήδεια ἀκούειν· εἰ δέ τινα ἄλλην ἡδονὴν παρέχεται, θαυμαστὸν οὐδέν. ἢ πῶς σοι φαίνεται;

The praises of eating and drinking, and the tale of the improper behaviour of Zeus and Here, are not to be repeated to the young.

Οὕτως, ἔφη.

Τί δέ; ποιεῖν ἄνδρα τὸν σοφώτατον λέγοντα, ὡς δοκεῖ αὐτῷ κάλλιστον εἶναι πάντων, ὅταν παραπλεῖαι ὦσι τράπεζαι

σίτου καὶ κρειῶν, μέθυ δ' ἐκ κρητῆρος ἀφύσσων B
οἰνοχόος φορέῃσι καὶ ἐγχείῃ δεπάεσσι,

17. νεανικεύματα A: νεανι(σκ)εύματα ΠΜ.

p. 390. δοκεῖ σοι ἐπιτήδειον εἶναι πρὸς ἐγκράτειαν ἑαυτοῦ ἀκούειν νέῳ; ἢ τὸ

λιμῷ δ' οἴκτιστον θανέειν καὶ πότμον ἐπισπεῖν;

ἢ Δία, καθευδόντων τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων, ὡς μόνος ἐγρηγορὼς ἃ ἐβουλεύσατο τούτων C πάντων ῥᾳδίως ἐπιλανθανόμενον διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων ἐπιθυμίαν, καὶ οὕτως ἐκπλαγέντα ἰδόντα τὴν Ἥραν, ὥστε μηδ' εἰς τὸ δωμάτιον ἐθέλειν ἐλθεῖν, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ βουλόμενον χαμαὶ ξυγγίγνεσθαι, καὶ λέγοντα ὡς οὕτως ὑπὸ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχεται, ὡς οὐδ' ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἐφοίτων πρὸς ἀλλήλους φίλους λήθοντε τοκῆας; οὐδὲ Ἄρεώς τε καὶ Ἀφροδίτης ὑπὸ Ἡφαίστου δεσμὸν δι' ἕτερα τοιαῦτα.

The indecent tale of Ares and Aphrodite.

Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὔ μοι φαίνεται ἐπιτήδειον.

D Ἀλλ' εἴ πού τινες, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καρτερίαι πρὸς ἅπαντα καὶ λέγονται καὶ πράττονται ὑπὸ ἐλλογίμων ἀνδρῶν, θεατέον τε καὶ ἀκουστέον, οἷον καὶ τὸ

στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ·
τέτλαθι δή, κραδίη· καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ' ἔτλης.

The opposite strain of endurance.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Οὐ μὲν δὴ δωροδόκους γε ἐατέον εἶναι τοὺς ἄνδρας οὐδὲ φιλοχρημάτους.

E Οὐδαμῶς.

Οὐδ' ᾀστέον αὐτοῖς ὅτι

δῶρα θεοὺς πείθει, δῶρ' αἰδοίους βασιλῆας·

οὐδὲ τὸν τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως παιδαγωγὸν Φοίνικα ἐπαινετέον, ὡς μετρίως ἔλεγε συμβουλεύων αὐτῷ δῶρα μὲν λαβόντι ἐπαμύνειν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς, ἄνευ δὲ δώρων μὴ

Condemnation of Achilles and Phoenix.

Republic III.

Socrates, Adeimantus.

ἀπαλλάττεσθαι τῆς μήνιος. οὐδ' αὐτὸν τὸν Ἀχιλλέα p. 390. ἀξιώσομεν οὐδ' ὁμολογήσομεν οὕτω φιλοχρήματον εἶναι, ὥστε παρὰ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος δῶρα λαβεῖν, καὶ τιμὴν αὖ λαβόντα νεκροῦ ἀπολύειν, | ἄλλως δὲ p. 391. μὴ 'θέλειν.

Οὔκουν δίκαιόν γε, ἔφη, ἐπαινεῖν τὰ τοιαῦτα.

The impious behaviour of Achilles to Apollo and the river-gods; his cruelty.

Ὀκνῶ δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δι' Ὅμηρον λέγειν ὅτι οὐδ' ὅσιον ταῦτά γε κατὰ Ἀχιλλέως φάναι καὶ ἄλλων λεγόντων πείθεσθαι· καὶ αὖ ὡς πρὸς τὸν Ἀπόλλω εἶπεν

ἔβλαψάς μ' ἑκάεργε, θεῶν ὀλοώτατε πάντων·
ἦ σ' ἂν τισαίμην, εἴ μοι δύναμίς γε παρείη·

καὶ ὡς πρὸς τὸν ποταμόν, θεὸν ὄντα, ἀπειθῶς εἶχε B καὶ μάχεσθαι ἕτοιμος ἦν· καὶ αὖ τὰς τοῦ ἑτέρου ποταμοῦ Σπερχειοῦ ἱερὰς τρίχας Πατρόκλῳ ἥρωϊ, ἔφη, κόμην ὀπάσαιμι φέρεσθαι, νεκρῷ ὄντι, καὶ ὡς ἔδρασε τοῦτο, οὐ πειστέον· τάς τε αὖ Ἕκτορος ἕλξεις περὶ τὸ σῆμα τὸ Πατρόκλου καὶ τὰς τῶν ζωγρηθέντων σφαγὰς εἰς τὴν πυράν, ξύμπαντα ταῦτα οὐ φήσομεν ἀληθῆ εἰρῆσθαι, οὐδ' ἐάσομεν C πείθεσθαι τοὺς ἡμετέρους ὡς Ἀχιλλεύς, θεᾶς ὢν παῖς καὶ Πηλέως, σωφρονεστάτου τε καὶ τρίτου ἀπὸ Διός, καὶ ὑπὸ τῷ σοφωτάτῳ Χείρωνι τεθραμμένος, τοσαύτης ἦν ταραχῆς πλέως, ὥστ' ἔχειν ἐν αὑτῷ νοσήματε δύο ἐναντίω ἀλλήλοιν, ἀνελευθερίαν μετὰ φιλοχρηματίας καὶ αὖ ὑπερηφανίαν θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων.

Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.

The tale of Theseus

Μὴ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μηδὲ τάδε πειθώμεθα μηδ' ἐῶμεν λέγειν, ὡς Θησεὺς Ποσειδῶνος υἱὸς Πειρίθους

5. ἐθέλειν Ξ: θέλειν ΑΠΜ.   7. δι' ΠΞ. δὴ A²M.

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SOCRATES, ADEIMANTUS.

p. 391. D τε Διὸς ὥρμησαν οὕτως ἐπὶ δεινὰς ἁρπαγάς, μηδέ τιν' ἄλλον θεοῦ παῖδά τε καὶ ἥρω τολμῆσαι ἂν δεινὰ καὶ ἀσεβῆ ἐργάσασθαι, οἷα νῦν καταψεύδονται αὐτῶν· ἀλλὰ προσαναγκάζωμεν τοὺς ποιητὰς ἢ μὴ τούτων αὐτὰ ἔργα φάναι ἢ τούτους μὴ εἶναι θεῶν παῖδας, ἀμφότερα δὲ μὴ λέγειν, μηδὲ ἡμῖν ἐπιχειρεῖν πείθειν τοὺς νέους, ὡς οἱ θεοὶ κακὰ γεννῶσι, καὶ E ἥρωες ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲν βελτίους· ὅπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, οὔθ' ὅσια ταῦτα οὔτε ἀληθῆ· ἐπεδείξαμεν γάρ που ὅτι ἐκ θεῶν κακὰ γίγνεσθαι ἀδύνατον.

and Peirithous.

Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Καὶ μὴν τοῖς γε ἀκούουσι βλαβερά· πᾶς γὰρ ἑαυτῷ ξυγγνώμην ἕξει κακῷ ὄντι, πεισθεὶς ὡς ἄρα τοιαῦτα πράττουσί τε καὶ ἔπραττον καὶ

οἱ θεῶν ἀγχίσποροι,
*οἱ Ζηνὸς ἐγγύς, ὧν κατ' Ἰδαῖον πάγον
Διὸς πατρῴου βωμός ἐστ' ἐν αἰθέρι,

καὶ

οὔ πώ σφιν ἐξίτηλον αἷμα δαιμόνων.

ὧν ἕνεκα παυστέον τοὺς τοιούτους μύθους, μὴ ἡμῖν p. 392. πολλὴν εὐχέρειαν | ἐντίκτωσι τοῖς νέοις πονηρίας.

The bad effect of these mythological tales upon the young.

Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Τί οὖν [ἡμῖν], ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔτι λοιπὸν εἶδος λόγων πέρι ὁριζομένοις οἵους τε λεκτέον καὶ μή; περὶ γὰρ θεῶν ὡς δεῖ λέγεσθαι εἴρηται, καὶ περὶ δαιμόνων τε καὶ ἡρώων καὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ ἀνθρώπων τὸ λοιπὸν εἴη ἄν;

1. ὥρμησαν AM: ὥρμησεν Π. 2. ἄλλον Π: ἄλλου AM: ἀλλοῦ A². 17. οἱ add. Bekker: om. MSS. 24. ἡμῖν M: om. A: post ἐγώ ponit Π. 25. πέρι ὁριζομένοις ΠΜ: περιορίζομεν οἷς A: περιοριζομένοις Ξ.

†

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Socrates, Adeimantus.

Δῆλα δή. p. 392.

Ἀδύνατον δή, ὦ φίλε, ἡμῖν τοῦτό γε ἐν τῷ παρόντι τάξαι.

Πῶς;

Misstatements of the poets about men.

Ὅτι οἶμαι ἡμᾶς ἐρεῖν ὡς ἄρα καὶ ποιηταὶ καὶ λογοποιοὶ κακῶς λέγουσι περὶ ἀνθρώπων τὰ μέγιστα, B ὅτι εἰσὶν ἄδικοι μέν, εὐδαίμονες δὲ πολλοί, δίκαιοι δὲ ἄθλιοι, καὶ ὡς λυσιτελεῖ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἐὰν λανθάνῃ, ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη ἀλλότριον μὲν ἀγαθόν, οἰκεία δὲ ζημία· καὶ τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα ἀπερεῖν λέγειν, τὰ δ' ἐναντία τούτων προστάξειν ᾄδειν τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν· ἢ οὐκ οἴει;

Εὖ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, οἶδα.

Οὐκοῦν ἐὰν ὁμολογῇς ὀρθῶς με λέγειν, φήσω σε ὡμολογηκέναι ἃ πάλαι *ζητοῦμεν;

Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, ὑπέλαβες.

Οὐκοῦν περὶ ἀνθρώπων ὅτι τοιούτους δεῖ λόγους C λέγεσθαι, τότε διομολογησόμεθα, ὅταν εὕρωμεν οἷόν ἐστι δικαιοσύνη καὶ ὡς φύσει λυσιτελοῦν τῷ ἔχοντι, ἐάν τε δοκῇ ἐάν τε μὴ τοιοῦτος εἶναι;

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

Τὰ μὲν δὴ λόγων πέρι ἐχέτω τέλος, τὸ δὲ λέξεως, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπτέον, καὶ ἡμῖν ἅ τε λεκτέον καὶ ὡς λεκτέον παντελῶς ἐσκέψεται.

Καὶ ὁ Ἀδείμαντος, Τοῦτο, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐ μανθάνω ὅ τι λέγεις.

Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δεῖ γε. ἴσως οὖν τῇδε D μᾶλλον εἴσει. ἆρ' οὐ πάντα, ὅσα ὑπὸ μυθολόγων ἢ ποιητῶν λέγεται, διήγησις οὖσα τυγχάνει ἢ γεγονότων ἢ ὄντων ἢ μελλόντων;

15. ζητοῦμεν cj. Herm.: ἐζητοῦμεν MSS.

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SOCRATES, ADEIMANTUS.

p. 392. Τί γάρ, ἔφη, ἄλλο;

Ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐχὶ ἤτοι ἁπλῇ διηγήσει ἢ διὰ μιμήσεως γιγνομένῃ ἢ δι᾽ ἀμφοτέρων περαίνουσιν;

Καὶ τοῦτο, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ἔτι δέομαι σαφέστερον μαθεῖν.

Analysis of the dramatic element in Epic poetry.

Γελοῖος, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἔοικα διδάσκαλος εἶναι καὶ ἀσαφής. ὥσπερ οὖν οἱ ἀδύνατοι λέγειν, οὐ κατὰ E ὅλον ἀλλ᾽ ἀπολαβὼν μέρος τι πειράσομαί σοι ἐν τούτῳ δηλῶσαι ὃ βούλομαι. καί μοι εἰπέ· ἐπίστασαι τῆς Ἰλιάδος τὰ πρῶτα, ἐν οἷς ὁ ποιητής φησι τὸν μὲν Χρύσην δεῖσθαι τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος ἀπολῦσαι τὴν θυγατέρα, τὸν δὲ χαλεπαίνειν, τὸν δέ, ἐπειδὴ p. 393. οὐκ ἐτύγχανε, | κατεύχεσθαι τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πρὸς τὸν θεόν;

Ἔγωγε.

Οἶσθ᾽ οὖν ὅτι μέχρι μὲν τούτων τῶν ἐπῶν

καὶ ἐλίσσετο πάντας Ἀχαιούς,
Ἀτρεΐδα δὲ μάλιστα δύω, κοσμήτορε λαῶν

λέγει τε αὐτὸς ὁ ποιητὴς καὶ οὐδὲ ἐπιχειρεῖ ἡμῶν τὴν διάνοιαν ἄλλοσε τρέπειν, ὡς ἄλλος τις ὁ λέγων ἢ B αὐτός· τὰ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ὢν ὁ Χρύσης λέγει καὶ πειρᾶται ἡμᾶς ὅ τι μάλιστα ποιῆσαι μὴ Ὅμηρον δοκεῖν εἶναι τὸν λέγοντα ἀλλὰ τὸν ἱερέα, πρεσβύτην ὄντα. καὶ τὴν ἄλλην δὴ πᾶσαν σχεδόν τι οὕτω πεποίηται διήγησιν περί τε τῶν ἐν Ἰλίῳ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἰθάκῃ καὶ ὅλῃ Ὀδυσσείᾳ παθημάτων.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν διήγησις μέν ἐστι καὶ ὅταν τὰς ῥήσεις ἑκάστοτε λέγῃ καὶ ὅταν τὰ μεταξὺ τῶν ῥήσεων;

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SOCRATES, ADEIMANTUS.

Epic poetry has an element of imitation in the speeches; the rest is simple narrative.

Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; p. 393

Ἀλλ' ὅταν γέ τινα λέγῃ ῥῆσιν ὥς τις ἄλλος C ὤν, ἆρ' οὐ τότε ὁμοιοῦν αὐτὸν φήσομεν ὅ τι μάλιστα τὴν αὑτοῦ λέξιν ἑκάστῳ, ὃν ἂν προείπῃ ὡς ἐροῦντα;

Φήσομεν· τί γάρ;

Οὐκοῦν τό γε ὁμοιοῦν ἑαυτὸν ἄλλῳ ἢ κατὰ φωνὴν ἢ κατὰ σχῆμα μιμεῖσθαί ἐστιν ἐκεῖνον ᾧ ἄν τις ὁμοιοῖ;

Τί μήν;

Ἐν δὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὗτός τε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταὶ διὰ μιμήσεως τὴν διήγησιν ποιοῦνται.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Illustration from the beginning of the Iliad.

Εἰ δέ γε μηδαμοῦ ἑαυτὸν ἀποκρύπτοιτο ὁ ποιητής, πᾶσα ἂν αὐτῷ ἄνευ μιμήσεως ἡ ποίησίς τε καὶ διήγησις γεγονυῖα εἴη. ἵνα δὲ μὴ εἴπῃς, ὅτι οὐκ αὖ D μανθάνεις, ὅπως ἂν τοῦτο γένοιτο, ἐγὼ φράσω. εἰ γὰρ Ὅμηρος εἰπὼν ὅτι ἦλθεν ὁ Χρύσης τῆς τε θυγατρὸς λύτρα φέρων καὶ ἱκέτης τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, μάλιστα δὲ τῶν βασιλέων, μετὰ τοῦτο μὴ ὡς Χρύσης γενόμενος ἔλεγεν, ἀλλ' ἔτι ὡς Ὅμηρος, οἶσθ' ὅτι οὐκ ἂν μίμησις ἦν ἀλλ' ἁπλῆ διήγησις. εἶχε δ' ἂν ὧδέ πως — φράσω δὲ ἄνευ μέτρου· οὐ γάρ εἰμι ποιητικός —· ἐλθὼν ὁ ἱερεὺς εὔχετο ἐκείνοις μὲν τοὺς θεοὺς δοῦναι E ἑλόντας τὴν Τροίαν αὐτοὺς σωθῆναι, τὴν δὲ θυγατέρα οἱ λῦσαι δεξαμένους ἄποινα καὶ τὸν θεὸν αἰδεσθέντας. ταῦτα δὲ εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι ἐσέβοντο καὶ συνῄνουν, ὁ δὲ Ἀγαμέμνων ἠγρίαινεν ἐντελλόμενος νῦν τε ἀπιέναι καὶ αὖθις μὴ ἐλθεῖν, μὴ αὐτῷ τό τε σκῆπτρον καὶ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ στέμματα οὐκ

15. διήγησις ΑΠ: ἡ διήγησις Μ.

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p. 393. ἐπαρκέσοι· πρὶν δὲ λυθῆναι αὐτοῦ τὴν θυγατέρα, ἐν Ἄργει ἔφη γηράσειν μετὰ οὗ· ἀπιέναι δ' ἐκέλευε καὶ
p. 394. μὴ ἐρεθίζειν, ἵνα σῶς οἴκαδε | ἔλθοι. ὁ δὲ πρεσβύτης ἀκούσας ἔδεισέ τε καὶ ἀπῄει σιγῇ, ἀποχωρήσας δὲ ἐκ τοῦ στρατοπέδου πολλὰ τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι εὔχετο, τάς τε ἐπωνυμίας τοῦ θεοῦ ἀνακαλῶν καὶ ὑπομιμνήσκων καὶ ἀπαιτῶν, εἴ τι πώποτε ἢ ἐν ναῶν οἰκοδομήσεσιν ἢ ἐν ἱερῶν θυσίαις κεχαρισμένον δωρήσαιτο· ὧν δὴ χάριν κατεύχετο τῖσαι τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς τὰ ἃ δάκρυα τοῖς ἐκείνου βέλεσιν. οὕτως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ
B ἑταῖρε, ἄνευ μιμήσεως ἁπλῆ διήγησις γίγνεται.

Μανθάνω, ἔφη.

Μάνθανε τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ταύτης αὖ ἐναντία γίγνεται, ὅταν τις τὰ τοῦ ποιητοῦ τὰ μεταξὺ τῶν ῥήσεων ἐξαιρῶν τὰ ἀμοιβαῖα καταλείπῃ.

Καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, μανθάνω, ὅτι ἔστι τὸ περὶ τὰς τραγῳδίας τοιοῦτον.

Tragedy and Comedy are wholly imitative; dithyrambic and some other kinds of poetry are devoid of imitation. Epic poetry is a combination of the two.

Ὀρθότατα, ἔφην, ὑπέλαβες, καὶ οἶμαί σοι ἤδη δηλοῦν ὃ ἔμπροσθεν οὐχ οἷός τ' ἦ, ὅτι τῆς ποιήσεώς
C τε καὶ μυθολογίας ἡ μὲν διὰ μιμήσεως ὅλη ἐστίν, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, τραγῳδία τε καὶ κωμῳδία, ἡ δὲ δι' ἀπαγγελίας αὐτοῦ τοῦ ποιητοῦ—εὕροις δ' ἂν αὐτὴν μάλιστά που ἐν διθυράμβοις —, ἡ δ' αὖ δι' ἀμφοτέρων ἔν τε τῇ τῶν ἐπῶν ποιήσει, πολλαχοῦ δὲ καὶ ἄλλοθι, εἴ μοι μανθάνεις.

Ἀλλὰ ξυνίημι, ἔφη, ὃ τότε ἐβούλου λέγειν.

Καὶ τὸ πρὸ τούτου δὴ ἀναμνήσθητι, ὅτι ἔφαμεν ἃ μὲν λεκτέον ἤδη εἰρῆσθαι, ὡς δὲ λεκτέον ἔτι σκεπτέον εἶναι.

Ἀλλὰ μέμνημαι.

25. μοι MSS.: μου cj. Heindorf.

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SOCRATES, ADEIMANTUS.

Τοῦτο τοίνυν αὐτὸ ἦν ὃ ἔλεγον, ὅτι χρείη διομολογήσασθαι πότερον ἐάσομεν τοὺς ποιητὰς μιμουμένους ἡμῖν τὰς διηγήσεις ποιεῖσθαι ἢ τὰ μὲν μιμουμένους, τὰ δὲ μή, καὶ ὁποῖα ἑκάτερα, ἢ οὐδὲ μιμεῖσθαι. p. 394. D

Μαντεύομαι, ἔφη, σκοπεῖσθαί σε, εἴτε παραδεξόμεθα τραγῳδίαν τε καὶ κωμῳδίαν εἰς τὴν πόλιν, εἴτε καὶ οὔ.

A hint about Homer, (cp. *infra*, bk. x.)

Ἴσως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἴσως δὲ καὶ πλείω ἔτι τούτων· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγέ πω οἶδα, ἀλλ' ὅπῃ ἂν ὁ λόγος ὥσπερ πνεῦμα φέρῃ, ταύτῃ ἰτέον.

Καὶ καλῶς γ', ἔφη, λέγεις.

Our guardians ought not to be imitators, for one man can only do one thing well;

Τόδε τοίνυν, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, ἄθρει, πότερον μιμητικοὺς ἡμῖν δεῖ εἶναι τοὺς φύλακας ἢ οὔ, ἢ καὶ τοῦτο τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἕπεται, ὅτι εἷς ἕκαστος ἓν μὲν ἂν ἐπιτήδευμα καλῶς ἐπιτηδεύοι, πολλὰ δ' οὔ, ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο ἐπιχειροῖ, πολλῶν ἐφαπτόμενος πάντων ἀποτυγχάνοι ἄν, ὥστ' εἶναί που ἐλλόγιμος; E

Τί δ' οὐ μέλλει;

Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ μιμήσεως ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, ὅτι πολλὰ ὁ αὐτὸς μιμεῖσθαι εὖ ὥσπερ ἓν οὐ δυνατός;

Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

Σχολῇ ἄρα ἐπιτηδεύσει | γέ τι ἅμα τῶν ἀξίων λόγου ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ πολλὰ μιμήσεται καὶ ἔσται μιμητικός, ἐπεί που οὐδὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἐγγὺς ἀλλήλων εἶναι δύο μιμήματα δύνανται οἱ αὐτοὶ ἅμα εὖ μιμεῖσθαι, οἷον κωμῳδίαν καὶ τραγῳδίαν ποιοῦντες. ἢ οὐ μιμήματε ἄρτι τούτω ἐκάλεις; p. 395.

Ἔγωγε· καὶ ἀληθῆ γε λέγεις, ὅτι οὐ δύνανται οἱ αὐτοί.

8. ἴσως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἴσως δὲ A : ἴσως δὲ M(pr.) : ἐγὼ—δὴ om. Π.
27. μιμήματε *q* : μιμήματα M : μιμήματά τε AΠ.

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SOCRATES, ADEIMANTUS.

p. 395. Οὐδὲ μὴν ῥαψῳδοί γε καὶ ὑποκριταὶ ἅμα.

Ἀληθῆ.

Ἀλλ' οὐδέ τοι ὑποκριταὶ κωμῳδοῖς τε καὶ τραγῳ-
B δοῖς οἱ αὐτοί· πάντα δὲ ταῦτα μιμήματα. ἢ οὔ;

Μιμήματα.

he cannot even imitate many things.

Καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, φαίνεταί μοι εἰς σμικρότερα κατακεκερματίσθαι ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις, ὥστε ἀδύνατος εἶναι πολλὰ καλῶς μιμεῖσθαι ἢ αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα πράττειν ὧν δὴ καὶ τὰ μιμήματά ἐστιν ἀφομοιώματα.

Ἀληθέστατα, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Εἰ ἄρα τὸν πρῶτον λόγον διασώσομεν, τοὺς φύλακας ἡμῖν τῶν ἄλλων πασῶν δημιουργιῶν ἀφειμέ-
C νους δεῖν εἶναι δημιουργοὺς ἐλευθερίας τῆς πόλεως πάνυ ἀκριβεῖς καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἐπιτηδεύειν ὅ τι μὴ εἰς τοῦτο φέρει, οὐδὲν δὴ δέοι ἂν αὐτοὺς ἄλλο πράττειν οὐδὲ μιμεῖσθαι. ἐὰν δὲ μιμῶνται, μιμεῖσθαι τὰ τούτοις προσήκοντα εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων, ἀνδρείους, σώφρονας, ὁσίους, ἐλευθέρους, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, τὰ δὲ ἀνελεύθερα μήτε ποιεῖν μήτε δεινοὺς εἶναι μιμήσασθαι, μηδὲ ἄλλο μηδὲν τῶν αἰσχρῶν, ἵνα μὴ ἐκ τῆς μιμήσεως τοῦ εἶναι ἀπολαύσωσιν. ἢ οὐκ ᾔσθη-
D σαι ὅτι αἱ μιμήσεις, ἐὰν ἐκ νέων πόρρω διατελέσωσιν, εἰς ἔθη τε καὶ φύσιν καθίστανται καὶ κατὰ σῶμα καὶ φωνὰς καὶ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν;

Καὶ μάλα, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Οὐ δὴ ἐπιτρέψομεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὧν φαμὲν κήδεσθαι καὶ δεῖν αὐτοὺς ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς γενέσθαι, γυναῖκα μιμεῖσθαι ἄνδρας ὄντας, ἢ νέαν ἢ πρεσβυτέραν, ἢ ἀνδρὶ λοιδορουμένην ἢ πρὸς θεοὺς ἐρίζουσάν τε καὶ

21. μὴ ΠΜ : om. A.

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Imitations which are of the degrading sort.

μεγαλαυχουμένην, οἰομένην εὐδαίμονα εἶναι, ἢ ἐν p. 395. ξυμφοραῖς τε καὶ πένθεσι καὶ θρήνοις ἐχομένην· E κάμνουσαν δὲ ἢ ἐρῶσαν ἢ ὠδίνουσαν, πολλοῦ καὶ δεήσομεν.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Οὐδέ γε δούλας τε καὶ δούλους πράττοντας ὅσα δούλων.

Οὐδὲ τοῦτο.

Οὐδέ γε ἄνδρας κακούς, ὡς ἔοικε, δειλούς τε καὶ τὰ ἐναντία πράττοντας ὧν νῦν δὴ εἴπομεν, κακηγοροῦντάς τε καὶ κωμῳδοῦντας ἀλλήλους καὶ αἰσχρολογοῦντας, μεθύοντας ἢ καὶ | νήφοντας, ἢ καὶ ἄλλα p. 396. ὅσα οἱ τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἐν λόγοις καὶ ἐν ἔργοις ἁμαρτάνουσιν εἰς αὑτούς τε καὶ εἰς ἄλλους, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ μαινομένοις ἐθιστέον ἀφομοιοῦν αὑτοὺς ἐν λόγοις οὐδὲ ἐν ἔργοις· γνωστέον μὲν γὰρ καὶ μαινομένους καὶ πονηροὺς ἄνδρας τε καὶ γυναῖκας, ποιητέον δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων οὐδὲ μιμητέον.

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

Τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· χαλκεύοντας ἤ τι ἄλλο δημιουργοῦντας, ἢ ἐλαύνοντας τριήρεις ἢ κελεύοντας τούτοις, ἤ τι ἄλλο τῶν περὶ ταῦτα μιμητέον; B

Καὶ πῶς, ἔφη, οἷς γε οὐδὲ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν τούτων οὐδενὶ ἐξέσται;

Τί δέ; ἵππους χρεμετίζοντας καὶ ταύρους μυκωμένους καὶ ποταμοὺς ψοφοῦντας καὶ θάλατταν κτυποῦσαν καὶ βροντὰς καὶ πάντα αὖ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἦ μιμήσονται;

Ἀλλ' ἀπείρηται αὐτοῖς, ἔφη, μήτε μαίνεσθαι μήτε μαινομένοις ἀφομοιοῦσθαι.

Εἰ ἄρ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μανθάνω ἃ σὺ λέγεις, ἔστι τι

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Socrates, Adeimantus.

p. 396. εἶδος λέξεώς τε καὶ διηγήσεως ἐν ᾧ ἂν διηγοῖτο ὁ τῷ C ὄντι καλὸς κἀγαθός, ὁπότε τι δέοι αὐτὸν λέγειν, καὶ ἕτερον αὖ ἀνόμοιον τούτῳ εἶδος, οὗ ἂν ἔχοιτο ἀεὶ καὶ ἐν ᾧ διηγοῖτο ὁ ἐναντίως ἐκείνῳ φύς τε καὶ τραφείς.

Imitations which may be encouraged.

Ποῖα δή, ἔφη, ταῦτα;

Ὁ μέν μοι δοκεῖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μέτριος ἀνήρ, ἐπειδὰν ἀφίκηται ἐν τῇ διηγήσει ἐπὶ λέξιν τινὰ ἢ πρᾶξιν ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ, ἐθελήσειν ὡς αὐτὸς ὢν ἐκεῖνος ἀπαγγέλλειν καὶ οὐκ αἰσχυνεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ μιμήσει, μάλιστα μὲν μιμούμενος τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀσφαλῶς τε καὶ D ἐμφρόνως πράττοντα, ἐλάττω δὲ καὶ ἧττον ἢ ὑπὸ νόσων ἢ ὑπὸ ἐρώτων ἐσφαλμένον ἢ καὶ ὑπὸ μέθης ἤ τινος ἄλλης ξυμφορᾶς· ὅταν δὲ γίγνηται κατά τινα ἑαυτοῦ ἀνάξιον, οὐκ ἐθελήσειν σπουδῇ ἀπεικάζειν ἑαυτὸν τῷ χείρονι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα κατὰ βραχύ, ὅταν τι χρηστὸν ποιῇ, ἀλλ' αἰσχυνεῖσθαι, ἅμα μὲν ἀγύμναστος ὢν τοῦ μιμεῖσθαι τοὺς τοιούτους, ἅμα δὲ καὶ δυσχεραίνων αὐτὸν ἐκμάττειν τε καὶ ἐνιστάναι εἰς E τοὺς τῶν κακιόνων τύπους, ἀτιμάζων τῇ διανοίᾳ, ὅ τι μὴ παιδιᾶς χάριν.

Εἰκός, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν διηγήσει χρήσεται οἵᾳ ἡμεῖς ὀλίγον πρότερον διήλθομεν περὶ τὰ τοῦ Ὁμήρου ἔπη, καὶ ἔσται αὐτοῦ ἡ λέξις μετέχουσα μὲν ἀμφοτέρων, μιμήσεώς τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης διηγήσεως, σμικρὸν δέ τι μέρος ἐν πολλῷ λόγῳ τῆς μιμήσεως; ἢ οὐδὲν λέγω;

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, οἷόν γε ἀνάγκη τὸν τύπον εἶναι τοῦ τοιούτου ῥήτορος.

Imitations which are to be prohibited.

p. 397. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ μὴ | τοιοῦτος αὖ, ὅσῳ ἂν

16. ἑαυτὸν ΠΜ: ἑαυτοῦ Α.

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φαυλότερος ᾖ, πάντα τε μᾶλλον [μιμήσεται] *ἢ διη- p. 397 γήσεται καὶ οὐδὲν ἑαυτοῦ ἀνάξιον οἰήσεται εἶναι, ὥστε πάντα ἐπιχειρήσει μιμεῖσθαι σπουδῇ τε καὶ ἐναντίον πολλῶν, καὶ ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, βροντάς τε καὶ ψόφους ἀνέμων τε καὶ χαλαζῶν καὶ ἀξόνων καὶ τροχιλίων καὶ σαλπίγγων καὶ αὐλῶν καὶ συρίγγων καὶ πάντων ὀργάνων φωνάς, καὶ ἔτι κυνῶν καὶ προβάτων καὶ ὀρνέων φθόγγους· καὶ ἔσται δὴ ἡ τούτου λέξις ἅπασα διὰ μιμήσεως φωναῖς τε καὶ B σχήμασιν, ἢ σμικρόν τι διηγήσεως ἔχουσα;

Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, καὶ τοῦτο.

Ταῦτα τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔλεγον τὰ δύο εἴδη τῆς λέξεως.

Two kinds of style—the one simple, the other multiplex. There is also a third, which is a combination of the two.

Καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν αὐτοῖν τὸ μὲν σμικρὰς τὰς μεταβολὰς ἔχει, καὶ ἐάν τις ἀποδιδῷ πρέπουσαν ἁρμονίαν καὶ ῥυθμὸν τῇ λέξει, ὀλίγου πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν γίγνεται λέγειν τῷ ὀρθῶς λέγοντι καὶ ἐν μιᾷ ἁρμονίᾳ—σμικραὶ γὰρ αἱ μεταβολαί—καὶ δὴ ἐν ῥυθμῷ ὡσαύτως παραπλησίῳ τινί; C

Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχει.

Τί δὲ τὸ τοῦ ἑτέρου εἶδος; οὐ τῶν ἐναντίων δεῖται, πασῶν μὲν ἁρμονιῶν, πάντων δὲ ῥυθμῶν, εἰ μέλλει αὖ οἰκείως λέγεσθαι, διὰ τὸ παντοδαπὰς μορφὰς τῶν μεταβολῶν ἔχειν;

Καὶ σφόδρα γε οὕτως ἔχει.

Ἆρ' οὖν πάντες οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ οἵ τι λέγοντες ἢ τῷ ἑτέρῳ τούτων ἐπιτυγχάνουσι τύπῳ τῆς λέξεως ἢ τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἢ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τινὶ ξυγκεραννύντες;

1. μιμήσεται ἢ διηγήσεται cj. Madvig : διηγήσεται ΑΠΜ : μιμήσεται q.
3. τε ΠΜ : γε Α. 18. σμικραὶ ΠΜ : σμικρὰ Α.

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SOCRATES, ADEIMANTUS.

The simple style alone is to be admitted in the State; the attractions of the mixed style are acknowledged, but it appears to be excluded.

p. 397. Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

D Τί οὖν ποιήσομεν; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· πότερον εἰς τὴν πόλιν πάντας τούτους παραδεξόμεθα ἢ τῶν ἀκράτων τὸν ἕτερον ἢ τὸν κεκραμένον;

Ἐὰν ἡ ἐμή, ἔφη, νικᾷ, τὸν τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς μιμητὴν [τὸν] ἄκρατον.

Ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, ἡδύς γε καὶ ὁ κεκραμένος, πολὺ δὲ ἥδιστος παισί τε καὶ παιδαγωγοῖς ὁ ἐναντίος οὗ σὺ αἱρεῖ καὶ τῷ πλείστῳ ὄχλῳ.

Ἥδιστος γάρ.

Ἀλλ' ἴσως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐκ ἂν αὐτὸν ἁρμόττειν E φαίης τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πολιτείᾳ, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι διπλοῦς ἀνὴρ παρ' ἡμῖν οὐδὲ πολλαπλοῦς, ἐπειδὴ ἕκαστος ἓν πράττει.

Οὐ γὰρ οὖν ἁρμόττει.

Οὐκοῦν διὰ ταῦτα ἐν μόνῃ τῇ τοιαύτῃ πόλει τόν τε σκυτοτόμον σκυτοτόμον εὑρήσομεν καὶ οὐ κυβερνήτην πρὸς τῇ σκυτοτομίᾳ, καὶ τὸν γεωργὸν γεωργὸν καὶ οὐ δικαστὴν πρὸς τῇ γεωργίᾳ, καὶ τὸν πολεμικὸν πολεμικὸν καὶ οὐ χρηματιστὴν πρὸς τῇ πολεμικῇ, καὶ πάντας οὕτω;

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.

The pantomimic artist is to receive great honours,

p. 398. Ἄνδρα δή, ὡς ἔοικε, δυνάμενον | ὑπὸ σοφίας παντοδαπὸν γίγνεσθαι καὶ μιμεῖσθαι πάντα χρήματα, εἰ ἡμῖν ἀφίκοιτο εἰς τὴν πόλιν αὐτός τε καὶ τὰ ποιήματα βουλόμενος ἐπιδείξασθαι, προσκυνοῖμεν ἂν αὐτὸν ὡς ἱερὸν καὶ θαυμαστὸν καὶ ἡδύν, εἴποιμεν δ' ἂν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ ἐν τῇ πόλει παρ' ἡμῖν οὔτε θέμις ἐγγενέσθαι, ἀποπέμποιμέν τε εἰς ἄλλην πόλιν μύρον κατὰ τῆς κεφαλῆς καταχέαντες καὶ ἐρίῳ

6. τὸν om. AMpr. 29. οὐδὲ Bekker.

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SOCRATES, ADEIMANTUS, GLAUCON.

but he is to be sent out of the country.

στέψαντες, αὐτοὶ δ' ἂν τῷ αὐστηροτέρῳ καὶ ἀηδε- p. 398. στέρῳ ποιητῇ χρῴμεθα καὶ μυθολόγῳ ὠφελίας ἕνεκα, B ὃς ἡμῖν τὴν τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς λέξιν μιμοῖτο καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα λέγοι ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς τύποις, οἷς κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐνομοθετησάμεθα, ὅτε τοὺς στρατιώτας ἐπεχειροῦμεν παιδεύειν.

Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, οὕτως ἂν ποιοῖμεν, εἰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἴη.

Νῦν δή, εἶπον ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, κινδυνεύει ἡμῖν τῆς μουσικῆς τὸ περὶ λόγους τε καὶ μύθους παντελῶς διαπεπεράνθαι· ἅ τε γὰρ λεκτέον καὶ ὡς λεκτέον εἴρηται.

Καὶ αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν μετὰ τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ περὶ ᾠδῆς τρό- C που καὶ μελῶν λοιπόν;

Δῆλα δή.

Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ πᾶς ἤδη ἂν εὕροι ἃ ἡμῖν λεκτέον περὶ αὐτῶν οἷα δεῖ εἶναι, εἴπερ μέλλομεν τοῖς προειρημένοις συμφωνήσειν;

Καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων ἐπιγελάσας, Ἐγὼ τοίνυν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, κινδυνεύω ἐκτὸς τῶν πάντων εἶναι· οὔκουν ἱκανῶς γε ἔχω ἐν τῷ παρόντι ξυμβαλέσθαι ποῖ' ἄττα δεῖ ἡμᾶς λέγειν· ὑποπτεύω μέντοι.

Πάντως δήπου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρῶτον μὲν τόδε ἱκανῶς ἔχεις λέγειν, ὅτι τὸ μέλος ἐκ τριῶν ἐστὶ συγκείμενον, D λόγου τε καὶ ἁρμονίας καὶ ῥυθμοῦ.

Ναί, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε.

Οὐκοῦν ὅσον γε αὐτοῦ λόγος ἐστίν, οὐδὲν δήπου διαφέρει τοῦ μὴ ᾀδομένου λόγου πρὸς τὸ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς δεῖν τύποις λέγεσθαι οἷς ἄρτι προείπομεν καὶ ὡσαύτως;

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SOCRATES, GLAUCON.

Melody and rhythm.

p. 398. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.

Καὶ μὴν τήν γε ἁρμονίαν καὶ ῥυθμὸν ἀκολουθεῖν δεῖ τῷ λόγῳ.

Πῶς δ' οὔ;

Ἀλλὰ μέντοι θρήνων τε καὶ ὀδυρμῶν ἔφαμεν ἐν λόγοις οὐδὲν προσδεῖσθαι.

Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

E Τίνες οὖν θρηνώδεις ἁρμονίαι; λέγε μοι· σὺ γὰρ μουσικός.

Μιξολυδιστί, ἔφη, καὶ συντονολυδιστὶ καὶ τοιαῦταί τινες.

Οὐκοῦν αὗται, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀφαιρετέαι· ἄχρηστοι γὰρ καὶ γυναιξὶν ἃς δεῖ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι, μὴ ὅτι ἀνδράσιν.

Πάνυ γε.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν μέθη γε φύλαξιν ἀπρεπέστατον καὶ μαλακία καὶ ἀργία.

Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Τίνες οὖν μαλακαί τε καὶ συμποτικαὶ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν;

The relaxed melodies or harmonies are the Ionian and the Lydian. These are to be banished.

Ἰαστί, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ λυδιστί, αἵτινες χαλαραὶ καλοῦνται.

p. 399. | Ταύταις οὖν, ὦ φίλε, ἐπὶ πολεμικῶν ἀνδρῶν ἔσθ' ὅ τι χρήσει;

Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ κινδυνεύει σοι δωριστὶ λείπεσθαι καὶ φρυγιστί.

Οὐκ οἶδα, ἔφην ἐγώ, τὰς ἁρμονίας, ἀλλὰ κατάλειπε ἐκείνην τὴν ἁρμονίαν, ἣ ἔν τε πολεμικῇ πράξει ὄντος ἀνδρείου καὶ ἐν πάσῃ βιαίῳ ἐργασίᾳ πρεπόν-

7. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν ΠΜ: οὐ γὰρ οὔ Α. 10. σύντονοι λυδιστὶ Π. 21. λυδιαστὶ Π. αἵτινες ΑΜ: αὖ τινὲς Π.

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SOCRATES, GLAUCON.

τως ἂν μιμήσαιτο φθόγγους τε καὶ προσῳδίας, καὶ ἀποτυχόντος ἢ εἰς τραύματα ἢ εἰς θανάτους ἰόντος ἢ εἴς τινα ἄλλην ξυμφορὰν πεσόντος, ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις παρατεταγμένως καὶ καρτερούντως ἀμυνομένου τὴν τύχην· καὶ ἄλλην αὖ ἐν εἰρηνικῇ τε καὶ μὴ βιαίῳ ἀλλ' ἐν ἑκουσίᾳ πράξει ὄντος, ἢ τινά τι πείθοντός τε καὶ δεομένου, ἢ εὐχῇ θεὸν ἢ διδαχῇ καὶ νουθετήσει ἄνθρωπον, ἢ τοὐναντίον ἄλλῳ δεομένῳ ἢ διδάσκοντι ἢ μεταπείθοντι ἑαυτὸν ἐπέχοντα, καὶ ἐκ τούτων πράξαντα κατὰ νοῦν, καὶ μὴ ὑπερηφάνως ἔχοντα, ἀλλὰ σωφρόνως τε καὶ μετρίως ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις πράττοντά τε καὶ τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα ἀγαπῶντα. ταύτας δύο ἁρμονίας, βίαιον, ἑκούσιον, δυστυχούντων, εὐτυχούντων, σωφρόνων, ἀνδρείων [ἁρμονίας] αἵτινες φθόγγους μιμήσονται κάλλιστα, ταύτας λεῖπε. p. 399. B C

The Dorian and Phrygian are to be retained.

'Αλλ', ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐκ ἄλλας αἰτεῖς λείπειν ἢ ἃς νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον.

Οὐκ ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πολυχορδίας γε οὐδὲ παναρμονίου ἡμῖν δεήσει ἐν ταῖς ᾠδαῖς τε καὶ μέλεσιν.

Οὔ μοι, ἔφη, φαίνεται.

Τριγώνων ἄρα καὶ πηκτίδων καὶ πάντων ὀργάνων ὅσα πολύχορδα καὶ πολυαρμόνια, δημιουργοὺς οὐ θρέψομεν. D

Οὐ φαινόμεθα.

Musical instruments—which are to be rejected and which allowed?

Τί δέ; αὐλοποιοὺς ἢ αὐλητὰς παραδέξει εἰς τὴν πόλιν; ἢ οὐ τοῦτο πολυχορδότατον, καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ παναρμόνια αὐλοῦ τυγχάνει ὄντα μίμημα;

Δῆλα δή, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Λύρα δή σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ κιθάρα λείπεται, καὶ

9. ἐπέχοντα ΑΠΜ : ὑπέχοντα Ξ. 12. τὰ ΠΜ : om. A.
13. ἁρμονίας ΑΠΜ : om. q. 14. ἁρμονίας ΑΠΜ : del. Bekker.

p. 399. κατὰ πόλιν χρήσιμα· καὶ αὖ κατ' ἀγροὺς τοῖς νομεῦσι σύριγξ ἄν τις εἴη.

Ὡς γοῦν, ἔφη, ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν σημαίνει.

E Οὐδέν γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καινὸν ποιοῦμεν, ὦ φίλε, κρίνοντες τὸν Ἀπόλλω καὶ τὰ τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ὄργανα πρὸ Μαρσύου τε καὶ τῶν ἐκείνου ὀργάνων.

Μὰ Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὔ μοι φαινόμεθα.

Καὶ νὴ τὸν κύνα, εἶπον, λελήθαμέν γε διακαθαίροντες πάλιν ἣν ἄρτι τρυφᾶν ἔφαμεν πόλιν.

Σωφρονοῦντές γε ἡμεῖς, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Ἴθι δή, ἔφην, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ καθαίρωμεν. ἑπόμενον γὰρ δὴ ταῖς ἁρμονίαις ἂν ἡμῖν εἴη τὸ περὶ ῥυθμούς, μὴ ποικίλους αὐτοὺς διώκειν μηδὲ παντοδαπὰς βάσεις, ἀλλὰ βίου ῥυθμοὺς ἰδεῖν κοσμίου τε

p. 400. καὶ ἀνδρείου τίνες εἰσίν· | οὓς ἰδόντα τὸν πόδα τῷ τοιούτου λόγῳ ἀναγκάζειν ἕπεσθαι καὶ τὸ μέλος, ἀλλὰ μὴ λόγον ποδί τε καὶ μέλει. οἵτινες δ' ἂν εἶεν οὗτοι οἱ ῥυθμοί, σὸν ἔργον, ὥσπερ τὰς ἁρμονίας, φράσαι.

Three kinds of rhythm as there are four notes of the tetrachord.

Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί', ἔφη, οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ τρί' ἄττα ἐστὶν εἴδη ἐξ ὧν αἱ βάσεις πλέκονται, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις τέτταρα, ὅθεν αἱ πᾶσαι ἁρμονίαι, τεθεαμένος ἂν εἴποιμι· ποῖα δὲ ποίου βίου μιμήματα, λέγειν οὐκ ἔχω.

B Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ μετὰ Δάμωνος βουλευσόμεθα, τίνες τε ἀνελευθερίας καὶ ὕβρεως ἢ μανίας καὶ ἄλλης κακίας πρέπουσαι βάσεις, καὶ τίνας τοῖς ἐναντίοις λειπτέον ῥυθμούς, οἶμαι δέ με ἀκηκοέναι οὐ σαφῶς ἐνόπλιόν τέ τινα ὀνομάζοντος αὐτοῦ ξύνθετον καὶ δάκτυλον καὶ ἡρῷόν γε, οὐκ οἶδα

23. ποῖα δὲ ποίου M : om. A : ποῖα δ' ὁποίου Π.

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ὅπως διακοσμοῦντος καὶ ἴσον ἄνω καὶ κάτω τιθέντος, p. 400. εἰς βραχύ τε καὶ μακρὸν γιγνόμενον, καί, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἴαμβον καί τιν' ἄλλον τροχαῖον ὠνόμαζε, μήκη δὲ καὶ βραχύτητας προσῆπτε. καὶ τούτων C τισὶν οἶμαι τὰς ἀγωγὰς τοῦ ποδὸς αὐτὸν οὐχ ἧττον ψέγειν τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖν ἢ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς αὐτούς, ἤτοι ξυναμφότερόν τι. οὐ γὰρ ἔχω λέγειν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μέν, ὥσπερ εἶπον, εἰς Δάμωνα ἀναβεβλήσθω· διελέσθαι γὰρ οὐ σμικροῦ λόγου. ἢ σὺ οἴει;

Μὰ Δί', οὐκ ἔγωγε.

Ἀλλὰ τόδε γε, ὅτι τὸ τῆς εὐσχημοσύνης τε καὶ ἀσχημοσύνης τῷ εὐρύθμῳ τε καὶ ἀρρύθμῳ ἀκολουθεῖ, δύνασαι διελέσθαι;

Πῶς δ' οὔ;

Rhythm and harmony follow style, and style is the expression of the soul.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ εὔρυθμόν γε καὶ τὸ ἄρρυθμον τὸ D μὲν τῇ καλῇ λέξει ἕπεται ὁμοιούμενον, τὸ δὲ τῇ ἐναντίᾳ, καὶ τὸ εὐάρμοστον καὶ ἀνάρμοστον ὡσαύτως, εἴπερ ῥυθμός γε καὶ ἁρμονία λόγῳ, ὥσπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο, ἀλλὰ μὴ λόγος τούτοις.

Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ταῦτά γε λόγῳ ἀκολουθητέον.

Τί δ' ὁ τρόπος τῆς λέξεως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ὁ λόγος; οὐ τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ἤθει ἕπεται;

Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Τῇ δὲ λέξει τὰ ἄλλα;

Ναί.

Simplicity the great first principle;

Εὐλογία ἄρα καὶ εὐαρμοστία καὶ εὐσχημοσύνη καὶ εὐρυθμία εὐηθείᾳ ἀκολουθεῖ, οὐχ ἣν ἄνοιαν οὖσαν E ὑποκοριζόμενοι καλοῦμεν ὡς εὐήθειαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν

7. ἔχω ΑΠΜ: ἔγωγε ἔχω r M corr. 11. καὶ ἀσχημοσύνης om. Π. 17. καὶ ἀνάρμοστον Π: καὶ τὸ ἀνάρμοστον M: om. A. 29. ὡς MSS.: νῦν cj. Cobet.

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Socrates, Glaucon.

p. 400. ὡς ἀληθῶς εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς τὸ ἦθος κατεσκευασμένην διάνοιαν.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ πανταχοῦ ταῦτα διωκτέα τοῖς νέοις, εἰ μέλλουσι τὸ αὑτῶν πράττειν;

Διωκτέα μὲν οὖν.

and a principle which is widely spread in nature and art.

p. 401. Ἔστι δέ γέ που πλήρης μὲν γραφικὴ | αὐτῶν καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη δημιουργία, πλήρης δὲ ὑφαντικὴ καὶ ποικιλία καὶ οἰκοδομία καὶ πᾶσα αὖ ἡ τῶν ἄλλων σκευῶν ἐργασία, ἔτι δὲ ἡ τῶν σωμάτων φύσις καὶ ἡ τῶν ἄλλων φυτῶν· ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις ἔνεστιν εὐσχημοσύνη ἢ ἀσχημοσύνη. καὶ ἡ μὲν ἀσχημοσύνη καὶ ἀρρυθμία καὶ ἀναρμοστία κακολογίας καὶ κακοηθείας ἀδελφά, τὰ δ' ἐναντία τοῦ ἐναντίου, σώφρονός τε καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἤθους, ἀδελφά τε καὶ μιμήματα.

Παντελῶς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Our citizens must grow up to manhood amidst impressions of grace and beauty only; all ugliness and vice must be excluded.

B Ἆρ' οὖν τοῖς ποιηταῖς ἡμῖν μόνον ἐπιστατητέον καὶ προσαναγκαστέον τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἰκόνα ἤθους ἐμποιεῖν τοῖς ποιήμασιν ἢ μὴ παρ' ἡμῖν ποιεῖν, ἢ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δημιουργοῖς ἐπιστατητέον καὶ διακωλυτέον τὸ κακόηθες τοῦτο καὶ ἀκόλαστον καὶ ἀνελεύθερον καὶ ἄσχημον μήτε ἐν εἰκόσι ζῴων μήτε ἐν οἰκοδομήμασι μήτε ἐν ἄλλῳ μηδενὶ δημιουργουμένῳ ἐμποιεῖν, ἢ ὁ μὴ οἷός τε ὢν οὐκ ἐατέος παρ' ἡμῖν δημιουργεῖν, ἵνα μὴ ἐν κακίας εἰκόσι τρεφόμενοι ἡμῖν
C οἱ φύλακες ὥσπερ ἐν κακῇ βοτάνῃ, πολλὰ ἑκάστης ἡμέρας κατὰ σμικρὸν ἀπὸ πολλῶν δρεπόμενοί τε καὶ νεμόμενοι, ἕν τι ξυνιστάντες λανθάνωσι κακὸν μέγα

13. ἀρρυθμία A[2]: ἀρυθμία M: ἀραθυμία AΠ.
29. νεμόμενοι ΠM: ἀνεμόμενοι A: ἀνιμώμενοι A[rec.] mg.

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SOCRATES, GLAUCON.

ἐν τῇ αὐτῶν ψυχῇ, ἀλλ' ἐκείνους ζητητέον τοὺς δη- p. 401. μιουργοὺς τοὺς εὐφυῶς δυναμένους ἰχνεύειν τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ εὐσχήμονος φύσιν, ἵνα ὥσπερ ἐν ὑγιεινῷ τόπῳ οἰκοῦντες οἱ νέοι ἀπὸ παντὸς ὠφελῶνται, ὁπόθεν ἂν αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν ἔργων ἢ πρὸς ὄψιν ἢ πρὸς ἀκοήν τι προσβάλῃ, ὥσπερ αὔρα φέρουσα ἀπὸ χρηστῶν τόπων ὑγίειαν, καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων λανθάνῃ D εἰς ὁμοιότητά τε καὶ φιλίαν καὶ ξυμφωνίαν τῷ καλῷ λόγῳ ἄγουσα;

Πολὺ γὰρ ἄν, ἔφη, κάλλιστα οὕτω τραφεῖεν.

The power of imparting grace is possessed by harmony.

Ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, τούτων ἕνεκα κυριωτάτη ἐν μουσικῇ τροφή, ὅτι μάλιστα καταδύεται εἰς τὸ ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς ὅ τε ῥυθμὸς καὶ ἁρμονία, καὶ ἐρρωμενέστατα ἅπτεται αὐτῆς φέροντα τὴν εὐσχημοσύνην, καὶ ποιεῖ εὐσχήμονα, ἐάν τις ὀρθῶς τραφῇ, εἰ δὲ μή, τοὐναντίον; καὶ ὅτι αὖ τῶν παρα- E λειπομένων καὶ μὴ καλῶς δημιουργηθέντων ἢ μὴ καλῶς φύντων ὀξύτατ' ἂν αἰσθάνοιτο ὁ ἐκεῖ τραφεὶς ὡς ἔδει, καὶ ὀρθῶς δὴ* χαίρων καὶ δυσχεραίνων τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἐπαινοῖ καὶ καταδεχόμενος εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν τρέφοιτ' ἂν ἀπ' αὐτῶν καὶ γίγνοιτο καλός τε κἀγαθός, | τὰ δ' αἰσχρὰ ψέγοι τ' ἂν ὀρθῶς καὶ μισοῖ ἔτι νέος p. 402. ὤν, πρὶν λόγον δυνατὸς εἶναι λαβεῖν, ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου ἀσπάζοιτ' ἂν αὐτὸν γνωρίζων δι' οἰκειότητα μάλιστα ὁ οὕτω τραφείς;

Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ἔφη, τῶν τοιούτων ἕνεκα ἐν μουσικῇ εἶναι ἡ τροφή.

Ὥσπερ ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, γραμμάτων πέρι τότε

6. αὔρα A^2M : λύρα AΠ. 19. ὀρθῶς . . . καταδεχόμενος ita cj. Vermehren : ὀρθῶς δὴ δυσχεραίνων τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἐπαινοῖ καὶ χαίρων καὶ καταδεχόμενος MSS. (χαίρων καὶ om. *q*).

p. 402. ἱκανῶς εἴχομεν, ὅτε τὰ στοιχεῖα μὴ λανθάνοι ἡμᾶς ὀλίγα ὄντα ἐν ἅπασιν οἷς ἔστι περιφερόμενα, καὶ B οὔτ' ἐν σμικρῷ οὔτ' ἐν μεγάλῳ ἠτιμάζομεν αὐτά, ὡς οὐ δέοι αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ προὐθυμούμεθα διαγιγνώσκειν, ὡς οὐ πρότερον ἐσόμενοι γραμματικοὶ πρὶν οὕτως ἔχοιμεν.

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Ἀληθῆ.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰκόνας γραμμάτων, εἴ που ἢ ἐν ὕδασιν ἢ ἐν κατόπτροις ἐμφαίνοιντο, οὐ πρότερον γνωσόμεθα, πρὶν ἂν αὐτὰ γνῶμεν, ἀλλ' ἔστι τῆς αὐτῆς τέχνης τε καὶ μελέτης;

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

The true musician must know the essential forms of virtue and vice.

Ἆρ' οὖν, ὃ λέγω, πρὸς θεῶν, οὕτως οὐδὲ μουσικοὶ C πρότερον ἐσόμεθα, οὔτε αὐτοὶ οὔτε οὓς φαμεν ἡμῖν παιδευτέον εἶναι τοὺς φύλακας, πρὶν ἂν τὰ τῆς σωφροσύνης εἴδη καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφὰ καὶ τὰ τούτων αὖ ἐναντία πανταχοῦ περιφερόμενα γνωρίζωμεν καὶ ἐνόντα ἐν οἷς ἔνεστιν αἰσθανώμεθα καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ εἰκόνας αὐτῶν, καὶ μήτε ἐν σμικροῖς μήτε ἐν μεγάλοις ἀτιμάζωμεν, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς οἰώμεθα τέχνης εἶναι καὶ μελέτης;

Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

The harmony of soul and body the fairest of sights.

D Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτου ἂν ξυμπίπτῃ ἔν τε τῇ ψυχῇ καλὰ ἤθη ἐνόντα καὶ ἐν τῷ εἴδει ὁμολογοῦντα ἐκείνοις καὶ ξυμφωνοῦντα, τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχοντα τύπου, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη κάλλιστον θέαμα τῷ δυναμένῳ θεᾶσθαι;

Πολύ γε.

8. καὶ εἰκόνας M: καὶ εἰ εἰκόνας AΠ.
21. οἰώμεθα Π: οἰόμεθα AM.

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Καὶ μὴν τό γε κάλλιστον ἐρασμιώτατον. p. 402.

Πῶς δ' οὔ;

Τῶν δὴ ὅ τι μάλιστα τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων ὅ γε μουσικὸς ἐρῴη ἄν· εἰ δὲ ἀξύμφωνος εἴη, οὐκ ἂν ἐρῴη.

The true lover will not mind defects of the person.

Οὐκ ἄν, εἴ γέ τι, ἔφη, κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐλλείποι· εἰ μέντοι τι κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, ὑπομείνειεν ἂν ὥστε ἐθέλειν ἀσπάζεσθαι.

Μανθάνω, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ἔστι σοι ἢ γέγονε παι- E
δικὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ συγχωρῶ. ἀλλὰ τόδε μοι εἰπέ· σωφροσύνῃ καὶ ἡδονῇ ὑπερβαλλούσῃ ἔστι τις κοινωνία;

Καὶ πῶς, ἔφη, ἥ γε ἔκφρονα ποιεῖ οὐχ ἧττον ἢ λύπη;

Ἀλλὰ τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀρετῇ;

| Οὐδαμῶς. p. 403.

Τί δέ; ὕβρει τε καὶ ἀκολασίᾳ;

Πάντων μάλιστα.

Μείζω δέ τινα καὶ ὀξυτέραν ἔχεις εἰπεῖν ἡδονὴν τῆς περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια;

Οὐκ ἔχω, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐδέ γε μανικωτέραν.

True love is temperate and harmonious.

Ὁ δὲ ὀρθὸς ἔρως πέφυκε κοσμίου τε καὶ καλοῦ σωφρόνως τε καὶ μουσικῶς ἐρᾶν;

Καὶ μάλα, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Οὐδὲν ἄρα προσοιστέον μανικὸν οὐδὲ ξυγγενὲς ἀκολασίας τῷ ὀρθῷ ἔρωτι;

Οὐ προσοιστέον.

True love is free from sensuality and coarseness.

Οὐ προσοιστέον ἄρα αὕτη ἡ ἡδονή, οὐδὲ κοινωνη- B
τέον αὐτῆς ἐραστῇ τε καὶ παιδικοῖς ὀρθῶς ἐρῶσί τε καὶ ἐρωμένοις;

3. δὴ ὅ τι ΠΜ: διότι A.

p. 403. Οὐ μέντοι, μὰ Δί', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, προσοιστέον.

Οὕτω δή, ὡς ἔοικε, νομοθετήσεις ἐν τῇ οἰκιζομένῃ πόλει φιλεῖν μὲν καὶ ξυνεῖναι καὶ ἅπτεσθαι ὥσπερ υἱέος παιδικῶν ἐραστήν, τῶν καλῶν χάριν, ἐὰν πείθῃ· τὰ δ' ἄλλα οὕτως ὁμιλεῖν πρὸς ὅν τις σπουδάζοι, ὅπως μηδέποτε δόξει μακρότερα τούτων ξυγγίγνε-
C σθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, ψόγον ἀμουσίας καὶ ἀπειροκαλίας ὑφέξοντα.

Οὕτως, ἔφη.

Ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ σοὶ φαίνεται τέλος ἡμῖν ἔχειν ὁ περὶ μουσικῆς λόγος; οἷ γοῦν δεῖ τελευτᾶν, τετελεύτηκε· δεῖ δέ που τελευτᾶν τὰ μουσικὰ εἰς τὰ τοῦ καλοῦ ἐρωτικά.

Ξύμφημι, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Gymnastic.

Μετὰ δὴ μουσικὴν γυμναστικῇ θρεπτέοι οἱ νεανίαι.

Τί μήν;

Δεῖ μὲν δὴ καὶ ταύτῃ ἀκριβῶς τρέφεσθαι ἐκ παί-
D δων διὰ βίου. ἔχει δέ πως, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ὧδε· σκόπει δὲ καὶ σύ. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ οὐ φαίνεται, ὃ ἂν χρηστὸν ᾖ σῶμα, τοῦτο τῇ αὑτοῦ ἀρετῇ ψυχὴν ἀγαθὴν ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον ψυχὴ ἀγαθὴ τῇ αὑτῆς ἀρετῇ σῶμα παρέχειν ὡς οἷόν τε βέλτιστον· σοὶ δὲ πῶς φαίνεται;

Καὶ ἐμοί, ἔφη, οὕτως.

The body to be entrusted to the mind.

Οὐκοῦν εἰ τὴν διάνοιαν ἱκανῶς θεραπεύσαντες παραδοῖμεν αὐτῇ τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι,
E ἡμεῖς δὲ ὅσον τοὺς τύπους ὑφηγησαίμεθα, ἵνα μὴ μακρολογῶμεν, ὀρθῶς ἂν ποιοῖμεν;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

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Μέθης μὲν δὴ εἴπομεν ὅτι ἀφεκτέον αὐτοῖς· παντὶ p. 403. γάρ που μᾶλλον ἐγχωρεῖ ἢ φύλακι μεθυσθέντι μὴ εἰδέναι ὅπου γῆς ἐστίν.

Γελοῖον γάρ, ἦ δ' ὅς, τόν γε φύλακα φύλακος δεῖσθαι.

Τί δὲ δὴ σίτων πέρι; ἀθληταὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ ἄνδρες τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγῶνος. ἢ οὐχί;

Ναί.

Ἆρ' οὖν ἡ τῶνδε τῶν ἀσκητῶν ἕξις προσήκουσ' | ἂν εἴη τούτοις; p. 404.

Ἴσως.

The usual training of athletes too gross and sleepy.

Ἀλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὑπνώδης αὕτη γέ τις καὶ σφαλερὰ πρὸς ὑγίειαν. ἢ οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὅτι καθεύδουσί τε τὸν βίον καί, ἐὰν σμικρὰ ἐκβῶσι τῆς τεταγμένης διαίτης, μεγάλα καὶ σφόδρα νοσοῦσιν οὗτοι οἱ ἀσκηταί;

Ὁρῶ.

Κομψοτέρας δή τινος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀσκήσεως δεῖ τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἀθληταῖς, οὓς γε ὥσπερ κύνας ἀγρύπνους τε ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ ὅ τι μάλιστα ὀξὺ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ πολλὰς μεταβολὰς ἐν ταῖς στρατείαις μεταβάλλοντας ὑδάτων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σίτων καὶ εἱλή- B σεων καὶ χειμώνων μὴ ἀκροσφαλεῖς εἶναι πρὸς ὑγίειαν.

Φαίνεταί μοι.

Ἆρ' οὖν ἡ βελτίστη γυμναστικὴ ἀδελφή τις ἂν εἴη τῆς μουσικῆς, ἣν ὀλίγον πρότερον διῇμεν;

Πῶς λέγεις;

Military gymnastic.

Ἁπλῆ που καὶ ἐπιεικὴς γυμναστική, καὶ μάλιστα ἡ τῶν περὶ τὸν πόλεμον.

15. σφόδρα Π : σφοδρὰ ΑΜΞ. 19. τε ἀνάγκη ΠΜ : τε καὶ ἀνάγκη Α.

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p. 404. Πῇ δή;

Καὶ παρ' Ὁμήρου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τά γε τοιαῦτα μάθοι ἄν τις. οἶσθα γὰρ ὅτι ἐπὶ στρατείας ἐν ταῖς τῶν ἡρώων ἑστιάσεσιν οὔτε ἰχθύσιν αὐτοὺς ἑστιᾷ, καὶ
C ταῦτα ἐπὶ θαλάττῃ ἐν Ἑλλησπόντῳ ὄντας, οὔτε ἑφθοῖς κρέασιν ἀλλὰ μόνον ὀπτοῖς, ἃ δὴ μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη στρατιώταις εὔπορα· πανταχοῦ γάρ, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, αὐτῷ τῷ πυρὶ χρῆσθαι εὐπορώτερον ἢ ἀγγεῖα ξυμπεριφέρειν.

Καὶ μάλα.

Οὐδὲ μὴν ἡδυσμάτων, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, Ὅμηρος πώποτε ἐμνήσθη. ἢ τοῦτο μὲν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀσκηταὶ ἴσασιν, ὅτι τῷ μέλλοντι σώματι εὖ ἕξειν ἀφεκτέον τῶν τοιούτων ἁπάντων;

Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ἔφη, ἴσασί τε καὶ ἀπέχονται.

Syracusan dinners and Corinthian courtezans are prohibited.

D Συρακοσίαν δέ, ὦ φίλε, τράπεζαν καὶ Σικελικὴν ποικιλίαν ὄψου, ὡς ἔοικας, οὐκ αἰνεῖς, εἴπερ σοι ταῦτα δοκεῖ ὀρθῶς ἔχειν.

Οὔ μοι δοκῶ.

Ψέγεις ἄρα καὶ Κορινθίαν κόρην φίλην εἶναι ἀνδράσι μέλλουσιν εὖ σώματος ἕξειν.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ Ἀττικῶν πεμμάτων τὰς δοκούσας εἶναι εὐπαθείας;

Ἀνάγκη.

The luxurious style of living may be justly compared to the panharmonic strain of music.

Ὅλην γάρ, οἶμαι, τὴν τοιαύτην σίτησιν καὶ δίαιταν τῇ μελοποιίᾳ τε καὶ ᾠδῇ τῇ ἐν τῷ παναρμονίῳ
E καὶ ἐν πᾶσι ῥυθμοῖς πεποιημένῃ ἀπεικάζοντες ὀρθῶς ἂν ἀπεικάζοιμεν.

Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Οὐκοῦν ἐκεῖ μὲν ἀκολασίαν ἡ ποικιλία ἐνέτικτεν,

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ἐνταῦθα δὲ νόσον, ἡ δὲ ἁπλότης κατὰ μὲν μουσικὴν p. 404. ἐν ψυχαῖς σωφροσύνην, κατὰ δὲ γυμναστικὴν ἐν σώμασιν ὑγίειαν;

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

Ἀκολασίας δὲ καὶ νόσων | πληθυουσῶν ἐν πόλει p. 405. ἆρ᾽ οὐ δικαστήριά τε καὶ ἰατρεῖα πολλὰ ἀνοίγεται, καὶ δικανική τε καὶ ἰατρικὴ σεμνύνονται, ὅταν δὴ καὶ ἐλεύθεροι πολλοὶ καὶ σφόδρα περὶ αὐτὰ σπουδάζωσιν;

Τί γὰρ οὐ μέλλει;

Every man should be his own doctor and lawyer.

Τῆς δὲ κακῆς τε καὶ αἰσχρᾶς παιδείας ἐν πόλει ἆρα μή τι μεῖζον ἕξεις λαβεῖν τεκμήριον ἢ τὸ δεῖσθαι ἰατρῶν καὶ δικαστῶν ἄκρων μὴ μόνον τοὺς φαύλους τε καὶ χειροτέχνας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν ἐλευθέρῳ σχήματι προσποιουμένους τεθράφθαι; ἢ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν B δοκεῖ καὶ ἀπαιδευσίας μέγα τεκμήριον τὸ ἐπακτῷ παρ᾽ ἄλλων, ὡς δεσποτῶν τε καὶ κριτῶν, τῷ δικαίῳ ἀναγκάζεσθαι χρῆσθαι [καὶ] ἀπορίᾳ οἰκείων;

Πάντων μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, αἴσχιστον.

Bad as it is to go to law, it is still worse to be a lover of litigation.

Ἦ δοκεῖ σοι, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τούτων αἴσχιον εἶναι τοῦτο, ὅταν τις μὴ μόνον τὸ πολὺ τοῦ βίου ἐν δικαστηρίοις φεύγων τε καὶ διώκων κατατρίβηται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ ἀπειροκαλίας ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ δὴ τούτῳ πεισθῇ καλλωπίζεσθαι, ὡς δεινὸς ὢν περὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν καὶ C ἱκανὸς πάσας μὲν στροφὰς στρέφεσθαι, πάσας δὲ διεξόδους διεξελθὼν ἀποστραφῆναι λυγιζόμενος, ὥστε μὴ παρασχεῖν δίκην, καὶ ταῦτα σμικρῶν τε καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀξίων ἕνεκα, ἀγνοῶν ὅσῳ κάλλιον καὶ

7. δικανικὴ MSS.: δικαστικὴ cj. Cobet.
18. καὶ AΠM: ὡς *v*: del. Ast.: δικαίων cj. Madvig.
26. λυγιζόμενος AM: λογιζόμενος Π.

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p. 405. ἄμεινον τὸ παρασκευάζειν τὸν βίον αὑτῷ μηδὲν δεῖσθαι νυστάζοντος δικαστοῦ;

Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ', ἔφη, ἐκείνου ἔτι αἴσχιον.

Bad also to require the help of medicine.

Τὸ δὲ ἰατρικῆς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δεῖσθαι ὅ τι μὴ τραυμάτων ἕνεκα ἤ τινων ἐπετείων νοσημάτων ἐπιπεσόν-
D των, ἀλλὰ δι' ἀργίαν τε καὶ δίαιταν οἵαν διήλθομεν, ῥευμάτων τε καὶ πνευμάτων ὥσπερ λίμνας ἐμπιπλαμένους φύσας τε καὶ κατάρρους νοσήμασιν ὀνόματα τίθεσθαι ἀναγκάζειν τοὺς κομψοὺς Ἀσκληπιάδας, οὐκ αἰσχρὸν δοκεῖ;

Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, ὡς ἀληθῶς καινὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἄτοπα νοσημάτων ὀνόματα.

In the time of Asclepius and of Homer the practice of medicine was very simple.

Οἷα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὡς οἶμαι, οὐκ ἦν ἐπ' Ἀσκληπιοῦ.
E τεκμαίρομαι δέ, ὅτι αὐτοῦ οἱ υἱεῖς ἐν Τροίᾳ Εὐρυπύλῳ τετρωμένῳ ἐπ' οἶνον Πράμνειον ἄλφιτα πολλὰ ἐπι-
p. 406. πασθέντα καὶ τυρὸν | ἐπιξυσθέντα, ἃ δὴ δοκεῖ φλεγματώδη εἶναι, οὐκ ἐμέμψαντο τῇ δούσῃ πιεῖν, οὐδὲ Πατρόκλῳ τῷ ἰωμένῳ ἐπετίμησαν.

Καὶ μὲν δή, ἔφη, ἄτοπόν γε τὸ πῶμα οὕτως ἔχοντι.

The nursing of disease began with Herodicus.

Οὔκ, εἴ γ' ἐννοεῖς, εἶπον, ὅτι τῇ παιδαγωγικῇ τῶν νοσημάτων ταύτῃ τῇ νῦν ἰατρικῇ πρὸ τοῦ Ἀσκληπιάδαι οὐκ ἐχρῶντο, ὥς φασι, πρὶν Ἡρόδικον γενέσθαι· Ἡρόδικος δὲ παιδοτρίβης ὢν καὶ νοσώδης γενόμενος, μίξας γυμναστικὴν ἰατρικῇ, ἀπέκναισε
B πρῶτον μὲν καὶ μάλιστα ἑαυτόν, ἔπειτ' ἄλλους ὕστερον πολλούς.

Πῇ δή; ἔφη.

Μακρόν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸν θάνατον αὑτῷ ποιήσας. παρακολουθῶν γὰρ τῷ νοσήματι θανασίμῳ ὄντι οὔτε ἰάσασθαι, οἶμαι, οἷός τ' ἦν ἑαυτόν, ἐν ἀσχολίᾳ τε

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πάντων ἰατρευόμενος διὰ βίου ἔζη, ἀποκναιόμενος, εἴ p. 406. τι τῆς εἰωθυίας διαίτης ἐκβαίη, δυσθανατῶν δὲ ὑπὸ σοφίας εἰς γῆρας ἀφίκετο.

Καλὸν ἄρα τὸ γέρας, ἔφη, τῆς τέχνης ἠνέγκατο.

Οἷον εἰκός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸν μὴ εἰδότα ὅτι Ἀσκλη- C πιὸς οὐκ ἀγνοίᾳ οὐδὲ ἀπειρίᾳ τούτου τοῦ εἴδους τῆς ἰατρικῆς τοῖς ἐκγόνοις οὐ κατέδειξεν αὐτό, ἀλλ' εἰδὼς ὅτι πᾶσι τοῖς εὐνομουμένοις ἔργον τι ἑκάστῳ ἐν τῇ πόλει προστέτακται, ὃ ἀναγκαῖον ἐργάζεσθαι, καὶ οὐδενὶ σχολὴ διὰ βίου κάμνειν ἰατρευομένῳ. ὃ ἡμεῖς γελοίως ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν δημιουργῶν αἰσθανόμεθα, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πλουσίων τε καὶ εὐδαιμόνων δοκούντων εἶναι οὐκ αἰσθανόμεθα.

Πῶς; ἔφη.

The working-man has no time for tedious remedies.

Τέκτων μέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κάμνων ἀξιοῖ παρὰ τοῦ D ἰατροῦ φάρμακον πιὼν ἐξεμέσαι τὸ νόσημα ἢ κάτω καθαρθεὶς ἢ καύσει ἢ τομῇ χρησάμενος ἀπηλλάχθαι· ἐὰν δέ τις αὐτῷ μακρὰν δίαιταν προστάττῃ, πιλίδιά τε περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν περιτιθεὶς καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἑπόμενα, ταχὺ εἶπεν ὅτι οὐ σχολὴ κάμνειν οὐδὲ λυσιτελεῖ οὕτω ζῆν, νοσήματι τὸν νοῦν προσέχοντα, τῆς δὲ προκειμένης ἐργασίας ἀμελοῦντα· καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα χαίρειν εἰπὼν τῷ τοιούτῳ ἰατρῷ, εἰς τὴν εἰωθυῖαν E δίαιταν ἐμβάς, ὑγιὴς γενόμενος ζῇ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττων· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἱκανὸν ᾖ τὸ σῶμα ὑπενεγκεῖν, τελευτήσας πραγμάτων ἀπηλλάγη.

Καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ μέν γ', ἔφη, δοκεῖ πρέπειν οὕτω ἰατρικῇ χρῆσθαι.

Ἆρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ἦν τι αὐτῷ ἔργον, | ὃ εἰ μὴ p. 407. πράττοι, οὐκ ἐλυσιτέλει ζῆν;

18. μακρὰν ΜΞ : μικρὰν ΑΠ : σμικρὰν q.

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p. 407. Δῆλον, ἔφη.

Ὁ δὲ δὴ πλούσιος, ὥς φαμεν, οὐδὲν ἔχει τοιοῦτον ἔργον προκείμενον, οὗ ἀναγκαζομένῳ ἀπέχεσθαι ἀβίωτον.

Οὔκουν δὴ λέγεταί γε.

Φωκυλίδου γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐκ ἀκούεις πῶς φησὶ δεῖν, ὅταν τῳ ἤδη βίος ᾖ, ἀρετὴν ἀσκεῖν.

Οἶμαι δέ γε, ἔφη, καὶ πρότερον.

The slow cure equally an impediment to the mechanical arts, to the practice of virtue,

Μηδέν, εἶπον, περὶ τούτου αὐτῷ μαχώμεθα, ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διδάξωμεν, πότερον μελετητέον τοῦτο
B τῷ πλουσίῳ καὶ ἀβίωτον τῷ μὴ μελετῶντι, ἢ νοσοτροφία τεκτονικῇ μὲν καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις ἐμπόδιον τῇ προσέξει τοῦ νοῦ, τὸ δὲ Φωκυλίδου παρακέλευμα οὐδὲν ἐμποδίζει.

Ναὶ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς, σχεδόν γέ τι πάντων μάλιστα ἥ γε περαιτέρω γυμναστικῆς ἡ περιττὴ αὕτη ἐπιμέλεια τοῦ σώματος· καὶ γὰρ πρὸς οἰκονομίας καὶ πρὸς στρατείας καὶ πρὸς ἑδραίους ἐν πόλει ἀρχὰς δύσκολος.

and to any kind of study or thought.

Τὸ δὲ δὴ μέγιστον, ὅτι καὶ πρὸς μαθήσεις ἁσ-
C τινασοῦν καὶ ἐννοήσεις τε καὶ μελέτας πρὸς ἑαυτὸν χαλεπή, κεφαλῆς τινὰς ἀεὶ διατάσεις καὶ ἰλίγγους ὑποπτεύουσα καὶ αἰτιωμένη ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ἐγγίγνεσθαι, ὥστε, ὅπῃ ταύτῃ ἀρετὴ ἀσκεῖται καὶ δοκιμάζεται, πάντῃ ἐμπόδιος· κάμνειν γὰρ οἴεσθαι ποιεῖ ἀεὶ καὶ ὠδίνοντα μήποτε λήγειν περὶ τοῦ σώματος.

Εἰκός γε, ἔφη.

2. ὡς ἔφαμεν Π. 12. μὲν AM : γὰρ Π. 15–17. σχεδόν γέ τι . . . σώματος Socrati tribuebant Ast., Bekk., Stallb. 22. τινὰς Ξ *q* : τινὸς ΑΠΜ. διατάσεις Galenus et *a v* : διαστάσεις ΑΠΜ. 24. ταύτῃ ΑΠΜ : αὕτη *q*. ἀρετὴ Μ : ἀρετῇ ΑΠ. 27. om. Π.

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Asclepius would not cure diseased constitutions, because they were of no use to the State.

Οὐκοῦν ταῦτα γιγνώσκοντα φῶμεν καὶ Ἀσκλη- p. 407.
πιὸν τοὺς μὲν φύσει τε καὶ διαίτῃ ὑγιεινῶς ἔχοντας
τὰ σώματα, νόσημα δέ τι ἀποκεκριμένον ἴσχοντας ἐν D
αὐτοῖς, τούτοις μὲν καὶ ταύτῃ τῇ ἕξει καταδεῖξαι
ἰατρικήν, φαρμάκοις τε καὶ τομαῖς τὰ νοσήματα ἐκ-
βάλλοντα αὐτῶν τὴν εἰωθυῖαν προστάττειν δίαιταν,
ἵνα μὴ τὰ πολιτικὰ βλάπτοι, τὰ δ' εἴσω διὰ παντὸς
νενοσηκότα σώματα οὐκ ἐπιχειρεῖν διαίταις κατὰ
σμικρὸν ἀπαντλοῦντα καὶ ἐπιχέοντα μακρὸν καὶ
κακὸν βίον ἀνθρώπῳ ποιεῖν, καὶ ἔκγονα αὐτῶν, ὡς
τὸ εἰκός, ἕτερα τοιαῦτα φυτεύειν, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὴ δυνά-
μενον ἐν τῇ καθεστηκυίᾳ περιόδῳ ζῆν μὴ οἴεσθαι δεῖν E
θεραπεύειν, ὡς οὔτε αὑτῷ οὔτε πόλει λυσιτελῆ;

Πολιτικόν, ἔφη, λέγεις Ἀσκληπιόν.

The case of Menelaus, who was attended by the sons of Asclepius.

Δῆλον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· καὶ οἱ παῖδες αὐτοῦ, ὅτι τοιοῦ-
τος ἦν, οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὡς καὶ ἐν Τροίᾳ ἀγαθοὶ πρὸς τὸν
| πόλεμον ἐφάνησαν, καὶ τῇ ἰατρικῇ, ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω, p. 408.
ἐχρῶντο; ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι ὅτι καὶ τῷ Μενέλεῳ ἐκ τοῦ
τραύματος οὗ ὁ Πάνδαρος ἔβαλεν

αἷμ' ἐκμυζήσαντ' ἐπί τ' ἤπια φάρμακ' ἔπασσον,

ὅ τι δ' ἐχρῆν μετὰ τοῦτο ἢ πιεῖν ἢ φαγεῖν οὐδὲν
μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ Εὐρυπύλῳ προσέταττον, ὡς ἱκανῶν
ὄντων τῶν φαρμάκων ἰάσασθαι ἄνδρας πρὸ τῶν
τραυμάτων ὑγιεινούς τε καὶ κοσμίους ἐν διαίτῃ, κἂν B
εἰ τύχοιεν ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα κυκεῶνα πιόντες, νοσώδη
δὲ φύσει τε καὶ ἀκόλαστον οὔτε αὑτοῖς οὔτε τοῖς
ἄλλοις ᾤοντο λυσιτελεῖν ζῆν, οὐδ' ἐπὶ τούτοις τὴν
τέχνην δεῖν εἶναι, οὐδὲ θεραπευτέον αὐτούς, οὐδ' εἰ
Μίδου πλουσιώτεροι εἶεν.

15. , ὅτι τοιοῦτος ἦν ΑΠΜ: δεικνύοιεν ἄν, ὅτι τοιοῦτος ἦν· ἢ (vel ἦ) plerique.

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The offence of Asclepius.

p. 408. Πάνυ κομψούς, ἔφη, λέγεις Ἀσκληπιοῦ παῖδας.

Πρέπει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καίτοι ἀπειθοῦντές γε ἡμῖν οἱ τραγῳδιοποιοί τε καὶ Πίνδαρος Ἀπόλλωνος μέν φασιν Ἀσκληπιὸν εἶναι, ὑπὸ δὲ χρυσοῦ πεισθῆναι C πλούσιον ἄνδρα θανάσιμον ἤδη ὄντα ἰάσασθαι, ὅθεν δὴ καὶ κεραυνωθῆναι αὐτόν. ἡμεῖς δὲ κατὰ τὰ προειρημένα οὐ πειθόμεθα αὐτοῖς ἀμφότερα, ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν θεοῦ ἦν, οὐκ ἦν, φήσομεν, αἰσχροκερδής· εἰ δ' αἰσχροκερδής, οὐκ ἦν θεοῦ.

Ὀρθότατα, ἦ δ' ὅς, ταῦτά γε. ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦδε τί λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἆρ' οὐκ ἀγαθοὺς δεῖ ἐν τῇ πόλει κεκτῆσθαι ἰατρούς; εἶεν δ' ἂν που μάλιστα D τοιοῦτοι ὅσοι πλείστους μὲν ὑγιεινούς, πλείστους δὲ νοσώδεις μετεχειρίσαντο, καὶ δικασταὶ αὖ ὡσαύτως οἱ παντοδαπαῖς φύσεσιν ὡμιληκότες.

Καὶ μάλα, εἶπον, ἀγαθοὺς λέγω. ἀλλ' οἶσθα οὓς ἡγοῦμαι τοιούτους;

Ἂν εἴπῃς, ἔφη.

Ἀλλὰ πειράσομαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· σὺ μέντοι οὐχ ὅμοιον πρᾶγμα τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ ἤρου.

Πῶς; ἔφη.

The physician should have experience of illness in his own person;

Ἰατροὶ μέν, εἶπον, δεινότατοι ἂν γένοιντο, εἰ ἐκ παίδων ἀρξάμενοι πρὸς τῷ μανθάνειν τὴν τέχνην ὡς πλείστοις τε καὶ πονηροτάτοις σώμασιν ὁμιλήσειαν E καὶ αὐτοὶ πάσας νόσους κάμοιεν καὶ εἶεν μὴ πάνυ ὑγιεινοὶ φύσει. οὐ γάρ, οἶμαι, σώματι σῶμα θεραπεύουσιν—οὐ γὰρ ἂν αὐτὰ ἐνεχώρει κακὰ εἶναί ποτε καὶ γενέσθαι —, ἀλλὰ ψυχῇ σῶμα, ἣ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ κακὴν γενομένην τε καὶ οὖσαν εὖ τι θεραπεύειν.

Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.

on the other hand,

Δικαστὴς δέ γε, ὦ φίλε, ψυχῇ ψυχῆς ἄρχει, ᾗ

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the judge should not learn to know evil by the practice of it, but by long observation of evil in others.

| οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ ἐκ νέας ἐν πονηραῖς ψυχαῖς τεθράφθαι p. 409. τε καὶ ὡμιληκέναι καὶ πάντα ἀδικήματα αὐτὴν ἠδικηκυῖαν διεξεληλυθέναι, ὥστε ὀξέως ἀφ' αὑτῆς τεκμαίρεσθαι τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀδικήματα οἷον κατὰ σῶμα νόσους· ἀλλ' ἄπειρον αὐτὴν καὶ ἀκέραιον δεῖ κακῶν ἠθῶν νέαν οὖσαν γεγονέναι, εἰ μέλλει καλὴ κἀγαθὴ οὖσα κρίνειν ὑγιῶς τὰ δίκαια. διὸ δὴ καὶ εὐήθεις νέοι ὄντες οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς φαίνονται καὶ εὐεξαπάτητοι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀδίκων, ἅτε οὐκ ἔχοντες ἐν ἑαυτοῖς παραδείγματα B ὁμοιοπαθῆ τοῖς πονηροῖς.

Καὶ μὲν δή, ἔφη, σφόδρα γε αὐτὸ πάσχουσιν.

Τοιγάρτοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ νέον ἀλλὰ γέροντα δεῖ τὸν ἀγαθὸν δικαστὴν εἶναι, ὀψιμαθῆ γεγονότα τῆς ἀδικίας οἷόν ἐστιν· οὐκ οἰκείαν ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ ψυχῇ ἐνοῦσαν ᾐσθημένον, ἀλλ' ἀλλοτρίαν ἐν ἀλλοτρίαις μεμελετηκότα ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ διαισθάνεσθαι οἷον πέφυκε κακόν, ἐπιστήμῃ, οὐκ ἐμπειρίᾳ οἰκείᾳ κεχρημένον. C

Γενναιοτατος γοῦν, ἔφη, ἔοικεν εἶναι ὁ τοιοῦτος δικαστής.

Such a knowledge of human nature far better and truer than that of the adept in crime.

Καὶ ἀγαθός γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὃ σὺ ἠρώτας· ὁ γὰρ ἔχων ψυχὴν ἀγαθὴν ἀγαθός. ὁ δὲ δεινὸς ἐκεῖνος καὶ καχύποπτος, ὁ πολλὰ αὐτὸς ἠδικηκὼς καὶ πανοῦργός τε καὶ σοφὸς οἰόμενος εἶναι, ὅταν μὲν ὁμοίοις ὁμιλῇ, δεινὸς φαίνεται ἐξευλαβούμενος, πρὸς τὰ ἐν αὑτῷ παραδείγματα ἀποσκοπῶν· ὅταν δὲ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ πρεσβυτέροις ἤδη πλησιάσῃ, ἀβέλτερος αὖ φαίνεται, D ἀπιστῶν παρὰ καιρὸν καὶ ἀγνοῶν ὑγιὲς ἦθος, ἅτε οὐκ ἔχων παράδειγμα τοῦ τοιούτου. πλεονάκις δὲ πονηροῖς ἢ χρηστοῖς ἐντυγχάνων σοφώτερος ἢ ἀμαθέστερος δοκεῖ εἶναι αὑτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλοις.

30. καὶ ἄλλοις ΑΠ : καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Μ.

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p. 409. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἀληθῆ.

Οὐ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοιοῦτον χρὴ τὸν δικαστὴν ζητεῖν τὸν ἀγαθόν τε καὶ σοφόν, ἀλλὰ τὸν πρότερον. πονηρία μὲν γὰρ ἀρετήν τε καὶ αὑτὴν οὔποτ' ἂν γνοίη, ἀρετὴ δὲ φύσεως παιδευομένης χρόνῳ ἅμα E αὑτῆς τε καὶ πονηρίας ἐπιστήμην λήψεται. σοφὸς οὖν οὗτος, ὥς μοι δοκεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ κακὸς γίγνεται.

The judge should be, not cunning, but good and wise.

Καὶ ἐμοί, ἔφη, ξυνδοκεῖ.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἰατρικήν, οἵαν εἴπομεν, μετὰ τῆς τοιαύτης δικαστικῆς κατὰ πόλιν νομοθετήσεις, αἳ τῶν p. 410. πολιτῶν σοι τοὺς μὲν εὐφυεῖς τὰ σώματα καὶ | τὰς ψυχὰς θεραπεύσουσι, τοὺς δὲ μή, ὅσοι μὲν κατὰ σῶμα τοιοῦτοι, ἀποθνήσκειν ἐάσουσι, τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν κακοφυεῖς καὶ ἀνιάτους αὐτοὶ ἀποκτενοῦσιν;

The physician should either cure or let die.

Τὸ γοῦν ἄριστον, ἔφη, αὐτοῖς τε τοῖς πάσχουσι καὶ τῇ πόλει οὕτω πέφανται.

Οἱ δὲ δὴ νέοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δῆλον ὅτι εὐλαβήσονταί σοι δικαστικῆς εἰς χρείαν ἰέναι, τῇ ἁπλῇ ἐκείνῃ μουσικῇ χρώμενοι ἣν δὴ ἔφαμεν σωφροσύνην ἐντίκτειν.

Τί μήν; ἔφη.

B Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἴχνη ταῦτα ὁ μουσικὸς γυμναστικὴν διώκων, ἐὰν ἐθέλῃ, αἱρήσει, ὥστε μηδὲν ἰατρικῆς δεῖσθαι ὅ τι μὴ ἀνάγκη;

Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Αὐτὰ μὴν τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ τοὺς πόνους πρὸς τὸ θυμοειδὲς τῆς φύσεως βλέπων κἀκεῖνο ἐγείρων πονήσει μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς ἰσχύν, οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀθληταὶ ῥώμης ἕνεκα σιτία καὶ πόνους μεταχειριεῖται.

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Ὀρθότατα, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, καὶ οἱ καθιστάντες μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδεύειν οὐχ οὗ ἕνεκά C τινες οἴονται καθιστᾶσιν, ἵνα τῇ μὲν τὸ σῶμα θεραπεύοιντο, τῇ δὲ τὴν ψυχήν;

Ἀλλὰ τί μήν; ἔφη.

Music and gymnastic are equally designed for the improvement of the mind.

Κινδυνεύουσιν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀμφότερα τῆς ψυχῆς ἕνεκα τὸ μέγιστον καθιστάναι.

Πῶς δή;

Οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, εἶπον, ὡς διατίθενται αὐτὴν τὴν διάνοιαν οἳ ἂν γυμναστικῇ μὲν διὰ βίου ὁμιλήσωσι, μουσικῆς δὲ μὴ ἅψωνται; ἢ ὅσοι ἂν τοὐναντίον διατεθῶσιν;

Τίνος δέ, ἦ δ' ὅς, πέρι λέγεις;

The mere athlete must be softened, and the philosophic nature prevented from becoming too soft.

Ἀγριότητός τε καὶ σκληρότητος, καὶ αὖ μαλακίας D τε καὶ ἡμερότητος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

Ἔγωγε, ἔφη· ὅτι οἱ μὲν γυμναστικῇ ἀκράτῳ χρησάμενοι ἀγριώτεροι τοῦ δέοντος ἀποβαίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ μουσικῇ μαλακώτεροι αὖ γίγνονται ἢ ὡς κάλλιον αὐτοῖς.

Καὶ μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τό γε ἄγριον τὸ θυμοειδὲς ἂν τῆς φύσεως παρέχοιτο, καὶ ὀρθῶς μὲν τραφὲν ἀνδρεῖον ἂν εἴη, μᾶλλον δ' ἐπιταθὲν τοῦ δέοντος σκληρόν τε καὶ χαλεπὸν γίγνοιτ' ἄν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός.

Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη.

Τί δέ; τὸ ἥμερον οὐχ ἡ φιλόσοφος ἂν ἔχοι φύσις, E καὶ μᾶλλον μὲν ἀνεθέντος αὐτοῦ μαλακώτερον εἴη τοῦ δέοντος, καλῶς δὲ τραφέντος ἥμερόν τε καὶ κόσμιον;

4. καθιστᾶσιν MSS.: καθίστασαν cj. Madvig.
12–15. ὅσοι ἂν . . . σκληρότητος καὶ AM: om. Π.
24. σκληρὸν AΠ: σκληρότερον M.

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p. 410. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

Δεῖν δέ γέ φαμεν τοὺς φύλακας ἀμφοτέρα ἔχειν τούτω τὼ φύσει.

Δεῖ γάρ.

Οὐκοῦν ἡρμόσθαι δεῖ αὐτὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλας;

Πῶς δ' οὔ;

Καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἡρμοσμένου σώφρων τε καὶ ἀνδρεία
p. 411. ἡ | ψυχή;

Πάνυ γε.

Τοῦ δὲ ἀναρμόστου δειλὴ καὶ ἄγροικος;

Καὶ μάλα.

Music, if carried too far, renders the weaker nature effeminate, the stronger irritable.

Οὐκοῦν ὅταν μέν τις μουσικῇ παρέχῃ καταυλεῖν καὶ καταχεῖν τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ τῶν ὤτων ὥσπερ διὰ χώνης ἃς νῦν δὴ ἡμεῖς ἐλέγομεν τὰς γλυκείας τε καὶ μαλακὰς καὶ θρηνώδεις ἁρμονίας, καὶ μινυρίζων τε καὶ γεγανωμένος ὑπὸ τῆς ᾠδῆς διατελῇ τὸν βίον ὅλον, οὗτος τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, εἴ τι θυμοειδὲς εἶχεν,
B ὥσπερ σίδηρον ἐμάλαξε καὶ χρήσιμον ἐξ ἀχρήστου καὶ σκληροῦ ἐποίησεν· ὅταν δ' ἐπέχων μὴ ἀνίῃ ἀλλὰ κηλῇ, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἤδη τήκει καὶ λείβει, ἕως ἂν ἐκτήξῃ τὸν θυμὸν καὶ ἐκτέμῃ ὥσπερ νεῦρα ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ποιήσῃ μαλθακὸν αἰχμητήν.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Καὶ ἐὰν μέν γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐξ ἀρχῆς φύσει ἄθυμον λάβῃ, ταχὺ τοῦτο διεπράξατο· ἐὰν δὲ θυμοειδῆ, ἀσθενῆ ποιήσας τὸν θυμὸν ὀξύρροπον ἀπειργάσατο,
C ἀπὸ σμικρῶν ταχὺ ἐρεθιζόμενόν τε καὶ κατασβεννύ-

2. ἀμφοτέρα cj. Schneider.: ἀμφότερα MSS. plerique.
3. τούτω τὼ ΑΠ: ταῦτα τῇ M.
12. καταυλεῖν MSS.: καταντλεῖν cj. Van Heusde.

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And in like manner the well-fed athlete, if he have no education, degenerates into a wild beast.

μενον. ἀκρόχολοι οὖν καὶ ὀργίλοι ἀντὶ θυμοειδοῦς γεγένηνται, δυσκολίας ἔμπλεῳ. p. 411.

Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

Τί δέ; ἂν αὖ γυμναστικῇ πολλὰ πονῇ καὶ εὐωχῆται εὖ μάλα, μουσικῆς δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφίας μὴ ἅπτηται, οὐ πρῶτον μὲν εὖ ἴσχων τὸ σῶμα φρονήματός τε καὶ θυμοῦ ἐμπίπλαται καὶ ἀνδρειότερος γίγνεται αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ;

Καὶ μάλα γε.

Τί δέ; ἐπειδὰν ἄλλο μηδὲν πράττῃ μηδὲ κοινωνῇ Μούσης μηδαμῇ, οὐκ εἴ τι καὶ ἐνῆν αὐτοῦ φιλομαθὲς D ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἅτε οὔτε μαθήματος γευόμενον οὐδενὸς οὔτε ζητήματος, οὔτε λόγου μετίσχον οὔτε τῆς ἄλλης μουσικῆς, ἀσθενές τε καὶ κωφὸν καὶ τυφλὸν γίγνεται, ἅτε οὐκ ἐγειρόμενον οὐδὲ τρεφόμενον οὐδὲ διακαθαιρομένων τῶν αἰσθήσεων αὐτοῦ;

Οὕτως, ἔφη.

Μισόλογος δή, οἶμαι, ὁ τοιοῦτος γίγνεται καὶ ἄμουσος, καὶ πειθοῖ μὲν διὰ λόγων οὐδὲν ἔτι χρῆται, βίᾳ δὲ καὶ ἀγριότητι ὥσπερ θηρίον πρὸς πάντα δια- E πράττεται, καὶ ἐν ἀμαθίᾳ καὶ σκαιότητι μετὰ ἀρρυθμίας τε καὶ ἀχαριστίας ζῇ.

Παντάπασιν, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὕτως ἔχει.

Ἐπὶ δὴ δύ' ὄντε τούτω, ὡς ἔοικε, δύο τέχνα θεὸν ἔγωγ' ἄν τινα φαίην δεδωκέναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, μουσικήν τε καὶ γυμναστικὴν ἐπὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς καὶ τὸ φιλόσοφον, οὐκ ἐπὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, εἰ μὴ εἰ πάρεργον, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἐκείνω, ὅπως ἂν ἀλλήλοιν ξυναρ-

1. ἀκρόχολοι AM : ἀκράχολοι Π. 2. γεγένηνται $A^2Π^2M$: γεγένηται AΠ. 12. γευόμενον DKqv : γενομένου AM : γευομένου Π. 13. οὔτε ζ. ΠΜ : οὐ ζ. A. 20. διαπράττεται MSS. : del. Herm. 27. εἰ πάρεργον Π : εἶπερ εργον A : ἢ πάρεργον A^2M.

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p. 412. μοσθῆτον | ἐπιτεινομένω καὶ ἀνιεμένω μέχρι τοῦ προσήκοντος.

Καὶ γὰρ ἔοικεν, ἔφη.

Τὸν κάλλιστ' ἄρα μουσικῇ γυμναστικὴν κεραννύντα καὶ μετριώτατα τῇ ψυχῇ προσφέροντα, τοῦτον ὀρθότατ' ἂν φαῖμεν εἶναι τελέως μουσικώτατον καὶ εὐαρμοστότατον, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸν τὰς χορδὰς ἀλλήλαις ξυνιστάντα.

Music to be mingled with gymnastic, and both attempered to the individual soul.

Εἰκότως γ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν τῇ πόλει ἡμῖν, ὦ Γλαύκων, δεήσει τοῦ τοιούτου τινὸς ἀεὶ ἐπιστάτου, εἰ μέλλει ἡ πολιτεία σώζεσθαι;

B Δεήσει μέντοι ὡς οἷόν τέ γε μάλιστα.

Οἱ μὲν δὴ τύποι τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς οὗτοι ἂν εἶεν. χορείας γὰρ τί ἄν τις διεξίοι τῶν τοιούτων καὶ θήρας τε καὶ κυνηγέσια καὶ γυμνικοὺς ἀγῶνας καὶ ἱππικούς; σχεδὸν γάρ τι δῆλα δὴ ὅτι τούτοις ἑπόμενα δεῖ αὐτὰ εἶναι, καὶ οὐκέτι χαλεπὰ εὑρεῖν.

Enough of principles of education: who are to be our rulers?

Ἴσως, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐ χαλεπά.

Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο τί ἂν ἡμῖν διαιρετέον εἴη; ἆρ' οὐκ αὐτῶν τούτων οἵτινες ἄρξουσί τε καὶ ἄρξονται;

C Τί μήν;

Ὅτι μὲν πρεσβυτέρους τοὺς ἄρχοντας δεῖ εἶναι, νεωτέρους δὲ τοὺς ἀρχομένους, δῆλον;

The elder must rule and the younger serve.

Δῆλον.

Καὶ ὅτι γε τοὺς ἀρίστους αὐτῶν;

Καὶ τοῦτο.

Οἱ δὲ γεωργῶν ἄριστοι ἆρ' οὐ γεωργικώτατοι γίγνονται;

Ναί.

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Νῦν δ', ἐπειδὴ φυλάκων αὐτοὺς ἀρίστους δεῖ εἶναι, ἆρ' οὐ φυλακικωτάτους πόλεως; p. 412.

Ναί.

Οὐκοῦν φρονίμους τε εἰς τοῦτο δεῖ ὑπάρχειν καὶ δυνατοὺς καὶ ἔτι κηδεμόνας τῆς πόλεως;

Ἔστι ταῦτα. D

Those are to be appointed rulers who have been tested in all the stages of their life;

Κήδοιτο δέ γ' ἄν τις μάλιστα τούτου ὃ τυγχάνοι φιλῶν.

Ἀνάγκη.

Καὶ μὴν τοῦτό γ' ἂν μάλιστα φιλοῖ, ᾧ ξυμφέρειν ἡγοῖτο τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ἑαυτῷ καὶ [ὅταν μάλιστα] ἐκείνου μὲν εὖ πράττοντος οἴοιτο ξυμβαίνειν καὶ ἑαυτῷ εὖ πράττειν, μὴ δέ, τοὐναντίον.

Οὕτως, ἔφη.

Ἐκλεκτέον ἄρ' ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων φυλάκων τοιούτους ἄνδρας, οἳ ἂν σκοποῦσιν ἡμῖν μάλιστα φαίνωνται παρὰ πάντα τὸν βίον, ὃ μὲν ἂν τῇ πόλει ἡγήσωνται E ξυμφέρειν, πάσῃ προθυμίᾳ ποιεῖν, ὃ δ' ἂν μή, μηδενὶ τρόπῳ πρᾶξαι ἂν ἐθέλειν.

Ἐπιτήδειοι γάρ, ἔφη.

Δοκεῖ δή μοι τηρητέον αὐτοὺς εἶναι ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς ἡλικίαις, εἰ φυλακικοί εἰσι τούτου τοῦ δόγματος καὶ μήτε γοητευόμενοι μήτε βιαζόμενοι ἐκβάλλουσιν ἐπιλανθανόμενοι δόξαν τὴν τοῦ ποιεῖν δεῖν ἃ τῇ πόλει βέλτιστα.

Τίνα, ἔφη, λέγεις τὴν ἐκβολήν;

Ἐγώ σοι, ἔφην, ἐρῶ. φαίνεταί μοι δόξα ἐξιέναι ἐκ διανοίας ἢ ἑκουσίως ἢ ἀκουσίως, ἑκουσίως μὲν ἡ

11. ὅταν μάλιστα MSS.: ὅτι μάλιστα Stobaeus: delet Hermann: 'ex prava iteratione superiorum ὅ γ' ἂν μάλιστα' ortum esse putavit Baiter.

12. οἴοιτο AM: οἷον τὸ Π. 13. μὴ δὲ ΑΠ: εἰ μὴ δὲ (β α) M. 24. ἐπιλανθανόμενοι MSS.: delet Cobet.

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p. 413. ψευδὴς | τοῦ μεταμανθάνοντος, ἀκουσίως δὲ πᾶσα ἡ ἀληθής.

Τὸ μὲν τῆς ἑκουσίου, ἔφη, μανθάνω, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀκουσίου δέομαι μαθεῖν.

Τί δαί; οὐ καὶ σὺ ἡγεῖ, ἔφην ἐγώ, τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν ἀκουσίως στέρεσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἑκουσίως; ἢ οὐ τὸ μὲν ἐψεῦσθαι τῆς ἀληθείας κακόν, τὸ δὲ ἀληθεύειν ἀγαθόν; ἢ οὐ τὸ τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν ἀληθεύειν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι;

Ἀλλ', ἦ δ' ὅς, ὀρθῶς λέγεις, καί μοι δοκοῦσιν ἄκοντες ἀληθοῦς δόξης στερίσκεσθαι.

Οὐκοῦν κλαπέντες ἢ γοητευθέντες ἢ βιασθέντες τοῦτο πάσχουσιν;

Οὐδὲ νῦν, ἔφη, μανθάνω.

B Τραγικῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κινδυνεύω λέγειν. κλαπέντας μὲν γὰρ τοὺς μεταπεισθέντας λέγω καὶ τοὺς ἐπιλανθανομένους, ὅτι τῶν μὲν χρόνος, τῶν δὲ λόγος ἐξαιρούμενος λανθάνει, νῦν γάρ που μανθάνεις;

and who are unchanged by the influences either of pleasure, or of fear,

Ναί.

Τοὺς τοίνυν βιασθέντας λέγω οὓς ἂν ὀδύνη τις ἢ ἀλγηδὼν μεταδοξάσαι ποιήσῃ.

Καὶ τοῦτ', ἔφη, ἔμαθον, καὶ ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

C Τοὺς μὴν γοητευθέντας, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, κἂν σὺ φαίης εἶναι οἳ ἂν μεταδοξάσωσιν ἢ ὑφ' ἡδονῆς κηληθέντες ἢ ὑπὸ φόβου τι δείσαντες.

or of enchantments.

Ἔοικε γάρ, ἦ δ' ὅς, γοητεύειν πάντα ὅσα ἀπατᾷ.

Ὃ τοίνυν ἄρτι ἔλεγον, ζητητέον τίνες ἄριστοι φύλακες τοῦ παρ' αὑτοῖς δόγματος, τοῦτο ὡς ποιητέον ὃ ἂν τῇ πόλει ἀεὶ δοκῶσι βέλτιστον εἶναι [αὐτοῖς ποιεῖν]. τηρητέον δὴ εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων προ-

29. αὐτοῖς (sic) ποιεῖν ΑΠΜ : αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν cj. Herm. : del. Bekker.

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θεμένοις ἔργα ἐν οἷς ἄν τις τὸ τοιοῦτον μάλιστα ἐπι- p. 413.
λανθάνοιτο καὶ ἐξαπατῷτο, καὶ τὸν μὲν μνήμονα καὶ
δυσεξαπάτητον ἐγκριτέον, τὸν δὲ μὴ ἀποκριτέον. D
ἢ γάρ;

Ναί.

Καὶ πόνους γε αὖ καὶ ἀλγηδόνας καὶ ἀγῶνας αὐτοῖς θετέον, ἐν οἷς ταὐτὰ ταῦτα τηρητέον.

Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τρίτου εἴδους τούτοις γοητείας ἅμιλλαν ποιητέον, καὶ θεατέον, ὥσπερ τοὺς πώλους ἐπὶ τοὺς ψόφους τε καὶ θορύβους ἄγοντες σκοποῦσιν εἰ φοβεροί, οὕτω νέους ὄντας εἰς δείματ'
ἄττα κομιστέον καὶ εἰς ἡδονὰς αὖ μεταβλητέον, βα- E
σανίζοντας πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ χρυσὸν ἐν πυρί, εἰ δυσγοήτευτος καὶ εὐσχήμων ἐν πᾶσι φαίνεται, φύλαξ αὑτοῦ ὢν ἀγαθὸς καὶ μουσικῆς ἧς ἐμάνθανεν, εὔρυθμόν τε καὶ εὐάρμοστον ἑαυτὸν ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις παρέχων, οἷος δὴ ἂν ὢν καὶ ἑαυτῷ καὶ πόλει χρησιμώτατος

If they stand the test they are to be honoured in life and after death.

εἴη. καὶ τὸν ἀεὶ ἔν τε παισὶ καὶ νεανίσκοις καὶ ἐν ἀνδράσι βασανιζόμενον καὶ ἀκήρατον ἐκβαίνοντα
| καταστατέον ἄρχοντα τῆς πόλεως καὶ φύλακα, καὶ p. 414.
τιμὰς δοτέον καὶ ζῶντι καὶ τελευτήσαντι, τάφων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μνημείων μέγιστα γέρα λαγχάνοντα· τὸν δὲ μὴ τοιοῦτον ἀποκριτέον. τοιαύτη τις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δοκεῖ μοι, ὦ Γλαύκων, ἡ ἐκλογὴ εἶναι καὶ κατάστασις τῶν ἀρχόντων τε καὶ φυλάκων, ὡς ἐν τύπῳ, μὴ δι' ἀκριβείας, εἰρῆσθαι.

Καὶ ἐμοί, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὕτως πῃ φαίνεται.

The title of guardians to be reserved for the elders,

Ἆρ' οὖν ὡς ἀληθῶς ὀρθότατον καλεῖν τούτους μὲν B
φύλακας παντελεῖς τῶν τε ἔξωθεν πολεμίων τῶν τε ἐντὸς φιλίων, ὅπως οἱ μὲν μὴ βουλήσονται, οἱ δὲ μὴ

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p. 414. δυνήσονται κακουργεῖν, τοὺς δὲ νέους, οὓς δὴ νῦν φύλακας ἐκαλοῦμεν, ἐπικούρους τε καὶ βοηθοὺς τοῖς τῶν ἀρχόντων δόγμασιν;

Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη.

the young men to be called auxiliaries.

Τίς ἂν οὖν ἡμῖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μηχανὴ γένοιτο τῶν ψευδῶν τῶν ἐν δέοντι γιγνομένων, ὧν δὴ νῦν ἐλέγο- C μεν, γενναῖόν τι ἓν ψευδομένους πεῖσαι μάλιστα μὲν καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἄρχοντας, εἰ δὲ μή, τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν;

Ποῖόν τι; ἔφη.

The Phoenician tale.

Μηδὲν καινόν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλὰ Φοινικικόν τι, πρότερον μὲν ἤδη πολλαχοῦ γεγονός, ὥς φασιν οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ πεπείκασιν, ἐφ' ἡμῶν δὲ οὐ γεγονὸς οὐδ' οἶδα εἰ γενόμενον ἄν, πεῖσαι δὲ συχνῆς πειθοῦς.

Ὡς ἔοικας, ἔφη, ὀκνοῦντι λέγειν.

Δόξω δέ σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ μάλ' εἰκότως ὀκνεῖν, ἐπειδὰν εἴπω.

Λέγ', ἔφη, καὶ μὴ φοβοῦ.

The citizens to be told that they are really autochthonous, sent up out of the earth,

D Λέγω δή· καίτοι οὐκ οἶδα ὁποίᾳ τόλμῃ ἢ ποίοις λόγοις χρώμενος ἐρῶ, καὶ ἐπιχειρήσω πρῶτον μὲν αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἄρχοντας πείθειν καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν, ὡς ἄρ' ἃ ἡμεῖς αὐτοὺς ἐτρέφομέν τε καὶ ἐπαιδεύομεν, ὥσπερ ὀνείρατα ἐδόκουν ταῦτα πάντα πάσχειν τε καὶ γίγνεσθαι περὶ αὐτούς, ἦσαν δὲ τότε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ὑπὸ γῆς ἐντὸς πλαττόμενοι καὶ τρεφόμενοι καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ τὰ ὅπλα E αὐτῶν καὶ ἡ ἄλλη σκευὴ δημιουργουμένη, ἐπειδὴ δὲ παντελῶς ἐξειργασμένοι ἦσαν, καὶ ἡ γῆ αὐτοὺς μήτηρ οὖσα ἀνῆκε, καὶ νῦν δεῖ ὡς περὶ μητρὸς καὶ

28. καὶ MSS.: del. Ast.: ὡς cj. Herm.
29. δεῖ qv: δὴ ΑΠΜ.

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p. 414. τροφοῦ τῆς χώρας ἐν ᾗ εἰσὶ βουλεύεσθαί τε καὶ ἀμύνειν αὐτούς, ἐάν τις ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἴῃ, καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν ὡς ἀδελφῶν ὄντων καὶ γηγενῶν διανοεῖσθαι.

Οὐκ ἐτός, ἔφη, πάλαι ᾐσχύνου τὸ ψεῦδος λέγειν.

and composed of metals of various quality.

Πάνυ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, | p. 415. εἰκότως· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἄκουε καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν τοῦ μύθου. ἐστὲ μὲν γὰρ δὴ πάντες οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει ἀδελφοί, ὡς φήσομεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς μυθολογοῦντες, ἀλλ' ὁ θεὸς πλάττων, ὅσοι μὲν ὑμῶν ἱκανοὶ ἄρχειν, χρυσὸν ἐν τῇ γενέσει ξυνέμιξεν αὐτοῖς, διὸ τιμιώτατοί εἰσιν· ὅσοι δ' ἐπίκουροι, ἄργυρον· σίδηρον δὲ καὶ χαλκὸν τοῖς τε γεωργοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δημιουργοῖς. ἅτε οὖν ξυγγενεῖς ὄντες πάντες τὸ μὲν πολὺ ὁμοίους ἂν ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς γεννῷτε, ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἐκ χρυσοῦ γεννηθείη ἂν ἀργυροῦν καὶ ἐξ ἀργυροῦ χρυ- B σοῦν ἔκγονον καὶ τἆλλα πάντα οὕτως ἐξ ἀλλήλων. τοῖς οὖν ἄρχουσι καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα παραγγέλλει ὁ θεός, ὅπως μηδενὸς οὕτω φύλακες ἀγαθοὶ ἔσονται μηδ' οὕτω σφόδρα φυλάξουσι μηδὲν ὡς τοὺς ἐκγόνους, ὅ τι αὐτοῖς τούτων ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς παραμέμικται, καὶ ἐάν τε σφέτερος ἔκγονος ὑπόχαλκος ἢ ὑποσίδηρος γένηται, μηδενὶ τρόπῳ κατελεήσουσιν, C ἀλλὰ τὴν τῇ φύσει προσήκουσαν τιμὴν ἀποδόντες ὤσουσιν εἰς δημιουργοὺς ἢ εἰς γεωργούς, καὶ ἂν αὖ ἐκ τούτων τις ὑπόχρυσος ἢ ὑπάργυρος φυῇ, τιμήσαντες ἀνάξουσι τοὺς μὲν εἰς φυλακήν, τοὺς δὲ εἰς ἐπικουρίαν, ὡς χρησμοῦ ὄντος τότε τὴν πόλιν διαφθαρῆναι, ὅταν αὐτὴν ὁ σιδηροῦς φύλαξ ἢ ὁ χαλκοῦς

The noble quality to rise in the State, the ignoble to descend.

29. σιδηροῦς φύλαξ A^2M : σίδηρος φύλαξ ΑΠ : σιδηροῦς omisso φύλαξ Ξ. ἢ ΠΜ et in litura A^2 : (·) A.

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p. 415. φυλάξῃ. τοῦτον οὖν τὸν μῦθον ὅπως ἂν πεισθεῖεν, ἔχεις τινὰ μηχανήν;

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D Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, ὅπως γ᾽ ἂν αὐτοὶ οὗτοι· ὅπως μέντ᾽ ἂν οἱ τούτων υἱεῖς καὶ οἱ ἔπειτα οἵ τ᾽ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι οἱ ὕστερον.

Is such a fiction credible?

Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, εὖ ἂν ἔχοι πρὸς τὸ μᾶλλον αὐτοὺς τῆς πόλεώς τε καὶ ἀλλήλων κήδεσθαι· σχεδὸν γάρ τι μανθάνω ὃ λέγεις.

Yes, in a future generation; not in the present.

Καὶ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἕξει ὅπῃ ἂν αὐτὸ ἡ φήμη ἀγάγῃ· ἡμεῖς δὲ τούτους τοὺς γηγενεῖς ὁπλίσαντες προάγωμεν ἡγουμένων τῶν ἀρχόντων. ἐλθόντες δὲ θεασάσθων τῆς πόλεως ὅπου κάλλιστον στρατοπεδεύσα-
E σθαι, ὅθεν τούς τε ἔνδον μάλιστ᾽ ἂν κατέχοιεν, εἴ τις μὴ ἐθέλοι τοῖς νόμοις πείθεσθαι, τούς τε ἔξωθεν ἀπαμύνοιεν, εἰ πολέμιος ὥσπερ λύκος ἐπὶ ποίμνην τις ἴοι· στρατοπεδευσάμενοι δέ, θύσαντες οἷς χρή, εὐνὰς ποιησάσθων. ἢ πῶς;

The selection of a site for the warriors' camp.

Οὕτως, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν τοιαύτας, οἵας χειμῶνός τε στέγειν καὶ θέρους ἱκανὰς εἶναι;

Πῶς γὰρ οὐχί; οἰκήσεις γάρ, ἔφη, δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν.

Ναί, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, στρατιωτικάς γε, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ χρηματιστικάς.

p. 416. | Πῶς, ἔφη, αὖ τοῦτο λέγεις διαφέρειν ἐκείνου;

Ἐγώ σοι, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, πειράσομαι εἰπεῖν. δεινότατον γάρ που πάντων καὶ αἴσχιστον ποιμέσι τοιούτους γε καὶ οὕτω τρέφειν κύνας ἐπικούρους ποιμνίων, ὥστε ὑπὸ ἀκολασίας ἢ λιμοῦ ἤ τινος ἄλλου κακοῦ ἔθους αὐτοὺς τοὺς κύνας ἐπιχειρῆσαι τοῖς προβάτοις κακουργεῖν καὶ ἀντὶ κυνῶν λύκοις ὁμοιωθῆναι.

The warriors must be humanized by education.

26. αἴσχιστον M: αἴσχιστόν που A: αἴσχιόν που Π.

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Socrates, Glaucon.

Δεινόν, ἦ δ' ὅς· πῶς δ' οὔ; p. 416.

Οὐκοῦν φυλακτέον παντὶ τρόπῳ μὴ τοιοῦτον ἡμῖν B οἱ ἐπίκουροι ποιήσωσι πρὸς τοὺς πολίτας, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῶν κρείττους εἰσίν, ἀντὶ ξυμμάχων εὐμενῶν δεσπόταις ἀγρίοις ἀφομοιωθῶσιν;

Φυλακτέον, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν τὴν μεγίστην τῆς εὐλαβείας παρεσκευασμένοι ἂν εἶεν, εἰ τῷ ὄντι καλῶς πεπαιδευμένοι εἰσίν;

Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰσί γ', ἔφη.

Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, Τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἄξιον διισχυρίζεσθαι, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων· ὃ μέντοι ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, ἄξιον, ὅτι δεῖ αὐτοὺς τῆς ὀρθῆς τυχεῖν παιδείας, C ἥτις ποτέ ἐστιν, εἰ μέλλουσι τὸ μέγιστον ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ ἥμεροι εἶναι αὑτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς φυλαττομένοις ὑπ' αὐτῶν.

Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Πρὸς τοίνυν τῇ παιδείᾳ ταύτῃ φαίη ἄν τις νοῦν ἔχων δεῖν καὶ τὰς οἰκήσεις καὶ τὴν ἄλλην οὐσίαν τοιαύτην αὐτοῖς παρεσκευάσθαι, ἥτις μήτε τοὺς φύλακας ὡς ἀρίστους εἶναι παύσοι αὐτούς, κακουργεῖν τε μὴ ἐπαροῖ περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας. D

Καὶ ἀληθῶς γε φήσει.

Their way of life will be that of a camp.

Ὅρα δή, εἶπον ἐγώ, εἰ τοιόνδε τινὰ τρόπον δεῖ αὐτοὺς ζῆν τε καὶ οἰκεῖν, εἰ μέλλουσι τοιοῦτοι ἔσεσθαι· πρῶτον μὲν οὐσίαν κεκτημένον μηδεμίαν μηδένα ἰδίαν, ἂν μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη· ἔπειτα οἴκησιν καὶ ταμιεῖον μηδενὶ εἶναι μηδὲν τοιοῦτον, εἰς ὃ οὐ πᾶς ὁ βουλόμενος εἴσεισι· τὰ δ' ἐπιτήδεια, ὅσων δέονται ἄνδρες ἀθληταὶ πολέμου σώφρονές τε καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι,

20. παρεσκευάσθαι Π : παρασκευάσασθαι AM : (παρασκευάσθαι Ξ).

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Socrates, Glaucon.

p. 416. ταξαμένους παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν δέχεσθαι μι-
E σθὸν τῆς φυλακῆς τοσοῦτον, ὅσον μήτε περιεῖναι
αὐτοῖς εἰς τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν μήτε ἐνδεῖν· φοιτῶντας δὲ εἰς
ξυσσίτια, ὥσπερ ἐστρατοπεδευμένους, κοινῇ ζῆν·
χρυσίον δὲ καὶ ἀργύριον εἰπεῖν αὐτοῖς ὅτι θεῖον παρὰ
θεῶν ἀεὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔχουσι καὶ οὐδὲν προσδέονται
τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου, οὐδὲ ὅσια τὴν ἐκείνου κτῆσιν τῇ
τοῦ θνητοῦ χρυσοῦ κτήσει ξυμμιγνύντας μιαίνειν,
p. 417. διότι πολλὰ καὶ ἀνόσια περὶ τὸ τῶν | πολλῶν νό-
μισμα γέγονε, τὸ παρ' ἐκείνοις δὲ ἀκήρατον· ἀλλὰ
μόνοις αὐτοῖς τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει μεταχειρίζεσθαι καὶ
ἅπτεσθαι χρυσοῦ καὶ ἀργύρου οὐ θέμις, οὐδ' ὑπὸ τὸν
αὐτὸν ὄροφον ἰέναι οὐδὲ περιάψασθαι οὐδὲ πίνειν ἐξ
ἀργύρου ἢ χρυσοῦ. καὶ οὕτω μὲν σῴζοιντό τ' ἂν
καὶ σῴζοιεν τὴν πόλιν· ὁπότε δ' αὐτοὶ γῆν τε
ἰδίαν καὶ οἰκίας καὶ νομίσματα κτήσονται, οἰκονόμοι
μὲν καὶ γεωργοὶ ἀντὶ φυλάκων ἔσονται, δεσπόται δ'
B ἐχθροὶ ἀντὶ ξυμμάχων τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν γενήσον-
ται, μισοῦντες δὲ δὴ καὶ μισούμενοι καὶ ἐπιβουλεύ-
οντες καὶ ἐπιβουλευόμενοι διάξουσι πάντα τὸν βίον,
πολὺ πλείω καὶ μᾶλλον δεδιότες τοὺς ἔνδον ἢ τοὺς
ἔξωθεν πολεμίους, θέοντες ἤδη τότε ἐγγύτατα ὀλέθρου
αὐτοί τε καὶ ἡ ἄλλη πόλις. τούτων οὖν πάντων
ἕνεκα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φῶμεν οὕτω δεῖν κατεσκευάσθαι
τοὺς φύλακας οἰκήσεώς τε πέρι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ
ταῦτα νομοθετήσωμεν, ἢ μή;

They must have no homes or property of their own.

Πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὃς ὁ Γλαύκων.

Δ.

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SOCRATES, ADEIMANTUS.

An objection that Socrates has made his citizens poor and miserable:

p. 419. Καὶ ὁ Ἀδείμαντος ὑπολαβὼν Τί οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπολογήσει, ἐάν τίς σε φῇ μὴ πάνυ τι εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας, καὶ ταῦτα δι' ἑαυτούς, ὧν ἔστι μὲν ἡ πόλις τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, οἱ δὲ μηδὲν ἀπολαύουσιν ἀγαθὸν τῆς πόλεως, οἷον ἄλλοι ἀγρούς τε κεκτημένοι καὶ οἰκίας οἰκοδομούμενοι καλὰς καὶ μεγάλας, καὶ ταύταις πρέπουσαν κατασκευὴν κτώμενοι, καὶ θυσίας θεοῖς ἰδίας θύοντες, καὶ ξενοδοκοῦντες, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἃ νῦν δὴ σὺ ἔλεγες, χρυσόν τε καὶ ἄργυρον κεκτημένοι καὶ πάντα ὅσα νομίζεται τοῖς μέλλουσι μακαρίοις εἶναι; ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς, φαίη ἄν, ὥσπερ ἐπίκουροι μισθωτοὶ ἐν τῇ πόλει φαίνονται | p. 420. καθῆσθαι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ φρουροῦντες.

and worst of all, adds Socrates, they get no pay.

Ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ταῦτά γε ἐπισίτιοι καὶ οὐδὲ μισθὸν πρὸς τοῖς σιτίοις λαμβάνοντες ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι, ὥστε οὐδ' ἂν ἀποδημῆσαι βούλωνται ἰδίᾳ, ἐξέσται αὐτοῖς, οὐδ' ἑταίραις διδόναι, οὐδ' ἀναλίσκειν, ἄν ποι βούλωνται ἄλλοσε, οἷα δὴ οἱ εὐδαίμονες δοκοῦντες εἶναι ἀναλίσκουσι. ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα συχνὰ τῆς κατηγορίας ἀπολείπεις.

Ἀλλ', ἦ δ' ὅς, ἔστω καὶ ταῦτα κατηγορημένα.

12. μισθωτοὶ MSS.: del. Badham.

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Yet very likely they may be the happiest of mankind.

The State, like a statue, must be judged of as a whole.

p. 420. B Τί οὖν δὴ ἀπολογησόμεθα, φῄς;

Ναί.

Τὸν αὐτὸν οἶμον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πορευόμενοι εὑρήσομεν, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἃ λεκτέα. ἐροῦμεν γὰρ ὅτι θαυμαστὸν μὲν ἂν οὐδὲν εἴη, εἰ καὶ οὗτοι οὕτως εὐδαιμονέστατοί εἰσιν, οὐ μὴν πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες τὴν πόλιν οἰκίζομεν, ὅπως ἕν τι ἡμῖν ἔθνος ἔσται διαφερόντως εὔδαιμον, ἀλλ' ὅπως ὅ τι μάλιστα ὅλη ἡ πόλις. ᾠήθημεν γὰρ ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ μάλιστα ἂν εὑρεῖν δικαιοσύνην καὶ αὖ ἐν τῇ κάκιστα οἰκουμένῃ ἀδικίαν, C κατιδόντες δὲ κρῖναι ἂν ὃ πάλαι ζητοῦμεν. νῦν μὲν οὖν, ὡς οἰόμεθα, τὴν εὐδαίμονα πλάττομεν οὐκ ἀπολαβόντες, ὀλίγους ἐν αὐτῇ τοιούτους τινὰς τιθέντες, ἀλλ' ὅλην· αὐτίκα δὲ τὴν ἐναντίαν σκεψόμεθα. ὥσπερ οὖν ἂν εἰ ἡμᾶς ἀνδριάντας γράφοντας προσελθών τις ἔψεγε λέγων ὅτι οὐ τοῖς καλλίστοις τοῦ ζῴου τὰ κάλλιστα φάρμακα προστίθεμεν — οἱ γὰρ ὀφθαλμοὶ κάλλιστον ὂν οὐκ ὀστρείῳ ἐναληλιμμένοι D εἶεν ἀλλὰ μέλανι —, μετρίως ἂν ἐδοκοῦμεν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀπολογεῖσθαι λέγοντες Ὦ θαυμάσιε, μὴ οἴου δεῖν ἡμᾶς οὕτω καλοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς γράφειν, ὥστε μηδὲ ὀφθαλμοὺς φαίνεσθαι, μηδ' αὖ τἆλλα μέρη, ἀλλ' ἄθρει εἰ τὰ προσήκοντα ἑκάστοις ἀποδιδόντες τὸ ὅλον καλὸν ποιοῦμεν. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν μὴ ἀνάγκαζε ἡμᾶς τοιαύτην εὐδαιμονίαν τοῖς φύλαξι προσάπτειν, ἣ ἐκείνους πᾶν μᾶλλον ἀπεργάσεται ἢ φύλακας. E ἐπιστάμεθα γὰρ καὶ τοὺς γεωργοὺς ξυστίδας ἀμφιέσαντες καὶ χρυσὸν περιθέντες πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἐργάζεσθαι κελεύειν τὴν γῆν, καὶ τοὺς κεραμέας κατακλίναντες ἐπιδέξια πρὸς τὸ πῦρ διαπίνοντάς τε καὶ

30. ἐπιδέξια A : ἐπὶ δεξιᾶ Π : ἐπὶ δεξιὰ M.

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εὐωχουμένους, τὸν τροχὸν παραθεμένους, ὅσον ἂν p. 420. ἐπιθυμῶσι κεραμεύειν, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ μακαρίους ποιεῖν, ἵνα δὴ ὅλη ἡ πόλις εὐδαιμονῇ. ἀλλ᾽ ἡμᾶς μὴ οὕτω νουθέτει· ὡς, ἂν σοι πειθώμεθα, οὔτε ὁ γεωργὸς γεωργὸς ἔσται οὔτε | ὁ κεραμεὺς κεραμεὺς οὔτε ἄλλος οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν ἔχων p. 421. σχῆμα, ἐξ ὧν πόλις γίγνεται. ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἐλάττων λόγος· νευρορράφοι γὰρ φαῦλοι γενόμενοι καὶ διαφθαρέντες καὶ προσποιησάμενοι εἶναι μὴ ὄντες πόλει οὐδὲν δεινόν· φύλακες δὲ νόμων τε καὶ πόλεως μὴ ὄντες ἀλλὰ δοκοῦντες ὁρᾷς δὴ ὅτι πᾶσαν ἄρδην πόλιν ἀπολλύασι, καὶ αὖ τοῦ εὖ οἰκεῖν καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν μόνοι τὸν καιρὸν ἔχουσιν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡμεῖς μὲν φύλακας ὡς ἀληθῶς ποιοῦμεν ἥκιστα κακούργους τῆς B πόλεως, ὁ δ᾽ ἐκεῖνο λέγων γεωργούς τινας καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν πανηγύρει ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐν πόλει ἑστιάτορας εὐδαίμονας, ἄλλο ἄν τι ἢ πόλιν λέγοι. σκεπτέον οὖν πότερον πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες τοὺς φύλακας καθιστῶμεν, ὅπως ὅ τι πλείστη αὐτοῖς εὐδαιμονία ἐγγενήσεται, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν εἰς τὴν πόλιν ὅλην βλέποντας θεατέον εἰ ἐκείνῃ ἐγγίγνεται, τοὺς δ᾽ ἐπικούρους τούτους καὶ τοὺς φύλακας ἐκεῖνο ἀναγκαστέον ποιεῖν καὶ C πειστέον, ὅπως ὅ τι ἄριστοι δημιουργοὶ τοῦ ἑαυτῶν ἔργου ἔσονται, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας ὡσαύτως, καὶ οὕτω ξυμπάσης τῆς πόλεως αὐξανομένης καὶ καλῶς οἰκιζομένης ἐατέον ὅπως ἑκάστοις τοῖς ἔθνεσιν ἡ φύσις ἀποδίδωσι τοῦ μεταλαμβάνειν εὐδαιμονίας.

The guardians must be guardians, not boon companions.

Ἀλλ᾽, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, καλῶς μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν.

Ἆρ᾽ οὖν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ τὸ τούτου ἀδελφὸν δόξω σοι μετρίως λέγειν;

16. εὐδαίμονας MSS.: , εὔδαιμον cj. Madvig.

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p. 421. Τί μάλιστα;

D Τοὺς ἄλλους αὖ δημιουργοὺς σκόπει εἰ τάδε διαφθείρει, ὥστε καὶ κακοὺς γίγνεσθαι.

Τὰ ποῖα δὴ ταῦτα;

Πλοῦτος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ πενία.

Πῶς δή;

Ὧδε. πλουτήσας χυτρεὺς δοκεῖ σοι ἔτι θελήσειν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς τέχνης;

When an artisan grows rich, he becomes careless: if he is very poor, he has no money to buy tools with. The city should be neither poor nor rich.

Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη.

Ἀργὸς δὲ καὶ ἀμελὴς γενήσεται μᾶλλον αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ;

Πολύ γε.

Οὐκοῦν κακίων χυτρεὺς γίγνεται;

Καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, πολύ.

Καὶ μὴν καὶ ὄργανά γε μὴ ἔχων παρέχεσθαι ὑπὸ πενίας ἤ τι ἄλλο τῶν εἰς τὴν τέχνην τά τε ἔργα E πονηρότερα ἐργάσεται καὶ τοὺς υἱεῖς ἢ ἄλλους οὓς ἂν διδάσκῃ χείρους δημιουργοὺς διδάξεται.

Πῶς δ' οὔ;

Ὑπ' ἀμφοτέρων δή, πενίας τε καὶ πλούτου, χείρω μὲν τὰ τῶν τεχνῶν ἔργα, χείρους δὲ αὐτοί.

Φαίνεται.

Ἕτερα δή, ὡς ἔοικε, τοῖς φύλαξιν εὑρήκαμεν, ἃ παντὶ τρόπῳ φυλακτέον ὅπως μήποτε αὐτοὺς λήσει εἰς τὴν πόλιν παραδύντα.

Ποῖα ταῦτα;

p. 422. Πλοῦτός τε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ πενία· | ὡς τοῦ μὲν τρυφὴν καὶ ἀργίαν καὶ νεωτερισμὸν ποιοῦντος, τοῦ δὲ ἀνελευθερίαν καὶ κακοεργίαν πρὸς τῷ νεωτερισμῷ.

2. διαφθείρει ΠΜ: διαφέρει A.

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But how, being poor, can she contend against a wealthy enemy?

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. τόδε μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, p. 422. σκόπει, πῶς ἡμῖν ἡ πόλις οἵα τ' ἔσται πολεμεῖν, ἐπειδὰν χρήματα μὴ κεκτημένη ᾖ, ἄλλως τε κἂν πρὸς μεγάλην τε καὶ πλουσίαν ἀναγκασθῇ πολεμεῖν.

Δῆλον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι πρὸς μὲν μίαν χαλεπώτερον, πρὸς δὲ δύο τοιαύτας ῥᾷον. B

Πῶς εἶπες; ἦ δ' ὅς.

Our wiry soldiers will be more than a match for their fat neighbours.

Πρῶτον μέν που, εἶπον, ἐὰν δέῃ μάχεσθαι, ἆρα οὐ πλουσίοις ἀνδράσι μαχοῦνται αὐτοὶ ὄντες πολέμου ἀθληταί;

Ναὶ τοῦτό γε, ἔφη.

Τί οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ 'Αδείμαντε; εἷς πύκτης ὡς οἷόν τε κάλλιστα ἐπὶ τοῦτο παρεσκευασμένος δυοῖν μὴ πύκταιν, πλουσίοιν δὲ καὶ πιόνοιν, οὐκ ἂν δοκεῖ σοι ῥᾳδίως μάχεσθαι;

Οὐκ ἂν ἴσως, ἔφη, ἅμα γε.

Οὐδ' εἰ ἐξείη, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὑποφεύγοντι τὸν πρότερον ἀεὶ προσφερόμενον ἀναστρέφοντα κρούειν, καὶ C τοῦτο ποιοῖ πολλάκις ἐν ἡλίῳ τε καὶ πνίγει; ἆρά γε οὐ καὶ πλέους χειρώσαιτ' ἂν τοιούτους ὁ τοιοῦτος;

'Αμέλει, ἔφη, οὐδὲν ἂν γένοιτο θαυμαστόν.

'Αλλ' οὐκ οἴει πυκτικῆς πλέον μετέχειν τοὺς πλουσίους ἐπιστήμῃ τε καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ ἢ πολεμικῆς;

Ἔγωγ', ἔφη.

'Ρᾳδίως ἄρα ἡμῖν οἱ ἀθληταὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων διπλασίοις τε καὶ τριπλασίοις αὐτῶν μαχοῦνται.

Συγχωρήσομαί σοι, ἔφη· δοκεῖς γάρ μοι ὀρθῶς λέγειν.

And they will have

Τί δ', ἂν πρεσβείαν πέμψαντες εἰς τὴν ἑτέραν D

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p. 422. πόλιν τἀληθῆ εἴπωσιν, ὅτι Ἡμεῖς μὲν οὐδὲν χρυσίῳ οὐδ' ἀργυρίῳ χρώμεθα, οὐδ' ἡμῖν θέμις, ὑμῖν δέ· ξυμπολεμήσαντες οὖν μεθ' ἡμῶν ἔχετε τὰ τῶν ἑτέρων· οἴει τινὰς ἀκούσαντας ταῦτα αἱρήσεσθαι κυσὶ πολεμεῖν στερεοῖς τε καὶ ἰσχνοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ μετὰ κυνῶν προβάτοις πίοσί τε καὶ ἁπαλοῖς;

allies who will readily join on condition of receiving the spoil.

Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ. ἀλλ' ἐὰν εἰς μίαν, ἔφη, πόλιν E συναθροισθῇ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων χρήματα, ὅρα μὴ κίνδυνον φέρῃ τῇ μὴ πλουτούσῃ.

Εὐδαίμων εἶ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι οἴει ἄξιον εἶναι ἄλλην τινὰ προσειπεῖν πόλιν ἢ τὴν τοιαύτην οἵαν ἡμεῖς κατεσκευάζομεν.

Ἀλλὰ τί μήν; ἔφη.

Μειζόνως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, χρὴ προσαγορεύειν τὰς ἄλλας· ἑκάστη γὰρ αὐτῶν πόλεις εἰσὶ πάμπολλαι, ἀλλ' οὐ πόλις, τὸ τῶν παιζόντων. δύο μέν, κἂν ὁτιοῦν ᾖ, πολεμία ἀλλήλαις, ἡ μὲν πενήτων, ἡ δὲ πλουσίων· p. 423. τούτων δ' | ἐν ἑκατέρᾳ πάνυ πολλαί, αἷς ἐὰν μὲν ὡς μιᾷ προσφέρῃ, παντὸς ἂν ἁμάρτοις, ἐὰν δὲ ὡς πολλαῖς, διδοὺς τὰ τῶν ἑτέρων τοῖς ἑτέροις χρήματά τε καὶ δυνάμεις ἢ καὶ αὐτούς, ξυμμάχοις μὲν ἀεὶ πολλοῖς χρήσει, πολεμίοις δ' ὀλίγοις. καὶ ἕως ἂν ἡ πόλις σοι οἰκῇ σωφρόνως ὡς ἄρτι ἐτάχθη, μεγίστη ἔσται, οὐ τῷ εὐδοκιμεῖν λέγω, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀληθῶς μεγίστη, καὶ ἐὰν μόνον ᾖ χιλίων τῶν προπολεμούντων· οὕτω γὰρ μεγάλην πόλιν μίαν οὐ ῥᾳδίως οὔτε B ἐν Ἕλλησιν οὔτε ἐν βαρβάροις εὑρήσεις, δοκούσας δὲ πολλὰς καὶ πολλαπλασίας τῆς τηλικαύτης. ἢ ἄλλως οἴει;

But many cities will conspire? No: they are divided in themselves.

Many states are contained in one.

16. μὲν AM: μὲν γὰρ Π. 17. ᾖ AM: ἢ Π. πολεμία ΑΠ; πολεμίαι M. 22. ἕως xv: ὡς ΑΠΜ.

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The limit to the size of the State the possibility of Unity.

Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὗτος ἂν εἴη καὶ κάλλιστος ὅρος τοῖς ἡμετέροις ἄρχουσιν, ὅσην δεῖ τὸ μέγεθος τὴν πόλιν ποιεῖσθαι καὶ ἡλίκῃ οὔσῃ ὅσην χώραν ἀφορισαμένους τὴν ἄλλην χαίρειν ἐᾶν.

Τίς, ἔφη, ὅρος;

Οἶμαι μέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τόνδε· μέχρι οὗ ἂν ἐθέλῃ αὐξομένη εἶναι μία, μέχρι τούτου αὔξειν, πέρα δὲ μή.

Καὶ καλῶς γ', ἔφη. C

Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῦτο αὖ ἄλλο πρόσταγμα τοῖς φύλαξι προστάξομεν, φυλάττειν παντὶ τρόπῳ ὅπως μήτε σμικρὰ ἡ πόλις ἔσται μήτε μεγάλη δοκοῦσα, ἀλλά τις ἱκανὴ καὶ μία.

Καὶ φαῦλόν γ', ἔφη, ἴσως αὐτοῖς προστάξομεν.

The duty of adjusting the citizens to the rank for which nature intended them.

Καὶ τούτου γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔτι φαυλότερον τόδε, οὗ καὶ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἐπεμνήσθημεν λέγοντες ὡς δέοι, ἐάν τε τῶν φυλάκων τις φαῦλος ἔκγονος γένηται, εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους αὐτὸν ἀποπέμπεσθαι, ἐάν τ' ἐκ D τῶν ἄλλων σπουδαῖος, εἰς τοὺς φύλακας. τοῦτο δ' ἐβούλετο δηλοῦν, ὅτι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας, πρὸς ὅ τις πέφυκε, πρὸς τοῦτο ἕνα πρὸς ἓν ἕκαστον ἔργον δεῖ κομίζειν, ὅπως ἂν ἓν τὸ αὑτοῦ ἐπιτηδεύων ἕκαστος μὴ πολλοί, ἀλλὰ εἷς γίγνηται, καὶ οὕτω δὴ ξύμπασα ἡ πόλις μία φύηται, ἀλλὰ μὴ πολλαί.

Ἔστι γάρ, ἔφη, τοῦτο ἐκείνου σμικρότερον.

Οὔτοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ ἀγαθὲ Ἀδείμαντε, ὡς δόξειεν ἄν τις, ταῦτα πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα αὐτοῖς προστάττομεν ἀλλὰ πάντα φαῦλα, ἐὰν τὸ λεγόμενον ἓν μέγα E φυλάττωσι, μᾶλλον δ' ἀντὶ μεγάλου ἱκανόν.

8. αὐξομένη AM : αὐξανομένη Π.

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p. 423. Τί τοῦτο; ἔφη.

Τὴν παιδείαν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τροφήν. ἐὰν γὰρ εὖ παιδευόμενοι μέτριοι ἄνδρες γίγνωνται, πάντα ταῦτα ῥᾳδίως διόψονται, καὶ ἄλλα γε ὅσα νῦν ἡμεῖς παραλείπομεν, τήν τε τῶν γυναικῶν κτῆσιν p. 424. καὶ γάμων καὶ παιδοποιίας, ὅτι | δεῖ ταῦτα κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν πάντα ὅ τι μάλιστα κοινὰ τὰ φίλων ποιεῖσθαι.

Good education has a cumulative force and affects the breed.

Ὀρθότατα γάρ, ἔφη, γίγνοιτ' ἄν.

Καὶ μήν, εἶπον, πολιτεία ἐάνπερ ἅπαξ ὁρμήσῃ εὖ, ἔρχεται ὥσπερ κύκλος αὐξανομένη. τροφὴ γὰρ καὶ παίδευσις χρηστὴ σωζομένη φύσεις ἀγαθὰς ἐμποιεῖ, καὶ αὖ φύσεις χρησταὶ τοιαύτης παιδείας ἀντιλαμβανόμεναι ἔτι βελτίους τῶν προτέρων φύονται, εἴς B τε τἆλλα καὶ εἰς τὸ γεννᾶν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις.

Εἰκός γ', ἔφη.

No innovations to be made either in music or gymnastic.

Ὡς τοίνυν διὰ βραχέων εἰπεῖν, τούτου ἀνθεκτέον τοῖς ἐπιμεληταῖς τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως ἂν αὐτοὺς μὴ λάθῃ διαφθαρὲν ἀλλὰ παρὰ πάντα αὐτὸ φυλάττωσι, τὸ μὴ νεωτερίζειν περὶ γυμναστικήν τε καὶ μουσικὴν παρὰ τὴν τάξιν, ἀλλ' ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα φυλάττειν, φοβουμένους ὅταν τις λέγῃ ὡς τὴν ἀοιδὴν μᾶλλον ἐπιφρονέουσιν ἄνθρωποι,

ἥτις ἀειδόντεσσι νεωτάτη ἀμφιπέληται,

C μὴ πολλάκις τὸν ποιητήν τις οἴηται λέγειν οὐκ ᾄσματα νέα ἀλλὰ τρόπον ᾠδῆς νέον, καὶ τοῦτο ἐπαινῇ. δεῖ δ' οὔτ' ἐπαινεῖν τὸ τοιοῦτον οὔτε ὑπολαμβάνειν. εἶδος γὰρ καινὸν μουσικῆς μεταβάλλειν εὐλαβητέον ὡς ἐν ὅλῳ κινδυνεύοντα· οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ κινοῦνται

24. ἐπιφρονέουσιν ΑΠ: ἐπιφρονέουσ' A corr. M.

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μουσικῆς τρόποι ἄνευ πολιτικῶν νόμων τῶν μεγίστων, ὥς φησί τε Δάμων καὶ ἐγὼ πείθομαι. p. 424.

Καὶ ἐμὲ τοίνυν, ἔφη ὁ Ἀδείμαντος, θὲς τῶν πεπεισμένων.

Τὸ δὴ φυλακτήριον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐνταῦθά D που οἰκοδομητέον τοῖς φύλαξιν, ἐν μουσικῇ.

Ἡ γοῦν παρανομία, ἔφη, ῥᾳδίως αὕτη λανθάνει παραδυομένη.

Ναί, ἔφην, ὡς ἐν παιδιᾶς γε μέρει καὶ ὡς κακὸν οὐδὲν ἐργαζομένη.

The spirit of lawlessness, beginning in music, gradually pervades the whole of life.

Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐργάζεται, ἔφη, ἄλλο γε ἢ κατὰ σμικρὸν εἰσοικισαμένη ἠρέμα ὑπορρεῖ πρὸς τὰ ἤθη τε καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα· ἐκ δὲ τούτων εἰς τὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ξυμβόλαια μείζων ἐκβαίνει, ἐκ δὲ δὴ τῶν ξυμβολαίων ἔρχεται ἐπὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ πολιτείας σὺν πολλῇ, ὦ E Σώκρατες, ἀσελγείᾳ, ἕως ἂν τελευτῶσα πάντα ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ ἀνατρέψῃ.

Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οὕτω τοῦτ' ἔχει;

Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν, ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐλέγομεν, τοῖς ἡμετέροις παισὶν ἐννομωτέρου εὐθὺς παιδιᾶς μεθεκτέον, ὡς παρανόμου γιγνομένης αὐτῆς καὶ παίδων τοιούτων ἐννόμους τε καὶ σπουδαίους ἐξ | αὐτῶν ἄνδρας p. 425. αὐξάνεσθαι ἀδύνατον ὄν;

Πῶς δ' οὐχί; ἔφη.

The habit of order the basis of education.

Ὅταν δὴ ἄρα καλῶς ἀρξάμενοι παῖδες παίζειν εὐνομίαν διὰ τῆς μουσικῆς εἰσδέξωνται, πάλιν τοὐναντίον ἢ 'κείνοις εἰς πάντα ξυνέπεταί τε καὶ αὔξει, ἐπανορθοῦσα εἴ τι καὶ πρότερον τῆς πόλεως ἔκειτο.

7. αὕτη ΑΠ : αὐτὴ Μ : ταύτῃ cj. Madvig.

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p. 425. Ἀληθῆ μέντοι, ἔφη.

Καὶ τὰ σμικρὰ ἄρα, εἶπον, δοκοῦντα εἶναι νόμιμα ἐξευρίσκουσιν οὗτοι, ἃ οἱ πρότερον ἀπώλλυσαν πάντα.

If the citizens have the root of the matter in them, they will supply the details for themselves.

Ποῖα;

B Τὸ τοιάδε· σιγάς τε τῶν νεωτέρων παρὰ πρεσβυτέροις, ἃς πρέπει, καὶ κατακλίσεις καὶ ὑπαναστάσεις καὶ γονέων θεραπείας, καὶ κουράς γε καὶ ἀμπεχόνας καὶ ὑποδέσεις καὶ ὅλον τὸν τοῦ σώματος σχηματισμὸν καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα τοιαῦτα. ἢ οὐκ οἴει;

Ἔγωγε.

Νομοθετεῖν δ' αὐτὰ οἶμαι εὔηθες· οὔτε γάρ που γίγνεται οὔτ' ἂν μείνειεν λόγῳ τε καὶ γράμμασι νομοθετηθέντα.

Πῶς γάρ;

Κινδυνεύει γοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, ἐκ C τῆς παιδείας ὅποι ἄν τις ὁρμήσῃ, τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ ἑπόμενα εἶναι. ἢ οὐκ ἀεὶ τὸ ὅμοιον ὃν ὅμοιον παρακαλεῖ;

Τί μήν;

Καὶ τελευτῶν δή, οἶμαι, φαῖμεν ἂν εἰς ἕν τι τέλεον καὶ νεανικὸν ἀποβαίνειν αὐτὸ ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ καὶ τοὐναντίον.

Τί γὰρ οὔκ; ἦ δ' ὅς.

Ἐγὼ μὲν τοίνυν, εἶπον, διὰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἂν ἔτι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπιχειρήσαιμι νομοθετεῖν.

Εἰκότως γ', ἔφη.

The mere routine of administration may be omitted by us.

Τί δέ, ὦ πρὸς θεῶν, ἔφην, [τάδε] τὰ ἀγοραῖα ξυμβολαίων τε πέρι κατ' ἀγορὰν ἕκαστοι ἃ πρὸς

7. ἃς AM : ὡς Π. 18. ὂν A (inter versus) Π : om. M. 28. τάδε Π : om. AM.

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ἀλλήλους ξυμβάλλουσιν, εἰ δὲ βούλει, καὶ χειροτεχνικῶν περὶ ξυμβολαίων καὶ λοιδοριῶν καὶ αἰκίας καὶ δικῶν λήξεως καὶ δικαστῶν καταστάσεως, καὶ εἴ που τελῶν τινὲς ἢ πράξεις ἢ θέσεις ἀναγκαῖοί εἰσιν ἢ κατ' ἀγορὰς ἢ λιμένας, ἢ καὶ τὸ παράπαν ἀγορανομικὰ ἄττα ἢ ἀστυνομικὰ ἢ ἐλλιμενικὰ ἢ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, τούτων τολμήσομέν τι νομοθετεῖν; p. 425. D

Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄξιον, ἔφη, ἀνδράσι καλοῖς κἀγαθοῖς ἐπιτάττειν· τὰ πολλὰ γὰρ αὐτῶν, ὅσα δεῖ νομοθετήσασθαι, ῥᾳδίως που εὑρήσουσιν. E

Ναί, ὦ φίλε, εἶπον, ἐάν γε θεὸς αὐτοῖς διδῷ σωτηρίαν τῶν νόμων ὧν ἔμπροσθεν διήλθομεν.

Εἰ δὲ μή γε, ἦ δ' ὅς, πολλὰ τοιαῦτα τιθέμενοι ἀεὶ καὶ ἐπανορθούμενοι τὸν βίον διατελέσουσιν, οἰόμενοι ἐπιλήψεσθαι τοῦ βελτίστου.

Illustration of reformers of the law taken from invalids who are always doctoring themselves, but will never listen to the truth.

Λέγεις, ἔφην ἐγώ, βιώσεσθαι τοὺς τοιούτους ὥσπερ τοὺς κάμνοντάς τε καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλοντας ὑπὸ ἀκολασίας ἐκβῆναι πονηρᾶς διαίτης.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Καὶ μὴν | οὗτοί γε χαριέντως διατελοῦσιν. ἰατρευόμενοι γὰρ οὐδὲν περαίνουσι, πλήν γε ποικιλώτερα καὶ μείζω ποιοῦσι τὰ νοσήματα, καὶ ἀεὶ ἐλπίζοντες, ἐάν τις φάρμακον ξυμβουλεύσῃ, ὑπὸ τούτου ἔσεσθαι ὑγιεῖς. p. 426.

Πάνυ γάρ, ἔφη, τῶν οὕτω καμνόντων τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη.

Τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· τόδε αὐτῶν οὐ χαρίεν, τὸ πάντων ἔχθιστον ἡγεῖσθαι τὸν τἀληθῆ λέγοντα, ὅτι πρὶν ἂν μεθύων καὶ ἐμπιπλάμενος καὶ ἀφροδισιάζων καὶ ἀργῶν παύσηται, οὔτε φάρμακα οὔτε καύσεις οὔτε B

3. λήξεως M : λήξεις ΑΠ. 5. παράπαν M : πάμπαν ΑΠ.

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p. 426. τομαὶ οὐδ' αὖ ἐπῳδαὶ αὐτὸν οὐδὲ περίαπτα οὐδὲ ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν ὀνήσει;

Οὐ πάνυ χαρίεν, ἔφη· τὸ γὰρ τῷ εὖ λέγοντι χαλεπαίνειν οὐκ ἔχει χάριν.

Οὐκ ἐπαινέτης εἶ, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὡς ἔοικας, τῶν τοιούτων ἀνδρῶν.

Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία.

Οὐδ' ἂν ἡ πόλις ἄρα, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, ὅλη τοιοῦτον ποιῇ, οὐκ ἐπαινέσει. ἢ οὐ φαίνονταί σοι ταὐτὸν ἐργάζεσθαι τούτοις τῶν πόλεων ὅσαι κακῶς
C πολιτευόμεναι προαγορεύουσι τοῖς πολίταις τὴν μὲν κατάστασιν τῆς πόλεως ὅλην μὴ κινεῖν, ὡς ἀποθανουμένους ὃς ἂν τοῦτο δρᾷ· ὃς δ' ἂν σφᾶς οὕτω πολιτευομένους ἥδιστα θεραπεύῃ καὶ χαρίζηται ὑποτρέχων καὶ προγιγνώσκων τὰς σφετέρας βουλήσεις καὶ ταύτας δεινὸς ᾖ ἀποπληροῦν, οὗτος ἄρα ἀγαθός τε ἔσται ἀνὴρ καὶ σοφὸς τὰ μεγάλα καὶ τιμήσεται ὑπὸ σφῶν;

Ταὐτὸν μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσι δρᾶν, καὶ οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν ἐπαινῶ.

D Τί δ' αὖ, τοὺς θέλοντας θεραπεύειν τὰς τοιαύτας πόλεις καὶ προθυμουμένους οὐκ ἄγασαι τῆς ἀνδρείας τε καὶ εὐχερείας;

Demagogues trying their hands at legislation may be excused for their ignorance of the world.

Ἔγωγ', ἔφη, πλήν γ' ὅσοι ἐξηπάτηνται ὑπ' αὐτῶν καὶ οἴονται τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πολιτικοὶ εἶναι, ὅτι ἐπαινοῦνται ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν.

Πῶς λέγεις; οὐ συγγιγνώσκεις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῖς ἀνδράσιν; ἢ οἴει οἷόν τ' εἶναι ἀνδρὶ μὴ ἐπισταμένῳ μετρεῖν, ἑτέρων τοιούτων πολλῶν λεγόντων ὅτι
E τετράπηχύς ἐστιν, αὐτὸν ταῦτα μὴ ἡγεῖσθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ;

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Οὐκ αὖ, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε. p. 426.

Μὴ τοίνυν χαλέπαινε· καὶ γάρ πού εἰσι πάντων χαριέστατοι οἱ τοιοῦτοι, νομοθετοῦντές τε οἷα ἄρτι διήλθομεν καὶ ἐπανορθοῦντες ἀεὶ οἰόμενοί τι πέρας εὑρήσειν περὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ξυμβολαίοις κακουργήματα καὶ περὶ ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ἀγνοοῦντες ὅτι τῷ ὄντι ὥσπερ Ὕδραν τέμνουσιν.

Καὶ μήν, | ἔφη, οὐκ ἄλλο τί γε ποιοῦσιν. p. 427.

Ἐγὼ μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδος νόμων πέρι καὶ πολιτείας οὔτ' ἐν κακῶς οὔτ' ἐν εὖ πολιτευομένῃ πόλει ᾤμην ἂν δεῖν τὸν ἀληθινὸν νομοθέτην πραγματεύεσθαι, ἐν τῇ μὲν ὅτι ἀνωφελῆ καὶ πλέον οὐδέν, ἐν δὲ τῇ ὅτι τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν κἂν ὁστισοῦν εὕροι, τὰ δὲ ὅτι αὐτόματα ἔπεισιν ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἐπιτηδευμάτων.

Τί οὖν, ἔφη, ἔτι ἂν ἡμῖν λοιπὸν τῆς νομοθεσίας εἴη; B

Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι Ἡμῖν μὲν οὐδέν, τῷ μέντοι Ἀπόλλωνι τῷ ἐν Δελφοῖς τά τε μέγιστα καὶ κάλλιστα καὶ πρῶτα τῶν νομοθετημάτων.

Τὰ ποῖα; ἦ δ' ὅς.

Religion to be left to the God of Delphi.

Ἱερῶν τε ἱδρύσεις καὶ θυσίαι καὶ ἄλλαι θεῶν τε καὶ δαιμόνων καὶ ἡρώων θεραπεῖαι· τελευτησάντων αὖ θῆκαι καὶ ὅσα τοῖς ἐκεῖ δεῖ ὑπηρετοῦντας ἵλεως αὐτοὺς ἔχειν. τὰ γὰρ δὴ τοιαῦτα οὔτ' ἐπιστάμεθα ἡμεῖς οἰκίζοντές τε πόλιν οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ πεισόμεθα, C ἐὰν νοῦν ἔχωμεν, οὐδὲ χρησόμεθα ἐξηγητῇ ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ πατρίῳ· οὗτος γὰρ δήπου ὁ θεὸς περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις πάτριος ἐξηγητὴς ἐν μέσῳ τῆς γῆς ἐπὶ τοῦ ὀμφαλοῦ καθήμενος ἐξηγεῖται.

1. αὖ ΑΠΜ : ἂν ΞΠ$^{\text{corr}}$.
23. τελευτησάντων ΑΠΜ : τελευτησάντων τε Ξ.

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p. 427. Καὶ καλῶς γ', ἔφη, λέγεις· καὶ ποιητέον οὕτω.

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D 'Ωικισμένη μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἤδη ἄν σοι εἴη, ὦ παῖ 'Αρίστωνος, ἡ πόλις· τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο σκόπει ἐν αὐτῇ, φῶς ποθὲν πορισάμενος ἱκανόν, αὐτός τε καὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν παρακάλει καὶ Πολέμαρχον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐάν πως ἴδωμεν ποῦ ποτ' ἂν εἴη ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ποῦ ἡ ἀδικία, καὶ τί ἀλλήλοιν διαφέρετον, καὶ πότερον δεῖ κεκτῆσθαι τὸν μέλλοντα εὐδαίμονα εἶναι, ἐάν τε λανθάνῃ ἐάν τε μὴ πάντας θεούς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους.

Our State, being complete,

E Οὐδὲν λέγεις, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων· σὺ γὰρ ὑπέσχου ζητήσειν, ὡς οὐχ ὅσιόν σοι ὂν μὴ οὐ βοηθεῖν δικαιοσύνῃ εἰς δύναμιν παντὶ τρόπῳ.

'Αληθῆ, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὑπομιμνήσκεις, καὶ ποιητέον μέν γε οὕτω, χρὴ δὲ καὶ ὑμᾶς ξυλλαμβάνειν.

'Αλλ', ἔφη, ποιήσομεν οὕτω.

'Ελπίζω τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εὑρήσειν αὐτὸ ὧδε. οἶμαι ἡμῖν τὴν πόλιν, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς γε ᾤκισται, τελέως ἀγαθὴν εἶναι.

must have the four cardinal virtues. If three of these are known the fourth will be what remains over.

'Ανάγκη, ἔφη.

Δῆλον δὴ ὅτι σοφή τ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σώφρων καὶ δικαία.

Δῆλον.

Οὐκοῦν ὅ τι ἂν αὐτῶν εὕρωμεν ἐν αὐτῇ, τὸ ὑπόλοιπον ἔσται τὸ οὐχ εὑρημένον;

p. 428. | Τί μήν;

῞Ωσπερ τοίνυν ἄλλων τινῶν τεττάρων, εἰ ἕν τι ἐζητοῦμεν αὐτῶν ἐν ὁτῳοῦν, ὁπότε πρῶτον ἐκεῖνο ἔγνωμεν, ἱκανῶς ἂν εἶχεν ἡμῖν, εἰ δὲ τὰ τρία πρότερον ἐγνωρίσαμεν, αὐτῷ ἂν τούτῳ ἐγνώριστο τὸ

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ζητούμενον· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο ἔτι ἦν ἢ τὸ ὑπολειφθέν. p. 428.

Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τούτων, ἐπειδὴ τέτταρα ὄντα τυγχάνει, ὡσαύτως ζητητέον;

Δῆλα δή.

The place of the virtues in the State.

Καὶ μὲν δὴ πρῶτόν γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐν αὐτῷ κατάδηλον εἶναι ἡ σοφία· καί τι ἄτοπον περὶ αὐτὴν φαίνεται. B

Τί; ἦ δ᾽ ὅς.

(1) The wisdom of the statesman advises, not about particular arts and pursuits,

Σοφὴ μὲν τῷ ὄντι δοκεῖ μοι ἡ πόλις εἶναι ἣν διήλθομεν· εὔβουλος γάρ, οὐχί;

Ναί.

Καὶ μὴν τοῦτό γε αὐτό, ἡ εὐβουλία, δῆλον ὅτι ἐπιστήμη τίς ἐστιν· οὐ γάρ που ἀμαθίᾳ γε ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιστήμῃ εὖ βουλεύονται.

Δῆλον.

Πολλαὶ δέ γε καὶ παντοδαπαὶ ἐπιστῆμαι ἐν τῇ πόλει εἰσίν.

Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Ἆρ᾽ οὖν διὰ τὴν τῶν τεκτόνων ἐπιστήμην σοφὴ καὶ εὔβουλος ἡ πόλις προσρητέα; C

Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, διά γε ταύτην, ἀλλὰ τεκτονική.

Οὐκ ἄρα διὰ τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ξυλίνων σκευῶν ἐπιστήμην, βουλευομένη ὡς ἂν ἔχοι βέλτιστα, σοφὴ κλητέα πόλις.

Οὐ μέντοι.

Τί δέ; τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ χαλκοῦ ἤ τινα ἄλλην τῶν τοιούτων;

Οὐδ᾽ ἡντινοῦν, ἔφη.

Οὐδὲ τὴν ὑπὲρ τοῦ καρποῦ τῆς γενέσεως ἐκ τῆς γῆς, ἀλλὰ γεωργική.

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p. 428. Δοκεῖ μοι.

Τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἔστι τις ἐπιστήμη ἐν τῇ ἄρτι ὑφ' ἡμῶν οἰκισθείσῃ παρά τισι τῶν πολιτῶν, ᾗ οὐχ D ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει τινὸς βουλεύεται, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ἑαυτῆς ὅλης, ὅντινα τρόπον αὐτή τε πρὸς αὑτὴν καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις ἄριστα ὁμιλοῖ;

but about the whole State.

Ἔστι μέντοι.

Τίς, ἔφην ἐγώ, καὶ ἐν τίσιν;

Αὕτη, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἡ φυλακική, καὶ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς ἄρχουσιν οὓς νῦν δὴ τελέους φύλακας ὠνομάζομεν.

Διὰ ταύτην οὖν τὴν ἐπιστήμην τί τὴν πόλιν προσαγορεύεις;

Εὔβουλον, ἔφη, καὶ τῷ ὄντι σοφήν.

Πότερον οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν τῇ πόλει οἴει ἡμῖν E χαλκέας πλείους ἐνέσεσθαι ἢ τοὺς ἀληθινοὺς φύλακας τούτους;

The statesmen or guardians are the smallest of all classes in the State.

Πολύ, ἔφη, χαλκέας.

Οὐκοῦν, ἔφην, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσοι ἐπιστήμας ἔχοντες ὀνομάζονταί τινες εἶναι, πάντων τούτων οὗτοι ἂν εἶεν ὀλίγιστοι;

Πολύ γε.

Τῷ σμικροτάτῳ ἄρα ἔθνει καὶ μέρει ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῇ ἐν τούτῳ ἐπιστήμῃ, τῷ προεστῶτι καὶ ἄρχοντι, ὅλη σοφὴ ἂν εἴη κατὰ φύσιν οἰκισθεῖσα πόλις· καὶ p. 429. τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικε, φύσει ὀλίγιστον γίγνεται | γένος, ᾧ προσήκει ταύτης τῆς ἐπιστήμης μεταλαγχάνειν ἣν μόνην δεῖ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν σοφίαν καλεῖσθαι.

3. ἤ M : ᾗ ΑΠ. 5. ἑαυτῆς M : αὑτῆς ΑΠ.
6. ἄριστα ὁμιλοῖ ΑΠΜ : ἄριστ' ἂν ὁμιλοίη cj. Ast.
14. οὖν M : om. ΑΠ.
27. ἣν AM : καὶ Π (omisso ἣν).

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Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις. p. 429.

Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἓν τῶν τεττάρων οὐκ οἶδα ὅντινα τρόπον εὑρήκαμεν, αὐτό τε καὶ ὅπου τῆς πόλεως ἵδρυται.

Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ἀποχρώντως εὑρῆσθαι.

(2) The courage which makes the city courageous is to be found chiefly in the soldier.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀνδρεία γε αὐτή τε καὶ ἐν ᾧ κεῖται τῆς πόλεως, δι' ὃ τοιαύτη κλητέα ἡ πόλις, οὐ πάνυ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν.

Πῶς δή;

Τίς ἄν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰς ἄλλο τι ἀποβλέψας ἢ B δειλὴν ἢ ἀνδρείαν πόλιν εἴποι ἀλλ' ἢ εἰς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος, ὃ προπολεμεῖ τε καὶ στρατεύεται ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς;

Οὐδ' ἂν εἷς, ἔφη, εἰς ἄλλο τι.

Οὐ γάρ, οἶμαι, εἶπον, οἵ γε ἄλλοι ἐν αὐτῇ ἢ δειλοὶ ἢ ἀνδρεῖοι ὄντες κύριοι ἂν εἶεν ἢ τοίαν αὐτὴν εἶναι ἢ τοίαν.

Οὐ γάρ.

It is the quality which preserves right opinion about things to be feared and not to be feared.

Καὶ ἀνδρεία ἄρα πόλις μέρει τινὶ ἑαυτῆς ἐστί, διὰ τὸ ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἔχειν δύναμιν τοιαύτην, ἣ διὰ παντὸς σώσει τὴν περὶ τῶν δεινῶν δόξαν, ταῦτά τε αὐτὰ C εἶναι καὶ τοιαῦτα, ἅ τε καὶ οἷα ὁ νομοθέτης παρήγγειλεν ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ. ἢ οὐ τοῦτο ἀνδρείαν καλεῖς;

Οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη, ἔμαθον ὃ εἶπες, ἀλλ' αὖθις εἰπέ.

Σωτηρίαν ἔγωγ', εἶπον, λέγω τινὰ εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν.

Ποίαν δὴ σωτηρίαν;

Τὴν τῆς δόξης τῆς ὑπὸ νόμου διὰ τῆς παιδείας γεγονυίας περὶ τῶν δεινῶν ἅ τέ ἐστι καὶ οἷα. διὰ

30. γεγονυίας q : γεγονυῖαν ΑΠΜ.

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p. 429. παντὸς δὲ ἔλεγον αὐτὴν σωτηρίαν τὸ ἔν τε λύπαις
D ὄντα διασῴζεσθαι αὐτὴν καὶ ἐν ἡδοναῖς καὶ ἐν ἐπιθυ-
μίαις καὶ ἐν φόβοις καὶ μὴ ἐκβάλλειν. ᾧ δέ μοι δοκεῖ
ὅμοιον εἶναι ἐθέλω ἀπεικάσαι, εἰ βούλει.

Ἀλλὰ βούλομαι.

Illustration from the art of dyeing.

Οὐκοῦν οἶσθα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι οἱ βαφεῖς, ἐπειδὰν
βουληθῶσι βάψαι ἔρια ὥστ' εἶναι ἁλουργά, πρῶτον
μὲν ἐκλέγονται ἐκ τοσούτων χρωμάτων μίαν φύσιν
τὴν τῶν λευκῶν, ἔπειτα προπαρασκευάζουσιν οὐκ
ὀλίγῃ παρασκευῇ θεραπεύσαντες, ὅπως δέξεται ὅ τι
E μάλιστα τὸ ἄνθος, καὶ οὕτω δὴ βάπτουσι. καὶ ὃ μὲν
ἂν τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ βαφῇ, δευσοποιὸν γίγνεται τὸ
βαφέν, καὶ ἡ πλύσις οὔτ' ἄνευ ῥυμμάτων οὔτε μετὰ
ῥυμμάτων δύναται αὐτῶν τὸ ἄνθος ἀφαιρεῖσθαι·
ἃ δ' ἂν μή, οἶσθα οἷα δὴ γίγνεται, ἐάν τέ τις
ἄλλα χρώματα βάπτῃ ἐάν τε καὶ ταῦτα μὴ προθερα-
πεύσας.

Οἶδα, ἔφη, ὅτι ἔκπλυτα καὶ γελοῖα.

Τοιοῦτον τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὑπόλαβε κατὰ δύναμιν
ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ἡμᾶς, ὅτε ἐξελεγόμεθα τοὺς στρατι-
p. 430. ώτας καὶ ἐπαιδεύομεν | μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ·
μηδὲν οἴου ἄλλο μηχανᾶσθαι ἢ ὅπως ἡμῖν ὅ τι κάλ-
λιστα τοὺς νόμους πεισθέντες δέξοιντο ὥσπερ βαφήν,
ἵνα δευσοποιὸς αὐτῶν ἡ δόξα γίγνοιτο καὶ περὶ δει-
νῶν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων διὰ τὸ τήν τε φύσιν καὶ τὴν
τροφὴν ἐπιτηδείαν ἐσχηκέναι, καὶ μὴ αὐτῶν ἐκπλύναι
τὴν βαφὴν τὰ ῥύμματα ταῦτα, δεινὰ ὄντα ἐκκλύζειν,
ἥ τε ἡδονή, παντὸς χαλεστραίου δεινοτέρα οὖσα
B τοῦτο δρᾶν καὶ κονίας, λύπη τε καὶ φόβος καὶ ἐπιθυ-

Our soldiers must take the dye of the laws.

22. μηδὲν ΑΠ : καὶ μηδὲν Μ. 26. ἐκπλῦναι Α.
28. χαλεστραίου ΑΠ : χαλαστραίου Μ.

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μία, παντὸς ἄλλου ῥύμματος. τὴν δὴ τοιαύτην δύναμιν p. 430. καὶ σωτηρίαν διὰ παντὸς δόξης ὀρθῆς τε καὶ νομίμου δεινῶν πέρι καὶ μὴ ἀνδρείαν ἔγωγε καλῶ καὶ τίθεμαι, εἰ μή τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις.

Ἀλλ' οὐδέν, ἦ δ' ὅς, λέγω· δοκεῖς γάρ μοι τὴν ὀρθὴν δόξαν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων ἄνευ παιδείας γεγονυῖαν, τήν τε θηριώδη καὶ ἀνδραποδώδη, οὔτε πάνυ νόμιμον ἡγεῖσθαι, ἄλλο τέ τι ἢ ἀνδρείαν καλεῖν.

Ἀληθέστατα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις. C

Ἀποδέχομαι τοίνυν τοῦτο ἀνδρείαν εἶναι.

Καὶ γὰρ ἀποδέχου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πολιτικήν γε, καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀποδέξει· αὖθις δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ, ἐὰν βούλῃ, ἔτι κάλλιον δίιμεν. νῦν γὰρ οὐ τοῦτο ἐζητοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ δικαιοσύνην· πρὸς οὖν τὴν ἐκείνου ζήτησιν, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἱκανῶς ἔχει.

Ἀλλὰ καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Two other virtues, temperance and justice, which must be considered in their proper order.

Δύο μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔτι λοιπὰ ἃ δεῖ κατιδεῖν ἐν D τῇ πόλει, ἥ τε σωφροσύνη καὶ οὗ δὴ ἕνεκα πάντα ζητοῦμεν, δικαιοσύνη.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Πῶς οὖν ἂν τὴν δικαιοσύνην εὕροιμεν, ἵνα μηκέτι πραγματευώμεθα περὶ σωφροσύνης;

Ἐγὼ μὲν τοίνυν, ἔφη, οὔτε οἶδα οὔτ' ἂν βουλοίμην αὐτὸ πρότερον φανῆναι, εἴπερ μηκέτι ἐπισκεψόμεθα σωφροσύνην· ἀλλ' εἰ ἔμοιγε βούλει χαρίζεσθαι, σκόπει πρότερον τοῦτο ἐκείνου.

Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, βούλομαί γε, εἰ μὴ E ἀδικῶ.

Σκόπει δή, ἔφη.

3, 8. νομίμου . . νόμιμον MSS.: μονίμου . . μόνιμον Stobaei plerique.

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p. 430. Σκεπτέον, εἶπον· καὶ ὥς γε ἐντεῦθεν ἰδεῖν, ξυμφωνίᾳ τινὶ καὶ ἁρμονίᾳ προσέοικε μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ πρότερον.

Πῶς;

Κόσμος πού τις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐστὶ καὶ ἡδονῶν τινῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐγκράτεια, ὥς φασι, κρείττω δὴ αὑτοῦ λέγοντες οὐκ οἶδ' ὅντινα τρόπον, καὶ ἄλλα ἄττα τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ ἴχνη αὐτῆς λέγεται. ἦ γάρ;

Πάντων μάλιστα, ἔφη.

The temperate is master of himself, but the same person, when intemperate, is also the slave of himself.

Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν κρείττω αὑτοῦ γελοῖον; ὁ γὰρ ἑαυτοῦ κρείττων καὶ ἥττων δήπου ἂν αὑτοῦ εἴη καὶ p. 431. ὁ ἥττων κρείττων· | ὁ αὐτὸς γὰρ ἐν ἅπασι τούτοις προσαγορεύεται.

Τί δ' οὔ;

Ἀλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φαίνεταί μοι βούλεσθαι λέγειν οὗτος ὁ λόγος, ὥς τι ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ μὲν βέλτιον ἔνι, τὸ δὲ χεῖρον, καὶ ὅταν μὲν τὸ βέλτιον φύσει τοῦ χείρονος ἐγκρατὲς ᾖ, τοῦτο λέγειν τὸ κρείττω αὑτοῦ — ἐπαινεῖ γοῦν —, ὅταν δὲ ὑπὸ τροφῆς κακῆς ἤ τινος ὁμιλίας κρατηθῇ ὑπὸ πλήθους τοῦ χείρονος σμικρότερον τὸ βέλτιον ὄν, B τοῦτο δὲ ὡς ἐν ὀνείδει ψέγειν τε καὶ καλεῖν ἥττω ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἀκόλαστον τὸν οὕτω διακείμενον.

Καὶ γὰρ ἔοικεν, ἔφη.

Ἀπόβλεπε τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς τὴν νέαν ἡμῖν πόλιν, καὶ εὑρήσεις ἐν αὐτῇ τὸ ἕτερον τούτων ἐνόν· κρείττω γὰρ αὐτὴν αὑτῆς δικαίως φήσεις προσαγο-

7. λέγοντες M et (γρ.) Amg.: φαίνονται ΑΠ.
8. λέγεται ΑΠΜ : φαίνεται cj. Herm.
20. τὸ ΠΜ : τὸν A.

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ρεύεσθαι, εἴπερ οὗ τὸ ἄμεινον τοῦ χείρονος ἄρχει p. 431. σῶφρον κλητέον καὶ κρεῖττον αὑτοῦ.

Ἀλλ' ἀποβλέπω, ἔφη, καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Καὶ μὴν καὶ τάς γε πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ἡδονάς τε καὶ λύπας ἐν *παισὶ μάλιστα ἄν C τις εὕροι καὶ γυναιξὶ καὶ οἰκέταις καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων λεγομένων ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τε καὶ φαύλοις.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Τὰς δέ γε ἁπλᾶς τε καὶ μετρίας, αἳ δὴ μετὰ νοῦ τε καὶ δόξης ὀρθῆς λογισμῷ ἄγονται, ἐν ὀλίγοις τε ἐπιτεύξει καὶ τοῖς βέλτιστα μὲν φῦσι, βέλτιστα δὲ παιδευθεῖσιν.

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.

The State which has the passions and desires of the many controlled by the few may be rightly called temperate.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ταῦτα ὁρᾷς ἐνόντα σοι ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ κρατουμένας αὐτόθι τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τὰς ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τε καὶ φαύλοις ὑπό τε τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ D τῆς φρονήσεως τῆς ἐν τοῖς ἐλάττοσί τε καὶ ἐπιεικεστέροις;

Ἔγωγ', ἔφη.

Εἰ ἄρα δεῖ τινὰ πόλιν προσαγορεύειν κρείττω ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ αὐτὴν αὑτῆς, καὶ ταύτην προσρητέον.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ σώφρονα κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα;

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

Καὶ μὴν εἴπερ αὖ ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει ἡ αὐτὴ δόξα ἔνεστι τοῖς τε ἄρχουσι καὶ ἀρχομένοις περὶ τοῦ οὕστινας δεῖ ἄρχειν, καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ ἂν εἴη τοῦτο ἐνόν. E ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ;

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, σφόδρα.

1. οὗ Ξq : οὖν ΑΠΜ. 5. παισὶ cj. H. Wolf. : πᾶσι MSS.

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p. 431. Ἐν ποτέροις οὖν φήσεις τῶν πολιτῶν τὸ σωφρονεῖν ἐνεῖναι, ὅταν οὕτως ἔχωσιν; ἐν τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἀρχομένοις;

Ἐν ἀμφοτέροις που, ἔφη.

Ὁρᾷς οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ἐπιεικῶς ἐμαντευόμεθα ἄρτι ὡς ἁρμονίᾳ τινὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη ὡμοίωται;

Τί δή;

Temperance resides in the whole State.

Ὅτι οὐχ ὥσπερ ἡ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἡ σοφία ἐν μέρει p. 432. τινὶ ἑκατέρα ἐνοῦσα ἡ μὲν | σοφήν, ἡ δὲ ἀνδρείαν τὴν πόλιν παρείχετο, οὐχ οὕτω ποιεῖ αὕτη, ἀλλὰ δι' ὅλης ἀτεχνῶς τέταται διὰ πασῶν παρεχομένη ξυνᾴδοντας τούς τε ἀσθενεστάτους ταὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἰσχυροτάτους καὶ τοὺς μέσους, εἰ μὲν βούλει, φρονήσει, εἰ δὲ βούλει, ἰσχύϊ, εἰ δέ, καὶ πλήθει ἢ χρήμασιν ἢ ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν τῶν τοιούτων· ὥστε ὀρθότατ' ἂν φαῖμεν ταύτην τὴν ὁμόνοιαν σωφροσύνην εἶναι, χείρονός τε καὶ ἀμείνονος κατὰ φύσιν ξυμφωνίαν, ὁπότερον δεῖ ἄρχειν καὶ ἐν πόλει καὶ ἐν ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ.

B Πάνυ μοι, ἔφη, ξυνδοκεῖ.

Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· τὰ μὲν τρία ἡμῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει κατῶπται, ὥς γε οὑτωσὶ δόξαι· τὸ δὲ δὴ λοιπὸν εἶδος, δι' ὃ ἂν ἔτι ἀρετῆς μετέχοι πόλις, τί ποτ' ἂν εἴη; δῆλον γάρ, ὅτι τοῦτό ἐστιν ἡ δικαιοσύνη.

Δῆλον.

Justice is not far off.

Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Γλαύκων, νῦν δὴ ἡμᾶς δεῖ ὥσπερ κυνηγέτας τινὰς θάμνον κύκλῳ περιίστασθαι προσέχοντας τὸν νοῦν, μή πῃ διαφύγῃ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀφανισθεῖσα C ἄδηλος γένηται· φανερὸν γὰρ δὴ ὅτι ταύτῃ

10. παρείχετο A²ΠΜ : παρέσχετο A. 22. διὸ A.
27. θάμνον Π : θάμνων AM.

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πῃ ἔστιν· ὅρα οὖν καὶ προθυμοῦ κατιδεῖν, ἐάν πως p. 432. πρότερος ἐμοῦ ἴδῃς καὶ ἐμοὶ φράσῃς.

Εἰ γὰρ ὤφελον, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον, ἐάν μοι ἑπομένῳ χρῇ καὶ τὰ δεικνύμενα δυναμένῳ καθορᾶν, πάνυ μοι μετρίως χρήσει.

Ἕπου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εὐξάμενος μετ' ἐμοῦ.

Ποιήσω ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ μόνον, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἡγοῦ.

Καὶ μήν, εἶπον ἐγώ, δύσβατός γέ τις ὁ τόπος φαίνεται καὶ ἐπίσκιος· ἔστι γοῦν σκοτεινὸς καὶ δυσδιερεύνητος. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὅμως ἰτέον.

Ἰτέον γάρ, ἔφη. D

Καὶ ἐγὼ κατιδὼν Ἰοὺ ἰού, εἶπον, ὦ Γλαύκων· κινδυνεύομέν τι ἔχειν ἴχνος, καί μοι δοκεῖ οὐ πάνυ τι ἐκφευξεῖσθαι ἡμᾶς.

Εὖ ἀγγέλλεις, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Ἦ μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, βλακικόν γε ἡμῶν τὸ πάθος.

Τὸ ποῖον;

Justice is tumbling out at our feet.

Πάλαι, ὦ μακάριε, φαίνεται πρὸ ποδῶν ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς κυλινδεῖσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ἑωρῶμεν ἄρ' αὐτό, ἀλλ' ἦμεν καταγελαστότατοι· ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ἔχοντες ζητοῦσιν ἐνίοτε ὃ ἔχουσι, καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰς αὐτὸ E μὲν οὐκ ἀπεβλέπομεν, πόρρω δέ ποι ἀπεσκοποῦμεν, ᾗ δὴ καὶ ἐλάνθανεν ἴσως ἡμᾶς.

Πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις;

Οὕτως, εἶπον, ὡς δοκοῦμέν μοι καὶ λέγοντες αὐτὸ καὶ ἀκούοντες πάλαι οὐ μανθάνειν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ὅτι ἐλέγομεν τρόπον τινὰ αὐτό.

Μακρόν, ἔφη, τὸ προοίμιον τῷ ἐπιθυμοῦντι ἀκοῦσαι.

We had already

Ἀλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἄκουε, | εἴ τι ἄρα λέγω. ὃ γὰρ p. 433.

2. φράσῃς ΠΜ : φράσεις A. 4. πάνυ μοι AM : πάνυ Π.

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p. 433. ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐθέμεθα δεῖν ποιεῖν διὰ παντός, ὅτε τὴν πόλιν κατῳκίζομεν, τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἤτοι τούτου τι εἶδος ἡ δικαιοσύνη. ἐθέμεθα δὲ δήπου καὶ πολλάκις ἐλέγομεν, εἰ μέμνησαι, ὅτι ἕνα ἕκαστον ἓν δέοι ἐπιτηδεύειν τῶν περὶ τὴν πόλιν, εἰς ὃ αὐτοῦ ἡ φύσις ἐπιτηδειοτάτη πεφυκυῖα εἴη.

found her when we spoke of one man doing one thing only.

Ἐλέγομεν γάρ.

Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν δικαιοσύνη ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο ἄλλων τε πολλῶν ἀκηκόαμεν καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν.

B Εἰρήκαμεν γάρ.

Τοῦτο τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, κινδυνεύει τρόπον τινὰ γιγνόμενον ἡ δικαιοσύνη εἶναι, τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν. οἶσθα ὅθεν τεκμαίρομαι;

Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ λέγ', ἔφη.

Δοκεῖ μοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ ὑπόλοιπον ἐν τῇ πόλει ὧν ἐσκέμμεθα, σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ φρονήσεως, τοῦτο εἶναι, ὃ πᾶσιν ἐκείνοις τὴν δύναμιν παρέσχεν, ὥστε ἐγγενέσθαι, καὶ ἐγγενομένοις γε σωτηρίαν παρέχειν, ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐνῇ. καίτοι ἔφαμεν δικαι-C οσύνην ἔσεσθαι τὸ ὑπολειφθὲν ἐκείνων, εἰ τὰ τρία εὕροιμεν.

From another point of view Justice is the residue of the three others.

Καὶ γὰρ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ δέοι γε κρῖναι τί τὴν πόλιν ἡμῖν τούτων μάλιστα ἀγαθὴν ἀπεργάσεται ἐγγενόμενον, δύσκριτον ἂν εἴη, πότερον ἡ ὁμοδοξία τῶν ἀρχόντων τε καὶ ἀρχομένων, ἢ ἡ περὶ δεινῶν τε καὶ μή, ἅττα ἐστί, δόξης ἐννόμου σωτηρία ἐν τοῖς στρατιώταις ἐγγενομένη, ἢ ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἄρχουσι φρό-D νησίς τε καὶ φυλακὴ ἐνοῦσα, ἢ τοῦτο μάλιστα ἀγαθὴν

26. ἢ ΠΜ : om. A. 29. ἢ ἡ ἐν Μ : ἢ ἐν ΑΠ.

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αὐτὴν ποιεῖ ἐνὸν καὶ ἐν παιδὶ καὶ ἐν γυναικὶ καὶ δούλῳ καὶ ἐλευθέρῳ καὶ δημιουργῷ καὶ ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ, ὅτι τὸ αὑτοῦ ἕκαστος εἷς ὢν ἔπραττε καὶ οὐκ ἐπολυπραγμόνει. p. 433.

Δύσκριτον, ἔφη· πῶς δ' οὔ;

Ἐνάμιλλον ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, πρὸς ἀρετὴν πόλεως τῇ τε σοφίᾳ αὐτῆς καὶ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ καὶ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἡ τοῦ ἕκαστον ἐν αὐτῇ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν δύναμις.

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν δικαιοσύνην τό γε τούτοις ἐνάμιλλον ἂν εἰς ἀρετὴν πόλεως θείης; E

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

Our idea is confirmed by the administration of justice in lawsuits. No man is to have what is not his own.

Σκόπει δὴ καὶ τῇδε, εἰ οὕτω δόξει· ἆρα τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ἐν τῇ πόλει τὰς δίκας προστάξεις δικάζειν;

Τί μήν;

Ἦ ἄλλου οὑτινοσοῦν μᾶλλον ἐφιέμενοι δικάσουσιν ἢ τούτου, ὅπως ἂν ἕκαστοι μήτ' ἔχωσι τἀλλότρια μήτε τῶν αὑτῶν στέρωνται;

Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τούτου.

Ὡς δικαίου ὄντος;

Ναί.

Καὶ ταύτῃ ἄρα πῃ ἡ τοῦ οἰκείου τε καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἕξις τε καὶ πρᾶξις δικαιοσύνη ἂν | ὁμολογοῖτο. p. 434.

Ἔστι ταῦτα.

Illustration: Classes, like individuals, should not meddle with one another's occupations.

Ἰδὲ δή, ἐὰν σοί, ὅπερ ἐμοί, ξυνδοκῇ. τέκτων σκυτοτόμου ἐπιχειρῶν ἔργα ἐργάζεσθαι ἢ σκυτοτόμος τέκτονος, ἢ τὰ ὄργανα μεταλαμβάνοντες τἀλλήλων ἢ τιμάς, ἢ καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐπιχειρῶν ἀμφότερα πράττειν,

13. οὕτω ΑΠΜ : γρ. σαυτῷ Amg.
17. οὑτινοσοῦν ΞM corr. : τινὸς οὖν ΑΠΜ. 18. τούτου ΠΜ : τοῦτο A.

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p. 434 πάντα τἆλλα μεταλλαττόμενα, ἆρά σοι ἄν τι δοκεῖ μέγα βλάψαι πόλιν;

Οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη.

Ἀλλ' ὅταν γε, οἶμαι, δημιουργὸς ὢν ἤ τις ἄλλος B χρηματιστὴς φύσει, ἔπειτα ἐπαιρόμενος ἢ πλούτῳ ἢ πλήθει ἢ ἰσχύϊ ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ τοιούτῳ εἰς τὸ τοῦ πολεμικοῦ εἶδος ἐπιχειρῇ ἰέναι, ἢ τῶν πολεμικῶν τις εἰς τὸ τοῦ βουλευτικοῦ καὶ φύλακος ἀνάξιος ὤν, καὶ τὰ ἀλλήλων οὗτοι ὄργανα μεταλαμβάνωσι καὶ τὰς τιμάς, ἢ ὅταν ὁ αὐτὸς πάντα ταῦτα ἅμα ἐπιχειρῇ πράττειν, τότε οἶμαι καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖν ταύτην τὴν τούτων μεταβολὴν καὶ πολυπραγμοσύνην ὄλεθρον εἶναι τῇ πόλει.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

Ἡ τριῶν ἄρα ὄντων γενῶν πολυπραγμοσύνη καὶ C μεταβολὴ εἰς ἄλληλα μεγίστη τε βλάβη τῇ πόλει καὶ ὀρθότατ' ἂν προσαγορεύοιτο μάλιστα κακουργία.

Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

Κακουργίαν δὲ τὴν μεγίστην τῆς ἑαυτοῦ πόλεως οὐκ ἀδικίαν φήσεις εἶναι;

Πῶς δ' οὔ;

Τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα ἀδικία· πάλιν δὲ ὧδε λέγωμεν· χρηματιστικοῦ, ἐπικουρικοῦ, φυλακικοῦ γένους οἰκειοπραγία, ἑκάστου τούτων τὸ αὑτοῦ πράττοντος ἐν πόλει, τοὐναντίον ἐκείνου δικαιοσύνη τ' ἂν εἴη καὶ τὴν πόλιν δικαίαν παρέχοι.

D Οὐκ ἄλλῃ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἔχειν ἢ ταύτῃ.

Μηδέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πω πάνυ παγίως αὐτὸ λέγωμεν, ἀλλ' ἐὰν μὲν ἡμῖν καὶ εἰς ἕνα ἕκαστον τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἰὸν τὸ εἶδος τοῦτο ὁμολογῆται καὶ ἐκεῖ δικαιοσύνη

From the larger example of the State we will

2. μεγάλα q. 22. λέγομεν ΠΜ.

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now return to the individual.

εἶναι, ξυγχωρησόμεθα ἤδη· τί γὰρ καὶ ἐροῦμεν; εἰ p. 434. δὲ μή, τότε ἄλλο τι σκεψόμεθα. νῦν δ' ἐκτελέσωμεν τὴν σκέψιν ἣν ᾠήθημεν, εἰ ἐν μείζονί τινι τῶν ἐχόντων δικαιοσύνην πρότερον ἐκεῖνο ἐπιχειρήσαιμεν θεάσασθαι, ῥᾷον ἂν ἐν ἑνὶ ἀνθρώπῳ κατιδεῖν οἷόν ἐστι. καὶ ἔδοξε δὴ ἡμῖν τοῦτο εἶναι πόλις, καὶ οὕτω E ᾠκίζομεν ὡς ἐδυνάμεθα ἀρίστην, εὖ εἰδότες ὅτι ἔν γε τῇ ἀγαθῇ ἂν εἴη. ὃ οὖν ἡμῖν ἐκεῖ ἐφάνη, ἐπαναφέρωμεν εἰς τὸν ἕνα. κἂν μὲν ὁμολογῆται, καλῶς ἕξει· ἐὰν δέ τι ἄλλο ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ ἐμφαίνηται, πάλιν ἐπανιόντες ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν βασανιοῦμεν. | καὶ τάχ' ἂν παρ' p. 435. ἄλληλα σκοποῦντες καὶ τρίβοντες, ὥσπερ ἐκ πυρείων, ἐκλάμψαι ποιήσαιμεν τὴν δικαιοσύνην, καὶ φανερὰν γενομένην βεβαιωσαίμεθ' ἂν αὐτὴν παρ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς.

'Αλλ', ἔφη, καθ' ὁδόν τε λέγεις καὶ ποιεῖν χρὴ οὕτως.

Ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅ γε ταὐτὸν ἄν τις προσείποι μεῖζόν τε καὶ ἔλαττον, ἀνόμοιον τυγχάνει ὂν ταύτῃ ᾗ ταὐτὸν προσαγορεύεται, ἢ ὅμοιον;

Ὅμοιον, ἔφη.

Καὶ δίκαιος ἄρα ἀνὴρ δικαίας πόλεως κατ' αὐτὸ B τὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης εἶδος οὐδὲν διοίσει, ἀλλ' ὅμοιος ἔσται.

Ὅμοιος, ἔφη.

'Αλλὰ μέντοι πόλις γε ἔδοξεν εἶναι δικαία, ὅτε ἐν αὐτῇ τριττὰ γένη φύσεων ἐνόντα τὸ αὑτῶν ἕκαστον ἔπραττε· σώφρων δὲ αὖ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σοφὴ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων γενῶν ἄλλ' ἄττα πάθη τε καὶ ἕξεις.

4. ἐκεῖνο A: ἐκεῖ ΠΜ.
14. βεβαιωσαίμεθ' ἂν M: βεβαιωσώμεθ' ἂν AΠ: βεβαιωσόμεθ' ἂν A[2].
26. αὐτῇ ΠΜ: ἑαυτῇ A.

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p. 435. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.

Καὶ τὸν ἕνα ἄρα, ὦ φίλε, οὕτως ἀξιώσομεν, τὰ C αὐτὰ ταῦτα εἴδη ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ ψυχῇ ἔχοντα, διὰ τὰ αὐτὰ πάθη ἐκείνοις τῶν αὐτῶν ὀνομάτων ὀρθῶς ἀξιοῦσθαι τῇ πόλει.

Πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

How can we decide whether or no the soul has three distinct principles?

Εἰς φαῦλόν γε αὖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ θαυμάσιε, σκέμμα ἐμπεπτώκαμεν περὶ ψυχῆς, εἴτε ἔχει τὰ τρία εἴδη ταῦτα ἐν αὑτῇ εἴτε μή.

Οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκοῦμεν, ἔφη, εἰς φαῦλον· ἴσως γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ λεγόμενον ἀληθές, ὅτι χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά.

Our method is inadequate, and for a better and longer one we have not at present time.

Φαίνεται, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. καὶ εὖ γ' ἴσθι, ὦ Γλαύκων, D ὡς ἡ ἐμὴ δόξα, ἀκριβῶς μὲν τοῦτο ἐκ τοιούτων μεθόδων, οἵαις νῦν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις χρώμεθα, οὐ μή ποτε λάβωμεν· ἀλλὰ γὰρ μακροτέρα καὶ πλείων ὁδὸς ἡ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἄγουσα· ἴσως μέντοι τῶν γε προειρημένων τε καὶ προεσκεμμένων ἀξίως.

Οὐκοῦν ἀγαπητόν; ἔφη· ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἔν γε τῷ παρόντι ἱκανῶς ἂν ἔχοι.

Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, εἶπον, ἔμοιγε καὶ πάνυ ἐξαρκέσει.

Μὴ τοίνυν ἀποκάμῃς, ἔφη, ἀλλὰ σκόπει.

E Ἆρ' οὖν ἡμῖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ὁμολογεῖν, ὅτι γε τὰ αὐτὰ ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἔνεστιν ἡμῶν εἴδη τε καὶ ἤθη ἅπερ ἐν τῇ πόλει; οὐ γάρ που ἄλλοθεν ἐκεῖσε ἀφῖκται. γελοῖον γὰρ ἂν εἴη, εἴ τις οἰηθείη τὸ θυμοειδὲς μὴ ἐκ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐγγεγονέναι, οἳ δὴ καὶ ἔχουσι ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν, οἷον οἱ κατὰ τὴν Θρᾴκην τε καὶ Σκυθικὴν καὶ σχεδόν τι

16. ἀλλὰ ΑΠΜ : ἄλλη α Galen.
27. ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι γεγονέναι Π.

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κατὰ τὸν ἄνω τόπον, ἢ τὸ φιλομαθές, ὃ δὴ περὶ τὸν p. 435. παρ' ἡμῖν μάλιστ' ἄν τις αἰτιάσαιτο τόπον, ἢ τὸ | φιλοχρήματον, ὃ περὶ τούς τε Φοίνικας εἶναι καὶ τοὺς p. 436. κατὰ Αἴγυπτον φαίη τις ἂν οὐχ ἥκιστα.

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν γνῶναι.

Οὐ δῆτα.

A digression in which an attempt is made to attain logical clearness.

Τόδε δὲ ἤδη χαλεπόν, εἰ τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ ἕκαστα πράττομεν ἢ τρισὶν οὖσιν ἄλλο ἄλλῳ· μανθάνομεν μὲν ἑτέρῳ, θυμούμεθα δὲ ἄλλῳ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, ἐπιθυμοῦμεν δ' αὖ τρίτῳ τινὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν τροφήν τε καὶ γέννησιν ἡδονῶν καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφά, ἢ ὅλῃ τῇ B ψυχῇ καθ' ἕκαστον αὐτῶν πράττομεν, ὅταν ὁρμήσωμεν. ταῦτ' ἔσται τὰ χαλεπὰ διορίσασθαι ἀξίως λόγου.

Καὶ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἔφη.

Ὧδε τοίνυν ἐπιχειρῶμεν αὐτὰ ὁρίζεσθαι, εἴτε τὰ αὐτὰ ἀλλήλοις εἴτε ἕτερά ἐστιν.

Πῶς;

The criterion of truth: Nothing can be and not be at the same time and in the same relation.

Δῆλον ὅτι ταὐτὸν τἀναντία ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν κατὰ ταὐτόν γε καὶ πρὸς ταὐτὸν οὐκ ἐθελήσει ἅμα, ὥστ' ἐάν που εὑρίσκωμεν ἐν αὐτοῖς ταῦτα γιγνόμενα, εἰσόμεθα ὅτι οὐ ταὐτὸν ἦν ἀλλὰ πλείω. C

Εἶεν.

Σκόπει δὴ ὃ λέγω.

Λέγε, ἔφη.

Ἑστάναι, εἶπον, καὶ κινεῖσθαι τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἆρα δυνατόν;

3. ὃ Ξq : τὸ ΑΠΜ.
9. τούτῳ MSS. : τούτων q^{corr}.
11. μὲν ΑΜ : om. Π.
15. τὰ ΑΜ : om. Π.

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p. 436. Οὐδαμῶς.

Ἔτι τοίνυν ἀκριβέστερον ὁμολογησώμεθα, μή πῃ προϊόντες ἀμφισβητήσωμεν. εἰ γάρ τις λέγοι ἄνθρωπον ἑστηκότα, κινοῦντα δὲ τὰς χεῖράς τε καὶ τὴν κεφαλήν, ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς ἕστηκέ τε καὶ κινεῖται ἅμα, οὐκ ἄν, οἶμαι, ἀξιοῖμεν οὕτω λέγειν δεῖν, ἀλλ' ὅτι D τὸ μέν τι αὐτοῦ ἕστηκε, τὸ δὲ κινεῖται. οὐχ οὕτω;

Οὕτω.

Anticipation of objections to this 'law of thought.'

Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ ἔτι μᾶλλον χαριεντίζοιτο ὁ ταῦτα λέγων, κομψευόμενος ὡς οἵ γε στρόβιλοι ὅλοι ἑστᾶσί τε ἅμα καὶ κινοῦνται, ὅταν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ πήξαντες τὸ κέντρον περιφέρωνται, ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι κύκλῳ περιιὸν ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἕδρᾳ τοῦτο δρᾷ, οὐκ ἂν ἀποδεχοίμεθα, ὡς οὐ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἑαυτῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα τότε μενόντων E τε καὶ φερομένων, ἀλλὰ φαῖμεν ἂν ἔχειν αὐτὰ εὐθύ τε καὶ περιφερὲς ἐν αὐτοῖς, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸ εὐθὺ ἑστάναι, οὐδαμῇ γὰρ ἀποκλίνειν, κατὰ δὲ τὸ περιφερὲς κύκλῳ κινεῖσθαι· ὅταν δὲ τὴν εὐθυωρίαν ἢ εἰς δεξιὰν ἢ εἰς ἀριστερὰν ἢ εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἢ εἰς τὸ ὄπισθεν ἐγκλίνῃ ἅμα περιφερόμενον, τότε οὐδαμῇ ἔστιν ἑστάναι.

Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ἔφη.

Οὐδὲν ἄρα ἡμᾶς τῶν τοιούτων λεγόμενον ἐκπλήξει, οὐδὲ μᾶλλόν τι πείσει ὥς ποτέ τι ἂν τὸ αὐτὸ ὂν ἅμα p. 437. κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ τἀναντία | πάθοι ἢ καὶ [εἴη ἢ καὶ] ποιήσειεν.

Οὔκουν ἐμέ γε, ἔφη.

Ἀλλ' ὅμως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἵνα μὴ ἀναγκαζώμεθα

5. ὁ AM : om. Π. 13. ἀποδεχοίμεθα *q* : ἀποδεχώμεθα ΑΠΜ.
18. εἰς δεξιὰν Π : καὶ εἰς δεξιὰν AM.
26. εἴη ἢ καὶ ΑΠΜ : om. r.

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πάσας τὰς τοιαύτας ἀμφισβητήσεις ἐπεξιόντες καὶ p. 437. βεβαιούμενοι ὡς οὐκ ἀληθεῖς οὔσας μηκύνειν, ὑποθέμενοι ὡς τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν προΐωμεν, ὁμολογήσαντες, ἐάν ποτε ἄλλῃ φανῇ ταῦτα ἢ ταύτῃ, πάντα ἡμῖν τὰ ἀπὸ τούτου ξυμβαίνοντα λελυμένα ἔσεσθαι.

Ἀλλὰ χρή, ἔφη, ταῦτα ποιεῖν.

Likes and dislikes exist in many forms.

Ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ ἐπινεύειν τῷ ἀνανεύειν καὶ B τὸ ἐφίεσθαί τινος λαβεῖν τῷ ἀπαρνεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ προσάγεσθαι τῷ ἀπωθεῖσθαι, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἐναντίων *ἂν ἀλλήλοις θείης εἴτε ποιημάτων εἴτε παθημάτων; οὐδὲν γὰρ ταύτῃ διοίσει.

Ἀλλ', ἦ δ' ὅς, τῶν ἐναντίων.

Τί οὖν; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· διψῆν καὶ πεινῆν καὶ ὅλως τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ αὖ τὸ ἐθέλειν καὶ τὸ βούλεσθαι, οὐ πάντα ταῦτα εἰς ἐκεῖνά ποι ἂν θείης τὰ εἴδη τὰ νῦν δὴ λεχθέντα; οἷον ἀεὶ τὴν τοῦ ἐπιθυμοῦντος C ψυχὴν οὐχὶ ἤτοι ἐφίεσθαι φήσεις ἐκείνου οὗ ἂν ἐπιθυμῇ, ἢ προσάγεσθαι τοῦτο ὃ ἂν βούληταί οἱ γενέσθαι, ἢ αὖ, καθ' ὅσον ἐθέλει τί οἱ πορισθῆναι, ἐπινεύειν τοῦτο πρὸς αὑτὴν ὥσπερ τινὸς ἐρωτῶντος, ἐπορεγομένην αὐτοῦ τῆς γενέσεως;

Ἔγωγε.

Τί δέ; τὸ ἀβουλεῖν καὶ μὴ ἐθέλειν μηδ' ἐπιθυμεῖν οὐκ εἰς τὸ ἀπωθεῖν καὶ ἀπελαύνειν ἀπ' αὑτῆς καὶ εἰς ἅπαντα τἀναντία ἐκείνοις θήσομεν;

Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; D

Τούτων δὴ οὕτως ἐχόντων ἐπιθυμιῶν τι φήσομεν εἶναι εἶδος, καὶ ἐναργεστάτας αὐτῶν τούτων ἥν τε δίψαν καλοῦμεν καὶ ἣν πεῖναν;

11. ἂν hic addit Baiter.: om. MSS.

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p. 437. Φήσομεν, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν ποτοῦ, τὴν δ' ἐδωδῆς;

Ναί.

Ἆρ' οὖν, καθ' ὅσον δίψα ἐστί, πλέονος ἄν τινος ἢ οὗ λέγομεν ἐπιθυμία ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ εἴη; οἷον δίψα ἐστὶ δίψα ἆρά γε θερμοῦ ποτοῦ ἢ ψυχροῦ, ἢ πολλοῦ ἢ ὀλίγου, ἢ καὶ *ἑνὶ λόγῳ ποιοῦ τινὸς πώματος; ἢ E ἐὰν μέν τις θερμότης τῷ δίψει προσῇ, τὴν τοῦ ψυχροῦ ἐπιθυμίαν προσπαρέχοιτ' ἄν, ἐὰν δὲ ψυχρότης, τὴν τοῦ θερμοῦ; ἐὰν δὲ διὰ πλήθους παρουσίαν πολλὴ ἡ δίψα ᾖ, τὴν τοῦ πολλοῦ παρέξεται, ἐὰν δὲ ὀλίγη, τὴν τοῦ ὀλίγου; αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ διψῆν οὐ μή ποτε ἄλλου γένηται ἐπιθυμία ἢ οὗπερ πέφυκεν, αὐτοῦ πώματος, καὶ αὖ τὸ πεινῆν βρώματος;

There may be simple thirst or qualified thirst, having respectively a simple or a qualified object.

Οὕτως, ἔφη, αὐτή γε ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἑκάστη αὐτοῦ μόνον ἑκάστου οὗ πέφυκε, τοῦ δὲ τοίου ἢ τοίου τὰ προσγιγνόμενα.

p. 438. | Μήτοι τις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀσκέπτους ἡμᾶς ὄντας θορυβήσῃ, ὡς οὐδεὶς ποτοῦ ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀλλὰ χρηστοῦ ποτοῦ, καὶ οὐ σίτου ἀλλὰ χρηστοῦ σίτου. πάντες γὰρ ἄρα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν· εἰ οὖν ἡ δίψα ἐπιθυμία ἐστί, χρηστοῦ ἂν εἴη εἴτε πώματος εἴτε ἄλλου ὅτου ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμία, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι οὕτω.

Exception: The term good expresses, not a particular, but an universal relation.

Ἴσως γὰρ ἄν, ἔφη, δοκοῖ τι λέγειν ὁ ταῦτα λέγων.

Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅσα γ' ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα B οἷα εἶναί του, τὰ μὲν ποιὰ ἄττα ποιοῦ τινός ἐστιν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τὰ δ' αὐτὰ ἕκαστα αὐτοῦ ἑκάστου μόνον.

5. ἢ οὗ (sic) M: ἢ οὐ A: που Π.
7. ἑνὶ λόγῳ cj. Cornarius: ἐν ὀλίγῳ MSS.
8, 10. ψυχροῦ . . . θερμοῦ MSS.: θερμοῦ . . . ψυχροῦ cj. Herm.

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Illustration of the argument from the use of language about correlative terms.

Οὐκ ἔμαθον, ἔφη. p. 438.

Οὐκ ἔμαθες, ἔφην, ὅτι τὸ μεῖζον τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν οἷον τινὸς εἶναι μεῖζον;

Πάνυ γε.

Οὐκοῦν τοῦ ἐλάττονος;

Ναί.

Τὸ δέ γε πολὺ μεῖζον πολὺ ἐλάττονος. ἦ γάρ;

Ναί.

Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ τὸ ποτὲ μεῖζον ποτὲ ἐλάττονος, καὶ τὸ ἐσόμενον μεῖζον ἐσομένου ἐλάττονος;

Ἀλλὰ τί μήν; ἦ δ' ὅς.

Καὶ τὰ πλείω δὴ πρὸς τὰ ἐλάττω καὶ τὰ διπλάσια C πρὸς τὰ ἡμίσεα καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ αὖ βαρύτερα πρὸς κουφότερα καὶ θάττω πρὸς τὰ βραδύτερα, καὶ ἔτι γε τὰ θερμὰ πρὸς τὰ ψυχρὰ καὶ πάντα τὰ τούτοις ὅμοια ἆρ' οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Τί δὲ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας; οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος; ἐπιστήμη μὲν αὐτὴ μαθήματος αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἢ ὅτου δὴ δεῖ θεῖναι τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἐπιστήμη δέ τις καὶ ποιά τις ποιοῦ τινὸς καὶ τινός. λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· οὐκ ἐπειδὴ οἰκίας ἐργασίας ἐπιστήμη D ἐγένετο, διήνεγκε τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν, ὥστε οἰκοδομικὴ κληθῆναι;

Τί μήν;

Ἆρ' οὐ τῷ ποιά τις εἶναι, οἵα ἑτέρα οὐδεμία τῶν ἄλλων;

Ναί.

Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ ποιοῦ τινός, καὶ αὐτὴ ποιά τις ἐγένετο; καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι οὕτω τέχναι τε καὶ ἐπιστῆμαι;

22. οἰκίας M : οἰκείας ΑΠ.

p. 438. Ἔστιν οὕτω.

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Recapitulation.

Anticipation of a possible confusion.

Τοῦτο τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φάθι με τότε βούλεσθαι λέγειν, εἰ ἄρα νῦν ἔμαθες, ὅτι ὅσα ἐστὶν οἷα εἶναί του, αὐτὰ μὲν μόνα αὐτῶν μόνων ἐστί, τῶν δὲ ποιῶν E τινῶν ποιὰ ἄττα. καὶ οὔ τι λέγω, ὡς, οἵων ἂν ᾖ, τοιαῦτα καὶ ἔστιν, ὡς ἄρα καὶ τῶν ὑγιεινῶν καὶ νοσωδῶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη ὑγιεινὴ καὶ νοσώδης καὶ τῶν κακῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν κακὴ καὶ ἀγαθή· ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ οὐκ αὐτοῦ οὗπερ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἐγένετο ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλὰ ποιοῦ τινός, τοῦτο δ' ἦν ὑγιεινὸν καὶ νοσῶδες, ποιὰ δή τις συνέβη καὶ αὐτὴ γενέσθαι, καὶ τοῦτο αὐτὴν ἐποίησε μηκέτι ἐπιστήμην ἁπλῶς καλεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ποιοῦ τινὸς προσγενομένου ἰατρικήν.

Ἔμαθον, ἔφη, καί μοι δοκεῖ οὕτως ἔχειν.

p. 439. Τὸ δὲ δὴ δίψος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ | τούτων θήσεις τῶν τινὸς εἶναι τοῦτο ὅπερ ἐστίν; ἔστι δὲ δή που δίψος;

Ἔγωγε, ἦ δ' ὅς· πώματός γε.

Οὐκοῦν ποιοῦ μέν τινος πώματος ποιόν τι καὶ δίψος, δίψος δ' οὖν αὐτὸ οὔτε πολλοῦ οὔτε ὀλίγου, οὔτε ἀγαθοῦ οὔτε κακοῦ, οὐδ' ἑνὶ λόγῳ ποιοῦ τινός, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ πώματος μόνον αὐτὸ δίψος πέφυκεν;

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

Τοῦ διψῶντος ἄρα ἡ ψυχή, καθ' ὅσον διψῇ, οὐκ B ἄλλο τι βούλεται ἢ πιεῖν, καὶ τούτου ὀρέγεται καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ὁρμᾷ.

Δῆλον δή.

16, 18, 21 (bis), 23. δῖψος Aq. 17. τινὸς MSS.: οἵων τινὸς cj. Madvig. δή που MSS.: δή του cj. Morgenstern.

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Socrates, Glaucon.

The law of contradiction.

Οὐκοῦν εἴ ποτέ τι αὐτὴν ἀνθέλκει διψῶσαν, ἕτερον p. 439. ἄν τι ἐν αὐτῇ εἴη αὐτοῦ τοῦ διψῶντος καὶ ἄγοντος ὥσπερ θηρίον ἐπὶ τὸ πιεῖν; οὐ γὰρ δή, φαμέν, τό γε αὐτὸ τῷ αὐτῷ ἑαυτοῦ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα τἀναντία πράττοι.

Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

Ὥσπερ γε, οἶμαι, τοῦ τοξότου οὐ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν, ὅτι αὐτοῦ ἅμα αἱ χεῖρες τὸ τόξον ἀπωθοῦνταί τε καὶ προσέλκονται, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἄλλη μὲν ἡ ἀπωθοῦσα χείρ, ἑτέρα δὲ ἡ προσαγομένη.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. C

Πότερον δὴ φῶμέν τινας ἔστιν ὅτε διψῶντας οὐκ ἐθέλειν πιεῖν;

Καὶ μάλα γ', ἔφη, πολλοὺς καὶ πολλάκις.

Τί οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, φαίη τις ἂν τούτων πέρι; οὐκ ἐνεῖναι μὲν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτῶν τὸ κελεῦον, ἐνεῖναι δὲ τὸ κωλῦον πιεῖν, ἄλλο ὂν καὶ κρατοῦν τοῦ κελεύοντος;

Ἔμοιγε, ἔφη, δοκεῖ.

The opposition of desire and reason.

Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ τὸ μὲν κωλῦον τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐγγίγνεται, ὅταν *ἐγγίγνηται, ἐκ λογισμοῦ, τὰ δὲ ἄγοντα καὶ D ἕλκοντα διὰ παθημάτων τε καὶ νοσημάτων παραγίγνεται;

Φαίνεται.

Οὐ δὴ ἀλόγως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀξιώσομεν αὐτὰ διττά τε καὶ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων εἶναι, τὸ μὲν ᾧ λογίζεται λογιστικὸν προσαγορεύοντες τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸ δὲ ᾧ ἐρᾷ τε καὶ πεινῇ καὶ διψῇ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας

3. θηρίον Ξ: θηρίου ΑΠΜ. δή MSS.: ἂν cj. Schanz.
4. ἅμα MSS.: ἅμ' ἂν cj. L. C.
21. ἐγγίγνηται Schneider: ἐγγένηται MSS.

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p. 439. ἐπτόηται ἀλόγιστόν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν, πληρώσεών τινων καὶ ἡδονῶν ἑταῖρον.

E Οὔκ, ἀλλ' εἰκότως, ἔφη, ἡγοίμεθ' ἂν οὕτως.

Ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δύο ἡμῖν ὡρίσθω εἴδη ἐν ψυχῇ ἐνόντα. τὸ δὲ δὴ τοῦ θυμοῦ καὶ ᾧ θυμούμεθα πότερον τρίτον, ἢ τούτων ποτέρῳ ἂν εἴη ὁμοφυές;

Ἴσως, ἔφη, τῷ ἑτέρῳ, τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ.

The third principle of spirit or passion illustrated by an example.

Ἀλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ποτὲ ἀκούσας τι †πιστεύω τούτῳ, ὡς ἄρα Λεόντιος ὁ Ἀγλαΐωνος ἀνιὼν ἐκ Πειραιέως ὑπὸ τὸ βόρειον τεῖχος ἐκτός, αἰσθόμενος νεκροὺς παρὰ τῷ δημίῳ κειμένους, ἅμα μὲν ἰδεῖν ἐπιθυμοῖ, ἅμα δὲ αὖ δυσχεραίνοι καὶ ἀποτρέποι ἑαυτόν, καὶ
p. 440. τέως μάχοιτό τε καὶ | παρακαλύπτοιτο, κρατούμενος δ' οὖν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, διελκύσας τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς, προσδραμὼν πρὸς τοὺς νεκρούς, Ἰδοὺ ὑμῖν, ἔφη, ὦ κακοδαίμονες, ἐμπλήσθητε τοῦ καλοῦ θεάματος.

Ἤκουσα, ἔφη, καὶ αὐτός.

Οὗτος μέντοι, ἔφην, ὁ λόγος σημαίνει τὴν ὀργὴν πολεμεῖν ἐνίοτε ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ὡς ἄλλο ὂν ἄλλῳ.

Σημαίνει γάρ, ἔφη.

Passion never takes part with desire against reason.

Righteous indignation never felt by a

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλοθι, ἔφην, πολλαχοῦ αἰσθανόμεθα, ὅταν βιάζωνταί τινα παρὰ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐπιθυμίαι,
B λοιδοροῦντά τε αὐτὸν καὶ θυμούμενον τῷ βιαζομένῳ ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ ὥσπερ δυοῖν στασιαζόντοιν ξύμμαχον τῷ λόγῳ γιγνόμενον τὸν θυμὸν τοῦ τοιούτου; ταῖς δ' ἐπιθυμίαις αὐτὸν κοινωνήσαντα, αἱροῦντος λόγου

2. ἑταῖρον ΠΜ : ἕτερον Α.
9. τι πιστεύω MSS. : τι οὐ πιστεύω cj. anon. : ἔτι πιστεύω cj. Madvig. τούτῳ ΑΠ : τοῦτο Μ.

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person of noble character when he deservedly suffers.

μὴ δεῖν ἀντιπράττειν, οἶμαί σε οὐκ ἂν φάναι γενομένου [p. 440.] ποτὲ ἐν σαυτῷ τοῦ τοιούτου αἰσθέσθαι, οἶμαι δ' οὐδ' ἐν ἄλλῳ.

Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἔφη.

Τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ὅταν τις οἴηται ἀδικεῖν, οὐχ [C] ὅσῳ ἂν γενναιότερος ᾖ, τοσούτῳ ἧττον δύναται ὀργίζεσθαι καὶ πεινῶν καὶ ῥιγῶν καὶ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων πάσχων ὑπ' ἐκείνου ὃν ἂν οἴηται δικαίως ταῦτα δρᾶν, καί, ὃ λέγω, οὐκ ἐθέλει πρὸς τοῦτον αὐτοῦ ἐγείρεσθαι ὁ θυμός;

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.

Τί δέ; ὅταν ἀδικεῖσθαί τις ἡγῆται, οὐκ ἐν τούτῳ ζεῖ τε καὶ χαλεπαίνει καὶ ξυμμαχεῖ τῷ δοκοῦντι δικαίῳ καὶ διὰ *τοῦ πεινῆν καὶ διὰ *τοῦ ῥιγοῦν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα πάσχειν ὑπομένων καὶ νικᾷ καὶ οὐ λήγει [D] τῶν γενναίων, πρὶν ἂν ἢ διαπράξηται ἢ τελευτήσῃ ἢ ὥσπερ κύων ὑπὸ νομέως ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ παρ' αὑτῷ ἀνακληθεὶς πραϋνθῇ;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἔοικε τούτῳ ᾧ λέγεις· καίτοι γ' ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πόλει τοὺς ἐπικούρους ὥσπερ κύνας ἐθέμεθα ὑπηκόους τῶν ἀρχόντων ὥσπερ ποιμένων πόλεως.

Καλῶς γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, νοεῖς ὃ βούλομαι λέγειν. ἀλλ' *ἦ πρὸς τούτῳ καὶ τόδε ἐνθυμεῖ;

Τὸ ποῖον; [E]

Ὅτι τοὐναντίον ἢ ἀρτίως ἡμῖν φαίνεται περὶ τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς. τότε μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμητικόν τι αὐτὸ φό-

2. ἐν σαυτῷ M : ἐν σαυτῷ A (with ε written above) : ἐν ἑαυτῷ Π.
13. ζεῖ Ξ : ζητεῖ ΑΠΜ.
14. διὰ τοῦ (bis) cj. L. C. : διὰ τὸ MSS. : δι' αὐτὸ cj. Madvig.
15. καὶ νικᾷ καὶ MSS. : κἂν νικᾶται cj. Madvig.
24. ἦ cj. Ast. : εἰ MSS. 27. αὐτὸ M : αὐτῷ ΑΠ.

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p. 440 μεθα εἶναι, νῦν δὲ πολλοῦ δεῖν φαμέν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς στάσει τίθεσθαι τὰ ὅπλα πρὸς τοῦ λογιστικοῦ.

Παντάπασιν, ἔφη.

Not two, but three principles in the soul, as in the State.

Ἆρ' οὖν ἕτερον ὂν καὶ τούτου, ἢ λογιστικοῦ τι εἶδος, ὥστε μὴ τρία ἀλλὰ δύο εἴδη εἶναι ἐν ψυχῇ, λογιστικὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν; ἢ καθάπερ ἐν τῇ πόλει p. 441. ξυνεῖχεν αὐτὴν τρία ὄντα γένη, | χρηματιστικόν, ἐπικουρικόν, βουλευτικόν, οὕτω καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ τρίτον τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ θυμοειδές, ἐπίκουρον ὂν τῷ λογιστικῷ φύσει, ἐὰν μὴ ὑπὸ κακῆς τροφῆς διαφθαρῇ;

Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, τρίτον.

Ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἄν γε τοῦ λογιστικοῦ ἄλλο τι φανῇ, ὥσπερ τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ ἐφάνη ἕτερον ὄν.

Ἀλλ' οὐ χαλεπόν, ἔφη, φανῆναι. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς παιδίοις τοῦτό γ' ἄν τις ἴδοι, ὅτι θυμοῦ μὲν εὐθὺς γενόμενα μεστά ἐστι, λογισμοῦ δ' ἔνιοι μὲν B ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν οὐδέποτε μεταλαμβάνειν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ὀψέ ποτε.

Appeal to Homer.

Ναὶ μὰ Δί', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καλῶς γε εἶπες. ἔτι δὲ ἐν τοῖς θηρίοις ἄν τις ἴδοι ὃ λέγεις, ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ ὃ ἄνω που ἐκεῖ εἴπομεν, τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου μαρτυρήσει, τὸ

στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ·

ἐνταῦθα γὰρ δὴ σαφῶς ὡς ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ ἐπιπλῆττον C πεποίηκεν Ὅμηρος τὸ ἀναλογισάμενον περὶ τοῦ βελτίονός τε καὶ χείρονος τῷ ἀλογίστως θυμουμένῳ.

3. τοῦ λογιστικοῦ Ξ: τὸ λογιστικὸν ΑΠΜ.
5. τούτου Ξ: τοῦτο ΑΠΜ. τι ΠΜ: om. Α.
9. ἐπικουρικὸν Π: ἐπικουρητικὸν ΑΜ.

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The conclusion that the same three principles exist both in the State and in the individual applied to each of them.

Κομιδῇ, ἔφη, ὀρθῶς λέγεις. p. 441.

Ταῦτα μὲν ἄρα, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, μόγις διανενεύκαμεν, καὶ ἡμῖν ἐπιεικῶς ὁμολογεῖται τὰ αὐτὰ μὲν ἐν πόλει, τὰ αὐτὰ δ᾽ ἐν ἑνὸς ἑκάστου τῇ ψυχῇ γένη ἐνεῖναι καὶ ἴσα τὸν ἀριθμόν.

Ἔστι ταῦτα.

Οὐκοῦν ἐκεῖνό γε ἤδη ἀναγκαῖον, ὡς πόλις ἦν σοφὴ καὶ ᾧ, οὕτω καὶ τὸν ἰδιώτην καὶ τούτῳ σοφὸν εἶναι;

Τί μήν;

Καὶ ᾧ δὴ ἀνδρεῖος ἰδιώτης καὶ ὥς, τούτῳ καὶ πόλιν D ἀνδρείαν καὶ οὕτως, καὶ τἄλλα πάντα πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὡσαύτως ἀμφότερα ἔχειν.

Ἀνάγκη.

Καὶ δίκαιον δή, ὦ Γλαύκων, οἶμαι, φήσομεν ἄνδρα εἶναι τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ ᾧπερ καὶ πόλις ἦν δικαία.

Καὶ τοῦτο πᾶσα ἀνάγκη.

Ἀλλ᾽ οὔ πῃ μὴν τοῦτο ἐπιλελήσμεθα, ὅτι ἐκείνη γε τῷ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστον ἐν αὐτῇ πράττειν τριῶν ὄντων γενῶν δικαία ἦν.

Οὔ μοι δοκοῦμεν, ἔφη, ἐπιλελῆσθαι.

Μνημονευτέον ἄρα ἡμῖν, ὅτι καὶ ἡμῶν ἕκαστος, ὅτου ἂν τὰ αὑτοῦ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ πράττῃ, οὗτος E δίκαιός τε ἔσται καὶ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττων.

Καὶ μάλα, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, μνημονευτέον.

Οὐκοῦν τῷ μὲν λογιστικῷ ἄρχειν προσήκει, σοφῷ ὄντι καὶ ἔχοντι τὴν ὑπὲρ ἁπάσης τῆς ψυχῆς προμήθειαν, τῷ δὲ θυμοειδεῖ ὑπηκόῳ εἶναι καὶ ξυμμάχῳ τούτου;

4. ἑνὸς ἑκάστου M: ἑνὶ ἑκάστου AΠ. τῇ AM: om. Π. γένη Ξ: γένει AMΠpr. 12. ἀνδρείαν Ξ: καὶ ἀνδρείαν AΠM.

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p. 441. Πάνυ γε.

Ἀρ' οὖν οὐχ, ὥσπερ ἐλέγομεν, μουσικῆς καὶ γυμναστικῆς κρᾶσις ξύμφωνα αὐτὰ ποιήσει, τὸ μὲν
p. 442. ἐπιτείνουσα καὶ τρέφουσα λόγοις | τε καλοῖς καὶ μαθήμασι, τὸ δὲ ἀνιεῖσα παραμυθουμένη, ἡμεροῦσα ἁρμονίᾳ τε καὶ ῥυθμῷ;

Music and gymnastic will harmonize passion and reason. These two combined will control desire,

Κομιδῇ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Καὶ τούτω δὴ οὕτω τραφέντε καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τὰ αὑτῶν μαθόντε καὶ παιδευθέντε *προστατήσετον τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ, ὃ δὴ πλεῖστον τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἐστὶ καὶ χρημάτων φύσει ἀπληστότατον· ὃ τηρήσετον μὴ τῷ πίμπλασθαι τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα καλουμένων ἡδονῶν πολὺ καὶ ἰσχυρὸν γενόμενον οὐκ αὖ
B τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττῃ, ἀλλὰ καταδουλώσασθαι καὶ ἄρχειν ἐπιχειρήσῃ ὧν οὐ προσῆκον αὐτῷ γένει, καὶ ξύμπαντα τὸν βίον πάντων ἀνατρέψῃ.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Ἀρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τοὺς ἔξωθεν πολεμίους τούτω ἂν κάλλιστα φυλαττοίτην ὑπὲρ ἁπάσης τῆς ψυχῆς τε καὶ τοῦ σώματος, τὸ μὲν βουλευόμενον, τὸ δὲ προπολεμοῦν, ἑπόμενον δὲ τῷ ἄρχοντι καὶ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἐπιτελοῦν τὰ βουλευθέντα;

and will be the best defenders both of body and soul.

Ἔστι ταῦτα.

Καὶ ἀνδρεῖον δή, οἶμαι, τούτῳ τῷ μέρει καλοῦμεν
C ἕνα ἕκαστον, ὅταν αὐτοῦ τὸ θυμοειδὲς διασῴζῃ διά τε λυπῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου παραγγελθὲν δεινόν τε καὶ μή.

The courageous.

Ὀρθῶς, γ', ἔφη.

9. *προστατήσετον* cj. Bekker: *προστήσετον* ΑΠ: *προσθήσετον* M.
11. ὃ Ξ: ὧ Π: ᾧ A: ὢ M.
19. *φυλαττοίτην* q: *φυλάττοι τὴν* ΑΠΜ.
26. *τοῦ λόγου* Ξ: *τῶν λόγων* ΑΠΜ.

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The wise.

Σοφὸν δέ γε ἐκείνῳ τῷ σμικρῷ μέρει, τῷ ὃ ἦρχέ p. 442. τ' ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ταῦτα παρήγγελλεν, ἔχον αὖ κἀκεῖνο ἐπιστήμην ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ ξυμφέροντος ἑκάστῳ τε καὶ ὅλῳ τῷ κοινῷ σφῶν αὐτῶν τριῶν ὄντων.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

The temperate.

Τί δέ; σώφρονα οὐ τῇ φιλίᾳ καὶ ξυμφωνίᾳ τῇ αὐτῶν τούτων, ὅταν τό τε ἄρχον καὶ τὼ ἀρχομένω D τὸ λογιστικὸν ὁμοδοξῶσι δεῖν ἄρχειν καὶ μὴ στασιάζωσιν αὐτῷ;

Σωφροσύνη γοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἢ τοῦτο, πόλεώς τε καὶ ἰδιώτου.

The just.

Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ δίκαιός γε, ᾧ πολλάκις λέγομεν, τούτῳ καὶ οὕτως ἔσται.

Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη.

Τί οὖν; εἶπον ἐγώ· μή πῃ ἡμῖν ἀπαμβλύνεται ἄλλο τι δικαιοσύνη δοκεῖν εἶναι ἢ ὅπερ ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐφάνη;

Οὐκ ἔμοιγε, ἔφη, δοκεῖ.

Ὧδε γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, παντάπασιν ἂν βεβαιωσαί- E μεθα εἴ τι ἡμῶν ἔτι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀμφισβητεῖ, τὰ φορτικὰ αὐτῷ προσφέροντες.

Ποῖα δή;

The nature of justice illustrated by commonplace instances.

Οἷον εἰ δέοι ἡμᾶς ἀνομολογεῖσθαι περί τε ἐκείνης τῆς πόλεως καὶ τοῦ ἐκείνῃ ὁμοίως πεφυκότος τε καὶ τεθραμμένου ἀνδρός, εἰ δοκεῖ ἂν παρακαταθήκην χρυσίου ἢ ἀργυρίου δεξάμενος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀποστερῆσαι, τίν' ἂν οἴει οἰηθῆναι τοῦτο αὐτὸν | δρᾶσαι μᾶλ- p. 443. λον ἢ ὅσοι μὴ τοιοῦτοι;

Οὐδέν' ἄν, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἱεροσυλιῶν καὶ κλοπῶν καὶ προ-

1. δέ γε A²ΠΜ : δ' Apr. 27. τοῦτο Ξ : τοῦτον ΑΠΜ.

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p. 443. δοσιῶν, ἢ ἰδίᾳ ἑταίρων ἢ δημοσίᾳ πόλεων, ἐκτὸς ἂν οὗτος εἴη;

Ἐκτός.

Καὶ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ὁπωστιοῦν ἄπιστος ἢ κατὰ ὅρκους ἢ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ὁμολογίας.

Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

Μοιχεῖαι μὴν καὶ γονέων ἀμέλειαι καὶ θεῶν ἀθεραπευσίαι παντὶ ἄλλῳ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ τοιούτῳ προσήκουσιν.

Παντὶ μέντοι, ἔφη.

B Οὐκοῦν τούτων πάντων αἴτιον, ὅτι αὐτοῦ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἕκαστον τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττει ἀρχῆς τε πέρι καὶ τοῦ ἄρχεσθαι;

Τοῦτο μὲν οὖν, καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο.

Ἔτι τι οὖν ἕτερον ζητεῖς δικαιοσύνην εἶναι ἢ ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν, ἣ τοὺς τοιούτους ἄνδρας τε παρέχεται καὶ πόλεις;

Μὰ Δία, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, οὐκ ἔγωγε.

We have realized the hope entertained in the first construction of the State.

Τέλεον ἄρα ἡμῖν τὸ ἐνύπνιον ἀποτετέλεσται, ὃ ἔφαμεν ὑποπτεῦσαι, ὡς εὐθὺς ἀρχόμενοι τῆς πόλεως
C οἰκίζειν κατὰ θεόν τινα εἰς ἀρχήν τε καὶ τύπον τινὰ τῆς δικαιοσύνης κινδυνεύομεν ἐμβεβηκέναι.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

Τὸ δέ γε ἦν ἄρα, ὦ Γλαύκων, δι᾽ ὃ καὶ ὠφελεῖ, εἴδωλόν τι τῆς δικαιοσύνης, τὸ τὸν μὲν σκυτοτομικὸν φύσει ὀρθῶς ἔχειν σκυτοτομεῖν καὶ ἄλλο μηδὲν πράττειν, τὸν δὲ τεκτονικὸν τεκταίνεσθαι, καὶ τἆλλα δὴ οὕτως.

1. ἂν A²ΠΜ : ὢν A.
4. ἢ Μ : ᾗ AΠ. 7. μὴν ΠΜ : μὲν A.
14. ἄλλο. Ἔτι τι Herm.: ἄλλο ἔτι· τί MSS.
19. τέλεον ΠMcorr. : τελευταῖον AMpr.

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Socrates, Glaucon.

The three principles harmonize in one.

The harmony of human life.

Φαίνεται. p. 443.

Τὸ δέ γε ἀληθές, τοιοῦτο μέν τι ἦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ τὴν ἔξω πρᾶξιν τῶν αὑτοῦ, D ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν ἐντὸς ὡς ἀληθῶς περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, μὴ ἐάσαντα τἀλλότρια πράττειν ἕκαστον ἐν αὑτῷ μηδὲ πολυπραγμονεῖν πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γένη, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι τὰ οἰκεῖα εὖ θέμενον καὶ ἄρξαντα αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ καὶ κοσμήσαντα καὶ φίλον γενόμενον ἑαυτῷ καὶ ξυναρμόσαντα τρία ὄντα, ὥσπερ ὅρους τρεῖς ἁρμονίας ἀτεχνῶς, νεάτης τε καὶ ὑπάτης καὶ μέσης, καὶ εἰ ἄλλα ἄττα μεταξὺ τυγχάνει ὄντα, E πάντα ταῦτα ξυνδήσαντα καὶ παντάπασιν ἕνα γενόμενον ἐκ πολλῶν, σώφρονα καὶ ἡρμοσμένον, οὕτω δὴ πράττειν ἤδη, ἐάν τι πράττῃ ἢ περὶ χρημάτων κτῆσιν ἢ περὶ σώματος θεραπείαν ἢ καὶ πολιτικόν τι ἢ περὶ τὰ ἴδια ξυμβόλαια, ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ἡγούμενον καὶ ὀνομάζοντα δικαίαν μὲν καὶ καλὴν πρᾶξιν ἣ ἂν ταύτην τὴν ἕξιν σώζῃ τε καὶ ξυναπεργάζηται, σοφίαν δὲ τὴν ἐπιστατοῦσαν ταύτῃ τῇ πράξει ἐπιστήμην, ἄδικον δὲ πρᾶξιν | ἣ ἂν ἀεὶ ταύτην λύῃ, p. 444. ἀμαθίαν δὲ τὴν ταύτῃ αὖ ἐπιστατοῦσαν δόξαν.

Παντάπασιν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· τὸν μὲν δίκαιον καὶ ἄνδρα καὶ πόλιν καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ὃ τυγχάνει ἐν αὐτοῖς ὄν, εἰ φαῖμεν εὑρηκέναι, οὐκ ἂν πάνυ τι, οἶμαι, δόξαιμεν ψεύδεσθαι.

Μὰ Δία οὐ μέντοι, ἔφη.

4. περὶ ἑαυτὸν ΠΜ : περὶ ἑαυτῶν A. 8, 9. αὑτὸν . . . ἑαυτῷ ΠΜ : om. A.

11. καὶ εἰ Π : εἰ καὶ A : εἰ$^{\beta}$ καὶ$^{\alpha}$ M.

16. ἢ περὶ τὰ ἴδια ΠΜ : ἢ καὶ περὶ τὰ ἴδια A.

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p. 444. Φῶμεν ἄρα;

Φῶμεν.

Ἔστω δή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· μετὰ γὰρ τοῦτο σκεπτέον, οἶμαι, ἀδικίαν.

Δῆλον.

Injustice the opposite of justice.

B Οὐκοῦν στάσιν τινὰ αὖ τριῶν ὄντων τούτων δεῖ αὐτὴν εἶναι καὶ πολυπραγμοσύνην καὶ ἀλλοτριοπραγμοσύνην καὶ ἐπανάστασιν μέρους τινὸς τῷ ὅλῳ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἵν' ἄρχῃ ἐν αὐτῇ οὐ προσῆκον, ἀλλὰ τοιούτου ὄντος φύσει οἵου πρέπειν αὐτῷ δουλεύειν τῷ τοῦ ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὄντι; τοιαῦτ' ἄττα, οἶμαι, φήσομεν καὶ τὴν τούτων ταραχὴν καὶ πλάνην εἶναι τήν τε ἀδικίαν καὶ ἀκολασίαν καὶ δειλίαν καὶ ἀμαθίαν καὶ ξυλλήβδην πᾶσαν κακίαν.

C Ταὐτὰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τὸ ἄδικα πράττειν καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν καὶ αὖ τὸ δίκαια ποιεῖν, ταῦτα πάντα τυγχάνει ὄντα κατάδηλα ἤδη σαφῶς, εἴπερ καὶ ἡ ἀδικία τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη;

Πῶς δή;

Ὅτι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τυγχάνει οὐδὲν διαφέροντα τῶν ὑγιεινῶν τε καὶ νοσωδῶν, ὡς ἐκεῖνα ἐν σώματι, ταῦτα ἐν ψυχῇ.

Πῇ; ἔφη.

Τὰ μέν που ὑγιεινὰ ὑγίειαν ἐμποιεῖ, τὰ δὲ νοσώδη νόσον.

Ναί.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ μὲν δίκαια πράττειν δικαιοσύνην D ἐμποιεῖ, τὸ δ' ἄδικα ἀδικίαν;

5. δῆλον ΑΜ: δῆλον ὅτι Π. 10. τῷ τοῦ Ξ: τοῦ δ' αὖ δουλεύειν ΑΠΜ. 15. αὐτὰ μὲν Stob. 17. τὸ δίκαια q: τὰ δίκαια ΑΠΜ.

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Ἀνάγκη. p. 444.

Ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν ὑγίειαν ποιεῖν τὰ ἐν τῷ σώματι κατὰ φύσιν καθιστάναι κρατεῖν τε καὶ κρατεῖσθαι ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, τὸ δὲ νόσον παρὰ φύσιν ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἄλλο ὑπ' ἄλλου.

Ἔστι γάρ.

Analogy of body and mind.

Οὐκοῦν αὖ, ἔφην, τὸ δικαιοσύνην ἐμποιεῖν τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ κατὰ φύσιν καθιστάναι κρατεῖν τε καὶ κρατεῖσθαι ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, τὸ δὲ ἀδικίαν παρὰ φύσιν ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἄλλο ὑπ' ἄλλου;

Κομιδῇ, ἔφη.

Health : disease : : justice : injustice.

Ἀρετὴ μὲν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὑγίειά τέ τις ἂν εἴη καὶ κάλλος καὶ εὐεξία ψυχῆς, κακία δὲ νόσος τε καὶ αἶ- E σχος καὶ ἀσθένεια.

Ἔστιν οὕτω.

Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα εἰς ἀρετῆς κτῆσιν φέρει, τὰ δ' αἰσχρὰ εἰς κακίας;

Ἀνάγκη.

The old question, whether the just or the unjust is the happier, has become ridiculous.

Τὸ δὴ λοιπὸν ἤδη, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡμῖν ἐστὶ σκέψασθαι, πότερον αὖ λυσιτελεῖ δίκαιά τε πράττειν καὶ | καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ εἶναι δίκαιον, ἐάν τε λανθάνῃ p. 445 ἐάν τε μὴ τοιοῦτος ὤν, ἢ ἀδικεῖν τε καὶ ἄδικον εἶναι, ἐάνπερ μὴ διδῷ δίκην μηδὲ βελτίων γίγνηται κολαζόμενος.

Ἀλλ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, γελοῖον ἔμοιγε φαίνεται τὸ σκέμμα γίγνεσθαι ἤδη, εἰ τοῦ μὲν σώματος τῆς φύσεως διαφθειρομένης δοκεῖ οὐ βιωτὸν εἶναι οὐδὲ μετὰ πάντων σιτίων τε καὶ ποτῶν καὶ παντὸς πλούτου καὶ πάσης ἀρχῆς, τῆς δὲ αὐτοῦ τούτου ᾧ ζῶμεν φύσεως ταραττομένης καὶ διαφθειρομένης βιωτὸν B ἄρα ἔσται, ἐάνπερ τις ποιῇ ὃ ἂν βουληθῇ ἄλλο πλὴν

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p. 445. τοῦτο ὁπόθεν κακίας μὲν καὶ ἀδικίας ἀπαλλαγήσεται, δικαιοσύνην δὲ καὶ ἀρετὴν κτήσεται, ἐπειδήπερ ἐφάνη γε ὄντα ἑκάτερα οἷα ἡμεῖς διεληλύθαμεν.

Γελοῖον γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐπείπερ ἐνταῦθα ἐληλύθαμεν, ὅσον οἷόν τε σαφέστατα κατιδεῖν ὅτι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, οὐ χρὴ ἀποκάμνειν.

Ἥκιστα, νὴ τὸν Δία, ἔφη, πάντων *ἀποκμητέον.

C Δεῦρο νῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἵνα καὶ ἴδῃς ὅσα καὶ εἴδη ἔχει ἡ κακία, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἅ γε δὴ καὶ ἄξια θέας.

Ἕπομαι, ἔφη· μόνον λέγε.

Καὶ μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὥσπερ ἀπὸ σκοπιᾶς μοι φαίνεται, ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα ἀναβεβήκαμεν τοῦ λόγου, ἓν μὲν εἶναι εἶδος τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἄπειρα δὲ τῆς κακίας, τέτταρα δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς ἄττα ὧν καὶ ἄξιον ἐπιμνησθῆναι.

Πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη.

As many forms of the soul as of the State.

Ὅσοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πολιτειῶν τρόποι εἰσὶν εἴδη ἔχοντες, τοσοῦτοι κινδυνεύουσι καὶ ψυχῆς τρόποι εἶναι.

D Πόσοι δή;

Πέντε μέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πολιτειῶν, πέντε δὲ ψυχῆς.

Λέγε, ἔφη, τίνες.

Λέγω, εἶπον, ὅτι εἷς μὲν οὗτος ὃν ἡμεῖς διεληλύθαμεν πολιτείας εἴη ἂν τρόπος, ἐπονομασθείη δ' ἂν καὶ διχῇ· ἐγγενομένου μὲν γὰρ ἀνδρὸς ἑνὸς ἐν τοῖς ἄρχουσι διαφέροντος βασιλεία ἂν κληθείη, πλειόνων δὲ ἀριστοκρατία.

7. ἀποκμητέον cj. Bekker: ἀποκνητέον MSS.
8. ὅσα καὶ εἴδη ΑΠ: ὅσα εἴδη Μ.

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη. p. 445.

Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἓν εἶδος λέγω· οὔτε γὰρ ἂν πλείους οὔτε εἷς ἐγγενόμενος κινήσειεν ἂν E τῶν ἀξίων λόγου νόμων τῆς πόλεως, τροφῇ τε καὶ παιδείᾳ χρησάμενος ᾗ διήλθομεν.

Οὐ γὰρ εἰκός, ἔφη.

3. ἐγγενόμενος Ξ: ἐγγενόμενοι ΑΠΜ.

E.

p. 449. Ἀγαθὴν μὲν τοίνυν τὴν τοιαύτην πόλιν τε καὶ
πολιτείαν καὶ ὀρθὴν καλῶ, καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τοιοῦτον,
κακὰς δὲ τὰς ἄλλας καὶ ἡμαρτημένας, εἴπερ αὕτη
ὀρθή, περί τε πόλεων διοικήσεις καὶ περὶ ἰδιωτῶν
ψυχῆς τρόπου κατασκευήν, ἐν τέτταρσι πονηρίας
εἴδεσιν οὔσας.

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Socrates, Glaucon, Polemarchus, Adeimantus.

Ποίας δὴ ταύτας; ἔφη.

Καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν ᾖα τὰς ἐφεξῆς ἐρῶν, ὥς μοι ἐφαί-
B νοντο ἕκασται ἐξ ἀλλήλων μεταβαίνειν· ὁ δὲ Πολέ-
μαρχος — σμικρὸν γὰρ ἀπωτέρω τοῦ Ἀδειμάντου
καθῆστο — ἐκτείνας τὴν χεῖρα καὶ λαβόμενος τοῦ
ἱματίου ἄνωθεν αὐτοῦ παρὰ τὸν ὦμον, ἐκεῖνόν τε
προσηγάγετο καὶ προτείνας ἑαυτὸν ἔλεγεν ἄττα
προσκεκυφώς, ὧν ἄλλο μὲν οὐδὲν κατηκούσαμεν,
τόδε δέ· Ἀφήσομεν οὖν, ἔφη, ἢ τί δράσομεν;

The community of women and children.

Ἥκιστά γε, ἔφη ὁ Ἀδείμαντος μέγα ἤδη λέγων.

Καὶ ἐγώ, Τί μάλιστα, ἔφην, ὑμεῖς οὐκ ἀφίετε;

Σέ, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς.

C Ἔτι ἐγὼ εἶπον, τί μάλιστα;

Ἀπορρᾳθυμεῖν ἡμῖν δοκεῖς, ἔφη, καὶ εἶδος ὅλον

The saying 'Friends

20. ἔτι ΑΠ : ἔτι Μ : ὅτι Ξq.

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οὐ τὸ ἐλάχιστον ἐκκλέπτειν τοῦ λόγου, ἵνα μὴ διέλ- p. 449. θῃς, καὶ λήσειν οἰηθῆναι εἰπὼν αὐτὸ φαύλως, ὡς ἄρα περὶ γυναικῶν τε καὶ παίδων παντὶ δῆλον, ὅτι κοινὰ τὰ φίλων ἔσται.

Οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς, ἔφην, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε;

'Have all things in common' is an insufficient solution of the problem.

Ναί, ἦ δ' ὅς. ἀλλὰ τὸ ὀρθῶς τοῦτο, ὥσπερ τἆλλα, λόγου δεῖται, τίς ὁ τρόπος τῆς κοινωνίας· πολλοὶ γὰρ ἂν γένοιντο. μὴ οὖν παρῇς ὅντινα σὺ λέγεις· ὡς ἡμεῖς πάλαι περιμένομεν οἰόμενοί σέ που D μνησθήσεσθαι παιδοποιίας τε πέρι, πῶς παιδοποιήσονται, καὶ γενομένους πῶς θρέψουσι, καὶ ὅλην ταύτην ἣν λέγεις κοινωνίαν γυναικῶν τε καὶ παίδων· μέγα γάρ τι οἰόμεθα φέρειν καὶ ὅλον εἰς πολιτείαν ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ ὀρθῶς γιγνόμενον. νῦν οὖν ἐπειδὴ ἄλλης ἐπιλαμβάνει πολιτείας πρὶν ταῦτα ἱκανῶς διελέσθαι, δέδοκται ἡμῖν τοῦτο, ὃ σὺ ἤκουσας, τὸ σὲ | μὴ μεθιέναι, πρὶν ἂν ταῦτα πάντα ὥσπερ τἆλλα p. 450. διέλθῃς.

Καὶ ἐμὲ τοίνυν, ὁ Γλαύκων ἔφη, κοινωνὸν τῆς ψήφου ταύτης τίθετε.

Ἀμέλει, ἔφη ὁ Θρασύμαχος, πᾶσι ταῦτα δεδογμένα ἡμῖν νόμιζε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

The feigned surprise of Socrates.

Οἷον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰργάσασθε ἐπιλαβόμενοί μου! ὅσον λόγον πάλιν, ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, κινεῖτε περὶ τῆς πολιτείας! ἣν ὡς ἤδη διεληλυθὼς ἔγωγε ἔχαιρον, ἀγαπῶν εἴ τις ἐάσοι ταῦτα ἀποδεξάμενος ὡς τότε ἐρρήθη. ἃ νῦν ὑμεῖς παρακαλοῦντες οὐκ ἴστε ὅσον B ἑσμὸν λόγων ἐπεγείρετε· ὃν ὁρῶν ἐγὼ παρῆκα τότε, μὴ παράσχοι πολὺν ὄχλον.

17. πάντα ὥσπερ AM : ὥσπερ πάντα Π.
21. ταῦτα ΠΜ : ταυτὰ A.

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SOCRATES, THRASYMACHUS, GLAUCON.

p. 450. Τί δέ; ἦ δ' ὃς ὁ Θρασύμαχος· χρυσοχοήσοντας οἴει τούσδε νῦν ἐνθάδε ἀφῖχθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ λόγων ἀκουσομένους;

Ναί, εἶπον, μετρίων γε.

The good humour of Thrasymachus.

Μέτρον δέ γ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Γλαύκων, τοιούτων λόγων ἀκούειν ὅλος ὁ βίος νοῦν ἔχουσιν. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἡμέτερον ἔα· σὺ δὲ περὶ ὧν ἐρωτῶμεν μηδα- C μῶς ἀποκάμῃς ᾗ σοι δοκεῖ διεξιών, τίς ἡ κοινωνία τοῖς φύλαξιν ἡμῖν παίδων τε πέρι καὶ γυναικῶν ἔσται καὶ τροφῆς νέων ἔτι ὄντων τῆς ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ χρόνῳ γιγνομένης γενέσεώς τε καὶ παιδείας, ἣ δὴ ἐπιπονωτάτη δοκεῖ εἶναι. πειρῶ *δὴ εἰπεῖν τίνα τρόπον δεῖ γίγνεσθαι αὐτήν.

Οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ὦ εὔδαιμον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διελθεῖν· πολλὰς γὰρ ἀπιστίας ἔχει ἔτι μᾶλλον τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ὧν διήλθομεν. καὶ γὰρ ὡς δυνατὰ λέγεται, ἀπιστοῖτ' ἄν, καὶ εἰ ὅ τι μάλιστα γένοιτο, ὡς ἄριστ' ἂν εἴη D ταῦτα, καὶ ταύτῃ ἀπιστήσεται. διὸ δὴ καὶ ὄκνος τις αὐτῶν ἅπτεσθαι, μὴ εὐχὴ δοκῇ εἶναι ὁ λόγος, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε.

Μηδέν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὄκνει· οὔτε γὰρ ἀγνώμονες οὔτε ἄπιστοι οὔτε δύσνοι οἱ ἀκουσόμενοι.

Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· Ὦ ἄριστε, ἦ που βουλόμενός με παραθαρρύνειν λέγεις;

Ἔγωγ', ἔφη.

A friendly audience is more dangerous than a hostile one.

Πᾶν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοὐναντίον ποιεῖς. πιστεύοντος μὲν γὰρ ἐμοῦ ἐμοὶ εἰδέναι ἃ λέγω, καλῶς εἶχεν E ἡ παραμυθία· ἐν γὰρ φρονίμοις τε καὶ φίλοις περὶ

5. μέτρον ΠΜ: μέτριον A. 8. ᾗ ΑΠ: , εἰ M.
12. πειρῶ δὴ cj. Baiter: πειρῶ ἂν A: πειρῶ οὖν ΠΜ.
19. δοκῇ A corr. M: δοκεῖ ΑΠ.

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τῶν μεγίστων τε καὶ φίλων τἀληθῆ εἰδότα λέγειν p. 450. ἀσφαλὲς καὶ θαρραλέον, ἀπιστοῦντα δὲ καὶ ζητοῦντα ἅμα τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, ὃ δὴ ἐγὼ δρῶ, φοβερόν τε καὶ σφαλερόν, οὔ τι γέλωτα | ὀφλεῖν — παιδικὸν p. 451. γὰρ τοῦτό γε —, ἀλλὰ μὴ σφαλεὶς τῆς ἀληθείας οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς φίλους ξυνεπισπασάμενος κείσομαι περὶ ἃ ἥκιστα δεῖ σφάλλεσθαι. προσκυνῶ δὲ Ἀδράστειαν, ὦ Γλαύκων, χάριν οὗ μέλλω λέγειν· ἐλπίζω γὰρ οὖν ἔλαττον ἁμάρτημα ἀκουσίως τινὸς φονέα γενέσθαι ἢ ἀπατεῶνα καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ δικαίων νομίμων πέρι. τοῦτο οὖν τὸ κινδύνευμα κινδυνεύειν ἐν ἐχθροῖς κρεῖττον ἢ φίλοις, ὥστε εὖ με παραμυθεῖ. B

Καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων γελάσας Ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἐάν τι πάθωμεν πλημμελὲς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου, ἀφίεμέν σε ὥσπερ φόνου καὶ καθαρὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀπατεῶνα ἡμῶν. ἀλλὰ θαρρήσας λέγε.

Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, εἶπον, καθαρός γε καὶ ἐκεῖ ὁ ἀφεθείς, ὡς ὁ νόμος λέγει· εἰκὸς δέ γε, εἴπερ ἐκεῖ, κἀνθάδε.

Λέγε τοίνυν, ἔφη, τούτου γ' ἕνεκα.

Λέγειν δή, ἔφην ἐγώ, χρὴ ἀνάπαλιν αὖ νῦν, ἃ τότε ἴσως ἔδει ἐφεξῆς λέγειν· τάχα δὲ οὕτως ἂν ὀρ- C θῶς ἔχοι, μετὰ ἀνδρεῖον δρᾶμα παντελῶς διαπερανθὲν τὸ γυναικεῖον αὖ περαίνειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπειδὴ σὺ οὕτω προκαλεῖ.

Men and women have similar natures

Ἀνθρώποις γὰρ φῦσι καὶ παιδευθεῖσιν ὡς ἡμεῖς διήλθομεν, κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν οὐκ ἔστ' ἄλλη ὀρθὴ

9. ἁμάρτημα MSS.: ἁμάρτημα εἶναι cj. Madvig.
11. δικαίων suspectum fuit Schneidero. καὶ νομίμων Ξ.
13. εὖ ΑΠΜ: οὐκ εὖ *q*: οὗ cj. Herm.
22. δὴ ΠΜ: δὲ Α. ἃ τότε x: ἅ ποτε ΑΠΜ.

p. 451. παίδων τε καὶ γυναικῶν κτῆσίς τε καὶ χρεία ἡ κατ' ἐκείνην τὴν ὁρμὴν ἰοῦσιν, ἥνπερ τὸ πρῶτον ὡρμήσαμεν· ἐπεχειρήσαμεν δέ που ὡς ἀγέλης φύλακας τοὺς ἄνδρας καθιστάναι τῷ λόγῳ.

and duties and should therefore have a similar education.

Ναί.

D 'Ακολουθῶμεν τοίνυν καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τροφὴν παραπλησίαν ἀποδιδόντες, καὶ σκοπῶμεν, εἰ ἡμῖν πρέπει ἢ οὔ.

Πῶς; ἔφη.

Ὧδε. τὰς θηλείας τῶν φυλάκων κυνῶν πότερα ξυμφυλάττειν οἰόμεθα δεῖν ἅπερ ἂν οἱ ἄρρενες φυλάττωσι καὶ ξυνθηρεύειν καὶ τἆλλα κοινῇ πράττειν, ἢ τὰς μὲν οἰκουρεῖν ἔνδον ὡς ἀδυνάτους διὰ τὸν τῶν σκυλάκων τόκον τε καὶ τροφήν, τοὺς δὲ πονεῖν τε καὶ πᾶσαν ἐπιμέλειαν ἔχειν περὶ τὰ ποίμνια;

No distinction amongst the animals such as is made between men and women.

E Κοινῇ, ἔφη, πάντα· πλὴν ὡς ἀσθενεστέραις χρώμεθα, τοῖς δὲ ὡς ἰσχυροτέροις.

Οἷόν τ' οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ χρῆσθαί τινι ζῴῳ, ἂν μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν τροφήν τε καὶ παιδείαν ἀποδιδῷς;

Οὐχ οἷόν τε.

Εἰ ἄρα ταῖς γυναιξὶν ἐπὶ ταὐτὰ χρησόμεθα καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσι, ταὐτὰ καὶ διδακτέον αὐτάς.

p. 452. | Ναί.

Μουσικὴ μὲν ἐκείνοις τε καὶ γυμναστικὴ ἐδόθη.

Ναί.

Καὶ ταῖς γυναιξὶν ἄρα τούτω τὼ τέχνα καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἀποδοτέον καὶ χρηστέον κατὰ ταὐτά.

Women must be taught music, gymnastic,

23. καὶ τοῖς A²ΠΜ : τοῖς A.

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and military exercises equally with men.

Εἰκὸς ἐξ ὧν λέγεις, ἔφη. p. 452.

Ἴσως δή, εἶπον, παρὰ τὸ ἔθος γελοῖα ἂν φαίνοιτο πολλὰ περὶ τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα, εἰ πράξεται ᾗ λέγεται.

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

Τί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, γελοιότατον αὐτῶν ὁρᾷς; ἢ δῆλα δὴ ὅτι γυμνὰς τὰς γυναῖκας ἐν ταῖς παλαίστραις γυμναζομένας μετὰ τῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὐ μόνον τὰς νέας, B ἀλλὰ καὶ ἤδη τὰς πρεσβυτέρας, ὥσπερ τοὺς γέροντας ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις, ὅταν ῥυσοὶ καὶ μὴ ἡδεῖς τὴν ὄψιν ὅμως φιλογυμναστῶσιν;

Νὴ τὸν Δία, ἔφη· γελοῖον γὰρ ἄν, ὥς γε ἐν τῷ παρεστῶτι, φανείη.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπείπερ ὡρμήσαμεν λέγειν, οὐ φοβητέον τὰ τῶν χαριέντων σκώμματα, ὅσα καὶ οἷα ἂν εἴποιεν εἰς τὴν τοιαύτην μεταβολὴν γενομένην καὶ περὶ τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ περὶ μουσικὴν καὶ C οὐκ ἐλάχιστα περὶ τὴν τῶν ὅπλων σχέσιν καὶ ἵππων ὀχήσεις.

Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Convention should not be permitted to stand in the way of a higher good.

Ἀλλ' ἐπείπερ λέγειν ἠρξάμεθα, πορευτέον πρὸς τὸ τραχὺ τοῦ νόμου, δεηθεῖσί τε τούτων μὴ τὰ αὑτῶν πράττειν ἀλλὰ σπουδάζειν, καὶ ὑπομνήσασιν ὅτι οὐ πολὺς χρόνος ἐξ οὗ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐδόκει αἰσχρὰ εἶναι καὶ γελοῖα ἅπερ νῦν τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν βαρβάρων, γυμνοὺς ἄνδρας ὁρᾶσθαι, καὶ ὅτε ἤρχοντο τῶν γυμνασίων πρῶτοι μὲν Κρῆτες, ἔπειτα Λακεδαι- D μόνιοι, ἐξῆν τοῖς τότε ἀστείοις πάντα ταῦτα κωμῳδεῖν. ἢ οὐκ οἴει;

Ἔγωγε.

Ἀλλ' ἐπειδή, οἶμαι, χρωμένοις ἄμεινον τὸ ἀποδύεσθαι τοῦ συγκαλύπτειν πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐφάνη, καὶ

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p. 452. τὸ ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς δὴ γελοῖον ἐξερρύη ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μηνυθέντος ἀρίστου· καὶ τοῦτο ἐνεδείξατο, ὅτι μάταιος ὃς γελοῖον ἄλλο τι ἡγεῖται ἢ τὸ κακόν, καὶ ὁ γελωτοποιεῖν ἐπιχειρῶν πρὸς ἄλλην E τινὰ ὄψιν ἀποβλέπων ὡς γελοίου ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἄφρονός τε καὶ κακοῦ, καὶ καλοῦ αὖ σπουδάζει πρὸς ἄλλον τινὰ σκοπὸν στησάμενος ἢ τὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

But is this community or equality possible?

Ἀρ' οὖν οὐ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο περὶ αὐτῶν ἀνομολογητέον, εἰ δυνατὰ ἢ οὔ, καὶ δοτέον ἀμφισβήτησιν εἴτε τις φιλοπαίσμων εἴτε σπουδαστικὸς ἐθέλει p. 453. ἀμφισβητῆσαι, πότερον δυνατὴ φύσις ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη | ἡ θήλεια τῇ τοῦ ἄρρενος γένους κοινωνῆσαι εἰς ἅπαντα τὰ ἔργα ἢ οὐδ' εἰς ἕν, ἢ εἰς τὰ μὲν οἷά τε, εἰς δὲ τὰ οὔ, καὶ τοῦτο δὴ τὸ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ποτέρων ἐστίν; ἆρ' οὐχ οὕτως ἂν κάλλιστά τις ἀρχόμενος, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, καὶ κάλλιστα τελευτήσειεν;

Πολύ γε, ἔφη.

Βούλει οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἡμεῖς πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄλλων ἀμφισβητήσωμεν, ἵνα μὴ ἔρημα τὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου λόγου πολιορκῆται;

B Οὐδέν, ἔφη, κωλύει.

Objection: We were saying that everyone should do his own work: Have not women and men severally a work of their own?

Λέγωμεν δὴ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ὅτι Ὦ Σώκρατές τε καὶ Γλαύκων, οὐδὲν δεῖ ὑμῖν ἄλλους ἀμφισβητεῖν· αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς κατοικίσεως, ἣν ᾠκίζετε πόλιν, ὡμολογεῖτε δεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἕκαστον ἕνα ἓν τὸ αὑτοῦ πράττειν.

Ὡμολογήσαμεν, οἶμαι· πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως οὐ πάμπολυ διαφέρει γυνὴ ἀνδρὸς τὴν φύσιν;

6. πρὸς MSS.: del. W. H. Thompson: εἰς Stob.

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Πῶς δ' οὐ διαφέρει; p. 453.

Οὐκοῦν ἄλλο καὶ ἔργον ἑκατέρῳ προσήκει προστάττειν τὸ κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν; C

Τί μήν;

Πῶς οὖν οὐχ ἁμαρτάνετε νῦν καὶ τἀναντία ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς λέγετε φάσκοντες αὖ τοὺς ἄνδρας καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας δεῖν τὰ αὐτὰ πράττειν, πλεῖστον κεχωρισμένην φύσιν ἔχοντας; ἕξεις τι, ὦ θαυμάσιε, πρὸς ταῦτ' ἀπολογεῖσθαι;

Ὡς μὲν ἐξαίφνης, ἔφη, οὐ πάνυ ῥᾴδιον· ἀλλὰ σοῦ δεήσομαί τε καὶ δέομαι καὶ τὸν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν λόγον, ὅστις ποτ' ἐστίν, ἑρμηνεῦσαι.

Ταῦτ' ἐστίν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα, ἃ ἐγὼ πάλαι προορῶν ἐφοβούμην D τε καὶ ὤκνουν ἅπτεσθαι τοῦ νόμου τοῦ περὶ τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ παίδων κτῆσιν καὶ τροφήν.

Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἔφη, οὐ γὰρ εὐκόλῳ ἔοικεν.

Οὐ γάρ, εἶπον. ἀλλὰ δὴ ὧδ' ἔχει· ἄν τέ τις εἰς κολυμβήθραν μικρὰν ἐμπέσῃ ἄν τε εἰς τὸ μέγιστον πέλαγος μέσον, ὅμως γε νεῖ οὐδὲν ἧττον.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡμῖν νευστέον καὶ πειρατέον σώζεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ λόγου, ἤτοι δελφῖνά τινα ἐλπίζοντας ἡμᾶς ὑπολαβεῖν ἄν ἤ τινα ἄλλην ἄπορον σωτηρίαν.

Ἔοικεν, ἔφη. E

Answer to the objection:

Φέρε δή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐάν πῃ εὕρωμεν τὴν ἔξοδον. ὡμολογοῦμεν γὰρ δὴ ἄλλην φύσιν ἄλλο δεῖν ἐπιτηδεύειν, γυναικὸς δὲ καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἄλλην εἶναι· τὰς δὲ ἄλλας φύσεις τὰ αὐτά φαμεν νῦν δεῖν ἐπιτηδεῦσαι. ταῦτα ἡμῶν κατηγορεῖτε;

27. ὡμολογοῦμεν M: ὁμολογοῦμεν ΑΠ.

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p. 453. Κομιδῇ γε.

p. 454. Ἦ γενναία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, | ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης.

Τί δή;

The seeming inconsistency arises out of a verbal opposition.

Ὅτι, εἶπον, δοκοῦσί μοι εἰς αὐτὴν καὶ ἄκοντες πολλοὶ ἐμπίπτειν καὶ οἴεσθαι οὐκ ἐρίζειν ἀλλὰ διαλέγεσθαι, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κατ' εἴδη διαιρούμενοι τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα διώκειν τοῦ λεχθέντος τὴν ἐναντίωσιν, ἔριδι, οὐ διαλέκτῳ πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρώμενοι.

Ἔστι γὰρ δή, ἔφη, περὶ πολλοὺς τοῦτο τὸ πάθος· ἀλλὰ μῶν καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοῦτο τείνει ἐν τῷ παρόντι;

B Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· κινδυνεύομεν γοῦν ἄκοντες ἀντιλογίας ἅπτεσθαι.

Πῶς;

When we assigned to different natures different pursuits, we meant only those differences of nature which affected the pursuits.

Τὸ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν ὅτι οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν δεῖ ἐπιτηδευμάτων τυγχάνειν πάνυ ἀνδρείως τε καὶ ἐριστικῶς κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα διώκομεν, ἐπεσκεψάμεθα δὲ οὐδ' ὁπηοῦν τί εἶδος τὸ τῆς ἑτέρας τε καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως καὶ πρὸς τί τεῖνον ὡριζόμεθα τότε, ὅτε τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα ἄλλῃ φύσει ἄλλα, τῇ δὲ αὐτῇ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀπεδίδομεν.

Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη, ἐπεσκεψάμεθα.

C Τοιγάρτοι, εἶπον, ἔξεστιν ἡμῖν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνερωτᾶν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς εἰ ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις φαλακρῶν καὶ κομητῶν καὶ οὐχ ἡ ἐναντία, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ὁμολογῶμεν ἐναντίαν εἶναι, ἐὰν φαλακροὶ σκυτοτομῶσι, μὴ ἐᾶν κομήτας, ἐὰν δ' αὖ κομῆται, μὴ τοὺς ἑτέρους.

Γελοῖον μέντ' ἂν εἴη, ἔφη.

17. μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν Ξ: τὴν αὐτὴν ΑΠΜ: τὴν ἄλλην cj. Baiter.

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Ἆρα κατ' ἄλλο τι, εἶπον ἐγώ, γελοῖον, ἢ ὅτι τότε p. 454. οὐ πάντως τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ τὴν ἑτέραν φύσιν ἐτιθέμεθα, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος τῆς ἀλλοιώσεώς τε καὶ ὁμοιώσεως μόνον ἐφυλάττομεν τὸ πρὸς αὐτὰ τεῖνον D τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα; οἷον ἰατρικὸν μὲν καὶ ἰατρικὸν τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντα τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν ἔχειν ἐλέγομεν· ἢ οὐκ οἴει;

Ἔγωγε.

Ἰατρικὸν δὲ καὶ τεκτονικὸν ἄλλην;

Πάντως που.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν γένος, ἐὰν μὲν πρὸς τέχνην τινὰ ἢ ἄλλο ἐπιτήδευμα διαφέρον φαίνηται, τοῦτο δὴ φήσομεν ἑκατέρῳ δεῖν ἀποδιδόναι· ἐὰν δ' αὐτῷ τούτῳ φαίνηται διαφέρειν, τῷ τὸ μὲν θῆλυ τίκτειν, τὸ δὲ ἄρρεν ὀχεύειν, οὐδέν τί πω φήσομεν μᾶλλον ἀποδεδεῖχθαι E ὡς πρὸς ὃ ἡμεῖς λέγομεν διαφέρει γυνὴ ἀνδρός, ἀλλ' ἔτι οἰησόμεθα δεῖν τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιτηδεύειν τούς τε φύλακας ἡμῖν καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας αὐτῶν.

Καὶ ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.

How in their relation to the state do women differ from men?

Οὐκοῦν μετὰ τοῦτο κελεύομεν τὸν τὰ ἐναντία λέγοντα τοῦτο αὐτὸ | διδάσκειν ἡμᾶς, πρὸς τίνα p. 455. τέχνην ἢ τί ἐπιτήδευμα τῶν περὶ πόλεως κατασκευὴν οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀλλὰ ἑτέρα φύσις γυναικός τε καὶ ἀνδρός;

Δίκαιον γοῦν.

Τάχα τοίνυν ἄν, ὅπερ σὺ ὀλίγον πρότερον ἔλεγες, εἴποι ἂν καὶ ἄλλος, ὅτι ἐν μὲν τῷ παραχρῆμα

4. τὸ Ξq : τὰ ΑΠΜ. τεῖνον τὰ q : τείνοντα ΑΠΜ : τεῖνον Ξ.
5. καὶ ἰατρικὸν q : καὶ ἰατρικὴν Α²ΠΜ (punctis notatum in M): καὶ ἰατρικῶν Apr. : om. Ξr. 6. ὄντα ΑΠΜ : ἔχοντα Θ.

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SOCRATES, GLAUCON.

The same natural gifts are found in both sexes, although they are possessed in a higher degree by men than by women.

p. 455. ἱκανῶς εἰπεῖν οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ἐπισκεψαμένῳ δὲ οὐδὲν χαλεπόν.

Εἴποι γὰρ ἄν.

Βούλει οὖν δεώμεθα τοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀντιλέγοντος
B ἀκολουθῆσαι ἡμῖν, ἐάν πως ἡμεῖς ἐκείνῳ ἐνδειξώμεθα ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐπιτήδευμα ἴδιον γυναικὶ πρὸς διοίκησιν πόλεως;

Πάνυ γε.

Ἴθι δή, φήσομεν πρὸς αὐτόν, ἀποκρίνου· ἆρα οὕτως ἔλεγες τὸν μὲν εὐφυῆ πρός τι εἶναι, τὸν δὲ ἀφυῆ, ἐν ᾧ ὁ μὲν ῥᾳδίως τι μανθάνοι, ὁ δὲ χαλεπῶς; καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀπὸ βραχείας μαθήσεως ἐπὶ πολὺ εὑρετικὸς εἴη οὗ ἔμαθεν, ὁ δὲ πολλῆς μαθήσεως τυχὼν καὶ μελέτης μηδ' ἃ ἔμαθε σώζοιτο; καὶ τῷ μὲν τὰ τοῦ
C σώματος ἱκανῶς ὑπηρετοῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ, τῷ δὲ ἐναντιοῖτο; ἆρ' ἄλλ' ἄττα ἐστὶν ἢ ταῦτα, οἷς τὸν εὐφυῆ πρὸς ἕκαστα καὶ τὸν μὴ ὡρίζου;

Οὐδείς, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἄλλα φήσει.

Οἶσθά τι οὖν ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων μελετώμενον, ἐν ᾧ οὐ πάντα ταῦτα τὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν γένος διαφερόντως ἔχει ἢ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν; ἢ μακρολογῶμεν τήν τε ὑφαντικὴν λέγοντες καὶ τὴν τῶν ποπάνων τε καὶ
D ἑψημάτων θεραπείαν, ἐν οἷς δή τι δοκεῖ τὸ γυναικεῖον γένος εἶναι, οὗ καὶ καταγελαστότατόν ἐστι πάντων ἡττώμενον;

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὅτι πολὺ κρατεῖται ἐν ἅπασιν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν τὸ γένος τοῦ γένους. γυναῖκες μέντοι πολλαὶ πολλῶν ἀνδρῶν βελτίους εἰς πολλά· τὸ δὲ ὅλον ἔχει ὡς σὺ λέγεις.

Οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστίν, ὦ φίλε, ἐπιτήδευμα τῶν πόλιν

10. τὸν μὲν ΠΜ; τὸ μὲν A.

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διοικούντων γυναικὸς διότι γυνή, οὐδ' ἀνδρὸς διότι p. 455 ἀνήρ, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως διεσπαρμέναι αἱ φύσεις ἐν ἀμφοῖν τοῖν ζῴοιν, καὶ πάντων μὲν μετέχει γυνὴ ἐπιτηδευμάτων κατὰ φύσιν, πάντων δὲ ἀνήρ, ἐπὶ πᾶσι δὲ E ἀσθενέστερον γυνὴ ἀνδρός.

Πάνυ γε.

Men and women are to be governed by the same laws and have the same pursuits.

Ἦ οὖν ἀνδράσι πάντα προστάξομεν, γυναικὶ δὲ οὐδέν;

Καὶ πῶς;

Ἀλλ' ἔστι γάρ, οἶμαι, ὡς φήσομεν, καὶ γυνὴ ἰατρική, ἡ δ' οὔ, καὶ μουσική, ἡ δ' ἄμουσος φύσει.

Τί μήν;

Γυμναστικὴ δ' ἄρα οὔ, οὐδὲ πολεμική, | ἡ δὲ p. 456. ἀπόλεμος καὶ οὐ φιλογυμναστική;

Οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

Τί δέ; φιλόσοφός τε καὶ μισόσοφος; καὶ θυμοειδής, ἡ δ' ἄθυμος;

Ἔστι καὶ ταῦτα.

Ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ φυλακικὴ γυνή, ἡ δ' οὔ. ἢ οὐ τοιαύτην καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τῶν φυλακικῶν φύσιν ἐξελεξάμεθα;

Τοιαύτην μὲν οὖν.

Καὶ γυναικὸς ἄρα καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις εἰς φυλακὴν πόλεως, πλὴν ὅσα ἀσθενεστέρα ἢ ἰσχυροτέρα ἐστίν.

Φαίνεται.

Καὶ γυναῖκες ἄρα αἱ τοιαῦται τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀν- B δράσιν ἐκλεκτέαι ξυνοικεῖν τε καὶ ξυμφυλάττειν, ἐπείπερ εἰσὶν ἱκαναὶ καὶ ξυγγενεῖς αὐτοῖς τὴν φύσιν.

Πάνυ γε.

13. καὶ γυμναστική, ἡ δ' ἄρα οὔ· Ξ.

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p. 456. Τὰ δ' ἐπιτηδεύματα οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀποδοτέα ταῖς αὐταῖς φύσεσιν;

Τὰ αὐτά.

Ἥκομεν ἄρα εἰς τὰ πρότερα περιφερόμενοι, καὶ ὁμολογοῦμεν μὴ παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι ταῖς τῶν φυλάκων γυναιξὶ μουσικήν τε καὶ γυμναστικὴν ἀποδιδόναι.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

We admit such institutions to be possible. Are they also for the best?

C Οὐκ ἄρα ἀδύνατά γε οὐδὲ εὐχαῖς ὅμοια ἐνομοθετοῦμεν, ἐπείπερ κατὰ φύσιν ἐτίθεμεν τὸν νόμον· ἀλλὰ τὰ νῦν παρὰ ταῦτα γιγνόμενα παρὰ φύσιν μᾶλλον, ὡς ἔοικε, γίγνεται.

Ἔοικεν.

Οὐκοῦν ἡ ἐπίσκεψις ἡμῖν ἦν εἰ δυνατά τε καὶ βέλτιστα λέγοιμεν;

Ἦν γάρ.

Καὶ ὅτι μὲν δὴ δυνατά, διωμολόγηται;

Ναί.

Ὅτι δὲ δὴ βέλτιστα, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο δεῖ διομολογηθῆναι;

Δῆλον.

There are different degrees of goodness both in women and in men.

Οὐκοῦν πρός γε τὸ φυλακικὴν γυναῖκα γενέσθαι, οὐκ ἄλλη μὲν ἡμῖν ἄνδρας ποιήσει παιδεία, ἄλλη D δὲ γυναῖκας, ἄλλως τε καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν παραλαβοῦσα;

Οὐκ ἄλλη.

Πῶς οὖν ἔχεις δόξης τοῦ τοιοῦδε πέρι;

Τίνος δή;

Τοῦ ὑπολαμβάνειν παρὰ σεαυτῷ τὸν μὲν ἀμείνω ἄνδρα, τὸν δὲ χείρω· ἢ πάντας ὁμοίους ἡγεῖ;

14. δυνατά τε a: δυνατά γε ΑΠΜ.

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Οὐδαμῶς. p. 456.

Ἐν οὖν τῇ πόλει ἣν ᾠκίζομεν, πότερον οἴει ἡμῖν ἀμείνους ἄνδρας ἐξειργάσθαι τοὺς φύλακας, τυχόντας ἧς διήλθομεν παιδείας, ἢ τοὺς σκυτοτόμους, τῇ σκυτικῇ παιδευθέντας;

Γελοῖον, ἔφη, ἐρωτᾷς.

Μανθάνω, ἔφην· τί δαί; τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν οὐχ οὗτοι ἄριστοι; E

Πολύ γε.

Our women by the practice of music and gymnastic will be made the best of women.

Τί δαί; αἱ γυναῖκες τῶν γυναικῶν οὐχ αὗται ἔσονται βέλτισται;

Καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, πολύ.

Ἔστι δέ τι πόλει ἄμεινον ἢ γυναῖκάς τε καὶ ἄνδρας ὡς ἀρίστους ἐγγίγνεσθαι;

Οὐκ ἔστιν.

Τοῦτο δὲ μουσική τε καὶ γυμναστικὴ παραγιγνόμεναι, ὡς ἡμεῖς | διήλθομεν, ἀπεργάσονται; p. 457.

Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;

Οὐ μόνον ἄρα δυνατὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄριστον πόλει νόμιμον ἐτίθεμεν.

Οὕτως.

Lighter duties are to be assigned to them; because they are weaker.

Ἀποδυτέον δὴ ταῖς τῶν φυλάκων γυναιξίν, ἐπείπερ ἀρετὴν ἀντὶ ἱματίων ἀμφιέσονται, καὶ κοινωνητέον πολέμου τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης φυλακῆς τῆς περὶ τὴν πόλιν, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλα πρακτέον· τούτων δ᾽ αὐτῶν τὰ ἐλαφρότερα ταῖς γυναιξὶν ἢ τοῖς ἀνδράσι δοτέον διὰ τὴν τοῦ γένους ἀσθένειαν. ὁ δὲ γελῶν ἀνὴρ ἐπὶ B γυμναῖς γυναιξί, τοῦ βελτίστου ἕνεκα γυμναζομέναις, ἀτελῆ τοῦ γελοίου σοφίας δρέπων καρπόν, οὐδὲν οἶδεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐφ᾽ ᾧ γελᾷ οὐδ᾽ ὅ τι πράτ-

7, 10. δαί A: δέ ΠΜ. 28. γυναιξί ΑΠ: ταῖς γυναιξί M Euseb. Theod.

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The noble saying.

p. 457. τει· κάλλιστα γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο καὶ λέγεται καὶ λελέξεται, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὠφέλιμον καλόν, τὸ δὲ βλαβερὸν αἰσχρόν.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἓν ὥσπερ κῦμα φῶμεν διαφεύγειν τοῦ γυναικείου πέρι νόμου λέγοντες, ὥστε μὴ C παντάπασι κατακλυσθῆναι τιθέντας ὡς δεῖ κοινῇ πάντα ἐπιτηδεύειν τούς τε φύλακας ἡμῖν καὶ τὰς φυλακίδας, ἀλλά πῃ τὸν λόγον αὐτὸν αὑτῷ ὁμολογεῖσθαι ὡς δυνατά τε καὶ ὠφέλιμα λέγει;

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, οὐ σμικρὸν κῦμα διαφεύγεις.

The second and greater wave.

Φήσεις γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ μέγα αὐτὸ εἶναι, ὅταν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἴδῃς.

Λέγε δή, ἴδω, ἔφη.

Τούτῳ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἕπεται νόμος καὶ τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ὅδε.

Τίς;

Τὰς γυναῖκας ταύτας τῶν ἀνδρῶν τούτων πάν-D των πάσας εἶναι κοινάς, ἰδίᾳ δὲ μηδενὶ μηδεμίαν συνοικεῖν· καὶ τοὺς παῖδας αὖ κοινούς, καὶ μήτε γονέα ἔκγονον εἰδέναι τὸν αὑτοῦ μήτε παῖδα γονέα.

Πολύ, ἔφη, τοῦτο ἐκείνου μεῖζον πρὸς ἀπιστίαν καὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ πέρι καὶ τοῦ ὠφελίμου.

Οὐκ οἶμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, περί γε τοῦ ὠφελίμου ἀμφισβητεῖσθαι ἄν, ὡς οὐ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν κοινὰς μὲν τὰς γυναῖκας εἶναι, κοινοὺς δὲ τοὺς παῖδας, εἴπερ οἷόν τε· ἀλλ' οἶμαι περὶ τοῦ εἰ δυνατὸν ἢ μὴ πλείστην [ἂν] ἀμφισβήτησιν γενέσθαι.

9. ὁμολογεῖσθαι ΑΜ : ὡμολογῆσθαι Α²Π.
28. πλείστην ἂν *vq* corr. : πλείστην ΑΠΜ.

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p. 457. E

Περὶ ἀμφοτέρων, ἦ δ' ὅς, εὖ μάλ' ἂν ἀμφισβητηθείη.

Λέγεις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λόγων σύστασιν· ἐγὼ δ' ᾤμην ἔκ γε τοῦ ἑτέρου ἀποδράσεσθαι, εἴ σοι δόξειεν ὠφέλιμον εἶναι, λοιπὸν δὲ δή μοι ἔσεσθαι περὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ καὶ μή.

Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔλαθες, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἀποδιδράσκων, ἀλλ' ἀμφοτέρων πέρι δίδου λόγον.

The utility and possibility of a community of wives and children.

Ὑφεκτέον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δίκην. τοσόνδε μέντοι χάρισαί μοι· ἔασόν με | (p. 458.) ἑορτάσαι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀργοὶ τὴν διάνοιαν εἰώθασιν ἑστιᾶσθαι ὑφ' ἑαυτῶν, ὅταν μόνοι πορεύωνται. καὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοί που, πρὶν ἐξευρεῖν τίνα τρόπον ἔσται τι ὧν ἐπιθυμοῦσι, τοῦτο παρέντες, ἵνα μὴ κάμνωσι βουλευόμενοι περὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ καὶ μή, θέντες ὡς ὑπάρχον εἶναι ὃ βούλονται, ἤδη τὰ λοιπὰ διατάττουσι καὶ χαίρουσι διεξιόντες οἷα δράσουσι γενομένου, ἀργὸν καὶ ἄλλως ψυχὴν ἔτι ἀργοτέραν ποιοῦντες.

The utility to be considered first, the possibility afterwards.

ἤδη οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς μαλθακίζομαι, (B) καὶ ἐκεῖνα μὲν ἐπιθυμῶ ἀναβαλέσθαι καὶ ὕστερον ἐπισκέψασθαι, ᾗ δυνατά, νῦν δὲ ὡς δυνατῶν ὄντων θεὶς σκέψομαι, ἄν μοι παρίῃς, πῶς διατάξουσιν αὐτὰ οἱ ἄρχοντες γιγνόμενα, καὶ ὅτι πάντων ξυμφορώτατ' ἂν εἴη πραχθέντα τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς φύλαξι. ταῦτα πειράσομαί σοι πρότερα συνδιασκοπεῖσθαι, ὕστερα δ' ἐκεῖνα, εἴπερ παρίῃς.

Ἀλλὰ παρίημι, ἔφη, καὶ σκόπει.

Οἶμαι τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἴπερ ἔσονται οἱ ἄρχοντες ἄξιοι τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος, οἵ τε τούτοις ἐπίκουροι (C) κατὰ ταὐτά, τοὺς μὲν ἐθελήσειν ποιεῖν τὰ ἐπιταττόμενα, τοὺς δὲ ἐπιτάξειν, τὰ μὲν αὐτοὺς πειθομένους

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The legislator will select guardians male and female, who will meet at common meals and exercises, and will be drawn to one another by an irresistible necessity.

p. 458. τοῖς νόμοις, τὰ δὲ καὶ μιμουμένους ὅσα ἂν ἐκείνοις ἐπιτρέψωμεν.

Εἰκός, ἔφη.

Σὺ μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ νομοθέτης αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐξέλεξας, οὕτω καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἐκλέξας παραδώσεις καθ' ὅσον οἷόν τε ὁμοφυεῖς· οἱ δέ, ἅτε οἰκίας τε καὶ ξυσσίτια κοινὰ ἔχοντες, ἰδίᾳ δὲ
D οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν τοιοῦτο κεκτημένου, ὁμοῦ δὴ ἔσονται, ὁμοῦ δὲ ἀναμεμιγμένων καὶ ἐν γυμνασίοις καὶ ἐν τῇ ἄλλῃ τροφῇ ὑπ' ἀνάγκης, οἶμαι, τῆς ἐμφύτου ἄξονται πρὸς τὴν ἀλλήλων μῖξιν. ἢ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖά σοι δοκῶ λέγειν;

Οὐ γεωμετρικαῖς γε, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἀλλ' ἐρωτικαῖς ἀνάγκαις, αἳ κινδυνεύουσιν ἐκείνων δριμύτεραι εἶναι πρὸς τὸ πείθειν τε καὶ ἕλκειν τὸν πολὺν λεών.

Καὶ μάλα, εἶπον. ἀλλὰ μετὰ δὴ ταῦτα, ὦ Γλαύ-
E κων, ἀτάκτως μὲν μίγνυσθαι ἀλλήλοις ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν ποιεῖν οὔτε ὅσιον ἐν εὐδαιμόνων πόλει οὔτ' ἐάσουσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες.

Οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον, ἔφη.

Δῆλον δὴ ὅτι γάμους τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ποιήσομεν ἱεροὺς εἰς δύναμιν ὅ τι μάλιστα· εἶεν δ' ἂν ἱεροὶ οἱ ὠφελιμώτατοι.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

The breeding of human beings, as of animals, to be from the best and from those who are of a ripe age.

p. 459. | Πῶς οὖν δὴ ὠφελιμώτατοι ἔσονται; τόδε μοι λέγε, ὦ Γλαύκων· ὁρῶ γάρ σου ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ καὶ κύνας θηρευτικοὺς καὶ τῶν γενναίων ὀρνίθων μάλα συχνούς· ἆρ' οὖν, ὦ πρὸς Διός, προσέσχηκάς τι τοῖς τούτων γάμοις τε καὶ παιδοποιίαις;

17. μίγνυσθαι ΠMmg.: γυμνοῦσθαι AM.
29. παιδοποιίαις A : παιδοπο(ι)ίαι Π : παιδοποιία M.

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Τὸ ποῖον, ἔφη. p. 459.

Πρῶτον μὲν αὐτῶν τούτων, καίπερ ὄντων γενναίων, ἆρ' οὐκ εἰσί τινες καὶ γίγνονται ἄριστοι;

Εἰσίν.

Πότερον οὖν ἐξ ἁπάντων ὁμοίως γεννᾷς, ἢ προθυμεῖ ὅ τι μάλιστα ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων;

Ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων.

Τί δ'; ἐκ τῶν νεωτάτων ἢ ἐκ τῶν γεραιτάτων ἢ ἐξ ἀκμαζόντων ὅ τι μάλιστα; B

Ἐξ ἀκμαζόντων.

Καὶ ἂν μὴ οὕτω γεννᾶται, πολύ σοι ἡγεῖ χεῖρον ἔσεσθαι τό τε τῶν ὀρνίθων καὶ τὸ τῶν κυνῶν γένος;

Ἔγωγ', ἔφη.

Τί δὲ ἵππων οἴει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων; ἦ ἄλλῃ πῃ ἔχειν;

Ἄτοπον μέντ' ἄν, ἦ δ' ὅς, εἴη.

Βαβαί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, ὡς ἄρα σφόδρα ἡμῖν δεῖ ἄκρων εἶναι τῶν ἀρχόντων, εἴπερ καὶ περὶ τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος ὡσαύτως ἔχει.

Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἔχει, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ τί δή; C

How to be accomplished?

Ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φαρμάκοις πολλοῖς χρῆσθαι. ἰατρὸν δέ που μὴ δεομένοις μὲν σώμασι φαρμάκων, ἀλλὰ διαίτῃ ἐθελόντων ὑπακούειν, καὶ φαυλότερον ἐξαρκεῖν ἡγούμεθα εἶναι· ὅταν δὲ δὴ καὶ φαρμακεύειν δέῃ, ἴσμεν ὅτι ἀνδρειοτέρου δεῖ τοῦ ἰατροῦ.

Ἀληθῆ· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τί λέγεις;

Useful lies 'very honest knaveries.'

Πρὸς τόδε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· συχνῷ τῷ ψεύδει καὶ τῇ

24. ἐθελόντων ΑΠΜ: ἐθέλουσιν r.
25. εἶναι MSS.: del. Steph.

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p. 459. ἀπάτῃ κινδυνεύει ἡμῖν δεήσειν χρῆσθαι τοὺς ἄρχοντας D ἐπ' ὠφελίᾳ τῶν ἀρχομένων. ἔφαμεν δέ που ἐν φαρμάκου εἴδει πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα χρήσιμα εἶναι.

Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ἔφη.

Ἐν τοῖς γάμοις τοίνυν καὶ παιδοποιίαις ἔοικε τὸ ὀρθὸν τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι οὐκ ἐλάχιστον.

Πῶς δή;

Other arrangements for the improvement of the breed;

Δεῖ μέν, εἶπον, ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων τοὺς ἀρίστους ταῖς ἀρίσταις συγγίγνεσθαι ὡς πλειστάκις, τοὺς δὲ φαυλοτάτους ταῖς φαυλοτάταις τοὐναντίον, καὶ E τῶν μὲν τὰ ἔκγονα τρέφειν, τῶν δὲ μή, εἰ μέλλει τὸ ποίμνιον ὅ τι ἀκρότατον εἶναι, καὶ ταῦτα πάντα γιγνόμενα λανθάνειν πλὴν αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἄρχοντας, εἰ αὖ ἡ ἀγέλη τῶν φυλάκων ὅ τι μάλιστα ἀστασίαστος ἔσται.

Ὀρθότατα, ἔφη.

and for the regulation of the population.

Οὐκοῦν δὴ ἑορταί τινες νομοθετητέαι ἔσονται, ἐν αἷς ξυνάξομεν τάς τε νύμφας καὶ τοὺς νυμφίους, καὶ θυσίαι καὶ ὕμνοι ποιητέοι τοῖς ἡμετέροις ποιηταῖς p. 460. πρέποντες | τοῖς γιγνομένοις γάμοις· τὸ δὲ πλῆθος τῶν γάμων ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄρχουσι ποιήσομεν, ἵν' ὡς μάλιστα διασῴζωσι τὸν αὐτὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ἀνδρῶν, πρός πολέμους τε καὶ νόσους καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποσκοποῦντες, καὶ μήτε μεγάλη ἡμῖν ἡ πόλις κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν μήτε σμικρὰ γίγνηται.

Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.

Pairing by lot.

Κλῆροι δή τινες, οἶμαι, ποιητέοι κομψοί, ὥστε τὸν φαῦλον ἐκεῖνον αἰτιᾶσθαι ἐφ' ἑκάστης συνέρξεως τύχην, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς ἄρχοντας.

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

17. ἔσονται A: om. ΠΜ.

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The brave deserve the fair.

Καὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς γέ που τῶν νέων ἐν πολέμῳ ἢ p. 460.
ἄλλοθί που γέρα δοτέον καὶ ἆθλα ἄλλα τε καὶ ἀφ- B
θονεστέρα ἡ ἐξουσία τῆς τῶν γυναικῶν ξυγκοιμήσεως, ἵνα καὶ ἅμα μετὰ προφάσεως ὡς πλεῖστοι τῶν παίδων ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων σπείρωνται.

Ὀρθῶς.

What is to be done with the children?

Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ ἀεὶ γιγνόμενα ἔκγονα παραλαμβάνουσαι αἱ ἐπὶ τούτων ἐφεστηκυῖαι ἀρχαὶ εἴτε ἀνδρῶν εἴτε γυναικῶν εἴτε ἀμφότερα —, κοιναὶ μὲν γάρ που καὶ ἀρχαὶ γυναιξί τε καὶ ἀνδράσιν.

Ναί.

Τὰ μὲν δὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, δοκῶ, λαβοῦσαι εἰς τὸν C
σηκὸν οἴσουσι παρά τινας τροφούς, χωρὶς οἰκούσας ἔν τινι μέρει τῆς πόλεως· τὰ δὲ τῶν χειρόνων, καὶ ἐάν τι τῶν ἑτέρων ἀνάπηρον γίγνηται, ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τε καὶ ἀδήλῳ κατακρύψουσιν ὡς πρέπει.

Εἴπερ μέλλει, ἔφη, καθαρὸν τὸ γένος τῶν φυλάκων ἔσεσθαι.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ τροφῆς οὗτοι ἐπιμελήσονται, τάς τε μητέρας ἐπὶ τὸν σηκὸν ἄγοντες, ὅταν σπαργῶσι,
πᾶσαν μηχανὴν μηχανώμενοι ὅπως μηδεμία τὸ αὑτῆς D
αἰσθήσεται, καὶ ἄλλας γάλα ἐχούσας ἐκπορίζοντες, ἐὰν μὴ αὐταὶ ἱκαναὶ ὦσι, καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων ἐπιμελήσονται, ὅπως μέτριον χρόνον θηλάσονται, ἀγρυπνίας δὲ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον πόνον τίτθαις τε καὶ τροφοῖς παραδώσουσιν;

Πολλὴν ῥᾳστώνην, ἔφη, λέγεις τῆς παιδοποιίας ταῖς τῶν φυλάκων γυναιξίν.

Πρέπει γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. τὸ δ' ἐφεξῆς διέλθωμεν

17. μέλλει Ξ : μέλλοι ΑΠΜ. 22. γάλα om. Π.
24. θηλάσονται Ξ : θηλάσωνται ΑΠΜ.

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p. 460. ὃ προὐθέμεθα. ἔφαμεν γὰρ δὴ ἐξ ἀκμαζόντων δεῖν τὰ ἔκγονα γίγνεσθαι.

Ἀληθῆ.

E Ἆρ᾽ οὖν σοι ξυνδοκεῖ μέτριος χρόνος ἀκμῆς τὰ εἴκοσι ἔτη γυναικί, ἀνδρὶ δὲ τὰ τριάκοντα;

Τὰ ποῖα αὐτῶν; ἔφη.

Γυναικὶ μέν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἀρξαμένῃ ἀπὸ εἰκοσιέτιδος μέχρι τετταρακονταέτιδος τίκτειν τῇ πόλει· ἀνδρὶ δέ, ἐπειδὰν τὴν ὀξυτάτην δρόμου ἀκμὴν παρῇ, τὸ ἀπὸ τούτου γεννᾶν τῇ πόλει μέχρι πεντεκαιπεντηκονταέτους.

A woman to bear children from twenty to forty; a man to beget them from twenty-five to fifty-five.

p. 461. Ἀμφοτέρων | γοῦν, ἔφη, αὕτη ἀκμὴ σώματός τε καὶ φρονήσεως.

Οὐκοῦν ἐάν τε πρεσβύτερος τούτων ἐάν τε νεώτερος τῶν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν γεννήσεων ἅψηται, οὔτε ὅσιον οὔτε δίκαιον φήσομεν τὸ ἁμάρτημα, ὡς παῖδα φιτύοντος τῇ πόλει, ὅς, ἂν λάθῃ, γεννήσεται οὐχ ὑπὸ θυσιῶν οὐδ᾽ ὑπὸ εὐχῶν φύς, ἃς ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστοις τοῖς γάμοις εὔξονται καὶ ἱέρειαι καὶ ἱερεῖς καὶ ξύμπασα ἡ πόλις ἐξ ἀγαθῶν ἀμείνους καὶ ἐξ ὠφελίμων ὠφελιμω-
B τέρους ἀεὶ τοὺς ἐκγόνους γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὸ σκότου μετὰ δεινῆς ἀκρατείας γεγονώς.

Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.

Ὁ αὐτὸς δέ γ᾽, εἶπον, νόμος, ἐάν τις τῶν ἔτι γεννώντων μὴ ξυνέρξαντος ἄρχοντος ἅπτηται τῶν ἐν ἡλικίᾳ γυναικῶν· νόθον γὰρ καὶ ἀνέγγυον καὶ ἀνίερον φήσομεν αὐτὸν παῖδα τῇ πόλει καθιστάναι.

Ὀρθότατα, ἔφη.

1. προὐθέμεθα xv Stob.: προθυμούμεθα AM: προμηθούμεθα Π.
18. φὺς ἃς AΞ: φύσας Π: θύσας ἃς M. ἐφ᾽ Amg (γρ.) Π: om. AM.
27. φήσομεν AM: θήσομεν A^2ΠM corr.

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After the prescribed age has been passed, more licence is allowed: but all who were born after certain hymeneal festivals at which their parents or grandparents came together must be kept separate.

Ὅταν δὲ δή, οἶμαι, αἵ τε γυναῖκες καὶ οἱ ἄνδρες p. 461. τοῦ γεννᾶν ἐκβῶσι τὴν ἡλικίαν, ἀφήσομέν που ἐλευθέρους αὐτοὺς συγγίγνεσθαι ᾧ ἂν ἐθέλωσι, πλὴν θυγατρὶ καὶ μητρὶ καὶ ταῖς τῶν θυγατέρων παισὶ καὶ C ταῖς ἄνω μητρός, καὶ γυναῖκας αὖ πλὴν υἱεῖ καὶ πατρὶ καὶ τοῖς τούτων εἰς τὸ κάτω καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω, καὶ ταῦτά γ' ἤδη πάντα διακελευσάμενοι προθυμεῖσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν μηδ' εἰς φῶς ἐκφέρειν κύημα μηδέ γ' ἕν, ἐὰν γένηται, ἐὰν δέ τι βιάσηται, οὕτω τιθέναι, ὡς οὐκ οὔσης τροφῆς τῷ τοιούτῳ.

Καὶ ταῦτα μέν γ', ἔφη, μετρίως λέγεται. πατέρας δὲ καὶ θυγατέρας καὶ ἃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες πῶς διαγνώ- D σονται ἀλλήλων;

Οὐδαμῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἀλλ' ἀφ' ἧς ἂν ἡμέρας τις αὐτῶν νυμφίος γένηται, μετ' ἐκείνην δεκάτῳ μηνὶ καὶ ἑβδόμῳ δὴ ἃ ἂν γένηται ἔκγονα, ταῦτα πάντα προσερεῖ τὰ μὲν ἄρρενα υἱεῖς, τὰ δὲ θήλεα θυγατέρας, καὶ ἐκεῖνα ἐκεῖνον πατέρα, καὶ οὕτω δὴ τὰ τούτων ἔκγονα παίδων παῖδας, καὶ ἐκεῖνα αὖ ἐκείνους πάππους τε καὶ τηθάς, τὰ δ' ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χρόνῳ γεγονότα, ἐν ᾧ αἱ μητέρες καὶ οἱ πατέρες αὐτῶν ἐγέννων, ἀδελφάς τε καὶ ἀδελφούς, ὥστε, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, E ἀλλήλων μὴ ἅπτεσθαι. ἀδελφοὺς δὲ καὶ ἀδελφὰς δώσει ὁ νόμος συνοικεῖν, ἐὰν ὁ κλῆρος ταύτῃ ξυμπίπτῃ καὶ ἡ Πυθία προσαναιρῇ.

Ὀρθότατα, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Ἡ μὲν δὴ κοινωνία, ὦ Γλαύκων, αὕτη τε καὶ τοιαύτη γυναικῶν τε καὶ παίδων τοῖς φύλαξί σοι τῆς

2. *ἀφήσομεν* Eusebius et Theodoretus : *φήσομεν* MSS.
8. *μηδέ γ' ἓν* AM : *μηδὲν* Π : *μηδὲ ἓν* cj. Cobet.
19. *ἐκεῖνα* Ξ : *ἐκείνου* ΑΠΜ.

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p. 461. πόλεως· ὡς δὲ ἑπομένη τε τῇ ἄλλῃ πολιτείᾳ καὶ μακρῷ βελτίστη, δεῖ δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο βεβαιώσασθαι παρὰ τοῦ λόγου. ἢ πῶς ποιῶμεν;

p. 462. | Οὕτω νὴ Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Ἆρ' οὖν οὐχ ἥδε ἀρχὴ τῆς ὁμολογίας, ἐρέσθαι ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, τί ποτε τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν εἰς πόλεως κατασκευήν, οὗ δεῖ στοχαζόμενον τὸν νομοθέτην τιθέναι τοὺς νόμους, καὶ τί μέγιστον κακόν, εἶτα ἐπισκέψασθαι, ἆρα ἃ νῦν δὴ διήλθομεν εἰς μὲν τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἴχνος ἡμῖν ἁρμόττει, τῷ δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ ἀναρμοστεῖ;

Πάντων μάλιστα, ἔφη.

The greatest good of States, unity; the greatest evil, discord. The one the result of public, the other of private feelings.

Ἔχομεν οὖν τι μεῖζον κακὸν πόλει ἢ ἐκεῖνο, ὃ ἂν
B αὐτὴν διασπᾷ καὶ ποιῇ πολλὰς ἀντὶ μιᾶς; ἢ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν τοῦ ὃ ἂν ξυνδῇ τε καὶ ποιῇ μίαν;

Οὐκ ἔχομεν.

Οὐκοῦν ἡ μὲν ἡδονῆς τε καὶ λύπης κοινωνία ξυνδεῖ, ὅταν ὅ τι μάλιστα πάντες οἱ πολῖται τῶν αὐτῶν γιγνομένων τε καὶ ἀπολλυμένων παραπλησίως χαίρωσι καὶ λυπῶνται;

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Ἡ δέ γε τῶν τοιούτων ἰδίωσις διαλύει, ὅταν οἱ μὲν περιαλγεῖς, οἱ δὲ περιχαρεῖς γίγνωνται ἐπὶ τοῖς
C αὐτοῖς παθήμασι τῆς πόλεώς τε καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει;

Τί δ' οὔ;

Ἆρ' οὖν ἐκ τοῦδε τὸ τοιόνδε γίγνεται, ὅταν μὴ ἅμα φθέγγωνται ἐν τῇ πόλει τὰ τοιάδε ῥήματα, τό τε ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἐμόν; καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου κατὰ ταὐτά;

1. ὡς δὲ A (corr. a p. m.) M : ὧδε Apr. Π. ἑπομένη A. 2. βελτίστῃ A. 15. ξυνδεῖ A. 27. ἐν τῇ πόλει ΑΠ : ἐν πόλει M.

†

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Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. p. 462.

Ἐν ᾗτινι δὴ πόλει πλεῖστοι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ τοῦτο λέγουσι τὸ ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἐμόν, αὕτη ἄριστα διοικεῖται;

Πολύ γε.

The State like a living being feels all together when hurt in any part.

Καὶ ἥτις δὴ ἐγγύτατα ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἔχει, οἷον ὅταν που ἡμῶν δάκτυλός του πληγῇ, πᾶσα ἡ κοινωνία ἡ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν τεταμένη εἰς μίαν σύνταξιν τὴν τοῦ ἄρχοντος ἐν αὐτῇ ᾔσθετό τε D καὶ πᾶσα ἅμα ξυνήλγησε μέρους πονήσαντος ὅλη, καὶ οὕτω δὴ λέγομεν ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὸν δάκτυλον ἀλγεῖ· καὶ περὶ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, περί τε λύπης πονοῦντος μέρους καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς ῥαΐζοντος;

Ὁ αὐτὸς γάρ, ἔφη· καὶ τοῦτο ὃ ἐρωτᾷς, τοῦ τοιούτου ἐγγύτατα ἡ ἄριστα πολιτευομένη πόλις οἰκεῖ.

Ἑνὸς δή, οἶμαι, πάσχοντος τῶν πολιτῶν ὁτιοῦν ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἡ τοιαύτη πόλις μάλιστά τε φήσει E ἑαυτῆς εἶναι τὸ πάσχον, καὶ ἢ ξυνησθήσεται ἅπασα ἢ ξυλλυπήσεται.

Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, τήν γε εὔνομον.

How different are the terms which are applied to the rulers in other States and in our own!

Ὥρα ἂν εἴη, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπανιέναι ἡμῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν πόλιν, καὶ τὰ τοῦ λόγου ὁμολογήματα σκοπεῖν ἐν αὐτῇ, εἰ αὐτὴ μάλιστ' ἔχει εἴτε καὶ ἄλλη τις μᾶλλον.

Οὐκοῦν χρή, ἔφη.

Τί οὖν; ἔστι μέν | που καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλε- p. 463.
σιν ἄρχοντές τε καὶ δῆμος, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ;

Ἔστιν.

1–3. κομιδῇ . . . ταὐτὰ om. Π. 2. πόλει ΑΠ: om. Mpr.

p. 463. Πολίτας μὲν δὴ πάντες οὗτοι ἀλλήλους προσεροῦσιν;

Πῶς δ' οὔ;

Ἀλλὰ πρὸς τῷ πολίτας τί ὁ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις δῆμος τοὺς ἄρχοντας προσαγορεύει;

Ἐν μὲν ταῖς πολλαῖς δεσπότας, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατουμέναις αὐτὸ τοὔνομα τοῦτο, ἄρχοντας.

Τί δ' ὁ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ δῆμος; πρὸς τῷ πολίτας τί τοὺς ἄρχοντάς φησιν εἶναι;

B Σωτῆράς τε καὶ ἐπικούρους, ἔφη.

Τί δ' οὗτοι τὸν δῆμον;

Μισθοδότας τε καὶ τροφέας.

Οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἄρχοντες τοὺς δήμους;

Δούλους, ἔφη.

Τί δ' οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀλλήλους;

Ξυνάρχοντας, ἔφη.

Τί δ' οἱ ἡμέτεροι;

Ξυμφύλακας.

Ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν τῶν ἀρχόντων τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν, εἴ τίς τινα ἔχει προσειπεῖν τῶν ξυναρχόντων τὸν μὲν ὡς οἰκεῖον, τὸν δ' ὡς ἀλλότριον;

Καὶ πολλούς γε.

Οὐκοῦν τὸν μὲν οἰκεῖον ὡς ἑαυτοῦ νομίζει τε καὶ C λέγει, τὸν δ' ἀλλότριον ὡς οὐχ ἑαυτοῦ;

Οὕτως.

Τί δὲ οἱ παρὰ σοὶ φύλακες; ἔσθ' ὅστις αὐτῶν ἔχοι ἂν τῶν ξυμφυλάκων νομίσαι τινὰ ἢ προσειπεῖν ὡς ἀλλότριον;

19. τῶν ἐν M: ἐν A, sed post rasuram viii literarum (utrum ἀρχόντων?) Π.

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Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη· παντὶ γάρ, ᾧ ἂν ἐντυγχάνῃ τις, p. 463. ἢ ὡς ἀδελφῷ ἢ ὡς ἀδελφῇ ἢ ὡς πατρὶ ἢ ὡς μητρὶ ἢ υἱεῖ ἢ θυγατρὶ ἢ τούτων ἐκγόνοις ἢ προγόνοις νομιεῖ ἐντυγχάνειν.

The State one family.

Κάλλιστα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις, ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ τόδε εἰπέ· πότερον αὐτοῖς τὰ ὀνόματα μόνον οἰκεῖα νομοθετήσεις, ἢ καὶ τὰς πράξεις πάσας κατὰ τὰ ὀνόματα D πράττειν, περί τε τοὺς πατέρας, ὅσα νόμος περὶ πατέρας αἰδοῦς τε πέρι καὶ κηδεμονίας καὶ τοῦ ὑπήκοον δεῖν εἶναι τῶν γονέων, ἢ μήτε πρὸς θεῶν μήτε πρὸς ἀνθρώπων αὐτῷ ἄμεινον ἔσεσθαι, ὡς οὔτε ὅσια οὔτε δίκαια πράττοντος ἄν, εἰ ἄλλα πράττοι ἢ ταῦτα; αὗταί σοι ἢ ἄλλαι φῆμαι ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν πολιτῶν ὑμνήσουσιν εὐθὺς περὶ τὰ τῶν παίδων ὦτα καὶ περὶ πατέρων, οὓς ἂν αὐτοῖς τις ἀποφήνῃ, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυγγενῶν;

Using the same terms, they will have the same modes of thinking and acting, and this is to be attributed mainly to the community of women and children.

Αὗται, ἔφη· γελοῖον γὰρ ἂν εἴη, εἰ ἄνευ ἔργων E οἰκεῖα ὀνόματα διὰ τῶν στομάτων μόνον φθέγγοιντο.

Πασῶν ἄρα πόλεων μάλιστα ἐν αὐτῇ ξυμφωνήσουσιν ἑνός τινος ἢ εὖ ἢ κακῶς πράττοντος, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν τὸ ῥῆμα, τὸ ὅτι τὸ ἐμὸν εὖ πράττει ἢ ὅτι τὸ ἐμὸν κακῶς.

Ἀληθέστατα, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Οὐκοῦν μετὰ | τούτου τοῦ δόγματός τε καὶ ῥήματος p. 464. ἔφαμεν ξυνακολουθεῖν τάς τε ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς λύπας κοινῇ;

Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε ἔφαμεν.

Οὐκοῦν μάλιστα τοῦ αὐτοῦ κοινωνήσουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ πολῖται, ὃ δὴ ἐμὸν ὀνομάσουσι; τούτου δὲ κοινωνοῦντες οὕτω δὴ λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς μάλιστα κοινωνίαν ἕξουσιν;

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p. 464. Πολύ γε.

Ἆρ' οὖν τούτων αἰτία πρὸς τῇ ἄλλῃ καταστάσει ἡ τῶν γυναικῶν τε καὶ παίδων κοινωνία τοῖς φύλαξιν;

Πολὺ μὲν οὖν μάλιστα, ἔφη.

B Ἀλλὰ μὴν μέγιστόν γε πόλει αὐτὸ ὡμολογήσαμεν ἀγαθόν, ἀπεικάζοντες εὖ οἰκουμένην πόλιν σώματι πρὸς μέρος αὐτοῦ λύπης τε πέρι καὶ ἡδονῆς ὡς ἔχει.

Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἔφη, ὡμολογήσαμεν.

Τοῦ μεγίστου ἄρα ἀγαθοῦ τῇ πόλει αἰτία ἡμῖν πέφανται ἡ κοινωνία τοῖς ἐπικούροις τῶν τε παίδων καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν.

Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη.

Καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τοῖς πρόσθεν γε ὁμολογοῦμεν· ἔφαμεν γάρ που οὔτε οἰκίας τούτοις ἰδίας δεῖν εἶναι C οὔτε γῆν οὔτε τι κτῆμα, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων τροφὴν λαμβάνοντας, μισθὸν τῆς φυλακῆς, κοινῇ πάντας ἀναλίσκειν, εἰ μέλλοιεν ὄντως φύλακες εἶναι.

Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.

There will be no private interests among them, and therefore no lawsuits or trials for assault or violence to elders.

Ἆρ' οὖν οὐχ, ὅπερ λέγω, τά τε πρόσθεν εἰρημένα καὶ τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀπεργάζεται αὐτοὺς ἀληθινοὺς φύλακας, καὶ ποιεῖ μὴ διασπᾶν τὴν πόλιν τὸ ἐμὸν ὀνομάζοντας μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀλλ' ἄλλον ἄλλο, τὸν μὲν εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ οἰκίαν ἕλκοντα ὅ τι ἂν δύνηται χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων κτήσασθαι, τὸν δὲ εἰς τὴν D ἑαυτοῦ ἑτέραν οὖσαν, καὶ γυναῖκά τε καὶ παῖδας ἑτέρους, ἡδονάς τε καὶ ἀλγηδόνας ἐμποιοῦντας ἰδίων ὄντων ἰδίας, ἀλλ' ἑνὶ δόγματι τοῦ οἰκείου πέρι ἐπὶ

15. ὁμολογοῦμεν Ξ: ὡμολογοῦμεν ΑΠΜ.

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τὸ αὐτὸ τείνοντας πάντας εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ὁμοπαθεῖς p. 464. λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς εἶναι;

Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Τί δέ; δίκαι τε καὶ ἐγκλήματα πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐκ οἰχήσεται ἐξ αὐτῶν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἴδιον ἐκτῆσθαι πλὴν τὸ σῶμα, τὰ δ' ἄλλα κοινά; ὅθεν δὴ ὑπάρχει τούτοις ἀστασιάστοις εἶναι, ὅσα γε E διὰ χρημάτων ἢ παίδων καὶ ξυγγενῶν κτῆσιν ἄνθρωποι στασιάζουσιν;

Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ἀπηλλάχθαι.

Καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ βιαίων γε οὐδ' αἰκίας δίκαι δικαίως ἂν εἶεν ἐν αὐτοῖς. ἥλιξι μὲν γὰρ ἥλικας ἀμύνεσθαι καλὸν καὶ δίκαιόν που φήσομεν, ἀνάγκην σωμάτων ἐπιμελείᾳ τιθέντες.

Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.

Καὶ γὰρ τόδε ὀρθὸν | ἔχει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὗτος ὁ p. 465. νόμος· εἴ πού τίς τῳ θυμοῖτο, ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πληρῶν τὸν θυμὸν ἧττον ἐπὶ μείζους ἂν ἴοι στάσεις.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Πρεσβυτέρῳ μὴν νεωτέρων πάντων ἄρχειν τε καὶ κολάζειν προστετάξεται.

Δῆλον.

Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε νεώτερος πρεσβύτερον, ἂν μὴ ἄρχοντες προστάττωσιν, οὔτε ἄλλο βιάζεσθαι ἐπιχειρήσει ποτὲ οὔτε τύπτειν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός. οἶμαι δ' οὐδὲ ἄλλως ἀτιμάσει· ἱκανὼ γὰρ τὼ φύλακε κωλύοντε, B δέος τε καὶ αἰδώς, αἰδὼς μὲν ὡς γονέων μὴ ἅπτεσθαι εἴργουσα, δέος δὲ * τοῦ τῷ πάσχοντι τοὺς ἄλλους

14. ἐπιμελείᾳ ΑΠΜ : ἐπιμελείας *q*K Stob.
20. πάντων ΑΠΜ : πάντῃ A².
28. τοῦ cj. Madvig : τὸ MSS.

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p. 465. βοηθεῖν, τοὺς μὲν ὡς υἱεῖς, τοὺς δὲ ὡς ἀδελφούς, τοὺς δὲ ὡς πατέρας.

Ξυμβαίνει γὰρ οὕτως, ἔφη.

Πανταχῇ δὴ ἐκ τῶν νόμων εἰρήνην πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἱ ἄνδρες ἄξουσιν;

Πολλήν γε.

From how many other evils will our citizens be delivered!

Τούτων μὴν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς μὴ στασιαζόντων οὐδὲν δεινὸν μή ποτε ἡ ἄλλη πόλις πρὸς τούτους ἢ πρὸς ἀλλήλους διχοστατήσῃ.

Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

C Τά γε μὴν σμικρότατα τῶν κακῶν δι' ἀπρέπειαν ὀκνῶ καὶ λέγειν, ὧν ἀπηλλαγμένοι ἂν εἶεν, κολακείας τε πλουσίων πένητες ἀπορίας τε καὶ ἀλγηδόνας ὅσας ἐν παιδοτροφίᾳ καὶ χρηματισμοῖς διὰ τροφὴν οἰκετῶν ἀναγκαίαν ἴσχουσι, τὰ μὲν δανειζόμενοι, τὰ δ' ἐξαρνούμενοι, τὰ δὲ πάντως πορισάμενοι θέμενοι παρὰ γυναῖκάς τε καὶ οἰκέτας, ταμιεύειν παραδόντες, ὅσα τε, ὦ φίλε, περὶ αὐτὰ καὶ οἷα πάσχουσι, δῆλά τε δὴ D καὶ ἀγεννῆ καὶ οὐκ ἄξια λέγειν.

Δῆλα γάρ, ἔφη, καὶ τυφλῷ.

Πάντων τε δὴ τούτων ἀπαλλάξονται, ζήσουσί τε τοῦ μακαριστοῦ βίου ὃν οἱ ὀλυμπιονῖκαι ζῶσι μακαριώτερον.

Πῇ;

Διὰ σμικρόν που μέρος εὐδαιμονίζονται ἐκεῖνοι ὧν τούτοις ὑπάρχει. ἥ τε γὰρ τῶνδε νίκη καλλίων, ἥ τ' ἐκ τοῦ δημοσίου τροφὴ τελεωτέρα. νίκην τε γὰρ νικῶσι ξυμπάσης τῆς πόλεως σωτηρίαν, τροφῇ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν ὅσων βίος δεῖται αὐτοί τε καὶ E παῖδες ἀναδοῦνται καὶ γέρα δέχονται παρὰ τῆς αὐ-

21. ἀπηλλάξονται cj. Cobet.

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τῶν πόλεως ζῶντές τε καὶ τελευτήσαντες ταφῆς ἀξίας p. 465. μετέχουσιν.

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Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, καλά.

Answer to the charge of Adeimantus that we make our citizens unhappy for their own good.

Μέμνησαι οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐκ οἶδα ὅτου λόγος ἡμῖν ἐπέπληξεν ὅτι τοὺς φύλακας οὐκ εὐδαίμονας | ποιοῖμεν, οἷς ἐξὸν πάντα ἔχειν p. 466. τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδὲν ἔχοιεν; ἡμεῖς δέ που εἴπομεν ὅτι τοῦτο μέν, εἴ που παραπίπτοι, εἰσαῦθις σκεψοίμεθα, νῦν δὲ τοὺς μὲν φύλακας φύλακας ποιοῖμεν, τὴν δὲ πόλιν ὡς οἷοί τ' εἶμεν εὐδαιμονεστάτην, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰς ἓν ἔθνος ἀποβλέποντες ἐν αὐτῇ τοῦτο εὔδαιμον πλάττοιμεν;

Μέμνημαι, ἔφη.

Their life not to be compared with that of citizens in ordinary States.

Τί οὖν; νῦν ἡμῖν ὁ τῶν ἐπικούρων βίος, εἴπερ τοῦ γε τῶν ὀλυμπιονικῶν πολύ τε καλλίων καὶ ἀμείνων φαίνεται, μή πῃ κατὰ τὸν τῶν σκυτοτόμων B φαίνεται βίον ἤ τινων ἄλλων δημιουργῶν ἢ τὸν τῶν γεωργῶν;

Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη.

He who seeks to be more than a guardian is naught.

Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὅ γε καὶ ἐκεῖ ἔλεγον, δίκαιον καὶ ἐνταῦθα εἰπεῖν, ὅτι, εἰ οὕτως ὁ φύλαξ ἐπιχειρήσει εὐδαίμων γίγνεσθαι, ὥστε μηδὲ φύλαξ εἶναι, μηδ' ἀρκέσει αὐτῷ βίος οὕτω μέτριος καὶ βέβαιος καὶ ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμὲν ἄριστος, ἀλλ' ἀνόητός τε καὶ μειρακιώδης δόξα ἐμπεσοῦσα εὐδαιμονίας πέρι ὁρμήσει αὐτὸν διὰ δύναμιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἅπαντα τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει οἰκειοῦ- C σθαι, γνώσεται τὸν Ἡσίοδον, ὅτι τῷ ὄντι ἦν σοφὸς λέγων πλέον εἶναί πως ἥμισυ παντός.

6. ποιοῖμεν Π : ποιοῦμεν A : ποιοῦμεν (οι above) M.
8. σκεψοίμεθα xv : σκεψόμεθα ΑΠΜ. 9. ποιοῖμεν ΠΜ : ποιοῦμεν A.
11. εὔδαιμον ΑΠ : om. M.

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p. 466. Ἐμοὶ μέν, ἔφη, ξυμβούλῳ χρώμενος μενεῖ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ βίῳ.

Συγχωρεῖς ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν κοινωνίαν τοῖς ἀνδράσιν, ἣν διεληλύθαμεν, παιδείας τε πέρι καὶ παίδων καὶ φυλακῆς τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν, κατά τε πόλιν μενούσας εἰς πόλεμόν τε ἰούσας καὶ ξυμφυλάττειν δεῖν καὶ ξυνθηρεύειν ὥσπερ κύνας, D καὶ πάντα πάντῃ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν κοινωνεῖν, καὶ ταῦτα πραττούσας τά τε βέλτιστα πράξειν καὶ οὐ παρὰ φύσιν τὴν τοῦ θήλεος πρὸς τὸ ἄρρεν, ᾗ πεφύκατον πρὸς ἀλλήλω κοινωνεῖν;

The common way of life includes common education, common children, common services and duties of men and women.

Συγχωρῶ, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐκεῖνο λοιπὸν διελέσθαι, εἰ ἄρα καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις δυνατόν, ὥσπερ ἐν ἄλλοις ζῴοις, ταύτην τὴν κοινωνίαν ἐγγενέσθαι, καὶ ὅπῃ δυνατόν;

Ἔφθης, ἔφη, εἰπὼν ᾗ ἔμελλον ὑπολήψεσθαι.

E Περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ οἶμαι, ἔφην, δῆλον ὃν τρόπον πολεμήσουσιν.

Πῶς; ἦ δ' ὅς.

Ὅτι κοινῇ στρατεύσονται, καὶ πρός γε ἄξουσι τῶν παίδων εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ὅσοι ἁδροί, ἵν' ὥσπερ οἱ τῶν ἄλλων δημιουργῶν θεῶνται ταῦτα, ἃ τελεωθέντας δεήσει δημιουργεῖν· πρὸς δὲ τῇ θέᾳ διακονεῖν καὶ | p. 467. ὑπηρετεῖν πάντα τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον, καὶ θεραπεύειν πατέρας τε καὶ μητέρας. ἢ οὐκ ᾔσθησαι τὰ περὶ τὰς τέχνας, οἷον τοὺς τῶν κεραμέων παῖδας, ὡς πολὺν χρόνον διακονοῦντες θεωροῦσι πρὶν ἅπτεσθαι τοῦ κεραμεύειν;

The children to accompany their parents on military expeditions;

Καὶ μάλα.

14. ἐν ἄλλοις ΑΠΜ : καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις *q* M corr. Ξ.

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Ἦ οὖν ἐκείνοις ἐπιμελέστερον παιδευτέον ἢ τοῖς φύλαξι τοὺς αὑτῶν ἐμπειρίᾳ τε καὶ θέᾳ τῶν προσηκόντων; p. 467.

Καταγέλαστον μέντ' ἄν, ἔφη, εἴη.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ μαχεῖταί γε πᾶν ζῷον διαφερόντως παρόντων ὧν ἂν τέκῃ. B

Ἔστιν οὕτω. κίνδυνος δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ σμικρὸς σφαλεῖσιν, οἷα δὴ ἐν πολέμῳ φιλεῖ, πρὸς ἑαυτοῖς παῖδας ἀπολέσαντας ποιῆσαι καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν ἀδύνατον ἀναλαβεῖν.

Ἀληθῆ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις. ἀλλὰ σὺ πρῶτον μὲν ἡγεῖ παρασκευαστέον τὸ μή ποτε κινδυνεῦσαι;

Οὐδαμῶς.

Τί δ'; εἴ που κινδυνευτέον, οὐκ ἐν ᾧ βελτίους ἔσονται κατορθοῦντες;

Δῆλον δή.

but care must be taken that they do not run any serious risk.

Ἀλλὰ σμικρὸν οἴει διαφέρειν καὶ οὐκ ἄξιον κινδύνου θεωρεῖν ἢ μὴ τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον παῖδας τοὺς ἄνδρας πολεμικοὺς ἐσομένους; C

Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ διαφέρει πρὸς ὃ λέγεις.

Τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα ὑπαρκτέον, θεωροὺς πολέμου τοὺς παῖδας ποιεῖν, προσμηχανᾶσθαι δ' αὐτοῖς ἀσφάλειαν, καὶ καλῶς ἕξει· ἦ γάρ;

Ναί.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρῶτον μὲν αὐτῶν οἱ πατέρες, ὅσα ἄνθρωποι, οὐκ ἀμαθεῖς ἔσονται ἀλλὰ γνωμονικοὶ τῶν στρατειῶν ὅσαι τε καὶ μὴ ἐπικίνδυνοι; D

Εἰκός, ἔφη.

Εἰς μὲν ἄρα τὰς ἄξουσιν, εἰς δὲ τὰς εὐλαβήσονται.

Ὀρθῶς.

p. 467. Καὶ ἄρχοντάς γέ που, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ τοὺς φαυλοτάτους αὐτοῖς ἐπιστήσουσιν ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐμπειρίᾳ τε καὶ ἡλικίᾳ ἱκανοὺς ἡγεμόνας τε καὶ παιδαγωγοὺς εἶναι. *Republic V.* SOCRATES, GLAUCON.

Πρέπει γάρ.

Ἀλλὰ γάρ, φήσομεν, καὶ παρὰ δόξαν πολλὰ πολλοῖς δὴ ἐγένετο.

Καὶ μάλα.

Πρὸς τοίνυν τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὦ φίλε, πτεροῦν χρὴ παιδία ὄντα εὐθύς, ἵν', ἄν τι δέῃ, πετόμενοι ἀποφεύγωσιν.

E Πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη.

Ἐπὶ τοὺς ἵππους, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀναβιβαστέον ὡς νεωτάτους, καὶ διδαξαμένους ἱππεύειν ἐφ' ἵππων ἀκτέον ἐπὶ τὴν θέαν, μὴ θυμοειδῶν μηδὲ μαχητικῶν, ἀλλ' ὅ τι ποδωκεστάτων καὶ εὐηνιωτάτων. οὕτω γὰρ κάλλιστά τε θεάσονται τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον, καὶ ἀσφαλέστατα, ἄν τι δέῃ, σωθήσονται μετὰ πρεσβυτέρων ἡγεμόνων ἑπόμενοι.

p. 468. Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, μοι δοκεῖς | λέγειν.

Τί δὲ δή, εἶπον, τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον; πῶς ἑκτέον σοι τοὺς στρατιώτας πρός αὐτούς τε καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους; ἆρα ὀρθῶς μοι καταφαίνεται ἢ οὔ;

Λέγ', ἔφη, ποῖ' ἄν.

Αὐτῶν μέν, εἶπον, τὸν λιπόντα τάξιν ἢ ὅπλα ἀποβαλόντα ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων ποιήσαντα διὰ κάκην ἆρα οὐ δημιουργόν τινα δεῖ καθιστάναι ἢ γεωργόν; The coward is to be degraded into a lower rank.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

14. διδαξαμένους *q*corr.: διδαξομένους ΑΠΜ: διδαχθέντας Πcorr. Mmg. Ξt: δεδιδαξομένους cj. Schneider. 24. ποίαν Π.

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Τὸν δὲ ζῶντα εἰς τοὺς πολεμίους ἁλόντα ἆρ᾽ οὐ p. 468. δωρεὰν διδόναι τοῖς θέλουσι χρῆσθαι τῇ ἄγρᾳ ὅ τι ἂν βούλωνται; B

Κομιδῇ γε.

The hero to receive honour from his comrades and favour from his beloved,

Τὸν δὲ ἀριστεύσαντά τε καὶ εὐδοκιμήσαντα οὐ πρῶτον μὲν ἐπὶ στρατείας ὑπὸ τῶν συστρατευομένων μειρακίων τε καὶ παίδων ἐν μέρει ὑπὸ ἑκάστου δοκεῖ σοι χρῆναι στεφανωθῆναι; ἢ οὔ;

Ἔμοιγε.

Τί δέ; δεξιωθῆναι;

Καὶ τοῦτο.

Ἀλλὰ τόδ᾽, οἶμαι, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, οὐκέτι σοι δοκεῖ.

Τὸ ποῖον;

Τὸ φιλῆσαί τε καὶ φιληθῆναι ὑπὸ ἑκάστου.

Πάντων, ἔφη, μάλιστα· καὶ προστίθημί γε τῷ νόμῳ, ἕως ἂν ἐπὶ ταύτης ὦσι τῆς στρατείας, καὶ C μηδενὶ ἐξεῖναι ἀπαρνηθῆναι ὃν ἂν βούληται φιλεῖν, ἵνα καί, ἐάν τίς του τύχῃ ἐρῶν ἢ ἄρρενος ἢ θηλείας, προθυμότερος ᾖ πρὸς τὸ τἀριστεῖα φέρειν.

Καλῶς, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἀγαθῷ ὄντι γάμοι τε ἕτοιμοι πλείους ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ αἱρέσεις τῶν τοιούτων πολλάκις παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ἔσονται, ἵν᾽ ὅ τι πλεῖστοι ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου γίγνωνται, εἴρηται ἤδη.

Εἴπομεν γάρ, ἔφη.

and to have precedence, and a larger share of meats and drinks;

Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ καθ᾽ Ὅμηρον τοῖς τοιοῖσδε δίκαιον τιμᾶν τῶν νέων ὅσοι ἀγαθοί. καὶ γὰρ Ὅμηρος τὸν D εὐδοκιμήσαντα ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ νώτοισιν Αἴαντα ἔφη διηνεκέεσσι γεραίρεσθαι, ὡς ταύτην οἰκείαν οὖσαν

8. χρῆναι ΑΠ : om. M.
16. καὶ μηδενὶ ΑΠ : μηδενὶ ΜΞ.

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p. 468. τιμὴν τῷ ἡβῶντί τε καὶ ἀνδρείῳ, ἐξ ἧς ἅμα τῷ τιμᾶσθαι καὶ τὴν ἰσχὺν αὐξήσει.

Ὀρθότατα, ἔφη.

Πεισόμεθα ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ταῦτά γε Ὁμήρῳ. καὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ἔν τε θυσίαις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις πᾶσι τοὺς ἀγαθούς, καθ' ὅσον ἂν ἀγαθοὶ φαίνωνται, καὶ ὕμνοις καὶ οἷς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν τιμήσομεν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις
E ἕδραις τε καὶ κρέασιν ἰδὲ πλείοις δεπάεσσιν, ἵνα ἅμα τῷ τιμᾶν ἀσκῶμεν τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας τε καὶ γυναῖκας.

Κάλλιστα, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Εἶεν· τῶν δὲ δὴ ἀποθανόντων ἐπὶ στρατείας ὃς ἂν εὐδοκιμήσας τελευτήσῃ ἆρ' οὐ πρῶτον μὲν φήσομεν τοῦ χρυσοῦ γένους εἶναι;

Πάντων γε μάλιστα.

also to be worshipped after death.

Ἀλλ' οὐ πεισόμεθα Ἡσιόδῳ, ἐπειδάν τινες τοῦ τοιούτου γένους τελευτήσωσιν, ὡς ἄρα

p. 469. | οἱ μὲν δαίμονες ἁγνοὶ ἐπιχθόνιοι τελέθουσιν,
ἐσθλοί, ἀλεξίκακοι, φύλακες μερόπων ἀνθρώπων;

Πεισόμεθα μὲν οὖν.

Διαπυθόμενοι ἄρα τοῦ θεοῦ, πῶς χρὴ τοὺς δαιμονίους τε καὶ θείους τιθέναι καὶ τίνι διαφόρῳ, οὕτω καὶ ταύτῃ θήσομεν ᾗ ἂν ἐξηγῆται;

Τί δ' οὐ μέλλομεν;

Καὶ τὸν λοιπὸν δὴ χρόνον ὡς δαιμόνων, οὕτω
B θεραπεύσομέν τε καὶ προσκυνήσομεν αὐτῶν τὰς θήκας; ταὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα νομιοῦμεν ὅταν τις γήρᾳ ἤ τινι ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ τελευτήσῃ τῶν ὅσοι ἂν διαφερόντως ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἀγαθοὶ κριθῶσιν;

Δίκαιον γοῦν, ἔφη.

19–21. ἀνθρώπων . . . . θεοῦ om. Π. 21. ἂν πῶς Π.

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Socrates, Glaucon.

Behaviour to enemies.

Τί δέ; πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους πῶς ποιήσουσιν ἡμῖν p. 469. οἱ στρατιῶται;

Τὸ ποῖον δή;

Πρῶτον μὲν ἀνδραποδισμοῦ πέρι, δοκεῖ δίκαιον Ἕλληνας Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι, ἢ μηδ᾽ ἄλλῃ ἐπιτρέπειν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ τοῦτο ἐθίζειν, τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ γένους φείδεσθαι, εὐλαβουμένους τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων δουλείαν; C

Ὅλῳ καὶ παντί, ἔφη, διαφέρει τὸ φείδεσθαι.

No Hellene shall be made a slave.

Μηδὲ Ἕλληνα ἄρα δοῦλον ἐκτῆσθαι μήτε αὐτούς, τοῖς τε ἄλλοις Ἕλλησιν οὕτω ξυμβουλεύειν;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη· μᾶλλόν γ᾽ ἂν οὖν οὕτω πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους τρέποιντο, ἑαυτῶν δ᾽ ἀπέχοιντο.

Τί δέ; σκυλεύειν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τοὺς τελευτήσαντας πλὴν ὅπλων, ἐπειδὰν νικήσωσιν, ἦ καλῶς ἔχει; ἢ οὐ πρόφασιν μὲν τοῖς δειλοῖς ἔχει μὴ πρὸς τὸν μαχό- D μενον ἰέναι, ὥς τι τῶν δεόντων δρῶντας ὅταν περὶ τὸν τεθνεῶτα κυπτάζωσι, πολλὰ δὲ ἤδη στρατόπεδα διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἁρπαγὴν ἀπώλετο;

Καὶ μάλα.

Those who fall in battle are not to be despoiled.

Ἀνελεύθερον δὲ οὐ δοκεῖ καὶ φιλοχρήματον νεκρὸν συλᾶν, καὶ γυναικείας τε καὶ σμικρᾶς διανοίας τὸ πολέμιον νομίζειν τὸ σῶμα τοῦ τεθνεῶτος ἀποπταμένου τοῦ ἐχθροῦ, λελοιπότος δὲ ᾧ ἐπολέμει; ἢ οἴει τι διάφορον δρᾶν τοὺς τοῦτο ποιοῦντας τῶν κυνῶν, E αἳ τοῖς λίθοις οἷς ἂν βληθῶσι χαλεπαίνουσι, τοῦ βαλόντος οὐχ ἁπτόμεναι;

Οὐδὲ σμικρόν, ἔφη.

Ἐατέον ἄρα τὰς νεκροσυλίας καὶ τὰς τῶν ἀναιρέσεων διακωλύσεις;

27. βαλόντος A: βάλλοντος ΠΜ.

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p. 469. Ἐατέον μέντοι, ἔφη, νὴ Δία.

Οὐδὲ μὴν που πρὸς τὰ ἱερὰ τὰ ὅπλα οἴσομεν ὡς ἀναθήσοντες, ἄλλως τε καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἐάν τι
p. 470. ἡμῖν μέλῃ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς | ἄλλους Ἕλληνας εὐνοίας· μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ φοβησόμεθα μή τι μίασμα ᾖ πρὸς ἱερὸν τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκείων φέρειν, ἐὰν μή τι δὴ ὁ θεὸς ἄλλο λέγῃ.

The arms of Hellenes not to be offered at temples;

Ὀρθότατα, ἔφη.

Τί δέ; γῆς τε τμήσεως τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς καὶ οἰκιῶν ἐμπρήσεως ποῖόν τί σοι δράσουσιν οἱ στρατιῶται πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους;

Σοῦ, ἔφη, δόξαν ἀποφαινομένου ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούσαιμι.

B Ἐμοὶ μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δοκεῖ τούτων μηδέτερα ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐπέτειον καρπὸν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι. καὶ ὧν ἕνεκα, βούλει σοι λέγω;

nor Hellenic territory devastated.

Πάνυ γε.

Φαίνεταί μοι, ὥσπερ καὶ ὀνομάζεται δύο ταῦτα ὀνόματα, πόλεμός τε καὶ στάσις, οὕτω καὶ εἶναι δύο, ὄντα ἐπὶ δυοῖν τινοῖν διαφοραῖν. λέγω δὲ τὰ δύο τὸ μὲν οἰκεῖον καὶ ξυγγενές, τὸ δὲ ἀλλότριον καὶ ὀθνεῖον. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῇ τοῦ οἰκείου ἔχθρᾳ στάσις κέκληται, ἐπὶ δὲ τῇ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου πόλεμος.

Καὶ οὐδέν γε, ἔφη, ἄπο τρόπου λέγεις.

C Ὅρα δὴ καὶ εἰ τόδε πρὸς τρόπου λέγω. φημὶ γὰρ τὸ μὲν Ἑλληνικὸν γένος αὐτὸ αὑτῷ οἰκεῖον εἶναι καὶ ξυγγενές, τῷ δὲ βαρβαρικῷ ὀθνεῖόν τε καὶ ἀλλότριον.

Καλῶς γε, ἔφη.

Ἕλληνας μὲν ἄρα βαρβάροις καὶ βαρβάρους

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Hellenic warfare is only a kind of discord not intended to be lasting.

Ἕλλησι πολεμεῖν μαχομένους τε φήσομεν καὶ πολε- p. 470. μίους φύσει εἶναι, καὶ πόλεμον τὴν ἔχθραν ταύτην κλητέον· Ἕλληνας δὲ Ἕλλησιν, ὅταν τι τοιοῦτο δρῶσι, φύσει μὲν φίλους εἶναι, νοσεῖν δ' ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ στασιάζειν, καὶ στάσιν τὴν D τοιαύτην ἔχθραν κλητέον.

Ἐγὼ μέν, ἔφη, ξυγχωρῶ οὕτω νομίζειν.

Σκόπει δή, εἶπον, ὅτι ἐν τῇ νῦν ὁμολογουμένῃ στάσει, ὅπου ἄν τι τοιοῦτον γένηται καὶ διαστῇ πόλις, ἐὰν ἑκάτεροι ἑκατέρων τέμνωσιν ἀγροὺς καὶ οἰκίας ἐμπιπρῶσιν, ὡς ἀλιτηριώδης τε δοκεῖ ἡ στάσις εἶναι καὶ οὐδέτεροι αὐτῶν φιλοπόλιδες· οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε ἐτόλμων τὴν τροφόν τε καὶ μητέρα κείρειν· ἀλλὰ μέτριον εἶναι τοὺς καρποὺς ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τοῖς κρατοῦσι τῶν κρατουμένων, καὶ διανοεῖσθαι ὡς διαλλαγη- E σομένων καὶ οὐκ ἀεὶ πολεμησόντων.

Πολὺ γάρ, ἔφη, ἡμερωτέρων αὕτη ἡ διάνοια ἐκείνης.

Τί δὲ δή; ἔφην· ἣν σὺ πόλιν οἰκίζεις, οὐχ Ἑλληνὶς ἔσται;

Δεῖ γ' αὐτήν, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀγαθοί τε καὶ ἥμεροι ἔσονται;

Σφόδρα γε.

The lover of his own city will also be a lover of Hellas.

Ἀλλ' οὐ φιλέλληνες; οὐδὲ οἰκείαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἡγήσονται, οὐδὲ κοινωνήσουσιν ὧνπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἱερῶν;

Καὶ σφόδρα γε.

Οὐκοῦν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας διαφοράν, | ὡς p. 471. οἰκείους, στάσιν ἡγήσονται καὶ οὐδὲ ὀνομάσουσι πόλεμον;

Οὐ γάρ.

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p. 471. Καὶ ὡς διαλλαγησόμενοι ἄρα διοίσονται;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Εὐμενῶς δὴ σωφρονιοῦσιν, οὐκ ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ κολάζοντες οὐδ’ ἐπ’ ὀλέθρῳ, σωφρονισταὶ ὄντες, οὐ πολέμιοι.

Οὕτως, ἔφη.

Hellenes should deal mildly with Hellenes; and with barbarians as Hellenes now deal with one another.

Οὐδ’ ἄρα τὴν Ἑλλάδα Ἕλληνες ὄντες κεροῦσιν, οὐδὲ οἰκήσεις ἐμπρήσουσιν, οὐδὲ ὁμολογήσουσιν ἐν ἑκάστῃ πόλει πάντας ἐχθροὺς αὐτοῖς εἶναι, καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας, ἀλλ’ ὀλίγους ἀεὶ B ἐχθροὺς τοὺς αἰτίους τῆς διαφορᾶς. καὶ διὰ ταῦτα πάντα οὔτε τὴν γῆν ἐθελήσουσι κείρειν αὐτῶν, ὡς φίλων τῶν πολλῶν, οὔτε οἰκίας ἀνατρέπειν, ἀλλὰ μέχρι τούτου ποιήσονται τὴν διαφοράν, μέχρι οὗ ἂν οἱ αἴτιοι ἀναγκασθῶσιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναιτίων ἀλγούντων δοῦναι δίκην.

Ἐγὼ μέν, ἔφη, ὁμολογῶ οὕτω δεῖν πρὸς τοὺς ἐναντίους τοὺς ἡμετέρους πολίτας προσφέρεσθαι· πρὸς δὲ τοὺς βαρβάρους, ὡς νῦν οἱ Ἕλληνες πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

Τιθῶμεν δὴ καὶ τοῦτον τὸν νόμον τοῖς φύλαξι, C μήτε γῆν τέμνειν μήτε οἰκίας ἐμπιπράναι;

Θῶμεν, ἔφη, καὶ ἔχειν γε καλῶς ταῦτά τε καὶ τὰ πρόσθεν.

The complaint of Glaucon respecting the hesitation of Socrates.

Ἀλλὰ γάρ μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐάν τίς σοι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπιτρέπῃ λέγειν, οὐδέποτε μνησθήσεσθαι ὃ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν παρωσάμενος πάντα ταῦτα εἴρηκας, τὸ ὡς δυνατὴ αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία γενέσθαι καὶ τίνα τρόπον ποτὲ δυνατή· ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε, εἰ γένοιτο, πάντ’ ἂν εἴη ἀγαθὰ πόλει ᾗ γένοιτο, καὶ ἃ σὺ παραλείπεις

4. οὐ πολέμιοι ΑΠ: ὡς οὐ πολέμιοι Amg. M.

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ἐγὼ λέγω, ὅτι καὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἄριστ' ἂν μάχοιντο p. 471. τῷ ἥκιστα ἀπολείπειν ἀλλήλους, γιγνώσκοντές τε D καὶ ἀνακαλοῦντες ταῦτα τὰ ὀνόματα ἑαυτούς, ἀδελφούς, πατέρας, υἱεῖς· εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸ θῆλυ συστρατεύοιτο, εἴτε καὶ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ τάξει εἴτε καὶ ὄπισθεν ἐπιτεταγμένον, φόβων τε ἕνεκα τοῖς ἐχθροῖς καὶ εἴ ποτέ τις ἀνάγκη βοηθείας γένοιτο, οἶδ' ὅτι ταύτῃ πάντῃ ἄμαχοι ἂν εἶεν· καὶ οἴκοι γε ἃ παραλείπεται ἀγαθά, ὅσα ἂν εἴη αὐτοῖς, ὁρῶ· ἀλλ' ὡς ἐμοῦ ὁμολογοῦντος E πάντα ταῦτα ὅτι εἴη ἂν καὶ ἄλλα γε μυρία, εἰ γένοιτο ἡ πολιτεία αὕτη, μηκέτι πλείω περὶ αὐτῆς λέγε, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἤδη πειρώμεθα ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς πείθειν, ὡς δυνατὸν καὶ ᾗ δυνατόν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα χαίρειν ἐῶμεν.

Socrates excuses himself and makes one or two remarks preparatory to a final effort.

| Ἐξαίφνης γε σύ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὥσπερ καταδρομὴν p. 472. ἐποιήσω ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον μου, καὶ οὐ συγγιγνώσκεις στραγγευομένῳ. ἴσως γὰρ οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι μόγις μοι τὼ δύο κύματε ἐκφυγόντι νῦν τὸ μέγιστον καὶ χαλεπώτατον τῆς τρικυμίας ἐπάγεις, ὃ ἐπειδὰν ἴδῃς τε καὶ ἀκούσῃς, πάνυ συγγνώμην ἕξεις, ὅτι εἰκότως ἄρα ὤκνουν τε καὶ ἐδεδοίκη οὕτω παράδοξον λόγον λέγειν τε καὶ ἐπιχειρεῖν διασκοπεῖν.

Ὅσῳ ἄν, ἔφη, τοιαῦτα πλείω λέγῃς, ἧττον ἀφεθήσει ὑφ' ἡμῶν πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἰπεῖν πῇ δυνατὴ γίγ- B νεσθαι αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία. ἀλλὰ λέγε καὶ μὴ διάτριβε.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρῶτον μὲν τόδε χρὴ ἀναμνησθῆναι, ὅτι ἡμεῖς ζητοῦντες δικαιοσύνην οἷόν ἐστι καὶ ἀδικίαν δεῦρο ἥκομεν.

8. οἴκοι γε A²M : οἴκοι τε AΠ.

17. στραγγευομένῳ cj. Casp. Orelli et Vindob. F corr.: στρατευομένῳ MSS. 21. λόγον λέγειν M : λέγειν λόγον AΠ : λέγειν λέγειν *q* pr. 28. ἀδικία Π.

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p. 472. Χρή· ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτό γ'; ἔφη.

Οὐδέν· ἀλλ' ἐὰν εὕρωμεν οἷόν ἐστι δικαιοσύνη, ἆρα καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν δίκαιον ἀξιώσομεν μηδὲν δεῖν αὐτῆς ἐκείνης διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ πανταχῇ τοιοῦτον C εἶναι οἷον δικαιοσύνη ἐστίν; ἢ ἀγαπήσομεν, ἐὰν ὅ τι ἐγγύτατα αὐτῆς ᾖ καὶ πλεῖστα τῶν ἄλλων ἐκείνης μετέχῃ;

Οὕτως, ἔφη· ἀγαπήσομεν.

Παραδείγματος ἄρα ἕνεκα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐζητοῦμεν αὐτό τε δικαιοσύνην οἷόν ἐστι, καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τελέως δίκαιον, εἰ γένοιτο, καὶ οἷος ἂν εἴη γενόμενος, καὶ ἀδικίαν αὖ καὶ τὸν ἀδικώτατον, ἵνα εἰς ἐκείνους ἀποβλέποντες, οἷοι ἂν ἡμῖν φαίνωνται εὐδαιμονίας τε πέρι καὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου, ἀναγκαζώμεθα καὶ περὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ὁμολογεῖν, ὃς ἂν ἐκείνοις ὅ τι ὁμοιότα-D τος ᾖ, τὴν ἐκείνοις μοῖραν ὁμοιοτάτην ἕξειν, ἀλλ' οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα, ἵν' ἀποδείξωμεν ὡς δυνατὰ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι.

(1) The ideal is a standard only which can never be perfectly realized;

Τοῦτο μέν, ἔφη, ἀληθὲς λέγεις.

Οἴει ἂν οὖν ἧττόν τι ἀγαθὸν ζωγράφον εἶναι ὃς ἂν γράψας παράδειγμα οἷον ἂν εἴη ὁ κάλλιστος ἄνθρωπος καὶ πάντα εἰς τὸ γράμμα ἱκανῶς ἀποδοὺς μὴ ἔχῃ ἀποδεῖξαι ὡς καὶ δυνατὸν γενέσθαι τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα;

Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη.

E Τί οὖν; οὐ καὶ ἡμεῖς, φαμέν, παράδειγμα ἐποιοῦμεν λόγῳ ἀγαθῆς πόλεως;

Πάνυ γε.

9. ζητοῦμεν Π.

11. εἰ MSS.: ᾖ cj. Bekker. καὶ οἷος MSS.: οἷος cj. Madvig.

16. ἐκείνοις Ξ: ἐκείνης ΑΠ: ἐκείν^οι^ης M.

22. εἰς τὸ γράμμα ἱκανῶς ΑΠ: ἱκανῶς εἰς τὸ γράμμα M.

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Ἧττόν τι οὖν οἴει ἡμᾶς εὖ λέγειν τούτου ἕνεκα, ἐὰν μὴ ἔχωμεν ἀποδεῖξαι ὡς δυνατὸν οὕτω πόλιν οἰκῆσαι ὡς ἐλέγετο; p. 472.

(2) but is none the worse for that.

Οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη.

Τὸ μὲν τοίνυν ἀληθές, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὕτως· εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο προθυμηθῆναι δεῖ σὴν χάριν, ἀποδεῖξαι πῇ μάλιστα καὶ κατὰ τί δυνατώτατ' ἂν εἴη, πάλιν μοι πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην ἀπόδειξιν τὰ αὐτὰ διομολόγησαι.

Τὰ ποῖα;

Ἆρ' οἷόν τέ τι | πραχθῆναι ὡς λέγεται, ἢ φύσιν p. 473. ἔχει πρᾶξιν λέξεως ἧττον ἀληθείας ἐφάπτεσθαι, κἂν εἰ μή τῳ δοκεῖ; ἀλλὰ σὺ πότερον ὁμολογεῖς οὕτως ἢ οὔ;

Ὁμολογῶ, ἔφη.

Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ μὴ ἀνάγκαζέ με, οἷα τῷ λόγῳ διήλθομεν, τοιαῦτα παντάπασι καὶ τῷ ἔργῳ δεῖν γιγνόμενα ἀποφαίνειν· ἀλλ', ἐὰν οἷοί τε γενώμεθα εὑρεῖν ὡς ἂν ἐγγύτατα τῶν εἰρημένων πόλις οἰκήσειεν, φάναι ἡμᾶς ἐξευρηκέναι ὡς δυνατὰ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι ἃ σὺ ἐπιτάττεις. ἢ οὐκ ἀγαπήσεις τούτων B τυγχάνων; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἂν ἀγαπῴην.

Καὶ γὰρ ἐγώ, ἔφη.

(3) Although the ideal cannot be realized, one or two changes, or rather a single change, might revolutionize a State.

Τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικε, πειρώμεθα ζητεῖν τε καὶ ἀποδεικνύναι, τί ποτε νῦν κακῶς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι πράττεται δι' ὃ οὐχ οὕτως οἰκοῦνται, καὶ τίνος ἂν σμικροτάτου μεταβαλόντος ἔλθοι εἰς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς πολιτείας πόλις, μάλιστα μὲν ἑνός, εἰ δὲ μή, δυοῖν, εἰ δὲ μή, ὅ τι ὀλιγίστων τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ σμικροτάτων τὴν δύναμιν.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. C

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p. 473. Ἑνὸς μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μεταβαλόντος δοκοῦμέν μοι ἔχειν δεῖξαι ὅτι μεταπέσοι ἄν, οὐ μέντοι σμικροῦ γε οὐδὲ ῥᾳδίου, δυνατοῦ δέ.

Τίνος; ἔφη.

Socrates goes forth to meet the wave.

Ἐπ' αὐτὸ δή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἶμι ὃ τῷ μεγίστῳ προσεικάζομεν κύματι. εἰρήσεται δ' οὖν, εἰ καὶ μέλλει γέλωτί τε ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ κῦμα ἐκγελῶν καὶ ἀδοξίᾳ κατακλύσειν. σκόπει δὲ ὃ μέλλω λέγειν.

Λέγε, ἔφη.

D Ἐὰν μή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ οἱ φιλόσοφοι βασιλεύσωσιν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἢ οἱ βασιλῆς τε νῦν λεγόμενοι καὶ δυνάσται φιλοσοφήσωσι γνησίως τε καὶ ἱκανῶς, καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ταὐτὸν συμπέσῃ, δύναμίς τε πολιτικὴ καὶ φιλοσοφία, τῶν δὲ νῦν πορευομένων χωρὶς ἐφ' ἑκάτερον αἱ πολλαὶ φύσεις ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀποκλεισθῶσιν, οὐκ ἔστι κακῶν παῦλα, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, ταῖς πόλεσι, δοκῶ δ' οὐδὲ τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ γένει, οὐδὲ αὕτη ἡ πολι-
E τεία μή ποτε πρότερον φυῇ τε εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ φῶς ἡλίου ἴδῃ, ἣν νῦν λόγῳ διεληλύθαμεν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὃ ἐμοὶ πάλαι ὄκνον ἐντίθησι λέγειν, ὁρῶντι ὡς πολὺ παρὰ δόξαν ῥηθήσεται· χαλεπὸν γὰρ ἰδεῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλῃ τις εὐδαιμονήσειεν οὔτε ἰδίᾳ οὔτε δημοσίᾳ.

'Cities will never cease from ill until they are governed by philosophers.'

Καὶ ὅς, Ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, τοιοῦτον ἐκβέβληκας ῥῆμά τε καὶ λόγον, ὃν εἰπὼν ἡγοῦ ἐπὶ σὲ πάνυ πολλούς τε καὶ οὐ φαύλους νῦν οὕτως, οἷον ῥίψαντας τὰ
p. 474. ἱμάτια, | γυμνοὺς λαβόντας ὅ τι ἑκάστῳ παρέτυχεν ὅπλον, θεῖν διατεταμένους ὡς θαυμάσια ἐργασομένους·

What will the world say to this?

5. προσεικάζομεν (vel προσηκάζομεν) xυ Stob.: προ(σ)εικάζομεν A: προεικάζομεν ΠΜ: παρεικάζομεν Ξ.
28. ἐργασομένους M: ἐργασομένους A (ο in litura): ἐργασαμένους Π.

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οὓς εἰ μὴ ἀμυνεῖ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἐκφεύξει, τῷ ὄντι p. 474. τωθαζόμενος δώσεις δίκην.

Οὐκοῦν σύ μοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τούτων αἴτιος;

Καλῶς γ', ἔφη, ἐγὼ ποιῶν. ἀλλά τοί σε οὐ προδώσω, ἀλλ' ἀμυνῶ οἷς δύναμαι· δύναμαι δὲ εὐνοίᾳ τε καὶ τῷ παρακελεύεσθαι, καὶ ἴσως ἂν ἄλλου του ἐμμελέστερόν σοι ἀποκρινοίμην. ἀλλ' ὡς B ἔχων τοιοῦτον βοηθὸν πειρῶ τοῖς ἀπιστοῦσιν ἐνδείξασθαι ὅτι ἔχει ᾗ σὺ λέγεις.

But who is a philosopher?

Πειρατέον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ οὕτω μεγάλην ξυμμαχίαν παρέχει. ἀναγκαῖον οὖν μοι δοκεῖ, εἰ μέλλομέν πῃ ἐκφεύξεσθαι οὓς λέγεις, διορίσασθαι πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοὺς φιλοσόφους τίνας λέγοντες τολμῶμεν φάναι δεῖν ἄρχειν, ἵνα διαδήλων γενομένων δύνηταί τις ἀμύνεσθαι, ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτι τοῖς μὲν προσήκει φύσει ἅπτεσθαί τε φιλοσοφίας ἡγεμονεύειν C τ' ἐν πόλει, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις μήτε ἅπτεσθαι ἀκολουθεῖν τε τῷ ἡγουμένῳ.

Ὥρα ἂν εἴη, ἔφη, ὁρίζεσθαι.

Ἴθι δή, ἀκολούθησόν μοι τῇδε, ἐὰν αὐτὸ ἀμῇ γέ πῃ ἱκανῶς ἐξηγησώμεθα.

Ἄγε, ἔφη.

Parallel of the lover.

Ἀναμιμνήσκειν οὖν σε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δεήσει, ἢ μέμνησαι ὅτι ὃν ἂν φῶμεν φιλεῖν τι, δεῖ φανῆναι αὐτόν, ἐὰν ὀρθῶς λέγηται, οὐ τὸ μὲν φιλοῦντα ἐκείνου, τὸ δὲ μή, ἀλλὰ πᾶν στέργοντα;

Ἀναμιμνήσκειν, ἔφη, ὡς ἔοικε, δεῖ· οὐ γὰρ πάνυ D γε ἐννοῶ.

The lover of the fair loves them all;

Ἄλλῳ, εἶπον, ἔπρεπεν, ὦ Γλαύκων, λέγειν ἃ λέγεις· ἀνδρὶ δ' ἐρωτικῷ οὐ πρέπει ἀμνημονεῖν ὅτι

22. ἄγε ΑΠ: ἄγε δὴ Μ.

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p. 474. πάντες οἱ ἐν ὥρᾳ τὸν φιλόπαιδα καὶ ἐρωτικὸν ἁμῇ γέ πῃ δάκνουσί τε καὶ κινοῦσι, δοκοῦντες ἄξιοι εἶναι ἐπιμελείας τε καὶ τοῦ ἀσπάζεσθαι. ἢ οὐχ οὕτω ποιεῖτε πρὸς τοὺς καλούς; ὁ μέν, ὅτι σιμός, ἐπίχαρις κληθεὶς ἐπαινεθήσεται ὑφ' ὑμῶν, τοῦ δὲ τὸ γρυπὸν βασιλικόν φατε εἶναι, τὸν δὲ δὴ διὰ μέσου E τούτων ἐμμετρώτατα ἔχειν, μέλανας δὲ ἀνδρικοὺς ἰδεῖν, λευκοὺς δὲ θεῶν παῖδας εἶναι· μελιχλώρους δὲ καὶ τοὔνομα οἴει τινὸς ἄλλου ποίημα εἶναι ἢ ἐραστοῦ ὑποκοριζομένου τε καὶ εὐχερῶς φέροντος τὴν ὠχρότητα, ἐὰν ἐπὶ ὥρᾳ ᾖ; καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ πάσας p. 475. προφάσεις προφασίζεσθέ τε | καὶ πάσας φωνὰς ἀφίετε, ὥστε μηδένα ἀποβάλλειν τῶν ἀνθούντων ἐν ὥρᾳ.

Εἰ βούλει, ἔφη, ἐπ' ἐμοῦ λέγειν περὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν ὅτι οὕτω ποιοῦσι, συγχωρῶ τοῦ λόγου χάριν.

Τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· τοὺς φιλοίνους οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ποιοῦντας ὁρᾷς; πάντα οἶνον ἐπὶ πάσης προφάσεως ἀσπαζομένους;

the lover of wines, all wines;

Καὶ μάλα.

Καὶ μὴν φιλοτίμους γε, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, καθορᾷς ὅτι, ἂν μὴ στρατηγῆσαι δύνωνται, τριττυαρχοῦσι, κἂν μὴ B ὑπὸ μειζόνων καὶ σεμνοτέρων τιμᾶσθαι, ὑπὸ σμικροτέρων καὶ φαυλοτέρων τιμώμενοι ἀγαπῶσιν, ὡς ὅλως τιμῆς ἐπιθυμηταὶ ὄντες.

the lover of honour, all honour;

Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

Τοῦτο δὴ φάθι ἢ μή· ἆρα ὃν ἄν τινος ἐπιθυμητικὸν λέγωμεν, παντὸς τοῦ εἴδους τούτου φήσομεν ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἢ τοῦ μέν, τοῦ δὲ οὔ;

5. ἐπαινεθήσεται ΑΠ : ἐπαινεῖται Α²Μ. 7. ἐμμετρώτατα (ο in litura) Α. 8. μελιχλώρους Α (γρ.) mg. : μελαγχλώρους ΑΠΜ. 23. τιμῶνται Μ.

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the philosopher, or lover of wisdom, all knowledge.

Παντός, ἔφη. p. 475.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον σοφίας φήσομεν ἐπιθυμητὴν εἶναι, οὐ τῆς μέν, τῆς δ' οὔ, ἀλλὰ πάσης;

Ἀληθῆ.

Τὸν ἄρα περὶ τὰ μαθήματα δυσχεραίνοντα, ἄλλως C τε καὶ νέον ὄντα καὶ μήπω λόγον ἔχοντα τί τε χρηστὸν καὶ μή, οὐ φήσομεν φιλομαθῆ οὐδὲ φιλόσοφον εἶναι, ὥσπερ τὸν περὶ τὰ σιτία δυσχερῆ οὔτε πεινῆν φαμὲν οὔτ' ἐπιθυμεῖν σιτίων, οὐδὲ φιλόσιτον ἀλλὰ κακόσιτον εἶναι.

Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε φήσομεν.

Τὸν δὲ δὴ εὐχερῶς ἐθέλοντα παντὸς μαθήματος γεύεσθαι καὶ ἀσμένως ἐπὶ τὸ μανθάνειν ἰόντα καὶ ἀπλήστως ἔχοντα, τοῦτον δ' ἐν δίκῃ φήσομεν φιλόσοφον· ἦ γάρ;

Under knowledge, however, are not to be included sights and sounds, or under the lovers of knowledge, musical amateurs and the like.

Καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων ἔφη· Πολλοὶ ἄρα καὶ ἄτοποι D ἔσονταί σοι τοιοῦτοι. οἵ τε γὰρ φιλοθεάμονες πάντες ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσι τῷ καταμανθάνειν χαίροντες τοιοῦτοι εἶναι, οἵ τε φιλήκοοι ἀτοπώτατοί τινές εἰσιν ὥς γ' ἐν φιλοσόφοις τιθέναι, οἳ πρὸς μὲν λόγους καὶ τοιαύτην διατριβὴν ἑκόντες οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοιεν ἐλθεῖν, ὥσπερ δὲ ἀπομεμισθωκότες τὰ ὦτα ἐπακοῦσαι πάντων χορῶν περιθέουσι τοῖς Διονυσίοις οὔτε τῶν κατὰ πόλεις οὔτε τῶν κατὰ κώμας ἀπολειπόμενοι. τούτους οὖν πάντας καὶ ἄλλους τοιούτων τινῶν μαθητικοὺς καὶ τοὺς τῶν τεχνυδρίων φιλοσόφους E φήσομεν;

Οὐδαμῶς, εἶπον, ἀλλ' ὁμοίους μὲν φιλοσόφοις.

Τοὺς δὲ ἀληθινούς, ἔφη, τίνας λέγεις;

Τοὺς τῆς ἀληθείας, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φιλοθεάμονας.

26. μαθητικοὺς Apr. (?) r: μαθηματικοὺς A corr. ΠΜ.

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p. 475. Καὶ τοῦτο μέν γ', ἔφη, ὀρθῶς· ἀλλὰ πῶς αὐτὸ λέγεις;

Οὐδαμῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ῥᾳδίως πρός γε ἄλλον· σὲ δὲ οἶμαι ὁμολογήσειν μοι τὸ τοιόνδε.

Τὸ ποῖον;

Ἐπειδή ἐστιν ἐναντίον καλὸν αἰσχρῷ, δύο αὐτὼ
p. 476. | εἶναι.

Πῶς δ' οὔ;

Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ δύο, καὶ ἓν ἑκάτερον;

Καὶ τοῦτο.

Καὶ περὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν πέρι ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, αὐτὸ μὲν ἓν ἕκαστον εἶναι, τῇ δὲ τῶν πράξεων καὶ σωμάτων καὶ ἀλλήλων κοινωνίᾳ πανταχοῦ φανταζόμενα πολλὰ φαίνεσθαι ἕκαστον.

Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Ταύτῃ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διαιρῶ· χωρὶς μὲν οὓς νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες φιλοθεάμονάς τε καὶ φιλοτέχνους καὶ
B πρακτικούς, καὶ χωρὶς αὖ περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος, οὓς μόνους ἄν τις ὀρθῶς προσείποι φιλοσόφους.

Πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις;

Οἱ μέν που, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φιλήκοοι καὶ φιλοθεάμονες τάς τε καλὰς φωνὰς ἀσπάζονται καὶ χρόας καὶ σχήματα καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων δημιουργούμενα, αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ καλοῦ ἀδύνατος αὐτῶν ἡ διάνοια τὴν φύσιν ἰδεῖν τε καὶ ἀσπάσασθαι.

Ἔχει γὰρ οὖν δή, ἔφη, οὕτως.

Οἱ δὲ δὴ ἐπ' αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν δυνατοὶ ἰέναι τε καὶ
C ὁρᾶν καθ' αὑτὸ ἆρα οὐ σπάνιοι ἂν εἶεν;

Καὶ μάλα.

25. τὴν φύσιν ΑΠΜ: τὸν νοῦν r Π corr. *q*.

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Ὁ οὖν καλὰ μὲν πράγματα νομίζων, αὐτὸ δὲ p. 476. κάλλος μήτε νομίζων μήτε, ἄν τις ἡγῆται ἐπὶ τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτοῦ, δυνάμενος ἕπεσθαι, ὄναρ ἢ ὕπαρ δοκεῖ σοι ζῆν; σκόπει δέ. τὸ ὀνειρώττειν ἆρα οὐ τόδε ἐστίν, ἐάν τε ἐν ὕπνῳ τις ἐάν τ' ἐγρηγορὼς τὸ ὅμοιόν τῳ μὴ ὅμοιον ἀλλ' αὐτὸ ἡγῆται εἶναι ᾧ ἔοικεν;

Ἐγὼ γοῦν ἄν, ἦ δ' ὅς, φαίην ὀνειρώττειν τὸν τοιοῦτον.

True knowledge is the ability to distinguish between the one and the many, between the idea and the objects which partake of the idea.

Τί δέ; ὁ τἀναντία τούτων ἡγούμενός τέ τι αὐτὸ D καλὸν καὶ δυνάμενος καθορᾶν καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου μετέχοντα, καὶ οὔτε τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτὸ οὔτε αὐτὸ τὰ μετέχοντα ἡγούμενος, ὕπαρ ἢ ὄναρ αὖ καὶ οὗτος δοκεῖ σοι ζῆν;

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, ὕπαρ.

Οὐκοῦν τούτου μὲν τὴν διάνοιαν ὡς γιγνώσκοντος γνώμην ἂν ὀρθῶς φαῖμεν εἶναι, τοῦ δὲ δόξαν ὡς δοξάζοντος;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Τί οὖν, ἐὰν ἡμῖν χαλεπαίνῃ οὗτος, ὅν φαμεν δοξάζειν ἀλλ' οὐ γιγνώσκειν, καὶ ἀμφισβητῇ ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγομεν, ἕξομέν τι παραμυθεῖσθαι αὐ- E τὸν καὶ πείθειν ἠρέμα, ἐπικρυπτόμενοι ὅτι οὐχ ὑγιαίνει;

Δεῖ γέ τοι δή, ἔφη.

Ἴθι δή, σκόπει τί ἐροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτόν. ἢ βούλει ὧδε πυνθανώμεθα παρ' αὐτοῦ, λέγοντες ὡς εἴ τι οἶδεν οὐδεὶς αὐτῷ φθόνος, ἀλλ' ἄσμενοι ἂν ἴδοιμεν εἰδότα τι. ἀλλ' ἡμῖν εἰπὲ τόδε· ὁ γιγνώσκων γιγνώσκει τὶ ἢ οὐδέν; σὺ οὖν μοι ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου ἀποκρίνου.

There is an interme-

Ἀποκρινοῦμαι, ἔφη, ὅτι γιγνώσκει τί.

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diate between being and not being, and a corresponding intermediate between ignorance and knowledge. This intermediate is a faculty termed opinion.

p. 476. Πότερον ὂν ἢ οὐκ ὄν;

p. 477. Ὄν· πῶς γὰρ | ἂν μὴ ὄν γέ τι γνωσθείη;

Ἱκανῶς οὖν τοῦτο ἔχομεν, κἂν εἰ πλεοναχῇ σκοποῖμεν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν παντελῶς ὂν παντελῶς γνωστόν, μὴ ὂν δὲ μηδαμῇ πάντῃ ἄγνωστον;

Ἱκανώτατα.

Εἶεν· εἰ δὲ δή τι οὕτως ἔχει ὡς εἶναί τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι, οὐ μεταξὺ ἂν κέοιτο τοῦ εἰλικρινῶς ὄντος καὶ τοῦ αὖ μηδαμῇ ὄντος;

Μεταξύ.

Οὐκοῦν *ἐπεὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τῷ ὄντι γνῶσις ἦν, ἀγνω-

B σία δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐπὶ μὴ ὄντι, ἐπὶ τῷ μεταξὺ τούτῳ μεταξύ τι καὶ ζητητέον ἀγνοίας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης, εἴ τι τυγχάνει ὂν τοιοῦτον;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Ἆρ' οὖν λέγομέν τι δόξαν εἶναι;

Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Πότερον ἄλλην δύναμιν ἐπιστήμης ἢ τὴν αὐτήν;

Ἄλλην.

Ἐπ' ἄλλῳ ἄρα τέτακται δόξα καὶ ἐπ' ἄλλῳ ἐπιστήμη, κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν ἑκατέρα τὴν αὑτῆς.

Οὕτω.

Οὐκοῦν ἐπιστήμη μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι πέφυκε, γνῶναι ὡς ἔστι τὸ ὄν; μᾶλλον δὲ ὧδέ μοι δοκεῖ πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι διελέσθαι.

Πῶς;

C Φήσομεν δυνάμεις εἶναι γένος τι τῶν ὄντων, αἷς δὴ

11. ἐπεὶ ἐπὶ cj. Herm.: ἐπὶ ΑΠΜ: εἰ ἐπὶ q.

13. μεταξὺ ΑΠΜ: μεταξὺ δὲ Ξ.

21. κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν Vind. F.: κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν A: κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν ΠΜ: κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην δύναμιν cj. Herm.

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καὶ ἡμεῖς δυνάμεθα ἃ δυνάμεθα καὶ ἄλλο πᾶν ὅ τί περ p. 477. ἂν δύνηται, οἷον λέγω ὄψιν καὶ ἀκοὴν τῶν δυνάμεων εἶναι, εἰ ἄρα μανθάνεις ὃ βούλομαι λέγειν τὸ εἶδος.

Ἀλλὰ μανθάνω, ἔφη.

Ἄκουσον δὴ ὅ μοι φαίνεται περὶ αὐτῶν. δυνάμεως γὰρ ἐγὼ οὔτε τινὰ χρόαν ὁρῶ οὔτε σχῆμα οὔτε τι τῶν τοιούτων οἷον καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν, πρὸς ἃ ἀποβλέπων ἔνια διορίζομαι παρ' ἐμαυτῷ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα. δυνάμεως δ' εἰς ἐκεῖνο μόνον D βλέπω ἐφ' ᾧ τε ἔστι καὶ ὃ ἀπεργάζεται, καὶ ταύτῃ ἑκάστην αὐτῶν δύναμιν ἐκάλεσα, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ τεταγμένην καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπεργαζομένην τὴν αὐτὴν καλῶ, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ ἑτέρῳ καὶ ἕτερον ἀπεργαζομένην ἄλλην. τί δὲ σύ; πῶς ποιεῖς;

Οὕτως, ἔφη.

Δεῦρο δὴ πάλιν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ ἄριστε. ἐπιστήμην πότερον δύναμίν τινα φῂς εἶναι αὐτήν, ἢ εἰς τί γένος τίθης;

Εἰς τοῦτο, ἔφη, πασῶν γε δυνάμεων ἐρρωμενε- E στάτην.

Τί δέ, δόξαν εἰς δύναμιν ἢ εἰς ἄλλο εἶδος οἴσομεν;

Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη. ᾧ γὰρ δοξάζειν δυνάμεθα, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ δόξα ἐστίν.

Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ὀλίγον γε πρότερον ὡμολόγεις μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ δόξαν.

Opinion differs from knowledge because the one errs, and the other is unerring.

Πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ἔφη, τό γε ἀναμάρτητον τῷ μὴ ἀναμαρτήτῳ ταὐτόν τις νοῦν ἔχων τιθείη;

Καλῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ δῆλον, ὅτι ἕτερον ἐπιστήμης δόξα | ὁμολογεῖται ἡμῖν. p. 478.

Ἕτερον.

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p. 478. Ἐφ' ἑτέρῳ ἄρα ἕτερόν τι δυναμένη ἑκατέρα αὐτῶν πέφυκεν.

Ἀνάγκη.

Ἐπιστήμη μέν γέ που ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι, τὸ ὂν γνῶναι ὡς ἔχει;

Ναί.

Δόξα δέ, φαμέν, δοξάζειν;

Ναί.

Ἦ ταὐτὸν ὅπερ ἐπιστήμη γιγνώσκει; καὶ ἔσται γνωστόν τε καὶ δοξαστὸν τὸ αὐτό; ἢ ἀδύνατον;

Ἀδύνατον, ἔφη, ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων, εἴπερ ἐπ' ἄλλῳ ἄλλη δύναμις πέφυκε, δυνάμεις δὲ ἀμφότεραί B ἐστον, δόξα τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ἄλλη δὲ ἑκατέρα, ὥς φαμέν. ἐκ τούτων δὴ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ γνωστὸν καὶ δοξαστὸν ταὐτὸν εἶναι.

Οὐκοῦν εἰ τὸ ὂν γνωστόν, ἄλλο τι ἂν δοξαστὸν ἢ τὸ ὂν εἴη;

Ἄλλο.

It also differs from ignorance, which is concerned with nothing.

Ἆρ' οὖν τὸ μὴ ὂν δοξάζει; ἢ ἀδύνατον καὶ δοξάσαι τό γε μὴ ὄν; ἐννόει δέ. οὐχ ὁ δοξάζων ἐπὶ τὶ φέρει τὴν δόξαν; ἢ οἷόν τε αὖ δοξάζειν μέν, δοξάζειν δὲ μηδέν;

Ἀδύνατον.

Ἀλλ' ἕν γέ τι δοξάζει ὁ δοξάζων;

Ναί.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν μὴ ὄν γε οὐχ ἕν τι, ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ὀρθότατ' C ἂν προσαγορεύοιτο.

Πάνυ γε.

Μὴ ὄντι μὴν ἄγνοιαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀπέδομεν, ὄντι δὲ γνῶσιν.

20. τό γε A²M: τὸ AΠ.

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Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.

Οὐκ ἄρα ὂν οὐδὲ μὴ ὂν δοξάζει.

Οὐ γάρ.

Οὔτε ἄρα ἄγνοια οὔτε γνῶσις δόξα ἂν εἴη.

Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

Its place is not to be sought without or beyond knowledge or ignorance, but between them.

Ἆρ' οὖν ἐκτὸς τούτων ἐστὶν ὑπερβαίνουσα ἢ γνῶσιν σαφηνείᾳ ἢ ἄγνοιαν ἀσαφείᾳ;

Οὐδέτερα.

Ἀλλ' ἆρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, γνώσεως μέν σοι φαίνεται δόξα σκοτωδέστερον, ἀγνοίας δὲ φανότερον;

Καὶ πολύ γε, ἔφη.

Ἐντὸς δ' ἀμφοῖν κεῖται; D

Ναί.

Μεταξὺ ἄρα ἂν εἴη τούτοιν δόξα.

Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

Οὐκοῦν ἔφαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν, εἴ τι φανείη οἷον ἅμα ὄν τε καὶ μὴ ὄν, τὸ τοιοῦτον μεταξὺ κεῖσθαι τοῦ εἰλικρινῶς ὄντος τε καὶ τοῦ πάντως μὴ ὄντος, καὶ οὔτε ἐπιστήμην οὔτε ἄγνοιαν ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ μεταξὺ αὖ φανὲν ἀγνοίας καὶ ἐπιστήμης;

Ὀρθῶς.

Νῦν δέ γε πέφανται μεταξὺ τούτοιν ὃ δὴ καλοῦμεν δόξαν.

Πέφανται.

Ἐκεῖνο δὴ λείποιτ' ἂν ἡμῖν εὑρεῖν, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ E ἀμφοτέρων μετέχον, τοῦ εἶναί τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ οὐδέτερον εἰλικρινὲς ὀρθῶς ἂν προσαγορευόμενον, ἵνα, ἐὰν φανῇ, δοξαστὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι ἐν δίκῃ προσαγορεύωμεν, τοῖς μὲν ἄκροις τὰ ἄκρα, τοῖς δὲ μεταξὺ τὰ μεταξὺ ἀποδιδόντες. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως;

10. φανότερον AM : φανερώτερον ΠΞ.

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SOCRATES, GLAUCON.

The absoluteness of the one and the relativeness of the many.

p. 478. Οὕτως.

Τούτων δὴ ὑποκειμένων λεγέτω μοι, φήσω, καὶ p. 479. ἀποκρινέσθω | ὁ χρηστός, ὃς αὐτὸ μὲν καλὸν καὶ ἰδέαν τινὰ αὐτοῦ κάλλους μηδεμίαν ἡγεῖται ἀεὶ μὲν κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν, πολλὰ δὲ τὰ καλὰ νομίζει, ἐκεῖνος ὁ φιλοθεάμων καὶ οὐδαμῇ ἀνεχόμενος, ἄν τις ἓν τὸ καλὸν φῇ εἶναι καὶ δίκαιον, καὶ τἆλλα οὕτω. τούτων γὰρ δή, ὦ ἄριστε, φήσομεν, τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν μῶν τι ἔστιν, ὃ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν φανήσεται; καὶ τῶν δικαίων, ὃ οὐκ ἄδικον; καὶ τῶν ὁσίων, ὃ οὐκ ἀνόσιον;

B Οὔκ, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, καὶ καλά πως αὐτὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ φανῆναι, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἐρωτᾷς.

Τί δέ; τὰ πολλὰ διπλάσια ἧττόν τι ἡμίσεα ἢ διπλάσια φαίνεται;

Οὐδέν.

Καὶ μεγάλα δὴ καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ κοῦφα καὶ βαρέα μή τι μᾶλλον ἃ ἂν φήσωμεν, ταῦτα προσρηθήσεται ἢ τἀναντία;

Οὔκ, ἀλλ' ἀεί, ἔφη, ἕκαστον ἀμφοτέρων ἕξεται.

Πότερον οὖν ἔστι μᾶλλον ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἕκαστον τῶν πολλῶν τοῦτο, ὃ ἄν τις φῇ αὐτὸ εἶναι;

Τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ἑστιάσεσιν, ἔφη, ἐπαμφοτερίζουσιν C ἔοικε, καὶ τῷ τῶν παίδων αἰνίγματι τῷ περὶ τοῦ εὐνούχου τῆς βολῆς πέρι τῆς νυκτερίδος, ᾧ καὶ ἐφ' οὗ αὐτὸν αὐτὴν αἰνίττονται βαλεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα ἐπαμφοτερίζειν, καὶ οὔτ' εἶναι οὔτε μὴ εἶναι οὐδὲν αὐτῶν δυνατὸν παγίως νοῆσαι, οὔτε ἀμφότερα οὔτε οὐδέτερον.

Ἔχεις οὖν αὐτοῖς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅ τι χρήσει, ἢ ὅποι

3. μὲν om. Π. 4. ἡγεῖται A²M : ἡγῆται AΠ.
25. ᾧ M : ὡς AΠ corr. : ω Πpr.

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θήσεις καλλίω θέσιν τῆς μεταξὺ οὐσίας τε καὶ τοῦ p. 479. μὴ εἶναι; οὔτε γάρ που σκοτωδέστερα μὴ ὄντος πρὸς τὸ μᾶλλον μὴ εἶναι φανήσεται, οὔτε φανότερα D ὄντος πρὸς τὸ μᾶλλον εἶναι.

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

Εὑρήκαμεν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅτι τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλὰ νόμιμα καλοῦ τε πέρι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μεταξύ που κυλινδεῖται τοῦ τε μὴ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ὄντος εἰλικρινῶς.

Εὑρήκαμεν.

Προωμολογήσαμεν δέ γε, εἴ τι τοιοῦτον φανείη, δοξαστὸν αὐτὸ ἀλλ' οὐ γνωστὸν δεῖν λέγεσθαι, τῇ μεταξὺ δυνάμει τὸ μεταξὺ πλανητὸν ἁλισκόμενον.

Ὡμολογήκαμεν.

Opinion is the apprehension, not of the absolute, but of the many.

Τοὺς ἄρα πολλὰ καλὰ θεωμένους, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ E καλὸν μὴ ὁρῶντας μηδ' ἄλλῳ ἐπ' αὐτὸ ἄγοντι δυναμένους ἕπεσθαι, καὶ πολλὰ δίκαια, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ δίκαιον μή, καὶ πάντα οὕτω, δοξάζειν φήσομεν ἅπαντα, γιγνώσκειν δὲ ὧν δοξάζουσιν οὐδέν.

Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

Τί δὲ αὖ τοὺς αὐτὰ ἕκαστα θεωμένους καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ὄντα; ἆρ' οὐ γιγνώσκειν ἀλλ' οὐ δοξάζειν;

Ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαί τε καὶ φιλεῖν τούτους μὲν ταῦτα φήσομεν ἐφ' οἷς γνῶσίς ἐστιν, | ἐκείνους p. 480. δὲ ἐφ' οἷς δόξα; ἢ οὐ μνημονεύομεν, ὅτι φωνάς τε καὶ χρόας καλὰς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔφαμεν τούτους φιλεῖν τε καὶ θεᾶσθαι, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ καλὸν οὐδ' ἀνέχεσθαι ὥς τι ὄν;

14. ὡμολογήκαμεν MSS.: an ὡμολογήσαμεν?

p. 480. Μεμνήμεθα.

Μὴ οὖν τι πλημμελήσομεν φιλοδόξους καλοῦντες αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον ἢ φιλοσόφους; καὶ ἆρα ἡμῖν σφόδρα χαλεπανοῦσιν, ἂν οὕτω λέγωμεν;

Οὔκ, ἄν γ' ἐμοὶ πείθωνται, ἔφη· τῷ γὰρ ἀληθεῖ χαλεπαίνειν οὐ θέμις.

Τοὺς αὐτὸ ἄρα ἕκαστον τὸ ὂν ἀσπαζομένους φιλοσόφους ἀλλ' οὐ φιλοδόξους κλητέον;

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

2. πλημμελήσομεν A^2Π : πλημμελήσωμεν AM.
7. τὸ ὂν AΠ : τὸ ἓν M.

5.

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| Οἱ μὲν δὴ φιλόσοφοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, καὶ οἱ μὴ διὰ μακροῦ τινὸς διεξελθόντος λόγου μόγις πως ἀνεφάνησαν οἵ εἰσιν ἑκάτεροι. p. 484.

Ἴσως γάρ, ἔφη, διὰ βραχέος οὐ ῥᾴδιον.

If we had time, we might have a nearer view of the true and false philosopher.

Οὐ φαίνεται, εἶπον. ἔμοιγ' οὖν ἔτι δοκεῖ ἂν βελτιόνως φανῆναι, εἰ περὶ τούτου μόνου ἔδει ῥηθῆναι, καὶ μὴ πολλὰ τὰ λοιπὰ διελθεῖν μέλλοντι κατόψεσθαι τί διαφέρει βίος δίκαιος ἀδίκου. B

Τί οὖν, ἔφη, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἡμῖν;

Τί δ' ἄλλο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ τὸ ἑξῆς; ἐπειδὴ φιλόσοφοι μὲν οἱ τοῦ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος δυνάμενοι ἐφάπτεσθαι, οἱ δὲ μὴ ἀλλ' ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ πάντως ἴσχουσι πλανώμενοι οὐ φιλόσοφοι, ποτέρους δὴ δεῖ πόλεως ἡγεμόνας εἶναι;

Πῶς οὖν λέγοντες ἂν αὐτό, ἔφη, μετρίως λέγοιμεν;

Which of them shall be our guardians?

Ὁπότεροι ἄν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δυνατοὶ φαίνωνται φυλάξαι νόμους τε καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα πόλεων, τούτους καθιστάναι φύλακας. C

Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.

2. διεξελθόντος ΑΠΜ : διεξελθόντες xυ : διεξεληλυθότος q.
3. οἳ ΑΠΜ : οἷοι Π²Ξ. 13. πάντως ΑΠΜ : παντοίως Π²mg. (γρ.).

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SOCRATES, ADEIMANTUS.

A question hardly to be asked.

p. 484. Τόδε δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἆρα δῆλον, εἴτε τυφλὸν εἴτε ὀξὺ ὁρῶντα χρὴ φύλακα τηρεῖν ὁτιοῦν;

Καὶ πῶς, ἔφη, οὐ δῆλον;

Ἦ οὖν δοκοῦσί τι τυφλῶν διαφέρειν οἱ τῷ ὄντι τοῦ ὄντος ἑκάστου ἐστερημένοι τῆς γνώσεως, καὶ μηδὲν ἐναργὲς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔχοντες παράδειγμα, μηδὲ δυνάμενοι, ὥσπερ γραφῆς, εἰς τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἀποβλέποντες κἀκεῖσε ἀεὶ ἀναφέροντές τε καὶ θεώμενοι
D ὡς οἷόν τε ἀκριβέστατα, οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε νόμιμα καλῶν τε πέρι καὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀγαθῶν τίθεσθαί τε, ἐὰν δέῃ τίθεσθαι, καὶ τὰ κείμενα φυλάττοντες σώζειν;

Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐ πολύ τι διαφέρει.

Τούτους οὖν μᾶλλον φύλακας στησόμεθα ἢ τοὺς ἐγνωκότας μὲν ἕκαστον τὸ ὄν, ἐμπειρίᾳ δὲ μηδὲν ἐκείνων ἐλλείποντας μηδ' ἐν ἄλλῳ μηδενὶ μέρει ἀρετῆς ὑστεροῦντας;

Ἄτοπον μέντ' ἄν, ἔφη, εἴη ἄλλους αἱρεῖσθαι, εἴ γε τἆλλα μὴ ἐλλείποιντο· τούτῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ σχεδόν τι τῷ μεγίστῳ ἂν προέχοιεν.

p. 485. | Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο δὴ λέγωμεν, τίνα τρόπον οἷοί τ' ἔσονται οἱ αὐτοὶ κἀκεῖνα καὶ ταῦτα ἔχειν;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

The philosopher is a lover of all truth and of all true being.

Ὃ τοίνυν ἀρχόμενοι τούτου τοῦ λόγου ἐλέγομεν, τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν πρῶτον δεῖν καταμαθεῖν· καὶ οἶμαι, ἐὰν ἐκείνην ἱκανῶς ὁμολογήσωμεν, ὁμολογήσειν καὶ ὅτι οἷοί τε ταῦτα ἔχειν οἱ αὐτοί, ὅτι τε οὐκ ἄλλους πόλεων ἡγεμόνας δεῖ εἶναι ἢ τούτους.

Πῶς;

Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ τῶν φιλοσόφων φύσεων πέρι ὡμο-

25. δεῖν ΑΠΜ : δεῖ ΦΚ*qv*.

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Socrates, Glaucon.

λογήσθω ἡμῖν, ὅτι μαθήματός γε ἀεὶ ἐρῶσιν ὃ ἂν p. 485. αὐτοῖς δηλοῖ ἐκείνης τῆς οὐσίας τῆς ἀεὶ οὔσης καὶ B μὴ πλανωμένης ὑπὸ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς.

Ὡμολογήσθω.

Καὶ μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ὅτι πάσης αὐτῆς, καὶ οὔτε σμικροῦ οὔτε μείζονος οὔτε τιμιωτέρου οὔτε ἀτιμοτέρου μέρους ἑκόντες ἀφίενται, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν περί τε τῶν φιλοτίμων καὶ ἐρωτικῶν διήλθομεν.

Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Τόδε τοίνυν μετὰ τοῦτο σκόπει εἰ ἀνάγκη ἔχειν πρὸς τούτῳ ἐν τῇ φύσει οἳ ἂν μέλλωσιν ἔσεσθαι C οἵους ἐλέγομεν.

Τὸ ποῖον;

Τὴν ἀψεύδειαν καὶ τὸ ἑκόντας εἶναι μηδαμῇ προσδέχεσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος, ἀλλὰ μισεῖν, τὴν δ' ἀλήθειαν στέργειν.

Εἰκός γ', ἔφη.

Οὐ μόνον γε, ὦ φίλε, εἰκός, ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τὸν ἐρωτικῶς του φύσει ἔχοντα πᾶν τὸ ξυγγενές τε καὶ οἰκεῖον τῶν παιδικῶν ἀγαπᾶν.

Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.

Ἦ οὖν οἰκειότερον σοφίᾳ τι ἀληθείας ἂν εὕροις;

Καὶ πῶς; ἦ δ' ὅς.

Ἦ οὖν δυνατὸν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν φιλόσοφόν τε καὶ φιλοψευδῆ; D

Οὐδαμῶς γε.

Τὸν ἄρα τῷ ὄντι φιλομαθῆ πάσης ἀληθείας δεῖ εὐθὺς ἐκ νέου ὅ τι μάλιστα ὀρέγεσθαι.

Παντελῶς γε.

1. ὃ ἂν ΑΠ : ὅσα ἂν Π^2 : ὅσ ἂν Μ.

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SOCRATES, GLAUCON.

He will be absorbed in the pleasures of the soul, and therefore temperate and the reverse of covetous or mean.

p. 485. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτῳ γε εἰς ἕν τι αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι σφόδρα ῥέπουσιν, ἴσμεν που ὅτι εἰς τἆλλα τούτῳ ἀσθενέστεραι, ὥσπερ ῥεῦμα ἐκεῖσε ἀπωχετευμένον.

Τί μήν;

Ὁι δὴ πρὸς τὰ μαθήματα καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐρρυήκασι, περὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς, οἶμαι, ἡδονὴν αὐτῆς καθ' αὑτὴν εἶεν ἄν, τὰς δὲ διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐκλείποιεν, εἰ μὴ πεπλασμένως ἀλλ' ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφός
E τις εἴη.

Μεγάλη ἀνάγκη.

Σώφρων μὴν ὅ γε τοιοῦτος καὶ οὐδαμῇ φιλοχρήματος· ὧν γὰρ ἕνεκα χρήματα μετὰ πολλῆς δαπάνης σπουδάζεται, ἄλλῳ τινὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τούτῳ προσήκει σπουδάζειν.

Οὕτως.

Καὶ μήν που καὶ τόδε δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ὅταν κρίνειν
p. 486. | μέλλῃς φύσιν φιλόσοφόν τε καὶ μή.

Τὸ ποῖον;

Μή σε λάθῃ μετέχουσα ἀνελευθερίας· ἐναντιώτατον γάρ που σμικρολογία ψυχῇ μελλούσῃ τοῦ ὅλου καὶ παντὸς ἀεὶ ἐπορέξεσθαι θείου τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνου.

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

In the magnificence of his contemplations he will not think much of human life.

Ἡι οὖν ὑπάρχει διανοίᾳ μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ θεωρία παντὸς μὲν χρόνου, πάσης δὲ οὐσίας, οἷόν τε οἴει τούτῳ μέγα τι δοκεῖν εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον;

Ἀδύνατον, ἦ δ' ὅς.

B Οὐκοῦν καὶ θάνατον οὐ δεινόν τι ἡγήσεται ὁ τοιοῦτος;

Ἥκιστά γε.

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Δειλῇ δὴ καὶ ἀνελευθέρῳ φύσει φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινῆς, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ἂν μετείη. p. 486.

Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.

Τί οὖν; ὁ κόσμιος καὶ μὴ φιλοχρήματος μηδ' ἀνελεύθερος μηδ' ἀλαζὼν μηδὲ δειλὸς ἔσθ' ὅπῃ ἂν δυσξύμβολος ἢ ἄδικος γένοιτο;

Οὐκ ἔστιν.

He will be of a gentle, sociable, harmonious nature; a lover of learning, having a good memory and moving spontaneously in the world of being.

Καὶ τοῦτο δὴ ψυχὴν σκοπῶν φιλόσοφον καὶ μὴ εὐθὺς νέου ὄντος ἐπισκέψει, εἰ ἄρα δικαία τε καὶ ἥμερος ἢ δυσκοινώνητος καὶ ἀγρία.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τόδε παραλείψεις, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι. C

Τὸ ποῖον;

Εὐμαθὴς ἢ δυσμαθής. ἢ προσδοκᾷς ποτέ τινά τι ἱκανῶς ἂν στέρξαι, ὃ πράττων ἂν ἀλγῶν τε πράττοι καὶ μόγις σμικρὸν ἀνύτων;

Οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο.

Τί δ'; εἰ μηδὲν ὧν μάθοι σώζειν δύναιτο, λήθης ὢν πλέως, ἆρ' ἂν οἷός τ' εἴη ἐπιστήμης μὴ κενὸς εἶναι;

Καὶ πῶς;

Ἀνόνητα δὴ πονῶν οὐκ, οἴει, ἀναγκασθήσεται τελευτῶν αὑτόν τε μισεῖν καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην πρᾶξιν;

Πῶς δ' οὔ; D

Ἐπιλήσμονα ἄρα ψυχὴν ἐν ταῖς ἱκανῶς φιλοσόφοις μή ποτε ἐγκρίνωμεν, ἀλλὰ μνημονικὴν αὐτὴν ζητῶμεν δεῖν εἶναι.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

1. δειλῇ δὲ Π. 22. ἀνόνητα Amg. Π²M : ἀνόητα AΠpr.
28. δεῖν AΠM : δεῖ Ξpr. (αὖ ἣν ζητοῦμεν δεῖ cj. Madvig).

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p. 486. Ἀλλ᾽ οὐ μὴν τό γε τῆς ἀμούσου τε καὶ ἀσχήμονος φύσεως ἄλλοσέ ποι ἂν φαῖμεν ἕλκειν ἢ εἰς ἀμετρίαν.

Τί μήν;

Ἀλήθειαν δ᾽ ἀμετρίᾳ ἡγεῖ ξυγγενῆ εἶναι ἢ ἐμμετρίᾳ;

Ἐμμετρίᾳ.

Ἔμμετρον ἄρα καὶ εὔχαριν ζητῶμεν πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις διάνοιαν φύσει, ἣν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος ἰδέαν

E ἑκάστου τὸ αὐτοφυὲς εὐάγωγον παρέξει.

Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;

Τί οὖν; μή πῃ δοκοῦμέν σοι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα ἕκαστα διεληλυθέναι καὶ ἑπόμενα ἀλλήλοις τῇ μελλούσῃ τοῦ ὄντος ἱκανῶς τε καὶ τελέως ψυχῇ μεταλήψεσθαι;

p. 487. Ἀναγκαιότατα μὲν | οὖν, ἔφη.

Conclusion: What a blameless study then is philosophy!

Ἔστιν οὖν ὅπῃ μέμψει τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδευμα, ὃ μή ποτ᾽ ἄν τις οἷός τε γένοιτο ἱκανῶς ἐπιτηδεῦσαι, εἰ μὴ φύσει εἴη μνήμων, εὐμαθής, μεγαλοπρεπής, εὔχαρις, φίλος τε καὶ ξυγγενὴς ἀληθείας, δικαιοσύνης, ἀνδρείας, σωφροσύνης;

Οὐδ᾽ ἂν ὁ Μῶμος, ἔφη, τό γε τοιοῦτον μέμψαιτο.

Ἀλλ᾽, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τελειωθεῖσι τοῖς τοιούτοις παιδείᾳ τε καὶ ἡλικίᾳ ἆρα οὐ μόνοις ἂν τὴν πόλιν ἐπιτρέποις;

B Καὶ ὁ Ἀδείμαντος, Ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, πρὸς μὲν ταῦτά σοι οὐδεὶς ἂν οἷός τ᾽ εἴη ἀντειπεῖν· ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοιόνδε τι πάσχουσιν οἱ ἀκούοντες ἑκάστοτε ἃ νῦν λέγεις· ἡγοῦνται δι᾽ ἀπειρίαν τοῦ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου παρ᾽ ἕκαστον τὸ ἐρώτημα

Nay, says Adeimantus, you can prove anything, but your hearers are

1. μὴν ΠΜ : μὴ A.

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unconvinced all the same.

σμικρὸν παραγόμενοι, ἀθροισθέντων τῶν σμικρῶν p. 487.
ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τῶν λόγων μέγα τὸ σφάλμα καὶ ἐναν-
τίον τοῖς πρώτοις ἀναφαίνεσθαι, καὶ ὥσπερ ὑπὸ τῶν
πεττεύειν δεινῶν οἱ μὴ τελευτῶντες ἀποκλείονται καὶ C
οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅ τι φέρωσιν, οὕτω καὶ σφεῖς τελευ-
τῶντες ἀποκλείεσθαι, καὶ οὐκ ἔχειν ὅ τι λέγωσιν ὑπὸ
πεττείας αὖ ταύτης τινὸς ἑτέρας, οὐκ ἐν ψήφοις ἀλλ'
ἐν λόγοις· ἐπεὶ τό γε ἀληθὲς οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ταύτῃ
ἔχειν. λέγω δ' εἰς τὸ παρὸν ἀποβλέψας. νῦν γὰρ
φαίη ἄν τίς σοι λόγῳ μὲν οὐκ ἔχειν καθ' ἕκαστον τὸ
ἐρωτώμενον ἐναντιοῦσθαι, ἔργῳ δὲ ὁρᾶν, ὅσοι ἂν ἐπὶ
φιλοσοφίαν ὁρμήσαντες μὴ τοῦ πεπαιδεῦσθαι ἕνεκα D
ἁψάμενοι νέοι ὄντες ἀπαλλάττωνται, ἀλλὰ μακρότε-
ρον ἐνδιατρίψωσι, τοὺς μὲν πλείστους καὶ πάνυ ἀλ-
λοκότους γιγνομένους, ἵνα μὴ παμπονήρους εἴπωμεν,
τοὺς δ' ἐπιεικεστάτους δοκοῦντας ὅμως τοῦτό γε ὑπὸ
τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος οὗ σὺ ἐπαινεῖς πάσχοντας, ἀχρή-
στους ταῖς πόλεσι γιγνομένους.

Common opinion declares philosophers to be either rogues or useless.

Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας, Οἴει οὖν, εἶπον, τοὺς ταῦτα λέγοντας ψεύδεσθαι;

Οὐκ οἶδα, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἀλλὰ τὸ σοὶ δοκοῦν ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούοιμι.

Socrates, instead of denying this statement, admits the truth of it.

Ἀκούοις ἄν, ὅτι ἔμοιγε φαίνονται τἀληθῆ λέ- E
γειν.

Πῶς οὖν, ἔφη, εὖ ἔχει λέγειν, ὅτι οὐ πρότερον κακῶν παύσονται αἱ πόλεις, πρὶν ἂν ἐν αὐταῖς οἱ φιλόσοφοι ἄρξωσιν, οὓς ἀχρήστους ὁμολογοῦμεν αὐταῖς εἶναι;

1. παραγόμενοι Amg. ΠΜ : παραγενόμενοι A.
5. φέρωσιν Vind. E : φέρουσιν ΑΠΜ.
8. ταύτῃ Π : ταύτην AM.

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p. 487. Ἐρωτᾷς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐρώτημα δεόμενον ἀποκρίσεως δι' εἰκόνος λεγομένης.

Σὺ δέ γε, ἔφη, οἶμαι, οὐκ εἴωθας δι' εἰκόνων λέγειν.

A parable.

Εἶεν, εἶπον· σκώπτεις ἐμβεβληκώς με εἰς λόγον οὕτω δυσαπόδεικτον; ἄκουε δ' οὖν τῆς εἰκόνος, ἵν'
p. 488. | ἔτι μᾶλλον ἴδῃς ὡς γλίσχρως εἰκάζω. οὕτω γὰρ χαλεπὸν τὸ πάθος τῶν ἐπιεικεστάτων, ὃ πρὸς τὰς πόλεις πεπόνθασιν, ὥστε οὐδ' ἔστιν ἓν οὐδὲν ἄλλο τοιοῦτον πεπονθός, ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἐκ πολλῶν αὐτὸ ξυναγαγεῖν εἰκάζοντα καὶ ἀπολογούμενον ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν, οἷον οἱ γραφῆς τραγελάφους καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μιγνύντες γράφουσι. νόησον γὰρ τοιουτονὶ γενόμενον εἴτε πολλῶν νεῶν πέρι εἴτε μιᾶς· ναύκληρον μεγέθει μὲν
B καὶ ῥώμῃ ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἐν τῇ νηῒ πάντας, ὑπόκωφον δὲ καὶ ὁρῶντα ὡσαύτως βραχύ τι καὶ γιγνώσκοντα περὶ ναυτικῶν ἕτερα τοιαῦτα, τοὺς δὲ ναύτας στασιάζοντας πρὸς ἀλλήλους περὶ τῆς κυβερνήσεως, ἕκαστον οἰόμενον δεῖν κυβερνᾶν, μήτε μαθόντα πώποτε τὴν τέχνην μήτε ἔχοντα ἀποδεῖξαι διδάσκαλον ἑαυτοῦ μηδὲ χρόνον ἐν ᾧ ἐμάνθανε, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις φάσκοντας μηδὲ διδακτὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν λέγοντα ὡς διδακ-
C τὸν ἑτοίμους κατατέμνειν, αὐτοὺς δὲ αὐτῷ ἀεὶ τῷ ναυκλήρῳ περικεχύσθαι δεομένους καὶ πάντα ποιοῦντας ὅπως ἂν σφίσι τὸ πηδάλιον ἐπιτρέψῃ, ἐνίοτε δ' ἂν μὴ πείθωσιν ἀλλὰ ἄλλοι μᾶλλον, τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἢ ἀποκτιννύντας ἢ ἐκβάλλοντας ἐκ τῆς νεώς, τὸν δὲ γενναῖον ναύκληρον μανδραγόρᾳ ἢ μέθῃ ἤ τινι ἄλλῳ ξυμποδίσαντας τῆς νεὼς ἄρχειν χρωμένους τοῖς ἐνοῦσι, καὶ πίνοντάς τε καὶ εὐωχουμένους πλεῖν

The noble captain whose senses are rather dull (the people in their better mind); the mutinous crew (the mob of politicians); and the pilot (the true philosopher).

8. τὸ πάθος Π : πάθος AM.

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ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς τοὺς τοιούτους, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐπαινοῦν- p. 488. τας ναυτικὸν μὲν καλοῦντας καὶ κυβερνητικὸν καὶ ἐπι- D στάμενον τὰ κατὰ ναῦν, ὃς ἂν ξυλλαμβάνειν δεινὸς ᾖ, ὅπως ἄρξουσιν ἢ πείθοντες ἢ βιαζόμενοι τὸν ναύκληρον, τὸν δὲ μὴ τοιοῦτον ψέγοντας ὡς ἄχρηστον, τοῦ δὲ ἀληθινοῦ κυβερνήτου πέρι μηδ᾽ ἐπαΐοντες, ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι ἐνιαυτοῦ καὶ ὡρῶν καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ ἄστρων καὶ πνευμάτων καὶ πάντων τῶν τῇ τέχνῃ προσηκόντων, εἰ μέλλει τῷ ὄντι νεὼς ἀρχικὸς ἔσεσθαι, ὅπως δὲ κυβερνήσει ἐάν τέ τινες βούλωνται ἐάν τε μή, μήτε τέχνην τούτου E μήτε μελέτην οἰόμενοι δυνατὸν εἶναι λαβεῖν ἅμα καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικήν. τοιούτων δὴ περὶ τὰς ναῦς γιγνομένων τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς κυβερνητικὸν οὐχ ἡγεῖ ἂν τῷ ὄντι μετεωροσκόπον τε καὶ ἀδολέσχην καὶ ἄχρηστόν σφισι | καλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς οὕτω κατεσκευασ- p. 489. μέναις ναυσὶ πλωτήρων;

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη ὁ Ἀδείμαντος.

The interpretation.

Οὐ δή, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, οἶμαι δεῖσθαί σε ἐξεταζομένην τὴν εἰκόνα ἰδεῖν, ὅτι ταῖς πόλεσι πρὸς τοὺς ἀληθινοὺς φιλοσόφους τὴν διάθεσιν ἔοικεν, ἀλλὰ μανθάνειν ὃ λέγω.

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν ἐκεῖνον τὸν θαυμάζοντα, ὅτι οἱ φιλόσοφοι οὐ τιμῶνται ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, δίδασκέ τε τὴν εἰκόνα καὶ πειρῶ πείθειν, ὅτι πολὺ ἂν θαυμαστότερον ἦν, εἰ ἐτιμῶντο. B

Ἀλλὰ διδάξω, ἔφη.

Καὶ ὅτι τοίνυν τἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὡς ἄχρηστοι τοῖς

1. πλεῖν ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς τοὺς τοιούτους om. Mpr. 6. ἐπαΐοντας xqv.
12. οἰομένους tv. 29. λέγεις ΑΠΜ : λέγειν Ξ : λέγει D.

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p. 489. πολλοῖς οἱ ἐπιεικέστατοι τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ· τῆς μέντοι ἀχρηστίας τοὺς μὴ χρωμένους κέλευε αἰτιᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς. οὐ γὰρ ἔχει φύσιν κυβερνήτην ναυτῶν δεῖσθαι ἄρχεσθαι ὑφ' αὑτοῦ οὐδὲ C τοὺς σοφοὺς ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν πλουσίων θύρας ἰέναι, ἀλλ' ὁ τοῦτο κομψευσάμενος ἐψεύσατο, τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς πέφυκεν, ἐάν τε πλούσιος ἐάν τε πένης κάμνῃ, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἐπὶ ἰατρῶν θύρας ἰέναι καὶ πάντα τὸν ἄρχεσθαι δεόμενον ἐπὶ τὰς τοῦ ἄρχειν δυναμένου, οὐ τὸν ἄρχοντα δεῖσθαι τῶν ἀρχομένων ἄρχεσθαι, οὗ ἂν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τι ὄφελος ᾖ. ἀλλὰ τοὺς νῦν πολιτικοὺς ἄρχοντας ἀπεικάζων οἷς ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν ναύταις οὐχ ἁμαρτήσει, καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τούτων ἀχρήστους λεγομένους καὶ μετεωρολέσχας τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς κυβερνήταις.

The uselessness of philosophers arises out of the unwillingness of mankind to make use of them.

Ὀρθότατα, ἔφη.

Ἔκ τε τοίνυν τούτων καὶ ἐν τούτοις οὐ ῥᾴδιον εὐδοκιμεῖν τὸ βέλτιστον ἐπιτήδευμα ὑπὸ τῶν τἀναντία ἐπιτηδευόντων· πολὺ δὲ μεγίστη καὶ ἰσχυροτάτη D διαβολὴ γίγνεται φιλοσοφίᾳ διὰ τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα φάσκοντας ἐπιτηδεύειν, οὓς δὴ σὺ φῂς τὸν ἐγκαλοῦντα τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ λέγειν ὡς παμπόνηροι οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἰόντων ἐπ' αὐτήν, οἱ δὲ ἐπιεικέστατοι ἄχρηστοι, καὶ ἐγὼ συνεχώρησα ἀληθῆ σε λέγειν. ἦ γάρ;

The real enemies of philosophy her professing followers.

Ναί.

Οὐκοῦν τῆς μὲν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἀχρηστίας τὴν αἰτίαν διεληλύθαμεν;

Καὶ μάλα.

Τῆς δὲ τῶν πολλῶν πονηρίας τὴν ἀνάγκην βούλει τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο διέλθωμεν, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲ

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τούτου φιλοσοφία αἰτία, ἂν δυνώμεθα, πειραθῶμεν p. 489. E δεῖξαι;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

due to many causes.

Ἀκούωμεν δὴ καὶ λέγωμεν ἐκεῖθεν ἀναμνησθέντες, ὅθεν διῇμεν τὴν φύσιν, οἷον ἀνάγκη φῦναι τὸν καλόν τε κἀγαθὸν ἐσόμενον. | ἡγεῖτο δ' αὐτῷ, εἰ νῷ ἔχεις, p. 490. πρῶτον μὲν ἀλήθεια, ἣν διώκειν αὐτὸν πάντως καὶ πάντῃ ἔδει ἢ ἀλαζόνι ὄντι μηδαμῇ μετεῖναι φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινῆς.

Ἦν γὰρ οὕτω λεγόμενον.

Οὐκοῦν ἓν μὲν τοῦτο σφόδρα οὕτω παρὰ δόξαν τοῖς νῦν δοκουμένοις περὶ αὐτοῦ;

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

But before considering this, let us again enumerate the qualities of the philosopher: his love of essence, of truth, of justice, besides his other virtues and natural gifts.

Ἆρ' οὖν δὴ οὐ μετρίως ἀπολογησόμεθα ὅτι πρὸς τὸ ὂν πεφυκὼς εἴη ἁμιλλᾶσθαι ὅ γε ὄντως φιλομαθής, καὶ οὐκ ἐπιμένοι ἐπὶ τοῖς δοξαζομένοις εἶναι πολλοῖς ἑκάστοις, ἀλλ' ἴοι καὶ οὐκ ἀμβλύνοιτο οὐδ' B ἀπολήγοι τοῦ ἔρωτος, πρὶν αὐτοῦ ὃ ἔστιν ἑκάστου τῆς φύσεως ἅψασθαι ᾧ προσήκει ψυχῆς ἐφάπτεσθαι τοῦ τοιούτου· προσήκει δὲ ξυγγενεῖ· ᾧ πλησιάσας καὶ μιγεὶς τῷ ὄντι ὄντως, γεννήσας νοῦν καὶ ἀλήθειαν, γνοίη τε καὶ ἀληθῶς ζῴη καὶ τρέφοιτο καὶ οὕτω λήγοι ὠδῖνος, πρὶν δ' οὔ;

Ὡς οἷόν τ', ἔφη, μετριώτατα.

Τί οὖν; τούτῳ τι μετέσται ψεῦδος ἀγαπᾶν ἢ πᾶν τοὐναντίον μισεῖν;

Μισεῖν, ἔφη. C

Ἡγουμένης δὴ ἀληθείας οὐκ ἄν ποτε, οἶμαι, φαῖμεν αὐτῇ χορὸν κακῶν ἀκολουθῆσαι.

6. νῷ ΑΠΜ: ἐν νῷ χν. 14. ἀπολογησόμεθα ΑΠΜ: ἀπελογησάμεθα cj. Ast.: ἀπελογισάμεθα cj. Madvig.

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p. 490. Πῶς γάρ;

Ἀλλ' ὑγιές τε καὶ δίκαιον ἦθος, ᾧ καὶ σωφροσύνην ἕπεσθαι.

Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.

Καὶ δὴ τὸν ἄλλον τῆς φιλοσόφου φύσεως χορὸν τί δεῖ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀναγκάζοντα τάττειν; μέμνησαι γάρ που ὅτι ξυνέβη προσῆκον τούτοις ἀνδρεία, μεγαλοπρέπεια, εὐμάθεια, μνήμη· καὶ σοῦ ἐπιλαβο-D μένου, ὅτι πᾶς μὲν ἀναγκασθήσεται ὁμολογεῖν οἷς λέγομεν, ἐάσας δὲ τοὺς λόγους, εἰς αὐτοὺς ἀποβλέψας περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος, φαίη ὁρᾶν αὐτῶν τοὺς μὲν ἀχρήστους, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς κακοὺς πᾶσαν κακίαν, τῆς διαβολῆς τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπισκοποῦντες ἐπὶ τούτῳ νῦν γεγόναμεν, τί ποθ' οἱ πολλοὶ κακοί, καὶ τούτου δὴ ἕνεκα πάλιν ἀνειλήφαμεν τὴν τῶν ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφων φύσιν καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὡρισάμεθα.

E Ἔστιν, ἔφη, ταῦτα.

The reasons why philosophical natures so easily deteriorate.

Ταύτης δή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τῆς φύσεως δεῖ θεάσασθαι τὰς φθοράς, ὡς διόλλυται ἐν πολλοῖς, σμικρὸν δέ τι ἐκφεύγει, οὓς δὴ καὶ οὐ πονηρούς, ἀχρήστους δὲ καλοῦσι· καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὖ τὰς μιμουμένας ταύτην p. 491. | καὶ εἰς τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα καθισταμένας αὐτῆς, οἷαι οὖσαι φύσεις ψυχῶν εἰς ἀνάξιον καὶ μεῖζον ἑαυτῶν ἀφικνούμεναι ἐπιτήδευμα, πολλαχῇ πλημμελοῦσαι, πανταχῇ καὶ ἐπὶ πάντας δόξαν οἵαν λέγεις φιλοσοφίᾳ προσῆψαν.

Τίνας δέ, ἔφη, τὰς διαφθορὰς λέγεις;

(1) There are but a few of them.

Ἐγώ σοι, εἶπον, ἂν οἷός τε γένωμαι, πειράσομαι διελθεῖν. τόδε μὲν οὖν, οἶμαι, πᾶς ἡμῖν ὁμολογήσει,

6. ἀναγκάζοντα ΑΠΜ : ἀναλαμβάνοντα Ξ : ἀναβιβάζοντα cj. Madvig.
11. μὲν Π : om. ΑΜ.

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τοιαύτην φύσιν καὶ πάντα ἔχουσαν ὅσα προσετάξα- p. 491. μεν νῦν δή, εἰ τελέως μέλλοι φιλόσοφος γενέσθαι, B ὀλιγάκις ἐν ἀνθρώποις φύεσθαι καὶ ὀλίγας. ἢ οὐκ οἴει;

Σφόδρα γε.

Τούτων δὴ τῶν ὀλίγων σκόπει ὡς πολλοὶ ὄλεθροι καὶ μεγάλοι.

Τίνες δή;

(2) And they may be distracted from philosophy by their own virtues;

Ὃ μὲν πάντων θαυμαστότατον ἀκοῦσαι, ὅτι ἓν ἕκαστον ὧν ἐπῃνέσαμεν τῆς φύσεως ἀπόλλυσι τὴν ἔχουσαν ψυχὴν καὶ ἀποσπᾷ φιλοσοφίας. λέγω δὲ ἀνδρείαν, σωφροσύνην καὶ πάντα ἃ διήλθομεν.

Ἄτοπον, ἔφη, ἀκοῦσαι.

and also, (3), by the ordinary goods of life.

Ἔτι τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς τούτοις τὰ λεγόμενα C ἀγαθὰ πάντα φθείρει καὶ ἀποσπᾷ, κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ ἰσχὺς σώματος καὶ ξυγγένεια ἐρρωμένη ἐν πόλει καὶ πάντα τὰ τούτων οἰκεῖα· ἔχεις γὰρ τὸν τύπον ὧν λέγω.

Ἔχω, ἔφη· καὶ ἡδέως γ' ἂν ἀκριβέστερον ἃ λέγεις πυθοίμην.

Λαβοῦ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅλου αὐτοῦ ὀρθῶς, καί σοι εὔδηλόν τε φανεῖται καὶ οὐκ ἄτοπα δόξει τὰ προειρημένα περὶ αὐτῶν.

Πῶς οὖν, ἔφη, κελεύεις;

Παντός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, σπέρματος πέρι ἢ φυτοῦ, εἴτε D ἐγγείων εἴτε τῶν ζῴων, ἴσμεν ὅτι τὸ μὴ τυχὸν τροφῆς ἧς προσήκει ἑκάστῳ μηδ' ὥρας μηδὲ τόπου, ὅσῳ ἂν ἐρρωμενέστερον ᾖ, τοσούτῳ πλειόνων ἐνδεῖ τῶν πρεπόντων· ἀγαθῷ γάρ που κακὸν ἐναντιώτερον ἢ τῷ μὴ ἀγαθῷ.

25. παντὸς ΠΜ: πάντως A.

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p. 491. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

Ἔχει δή, οἶμαι, λόγον τὴν ἀρίστην φύσιν ἐν ἀλλοτριωτέρᾳ οὖσαν τροφῇ κάκιον ἀπαλλάττειν τῆς φαύλης.

(4) The finer natures more liable to injury than the inferior.

Ἔχει.

E Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς οὕτω φῶμεν τὰς εὐφυεστάτας κακῆς παιδαγωγίας τυχούσας διαφερόντως κακὰς γίγνεσθαι; ἢ οἴει τὰ μεγάλα ἀδικήματα καὶ τὴν ἄκρατον πονηρίαν ἐκ φαύλης, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ νεανικῆς φύσεως τροφῇ διολομένης γίγνεσθαι, ἀσθενῆ δὲ φύσιν μεγάλων οὔτε ἀγαθῶν οὔτε κακῶν αἰτίαν ποτὲ ἔσεσθαι;

Οὔκ, ἀλλά, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὕτως.

(5) They are not corrupted by private sophists, but compelled by the opinion of the world meeting in the assembly or in some other place of resort.

p. 492. Ἣν τοίνυν ἔθεμεν | τοῦ φιλοσόφου φύσιν, ἂν μέν, οἶμαι, μαθήσεως προσηκούσης τύχῃ, εἰς πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἀνάγκη αὐξανομένην ἀφικνεῖσθαι, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἐν προσηκούσῃ σπαρεῖσά τε καὶ φυτευθεῖσα τρέφηται, εἰς πάντα τἀναντία αὖ, ἐὰν μή τις αὐτῇ βοηθήσας θεῶν τύχῃ. ἢ καὶ σὺ ἡγεῖ, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, διαφθειρομένους τινὰς εἶναι ὑπὸ σοφιστῶν νέους, διαφθείροντας δέ τινας σοφιστὰς ἰδιωτικούς, ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον λόγου, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ταῦτα B λέγοντας μεγίστους μὲν εἶναι σοφιστάς, παιδεύειν δὲ τελεώτατα καὶ ἀπεργάζεσθαι οἵους βούλονται εἶναι καὶ νέους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας;

Πότε δή; ἦ δ' ὅς.

Ὅταν, εἶπον, ξυγκαθεζόμενοι ἁθρόοι *οἱ πολλοὶ εἰς ἐκκλησίας ἢ εἰς δικαστήρια ἢ θέατρα ἢ στρατόπεδα ἤ τινα ἄλλον κοινὸν πλήθους ξύλλογον ξὺν

28. οἱ πολλοὶ cj. Herm.: πολλοὶ MSS.: del. Cobet.

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πολλῷ θορύβῳ τὰ μὲν ψέγωσι τῶν λεγομένων ἢ p. 492.
πραττομένων, τὰ δὲ ἐπαινῶσιν, ὑπερβαλλόντως ἑκά- C
τερα, καὶ ἐκβοῶντες καὶ κροτοῦντες, πρὸς δ' αὐτοῖς
αἵ τε πέτραι καὶ ὁ τόπος ἐν ᾧ ἂν ὦσιν ἐπηχοῦντες
διπλάσιον θόρυβον παρέχωσι τοῦ ψόγου καὶ ἐπαίνου.
ἐν δὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ τὸν νέον, τὸ λεγόμενον, τίνα οἴει
καρδίαν ἴσχειν; ἢ *ποίαν αὐτῷ παιδείαν ἰδιωτικὴν
ἀνθέξειν, ἣν οὐ κατακλυσθεῖσαν ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιούτου
ψόγου ἢ ἐπαίνου οἰχήσεσθαι φερομένην κατὰ ῥοῦν ᾗ
ἂν οὗτος φέρῃ, καὶ φήσειν τε τὰ αὐτὰ τούτοις καλὰ D
καὶ αἰσχρὰ εἶναι, καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσειν ἅπερ ἂν οὗτοι, καὶ
ἔσεσθαι τοιοῦτον;

Πολλή, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀνάγκη.

(6) The other compulsion of violence and death.

Καὶ μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὔπω τὴν μεγίστην ἀνάγκην εἰρήκαμεν.

Ποίαν; ἔφη.

Ἣν ἔργῳ προστιθέασι λόγῳ μὴ πείθοντες οὗτοι οἱ παιδευταί τε καὶ σοφισταί. ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα, ὅτι τὸ[ν] μὴ πειθόμενον ἀτιμίαις τε καὶ χρήμασι καὶ θανάτοις κολάζουσιν;

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, σφόδρα.

Τίνα οὖν ἄλλον σοφιστὴν οἴει ἢ ποίους ἰδιωτικοὺς E
λόγους ἐναντία τούτοις τείνοντας κρατήσειν;

Οἶμαι μὲν οὐδένα, ἦ δ' ὅς.

They must be saved, if at all, by the power of God.

Οὐ γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐπιχειρεῖν πολλὴ ἄνοια. οὔτε γὰρ γίγνεται οὔτε γέγονεν οὐδὲ οὖν μὴ γένηται ἀλλοῖον ἦθος πρὸς ἀρετὴν παρὰ τὴν τούτων παιδείαν πεπαιδευμένον, ἀνθρώπειον, ὦ ἑταῖρε· θεῖον μέντοι κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἐξαιρῶμεν λόγου. εὖ γὰρ

7. ποίαν cj. Cobet: ποίαν ἂν MSS.
18. τὸν Π: τὸ AM.

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The great brute; his behaviour and temper (the people looked at from their worse side).

p. 492. χρὴ εἰδέναι, ὅ τί περ ἂν σωθῇ τε καὶ γένηται οἷον
p. 493. δεῖ ἐν τοιαύτῃ καταστάσει πολιτειῶν, | θεοῦ μοῖραν αὐτὸ σῶσαι λέγων οὐ κακῶς ἐρεῖς.

Οὐδ' ἐμοὶ ἄλλως, ἔφη, δοκεῖ.

Ἔτι τοίνυν σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς τούτοις καὶ τόδε δοξάτω.

Τὸ ποῖον;

Ἕκαστος τῶν μισθαρνούντων ἰδιωτῶν, οὓς δὴ οὗτοι σοφιστὰς καλοῦσι καὶ ἀντιτέχνους ἡγοῦνται, μὴ ἄλλα παιδεύειν ἢ ταῦτα τὰ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματα, ἃ δοξάζουσιν ὅταν ἀθροισθῶσι, καὶ σοφίαν ταύτην καλεῖν· οἷόνπερ ἂν εἰ θρέμματος μεγάλου καὶ ἰσχυροῦ τρεφομένου τὰς ὀργάς τις καὶ ἐπιθυμίας κατεμάν-
B θανεν, ὅπῃ τε προσελθεῖν χρὴ καὶ ὅπῃ ἅψασθαι αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὁπότε χαλεπώτατον ἢ πραότατον καὶ ἐκ τίνων γίγνεται, καὶ φωνὰς δὴ ἐφ' οἷς *ἑκάστας εἴωθε φθέγγεσθαι, καὶ οἵας αὖ ἄλλου φθεγγομένου ἡμεροῦταί τε καὶ ἀγριαίνει, καταμαθὼν δὲ ταῦτα πάντα ξυνουσίᾳ τε καὶ χρόνου τριβῇ σοφίαν τε καλέσειεν καὶ ὡς τέχνην συστησάμενος ἐπὶ διδασκαλίαν τρέποιτο, μηδὲν εἰδὼς τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τούτων τῶν δογμάτων τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν, ὅ τι καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ
C κακὸν ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, ὀνομάζοι δὲ πάντα ταῦτα ἐπὶ ταῖς τοῦ μεγάλου ζῴου δόξαις, οἷς μὲν χαίροι ἐκεῖνο ἀγαθὰ καλῶν, οἷς δὲ ἄχθοιτο κακά, ἄλλον δὲ μηδένα ἔχοι λόγον περὶ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τἀναγκαῖα δίκαια καλοῖ καὶ καλά, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν, ὅσον διαφέρει τῷ ὄντι, μήτε ἑωρακὼς

8. ἕκαστος ΑΠΜ : ἕκαστον *v*.
10. ταῦτα ΑΠ : om. Μ.
16. ἐφ' οἷς ἑκάστας cj. G. van Prinsterer : ἐφ' οἷς ἕκαστος ΑΠΜ : ἃς ἐφ' ἑκάστοις *q* : ἐφ' οἷς ἑκάστοτε Vind. E.

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εἴη μήτε ἄλλῳ δυνατὸς δεῖξαι. τοιοῦτος δὴ ὢν πρὸς p. 493. Διὸς οὐκ ἄτοπος ἄν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι παιδευτής;

Ἔμοιγ', ἔφη.

Ἦ οὖν τι τούτου δοκεῖ διαφέρειν ὁ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν καὶ παντοδαπῶν ξυνιόντων ὀργὴν καὶ ἡδονὰς D κατανενοηκέναι σοφίαν ἡγούμενος, εἴτ' ἐν γραφικῇ εἴτ' ἐν μουσικῇ εἴτε δὴ ἐν πολιτικῇ; ὅτι μὲν γάρ, ἐάν τις τούτοις ὁμιλῇ ἐπιδεικνύμενος ἢ ποίησιν ἤ τινα ἄλλην δημιουργίαν ἢ πόλει διακονίαν, κυρίους αὑτοῦ ποιῶν τοὺς πολλούς, πέρα τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ἡ Διομηδεία λεγομένη ἀνάγκη ποιεῖν αὐτῷ ταῦτα ἃ ἂν οὗτοι ἐπαινῶσιν· ὡς δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ καλὰ ταῦτα τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ἤδη πώποτέ του ἤκουσας αὐτῶν λόγον διδόντος οὐ καταγέλαστον;

He who associates with the people will conform to their tastes and will produce only what pleases them.

Οἶμαι δέ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐδ' ἀκούσομαι. E

Ταῦτα τοίνυν πάντα ἐννοήσας ἐκεῖνο ἀναμνήσθητι· αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ πολλὰ καλά, ἢ αὐτό τι ἕκαστον καὶ μὴ τὰ πολλὰ ἕκαστα, ἔσθ' ὅπως | πλῆθος ἀνέξεται ἢ ἡγήσεται εἶναι; p. 494.

Ἥκιστά γ', ἔφη.

Φιλόσοφον μὲν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πλῆθος ἀδύνατον εἶναι.

Ἀδύνατον.

Καὶ τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας ἄρα ἀνάγκη ψέγεσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν.

Ἀνάγκη.

Καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων δὴ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν, ὅσοι προσομιλοῦντες ὄχλῳ ἀρέσκειν αὐτῷ ἐπιθυμοῦσιν.

Δῆλον.

Ἐκ δὴ τούτων τίνα ὁρᾷς σωτηρίαν φιλοσόφῳ φύσει, ὥστ' ἐν τῷ ἐπιτηδεύματι μείνασαν πρὸς τέλος

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p. 494. ἐλθεῖν; ἐννόει δ' ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν. ὡμολόγηται B γὰρ δὴ ἡμῖν εὐμάθεια καὶ μνήμη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ μεγαλοπρέπεια ταύτης εἶναι τῆς φύσεως.

Ναί.

Οὐκοῦν εὐθὺς ἐν *παισὶν ὁ τοιοῦτος πρῶτος ἔσται ἐν ἅπασιν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐὰν τὸ σῶμα φυῇ προσφερὴς τῇ ψυχῇ;

The youth who has great bodily and mental gifts will be flattered from his childhood,

Τί δ' οὐ μέλλει; ἔφη.

Βουλήσονται δή, οἶμαι, αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι, ἐπειδὰν πρεσβύτερος γίγνηται, ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτῶν πράγματα οἵ τε οἰκεῖοι καὶ οἱ πολῖται.

Πῶς δ' οὔ;

C Ὑποκείσονται ἄρα δεόμενοι καὶ τιμῶντες, προκαταλαμβάνοντες καὶ προκολακεύοντες τὴν μέλλουσαν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν.

Φιλεῖ γοῦν, ἔφη, οὕτω γίγνεσθαι.

Τί οὖν οἴει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸν τοιοῦτον ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ποιήσειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐὰν τύχῃ μεγάλης πόλεως ὢν καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ πλούσιός τε καὶ γενναῖος, καὶ ἔτι εὐειδὴς καὶ μέγας; ἆρ' οὐ πληρωθήσεσθαι ἀμηχάνου ἐλπίδος, ἡγούμενον καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων D καὶ τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων ἱκανὸν ἔσεσθαι πράττειν, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ὑψηλὸν ἐξαρεῖν αὐτόν, σχηματισμοῦ καὶ φρονήματος κενοῦ ἄνευ νοῦ ἐμπιπλάμενον;

Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη.

Τῷ δὴ οὕτω διατιθεμένῳ ἐάν τις ἠρέμα προσελθὼν τἀληθῆ λέγῃ, ὅτι νοῦς οὐκ ἔνεστιν αὐτῷ, δεῖται δέ, τὸ δὲ οὐ κτητὸν μὴ δουλεύσαντι τῇ κτήσει αὐτοῦ, ἆρ' εὐπετὲς οἴει εἶναι εἰσακοῦσαι διὰ τοσούτων κακῶν;

and being incapable of hearing reason, will be easily drawn away from philosophy.

5. παισὶν cj. Geer: πᾶσιν MSS.
24. ἄνευ νοῦ MSS.: del. G. van Prinsterer.

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Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ἦ δ' ὅς. p. 494.

Ἐὰν δ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διὰ τὸ εὖ πεφυκέναι καὶ τὸ ξυγγενὲς τῶν λόγων εἷς αἰσθάνηταί τέ πῃ καὶ E κάμπτηται καὶ ἕλκηται πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν, τί οἰόμεθα δράσειν ἐκείνους τοὺς ἡγουμένους ἀπολλύναι αὐτοῦ τὴν χρείαν τε καὶ ἑταιρείαν; οὐ πᾶν μὲν ἔργον, πᾶν δ' ἔπος λέγοντάς τε καὶ πράττοντας καὶ περὶ αὐτόν, ὅπως ἂν μὴ πεισθῇ, καὶ περὶ τὸν πείθοντα, ὅπως ἂν μὴ οἷός τ' ᾖ, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐπιβουλεύοντας καὶ δημοσίᾳ εἰς ἀγῶνας καθιστάντας;

| Πολλή, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἀνάγκη. p. 495.

Ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως ὁ τοιοῦτος φιλοσοφήσει;

Οὐ πάνυ.

The very qualities which make a philosopher may also divert him from philosophy.

Ὁρᾷς οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι οὐ κακῶς ἐλέγομεν, ὡς ἄρα καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ τῆς φιλοσόφου φύσεως μέρη, ὅταν ἐν κακῇ τροφῇ γένηται, αἴτια τρόπον τινὰ τοῦ ἐκπεσεῖν ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος, καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα ἀγαθά, πλοῦτοί τε καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη παρασκευή;

Οὐ γάρ, ἀλλ' ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, ἐλέχθη.

Great natures alone capable either of great good, or great evil.

Οὗτος δή, εἶπον, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ὄλεθρός τε καὶ διαφθορὰ τοσαύτη τε καὶ τοιαύτη τῆς βελτίστης B φύσεως εἰς τὸ ἄριστον ἐπιτήδευμα, ὀλίγης καὶ ἄλλως γιγνομένης, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμέν. καὶ ἐκ τούτων δὴ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ οἱ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐργαζόμενοι τὰς πόλεις γίγνονται καὶ τοὺς ἰδιώτας, καὶ οἱ τἀγαθά, οἳ ἂν ταύτῃ τύχωσι ῥυέντες· σμικρὰ δὲ φύσις οὐδὲν μέγα οὐδέποτε οὐδένα οὔτε ἰδιώτην οὔτε πόλιν δρᾷ.

Ἀληθέστατα, ἦ δ' ὅς.

7. τε ΑΠ: om. M.
14. ὁρᾷς ΠΜ: ἄρα A.

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p. 495. Οὗτοι μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἐκπίπτοντες, οἷς μάλιστα C προσήκει, ἔρημον καὶ ἀτελῆ φιλοσοφίαν λείποντες αὐτοί τε βίον οὐ προσήκοντα οὐδ᾽ ἀληθῆ ζῶσι, τὴν δέ, ὥσπερ ὀρφανὴν συγγενῶν, ἄλλοι ἐπεισελθόντες ἀνάξιοι ᾔσχυνάν τε καὶ ὀνείδη περιῆψαν, οἷα καὶ σὺ φῂς ὀνειδίζειν τοὺς ὀνειδίζοντας, ὡς οἱ ξυνόντες αὐτῇ οἱ μὲν οὐδενός, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ πολλῶν κακῶν ἄξιοί εἰσιν.

Καὶ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη, τά γε λεγόμενα ταῦτα.

The attractiveness of philosophy to the vulgar.

Εἰκότως γε, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, λεγόμενα. καθορῶντες γὰρ ἄλλοι ἀνθρωπίσκοι κενὴν τὴν χώραν ταύτην γιγνομένην, καλῶν δὲ ὀνομάτων καὶ προσχημάτων D μεστήν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐκ τῶν εἱργμῶν εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ ἀποδιδράσκοντες, ἄσμενοι καὶ οὗτοι ἐκ τῶν τεχνῶν ἐκπηδῶσιν εἰς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, οἳ ἂν κομψότατοι ὄντες τυγχάνωσι περὶ τὸ αὑτῶν τεχνίον. ὅμως γὰρ δὴ πρός γε τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας καίπερ οὕτω πραττούσης φιλοσοφίας τὸ ἀξίωμα μεγαλοπρεπέστερον λείπεται, οὗ δὴ ἐφιέμενοι πολλοὶ ἀτελεῖς μὲν τὰς φύσεις, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν τε καὶ δημιουργιῶν ὥσπερ τὰ σώματα E λελώβηνται, οὕτω καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ξυγκεκλασμένοι τε καὶ ἀποτεθρυμμένοι διὰ τὰς βαναυσίας τυγχάνουσιν— ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη;

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

Δοκεῖς οὖν τι, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, διαφέρειν αὐτοὺς ἰδεῖν ἀργύριον κτησαμένου χαλκέως φαλακροῦ καὶ σμικροῦ, νεωστὶ μὲν ἐκ δεσμῶν λελυμένου, ἐν βαλανείῳ δὲ λελουμένου, νεουργὸν ἱμάτιον ἔχοντος, ὡς νυμφίου παρεσκευασμένου, διὰ πενίαν καὶ ἐρημίαν τοῦ δεσπότου τὴν θυγατέρα μέλλοντος γαμεῖν;

p. 496. Οὐ | πάνυ, ἔφη, διαφέρει.

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Ποῖ᾽ ἄττα οὖν εἰκὸς γεννᾶν τοὺς τοιούτους; οὐ p. 496. νόθα καὶ φαῦλα;

Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη.

Τί δαί; τοὺς ἀναξίους παιδεύσεως, ὅταν αὐτῇ πλησιάζοντες ὁμιλῶσι μὴ κατ᾽ ἀξίαν, ποῖ᾽ ἄττα φῶμεν γεννᾶν διανοήματά τε καὶ δόξας; ἆρ᾽ οὐχ ὡς ἀληθῶς προσήκοντα ἀκοῦσαι σοφίσματα, καὶ οὐδὲν γνήσιον οὐδὲ φρονήσεως †ἄξιον ἀληθινῆς ἐχόμενον;

Παντελῶς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Few are the worthy disciples;

Πάνσμικρον δή τι, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, λείπεται τῶν κατ᾽ ἀξίαν ὁμιλούντων φιλοσοφίᾳ, ἤ που B ὑπὸ φυγῆς καταληφθὲν γενναῖον καὶ εὖ τεθραμμένον ἦθος, ἀπορίᾳ τῶν διαφθερούντων κατὰ φύσιν μεῖναν ἐπ᾽ αὐτῇ, ἢ ἐν σμικρᾷ πόλει ὅταν μεγάλη ψυχὴ φυῇ καὶ ἀτιμάσασα τὰ τῆς πόλεως ὑπερίδῃ· βραχὺ δέ πού τι καὶ ἀπ᾽ ἄλλης τέχνης δικαίως ἀτιμάσαν εὐφυὲς ἐπ᾽ αὐτὴν ἂν ἔλθοι. εἴη δ᾽ ἂν καὶ ὁ τοῦ ἡμετέρου ἑταίρου Θεάγους χαλινὸς οἷος κατασχεῖν· καὶ γὰρ Θεάγει τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα παρεσκεύασται πρὸς τὸ ἐκπεσεῖν φιλοσοφίας, ἡ δὲ τοῦ σώματος νοσοτρο- C φία ἀπείργουσα αὐτὸν τῶν πολιτικῶν κατέχει. τὸ δ᾽ ἡμέτερον οὐκ ἄξιον λέγειν, τὸ δαιμόνιον σημεῖον· ἢ γάρ πού τινι ἄλλῳ ἢ οὐδενὶ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν γέγονε. καὶ τούτων δὴ τῶν ὀλίγων οἱ γενόμενοι καὶ γευσάμενοι ὡς ἡδὺ καὶ μακάριον τὸ κτῆμα, καὶ τῶν πολλῶν αὖ ἱκανῶς ἰδόντες τὴν μανίαν, καὶ ὅτι οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν περὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων πράττει

8. ἄξιον ΑΜ : ἄξιον ὡς Π.
11. πάνσμικρον Α : πᾶν σμικρὸν Π : πάνυ σμικρὸν Μ.
25. γενόμενοι ΑΠ : γευόμενοι Μ.
28. τὰ ΑΠ : om. Μ.

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p. 496. οὐδ' ἔστι ξύμμαχος μεθ' ὅτου τις ἰὼν ἐπὶ τὴν τῷ
D δικαίῳ βοήθειαν σῴζοιτ' ἄν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἰς θηρία ἄνθρωπος ἐμπεσών, οὔτε ξυναδικεῖν ἐθέλων οὔτε ἱκανὸς ὢν εἷς πᾶσιν ἀγρίοις ἀντέχειν, πρίν τι τὴν πόλιν ἢ φίλους ὀνῆσαι προαπολόμενος ἀνωφελὴς αὑτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν γένοιτο,—ταῦτα πάντα λογισμῷ λαβών, ἡσυχίαν ἔχων καὶ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττων, οἷον ἐν χειμῶνι κονιορτοῦ καὶ ζάλης ὑπὸ πνεύματος φερομένου ὑπὸ τειχίον ἀποστάς, ὁρῶν τοὺς ἄλλους καταπιμπλαμένους ἀνομίας, ἀγαπᾷ, εἴ πῃ αὐτὸς κα-
E θαρὸς ἀδικίας τε καὶ ἀνοσίων ἔργων τόν τε ἐνθάδε βίον βιώσεται καὶ τὴν ἀπαλλαγὴν αὐτοῦ μετὰ καλῆς ἐλπίδος ἵλεώς τε καὶ εὐμενὴς ἀπαλλάξεται.

and these are unable to resist the madness of the world; they therefore in order to escape the storm take shelter behind a wall and live their own life.

p. 497. Ἀλλά τοι, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐ τὰ ἐλάχιστα ἂν | διαπραξάμενος ἀπαλλάττοιτο.

Οὐδέ γε, εἶπον, τὰ μέγιστα, μὴ τυχὼν πολιτείας προσηκούσης· ἐν γὰρ προσηκούσῃ αὐτός τε μᾶλλον αὐξήσεται καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἰδίων τὰ κοινὰ σώσει.

Τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φιλοσοφίας ὧν ἕνεκα διαβολὴν εἴληφε καὶ ὅτι οὐ δικαίως, ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ μετρίως εἰρῆσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἔτ' ἄλλο λέγεις τι σύ.

Ἀλλ' οὐδέν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἔτι λέγω περὶ τούτου· ἀλλὰ τὴν προσήκουσαν αὐτῇ τίνα τῶν νῦν λέγεις πολιτειῶν;

B Οὐδ' ἡντινοῦν, εἶπον, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπαιτιῶμαι, μηδεμίαν ἀξίαν εἶναι τῶν νῦν κατάστασιν πόλεως φιλοσόφου φύσεως· διὸ καὶ στρέφεσθαί τε καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι αὐτήν, ὥσπερ ξενικὸν σπέρμα ἐν γῇ ἄλλῃ σπειρόμενον ἐξίτηλον εἰς τὸ ἐπιχώριον φιλεῖ κρατού-

No existing State suited to philosophy.

1. τῷ δικαίῳ A : τῶν δικαίων ΠΜ. 9. ἀποστάς A : ὑποστάς ΠΜ. 23. αὐτοῖς M.

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μενον ἰέναι, οὕτω καὶ τοῦτο τὸ γένος νῦν μὲν οὐκ p. 497. ἴσχειν τὴν αὑτοῦ δύναμιν, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς ἀλλότριον ἦθος ἐκπίπτειν· εἰ δὲ λήψεται τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὸ ἄριστόν ἐστι, τότε δηλώσει ὅτι C τοῦτο μὲν τῷ ὄντι θεῖον ἦν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἀνθρώπινα, τά τε τῶν φύσεων καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων. δῆλος δὴ οὖν εἶ ὅτι μετὰ τοῦτο ἐρήσει τίς αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία.

Οὐκ ἔγνως, ἔφη· οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο ἔμελλον, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ αὕτη ἣν ἡμεῖς διεληλύθαμεν οἰκίζοντες τὴν πόλιν ἢ ἄλλη.

Even our own State requires the addition of the living authority.

Τὰ μὲν ἄλλα, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, αὕτη· τοῦτο δὲ αὐτὸ ἐρρήθη μὲν καὶ τότε, ὅτι δεήσοι τι ἀεὶ ἐνεῖναι ἐν τῇ πόλει λόγον ἔχον τῆς πολιτείας τὸν αὐτόν, D ὅνπερ καὶ σὺ ὁ νομοθέτης ἔχων τοὺς νόμους ἐτίθεις.

Ἐρρήθη γάρ, ἔφη.

Ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἱκανῶς, εἶπον, ἐδηλώθη, φόβῳ ὧν ὑμεῖς ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι δεδηλώκατε μακρὰν καὶ χαλεπὴν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν οὐ *πάντων ῥᾷστον διελθεῖν.

Τὸ ποῖον;

Τίνα τρόπον μεταχειριζομένη πόλις φιλοσοφίαν οὐ διολεῖται. τὰ γὰρ δὴ μεγάλα πάντα ἐπισφαλῆ, καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον τὰ καλὰ τῷ ὄντι χαλεπά.

Ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως, ἔφη, λαβέτω τέλος ἡ ἀπόδειξις τούτου E φανεροῦ γενομένου.

Οὐ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ, τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι διακωλύσει· παρὼν δὲ τήν γ᾽ ἐμὴν προ-

2. ἦθος ΑΠΜ : εἶδος Ξ. 13. ἐνεῖναι Μ : ἐν εἶναι Π : ἐν εἶναι Α. 20. πάντων cj. Bekker : πάντως MSS.

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p. 497. θυμίαν εἴσει. σκόπει δὲ καὶ νῦν ὡς προθύμως καὶ παρακινδυνευτικῶς μέλλω λέγειν, ὅτι τοὐναντίον ἢ νῦν δεῖ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος τούτου πόλιν ἅπτεσθαι.

Πῶς;

The superficial study of philosophy which exists in the present day.

Νῦν μέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἱ καὶ ἁπτόμενοι μειράκια
p. 498. ὄντα ἄρτι | ἐκ παίδων τὸ μεταξὺ οἰκονομίας καὶ χρηματισμοῦ πλησιάσαντες αὐτοῦ τῷ χαλεπωτάτῳ ἀπαλλάττονται, οἱ φιλοσοφώτατοι ποιούμενοι — λέγω δὲ χαλεπώτατον τὸ περὶ τοὺς λόγους —· ἐν δὲ τῷ ἔπειτα, ἐὰν καὶ ἄλλων τοῦτο πραττόντων παρακαλούμενοι ἐθέλωσιν ἀκροαταὶ γίγνεσθαι, μεγάλα ἡγοῦνται, πάρεργον οἰόμενοι αὐτὸ δεῖν πράττειν· πρὸς δὲ τὸ γῆρας ἐκτὸς δή τινων ὀλίγων ἀποσβέννυνται πολὺ μᾶλλον τοῦ Ἡρακλειτείου ἡλίου,
B ὅσον αὖθις οὐκ ἐξάπτονται.

Δεῖ δὲ πῶς; ἔφη.

Πᾶν τοὐναντίον, μειράκια μὲν ὄντα καὶ παῖδας μειρακιώδη παιδείαν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν μεταχειρίζεσθαι, τῶν τε σωμάτων, ἐν ᾧ βλαστάνει τε καὶ ἀνδροῦται, εὖ μάλα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ὑπηρεσίαν φιλοσοφίᾳ κτωμένους· προϊούσης δὲ τῆς ἡλικίας, ἐν ᾗ ἡ ψυχὴ τελειοῦσθαι ἄρχεται, ἐπιτείνειν τὰ ἐκείνης γυμνάσια·
C ὅταν δὲ λήγῃ μὲν ἡ ῥώμη, πολιτικῶν δὲ καὶ στρατειῶν ἐκτὸς γίγνηται, τότε ἤδη ἀφέτους νέμεσθαι καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο πράττειν, ὅ τι μὴ πάρεργον, τοὺς μέλλοντας εὐδαιμόνως βιώσεσθαι καὶ τελευτήσαντας τῷ βίῳ τῷ βεβιωμένῳ τὴν ἐκεῖ μοῖραν ἐπιστήσειν πρέπουσαν.

Ὡς ἀληθῶς μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη, λέγειν γε προθύμως, ὦ Σώκρατες· οἶμαι μέντοι τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν ἀκουόν-

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των προθυμότερον ἔτι ἀντιτείνειν οὐδ᾽ ὁπωστιοῦν p. 498. πεισομένους, ἀπὸ Θρασυμάχου ἀρξαμένους.

Thrasymachus once more.

Μὴ διάβαλλε, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἐμὲ καὶ Θρασύμαχον ἄρτι φίλους γεγονότας, οὐδὲ πρὸ τοῦ ἐχθροὺς ὄντας. D πείρας γὰρ οὐδὲν ἀνήσομεν, ἕως ἂν ἢ πείσωμεν καὶ τοῦτον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἢ προὔργου τι ποιήσωμεν εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν βίον, ὅταν αὖθις γενόμενοι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐντύχωσι λόγοις.

Εἰς μικρόν γ᾽, ἔφη, χρόνον εἴρηκας.

The people hate philosophy because they have only known bad and conventional imitations of it.

Εἰς οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν, ἔφην, ὥς γε πρὸς τὸν ἅπαντα. τὸ μέντοι μὴ πείθεσθαι τοῖς λεγομένοις τοὺς πολλοὺς θαῦμα οὐδέν· οὐ γὰρ πώποτε εἶδον γενόμενον τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον τοιαῦτ᾽ ἄττα ῥήματα E ἐξεπίτηδες ἀλλήλοις ὡμοιωμένα, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου, ὥσπερ νῦν, συμπεσόντα· ἄνδρα δὲ ἀρετῇ παρισωμένον καὶ ὡμοιωμένον μέχρι τοῦ δυνατοῦ τελέως ἔργῳ τε καὶ λόγῳ, δυναστεύοντα ἐν πόλει ἑτέρᾳ τοιαύτῃ, οὐ πώποτε |ἑωράκασιν, οὔτε ἕνα οὔτε πλείους. ἢ οἴει;

Οὐδαμῶς γε.

Οὐδέ γε αὖ λόγων, ὦ μακάριε, καλῶν τε καὶ p. 499. ἐλευθέρων ἱκανῶς ἐπήκοοι γεγόνασιν, οἵων ζητεῖν μὲν τὸ ἀληθὲς ξυντεταμένως ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου τοῦ γνῶναι χάριν, τὰ δὲ κομψά τε καὶ ἐριστικὰ καὶ μηδαμόσε ἄλλοσε τείνοντα ἢ πρὸς δόξαν καὶ ἔριν καὶ ἐν δίκαις καὶ ἐν ἰδίαις συνουσίαις πόρρωθεν ἀσπαζομένων.

Οὐδὲ τούτων, ἔφη.

Τούτων τοι χάριν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ ταῦτα προορώ- B

1. ἀντιτείνειν MSS.: ἀντιτενεῖν cj. Steph.: ἂν ἀντιτείνειν *q* corr.
10. εἰς οὐδέν᾽ οὖν *q* corr.
22. οἵων AM : οἷον A^2Π.

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p. 499. μενοι ἡμεῖς τότε καὶ δεδιότες ὅμως ἐλέγομεν, ὑπὸ τἀληθοῦς ἠναγκασμένοι, ὅτι οὔτε πόλις οὔτε πολιτεία οὐδέ γ' ἀνὴρ ὁμοίως μή ποτε γένηται τέλεος, πρὶν ἂν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις τούτοις τοῖς ὀλίγοις καὶ οὐ πονηροῖς, ἀχρήστοις δὲ νῦν κεκλημένοις, ἀνάγκη τις ἐκ τύχης περιβάλῃ, εἴτε βούλονται εἴτε μή, πόλεως ἐπιμεληθῆναι, καὶ τῇ πόλει *κατηκόῳ γενέσθαι, ἢ τῶν νῦν ἐν δυναστείαις ἢ βασιλείαις ὄντων υἱέσιν ἢ αὐ- C τοῖς ἔκ τινος θείας ἐπιπνοίας ἀληθινῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινὸς ἔρως ἐμπέσῃ. τούτων δὲ πότερα γενέσθαι ἢ ἀμφότερα ὡς ἄρα ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐδένα φημὶ ἔχειν λόγον. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἡμεῖς δικαίως καταγελῴμεθα, ὡς ἄλλως εὐχαῖς ὅμοια λέγοντες. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως;

Οὕτως.

Somewhere, at some time, there may have been or may be a philosopher who is also the ruler of a State.

Εἰ τοίνυν ἄκροις εἰς φιλοσοφίαν πόλεώς τις ἀνάγκη ἐπιμεληθῆναι ἢ γέγονεν ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ τῷ παρεληλυθότι χρόνῳ ἢ καὶ νῦν ἔστιν ἔν τινι βαρβαρικῷ τόπῳ, D πόρρω που ἐκτὸς ὄντι τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐπόψεως, ἢ καὶ ἔπειτα γενήσεται, περὶ τούτου ἕτοιμοι τῷ λόγῳ διαμάχεσθαι, ὡς γέγονεν ἡ εἰρημένη πολιτεία καὶ ἔστι καὶ γενήσεταί γε, ὅταν αὕτη ἡ Μοῦσα πόλεως ἐγκρατὴς γένηται. οὐ γὰρ ἀδύνατος γενέσθαι, οὐδ' ἡμεῖς ἀδύνατα λέγομεν· χαλεπὰ δὲ καὶ παρ' ἡμῶν ὁμολογεῖται.

Καὶ ἐμοί, ἔφη, οὕτω δοκεῖ.

Τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι οὐκ αὖ δοκεῖ, ἐρεῖς;

Ἴσως, ἔφη.

6. περιβάλῃ ΑΠΜ : παραβάλῃ ΞΜ corr.
7. κατηκόῳ cj. Schleiermacher : κατήκοοι ΑΜ : κατήκοι Π.

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Ὦ μακάριε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μὴ πάνυ οὕτω τῶν πολλῶν p. 499. κατηγόρει. ἀλλοίαν τοι δόξαν ἕξουσιν, ἐὰν αὐτοῖς E μὴ φιλονεικῶν ἀλλὰ παραμυθούμενος καὶ ἀπολυόμενος τὴν τῆς φιλομαθείας διαβολὴν ἐνδεικνύῃ οὓς λέγεις τοὺς φιλοσόφους, καὶ διορίζῃ ὥσπερ ἄρτι τήν τε φύσιν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν | ἐπιτήδευσιν, ἵνα μὴ ἡγῶνταί p. 500. σε λέγειν οὓς αὐτοὶ οἴονται. ἢ †καὶ ἐὰν οὕτω θεῶνται, ἀλλοίαν τοι φήσεις αὐτοὺς δόξαν λήψεσθαι καὶ ἄλλα ἀποκρινεῖσθαι. ἢ οἴει τινὰ χαλεπαίνειν τῷ μὴ χαλεπῷ ἢ φθονεῖν τῷ μὴ φθονερῷ ἄφθονόν τε καὶ πρᾶον ὄντα; ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ σε προφθάσας λέγω, ὅτι ἐν ὀλίγοις τισὶν ἡγοῦμαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τῷ πλήθει, χαλεπὴν οὕτω φύσιν γίγνεσθαι.

Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀμέλει, ἔφη, ξυνοίομαι.

The feeling against philosophy is really a feeling against pretended philosophers who are always talking about persons.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ξυνοίει, τοῦ χαλεπῶς πρὸς B φιλοσοφίαν τοὺς πολλοὺς διακεῖσθαι ἐκείνους αἰτίους εἶναι τοὺς ἔξωθεν οὐ προσῆκον ἐπεισκεκωμακότας, λοιδορουμένους τε αὐτοῖς καὶ φιλαπεχθημόνως ἔχοντας καὶ ἀεὶ περὶ ἀνθρώπων τοὺς λόγους ποιουμένους, ἥκιστα φιλοσοφίᾳ πρέπον ποιοῦντας;

Πολύ γ', ἔφη.

The true philosopher, who has his eye

Οὐδὲ γάρ που, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, σχολὴ τῷ γε ὡς ἀληθῶς πρὸς τοῖς οὖσι τὴν διάνοιαν ἔχοντι κάτω βλέπειν εἰς ἀνθρώπων πραγματείας, καὶ μαχόμενον C αὐτοῖς φθόνου τε καὶ δυσμενείας ἐμπίπλασθαι, ἀλλ' εἰς τεταγμένα ἄττα καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἀεὶ ἔχοντα ὁρῶντας καὶ θεωμένους οὔτ' ἀδικοῦντα οὔτ' ἀδικούμενα

2. ἀλλοίαν ΑΠ : ἀλλ' οἵαν Μ. ἐὰν ΑΜ : ἐ.ν Π.
7. ἤ, καὶ : ἢ καὶ ΑΠΜ : καὶ Ξ : ἢ οὐκ *q* : (an ἢ οὐκ . . . ἀλλοίαν τε?).
8. τοι ΑΠΜ : τε *v*.
9. ἀποκρινεῖσθαι Π et forsitan Mpr. : ἀποκρίνεσθαι ΑΜ corr.
27. ἀδικούμενα Ξ : ἀδικούμενος Πpr. (ον superscr.) : ἀδικούμενον ΑΠ corr. m. pr. Μ.

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p. 500. ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, κόσμῳ δὲ πάντα καὶ κατὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ταῦτα μιμεῖσθαί τε καὶ ὅ τι μάλιστα ἀφομοιοῦσθαι. ἢ οἴει τινὰ μηχανὴν εἶναι, ὅτῳ τις ὁμιλεῖ ἀγάμενος, μὴ μιμεῖσθαι ἐκεῖνο;

Ἀδύνατον, ἔφη.

Θείῳ δὴ καὶ κοσμίῳ ὅ γε φιλόσοφος ὁμιλῶν κόσ-
D μιός τε καὶ θεῖος εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ γίγνεται· διαβολὴ δ' ἐν πᾶσι πολλή.

fixed upon immutable principles, will fashion States after the heavenly image.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

Ἂν οὖν τις, εἶπον, αὐτῷ ἀνάγκη γένηται ἃ ἐκεῖ ὁρᾷ μελετῆσαι εἰς ἀνθρώπων ἤθη καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ τιθέναι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἑαυτὸν πλάττειν, ἆρα κακὸν δημιουργὸν αὐτὸν οἴει γενήσεσθαι σωφροσύνης τε καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ξυμπάσης τῆς δημοτικῆς ἀρετῆς;

Ἥκιστά γε, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Ἀλλ' ἐὰν δὴ αἴσθωνται οἱ πολλοί, ὅτι ἀληθῆ περὶ
E αὐτοῦ λέγομεν, χαλεπανοῦσι δὴ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις καὶ ἀπιστήσουσιν ἡμῖν λέγουσιν, ὡς οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἄλλως εὐδαιμονήσειε πόλις, εἰ μὴ αὐτὴν διαγράψειαν οἱ τῷ θείῳ παραδείγματι χρώμενοι ζωγράφοι;

Οὐ χαλεπανοῦσιν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐάνπερ αἴσθωνται. ἀλλὰ
p. 501. δὴ τίνα | λέγεις τρόπον τῆς διαγραφῆς;

Λαβόντες, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὥσπερ πίνακα πόλιν τε καὶ ἤθη ἀνθρώπων, πρῶτον μὲν καθαρὰν ποιήσειαν ἄν, ὃ οὐ πάνυ ῥᾴδιον· ἀλλ' οὖν οἶσθ' ὅτι τούτῳ ἂν εὐθὺς τῶν ἄλλων διενέγκοιεν, τῷ μήτε ἰδιώτου μήτε πόλεως ἐθελῆσαι ἂν ἅψασθαι μηδὲ γράφειν νόμους, πρὶν ἢ παραλαβεῖν καθαρὰν ἢ αὐτοὶ ποιῆσαι.

He will begin with a 'tabula rasa,' and there inscribe his laws.

27. διενέγκοιεν q : διενεγκεῖν ΑΠΜ.
28. μηδὲ γράφειν ΑΠΜ : μηδ' ἐγγράφειν cj. Cobet.

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Socrates, Adeimantus.

Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἔφη. p. 501.

Οὐκοῦν μετὰ ταῦτα οἴει ὑπογράψασθαι ἂν τὸ σχῆμα τῆς πολιτείας;

Τί μήν;

Ἔπειτα, οἶμαι, ἀπεργαζόμενοι πυκνὰ ἂν ἑκατέρωσ' B ἀποβλέποιεν πρός τε τὸ φύσει δίκαιον καὶ καλὸν καὶ σῶφρον καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο αὖ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἐμποιοῖεν ξυμμιγνύντες τε καὶ κεραννύντες ἐκ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων τὸ ἀνδρείκελον, ἀπ' ἐκείνου τεκμαιρόμενοι, ὃ δὴ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐκάλεσεν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐγγιγνόμενον θεοειδές τε καὶ θεοείκελον.

Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.

Καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄν, οἶμαι, ἐξαλείφοιεν, τὸ δὲ πάλιν ἐγγράφοιεν, ἕως ὅ τι μάλιστα ἀνθρώπεια ἤθη εἰς C ὅσον ἐνδέχεται θεοφιλῆ ποιήσειαν.

Καλλίστη γοῦν ἄν, ἔφη, ἡ γραφὴ γένοιτο.

The enemies of philosophy, when they hear the truth, are gradually propitiated,

Ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πείθομέν πῃ ἐκείνους, οὓς διατεταμένους ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ἔφησθα ἰέναι, ὡς τοιοῦτός ἐστι πολιτειῶν ζωγράφος, ὃν τότ' ἐπῃνοῦμεν πρὸς αὐτούς, δι' ὃν ἐκεῖνοι ἐχαλέπαινον ὅτι τὰς πόλεις αὐτῷ παρεδίδομεν, καί τι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ νῦν ἀκούοντες πραΰνονται;

Καὶ πολύ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς, εἰ σωφρονοῦσιν.

Πῇ γὰρ δὴ ἕξουσιν ἀμφισβητῆσαι; ποτέρον μὴ D τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ ἀληθείας ἐραστὰς εἶναι τοὺς φιλοσόφους;

Ἄτοπον μέντ' ἄν, ἔφη, εἴη.

7. ἐκεῖνο . . . ἐμποιοῖεν ΑΠΜ (αὐτὸ Μ): ἐκεῖνο αὖ, ὃ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐμποιοῖεν, Ξ. 16. θεοφιλῆ MSS.: θεοειδῆ cj. Badham. 22. τί (sic) A: ἔτι Π: om. M.

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p. 501. Ἀλλὰ μὴ τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν οἰκείαν εἶναι τοῦ ἀρίστου, ἣν ἡμεῖς διήλθομεν;

Οὐδὲ τοῦτο.

Τί δέ; τὴν τοιαύτην τυχοῦσαν τῶν προσηκόντων ἐπιτηδευμάτων οὐκ ἀγαθὴν τελέως ἔσεσθαι καὶ φιλόσοφον, εἴπερ τινὰ ἄλλην; ἢ ἐκείνους φήσειν μᾶλλον, οὓς ἡμεῖς ἀφωρίσαμεν;

E Οὐ δήπου.

Ἔτι οὖν ἀγριανοῦσι λεγόντων ἡμῶν ὅτι, πρὶν ἂν πόλεως τὸ φιλόσοφον γένος ἐγκρατὲς γένηται, οὔτε πόλει οὔτε πολίταις κακῶν παῦλα ἔσται, οὐδὲ ἡ πολιτεία ἣν μυθολογοῦμεν λόγῳ ἔργῳ τέλος λήψεται;

Ἴσως, ἔφη, ἧττον.

Βούλει οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μὴ ἧττον φῶμεν αὐτοὺς ἀλλὰ παντάπασι πράους γεγονέναι καὶ πεπεῖσθαι,
p. 502. ἵνα, | εἰ μή τι ἄλλο, αἰσχυνθέντες ὁμολογήσωσιν;

and at length become quite gentle.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Οὗτοι μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦτο πεπεισμένοι ἔστων· τοῦδε δὲ πέρι τις ἀμφισβητήσει ὡς οὐκ ἂν τύχοιεν γενόμενοι βασιλέων ἔκγονοι ἢ δυναστῶν τὰς φύσεις φιλόσοφοι;

There may have been one son of a king a philosopher who has remained uncorrupted and has a State obedient to his will.

Οὐδ' ἂν εἷς, ἔφη.

Τοιούτους δὲ γενομένους ὡς πολλὴ ἀνάγκη διαφθαρῆναι, ἔχει τις λέγειν; ὡς μὲν γὰρ χαλεπὸν σωθῆναι, καὶ ἡμεῖς ξυγχωροῦμεν· ὡς δὲ ἐν παντὶ τῷ
B χρόνῳ τῶν πάντων οὐδέποτε οὐδ' ἂν εἷς σωθείη, ἔσθ' ὅστις ἀμφισβητήσειε;

Καὶ πῶς;

20. τις ΑΠ : , τίς Μ.
28. ἀμφισβητήσειε ΑΜ : ἀμφισβητήσεως Π : ἀμφισβητήσει *q*K.

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Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἷς ἱκανὸς γενόμενος, πόλιν p. 502. ἔχων πειθομένην, πάντ' ἐπιτελέσαι τὰ νῦν ἀπιστούμενα.

Ἱκανὸς γάρ, ἔφη.

Ἄρχοντος γάρ που, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τιθέντος τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα ἃ διεληλύθαμεν, οὐ δήπου ἀδύνατον ἐθέλειν ποιεῖν τοὺς πολίτας.

Οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν.

Ἀλλὰ δή, ἅπερ ἡμῖν δοκεῖ, δόξαι καὶ ἄλλοις θαυμαστόν τι καὶ ἀδύνατον;

Οὐκ οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ἦ δ' ὅς. C

Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε βέλτιστα, εἴπερ δυνατά, ἱκανῶς ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, διήλθομεν.

Ἱκανῶς γάρ.

Our constitution then is not unattainable.

Νῦν δή, ὡς ἔοικε, ξυμβαίνει ἡμῖν περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας ἄριστα μὲν εἶναι ἃ λέγομεν, εἰ γένοιτο, χαλεπὰ δὲ γενέσθαι, οὐ μέντοι ἀδύνατά γε.

Ξυμβαίνει γάρ, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο μόγις τέλος ἔσχε, τὰ ἐπίλοιπα δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο λεκτέον, τίνα τρόπον ἡμῖν καὶ D ἐκ τίνων μαθημάτων τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων οἱ σωτῆρες ἐνέσονται τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ κατὰ ποίας ἡλικίας ἕκαστοι ἑκάστων ἁπτόμενοι;

Λεκτέον μέντοι, ἔφη.

Recapitulation.

Οὐδέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ σοφόν μοι ἐγένετο τήν τε τῶν γυναικῶν τῆς κτήσεως δυσχέρειαν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν παραλιπόντι καὶ παιδογονίαν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀρχόντων κατάστασιν, εἰδότι ὡς ἐπίφθονός τε καὶ χαλεπὴ γίγνεσθαι ἡ παντελῶς ἀληθής· νῦν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἦλθε τὸ δεῖν αὐτὰ διελθεῖν. καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ E

29. ἡ ΜΞ: ᾗ ΑΠ.

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p. 502. τῶν γυναικῶν τε καὶ παίδων πεπέρανται, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀρχόντων ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μετελθεῖν δεῖ. ἐλέγομεν p. 503. δ', εἰ μνημονεύεις, δεῖν αὐτοὺς φιλοπόλιδάς | τε φαίνεσθαι, βασανιζομένους ἐν ἡδοναῖς τε καὶ λύπαις, καὶ τὸ δόγμα τοῦτο μήτ' ἐν πόνοις μήτ' ἐν φόβοις μήτ' ἐν ἄλλῃ μηδεμιᾷ μεταβολῇ φαίνεσθαι ἐκβάλλοντας, ἢ τὸν ἀδυνατοῦντα ἀποκριτέον, τὸν δὲ πανταχοῦ ἀκήρατον ἐκβαίνοντα, ὥσπερ χρυσὸν ἐν πυρὶ βασανιζόμενον, στατέον ἄρχοντα καὶ γέρα δοτέον καὶ ζῶντι καὶ τελευτήσαντι καὶ ἆθλα. τοιαῦτ' ἄττα ἦν τὰ λεγόμενα παρεξιόντος καὶ παρακα- B λυπτομένου τοῦ λόγου, πεφοβημένου κινεῖν τὸ νῦν παρόν.

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις· μέμνημαι γάρ.

Ὄκνος γάρ, ἔφην, ὦ φίλε, ἐγώ, εἰπεῖν τὰ νῦν ἀποτετολμημένα· νῦν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν τετολμήσθω εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τοὺς ἀκριβεστάτους φύλακας φιλοσόφους δεῖ καθιστάναι.

Εἰρήσθω γάρ, ἔφη.

The guardian must be a philosopher, and a philosopher must be a person of rare gifts.

Νόησον δή, ὡς εἰκότως ὀλίγοι ἔσονταί σοι. ἣν γὰρ διήλθομεν φύσιν δεῖν ὑπάρχειν αὐτοῖς, εἰς ταὐτὸ ξυμφύεσθαι αὐτῆς τὰ μέρη ὀλιγάκις ἐθέλει, τὰ πολλὰ δὲ διεσπασμένη φύεται.

C Πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις;

Εὐμαθεῖς καὶ μνήμονες καὶ ἀγχίνοι καὶ ὀξεῖς καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τούτοις ἕπεται οἶσθ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ἅμα φύεσθαι καὶ νεανικοί τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τὰς διανοίας οἷοι κοσμίως μετὰ ἡσυχίας καὶ βεβαιότητος ἐθέλειν ζῆν, ἀλλ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι ὑπὸ ὀξύτητος φέρονται

28. βεβαιότητος ΑΠΜpr. : ἡμερότητος r Ξ : γρ. ἡμερότητος Mmg.

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ὅπῃ ἂν τύχωσι, καὶ τὸ βέβαιον ἅπαν αὐτῶν ἐξοίχεται. p. 503.

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

The contrast of the quick and solid temperaments.

Οὐκοῦν τὰ βέβαια αὖ ταῦτα ἤθη καὶ οὐκ εὐμετάβολα, οἷς ἂν τις μᾶλλον ὡς πιστοῖς χρήσαιτο, καὶ D ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ πρὸς τοὺς φόβους δυσκίνητα ὄντα, πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις αὖ ποιεῖ ταὐτόν, δυσκινήτως ἔχει καὶ δυσμαθῶς ὥσπερ ἀπονεναρκωμένα, καὶ ὕπνου τε καὶ χάσμης ἐμπίπλανται, ὅταν τι δέῃ τοιοῦτον διαπονεῖν.

Ἔστι ταῦτα, ἔφη.

They must be united.

Ἡμεῖς δέ γε ἔφαμεν ἀμφοτέρων δεῖν εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς μετέχειν, ἢ μήτε παιδείας τῆς ἀκριβεστάτης δεῖν αὐτῷ μεταδιδόναι μήτε τιμῆς μήτε ἀρχῆς.

Ὀρθῶς, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς.

Οὐκοῦν σπάνιον αὐτὸ οἴει ἔσεσθαι;

Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;

He who is to hold command must be tested in many kinds of knowledge.

Βασανιστέον δὴ ἔν τε οἷς τότε ἐλέγομεν πόνοις τε E καὶ φόβοις καὶ ἡδοναῖς, καὶ ἔτι δὴ ὃ τότε παρεῖμεν νῦν λέγομεν, ὅτι καὶ ἐν μαθήμασι πολλοῖς γυμνάζειν δεῖ, σκοποῦντας, εἰ καὶ τὰ μέγιστα μαθήματα δυνατὴ ἔσται ἐνεγκεῖν, εἴτε καὶ | ἀποδειλιάσει, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν p. 504. τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀποδειλιῶντες.

Πρέπει γέ τοι δή, ἔφη, οὕτω σκοπεῖν. ἀλλὰ ποῖα δὴ λέγεις μαθήματα μέγιστα;

Μνημονεύεις μέν που, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὅτι τριττὰ εἴδη ψυχῆς διαστησάμενοι ξυνεβιβάζομεν δικαιοσύνης τε πέρι καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ σοφίας ὃ ἕκαστον εἴη.

21. δυνατὴ AM : δυνατὴ (δες above) ΠΞ.
23. τοῖς ἄθλοις cj. Orelli.

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p. 504. Μὴ γὰρ μνημονεύων, ἔφη, τὰ λοιπὰ ἂν εἴην δίκαιος μὴ ἀκούειν.

Ἦ καὶ τὸ προρρηθὲν αὐτῶν;

B Τὸ ποῖον δή;

The shorter exposition of education, which has been already given, inadequate.

Ἐλέγομέν που ὅτι ὡς μὲν δυνατὸν ἦν κάλλιστα αὐτὰ κατιδεῖν ἄλλη μακροτέρα εἴη περίοδος, ἣν περιελθόντι καταφανῆ γίγνοιτο, τῶν μέντοι ἔμπροσθεν προειρημένων ἑπομένας ἀποδείξεις οἷόν τ' εἴη προσάψαι. καὶ ὑμεῖς ἐξαρκεῖν ἔφατε, καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἐρρήθη τὰ τότε τῆς μὲν ἀκριβείας, ὡς ἐμοὶ ἐφαίνετο, ἐλλιπῆ, εἰ δὲ ὑμῖν ἀρεσκόντως, ὑμεῖς ἂν τοῦτο εἴποιτε.

Ἀλλ' ἔμοιγε, ἔφη, μετρίως· ἐφαίνετο μὴν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις.

C Ἀλλ', ὦ φίλε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μέτρον τῶν τοιούτων ἀπολεῖπον καὶ ὁτιοῦν τοῦ ὄντος οὐ πάνυ μετρίως γίγνεται· ἀτελὲς γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς μέτρον. δοκεῖ δ' ἐνίοτέ τισιν ἱκανῶς ἤδη ἔχειν καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖν περαιτέρω ζητεῖν.

Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, συχνοὶ πάσχουσιν αὐτὸ διὰ ῥᾳθυμίαν.

Τούτου δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦ παθήματος ἥκιστα προσδεῖ φύλακι πόλεώς τε καὶ νόμων.

Εἰκός, ἦ δ' ὅς.

The guardian must take the longer road of

D Τὴν μακροτέραν τοίνυν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἔφην, περιιτέον τῷ τοιούτῳ, καὶ οὐχ ἧττον μανθάνοντι πονητέον ἢ γυμναζομένῳ· ἤ, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, τοῦ μεγίστου

16. ἀπολεῖπον Amg. *v.*: ἀπολείπων AM: ἀπολειπῶν Π. μέτριον Amg. (γρ.)
18. δεῖν M: δεῖ AΠ.
23. προσδεῖ Π: προσδεῖται AM (προσδεῖται φυλακὴ Ξ).
26, 27. ἢ γυμναζομένῳ . . . μεγίστου τε ΠΜ: om. A.

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the higher learning,

τε καὶ μάλιστα προσήκοντος μαθήματος ἐπὶ τέλος p. 504.
οὔποτε ἥξει.

Οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα, ἔφη, μέγιστα, ἀλλ' ἔτι τι μεῖζον
δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ὧν διήλθομεν;

Καὶ μεῖζον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων οὐχ
ὑπογραφὴν δεῖ ὥσπερ νῦν θεάσασθαι, ἀλλὰ τὴν
τελεωτάτην ἀπεργασίαν μὴ παριέναι. ἢ οὐ γελοῖον
ἐπὶ μὲν ἄλλοις σμικροῦ ἀξίοις πᾶν ποιεῖν συντεινο- E
μένους, ὅπως ὅ τι ἀκριβέστατα καὶ καθαρώτατα ἕξει,
τῶν δὲ μεγίστων μὴ μεγίστας ἀξιοῦν εἶναι καὶ τὰς
ἀκριβείας;

which leads upwards at last to the idea of good.

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, ἄξιον τὸ διανόημα. ὃ μέντοι
μέγιστον μάθημα καὶ περὶ ὅ τι αὐτὸ λέγεις, οἴει τιν'
ἄν σε, ἔφη, ἀφεῖναι μὴ ἐρωτήσαντα τί ἐστιν;

Οὐ πάνυ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ ἐρώτα. πάντως
αὐτὸ οὐκ ὀλιγάκις ἀκήκοας, νῦν δὲ ἢ οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ἢ
αὖ διανοεῖ ἐμοὶ πράγματα | παρέχειν ἀντιλαμβανό- p. 505.
μενος. οἶμαι δὲ τοῦτο μᾶλλον· ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε ἡ τοῦ
ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα μέγιστον μάθημα, πολλάκις ἀκήκοας, ᾗ
καὶ δίκαια καὶ τἆλλα προσχρησάμενα χρήσιμα καὶ
ὠφέλιμα γίγνεται. καὶ νῦν σχεδὸν οἶσθ' ὅτι μέλλω
τοῦτο λέγειν, καὶ πρὸς τούτῳ ὅτι αὐτὴν οὐχ ἱκανῶς
ἴσμεν· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἴσμεν, ἄνευ δὲ ταύτης εἰ ὅ τι μάλιστα
τἆλλα ἐπισταίμεθα, οἶσθ' ὅτι οὐδὲν ἡμῖν ὄφελος,
ὥσπερ οὐδ' εἰ *κεκτῄμεθά τι ἄνευ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. B
ἢ οἴει τι πλέον εἶναι πᾶσαν κτῆσιν ἐκτῆσθαι, μὴ
μέντοι ἀγαθήν; ἢ πάντα τἆλλα φρονεῖν ἄνευ τοῦ
ἀγαθοῦ, καλὸν δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸν μηδὲν φρονεῖν;

12. ἄξιον τὸ διανόημα MSS.: del. Schleiermacher.
20. καὶ δίκαια καὶ Π: δίκαια καὶ AM: δὴ καὶ r.
25. κεκτῄμεθα Bekker: κεκτήμεθα MSS.
26. εἶναι ΜΞ: εἰδέναι ΑΠ.

p. 505. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη.

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But what is the good?

Some say pleasure, others knowledge, which they absurdly explain to mean the knowledge of the good.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε γε οἶσθα, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν πολλοῖς ἡδονὴ δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ κομψοτέροις φρόνησις.

Πῶς δ' οὔ;

Καὶ ὅτι γε, ὦ φίλε, οἱ τοῦτο ἡγούμενοι οὐκ ἔχουσι δεῖξαι ἥτις φρόνησις, ἀλλ' ἀναγκάζονται τελευτῶντες τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φάναι.

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, γελοίως.

C Πῶς γὰρ οὐχί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ ὀνειδίζοντές γε ὅτι οὐκ ἴσμεν τὸ ἀγαθὸν λέγουσι πάλιν ὡς εἰδόσι; φρόνησιν γὰρ αὐτό φασιν εἶναι ἀγαθοῦ, ὡς αὖ ξυνιέντων ἡμῶν ὅ τι λέγουσιν, ἐπειδὰν τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φθέγξωνται ὄνομα.

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

Τί δαί; οἱ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν ὁριζόμενοι μῶν μή τι ἐλάττονος πλάνης ἔμπλεῳ τῶν ἑτέρων; ἢ οὐ καὶ οὗτοι ἀναγκάζονται ὁμολογεῖν ἡδονὰς εἶναι κακάς;

Σφόδρα γε.

D Συμβαίνει δὴ αὐτοῖς, οἶμαι, ὁμολογεῖν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι καὶ κακὰ ταὐτά. ἢ γάρ;

Τί μήν;

Οὐκοῦν ὅτι μὲν μεγάλαι καὶ πολλαὶ ἀμφισβητήσεις περὶ αὐτοῦ, φανερόν;

Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Τί δέ; τόδε οὐ φανερόν, ὡς δίκαια μὲν καὶ καλὰ πολλοὶ ἂν ἕλοιντο τὰ δοκοῦντα, κἂν μὴ ᾖ, ὅμως ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ κεκτῆσθαι καὶ δοκεῖν, ἀγαθὰ δὲ οὐδενὶ ἔτι ἀρκεῖ τὰ δοκοῦντα κτᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ

28. ᾖ r: εἴη ΑΠΜ.

Republic VI.

SOCRATES, ADEIMANTUS.

ὄντα ζητοῦσι, τὴν δὲ δόξαν ἐνταῦθα ἤδη πᾶς ἀτιμάζει; p. 505.

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

Every man pursues the good, but without knowing the nature of it.

Ὃ δὴ διώκει μὲν ἅπασα ψυχὴ καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα E πάντα πράττει, ἀπομαντευομένη τι εἶναι, ἀποροῦσα δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσα λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶν οὐδὲ πίστει χρήσασθαι μονίμῳ οἵᾳ καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα, διὰ τοῦτο δὲ ἀποτυγχάνει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, εἴ τι ὄφελος ἦν, περὶ δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ τοσοῦτον | οὕτω φῶμεν p. 506. δεῖν ἐσκοτῶσθαι καὶ ἐκείνους τοὺς βελτίστους ἐν τῇ πόλει, οἷς πάντα ἐγχειριοῦμεν;

Ἥκιστά γ᾽, ἔφη.

Οἶμαι γοῦν, εἶπον, δίκαιά τε καὶ καλὰ ἀγνοούμενα, ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἀγαθά ἐστιν, οὐ πολλοῦ τινὸς ἄξιον φύλακα κεκτῆσθαι ἂν ἑαυτῶν τὸν τοῦτο ἀγνοοῦντα· μαντεύομαι δὲ μηδένα αὐτὰ πρότερον γνώσεσθαι ἱκανῶς.

Καλῶς γάρ, ἔφη, μαντεύει.

Οὐκοῦν ἡμῖν ἡ πολιτεία τελέως κεκοσμήσεται, B ἐὰν ὁ τοιοῦτος αὐτὴν ἐπισκοπῇ φύλαξ, ὁ τούτων ἐπιστήμων;

The guardian ought to know these things.

Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ σὺ δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, πότερον ἐπιστήμην τὸ ἀγαθὸν φῂς εἶναι ἢ ἡδονήν; ἢ ἄλλο τι παρὰ ταῦτα;

Οὗτος, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἀνήρ, καλῶς ἦσθα καὶ πάλαι καταφανὴς ὅτι σοι οὐκ ἀποχρήσοι τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦν περὶ αὐτῶν.

Οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιόν μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνεται τὰ τῶν ἄλλων μὲν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν δόγματα, τὸ δ᾽ αὑτοῦ μή, τοσοῦτον χρόνον περὶ ταῦτα πραγματευόμενον.

19. τελέως ΑΜ : παντελῶς Π. 25. καλῶς ΑΠΜ : καλὸς A²tK.

p. 506. C Τί δαί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· δοκεῖ σοι δίκαιον εἶναι περὶ ὧν τις μὴ οἶδε λέγειν ὡς εἰδότα;

Οὐδαμῶς γ', ἔφη, ὡς εἰδότα, ὡς μέντοι οἰόμενον ταῦθ' ἃ οἴεται ἐθέλειν λέγειν.

Τί δαί; εἶπον· οὐκ ᾔσθησαι τὰς ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης δόξας, ὡς πᾶσαι αἰσχραί; ὧν αἱ βέλτισται τυφλαί. ἢ δοκοῦσί τί σοι τυφλῶν διαφέρειν ὁδὸν ὀρθῶς πορευομένων οἱ ἄνευ νοῦ ἀληθές τι δοξάζοντες;

Οὐδέν, ἔφη.

Βούλει οὖν αἰσχρὰ θεάσασθαι, τυφλά τε καὶ D σκολιά, ἐξὸν παρ' ἄλλων ἀκούειν φανά τε καὶ καλά;

Μὴ πρὸς Διός, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Γλαύκων, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τέλει ὢν ἀποστῇς. ἀρκέσει γὰρ ἡμῖν, κἂν ὥσπερ δικαιοσύνης πέρι καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων διῆλθες, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ διέλθῃς.

We can only attain to the things of the mind through the things of sense.

Καὶ γὰρ ἐμοί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, καὶ μάλα ἀρκέσει· ἀλλ' ὅπως μὴ οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσομαι, προθυμούμενος δὲ ἀσχημονῶν γέλωτα ὀφλήσω. ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριοι, E αὐτὸ μὲν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τἀγαθὸν ἐάσωμεν τὸ νῦν εἶναι· πλέον γάρ μοι φαίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν παροῦσαν ὁρμὴν ἐφικέσθαι τοῦ γε δοκοῦντος ἐμοὶ τὰ νῦν· ὃς δὲ ἔκγονός τε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φαίνεται καὶ ὁμοιότατος ἐκείνῳ, λέγειν ἐθέλω, εἰ καὶ ὑμῖν φίλον, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐᾶν.

The offspring of the good : parent : : interest : principal.

Ἀλλ', ἔφη, λέγε· εἰσαῦθις γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀποτίσεις τὴν διήγησιν.

1. τί δαί A²M : τί δέ AΠ.
5. τί δαί M : τί δέ AΠ.
11. φανά AΠ : φανερά c. γρ. φανά M.

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Socrates, Glaucon.

Βουλοίμην ἄν, εἶπον, ἐμέ τε δύνασθαι αὐτὴν p. 506.
| ἀποδοῦναι καὶ ὑμᾶς κομίσασθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὥσπερ p. 507.
νῦν τοὺς τόκους μόνον. τοῦτον δὲ δὴ οὖν τὸν τόκον τε καὶ ἔκγονον αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κομίσασθε. εὐλαβεῖσθε μέντοι, μή πῃ ἐξαπατήσω ὑμᾶς ἄκων, κίβδηλον ἀποδιδοὺς τὸν λόγον τοῦ τόκου.

Εὐλαβησόμεθα, ἔφη, κατὰ δύναμιν· ἀλλὰ μόνον λέγε.

Διομολογησάμενός γ', ἔφην ἐγώ, καὶ ἀναμνήσας ὑμᾶς τά τ' ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ῥηθέντα καὶ ἄλλοτε ἤδη πολλάκις εἰρημένα.

Τὰ ποῖα; ἦ δ' ὅς. B

Πολλὰ καλά, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἕκαστα οὕτως εἶναί φαμέν τε καὶ διορίζομεν τῷ λόγῳ.

Φαμὲν γάρ.

Καὶ αὐτὸ δὴ καλὸν καὶ αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ οὕτω περὶ πάντων ἃ τότε ὡς πολλὰ ἐτίθεμεν, πάλιν αὖ κατ' ἰδέαν μίαν ἑκάστου ὡς μιᾶς οὔσης τιθέντες, ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον προσαγορεύομεν.

Ἔστι ταῦτα.

Καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ ὁρᾶσθαί φαμεν, νοεῖσθαι δ' οὔ, τὰς δ' αὖ ἰδέας νοεῖσθαι μέν, ὁρᾶσθαι δ' οὔ. C

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

Τῷ οὖν ὁρῶμεν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὰ ὁρώμενα;

Τῇ ὄψει, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἀκοῇ τὰ ἀκουόμενα, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσι πάντα τὰ αἰσθητά;

Τί μήν;

Of the senses, Sight is the most complex,

Ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐννενόηκας τὸν τῶν αἰσθήσεων δημιουργὸν ὅσῳ πολυτελεστάτην τὴν τοῦ ὁρᾶν τε καὶ ὁρᾶσθαι δύναμιν ἐδημιούργησεν;

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SOCRATES, GLAUCON.

p. 507. Οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη.

Ἀλλ' ὧδε σκόπει. ἔστιν ὅ τι προσδεῖ ἀκοῇ καὶ φωνῇ γένους ἄλλου εἰς τὸ τὴν μὲν ἀκούειν, τὴν δὲ D ἀκούεσθαι, ὃ ἐὰν μὴ παραγένηται τρίτον, ἡ μὲν οὐκ ἀκούσεται, ἡ δὲ οὐκ ἀκουσθήσεται;

Οὐδενός, ἔφη.

Οἶμαι δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐδ' ἄλλαις πολλαῖς, ἵνα μὴ εἴπω ὅτι οὐδεμιᾷ, τοιούτου προσδεῖ οὐδενός. ἢ σύ τινα ἔχεις εἰπεῖν;

Οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Τὴν δὲ τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι προσδεῖται;

Πῶς;

Ἐνούσης που ἐν ὄμμασιν ὄψεως καὶ ἐπιχειροῦντος τοῦ ἔχοντος χρῆσθαι αὐτῇ, παρούσης δὲ χρόας ἐν E αὐτοῖς, ἐὰν μὴ παραγένηται γένος τρίτον ἰδίᾳ ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο πεφυκός, οἶσθα ὅτι ἥ τε ὄψις οὐδὲν ὄψεται, τά τε χρώματα ἔσται ἀόρατα.

and, unlike the other senses, requires the addition of a third nature before it can be used. This third nature is light.

Τίνος δὴ λέγεις, ἔφη, τούτου;

Ὃ δὴ σὺ καλεῖς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φῶς.

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Οὐ σμικρᾷ ἄρα ἰδέᾳ ἡ τοῦ ὁρᾶν αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ p. 508. τοῦ ὁρᾶσθαι δύναμις | τῶν ἄλλων συζεύξεων τιμιωτέρῳ ζυγῷ ἐζύγησαν, εἴπερ μὴ ἄτιμον τὸ φῶς.

Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, πολλοῦ γε δεῖ ἄτιμον εἶναι.

Τίνα οὖν ἔχεις αἰτιάσασθαι τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ θεῶν τούτου κύριον, οὗ ἡμῖν τὸ φῶς ὄψιν τε ποιεῖ ὁρᾶν ὅ τι κάλλιστα καὶ τὰ ὁρώμενα ὁρᾶσθαι;

Ὅνπερ καὶ σύ, ἔφη, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι· τὸν ἥλιον γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι ἐρωτᾷς.

20. σὺ . . . usque ad p. 295, 9. τὰ τότε ὁρώμενα desunt in Π.

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SOCRATES, GLAUCON.

The eye like the sun, but not the same with it.

Ἆρ' οὖν ὧδε πέφυκεν ὄψις πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν θεόν; p. 508.

Πῶς;

Οὐκ ἔστιν ἥλιος ἡ ὄψις οὔτε αὐτὴ οὔτ' ἐν ᾧ ἐγγίγνεται, ὃ δὴ καλοῦμεν ὄμμα. B

Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

Ἀλλ' ἡλιοειδέστατόν γε οἶμαι τῶν περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ὀργάνων.

Πολύ γε.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν, ἣν ἔχει, ἐκ τούτου ταμιευομένην ὥσπερ ἐπίρρυτον κέκτηται;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ ὁ ἥλιος ὄψις μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, αἴτιος δ' ὢν αὐτῆς ὁρᾶται ὑπ' αὐτῆς ταύτης;

Οὕτως, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Τοῦτον τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φάναι με λέγειν τὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔκγονον, ὃν τἀγαθὸν ἐγέννησεν ἀνάλογον ἑαυτῷ, ὅ τί περ αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ τόπῳ πρός τε νοῦν C καὶ τὰ νοούμενα, τοῦτο τοῦτον ἐν τῷ ὁρατῷ πρός τε ὄψιν καὶ τὰ ὁρώμενα.

Πῶς; ἔφη· ἔτι δίελθέ μοι.

Ὀφθαλμοί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἶσθ' ὅτι, ὅταν μηκέτι ἐπ' ἐκεῖνά τις αὐτοὺς τρέπῃ ὧν ἂν τὰς χρόας τὸ ἡμερινὸν φῶς ἐπέχῃ, ἀλλὰ ὧν νυκτερινὰ φέγγη, ἀμβλυώττουσί τε καὶ ἐγγὺς φαίνονται τυφλῶν, ὥσπερ οὐκ ἐνούσης καθαρᾶς ὄψεως;

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

Visible objects are to be seen only when the sun

Ὅταν δέ γ', οἶμαι, ὧν ὁ ἥλιος καταλάμπῃ, σαφῶς D ὁρῶσι, καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις ὄμμασιν ἐνοῦσα φαίνεται.

22. ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα MΞ : ἐπέκεινά A : ἐπ' ἐκείνοις q. 24. ὧν AM : ὡς r.

SOCRATES, GLAUCON.

p. 508. Τί μήν;

Οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὧδε νόει· ὅταν μὲν οὗ καταλάμπει ἀλήθειά τε καὶ τὸ ὄν, εἰς τοῦτο ἀπερείσηται, ἐνόησέ τε καὶ ἔγνω αὐτὸ καὶ νοῦν ἔχειν φαίνεται· ὅταν δὲ εἰς τὸ τῷ σκότῳ κεκραμένον, τὸ γιγνόμενόν τε καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, δοξάζει τε καὶ ἀμβλυώττει ἄνω καὶ κάτω τὰς δόξας μεταβάλλον, καὶ ἔοικεν αὖ νοῦν οὐκ ἔχοντι.

shines upon them; truth is only known when illuminated by the idea of good.

Ἔοικε γάρ.

E Τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρέχον τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις καὶ τῷ γιγνώσκοντι τὴν δύναμιν ἀποδιδὸν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν φάθι εἶναι, αἰτίαν δ' ἐπιστήμης οὖσαν καὶ ἀληθείας ὡς γιγνωσκομένης μὲν διανοοῦ, οὕτω δὲ καλῶν ἀμφοτέρων ὄντων, γνώσεώς τε καὶ ἀληθείας, ἄλλο καὶ κάλλιον ἔτι τούτων ἡγούμενος αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς ἡγήσει· ἐπιστήμην δὲ καὶ ἀλήθειαν, p. 509. ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ φῶς τε | καὶ ὄψιν ἡλιοειδῆ μὲν νομίζειν ὀρθόν, ἥλιον δὲ ἡγεῖσθαι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀγαθοειδῆ μὲν νομίζειν ταῦτ' ἀμφότερα ὀρθόν, ἀγαθὸν δὲ ἡγεῖσθαι ὁπότερον αὐτῶν οὐκ ὀρθόν, ἀλλ' ἔτι μειζόνως τιμητέον τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕξιν.

The idea of good is higher than science or truth (the objective than the subjective).

Ἀμήχανον κάλλος, ἔφη, λέγεις, εἰ ἐπιστήμην μὲν καὶ ἀλήθειαν παρέχει, αὐτὸ δ' ὑπὲρ ταῦτα κάλλει ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ δήπου σύ γε ἡδονὴν αὐτὸ λέγεις.

Εὐφήμει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἀλλ' ὧδε μᾶλλον τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ ἔτι ἐπισκόπει.

B Πῶς;

10. γιγνωσκομένοις A: γιγνομένοις M.

12–14. αἰτίαν . . . διανοοῦ AM: (γιγνωσκομένην β, γιγνωσκομένων q—διὰ νόου τqβ): ὡς γιγνωσκομένην διὰ νοῦ, αἰτίαν δ' ἐπιστήμης οὖσαν καὶ ἀληθείας· cj. van Heusde.

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SOCRATES, GLAUCON.

Τὸν ἥλιον τοῖς ὁρωμένοις οὐ μόνον, οἶμαι, τὴν τοῦ ὁρᾶσθαι δύναμιν παρέχειν φήσεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ αὔξην καὶ τροφήν, οὐ γένεσιν αὐτὸν ὄντα. p. 509.

Πῶς γάρ;

As the sun is the cause of generation, so the good is the cause of being and essence.

Καὶ τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις τοίνυν μὴ μόνον τὸ γιγνώσκεσθαι φάναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παρεῖναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναί τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπ' ἐκείνου αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος.

Καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων μάλα γελοίως, Ἄπολλον, ἔφη, δαιμονίας ὑπερβολῆς! C

Σὺ γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αἴτιος, ἀναγκάζων τὰ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν.

Καὶ μηδαμῶς γ', ἔφη, παύσῃ, εἰ μή τι, ἀλλὰ τὴν περὶ τὸν ἥλιον ὁμοιότητα αὖ διεξιών, εἴ πῃ ἀπολείπεις.

Ἀλλὰ μήν, εἶπον, συχνά γε ἀπολείπω.

Μηδὲ σμικρὸν τοίνυν, ἔφη, παραλίπῃς.

Οἶμαι μέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ πολύ· ὅμως δέ, ὅσα γ' ἐν τῷ παρόντι δυνατόν, ἑκὼν οὐκ ἀπολείψω.

Μὴ γάρ, ἔφη.

Νόησον τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, δύο αὐτὼ εἶναι, καὶ βασιλεύειν τὸ μὲν νοητοῦ γένους τε καὶ τόπου, τὸ δ' αὖ ὁρατοῦ, ἵνα μὴ οὐρανὸν εἰπὼν δόξω σοι σοφίζεσθαι περὶ τὸ ὄνομα. ἀλλ' οὖν ἔχεις ταῦτα διττὰ εἴδη, ὁρατόν, νοητόν; D

Ἔχω.

The two spheres of

Ὥσπερ τοίνυν γραμμὴν δίχα τετμημένην λαβὼν

26. οὐρανὸν AM: οὐρανοῦ Ξ.

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SOCRATES, GLAUCON.

p. 509. ἄνισα τμήματα, πάλιν τέμνε ἑκάτερον τμῆμα ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, τό τε τοῦ ὁρωμένου γένους καὶ τὸ τοῦ νοουμένου, καί σοι ἔσται σαφηνείᾳ καὶ ἀσαφείᾳ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐν μὲν τῷ ὁρωμένῳ τὸ μὲν ἕτερον
E τμῆμα εἰκόνες. λέγω δὲ τὰς εἰκόνας πρῶτον μὲν
p. 510. | τὰς σκιάς, ἔπειτα τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι φαντάσματα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὅσα πυκνά τε καὶ λεῖα καὶ φανὰ ξυνέστηκε, καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον, εἰ κατανοεῖς.

sight and knowledge are represented by a line which is divided into two unequal parts.

Ἀλλὰ κατανοῶ.

Τὸ τοίνυν ἕτερον τίθει ᾧ τοῦτο ἔοικε, τά τε περὶ ἡμᾶς ζῷα καὶ πᾶν τὸ φυτευτὸν καὶ τὸ σκευαστὸν ὅλον γένος.

Τίθημι, ἔφη.

Ἦ καὶ ἐθέλοις ἂν αὐτὸ φάναι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διῃρῆσθαι ἀληθείᾳ τε καὶ μή, ὡς τὸ δοξαστὸν πρὸς τὸ γνωστόν, οὕτω τὸ ὁμοιωθὲν πρὸς τὸ ᾧ ὡμοιώθη;

B Ἔγωγ', ἔφη, καὶ μάλα.

Σκόπει δὴ αὖ καὶ τὴν τοῦ νοητοῦ τομὴν ᾗ τμητέον.

Πῇ;

Ἧι τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ τοῖς τότε τμηθεῖσιν ὡς εἰκόσι χρωμένη ψυχὴ ζητεῖν ἀναγκάζεται ἐξ ὑποθέσεων, οὐκ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν πορευομένη, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τελευτήν, τὸ δ' αὖ ἕτερον τὸ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἰοῦσα καὶ ἄνευ ὧνπερ ἐκεῖνο εἰκόνων, αὐτοῖς εἴδεσι δι' αὐτῶν τὴν μέθοδον ποιουμένη.

Images and hypotheses.

Ταῦτ', ἔφη, ἃ λέγεις, οὐχ ἱκανῶς ἔμαθον.

1. τμῆμα A : τὸ τμῆμα M corr. Ξ : om. Mpr.
3. σαφηνείᾳ καὶ ἀσαφείᾳ A : σαφήνεια καὶ ἀσάφεια M.
21. τμηθεῖσιν M : μιμηθεῖσιν A Procl. : τιμηθεῖσι Vind. F.
24. τὸ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν MSS. : ἐπ' ἀρχὴν cj. Ast.
25. ὧνπερ AM : τῶν περὶ Vind. F.

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SOCRATES, GLAUCON.

The hypotheses of mathematics.

Ἀλλ' αὖθις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ῥᾷον γὰρ τούτων προειρημένων μαθήσει· (p. 510. C) οἶμαι γάρ σε εἰδέναι, ὅτι οἱ περὶ τὰς γεωμετρίας τε καὶ λογισμοὺς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πραγματευόμενοι, ὑποθέμενοι τό τε περιττὸν καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ γωνιῶν τριττὰ εἴδη καὶ ἄλλα τούτων ἀδελφὰ καθ' ἑκάστην μέθοδον, ταῦτα μὲν ὡς εἰδότες, ποιησάμενοι ὑποθέσεις αὐτά, οὐδένα λόγον οὔτε αὐτοῖς οὔτε ἄλλοις ἔτι ἀξιοῦσι περὶ αὐτῶν διδόναι ὡς παντὶ φανερῶν, ἐκ τούτων δ' ἀρχόμενοι τὰ (D) λοιπὰ ἤδη διεξιόντες τελευτῶσιν ὁμολογουμένως ἐπὶ τοῦτο οὗ ἂν ἐπὶ σκέψιν ὁρμήσωσιν.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε οἶδα.

In both spheres hypotheses are used, in the lower taking the form of images, but in the higher the soul ascends above hypothesis to the idea of good.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι τοῖς ὁρωμένοις εἴδεσι προσχρῶνται καὶ τοὺς λόγους περὶ αὐτῶν ποιοῦνται, οὐ περὶ τούτων διανοούμενοι, ἀλλ' ἐκείνων πέρι οἷς ταῦτα ἔοικε, τοῦ τετραγώνου αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα τοὺς λόγους ποιούμενοι καὶ διαμέτρου αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' οὐ ταύτης ἣν γράφουσι, καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως, αὐτὰ μὲν ταῦτα, ἃ πλάττουσί τε (E) καὶ γράφουσιν, ὧν καὶ σκιαὶ καὶ ἐν ὕδασιν εἰκόνες εἰσί, τούτοις μὲν ὡς εἰκόσιν αὖ χρώμενοι, ζητοῦντές τε αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα ἰδεῖν ἃ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἴδοι τις | (p. 511.) ἢ τῇ διανοίᾳ.

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Τοῦτο τοίνυν νοητὸν μὲν τὸ εἶδος ἔλεγον, ὑποθέσεσι δ' ἀναγκαζομένην ψυχὴν χρῆσθαι περὶ τὴν ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ, οὐκ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἰοῦσαν, ὡς οὐ δυναμένην τῶν ὑποθέσεων ἀνωτέρω ἐκβαίνειν, εἰκόσι δὲ

1. γὰρ A : om. M.
9. φανερῶν A : φανερὸν M.
13. ὁρωμένοις A : εἰρημένοις M.
18. ταῦτα, ἃ . . . p. 296, 28. τιμωμένους τε desunt in M.
20. ζητοῦντες δὲ x Vind. F. 26. οὐκ ἐπ' AΞ : οὐκ ἂν ἐπ' m.

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p. 511. χρωμένην αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπεικασθεῖσι καὶ ἐκείνοις πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ὡς ἐναργέσι δεδοξασμένοις τε καὶ τετιμημένοις.

B Μανθάνω, ἔφη, ὅτι τὸ ὑπὸ ταῖς γεωμετρίαις τε καὶ ταῖς ταύτης ἀδελφαῖς τέχναις λέγεις.

Dialectic by the help of hypotheses rises above hypotheses.

Τὸ τοίνυν ἕτερον μάνθανε τμῆμα τοῦ νοητοῦ λέγοντά με τοῦτο, οὗ αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος ἅπτεται τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμει, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ποιούμενος οὐκ ἀρχάς, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ὑποθέσεις, οἷον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὁρμάς, ἵνα μέχρι τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν ἰών, ἁψάμενος αὐτῆς, πάλιν αὖ ἐχόμενος τῶν ἐκείνης ἐχομένων, οὕτως ἐπὶ τελευτὴν καταβαίνῃ, αἰσθητῷ παντάπασιν οὐδενὶ προσχρώ-
C μενος, ἀλλ' εἴδεσιν αὐτοῖς δι' αὐτῶν εἰς αὐτά, καὶ τελευτᾷ εἰς εἴδη.

Μανθάνω, ἔφη, ἱκανῶς μὲν οὔ — δοκεῖς γάρ μοι συχνὸν ἔργον λέγειν — ὅτι μέντοι βούλει διορίζειν σαφέστερον εἶναι τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιστήμης τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ νοητοῦ θεωρούμενον ἢ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν καλουμένων, αἷς αἱ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαὶ καὶ διανοίᾳ μὲν ἀναγκάζονται ἀλλὰ μὴ αἰσθήσεσιν
D αὐτὰ θεᾶσθαι οἱ θεώμενοι, διὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἀνελθόντες σκοπεῖν ἀλλ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεων, νοῦν οὐκ ἴσχειν περὶ αὐτὰ δοκοῦσί σοι, καίτοι νοητῶν ὄντων μετὰ ἀρχῆς. διάνοιαν δὲ καλεῖν μοι δοκεῖς τὴν τῶν γεωμετρικῶν τε καὶ τὴν τῶν τοιούτων ἕξιν ἀλλ' οὐ νοῦν, ὡς μεταξύ τι δόξης τε καὶ νοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν οὖσαν.

Return to psychology.

3. τετιμημένοις A corr. p. m. m r: τετμημένοις Apr. Ξ.
5. ταύτης A: ταύταις Θ.
16. οὔ Ξ: οὖν A.

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Four faculties: Reason, understanding, faith, perception, shadows.

Ἱκανώτατα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀπεδέξω. καί μοι ἐπὶ p. 511. τοῖς τέτταρσι τμήμασι τέτταρα ταῦτα παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γιγνόμενα λαβέ, νόησιν μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀνωτάτω, διάνοιαν δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ δευτέρῳ, τῷ τρίτῳ δὲ πίστιν E ἀπόδος καὶ τῷ τελευταίῳ εἰκασίαν, καὶ τάξον αὐτὰ ἀνὰ λόγον, ὥσπερ ἐφ' οἷς ἐστὶν ἀληθείας μετέχειν, οὕτω ταῦτα σαφηνείας ἡγησάμενος μετέχειν.

Μανθάνω, ἔφη, καὶ ξυγχωρῶ καὶ τάττω ὡς λέγεις.

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p. 514. | Μετὰ ταῦτα δή, εἶπον, ἀπείκασον τοιούτῳ πάθει τὴν ἡμετέραν φύσιν παιδείας τε πέρι καὶ ἀπαιδευσίας· ἰδὲ γὰρ ἀνθρώπους οἷον ἐν καταγείῳ οἰκήσει σπηλαιώδει, ἀναπεπταμένην πρὸς τὸ φῶς τὴν εἴσοδον ἐχούσῃ μακρὰν παρ' ἅπαν τὸ σπήλαιον, ἐν ταύτῃ ἐκ παίδων ὄντας ἐν δεσμοῖς καὶ τὰ σκέλη καὶ τοὺς B αὐχένας, ὥστε μένειν τε αὐτοὺς εἴς τε τὸ πρόσθεν μόνον ὁρᾶν, κύκλῳ δὲ τὰς κεφαλὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ ἀδυνάτους περιάγειν, φῶς δὲ αὐτοῖς πυρὸς ἄνωθεν καὶ πόρρωθεν καόμενον ὄπισθεν αὐτῶν, μεταξὺ δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς καὶ τῶν δεσμωτῶν ἐπάνω ὁδόν, παρ' ἣν ἰδὲ τειχίον παρῳκοδομημένον, ὥσπερ τοῖς θαυματοποιοῖς πρὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρόκειται τὰ παραφράγματα, ὑπὲρ ὧν τὰ θαύματα δεικνύασιν.

The den, the prisoners: the light at a distance;

Ὁρῶ, ἔφη.

Ὅρα τοίνυν παρὰ τοῦτο τὸ τειχίον φέροντας ἀνθρώπους σκεύη τε παντοδαπὰ ὑπερέχοντα τοῦ τειχίου p. 515. καὶ ἀνδριάντας | καὶ ἄλλα ζῷα λίθινά τε καὶ ξύλινα καὶ παντοῖα εἰργασμένα, οἷον εἰκός, τοὺς μὲν φθεγγομένους, τοὺς δὲ σιγῶντας τῶν παραφερόντων.

the low wall, and the moving figures of which the shadows are seen on the opposite wall of the den.

4. ἀναπεπταμένην A : ἀναπεπταμένη m.
7. αὐτοὺς MSS. : αὐτοῦ cj. Hirschig.
10. καόμενον (vel καιόμενον) MSS. : καομένου cj. Hirschig.

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Ἄτοπον, ἔφη, λέγεις εἰκόνα καὶ δεσμώτας ἀτόπους. p. 515.

Ὁμοίους ἡμῖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· τοὺς γὰρ τοιούτους πρῶτον μὲν ἑαυτῶν τε καὶ ἀλλήλων οἴει ἄν τι ἑωρακέναι ἄλλο πλὴν τὰς σκιὰς τὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς εἰς τὸ καταντικρὺ αὐτῶν τοῦ σπηλαίου προσπιπτούσας;

Πῶς γάρ, ἔφη, εἰ ἀκινήτους γε τὰς κεφαλὰς ἔχειν ἠναγκασμένοι εἶεν διὰ βίου; B

Τί δὲ τῶν παραφερομένων; οὐ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο;

Τί μήν;

Εἰ οὖν διαλέγεσθαι οἷοί τ' εἶεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οὐ ταῦτα ἡγεῖ ἂν τὰ παρόντα αὐτοὺς νομίζειν ὀνομάζειν ἅπερ ὁρῷεν;

Ἀνάγκη.

Τί δ'; εἰ καὶ ἠχὼ τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἐκ τοῦ καταντικρὺ ἔχοι, ὁπότε τις τῶν παριόντων φθέγξαιτο, οἴει ἂν ἄλλο τι αὐτοὺς ἡγεῖσθαι τὸ φθεγγόμενον ἢ τὴν παριοῦσαν σκιάν;

Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη.

The prisoners would mistake the shadows for realities.

Παντάπασι δή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἱ τοιοῦτοι οὐκ ἂν C ἄλλο τι νομίζοιεν τὸ ἀληθὲς ἢ τὰς τῶν σκευαστῶν σκιάς.

Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

Σκόπει δή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὐτῶν λύσιν τε καὶ ἴασιν τῶν δεσμῶν καὶ τῆς ἀφροσύνης, οἵα τις ἂν εἴη, εἰ φύσει τοιάδε ξυμβαίνοι αὐτοῖς· ὁπότε τις λυθείη καὶ ἀναγκάζοιτο ἐξαίφνης ἀνίστασθαί τε καὶ περιάγειν τὸν αὐχένα καὶ βαδίζειν καὶ πρὸς τὸ φῶς ἀναβλέ-

12. οὐ ταῦτα Ξ: οὐ ταὐτὰ A: οὐκ αὐτὰ cj. Vermehren.
13. παριόντα x. 19. παροῦσαν m r.

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And when released, they would still persist in maintaining the superior truth of the shadows.

p. 515. πειν, πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ποιῶν ἀλγοῖ τε καὶ διὰ τὰς D μαρμαρυγὰς ἀδυνατοῖ καθορᾶν ἐκεῖνα ὧν τότε τὰς σκιὰς ἑώρα, τί ἂν οἴει αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν, εἴ τις αὐτῷ λέγοι ὅτι τότε μὲν ἑώρα φλυαρίας, νῦν δὲ μᾶλλόν τι ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ ὄντος καὶ πρὸς μᾶλλον ὄντα τετραμμένος ὀρθότερα βλέποι, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν παριόντων δεικνὺς αὐτῷ ἀναγκάζοι ἐρωτῶν ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὅ τι ἔστιν; οὐκ οἴει αὐτὸν ἀπορεῖν τε ἂν καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι τὰ τότε ὁρώμενα ἀληθέστερα ἢ τὰ νῦν δεικνύμενα;

Πολύ γ', ἔφη.

E Οὐκοῦν κἂν εἰ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ φῶς ἀναγκάζοι αὐτὸν βλέπειν, ἀλγεῖν τε ἂν τὰ ὄμματα καὶ φεύγειν ἀποστρεφόμενον πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ἃ δύναται καθορᾶν, καὶ νομίζειν ταῦτα τῷ ὄντι σαφέστερα τῶν δεικνυμένων;

Οὕτως, ἔφη.

When dragged upwards, they would be dazzled by excess of light.

Εἰ δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐντεῦθεν ἕλκοι τις αὐτὸν βίᾳ διὰ τραχείας τῆς ἀναβάσεως καὶ ἀνάντους, καὶ μὴ ἀνείη πρὶν ἐξελκύσειεν εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς, ἆρα οὐχὶ ὀδυνᾶσθαί τε ἂν καὶ ἀγανακτεῖν ἑλκόμενον, καὶ p. 516. ἐπειδὴ πρὸς τὸ φῶς | ἔλθοι, αὐγῆς ἂν ἔχοντα τὰ ὄμματα μεστὰ ὁρᾶν οὐδ' ἂν ἓν δύνασθαι τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἀληθῶν;

Οὐ γὰρ ἄν, ἔφη, ἐξαίφνης γε.

Συνηθείας δή, οἶμαι, δέοιτ' ἄν, εἰ μέλλοι τὰ ἄνω ὄψεσθαι· καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὰς σκιὰς ἂν ῥᾷστα καθορῷ, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι τά τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων εἴδωλα, ὕστερον δὲ αὐτά·

9. ὁρώμενα] desinit lacuna in Π.
14. δύναται ΑΠ : δύνανται Ξ.

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ἐκ δὲ τούτων τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν οὐρανὸν p. 516. νύκτωρ ἂν ῥᾷον θεάσαιτο, προσβλέπων τὸ τῶν ἄστρων τε καὶ σελήνης φῶς, ἢ μεθ' ἡμέραν τὸν ἥλιόν B τε καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου.

Πῶς δ' οὔ;

At length they will see the sun and understand his nature.

Τελευταῖον δή, οἶμαι, τὸν ἥλιον, οὐκ ἐν ὕδασιν οὐδ' ἐν ἀλλοτρίᾳ ἕδρᾳ φαντάσματα αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν καθ' αὑτὸν ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ χώρᾳ δύναιτ' ἂν κατιδεῖν καὶ θεάσασθαι οἷός ἐστιν.

Ἀναγκαῖον, ἔφη.

Καὶ μετὰ ταῦτ' ἂν ἤδη συλλογίζοιτο περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι αὐτὸς ὁ τάς τε ὥρας παρέχων καὶ ἐνιαυτοὺς καὶ πάντα ἐπιτροπεύων τὰ ἐν τῷ ὁρωμένῳ τόπῳ, καὶ ἐκείνων ὧν σφεῖς ἑώρων τρόπον τινὰ πάντων C αἴτιος.

Δῆλον, ἔφη, ὅτι ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἂν μετ' ἐκεῖνα ἔλθοι.

They would then pity their old companions of the den.

Τί οὖν; ἀναμιμνησκόμενον αὐτὸν τῆς πρώτης οἰκήσεως καὶ τῆς ἐκεῖ σοφίας καὶ τῶν τότε ξυνδεσμωτῶν οὐκ ἂν οἴει αὐτὸν μὲν εὐδαιμονίζειν τῆς μεταβολῆς, τοὺς δὲ ἐλεεῖν;

Καὶ μάλα.

Τιμαὶ δὲ καὶ ἔπαινοι εἴ τινες αὐτοῖς ἦσαν τότε παρ' ἀλλήλων καὶ γέρα τῷ ὀξύτατα καθορῶντι τὰ παριόντα, καὶ μνημονεύοντι μάλιστα ὅσα τε πρότερα αὐτῶν καὶ ὕστερα εἰώθει καὶ ἅμα πορεύεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ D τούτων δὴ δυνατώτατα ἀπομαντευομένῳ τὸ μέλλον ἥξειν, δοκεῖς ἂν αὐτὸν ἐπιθυμητικῶς αὐτῶν ἔχειν καὶ ζηλοῦν τοὺς παρ' ἐκείνοις τιμωμένους τε καὶ ἐνδυναστεύοντας, ἢ τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου ἂν πεπονθέναι καὶ

12. αὐτὸς ὁ A: οὗτος ὁ Π.

28. τιμωμένους τε] desinit lacuna in M.

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p. 516. σφόδρα βούλεσθαι ἐπάρουρον ἐόντα θητευέμεν ἄλλῳ ἀνδρὶ παρ' ἀκλήρῳ καὶ ὁτιοῦν ἂν πεπονθέναι μᾶλλον ἢ 'κεῖνά τε δοξάζειν καὶ ἐκείνως ζῆν;

E Οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔγωγε οἶμαι, πᾶν μᾶλλον πεπονθέναι ἂν δέξασθαι ἢ ζῆν ἐκείνως.

Καὶ τόδε δὴ ἐννόησον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. εἰ πάλιν ὁ τοιοῦτος καταβὰς εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν θᾶκον καθίζοιτο, ἆρ' οὐ σκότους *ἂν ἀνάπλεως σχοίη τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς, ἐξαίφνης ἥκων ἐκ τοῦ ἡλίου;

Καὶ μάλα γ', ἔφη.

Τὰς δὲ δὴ σκιὰς ἐκείνας πάλιν εἰ δέοι αὐτὸν γνωματεύοντα διαμιλλᾶσθαι τοῖς ἀεὶ δεσμώταις ἐκείνοις, p. 517. ἐν ᾧ ἀμβλυώττει, | πρὶν καταστῆναι τὰ ὄμματα, οὗτος δ' ὁ χρόνος μὴ πάνυ ὀλίγος εἴη τῆς συνηθείας, ἆρ' οὐ γέλωτ' ἂν παράσχοι, καὶ λέγοιτο ἂν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὡς ἀναβὰς ἄνω διεφθαρμένος ἥκει τὰ ὄμματα, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἄξιον οὐδὲ πειρᾶσθαι ἄνω ἰέναι; καὶ τὸν ἐπιχειροῦντα λύειν τε καὶ ἀνάγειν, εἴ πως ἐν ταῖς χερσὶ δύναιντο λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτιννύναι ἄν;

But when they returned to the den they would see much worse than those who had never left it.

Σφόδρα γ', ἔφη.

Ταύτην τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὴν εἰκόνα, ὦ φίλε B Γλαύκων, προσαπτέον ἅπασαν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λεγομένοις, τὴν μὲν δι' ὄψεως φαινομένην ἕδραν τῇ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου οἰκήσει ἀφομοιοῦντα, τὸ δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς ἐν αὐτῇ φῶς τῇ τοῦ ἡλίου δυνάμει· τὴν δὲ ἄνω ἀνάβασιν καὶ θέαν τῶν ἄνω τὴν εἰς τὸν νοητὸν τόπον

The prison is the world of sight, the light of the fire is the sun.

6, 7. ὁ τοιοῦτος ΠΜ: ὅτι οὗτος Α. θᾶκον Π: θῶκον Μ: θάκον Α. 8. ἂν add. Baiter. 11. γνωμονεύοντα Timaeus in lexico. 13. τὰ ὄμματα ΑΠ: τὸ ὄμμα Μ. 19. καὶ ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτιννύναι ἂν ΑΠ: καὶ ἀποκτείνειαν ἂν cj. Bekker: καὶ ἀποκτενεῖν, ἀποκτιννύναι αὖ Μ.

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τῆς ψυχῆς ἄνοδον τιθεὶς οὐχ ἁμαρτήσει τῆς γ' ἐμῆς p. 517. ἐλπίδος, ἐπειδὴ ταύτης ἐπιθυμεῖς ἀκούειν. θεὸς δέ που οἶδεν, εἰ ἀληθὴς οὖσα τυγχάνει. τὰ δ' οὖν ἐμοὶ φαινόμενα οὕτω φαίνεται, ἐν τῷ γνωστῷ τελευταία ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα καὶ μόγις ὁρᾶσθαι, ὀφθεῖσα δὲ συλλογιστέα εἶναι ὡς ἄρα πᾶσι πάντων αὕτη ὀρθῶν C τε καὶ καλῶν αἰτία, ἔν τε ὁρατῷ φῶς καὶ τὸν τούτου κύριον τεκοῦσα, ἔν τε νοητῷ αὐτὴ κυρία ἀλήθειαν καὶ νοῦν παρασχομένη, καὶ ὅτι δεῖ ταύτην ἰδεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα ἐμφρόνως πράξειν ἢ ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ.

Ξυνοίομαι, ἔφη, καὶ ἐγώ, ὅν γε δὴ τρόπον δύναμαι.

Ἴθι τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τόδε ξυνοιήθητι καὶ μὴ θαυμάσῃς, ὅτι οἱ ἐνταῦθα ἐλθόντες οὐκ ἐθέλουσι τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράττειν, ἀλλ' ἄνω ἀεὶ ἐπείγονται αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ διατρίβειν. εἰκὸς γάρ που οὕτως, D εἴπερ αὖ κατὰ τὴν προειρημένην εἰκόνα τοῦτ' ἔχει.

Εἰκὸς μέντοι, ἔφη.

Τί δέ; τόδε οἴει τι θαυμαστόν, εἰ ἀπὸ θείων, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, θεωριῶν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπειά τις ἐλθὼν κακὰ ἀσχημονεῖ τε καὶ φαίνεται σφόδρα γελοῖος ἔτι ἀμβλυώττων καὶ πρὶν ἱκανῶς συνήθης γενέσθαι τῷ παρόντι σκότῳ ἀναγκαζόμενος ἐν δικαστηρίοις ἢ ἄλλοθί που ἀγωνίζεσθαι περὶ τῶν τοῦ δικαίου σκιῶν ἢ ἀγαλμάτων ὧν αἱ σκιαί, καὶ διαμιλλᾶσθαι περὶ τούτου, ὅπῃ ποτὲ ὑπολαμβάνεται ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτὴν E δικαιοσύνην μὴ πώποτε ἰδόντων;

Οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν θαυμαστόν, ἔφη.

Nothing extraordinary in the

Ἀλλ' εἰ νοῦν γε ἔχοι τις, | ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μεμνῇτ' ἄν, p. 518. ὅτι διτταὶ καὶ ἀπὸ διττῶν γίγνονται ἐπιταράξεις ὄμ-

6. αὔτη AM : αὐτὴ Ξ : αὐτῇ Π.   8. αὔτη M.

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p. 518. μασιν, ἔκ τε φωτὸς εἰς σκότος μεθισταμένων καὶ ἐκ σκότους εἰς φῶς. ταὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα νομίσας γίγνεσθαι καὶ περὶ ψυχήν, ὁπότε ἴδοι θορυβουμένην τινὰ καὶ ἀδυνατοῦσάν τι καθορᾶν, οὐκ ἂν ἀλογίστως γελῷ, ἀλλ' ἐπισκοποῖ ἄν, πότερον ἐκ φανοτέρου βίου ἥκουσα ὑπὸ ἀηθείας ἐσκότωται, ἢ ἐξ ἀμαθίας B πλείονος εἰς φανότερον ἰοῦσα ὑπὸ λαμπροτέρου μαρμαρυγῆς ἐμπέπλησται, καὶ οὕτω δὴ τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίσειεν ἂν τοῦ πάθους τε καὶ βίου, τὴν δὲ ἐλεήσειεν, καὶ εἰ γελᾶν ἐπ' αὐτῇ βούλοιτο, ἧττον ἂν καταγέλαστος ὁ γέλως αὐτῷ εἴη ἢ ὁ ἐπὶ τῇ ἄνωθεν ἐκ φωτὸς ἡκούσῃ.

philosopher being unable to see in the dark.

The eyes may be blinded in two ways, by excess or by defect of light.

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, μετρίως λέγεις.

Δεῖ δή, εἶπον, ἡμᾶς τοιόνδε νομίσαι περὶ αὐτῶν, εἰ ταῦτ' ἀληθῆ, τὴν παιδείαν οὐχ οἵαν τινὲς ἐπαγγελλόμενοί φασιν εἶναι τοιαύτην καὶ εἶναι. φασὶ C δέ που οὐκ ἐνούσης ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπιστήμης σφεῖς ἐντιθέναι, οἷον τυφλοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ὄψιν ἐντιθέντες.

The conversion of the soul is the turning round the eye from darkness to light.

Φασὶ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη.

Ὁ δέ γε νῦν λόγος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, σημαίνει ταύτην τὴν ἐνοῦσαν ἑκάστου δύναμιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τὸ ὄργανον ᾧ καταμανθάνει ἕκαστος, οἷον εἰ ὄμμα μὴ δυνατὸν ἦν ἄλλως ἢ ξὺν ὅλῳ τῷ σώματι στρέφειν πρὸς τὸ φανὸν ἐκ τοῦ σκοτώδους, οὕτω ξὺν ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ ἐκ τοῦ γιγνομένου περιακτέον εἶναι, ἕως ἂν εἰς τὸ ὂν καὶ τοῦ ὄντος τὸ φανότατον δυνατὴ γένηται D ἀνασχέσθαι θεωμένη. τοῦτο δ' εἶναί φαμεν τἀγαθόν. ἢ γάρ;

Ναί.

9. εὐδαιμονίσειεν *q*: εὐδαιμονήσειεν ΑΠΜ.

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Τούτου τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὐτοῦ τέχνη ἂν εἴη, p. 518. τῆς περιαγωγῆς, τίνα τρόπον ὡς ῥᾷστά τε καὶ ἀνυσιμώτατα μεταστραφήσεται, οὐ τοῦ ἐμποιῆσαι αὐτῷ τὸ ὁρᾶν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἔχοντι μὲν αὐτό, οὐκ ὀρθῶς δὲ τετραμμένῳ οὐδὲ βλέποντι οἷ ἔδει, τοῦτο διαμηχανήσασθαι.

Ἔοικε γάρ, ἔφη.

The virtue of wisdom comes of a divine power which may be turned either towards good or towards evil.

Αἱ μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλαι ἀρεταὶ καλούμεναι ψυχῆς κινδυνεύουσιν ἐγγύς τι εἶναι τῶν τοῦ σώματος· τῷ ὄντι γὰρ οὐκ ἐνοῦσαι πρότερον ὕστερον ἐμποιεῖσθαι E ἔθεσι καὶ ἀσκήσεσιν· ἡ δὲ τοῦ φρονῆσαι παντὸς μᾶλλον θειοτέρου τινὸς τυγχάνει, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὖσα, ὃ τὴν μὲν δύναμιν οὐδέποτε ἀπόλλυσιν, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς περιαγωγῆς χρήσιμόν τε καὶ ὠφέλιμον καὶ ἄχρηστον αὖ | καὶ βλαβερὸν γίγνεται. ἢ οὔπω ἐννενόηκας, p. 519. τῶν λεγομένων πονηρῶν μέν, σοφῶν δέ, ὡς δριμὺ μὲν βλέπει τὸ ψυχάριον καὶ ὀξέως διορᾷ ταῦτα ἐφ' ἃ τέτραπται, ὡς οὐ φαύλην ἔχον τὴν ὄψιν, κακίᾳ δ' ἠναγκασμένον ὑπηρετεῖν, ὥστε ὅσῳ ἂν ὀξύτερον βλέπῃ, τοσούτῳ πλείω κακὰ ἐργαζόμενον;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Τοῦτο μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως εἰ ἐκ παιδὸς εὐθὺς κοπτόμενον περιεκόπη τὰς τῆς γενέσεως ξυγγενεῖς ὥσπερ μολυβδίδας, αἳ δὴ ἐδω- B δαῖς τε καὶ τοιούτων ἡδοναῖς τε καὶ λιχνείαις προσφυεῖς γιγνόμεναι †περὶ κάτω στρέφουσι τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ὄψιν· ὧν εἰ ἀπαλλαγὲν περιεστρέφετο εἰς

1. τούτου ΠΜ : τοῦτο Α ?
5. διαμηχανήσασθαι ΠΜ : δεῖ. μηχανήσασθαι Α.
9. ἐγγύς τι εἶναι MSS. : ἐγγύς τι *τείνειν cj. L. C.
14. χρήσιμόν τε ΠΜ : χρήσιμον Α. 23. τὰς ΑΠ²q : τὰ ΠΜ.
26. περὶ ΑΠΜ : περὶ τὰ (vel τὸ) qr : del. Herm. : περικάτω cj. Madvig.

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p. 519. τἀληθῆ, καὶ ἐκεῖνα ἂν τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνθρώπων ὀξύτατα ἑώρα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐφ' ἃ νῦν τέτραπται.

Εἰκός γε, ἔφη.

Neither the uneducated nor the over-educated will be good servants of the State.

Τί δέ; τόδε οὐκ εἰκός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων, μήτε τοὺς ἀπαιδεύτους καὶ ἀληθείας ἀπείρους ἱκανῶς ἄν ποτε πόλιν ἐπιτροπεῦσαι, C μήτε τοὺς ἐν παιδείᾳ ἐωμένους διατρίβειν διὰ τέλους, τοὺς μὲν ὅτι σκοπὸν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἕνα, οὗ στοχαζομένους δεῖ ἅπαντα πράττειν ἃ ἂν πράττωσιν ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ, τοὺς δὲ ὅτι ἑκόντες εἶναι οὐ πράξουσιν, ἡγούμενοι ἐν μακάρων νήσοις ζῶντες ἔτι ἀπῳκίσθαι;

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.

Ἡμέτερον δὴ ἔργον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τῶν οἰκιστῶν τάς τε βελτίστας φύσεις ἀναγκάσαι ἀφικέσθαι πρὸς τὸ μάθημα ὃ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἔφαμεν εἶναι μέγιστον, D ἰδεῖν τε τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀναβῆναι ἐκείνην τὴν ἀνάβασιν, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀναβάντες ἱκανῶς ἴδωσι, μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν αὐτοῖς ὃ νῦν ἐπιτρέπεται.

Τὸ ποῖον δή;

Men should ascend to the upper world, but they should also return to the lower.

Τὸ αὐτοῦ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καταμένειν καὶ μὴ ἐθέλειν πάλιν καταβαίνειν παρ' ἐκείνους τοὺς δεσμώτας μηδὲ μετέχειν τῶν παρ' ἐκείνοις πόνων τε καὶ τιμῶν, εἴτε φαυλότεραι εἴτε σπουδαιότεραι.

Ἔπειτ', ἔφη, ἀδικήσομεν αὐτούς, καὶ ποιήσομεν χεῖρον ζῆν, δυνατὸν αὐτοῖς ὂν ἄμεινον;

E Ἐπελάθου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πάλιν, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι νόμῳ οὐ τοῦτο μέλει, ὅπως ἕν τι γένος ἐν πόλει διαφερόντως εὖ πράξει, ἀλλ' ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει τοῦτο μηχανᾶται ἐγγενέσθαι, ξυναρμόττων τοὺς πολίτας πειθοῖ

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τε καὶ ἀνάγκῃ, ποιῶν μεταδιδόναι ἀλλήλοις τῆς ὠφε- p. 519.
λείας ἣν ἂν ἕκαστοι τὸ κοινὸν | δυνατοὶ ὦσιν ὠφε- p. 520.
λεῖν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐμποιῶν τοιούτους ἄνδρας ἐν τῇ πόλει,
οὐχ ἵνα ἀφίῃ τρέπεσθαι ὅπῃ ἕκαστος βούλεται, ἀλλ'
ἵνα καταχρῆται αὐτὸς αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὸν ξύνδεσμον τῆς
πόλεως.

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη· ἐπελαθόμην γάρ.

The duties of philosophers.

Σκέψαι τοίνυν, εἶπον, ὦ Γλαύκων, ὅτι οὐδ' ἀδική-
σομεν τοὺς παρ' ἡμῖν φιλοσόφους γιγνομένους, ἀλλὰ
δίκαια πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐροῦμεν, προσαναγκάζοντες τῶν
ἄλλων ἐπιμελεῖσθαί τε καὶ φυλάττειν. ἐροῦμεν γὰρ
ὅτι οἱ μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι τοιοῦτοι γιγνόμενοι B
εἰκότως οὐ μετέχουσι τῶν ἐν αὐταῖς πόνων· αὐτό-
ματοι γὰρ ἐμφύονται ἀκούσης τῆς ἐν ἑκάστῃ πολι-
τείας, δίκην δ' ἔχει τό γε αὐτοφυὲς μηδενὶ τροφὴν
ὀφεῖλον μηδ' ἐκτίνειν τῳ προθυμεῖσθαι τὰ τροφεῖα·
ὑμᾶς δ' ἡμεῖς ὑμῖν τε αὐτοῖς τῇ τε ἄλλῃ πόλει ὥσπερ
ἐν σμήνεσιν ἡγεμόνας τε καὶ βασιλέας ἐγεννήσαμεν,
ἄμεινόν τε καὶ τελεώτερον ἐκείνων πεπαιδευμένους
καὶ μᾶλλον δυνατοὺς ἀμφοτέρων μετέχειν. κατα- C
βατέον οὖν ἐν μέρει ἑκάστῳ εἰς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ξυν-
οίκησιν καὶ ξυνεθιστέον τὰ σκοτεινὰ θεάσασθαι·
ξυνεθιζόμενοι γὰρ μυρίῳ βέλτιον ὄψεσθε τῶν ἐκεῖ
καὶ γνώσεσθε ἕκαστα τὰ εἴδωλα ἅττα ἐστὶ καὶ ὧν,
διὰ τὸ τἀληθῆ ἑωρακέναι καλῶν τε καὶ δικαίων καὶ
ἀγαθῶν πέρι. καὶ οὕτω ὕπαρ ἡμῖν καὶ ὑμῖν ἡ πόλις
οἰκήσεται, ἀλλ' οὐκ ὄναρ, ὡς νῦν αἱ πολλαὶ ὑπὸ
σκιαμαχούντων τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ στασιαζόντων
περὶ τοῦ ἄρχειν οἰκοῦνται, ὡς μεγάλου τινὸς ἀγαθοῦ D
ὄντος. τὸ δέ που ἀληθὲς ὧδε ἔχει· ἐν πόλει ᾗ ἥκιστα
πρόθυμοι ἄρχειν οἱ μέλλοντες ἄρξειν, ταύτην ἄριστα

Their obligations to their country will induce them to take part in her government.

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p. 520. καὶ ἀστασιαστότατα ἀνάγκη οἰκεῖσθαι, τὴν δ' ἐναντίους ἄρχοντας σχοῦσαν ἐναντίως.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Ἀπειθήσουσιν οὖν ἡμῖν, οἴει, οἱ τρόφιμοι ταῦτ' ἀκούοντες, καὶ οὐκ ἐθελήσουσι ξυμπονεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἕκαστοι ἐν μέρει, τὸν δὲ πολὺν χρόνον μετ' ἀλλήλων οἰκεῖν ἐν τῷ καθαρῷ;

They will be willing but not anxious to rule.

E Ἀδύνατον, ἔφη· δίκαια γὰρ δὴ δικαίοις ἐπιτάξομεν· παντὸς μὴν μᾶλλον ὡς ἐπ' ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῶν ἕκαστος εἶσι τὸ ἄρχειν, τοὐναντίον τῶν νῦν ἐν ἑκάστῃ πόλει ἀρχόντων.

The statesman must be provided with a better life than that of a ruler; and then he will not covet office.

Οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ ἑταῖρε. εἰ μὲν βίον
p. 521. ἐξευρήσεις ἀμείνω τοῦ ἄρχειν τοῖς | μέλλουσιν ἄρξειν, ἔστι σοι δυνατὴ γενέσθαι πόλις εὖ οἰκουμένη· ἐν μόνῃ γὰρ αὐτῇ ἄρξουσιν οἱ τῷ ὄντι πλούσιοι, οὐ χρυσίου, ἀλλ' οὗ δεῖ τὸν εὐδαίμονα πλουτεῖν, ζωῆς ἀγαθῆς τε καὶ ἔμφρονος· εἰ δὲ πτωχοὶ καὶ πεινῶντες ἀγαθῶν ἰδίων ἐπὶ τὰ δημόσια ἴασιν, ἐντεῦθεν οἰόμενοι τἀγαθὸν δεῖν ἁρπάζειν, οὐκ ἔστι· περιμάχητον γὰρ τὸ ἄρχειν γιγνόμενον, οἰκεῖος ὢν καὶ ἔνδον ὁ τοιοῦτος πόλεμος αὐτούς τε ἀπόλλυσι καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν.

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

B Ἔχεις οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, βίον ἄλλον τινὰ πολιτικῶν ἀρχῶν καταφρονοῦντα ἢ τὸν τῆς ἀληθινῆς φιλοσοφίας;

Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Ἀλλὰ μέντοι δεῖ γε μὴ ἐραστὰς τοῦ ἄρχειν ἰέναι ἐπ' αὐτό· εἰ δὲ μή, οἵ γε ἀντερασταὶ μαχοῦνται.

Πῶς δ' οὔ;

Τίνας οὖν ἄλλους ἀναγκάσεις ἰέναι ἐπὶ φυλακὴν

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τῆς πόλεως ἢ οἱ περὶ τούτων τε φρονιμώτατοι δι' ὧν p. 521. ἄριστα πόλις οἰκεῖται ἔχουσί τε τιμὰς ἄλλας καὶ βίον ἀμείνω τοῦ πολιτικοῦ;

Οὐδένας ἄλλους, ἔφη.

Βούλει οὖν τοῦτ' ἤδη σκοπῶμεν, τίνα τρόπον οἱ C τοιοῦτοι ἐγγενήσονται, καὶ πῶς τις ἀνάξει αὐτοὺς εἰς φῶς, ὥσπερ ἐξ Ἅιδου λέγονται δή τινες εἰς θεοὺς ἀνελθεῖν;

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ βούλομαι; ἔφη.

The training of the guardians.

Τοῦτο δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ὀστράκου ἂν εἴη περιστροφή, ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς περιαγωγή, ἐκ νυκτερινῆς τινὸς ἡμέρας εἰς ἀληθινὴν τοῦ ὄντος οὖσαν ἐπάνοδον, ἣν δὴ φιλοσοφίαν ἀληθῆ φήσομεν εἶναι.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Οὐκοῦν δεῖ σκοπεῖσθαι, τί τῶν μαθημάτων ἔχει τοιαύτην δύναμιν; D

Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

What knowledge will draw the soul upwards?

Τί ἂν οὖν εἴη, ὦ Γλαύκων, μάθημα ψυχῆς ὁλκὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ γιγνομένου ἐπὶ τὸ ὄν; τόδε δ' ἐννοῶ λέγων ἅμα· οὐκ ἀθλητὰς μέντοι πολέμου ἔφαμεν τούτους ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι νέους ὄντας;

Ἔφαμεν γάρ.

Δεῖ ἄρα καὶ τοῦτο προσέχειν τὸ μάθημα ὃ ζητοῦμεν πρὸς ἐκείνῳ.

Τὸ ποῖον;

Μὴ ἄχρηστον πολεμικοῖς ἀνδράσιν εἶναι.

Δεῖ μέντοι, ἔφη, εἴπερ οἷόν τε.

Recapitulation. The first

Γυμναστικῇ μὴν καὶ μουσικῇ ἔν γε τῷ πρόσθεν E ἐπαιδεύοντο ἡμῖν.

1. οἱ περὶ ΠΜ: οἱ περὶ A: οἵπερ *q*.
12. οὖσαν ἐπάνοδον ΑΠΜ: ἐπάνοδον Ξ: οὐσίαν ἐπάνοδος cj. Cobet.

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education had two parts, music and gymnastic.

p. 521. Ἦν ταῦτα, ἔφη.

Γυμναστικὴ μέν που περὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον τετεύτακε· σώματος γὰρ αὔξης καὶ φθίσεως ἐπιστατεῖ.

Φαίνεται.

Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ὃ ζητοῦμεν μάθημα.

p. 522. | Οὐ γάρ.

Ἀλλ' ἆρα μουσικὴ ὅσην τὸ πρότερον διήλθομεν;

Ἀλλ' ἦν ἐκείνη γ', ἔφη, ἀντίστροφος τῆς γυμναστικῆς, εἰ μέμνησαι, ἔθεσι παιδεύουσα τοὺς φύλακας, κατά τε ἁρμονίαν εὐαρμοστίαν τινά, οὐκ ἐπιστήμην, παραδιδοῦσα, καὶ κατὰ ῥυθμὸν εὐρυθμίαν, ἔν τε τοῖς λόγοις ἕτερα τούτων ἀδελφά, ἔφη, ἄττα ἔχουσα, καὶ ὅσοι μυθώδεις τῶν λόγων καὶ ὅσοι ἀληθινώτεροι ἦσαν. μάθημα δὲ πρὸς τοιοῦτόν τι ἀγαθόν, οἷον
B σὺ νῦν ζητεῖς, οὐδὲν ἦν ἐν αὐτῇ.

Ἀκριβέστατα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀναμιμνήσκεις με· τῷ γὰρ ὄντι τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν εἶχεν. ἀλλ', ὦ δαιμόνιε Γλαύκων, τί ἂν εἴη τοιοῦτον; αἵ τε γὰρ τέχναι βάναυσοί που ἅπασαι ἔδοξαν εἶναι—

Πῶς δ' οὔ; καὶ μὴν τί ἔτ' ἄλλο λείπεται μάθημα, μουσικῆς καὶ γυμναστικῆς καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν κεχωρισμένον;

Φέρε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ μηδὲν ἔτι ἐκτὸς τούτων ἔχομεν λαβεῖν, τῶν ἐπὶ πάντα τεινόντων τι λάβωμεν.

Τὸ ποῖον;

C Οἷον τοῦτο τὸ κοινόν, ᾧ πᾶσαι προσχρῶνται τέχναι τε καὶ διάνοιαι καὶ ἐπιστῆμαι. ὃ καὶ παντὶ ἐν πρώτοις ἀνάγκη μανθάνειν.

15. ἀγαθόν ΑΠΜ: γρ. ἄγον Πmg.
22. κεχωρισμένον A corr. ΠΜ: κεχωρισμένων Apr.

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Ποῖον; ἔφη. p. 522.

Τὸ φαῦλον τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ ἕν τε καὶ τὰ δύο καὶ τὰ τρία διαγιγνώσκειν· λέγω δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν κεφαλαίῳ ἀριθμόν τε καὶ λογισμόν. ἢ οὐχ οὕτω περὶ τούτων ἔχει, ὡς πᾶσα τέχνη τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀναγκάζεται αὐτῶν μέτοχος γίγνεσθαι;

There remains for the second education, arithmetic;

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἡ πολεμική;

Πολλή, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη.

Παγγέλοιον γοῦν, ἔφην, στρατηγὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις Παλαμήδης ἑκάστοτε ἀποφαίνει. D ἢ οὐκ ἐννενόηκας, ὅτι φησὶν ἀριθμὸν εὑρὼν τάς τε τάξεις τῷ στρατοπέδῳ καταστῆσαι ἐν Ἰλίῳ καὶ ἐξαριθμῆσαι ναῦς τε καὶ τἆλλα πάντα, ὡς πρὸ τοῦ ἀναριθμήτων ὄντων καὶ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐδ' ὅσους πόδας εἶχεν εἰδότος, εἴπερ ἀριθμεῖν μὴ ἠπίστατο; καίτοι ποῖόν τιν' αὐτὸν οἴει στρατηγὸν εἶναι;

Ἄτοπόν τιν', ἔφη, ἔγωγε, εἰ ἦν τοῦτ' ἀληθές.

Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μάθημα ἀναγκαῖον πολε- E μικῷ ἀνδρὶ θήσομεν καὶ λογίζεσθαί τε καὶ ἀριθμεῖν δύνασθαι;

Πάντων γ', ἔφη, μάλιστα, εἰ καὶ ὁτιοῦν μέλλει τάξεων ἐπαΐειν, μᾶλλον δ' εἰ καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἔσεσθαι.

Ἐννοεῖς οὖν, εἶπον, περὶ τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα ὅπερ ἐγώ;

Τὸ ποῖον;

that being a study which leads naturally

Κινδυνεύει τῶν πρὸς τὴν νόησιν | ἀγόντων φύσει p. 523. εἶναι ὧν ζητοῦμεν, χρῆσθαι δ' οὐδεὶς αὐτῷ ὀρθῶς, ἑλκτικῷ ὄντι παντάπασι πρὸς οὐσίαν.

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p. 523. Πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις;

Ἐγὼ πειράσομαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τό γ' ἐμοὶ δοκοῦν δηλῶσαι. ἃ γὰρ διαιροῦμαι παρ' ἐμαυτῷ ἀγωγά τε εἶναι οἷ λέγομεν καὶ μή, ξυνθεατὴς γενόμενος ξύμφαθι ἢ ἄπειπε, ἵνα καὶ τοῦτο σαφέστερον ἴδωμεν εἰ ἔστιν οἷον μαντεύομαι.

Δείκνυ', ἔφη.

Δείκνυμι δή, εἶπον, εἰ καθορᾷς, τὰ μὲν ἐν ταῖς B αἰσθήσεσιν οὐ παρακαλοῦντα τὴν νόησιν εἰς ἐπίσκεψιν, ὡς ἱκανῶς ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως κρινόμενα, τὰ δὲ παντάπασι διακελευόμενα ἐκείνην ἐπισκέψασθαι, ὡς τῆς αἰσθήσεως οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ποιούσης.

to reflection, for reflection is aroused by contradictory impressions of sense.

Τὰ πόρρωθεν, ἔφη, φαινόμενα δῆλον ὅτι λέγεις καὶ τὰ ἐσκιαγραφημένα.

Οὐ πάνυ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔτυχες οὗ λέγω.

Ποῖα μήν, ἔφη, λέγεις;

Τὰ μὲν οὐ παρακαλοῦντα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅσα μὴ ἐκ- C βαίνει εἰς ἐναντίαν αἴσθησιν ἅμα· τὰ δ' ἐκβαίνοντα ὡς παρακαλοῦντα τίθημι, ἐπειδὰν ἡ αἴσθησις μηδὲν μᾶλλον τοῦτο ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον δηλοῖ, εἴτ' ἐγγύθεν προσπίπτουσα εἴτε πόρρωθεν. ὧδε δὲ ἃ λέγω σαφέστερον εἴσει. οὗτοι, φαμέν, τρεῖς ἂν εἶεν δάκτυλοι, ὅ τε σμικρότατος καὶ ὁ δεύτερος καὶ ὁ μέσος.

Πάνυ γ', ἔφη.

Ὡς ἐγγύθεν τοίνυν ὁρωμένους λέγοντός μου διανοοῦ. ἀλλά μοι περὶ αὐτῶν τόδε σκόπει.

Τὸ ποῖον;

No difficulty in simple perception.

Δάκτυλος μὲν αὐτῶν φαίνεται ὁμοίως ἕκαστος, D καὶ ταύτῃ γε οὐδὲν διαφέρει, ἐάν τε ἐν μέσῳ ὁρᾶται ἐάν τ' ἐν ἐσχάτῳ, ἐάν τε λευκὸς ἐάν τε μέλας, ἐάν

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τε παχὺς ἐάν τε λεπτός, καὶ πᾶν ὅ τι τοιοῦτον. ἐν p. 523. πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις οὐκ ἀναγκάζεται τῶν πολλῶν ἡ ψυχὴ τὴν νόησιν ἐπερέσθαι τί ποτ' ἐστὶ δάκτυλος· οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ ἡ ὄψις αὐτῇ ἅμα ἐσήμηνε τὸν δάκτυλον τοὐναντίον ἢ δάκτυλον εἶναι.

Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰκότως τό γε τοιοῦτον νοήσεως οὐκ ἂν παρακλητικὸν οὐδ' ἐγερτικὸν εἴη. E

Εἰκότως.

But the same senses at the same time give different impressions which are at first indistinct and have to be distinguished by the mind.

Τί δὲ δή; τὸ μέγεθος αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν σμικρότητα ἡ ὄψις ἆρα ἱκανῶς ὁρᾷ, καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτῇ διαφέρει ἐν μέσῳ τινὰ αὐτῶν κεῖσθαι ἢ ἐπ' ἐσχάτῳ; καὶ ὡσαύτως πάχος καὶ λεπτότητα ἢ μαλακότητα καὶ σκληρότητα ἡ ἁφή; καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις ἆρ' οὐκ ἐνδεῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα δηλοῦσιν; ἢ ὧδε ποιεῖ ἑκάστη αὐτῶν· πρῶτον | μὲν ἡ ἐπὶ τῷ σκληρῷ τεταγμένη p. 524. αἴσθησις ἠνάγκασται καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ μαλακῷ τετάχθαι, καὶ παραγγέλλει τῇ ψυχῇ ὡς ταὐτὸν σκληρόν τε καὶ μαλακὸν αἰσθανομένη;

Οὕτως, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις αὖ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπορεῖν τί ποτε σημαίνει αὕτη ἡ αἴσθησις τὸ σκληρόν, εἴπερ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ μαλακὸν λέγει, καὶ ἡ τοῦ κούφου καὶ ἡ τοῦ βαρέος, τί τὸ κοῦφον καὶ βαρύ, εἰ τό τε βαρὺ κοῦφον καὶ τὸ κοῦφον βαρὺ σημαίνει;

The aid of number is invoked in order to remove the confusion.

Καὶ γάρ, ἔφη, αὗταί γε ἄτοποι τῇ ψυχῇ αἱ ἑρμηνεῖαι καὶ ἐπισκέψεως δεόμεναι. B

Εἰκότως ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις πρῶτον μὲν πειρᾶται λογισμόν τε καὶ νόησιν ψυχὴ παρακα-

22. αὕτη *AM*: αὐτῇ Π.

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p. 524. λοῦσα ἐπισκοπεῖν, εἴτε ἓν εἴτε δύο ἐστὶν ἕκαστα τῶν εἰσαγγελλομένων.

Πῶς δ' οὔ;

Οὐκοῦν ἐὰν δύο φαίνηται, ἕτερόν τε καὶ ἓν ἑκάτερον φαίνεται;

Ναί.

Εἰ ἄρα ἓν ἑκάτερον, ἀμφότερα δὲ δύο, τά γε δύο κεχωρισμένα νοήσει· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀχώριστά γε δύο C ἐνόει, ἀλλ' ἕν.

Ὀρθῶς.

Μέγα μὴν καὶ ὄψις καὶ σμικρὸν ἑώρα, φαμέν, ἀλλ' οὐ κεχωρισμένον ἀλλὰ συγκεχυμένον τι. ἦ γάρ;

Ναί.

The chaos then begins to be defined.

Διὰ δὲ τὴν τούτου σαφήνειαν μέγα αὖ καὶ σμικρὸν ἡ νόησις ἠναγκάσθη ἰδεῖν, οὐ συγκεχυμένα ἀλλὰ διωρισμένα, τοὐναντίον ἢ 'κείνη.

Ἀληθῆ.

Οὐκοῦν ἐντεῦθέν ποθεν πρῶτον ἐπέρχεται ἐρέσθαι ἡμῖν, τί οὖν ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα αὖ καὶ τὸ σμικρόν;

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

The parting of the visible and intelligible.

Καὶ οὕτω δὴ τὸ μὲν νοητόν, τὸ δ' ὁρατὸν ἐκαλέσαμεν.

D Ὀρθότατ', ἔφη.

Ταῦτα τοίνυν καὶ ἄρτι ἐπεχείρουν λέγειν, ὡς τὰ μὲν παρακλητικὰ τῆς διανοίας ἐστί, τὰ δ' οὔ, ἃ μὲν εἰς τὴν αἴσθησιν ἅμα τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἑαυτοῖς ἐμπίπτει, παρακλητικὰ ὁριζόμενος, ὅσα δὲ μή, οὐκ ἐγερτικὰ τῆς νοήσεως.

Μανθάνω τοίνυν ἤδη, ἔφη, καὶ δοκεῖ μοι οὕτως.

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Thought is aroused by the contradiction of the one and many.

Τί οὖν; ἀριθμός τε καὶ τὸ ἓν ποτέρων δοκεῖ εἶναι; p. 524.

Οὐ ξυννοῶ, ἔφη.

Ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων, ἔφην, ἀναλογίζου. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἱκανῶς αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ὁρᾶται ἢ ἄλλῃ τινὶ αἰσθήσει λαμβάνεται τὸ ἕν, οὐκ ἂν ὁλκὸν εἴη ἐπὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δακτύλου ἐλέγομεν· εἰ δ' ἀεί τι αὐτῷ ἅμα ὁρᾶται ἐναντίωμα, ὥστε μηδὲν μᾶλλον ἓν ἢ καὶ τοὐναντίον φαίνεσθαι, τοῦ ἐπικρινοῦντος δὴ δέοι ἂν ἤδη καὶ ἀναγκάζοιτ' ἂν ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχὴ ἀπορεῖν καὶ ζητεῖν, κινοῦσα ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὴν ἔννοιαν, καὶ ἀνερωτᾶν, τί ποτέ ἐστιν αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν, καὶ οὕτω τῶν | ἀγωγῶν ἂν εἴη καὶ μεταστρεπτικῶν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θέαν ἡ περὶ τὸ ἓν μάθησις. E p. 525.

Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφη, τοῦτό γ' ἔχει οὐχ ἥκιστα ἡ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὄψις· ἅμα γὰρ ταὐτὸν ὡς ἕν τε ὁρῶμεν καὶ ὡς ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος.

Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τὸ ἕν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ξύμπας ἀριθμὸς ταὐτὸν πέπονθε τούτῳ;

Πῶς δ' οὔ;

Ἀλλὰ μὴν λογιστική τε καὶ ἀριθμητικὴ περὶ ἀριθμὸν πᾶσα.

Καὶ μάλα.

Ταῦτα δέ γε φαίνεται ἀγωγὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν. B

Ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν.

Ὧν ζητοῦμεν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, μαθημάτων ἂν εἴη· πολεμικῷ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὰς τάξεις ἀναγκαῖον μαθεῖν ταῦτα, φιλοσόφῳ δὲ διὰ τὸ τῆς οὐσίας ἁπτέον εἶναι

1. ποτέρων A²Π : πότερον A*M*.
16. τὸ αὐτὸ ΑΠ*M* : αὐτὸ Ξ (primitus, τὸ superscriptum ab eadem manu.) 19. τούτῳ A : τοῦτο Π : om. *M*r.

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p. 525. γενέσεως ἐξαναδύντι, ἢ μηδέποτε λογιστικῷ γενέσθαι.

Ἔστι ταῦτ', ἔφη.

Ὁ δέ γε ἡμέτερος φύλαξ πολεμικός τε καὶ φιλόσοφος τυγχάνει ὤν.

Τί μήν;

Arithmetic has a practical and also a philosophical use, the latter the higher.

Προσῆκον δὴ τὸ μάθημα ἂν εἴη, ὦ Γλαύκων, νομοθετῆσαι καὶ πείθειν τοὺς μέλλοντας ἐν τῇ πόλει C τῶν μεγίστων μεθέξειν, ἐπὶ λογιστικὴν ἰέναι καὶ ἀνθάπτεσθαι αὐτῆς μὴ ἰδιωτικῶς, ἀλλ' ἕως ἂν ἐπὶ θέαν τῆς τῶν ἀριθμῶν φύσεως ἀφίκωνται τῇ νοήσει αὐτῇ, οὐκ ὠνῆς οὐδὲ πράσεως χάριν ὡς ἐμπόρους ἢ καπήλους μελετῶντας, ἀλλ' ἕνεκα πολέμου τε καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ῥᾳστώνης τε μεταστροφῆς ἀπὸ γενέσεως ἐπ' ἀλήθειάν τε καὶ οὐσίαν.

Κάλλιστ', ἔφη, λέγεις.

Καὶ μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, νῦν καὶ ἐννοῶ ῥηθέντος τοῦ D περὶ τοὺς λογισμοὺς μαθήματος, ὡς κομψόν ἐστι καὶ πολλαχῇ χρήσιμον ἡμῖν πρὸς ὃ βουλόμεθα, ἐὰν τοῦ γνωρίζειν ἕνεκά τις αὐτὸ ἐπιτηδεύῃ ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦ καπηλεύειν.

Πῇ δή; ἔφη.

The higher arithmetic is concerned, not with visible or tangible objects, but with abstract numbers.

Τοῦτό γε, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ὡς σφόδρα ἄνω ποι ἄγει τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἀναγκάζει διαλέγεσθαι, οὐδαμῇ ἀποδεχόμενον, ἐάν τις αὐτῇ ὁρατὰ ἢ ἁπτὰ σώματα ἔχοντας ἀριθμοὺς προτεινόμενος διαλέγηται. οἶσθα γάρ που τοὺς περὶ E ταῦτα δεινοὺς ὡς, ἐάν τις αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν ἐπιχειρῇ τῷ λόγῳ τέμνειν, καταγελῶσί τε καὶ οὐκ ἀποδέχονται,

14. τε A: om. Π: καὶ *M*r.
28. ὡς *M*r: δύο ὡς AΠ.

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ἀλλ' ἐὰν σὺ κερματίζῃς αὐτό, ἐκεῖνοι πολλαπλασιοῦσιν, εὐλαβούμενοι μή ποτε φανῇ τὸ ἓν μὴ ἓν ἀλλὰ πολλὰ μόρια. p. 525.

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Τί οὖν οἴει, ὦ Γλαύκων, | εἴ τις ἔροιτο αὐτούς, p. 526. Ὦ θαυμάσιοι, περὶ ποίων ἀριθμῶν διαλέγεσθε, ἐν οἷς τὸ ἓν οἷον ὑμεῖς ἀξιοῦτέ ἐστιν, ἴσον τε ἕκαστον πᾶν παντὶ καὶ οὐδὲ σμικρὸν διαφέρον, μόριόν τε ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ οὐδέν; τί ἂν οἴει αὐτοὺς ἀποκρίνασθαι;

Τοῦτο ἔγωγε, ὅτι περὶ τούτων λέγουσιν ὧν διανοηθῆναι μόνον ἐγχωρεῖ, ἄλλως δ' οὐδαμῶς μεταχειρίζεσθαι δυνατόν.

Ὁρᾷς οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι τῷ ὄντι ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν κινδυνεύει εἶναι τὸ μάθημα, ἐπειδὴ φαίνεταί γε προσαναγκάζον αὐτῇ τῇ νοήσει χρῆσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀλήθειαν; B

Καὶ μὲν δή, ἔφη, σφόδρα γε ποιεῖ αὐτό.

The arithmetician is naturally quick, and the study of arithmetic gives him still greater quickness.

Τί δέ; τόδε ἤδη ἐπεσκέψω, ὡς οἵ τε φύσει λογιστικοὶ εἰς πάντα τὰ μαθήματα ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ὀξεῖς φύονται, οἵ τε βραδεῖς, ἂν ἐν τούτῳ παιδευθῶσι καὶ γυμνάσωνται, κἂν μηδὲν ἄλλο ὠφεληθῶσιν, ὅμως εἴς γε τὸ ὀξύτεροι αὐτοὶ αὑτῶν γίγνεσθαι πάντες ἐπιδιδόασιν;

Ἔστιν, ἔφη, οὕτως.

Καὶ μήν, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἅ γε μείζω πόνον παρέχει μανθάνοντι καὶ μελετῶντι, οὐκ ἂν ῥᾳδίως οὐδὲ πολλὰ ἂν εὕροις ὡς τοῦτο. C

Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

Πάντων δὴ ἕνεκα τούτων οὐκ ἀφετέον τὸ μάθημα, ἀλλ' οἱ ἄριστοι τὰς φύσεις παιδευτέοι ἐν αὐτῷ.

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p. 526. Ξύμφημι, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν, εἶπον, ἐν ἡμῖν κείσθω· δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ἐχόμενον τούτου σκεψώμεθα ἆρά τι προσήκει ἡμῖν.

Τὸ ποῖον; ἢ γεωμετρίαν, ἔφη, λέγεις;

Αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

Geometry has practical applications;

D Ὅσον μέν, ἔφη, πρὸς τὰ πολεμικὰ αὐτοῦ τείνει, δῆλον ὅτι προσήκει· πρὸς γὰρ τὰς στρατοπεδεύσεις καὶ καταλήψεις χωρίων καὶ συναγωγὰς καὶ ἐκτάσεις στρατιᾶς καὶ ὅσα δὴ ἄλλα σχηματίζουσι τὰ στρατόπεδα ἐν αὐταῖς τε ταῖς μάχαις καὶ πορείαις διαφέροι ἂν αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ γεωμετρικὸς καὶ μὴ ὤν.

Ἀλλ' οὖν δή, εἶπον, πρὸς μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα βραχύ τι ἂν ἐξαρκοῖ γεωμετρίας τε καὶ λογισμῶν μόριον· τὸ δὲ πολὺ αὐτῆς καὶ πορρωτέρω προϊὸν σκοπεῖσθαι E δεῖ, εἴ τι πρὸς ἐκεῖνο τείνει, πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν κατιδεῖν ῥᾷον τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν. τείνει δέ, φαμέν, πάντα αὐτόσε, ὅσα ἀναγκάζει ψυχὴν εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν τόπον μεταστρέφεσθαι ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονέστατον τοῦ ὄντος, ὃ δεῖ αὐτὴν παντὶ τρόπῳ ἰδεῖν.

Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν οὐσίαν ἀναγκάζει θεάσασθαι, προσήκει, εἰ δὲ γένεσιν, οὐ προσήκει.

Φαμέν γε δή.

p. 527. Οὐ τοίνυν τοῦτό γε, | ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀμφισβητήσουσιν ἡμῖν ὅσοι καὶ σμικρὰ γεωμετρίας ἔμπειροι, ὅτι αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἔχει τοῖς ἐν αὐτῇ λόγοις λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τῶν μεταχειριζομένων.

12. γεωμετρικὸς A : γεωμετρικὸς τε Π corr. : γεωμετρικός τε *M*.
15. προϊὸν Π*M* : προσιὸν A.

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These are trifling, however, in comparison with that greater part of the science which tends towards the good, and is concerned with the eternal.

Πῶς; ἔφη. p. 527.

Λέγουσι μέν που μάλα γελοίως τε καὶ ἀναγκαίως· ὡς γὰρ πράττοντές τε καὶ πράξεως ἕνεκα πάντας τοὺς λόγους ποιούμενοι λέγουσι τετραγωνίζειν τε καὶ παρατείνειν καὶ προστιθέναι καὶ πάντα οὕτω φθεγγόμενοι· τὸ δ᾽ ἔστι που πᾶν τὸ μάθημα γνώσεως B ἕνεκα ἐπιτηδευόμενον.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ἔτι διομολογητέον;

Τὸ ποῖον;

Ὡς τοῦ ἀεὶ ὄντος γνώσεως, ἀλλὰ οὐ τοῦ ποτέ τι γιγνομένου καὶ ἀπολλυμένου.

Εὐομολόγητον, ἔφη· τοῦ γὰρ ἀεὶ ὄντος ἡ γεωμετρικὴ γνῶσίς ἐστιν.

Ὁλκὸν ἄρα, ὦ γενναῖε, ψυχῆς πρὸς ἀλήθειαν εἴη ἂν καὶ ἀπεργαστικὸν φιλοσόφου διανοίας πρὸς τὸ ἄνω σχεῖν ἃ νῦν κάτω οὐ δέον ἔχομεν.

Ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα, ἔφη.

Ὡς οἷόν τ᾽ ἄρα, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, μάλιστα προστακτέον, C ὅπως οἱ ἐν τῇ καλλιπόλει σοι μηδενὶ τρόπῳ γεωμετρίας ἀφέξονται. καὶ γὰρ τὰ πάρεργα αὐτοῦ οὐ σμικρά.

Ποῖα; ἦ δ᾽ ὅς.

Ἅ τε δὴ σὺ εἶπες, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον, καὶ δὴ καὶ πρὸς πάσας μαθήσεις, ὥστε κάλλιον ἀποδέχεσθαι, ἴσμεν που ὅτι τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ παντὶ διοίσει ἡμμένος τε γεωμετρίας καὶ μή.

Τῷ παντὶ μέντοι νὴ Δί᾽, ἔφη.

Δεύτερον δὴ τοῦτο τιθῶμεν μάθημα τοῖς νέοις;

13. εὐομολόγητον Amg. (γρ.) Π*M*: εὖ διομολογητέον A.
15. ὁλκὸν . . . ψυχῆς AΠ (pr.): ἕλκον . . . ψυχὴν *M*Ξ.

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p. 527. Τιθῶμεν, ἔφη.

D Τί δέ; τρίτον θῶμεν ἀστρονομίαν; ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ;

Ἔμοιγ' οὖν, ἔφη· τὸ γὰρ περὶ ὥρας εὐαισθητοτέρως ἔχειν καὶ μηνῶν καὶ ἐνιαυτῶν οὐ μόνον γεωργίᾳ οὐδὲ ναυτιλίᾳ προσήκει, ἀλλὰ καὶ στρατηγίᾳ οὐχ ἧττον.

Astronomy, like the previous sciences, is at first praised by Glaucon for its practical uses.

Ἡδὺς εἶ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ἔοικας δεδιότι τοὺς πολλούς, μὴ δοκῇς ἄχρηστα μαθήματα προστάττειν. τὸ δ' ἔστιν οὐ πάνυ φαῦλον ἀλλὰ χαλεπὸν πιστεῦσαι, ὅτι ἐν τούτοις τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἑκάστου ὄργανόν E τι ψυχῆς ἐκκαθαίρεταί τε καὶ ἀναζωπυρεῖται ἀπολλύμενον καὶ τυφλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων, κρεῖττον ὂν σωθῆναι μυρίων ὀμμάτων· μόνῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀλήθεια ὁρᾶται. οἷς μὲν οὖν ταῦτα ξυνδοκεῖ ἀμηχάνως ὡς εὖ δόξεις λέγειν· ὅσοι δὲ τούτου μηδαμῇ ᾐσθημένοι εἰσὶν εἰκότως ἡγήσονταί σε λέγειν οὐδέν· ἄλλην γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῶν οὐχ ὁρῶσιν ἀξίαν λόγου ὠφελίαν. σκόπει οὖν αὐτόθεν, πρὸς ποτέρους διαλέγει· ἢ οὐ| πρὸς οὐδετέρους, ἀλλὰ σαυτοῦ p. 528. ἕνεκα τὸ μέγιστον ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους, φθονοῖς μὴν οὐδ' ἂν ἄλλῳ, εἴ τίς τι δύναιτο ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὄνασθαι.

Οὕτως, ἔφη, αἱροῦμαι, ἐμαυτοῦ ἕνεκα τὸ πλεῖστον λέγειν τε καὶ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

Correction of the order.

Ἄναγε τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰς τοὐπίσω· νῦν δὴ γὰρ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὸ ἑξῆς ἐλάβομεν τῇ γεωμετρίᾳ.

Πῶς λαβόντες; ἔφη.

Μετὰ ἐπίπεδον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν περιφορᾷ ὂν ἤδη στερεὸν λαβόντες, πρὶν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ λαβεῖν·

19. οὐ πρὸς οὐδετέρους ΑΠ : πρὸς οὐδετέρους *ΜΞ* : οὐδὲ πρὸς ἑτέρους cj. Cobet.

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ὀρθῶς δὲ ἔχει ἑξῆς μετὰ δευτέραν αὔξην τρίτην p. 528.
λαμβάνειν. ἔστι δέ που τοῦτο περὶ τὴν τῶν κύβων B
αὔξην καὶ τὸ βάθους μετέχον.

Ἔστι γάρ, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ ταῦτά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖ οὔπω εὑρῆσθαι.

The pitiable condition of solid geometry.

Διττὰ γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὰ αἴτια· ὅτι τε οὐδεμία πόλις ἐντίμως αὐτὰ ἔχει, ἀσθενῶς ζητεῖται χαλεπὰ ὄντα, ἐπιστάτου τε δέονται οἱ ζητοῦντες, ἄνευ οὗ οὐκ ἂν εὕροιεν· ὃν πρῶτον μὲν γενέσθαι χαλεπόν, ἔπειτα καὶ γενομένου, ὡς νῦν ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν πείθοιντο
οἱ περὶ ταῦτα ζητητικοὶ μεγαλοφρονούμενοι. εἰ δὲ C
πόλις ὅλη ξυνεπιστατοῖ ἐντίμως ἄγουσα αὐτά, οὗτοί τε ἂν πείθοιντο καὶ ξυνεχῶς τε ἂν καὶ ἐντόνως ζητούμενα ἐκφανῆ γένοιτο ὅπῃ ἔχει· ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀτιμαζόμενα καὶ κολουόμενα, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ζητούντων, λόγον οὐκ ἐχόντων καθ' ὅ τι χρήσιμα, ὅμως πρὸς ἅπαντα ταῦτα βίᾳ ὑπὸ χά-
ριτος αὐξάνεται, καὶ οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν αὐτὰ φα- D
νῆναι.

Καὶ μὲν δή, ἔφη, τό γε ἐπίχαρι καὶ διαφερόντως ἔχει. ἀλλά μοι σαφέστερον εἰπὲ ἃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες. τὴν μὲν γάρ που τοῦ ἐπιπέδου πραγματείαν γεωμετρίαν ἐτίθης.

Ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

Εἶτά γ', ἔφη, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀστρονομίαν μετὰ ταύτην, ὕστερον δ' ἀνεχώρησας.

The motion of solids.

Σπεύδων γάρ, ἔφην, ταχὺ πάντα διεξελθεῖν μᾶλλον βραδύνω· ἑξῆς γὰρ οὖσαν τὴν βάθους αὔξης μέθοδον, ὅτι τῇ ζητήσει γελοίως ἔχει, ὑπερβὰς αὐτὴν

15. , ὑπὸ δὲ MSS.: ὑπὸ cj. Madvig.
18. αὐτὰ MSS.

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p. 528. E μετὰ γεωμετρίαν ἀστρονομίαν ἔλεγον, φορὰν οὖσαν βάθους.

Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Τέταρτον τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τιθῶμεν μάθημα ἀστρονομίαν, ὡς ὑπαρχούσης τῆς νῦν παραλειπομένης, ἐὰν αὐτὴν πόλις μετίῃ.

Glaucon grows sentimental about astronomy.

Εἰκός, ἦ δ' ὅς. καὶ ὃ γε νῦν δή μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπέπληξας περὶ ἀστρονομίας ὡς φορτικῶς ἐπαινοῦντι, p. 529. νῦν ᾗ σὺ μετέρχει ἐπαινῶ· | παντὶ γάρ μοι δοκεῖ δῆλον, ὅτι αὕτη γε ἀναγκάζει ψυχὴν εἰς τὸ ἄνω ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε ἄγει.

Ἴσως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, παντὶ δῆλον πλὴν ἐμοί· ἐμοὶ γὰρ οὐ δοκεῖ οὕτως.

Ἀλλὰ πῶς; ἔφη.

Ὡς μὲν νῦν αὐτὴν μεταχειρίζονται οἱ εἰς φιλοσοφίαν ἀνάγοντες, πάνυ ποιεῖν κάτω βλέπειν.

Πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις;

He is rebuked by Socrates,

Οὐκ ἀγεννῶς μοι δοκεῖς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὴν περὶ τὰ ἄνω μάθησιν λαμβάνειν παρὰ σαυτῷ ᾗ ἐστι· κινδυ-B νεύεις γὰρ καὶ εἴ τις ἐν ὀροφῇ ποικίλματα θεώμενος ἀνακύπτων καταμανθάνοι τι, ἡγεῖσθαι ἂν αὐτὸν νοήσει ἀλλ' οὐκ ὄμμασι θεωρεῖν. ἴσως οὖν καλῶς ἡγεῖ, ἐγὼ δ' εὐηθικῶς. ἐγὼ γὰρ αὖ οὐ δύναμαι ἄλλο τι νομίσαι ἄνω ποιοῦν ψυχὴν βλέπειν μάθημα ἢ ἐκεῖνο, ὃ ἂν περὶ τὸ ὄν τε ᾖ καὶ τὸ ἀόρατον, ἐάν τέ τις ἄνω κεχηνὼς ἢ κάτω συμμεμυκὼς τῶν αἰσθητῶν τι ἐπιχειρῇ μανθάνειν, οὔτε μαθεῖν ἄν ποτέ φημι αὐτόν — ἐπιστήμην γὰρ οὐδὲν ἔχειν

19. ἣ *M*: ᾗ ΑΠ. 22. νοήσει *q*x: νοήσειν ΑΠ*M*: νοεῖν τι Ξ.
24. ποιεῖν cj. Heindorf. 26. ἐὰν δέ cj. Herm.
27. τι Α*M*: om. Π.

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who explains that the higher astronomy is an abstract science.

τῶν τοιούτων — οὔτε ἄνω ἀλλὰ κάτω αὐτοῦ βλέπειν p. 529. τὴν ψυχήν, κἂν ἐξ ὑπτίας νέων ἐν γῇ ἢ ἐν θαλάττῃ C μανθάνῃ.

Δίκην, ἔφη, ἔχω· ὀρθῶς γάρ μοι ἐπέπληξας. ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ ἔλεγες δεῖν ἀστρονομίαν μανθάνειν παρὰ ἃ νῦν μανθάνουσιν, εἰ μέλλοιεν ὠφελίμως πρὸς ἃ λέγομεν μαθήσεσθαι;

Ὧδε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ταῦτα μὲν τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ποικίλματα, ἐπείπερ ἐν ὁρατῷ πεποίκιλται, κάλλιστα μὲν ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ ἀκριβέστατα τῶν τοιούτων ἔχειν, D τῶν δὲ ἀληθινῶν πολὺ ἐνδεῖν, ἃς τὸ ὂν τάχος καὶ ἡ οὖσα βραδυτὴς ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ ἀριθμῷ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀληθέσι σχήμασι φοράς τε πρὸς ἄλληλα φέρεται καὶ τὰ ἐνόντα φέρει· ἃ δὴ λόγῳ μὲν καὶ διανοίᾳ ληπτά, ὄψει δ' οὔ· ἢ σὺ οἴει;

Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν, εἶπον, τῇ περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ποικιλίᾳ παραδείγμασι χρηστέον τῆς πρὸς ἐκεῖνα μαθήσεως ἕνεκα, ὁμοίως ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἐντύχοι ὑπὸ Δαιδάλου ἤ τινος ἄλλου δημιουργοῦ ἢ γραφέως διαφερόντως E γεγραμμένοις καὶ ἐκπεπονημένοις διαγράμμασιν. ἡγήσαιτο γὰρ ἄν πού τις ἔμπειρος γεωμετρίας, ἰδὼν τὰ τοιαῦτα, κάλλιστα μὲν ἔχειν ἀπεργασίᾳ, γελοῖον μὴν ἐπισκοπεῖν ταῦτα σπουδῇ ὡς τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν αὐτοῖς ληψόμενον ἴσων ἢ διπλασίων | ἢ ἄλλης τινὸς p. 530. συμμετρίας.

Τί δ' οὐ μέλλει γελοῖον εἶναι; ἔφη.

The real knowledge of astron-

Τῷ ὄντι δὴ ἀστρονομικόν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὄντα οὐκ οἴει ταὐτὸν πείσεσθαι εἰς τὰς τῶν ἄστρων φορὰς

2. νέων Π : μὲν A*M* : ναίων Ξ : ᾗ cj. Madvig.
20. διαφερόντως A²Π*M* : διαφέροντος A.

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omy as of geometry is to be obtained by the use of abstractions.

p. 530. ἀποβλέποντα; νομιεῖν μέν, ὡς οἷόν τε κάλλιστα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔργα συστήσασθαι, οὕτω ξυνεστάναι τῷ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ δημιουργῷ αὐτόν τε καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ· τὴν δὲ νυκτὸς πρὸς ἡμέραν ξυμμετρίαν καὶ τούτων πρὸς μῆνα καὶ μηνὸς πρὸς ἐνιαυτὸν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων B ἄστρων πρός τε ταῦτα καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα, οὐκ ἄτοπον, οἴει, ἡγήσεται τὸν νομίζοντα γίγνεσθαί τε ταῦτα ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ οὐδαμῇ οὐδὲν παραλλάττειν, σῶμά τε ἔχοντα καὶ ὁρώμενα, καὶ ζητεῖν παντὶ τρόπῳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν αὐτῶν λαβεῖν;

Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ἔφη, σοῦ νῦν ἀκούοντι.

Προβλήμασιν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, χρώμενοι ὥσπερ γεωμετρίαν οὕτω καὶ ἀστρονομίαν μέτιμεν· τὰ δ' ἐν C τῷ οὐρανῷ ἐάσομεν, εἰ μέλλομεν ὄντως ἀστρονομίας μεταλαμβάνοντες χρήσιμον τὸ φύσει φρόνιμον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐξ ἀχρήστου ποιήσειν.

Ἦ πολλαπλάσιον, ἔφη, τὸ ἔργον ἢ ὡς νῦν ἀστρονομεῖται προστάττεις.

Οἶμαι δέ γε, εἶπον, καὶ τἆλλα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον προστάξειν ἡμᾶς, ἐάν τι ἡμῶν ὡς νομοθετῶν ὄφελος ᾖ. — Ἀλλὰ γάρ τι ἔχεις ὑπομνῆσαι τῶν προσηκόντων μαθημάτων;

Οὐκ ἔχω, ἔφη, νῦν γ' οὑτωσί.

Οὐ μὴν ἕν, ἀλλὰ πλείω, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἴδη παρέχεται D ἡ φορά, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι. τὰ μὲν οὖν πάντα ἴσως ὅστις σοφὸς ἕξει εἰπεῖν· ἃ δὲ καὶ ἡμῖν προφανῆ, δύο.

Ποῖα δή;

Πρὸς τούτῳ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀντίστροφον αὐτοῦ.

1. νομιεῖν ΑΠ : νοεῖν *M*.
16. ἐξ ἀχρήστου Π*M* : ἐξ ἀρχῆς του Α.
21. γάρ τι *Mq* : γὰρ τί ΑΠ.

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What astronomy is to the eye, harmonics are to the ear.

Τὸ ποῖον; p. 530.

Κινδυνεύει, ἔφην, ὡς πρὸς ἀστρονομίαν ὄμματα πέπηγεν, ὣς πρὸς ἐναρμόνιον φορὰν ὦτα παγῆναι, καὶ αὗται ἀλλήλων ἀδελφαί τινες αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι εἶναι, ὡς οἵ τε Πυθαγόρειοί φασι καὶ ἡμεῖς, ὦ Γλαύκων, συγχωροῦμεν. ἢ πῶς ποιοῦμεν;

Οὕτως, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ πολὺ τὸ ἔργον, ἐκείνων E πευσόμεθα, πῶς λέγουσι περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο πρὸς τούτοις· ἡμεῖς δὲ παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα φυλάξομεν τὸ ἡμέτερον.

Ποῖον;

They must be studied with a view to the good and not after the fashion of the empirics or even of the Pythagoreans.

Μή ποτ' αὐτῶν τι ἀτελὲς ἐπιχειρῶσιν ἡμῖν μανθάνειν οὓς θρέψομεν, καὶ οὐκ ἐξῆκον ἐκεῖσε ἀεί, οἷ πάντα δεῖ ἀφήκειν, οἷον ἄρτι περὶ τῆς ἀστρονομίας ἐλέγομεν. ἢ οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι καὶ περὶ ἁρμονίας ἕτερον | τοιοῦτον ποιοῦσι; τὰς γὰρ ἀκουομένας αὖ συμφω- p. 531. νίας καὶ φθόγγους ἀλλήλοις ἀναμετροῦντες ἀνήνυτα, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀστρονόμοι, πονοῦσιν.

Νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ἔφη, καὶ γελοίως γε, πυκνώματ' ἄττα ὀνομάζοντες καὶ παραβάλλοντες τὰ ὦτα, οἷον ἐκ γειτόνων φωνὴν θηρευόμενοι, οἱ μέν φασιν ἔτι κατακούειν ἐν μέσῳ τινὰ ἠχὴν καὶ σμικρότατον εἶναι τοῦτο διάστημα, ᾧ μετρητέον, οἱ δὲ ἀμφισβητοῦντες ὡς ὅμοιον ἤδη φθεγγομένων, ἀμφότεροι ὦτα τοῦ νοῦ B προστησάμενοι.

Σὺ μέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοὺς χρηστοὺς λέγεις τοὺς ταῖς χορδαῖς πράγματα παρέχοντας καὶ βασανίζοντας, ἐπὶ τῶν κολλόπων στρεβλοῦντας. ἵνα δὲ μὴ μακροτέρα ἡ εἰκὼν γίγνηται πλήκτρῳ τε πληγῶν γιγνομένων καὶ κατηγορίας πέρι καὶ ἐξαρνήσεως καὶ

p. 531. ἀλαζονείας χορδῶν, παύομαι τῆς εἰκόνος καὶ οὔ φημι τούτους λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἐκείνους οὓς ἔφαμεν νῦν δὴ περὶ ἁρμονίας ἐρήσεσθαι. ταὐτὸν γὰρ ποιοῦσι τοῖς C ἐν τῇ ἀστρονομίᾳ· τοὺς γὰρ ἐν ταύταις ταῖς συμφωνίαις ταῖς ἀκουομέναις ἀριθμοὺς ζητοῦσιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰς προβλήματα ἀνίασιν, ἐπισκοπεῖν τίνες ξύμφωνοι ἀριθμοὶ καὶ τίνες οὔ, καὶ διὰ τί ἑκάτεροι.

Δαιμόνιον γάρ, ἔφη, πρᾶγμα λέγεις.

Χρήσιμον μὲν οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ζήτησιν, ἄλλως δὲ μεταδιωκόμενον ἄχρηστον.

Εἰκός γ', ἔφη.

All these studies must be correlated with one another.

Οἶμαι δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἡ τούτων πάντων ὧν D διεληλύθαμεν μέθοδος ἐὰν μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀλλήλων κοινωνίαν ἀφίκηται καὶ ξυγγένειαν, καὶ ξυλλογισθῇ ταῦτα ᾗ ἐστὶν ἀλλήλοις οἰκεῖα, φέρειν τι αὐτῶν εἰς ἃ βουλόμεθα τὴν πραγματείαν καὶ οὐκ ἀνόνητα πονεῖσθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνόνητα.

Καὶ ἐγώ, ἔφη, οὕτω μαντεύομαι. ἀλλὰ πάμπολυ ἔργον λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Want of reasoning power in mathematicians.

Τοῦ προοιμίου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ τίνος λέγεις; ἢ οὐκ ἴσμεν, ὅτι πάντα ταῦτα προοίμιά ἐστιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ νόμου ὃν δεῖ μαθεῖν; οὐ γάρ που δοκοῦσί γέ σοι οἱ E ταῦτα δεινοὶ διαλεκτικοὶ εἶναι.

Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη, εἰ μὴ μάλα γέ τινες ὀλίγοι ὧν ἐγὼ ἐντετύχηκα.

'Αλλὰ ἤδη, εἶπον, μὴ δυνατοί τινες ὄντες δοῦναί τε καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι λόγον εἴσεσθαί ποτέ τι ὧν φαμὲν δεῖν εἰδέναι;

23. που ΑΠ : πω Μ. 27. ἤδη ΑΠΜ : οἱ δὴ cj. Badham. μὴ ΠΜ : οἱ μὴ Α. τινες MSS. : τινος cj. Badham : τινες del. Ast.

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Οὐδ' αὖ, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε. p. 531.

| Οὐκοῦν, εἶπον, ὦ Γλαύκων, οὗτος ἤδη αὐτός p. 532. ἐστιν ὁ νόμος ὃν τὸ διαλέγεσθαι περαίνει; ὃν καὶ ὄντα νοητὸν μιμοῖτ' ἂν ἡ τῆς ὄψεως δύναμις, ἣν ἐλέγομεν πρὸς αὐτὰ ἤδη τὰ ζῷα ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποβλέπειν καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ τὰ ἄστρα τε καὶ τελευταῖον δὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν ἥλιον. οὕτω καὶ ὅταν τις τῷ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιχειρῇ, ἄνευ πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων διὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐπ' αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον ὁρμᾷ καὶ μὴ ἀποστῇ, πρὶν ἂν αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῇ νοήσει B λάβῃ, ἐπ' αὐτῷ γίγνεται τῷ τοῦ νοητοῦ τέλει, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος τότε ἐπὶ τῷ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ.

Dialectic proceeds by reason only, without any help from sense.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Τί οὖν; οὐ διαλεκτικὴν ταύτην τὴν πορείαν καλεῖς;

Τί μήν;

Ἡ δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λύσις τε ἀπὸ τῶν δεσμῶν καὶ μεταστροφὴ ἀπὸ τῶν σκιῶν ἐπὶ τὰ εἴδωλα καὶ τὸ φῶς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ καταγείου εἰς τὸν ἥλιον ἐπάνοδος, καὶ ἐκεῖ πρὸς μὲν τὰ ζῷά τε καὶ φυτὰ καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς ἐπ' ἀδυναμίᾳ βλέπειν, πρὸς δὲ τὰ ἐν C ὕδασι φαντάσματα θεῖα καὶ σκιὰς τῶν ὄντων, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰδώλων σκιὰς δι' ἑτέρου τοιούτου φωτὸς ὡς πρὸς ἥλιον κρίνειν ἀποσκιαζομένας, — πᾶσα αὕτη ἡ πραγματεία τῶν τεχνῶν, ἃς διήλθομεν, ταύτην ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ἐπαναγωγὴν τοῦ βελτίστου ἐν ψυχῇ

The gradual acquirement of dialectic by the pursuit of the arts anticipated in the allegory of the den.

3. περαίνει x q a : παραινεῖ ΑΠΜ. 8. ἄνευ MSS. : ἂν ἄνευ cj. Ast.
9. ἕκαστον Π : om. AM. ὁρμᾷ MSS. : ὁρμᾶν cj. Ast, et sic Clem. Alex. καὶ μὴ ΑΠΜ : καὶ ἣν μὴ Φ : κἂν μὴ cj. Sommer.
21. ἐπ' ἀδυναμίᾳ ΑΠΜ : ἔτι ἀδυναμία cj. Naegelsbach, et sic Iambl. περὶ τῆς κοινῆς μαθηματικῆς ἐπιστήμης (Villoison. anecd. Gr. II, 196) : ἔστιν ἐπ' ἀδυναμία Ξ.

p. 532. πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀρίστου ἐν τοῖς οὖσι θέαν, ὥσπερ τότε τοῦ σαφεστάτου ἐν σώματι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ φανοτάτου D ἐν τῷ σωματοειδεῖ τε καὶ ὁρατῷ τόπῳ.

Ἐγὼ μέν, ἔφη, ἀποδέχομαι οὕτω. καί τοι παντάπασί γέ μοι δοκεῖ χαλεπὰ μὲν ἀποδέχεσθαι εἶναι, ἄλλον δ' αὖ τρόπον χαλεπὰ μὴ ἀποδέχεσθαι. ὅμως δέ — οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι μόνον ἀκουστέα, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὖθις πολλάκις ἐπανιτέον — ταῦτα θέντες ἔχειν ὡς νῦν λέγεται, ἐπ' αὐτὸν δὴ τὸν νόμον ἴωμεν, καὶ διέλθωμεν οὕτως, ὥσπερ τὸ προοίμιον διήλθομεν. λέγε οὖν, τίς ὁ τρόπος τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνά- E μεως, καὶ κατὰ ποῖα δὴ εἴδη διέστηκε, καὶ τίνες αὖ ὁδοί. αὗται γὰρ ἂν ἤδη, ὡς ἔοικεν, αἱ πρὸς αὐτὸ ἄγουσαι εἶεν, οἷ ἀφικομένῳ ὥσπερ ὁδοῦ ἀνάπαυλα ἂν εἴη καὶ τέλος τῆς πορείας.

The nature of dialectic can only be revealed to those who have been students of the preliminary sciences,

p. 533. Οὐκέτ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, οἷός τ' | ἔσει ἀκολουθεῖν· ἐπεὶ τό γ' ἐμὸν οὐδὲν ἂν προθυμίας ἀπολίποι· οὐδ' εἰκόνα ἂν ἔτι οὗ λέγομεν ἴδοις, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἀληθές, ὅ γε δή μοι φαίνεται, εἰ δ' ὄντως ἢ μή, οὐκέτ' ἄξιον τοῦτο διισχυρίζεσθαι· ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν *δεῖ τοιοῦτόν τι ἰδεῖν, ἰσχυριστέον. ἢ γάρ;

Τί μήν;

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις μόνη ἂν φήνειεν ἐμπείρῳ ὄντι ὧν νῦν δὴ διήλθομεν, ἄλλῃ δὲ οὐδαμῇ δυνατόν;

Καὶ τοῦτ', ἔφη, ἄξιον διισχυρίζεσθαι.

B Τόδε γοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐδεὶς ἡμῖν ἀμφισβητήσει λέγουσιν, ὡς αὐτοῦ γε ἑκάστου πέρι, ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον, ἄλλη τις ἐπιχειρεῖ μέθοδος ὁδῷ περὶ παντὸς

10. διέλθωμεν ΜΞ : ἔλθωμεν ΑΠ. 12. αὖ ΑΠΜ : αἱ r.
20. μὲν δεῖ cj. Madvig (cum Ficino): δεῖ μὲν Φ : μὲν δὴ ΑΠΜ.

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λαμβάνειν· ἀλλ' αἱ μὲν ἄλλαι πᾶσαι τέχναι ἢ πρὸς p. 533. δόξας ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἐπιθυμίας εἰσὶν ἢ πρὸς γενέσεις τε καὶ συνθέσεις ἢ πρὸς θεραπείαν τῶν φυομένων τε καὶ συντιθεμένων ἅπασαι τετράφαται· αἱ δὲ λοιπαί, ἃς τοῦ ὄντος τι ἔφαμεν ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι, γεωμετρίας τε καὶ τὰς ταύτῃ ἑπομένας, ὁρῶμεν ὡς ὀνειρώττουσι C μὲν περὶ τὸ ὄν, ὕπαρ δὲ ἀδύνατον αὐταῖς ἰδεῖν, ἕως ἂν ὑποθέσεσι χρώμεναι ταύτας ἀκινήτους ἐῶσι, μὴ δυνάμεναι λόγον διδόναι αὐτῶν. ᾧ γὰρ ἀρχὴ μὲν ὃ μὴ οἶδε, τελευτὴ δὲ καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ ἐξ οὗ μὴ οἶδε συμπέπλεκται, τίς μηχανὴ τὴν τοιαύτην ὁμολογίαν ποτὲ ἐπιστήμην γενέσθαι;

Οὐδεμία, ἦ δ' ὅς.

which are her handmaids.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος μόνη ταύτῃ πορεύεται, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναιροῦσα ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχήν, ἵνα βεβαιώσηται, καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἐν βορβόρῳ D βαρβαρικῷ τινὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα κατορωρυγμένον ἠρέμα ἕλκει καὶ ἀνάγει ἄνω, συνερίθοις καὶ συμπεριαγωγοῖς χρωμένη αἷς διήλθομεν τέχναις· ἃς ἐπιστήμας μὲν πολλάκις προσείπομεν διὰ τὸ ἔθος, δέονται δὲ ὀνόματος ἄλλου, ἐναργεστέρου μὲν ἢ δόξης, ἀμυδροτέρου δὲ ἢ ἐπιστήμης. διάνοιαν δὲ αὐτὴν ἔν γε τῷ πρόσθεν που ὡρισάμεθα. ἔστι δ', ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐ περὶ ὀνόματος ἀμφισβήτησις, οἷς τοσούτων πέρι E σκέψις ὅσων ἡμῖν πρόκειται.

Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη· ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν μόνον δηλοῖ πρὸς τὴν ἕξιν σαφηνείᾳ ὃ λέγει ἐν ψυχῇ.

Two divisions of

Ἀρέσκει οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὥσπερ τὸ πρότερον,

27. ὃ *q*: om. ΑΠΜ. λέγει Π: λέγει A: λέγειν M: λέγοι *q*. ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν ... ἐν ψυχῇ om. Ξ. 28. οὖν Π: γοῦν AM.

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p. 533. τὴν μὲν πρώτην μοῖραν ἐπιστήμην καλεῖν, δευτέραν
p. 534. δὲ διάνοιαν, | τρίτην δὲ πίστιν καὶ εἰκασίαν τετάρτην· καὶ ξυναμφότερα μὲν ταῦτα δόξαν, ξυναμφότερα δ' ἐκεῖνα νόησιν· καὶ δόξαν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, νόησιν δὲ περὶ οὐσίαν· καὶ ὅ τι οὐσία πρὸς γένεσιν, νόησιν πρὸς δόξαν, καὶ ὅ τι νόησις πρὸς δόξαν, ἐπιστήμην πρὸς πίστιν καὶ διάνοιαν πρὸς εἰκασίαν; τὴν δ' ἐφ' οἷς ταῦτα ἀναλογίαν καὶ διαίρεσιν διχῇ ἑκατέρου, δοξαστοῦ τε καὶ νοητοῦ, ἐῶμεν, ὦ Γλαύκων, ἵνα μὴ ἡμᾶς πολλαπλασίων λόγων ἐμπλήσῃ ἢ ὅσων οἱ παρεληλυθότες.

the mind, intellect and opinion, each having two subdivisions.

B 'Αλλὰ μὴν ἔμοιγ', ἔφη, τά γε ἄλλα, καθ' ὅσον δύναμαι ἕπεσθαι, ξυνδοκεῖ.

Ἦ καὶ διαλεκτικὸν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἑκάστου λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὐσίας; καὶ τὸν μὴ ἔχοντα, καθ' ὅσον ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ λόγον αὑτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ διδόναι, κατὰ τοσοῦτον νοῦν περὶ τούτου οὐ φήσεις ἔχειν;

Πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ἦ δ' ὅς, φαίην;

Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὡσαύτως· ὃς ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ διορίσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων
C ἀφελὼν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν, καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν μάχῃ διὰ πάντων ἐλέγχων διεξιών, μὴ κατὰ δόξαν ἀλλὰ κατ' οὐσίαν προθυμούμενος ἐλέγχειν, ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ἀπτῶτι τῷ λόγῳ διαπορεύηται, οὔτε αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν φήσεις εἰδέναι τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα οὔτε ἄλλο ἀγαθὸν οὐδέν, ἀλλ' εἴ πῃ εἰδώλου τινὸς ἐφάπτεται, δόξῃ, οὐκ ἐπιστήμῃ ἐφάπτεσθαι, καὶ τὸν νῦν βίον ὀνειροπολοῦντα καὶ ὑπνώττοντα, πρὶν ἐνθάδ' ἐξεγρέσθαι,

No truth which does not rest on the idea of good

7. ἐπιστήμην Apr. Π : ἐπιστήμη A corr. M.
11. ὅσων Ξ : ὅσον ΑΠΜ : ὅσοι cj. Madvig.
25. φήσεις ΠΜ : οὐδὲν φήσεις A (?).

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εἰς Ἅιδου πρότερον ἀφικόμενον τελέως ἐπικαταδαρθάνειν; p. 534. D

Νὴ τὸν Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς, σφόδρα γε πάντα ταῦτα φήσω.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν τούς γε σαυτοῦ παῖδας, οὓς τῷ λόγῳ τρέφεις τε καὶ παιδεύεις, εἴ ποτε ἔργῳ τρέφοις, οὐκ ἂν ἐάσαις, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἀλόγους ὄντας ὥσπερ γραμμάς, ἄρχοντας ἐν τῇ πόλει κυρίους τῶν μεγίστων εἶναι.

Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη.

Νομοθετήσεις δὴ αὐτοῖς ταύτης μάλιστα τῆς παιδείας ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, ἐξ ἧς ἐρωτᾶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἐπιστημονέστατα οἷοί τ' ἔσονται;

Νομοθετήσω, ἔφη, μετά γε σοῦ. E

ought to have a high place.

Ἆρ' οὖν δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὥσπερ θριγκὸς τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἡ διαλεκτικὴ ἡμῖν ἐπάνω κεῖσθαι, καὶ οὐκέτ' ἄλλο τούτου μάθημα ἀνωτέρω ὀρθῶς ἂν ἐπιτίθεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἔχειν ἤδη τέλος τὰ τῶν | μαθημάτων; p. 535.

Ἔμοιγ', ἔφη.

Διανομὴ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ λοιπόν σοι, τίσι ταῦτα τὰ μαθήματα δώσομεν καὶ τίνα τρόπον.

Δῆλον, ἔφη.

Μέμνησαι οὖν τὴν προτέραν ἐκλογὴν τῶν ἀρχόντων, οἵους ἐξελέξαμεν;

Πῶς γάρ, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὔ;

The natural gifts which are required in the dialectician: a towardly understanding;

Τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐκείνας τὰς φύσεις οἴου δεῖν ἐκλεκτέας εἶναι· τούς τε γὰρ βεβαιοτάτους καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρειοτάτους προαιρετέον, καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν τοὺς εὐειδεστάτους· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ζητητέον μὴ μόνον γενναίους τε καὶ βλοσυροὺς τὰ ἤθη, B

p. 535. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἃ τῇδε τῇ παιδείᾳ τῆς φύσεως πρόσφορα ἑκτέον αὐτοῖς.

Ποῖα δὴ διαστέλλει;

Δριμύτητα, ὦ μακάριε, ἔφην, δεῖ αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὰ μαθήματα ὑπάρχειν, καὶ μὴ χαλεπῶς μανθάνειν· πολὺ γάρ τοι μᾶλλον ἀποδειλιῶσι ψυχαὶ ἐν ἰσχυροῖς μαθήμασιν ἢ ἐν γυμνασίοις· οἰκειότερος γὰρ αὐταῖς ὁ πόνος, ἴδιος ἀλλ' οὐ κοινὸς ὢν μετὰ τοῦ σώματος.

a good memory; strength of character;

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.

C Καὶ μνήμονα δὴ καὶ ἄρρατον καὶ πάντῃ φιλόπονον ζητητέον. ἢ τίνι τρόπῳ οἴει τά τε τοῦ σώματος ἐθελήσειν τινὰ διαπονεῖν καὶ τοσαύτην μάθησίν τε καὶ μελέτην ἐπιτελεῖν;

Οὐδένα, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐὰν μὴ παντάπασί γ' ᾖ εὐφυής.

Τὸ γοῦν νῦν ἁμάρτημα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἡ ἀτιμία φιλοσοφίᾳ διὰ ταῦτα προσπέπτωκεν, ὃ καὶ πρότερον εἶπον, ὅτι οὐ κατ' ἀξίαν αὐτῆς ἅπτονται· οὐ γὰρ νόθους ἔδει ἅπτεσθαι, ἀλλὰ γνησίους.

Πῶς; ἔφη.

D Πρῶτον μέν, εἶπον, φιλοπονίᾳ οὐ χωλὸν δεῖ εἶναι τὸν ἁψόμενον, τὰ μὲν ἡμίσεα φιλόπονον, τὰ δ' ἡμίσεα ἄπονον. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο, ὅταν τις φιλογυμναστὴς μὲν καὶ φιλόθηρος ᾖ καὶ πάντα τὰ διὰ τοῦ σώματος φιλοπονῇ, φιλομαθὴς δὲ μή, μηδὲ φιλήκοος μηδὲ ζητητικός, ἀλλ' ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις μισοπονῇ· χωλὸς δὲ καὶ ὁ τἀναντία τούτου μεταβεβληκὼς τὴν φιλοπονίαν.

industry;

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.

11. πάντῃ ΠΜ : πάντα Α (?).
21. φιλοπονίᾳ ΑΠ : φιλοπονίας Μ.

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love of truth,

Οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ταὐτὸν p. 535.
τοῦτο ἀνάπηρον ψυχὴν θήσομεν, ἣ ἂν τὸ μὲν ἑκού- E
σιον ψεῦδος μισῇ καὶ χαλεπῶς φέρῃ αὐτή τε καὶ
ἑτέρων ψευδομένων ὑπεραγανακτῇ, τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον
εὐκόλως προσδέχηται καὶ ἀμαθαίνουσά που ἁλισκομένη μὴ ἀγανακτῇ, ἀλλ' εὐχερῶς ὥσπερ θηρίον ὕειον ἐν ἀμαθίᾳ μολύνηται;

Παντάπασι | μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. p. 536.

the moral virtues.

Καὶ πρὸς σωφροσύνην, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ μεγαλοπρέπειαν καὶ πάντα τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μέρη οὐχ ἥκιστα δεῖ φυλάττειν τὸν νόθον τε καὶ τὸν γνήσιον. ὅταν γάρ τις μὴ ἐπίστηται τὰ τοιαῦτα σκοπεῖν καὶ ἰδιώτης καὶ πόλις, λανθάνουσι χωλοῖς τε καὶ νόθοις χρώμενοι πρὸς ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι τούτων, οἱ μὲν φίλοις, οἱ δὲ ἄρχουσι.

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχει.

Ἡμῖν δή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα διευλαβητέον· ὡς ἐὰν μὲν ἀρτιμελεῖς τε καὶ ἀρτίφρονας ἐπὶ B
τοσαύτην μάθησιν καὶ τοσαύτην ἄσκησιν κομίσαντες παιδεύωμεν, ἥ τε δίκη ἡμῖν οὐ μέμψεται αὐτή, τήν τε πόλιν καὶ πολιτείαν σώσομεν, ἀλλοίους δὲ ἄγοντες ἐπὶ ταῦτα τἀναντία πάντα καὶ πράξομεν καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἔτι πλείω γέλωτα καταντλήσομεν.

Αἰσχρὸν μέντ' ἂν εἴη, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Socrates plays a little with himself and his subject.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, εἶπον· γελοῖον δ' ἔγωγε καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἔοικα παθεῖν.

Τὸ ποῖον; ἔφη.

Ἐπελαθόμην, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ἐπαίζομεν, καὶ μᾶλ- C
λον ἐντεινάμενος εἶπον. λέγων γὰρ ἅμα ἔβλεψα πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν, καὶ ἰδὼν προπεπηλακισμένην ἀναξίως

12. τὰ ΑΜ : πάντῃ τὰ Π.

p. 536. ἀγανακτήσας μοι δοκῶ καὶ ὥσπερ θυμωθεὶς τοῖς αἰτίοις σπουδαιότερον εἰπεῖν ἃ εἶπον.

Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη, οὔκουν ὥς γ' ἐμοὶ ἀκροατῇ.

Ἀλλ' ὡς ἐμοί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ῥήτορι. τόδε δὲ μὴ ἐπιλανθανώμεθα, ὅτι ἐν μὲν τῇ προτέρᾳ ἐκλογῇ πρεσβύτας ἐξελέγομεν, ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ οὐκ ἐγχωρήσει· D Σόλωνι γὰρ οὐ πειστέον, ὡς γηράσκων τις πολλὰ δυνατὸς μανθάνειν, ἀλλ' ἧττον ἢ τρέχειν, νέων δὲ πάντες οἱ μεγάλοι καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ πόνοι.

Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

Τὰ μὲν τοίνυν λογισμῶν τε καὶ γεωμετριῶν καὶ πάσης τῆς προπαιδείας, ἣν τῆς διαλεκτικῆς δεῖ προπαιδευθῆναι, παισὶν οὖσι χρὴ προβάλλειν, οὐχ ὡς ἐπάναγκες μαθεῖν τὸ σχῆμα τῆς διδαχῆς ποιουμένους.

Τί δή;

E Ὅτι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐδὲν μάθημα μετὰ δουλείας τὸν ἐλεύθερον χρὴ μανθάνειν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σώματος πόνοι βίᾳ πονούμενοι χεῖρον οὐδὲν τὸ σῶμα ἀπεργάζονται, ψυχῇ δὲ βίαιον οὐδὲν ἔμμονον μάθημα.

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.

Μὴ τοίνυν βίᾳ, εἶπον, ὦ ἄριστε, τοὺς παῖδας ἐν p. 537. τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἀλλὰ παίζοντας | τρέφε, ἵνα καὶ μᾶλλον οἷός τ' ᾖς καθορᾶν ἐφ' ὃ ἕκαστος πέφυκεν.

Ἔχει ὃ λέγεις, ἔφη, λόγον.

Οὐκοῦν μνημονεύεις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι καὶ εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἔφαμεν τοὺς παῖδας εἶναι ἀκτέον ἐπὶ τῶν ἵππων θεωρούς, καὶ ἐάν που ἀσφαλὲς ᾖ, προσακτέον ἐγγὺς καὶ γευστέον αἵματος, ὥσπερ τοὺς σκύλακας;

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For the study of dialectic the young must be selected.

The preliminary studies should be commenced in childhood, but never forced.

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Μέμνημαι, ἔφη.

Ἐν πᾶσι δὴ τούτοις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῖς τε πόνοις καὶ μαθήμασι καὶ φόβοις ὃς ἂν ἐντρεχέστατος ἀεὶ φαίνηται, εἰς ἀριθμόν τινα ἐγκριτέον.

Ἐν τίνι, ἔφη, ἡλικίᾳ; B

The necessary gymnastics must be completed first.

Ἡνίκα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τῶν ἀναγκαίων γυμνασίων μεθίενται. οὗτος γὰρ ὁ χρόνος, ἐάν τε δύο ἐάν τε τρία ἔτη γίγνηται, ἀδύνατός τι ἄλλο πρᾶξαι. κόποι γὰρ καὶ ὕπνοι μαθήμασι πολέμιοι· καὶ ἅμα μία καὶ αὕτη τῶν βασάνων οὐκ ἐλαχίστη, τίς ἕκαστος ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις φανεῖται.

Πῶς γὰρ οὔκ; ἔφη.

At twenty years of age the disciples will begin to be taught the correlation of the sciences.

Μετὰ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐκ τῶν εἰκοσιετῶν οἱ προκριθέντες τιμάς τε μείζους τῶν ἄλλων οἴσονται, τά τε χύδην μαθήματα παισὶν ἐν C τῇ παιδείᾳ γενόμενα τούτοις συνακτέον εἰς σύνοψιν οἰκειότητος ἀλλήλων τῶν μαθημάτων καὶ τῆς τοῦ ὄντος φύσεως.

Μόνη γοῦν, εἶπεν, ἡ τοιαύτη μάθησις βέβαιος, ἐν οἷς ἂν ἐγγένηται.

Καὶ μεγίστη γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πεῖρα διαλεκτικῆς φύσεως καὶ μή· ὁ μὲν γὰρ συνοπτικὸς διαλεκτικός, ὁ δὲ μὴ οὔ.

Ξυνοίομαι, ἦ δ' ὅς.

At thirty the most promising will be placed in a select class.

Ταῦτα τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δεήσει σε ἐπισκοποῦντα, οἳ ἂν μάλιστα τοιοῦτοι ἐν αὐτοῖς ὦσι καὶ μόνιμοι D μὲν ἐν μαθήμασι, μόνιμοι δ' ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις νομίμοις, τούτους αὖ, ἐπειδὰν τὰ τριάκοντα ἔτη ἐκβαίνωσιν, ἐκ τῶν προκρίτων προκρινάμενον εἰς μείζους τε τιμὰς καθιστάναι καὶ σκοπεῖν, τῇ τοῦ

28. τούτους *q* pr.: τούτοις ΑΠΜ.

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p. 537. διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμει βασανίζοντα, τίς ὀμμάτων καὶ τῆς ἄλλης αἰσθήσεως δυνατὸς μεθιέμενος ἐπ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὂν μετ' ἀληθείας ἰέναι. καὶ ἐνταῦθα δὴ πολλῆς φυλακῆς ἔργον, ὦ ἑταῖρε.

Τί μάλιστα; ἦ δ' ὅς.

E Οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ νῦν περὶ τὸ διαλέγεσθαι κακὸν γιγνόμενον ὅσον γίγνεται;

The growth of scepticism in the minds of the young, illustrated by the case of a supposititious son,

Τὸ ποῖον; ἔφη.

Παρανομίας που, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐμπίπλανται.

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

Θαυμαστὸν οὖν τι οἴει, εἶπον, πάσχειν αὐτούς, καὶ οὐ ξυγγιγνώσκεις;

Πῇ μάλιστα; ἔφη.

Οἷον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἴ τις ὑποβολιμαῖος τραφείη ἐν πολλοῖς μὲν χρήμασι, πολλῷ δὲ καὶ μεγάλῳ γένει

p. 538. | καὶ κόλαξι πολλοῖς, ἀνὴρ δὲ γενόμενος αἴσθοιτο, ὅτι οὐ τούτων ἐστὶ τῶν φασκόντων γονέων, τοὺς δὲ τῷ ὄντι γεννήσαντας μὴ εὕροι, τοῦτον ἔχεις μαντεύσασθαι, πῶς ἂν διατεθείη πρός τε τοὺς κόλακας καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ὑποβαλομένους ἐν ἐκείνῳ τε τῷ χρόνῳ, ᾧ οὐκ ᾔδει τὰ περὶ τῆς ὑποβολῆς, καὶ ἐν ᾧ αὖ ᾔδει; ἢ βούλει ἐμοῦ μαντευομένου ἀκοῦσαι;

Βούλομαι, ἔφη.

Μαντεύομαι τοίνυν, εἶπον, μᾶλλον αὐτὸν τιμᾶν

B ἂν τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὴν μητέρα καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους οἰκείους δοκοῦντας ἢ τοὺς κολακεύοντας, καὶ ἧττον μὲν ἂν περιιδεῖν ἐνδεεῖς τινός, ἧττον δὲ παράνομόν τι δρᾶσαι ἢ εἰπεῖν εἰς αὐτούς, ἧττον δὲ ἀπειθεῖν τὰ

who ceases to honour his father

7. κακὸν ΠΜ : καλὸν A.
9. ἐμπίπλανται M : ἐμπίπλαται AΠ.
20. ὑποβαλομένους AM : ὑποβαλλομένους Π.

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when he discovers that he is not his father.

μεγάλα ἐκείνοις ἢ τοῖς κόλαξιν, ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ τὸ ἀληθὲς μὴ εἰδείη. p. 538.

Εἰκός, ἔφη.

Αἰσθόμενον τοίνυν τὸ ὂν μαντεύομαι αὖ περὶ μὲν τούτους ἀνεῖναι ἂν τὸ τιμᾶν τε καὶ σπουδάζειν, περὶ δὲ τοὺς κόλακας ἐπιτεῖναι, καὶ πείθεσθαί τε αὐτοῖς διαφερόντως ἢ πρότερον καὶ ζῆν ἂν ἤδη κατ' ἐκεί- C νους, ξυνόντα αὐτοῖς ἀπαρακαλύπτως, πατρὸς δὲ ἐκείνου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ποιουμένων οἰκείων, εἰ μὴ πάνυ εἴη φύσει ἐπιεικής, μέλειν τὸ μηδέν.

Πάντ', ἔφη, λέγεις οἷά περ ἂν γένοιτο. ἀλλὰ πῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἁπτομένους τῶν λόγων αὕτη φέρει ἡ εἰκών;

So men who begin to analyse the first principles of morality cease to respect them.

Τῇδε. ἔστι που ἡμῖν δόγματα ἐκ παίδων περὶ δικαίων καὶ καλῶν, ἐν οἷς ἐκτεθράμμεθα ὥσπερ ὑπὸ γονεῦσι, πειθαρχοῦντές τε καὶ τιμῶντες αὐτά.

Ἔστι γάρ.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλα ἐναντία τούτων ἐπιτηδεύματα D ἡδονὰς ἔχοντα, ἃ κολακεύει μὲν ἡμῶν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἕλκει ἐφ' αὑτά, πείθει δ' οὒ τοὺς καὶ ὁπηοῦν μετρίους· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνα τιμῶσι τὰ πάτρια καὶ ἐκείνοις πειθαρχοῦσιν.

Ἔστι ταῦτα.

Τί οὖν; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ὅταν τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα ἐλθὸν ἐρώτημα ἔρηται, τί ἐστι τὸ καλόν, καὶ ἀποκριναμένου ὃ τοῦ νομοθέτου ἤκουεν ἐξελέγχῃ ὁ λόγος, καὶ πολλάκις καὶ πολλαχῇ ἐλέγχων εἰς δόξαν καταβάλῃ, ὡς τοῦτο οὐδὲν μᾶλλον καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν, καὶ περὶ δι- E

2. μὴ om. Π. 12. πρὸς τοὺς ἁπτομένους ΑΜ : προσαπτομένους Π. 26. ἤκουεν ΑΠΜ : ἤκουσεν Α²Ξ. 27. καταβάλῃ Μ corr. p. m. Ξ : καταλάβῃ ΑΜpr. : καταβάλλῃ Π.

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p. 538. καίου ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἃ μάλιστα ἦγεν ἐν τιμῇ, μετὰ τοῦτο τί οἴει ποιήσειν αὐτὸν πρὸς αὐτὰ τιμῆς τε πέρι καὶ πειθαρχίας;

Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, μήτε τιμᾶν ἔτι ὁμοίως μήτε πείθεσθαι.

Ὅταν οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μήτε ταῦτα ἡγῆται τίμια καὶ οἰκεῖα, ὥσπερ πρὸ τοῦ, τά τε ἀληθῆ μὴ εὑρίσκῃ,
p. 539. ἔστι πρὸς ὁποῖον | βίον ἄλλον ἢ τὸν κολακεύοντα εἰκότως προσχωρήσεται;

Οὐκ ἔστιν, ἔφη.

Παράνομος δή, οἶμαι, δόξει γεγονέναι ἐκ νομίμου.

Ἀνάγκη.

Οὐκοῦν, ἔφην, εἰκὸς τὸ πάθος τῶν οὕτω λόγων ἁπτομένων καί, ὃ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, πολλῆς συγγνώμης ἄξιον;

Καὶ ἐλέου γ', ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν ἵνα μὴ γίγνηται ὁ ἔλεος οὗτος περὶ τοὺς τριακοντούτας σοι, εὐλαβουμένῳ παντὶ τρόπῳ τῶν λόγων ἁπτέον;

Καὶ μάλ', ἦ δ' ὅς.

B Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ μία μὲν εὐλάβεια αὕτη συχνή, τὸ μὴ νέους ὄντας αὐτῶν γεύεσθαι; οἶμαι γάρ σε οὐ λεληθέναι, ὅτι οἱ μειρακίσκοι, ὅταν τὸ πρῶτον λόγων γεύωνται, ὡς παιδιᾷ αὐτοῖς καταχρῶνται, ἀεὶ εἰς ἀντιλογίαν χρώμενοι, καὶ μιμούμενοι τοὺς ἐξελέγχοντας αὐτοὶ ἄλλους ἐλέγχουσι, χαίροντες ὥσπερ σκυλάκια τῷ ἕλκειν τε καὶ σπαράττειν τῷ λόγῳ τοὺς πλησίον ἀεί.

Young men are fond of pulling truth to pieces and thus bring disgrace upon themselves and upon philosophy.

Ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

11. νομικοῦ Π. 19. εὐλαβουμένῳ MSS.: εὐλαβουμένοις cj. Baiter.

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Socrates, Glaucon.

Οὐκοῦν ὅταν δὴ πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτοὶ ἐλέγξωσιν, p. 539. ὑπὸ πολλῶν δὲ ἐλεγχθῶσι, σφόδρα καὶ ταχὺ ἐμπίπ- C τουσιν εἰς τὸ μηδὲν ἡγεῖσθαι ὧνπερ πρότερον· καὶ ἐκ τούτων δὴ αὐτοί τε καὶ τὸ ὅλον φιλοσοφίας πέρι εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους διαβέβληνται.

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

The dialectician and eristic.

Ὁ δὲ δὴ πρεσβύτερος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τῆς μὲν τοιαύτης μανίας οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοι μετέχειν, τὸν δὲ διαλέγεσθαι ἐθέλοντα καὶ σκοπεῖν τἀληθὲς μᾶλλον μιμήσεται ἢ τὸν παιδιᾶς χάριν παίζοντα καὶ ἀντιλέγοντα, καὶ αὐτός τε μετριώτερος ἔσται καὶ τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα D τιμιώτερον ἀντὶ ἀτιμοτέρου ποιήσει.

Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ προειρημένα τούτου ἐπ' εὐλαβείᾳ πάντα προείρηται, τὸ τὰς φύσεις κοσμίους εἶναι καὶ στασίμους οἷς τις μεταδώσει τῶν λόγων, καὶ μὴ ὡς νῦν ὁ τυχὼν καὶ οὐδὲν προσήκων ἔρχεται ἐπ' αὐτό;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Ἀρκεῖ δὴ ἐπὶ λόγων μεταλήψει μεῖναι ἐνδελεχῶς καὶ ξυντόνως μηδὲν ἄλλο πράττοντι, ἀλλ' ἀντιστρόφως γυμναζομένῳ τοῖς περὶ τὸ σῶμα γυμνασίοις, ἔτη διπλάσια ἢ τότε;

The study of philosophy to continue for five years; 30–35.

Ἕξ, ἔφη, ἢ τέτταρα λέγεις; E

Ἀμέλει, εἶπον, πέντε θές. μετὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καταβιβαστέοι ἔσονταί σοι εἰς τὸ σπήλαιον πάλιν ἐκεῖνο, καὶ ἀναγκαστέοι ἄρχειν τά τε περὶ τὸν πόλεμον καὶ ὅσαι νέων ἀρχαί, ἵνα μηδ' ἐμπειρίᾳ ὑστερῶσι τῶν ἄλλων· καὶ ἔτι καὶ ἐν τούτοις βασανιστέοι, εἰ ἐμμενοῦσιν ἑλκόμενοι | πανταχόσε ἤ τι καὶ παρακινή- p. 540. σουσιν.

2. ἐλεγχθῶσι AM: ἐξελεγχθῶσι Π.

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During fifteen years, 35–50, they are to hold the great offices of State. At the end of that time they are to live chiefly in the contemplation of the good, but occasionally to return to politics.

p. 540. Χρόνον δέ, ἦ δ' ὅς, πόσον τοῦτον τίθης;

Πεντεκαίδεκα ἔτη, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. γενομένων δὲ
πεντηκοντουτῶν τοὺς διασωθέντας καὶ ἀριστεύσαν-
τας πάντα πάντῃ ἐν ἔργοις τε καὶ ἐπιστήμαις πρὸς
τέλος ἤδη ἀκτέον, καὶ ἀναγκαστέον ἀνακλίναντας
τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς αὐγὴν εἰς αὐτὸ ἀποβλέψαι τὸ πᾶσι
φῶς παρέχον, καὶ ἰδόντας τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτό, παρα-
δείγματι χρωμένους ἐκείνῳ, καὶ πόλιν καὶ ἰδιώτας
B καὶ ἑαυτοὺς κοσμεῖν τὸν ἐπίλοιπον βίον ἐν μέρει
ἑκάστους, τὸ μὲν πολὺ πρὸς φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίβον-
τας, ὅταν δὲ τὸ μέρος ἥκῃ, πρὸς πολιτικοῖς ἐπιτα-
λαιπωροῦντας καὶ ἄρχοντας ἑκάστους τῆς πόλεως
ἕνεκα, οὐχ ὡς καλόν τι ἀλλ' ὡς ἀναγκαῖον πράτ-
τοντας, καὶ οὕτως ἄλλους ἀεὶ παιδεύσαντας τοιού-
τους, ἀντικαταλιπόντας τῆς πόλεως φύλακας, εἰς
μακάρων νήσους ἀπιόντας οἰκεῖν· μνημεῖα δ' αὐτοῖς
C καὶ θυσίας τὴν πόλιν δημοσίᾳ ποιεῖν, ἐὰν καὶ
ἡ Πυθία ξυναναιρῇ, ὡς δαίμοσιν, εἰ δὲ μή, ὡς εὐ-
δαίμοσί τε καὶ θείοις.

Παγκάλους, ἔφη, τοὺς ἄρχοντας, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὥσπερ ἀνδριαντοποιὸς ἀπείργασαι.

Καὶ τὰς ἀρχούσας γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων. μηδὲν γάρ τι οἴου με περὶ ἀνδρῶν εἰρηκέναι μᾶλλον ἃ εἴρηκα ἢ περὶ γυναικῶν, ὅσαι ἂν αὐτῶν ἱκαναὶ τὰς φύσεις ἐγγίγνωνται.

Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, εἴπερ ἴσα γε πάντα τοῖς ἀνδράσι κοινωνήσουσιν, ὡς διήλθομεν.

D Τί οὖν; ἔφην· ξυγχωρεῖτε περὶ τῆς πόλεώς τε

10. φιλοσοφίᾳ A[2]: φιλοσοφίαν ΑΠΜ.

18. ξυναναιρῇ Aristides Π 12 (Dind.): ξυνανερῇ Vind. E: ξυναιρῇ AM: ξυναίρῃ Π.

28. ξυγχωρεῖτε A[2]M: ξυγχωρεῖν τε Apr.(?)Π: ξυγχωρεῖς Ξ.

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καὶ πολιτείας μὴ παντάπασιν ἡμᾶς εὐχὰς εἰρηκέναι, p. 540. ἀλλὰ χαλεπὰ μέν, δυνατὰ δέ πῃ, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλῃ ᾗ εἴρηται, ὅταν οἱ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι δυνάσται, ἢ πλείους ἢ εἷς, ἐν πόλει γενόμενοι τῶν μὲν νῦν τιμῶν καταφρονήσωσιν, ἡγησάμενοι ἀνελευθέρους εἶναι καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀξίας, τὸ δὲ ὀρθὸν περὶ πλείστου ποιησάμενοι καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τούτου τιμάς, μέγιστον δὲ καὶ E ἀναγκαιότατον τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ τούτῳ δὴ ὑπηρετοῦντές τε καὶ αὔξοντες αὐτὸ διασκευωρήσωνται τὴν ἑαυτῶν πόλιν;

Πῶς; ἔφη.

Practical measures for the speedy foundation of the State.

Ὅσοι μὲν ἄν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρεσβύτεροι τυγχάνωσι δεκετῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, πάντας ἐκπέμψωσιν εἰς τοὺς | ἀγρούς, τοὺς δὲ παῖδας αὐτῶν παραλαβόντες ἐκτὸς p. 541. τῶν νῦν ἠθῶν, ἃ καὶ οἱ γονῆς ἔχουσι, θρέψωνται ἐν τοῖς σφετέροις τρόποις καὶ νόμοις, οὖσιν οἵοις διεληλύθαμεν τότε· καὶ οὕτω τάχιστά τε καὶ ῥᾷστα πόλιν τε καὶ πολιτείαν, ἣν ἐλέγομεν, καταστᾶσαν αὐτήν τε εὐδαιμονήσειν καὶ τὸ ἔθνος, ἐν ᾧ ἂν ἐγγένηται, πλεῖστα ὀνήσειν;

Πολύ γ', ἔφη· καὶ ὡς ἂν γένοιτο, εἴπερ ποτὲ B γίγνοιτο, δοκεῖς μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εὖ εἰρηκέναι.

Οὐκοῦν ἅδην ἤδη, εἶπον ἐγώ, ἔχουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ λόγοι περί τε τῆς πόλεως ταύτης καὶ τοῦ ὁμοίου ταύτῃ ἀνδρός; δῆλος γάρ που καὶ οὗτος, οἷον φήσομεν δεῖν αὐτὸν εἶναι.

Δῆλος, ἔφη· καὶ ὅπερ ἐρωτᾷς, δοκεῖ μοι τέλος ἔχειν.

13. δέκ' ἐτῶν A.

Η.

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Recapitulation of Book V.

p. 543. | Εἶεν· ταῦτα μὲν δὴ ὡμολόγηται, ὦ Γλαύκων, τῇ μελλούσῃ ἄκρως οἰκεῖν πόλει κοινὰς μὲν γυναῖκας, κοινοὺς δὲ παῖδας εἶναι καὶ πᾶσαν παιδείαν, ὡσαύτως δὲ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα κοινὰ ἐν πολέμῳ τε καὶ εἰρήνῃ, βασιλέας δὲ αὐτῶν εἶναι τοὺς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ τε καὶ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον γεγονότας ἀρίστους.

Ὡμολόγηται, ἔφη.

B Καὶ μὴν καὶ τάδε ξυνεχωρήσαμεν, ὡς, ὅταν δὴ καταστῶσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες, ἄγοντες τοὺς στρατιώτας κατοικιοῦσιν εἰς οἰκήσεις οἵας προείπομεν, ἴδιον μὲν οὐδὲν οὐδενὶ ἐχούσας, κοινὰς δὲ πᾶσι· πρὸς δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις οἰκήσεσι καὶ τὰς κτήσεις, εἰ μνημονεύεις, διωμολογησάμεθά που οἷαι ἔσονται αὐτοῖς.

Ἀλλὰ μνημονεύω, ἔφη, ὅτι γε οὐδὲν οὐδένα ᾠόμεθα δεῖν κεκτῆσθαι ὧν νῦν οἱ ἄλλοι, ὥσπερ δὲ ἀθλητάς τε πολέμου καὶ φύλακας, μισθὸν τῆς φυ-
C λακῆς δεχομένους εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν τὴν εἰς ταῦτα τροφὴν παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων, αὐτῶν τε δεῖν καὶ τῆς ἄλλης πόλεως ἐπιμελεῖσθαι.

Ὀρθῶς, ἔφην, λέγεις. ἀλλ' ἄγε, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτ'

15. ὧν AM : ὡς Π. 20. ἀλλά γε A.

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Return to the end of Book IV.

ἀπετελέσαμεν, ἀναμνησθῶμεν, πόθεν δεῦρο ἐξετρα- p. 543. πόμεθα, ἵνα πάλιν τὴν αὐτὴν ἴωμεν.

Οὐ χαλεπόν, ἔφη. σχεδὸν γάρ, καθάπερ νῦν, ὡς διεληλυθὼς περὶ τῆς πόλεως τοὺς λόγους ἐποιοῦ λέγων ὡς ἀγαθὴν μὲν τὴν τοιαύτην, οἵαν τότε διῆλθες, τιθείης πόλιν, καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν ἐκείνῃ ὅμοιον, καὶ D ταῦτα, ὡς ἔοικας, καλλίω ἔτι ἔχων εἰπεῖν πόλιν τε καὶ ἄνδρα. ἀλλ' | οὖν δὴ τὰς ἄλλας ἡμαρτημένας p. 544. ἔλεγες, εἰ αὕτη ὀρθή. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν πολιτειῶν ἔφησθα, ὡς μνημονεύω, τέτταρα εἴδη εἶναι, ὧν καὶ πέρι λόγον ἄξιον εἴη ἔχειν καὶ ἰδεῖν αὐτῶν τὰ ἁμαρτήματα καὶ τοὺς ἐκείναις αὖ ὁμοίους, ἵνα πάντας αὐτοὺς ἰδόντες, καὶ ὁμολογησάμενοι τὸν ἄριστον καὶ τὸν κάκιστον ἄνδρα, ἐπισκεψαίμεθα, εἰ ὁ ἄριστος εὐδαιμονέστατος καὶ ὁ κάκιστος ἀθλιώτατος, ἢ ἄλλως ἔχοι· καὶ ἐμοῦ ἐρομένου, τίνας λέγοις τὰς τέτταρας πολιτείας, ἐν τούτῳ ὑπέλαβε Πολέμαρχός τε καὶ B Ἀδείμαντος, καὶ οὕτω δὴ σὺ ἀναλαβὼν τὸν λόγον δεῦρ' ἀφῖξαι.

Ὀρθότατα, εἶπον, ἐμνημόνευσας.

Πάλιν τοίνυν, ὥσπερ παλαιστής, τὴν αὐτὴν λαβὴν πάρεχε, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐμοῦ ἐρομένου πειρῶ εἰπεῖν, ἅπερ τότε ἔμελλες λέγειν.

Ἐάνπερ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δύνωμαι.

Καὶ μήν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐπιθυμῶ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀκοῦσαι, τίνας ἔλεγες τὰς τέτταρας πολιτείας.

Four imperfect constitutions, the Cretan or Spartan, Oligarchy,

Οὐ χαλεπῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀκούσει. εἰσὶ γὰρ ἃς C λέγω, αἵπερ καὶ ὀνόματα ἔχουσιν, ἥ τε ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπαινουμένη, ἡ Κρητική τε καὶ Λακωνικὴ αὕτη· καὶ δευτέρα καὶ δευτέρως ἐπαινουμένη, καλου-

30. καὶ δευτέρως ΑΠΜ : ἡ δευτέρως cj. Herm.

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Socrates, Glaucon.

Democracy, Tyranny.

p. 544. μένη δ' ὀλιγαρχία, συχνῶν γέμουσα κακῶν πολιτεία· ἥ τε ταύτῃ διάφορος καὶ ἐφεξῆς γιγνομένη δημοκρατία, καὶ ἡ γενναία δὴ τυραννὶς καὶ πασῶν τούτων διαφέρουσα, τέταρτόν τε καὶ ἔσχατον πόλεως νόσημα. D ἤ τινα ἄλλην ἔχεις ἰδέαν πολιτείας, ἥτις καὶ ἐν εἴδει διαφανεῖ τινὶ κεῖται; δυναστεῖαι γὰρ καὶ ὠνηταὶ βασιλεῖαι καὶ τοιαῦταί τινες πολιτεῖαι μεταξύ τι τούτων πού εἰσιν, εὕροι δ' ἂν τις αὐτὰς οὐκ ἐλάττους περὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους ἢ τοὺς Ἕλληνας.

Πολλαὶ γοῦν καὶ ἄτοποι, ἔφη, λέγονται.

States are like men, because they are made up of men.

Οἶσθ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι καὶ ἀνθρώπων εἴδη τοσαῦτα ἀνάγκη τρόπων εἶναι, ὅσαπερ καὶ πολιτειῶν; ἢ οἴει ἐκ δρυός ποθεν ἢ ἐκ πέτρας τὰς πολιτείας γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἐκ τῶν ἠθῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, E ἃ ἂν ὥσπερ ῥέψαντα τἆλλα ἐφελκύσηται;

Οὐδαμῶς ἔγωγ', ἔφη, ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐντεῦθεν.

Οὐκοῦν εἰ τὰ τῶν πόλεων πέντε, καὶ αἱ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν κατασκευαὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πέντε ἂν εἶεν.

Τί μήν;

Τὸν μὲν δὴ τῇ ἀριστοκρατίᾳ ὅμοιον διεληλύθαμεν ἤδη, ὃν ἀγαθόν τε καὶ δίκαιον ὀρθῶς φαμὲν εἶναι.

p. 545. | Διεληλύθαμεν.

Ἆρ' οὖν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο διιτέον τοὺς χείρους, τὸν φιλόνεικόν τε καὶ φιλότιμον, κατὰ τὴν Λακωνικὴν ἑστῶτα πολιτείαν, καὶ ὀλιγαρχικὸν αὖ καὶ δημοκρατικὸν καὶ τὸν τυραννικόν, ἵνα τὸν ἀδικώτατον ἰδόντες ἀντιθῶμεν τῷ δικαιοτάτῳ καὶ ἡμῖν τελέα ἡ σκέψις ᾖ, B πῶς ποτὲ ἡ ἄκρατος δικαιοσύνη πρὸς ἀδικίαν τὴν

3. καὶ Π : καὶ ἡ AM. 4. διαφέρουσα Ξxv Ficinus, Stobaeus : διαφεύγουσα ΑΠΜ. 12. τρόπων AM : τρόπον Π : τρόπον τινὰ Ξ.

Republic VIII.

SOCRATES, GLAUCON.

ἄκρατον ἔχει εὐδαιμονίας τε πέρι τοῦ ἔχοντος καὶ ἀθλιότητος, ἵνα ἢ Θρασυμάχῳ πειθόμενοι διώκωμεν ἀδικίαν ἢ τῷ νῦν προφαινομένῳ λόγῳ δικαιοσύνην; p. 545.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, οὕτω ποιητέον.

The State and the Individual.

Ἆρ' οὖν, ὥσπερ ἠρξάμεθα ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις πρότερον σκοπεῖν τὰ ἤθη ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἰδιώταις, ὡς ἐναργέστερον ὄν, καὶ νῦν οὕτω πρῶτον μὲν τὴν φιλότιμον σκεπτέον πολιτείαν — ὄνομα γὰρ οὐκ ἔχω λεγόμενον ἄλλο· ἢ τιμοκρατίαν ἢ τιμαρχίαν αὐτὴν κλητέον —, πρὸς δὲ ταύτην τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα σκεψόμεθα, ἔπειτα ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ ἄνδρα ὀλι- C γαρχικόν, αὖθις δὲ εἰς δημοκρατίαν ἀποβλέψαντες θεασόμεθα ἄνδρα δημοκρατικόν, τὸ δὲ τέταρτον εἰς τυραννουμένην πόλιν ἐλθόντες καὶ ἰδόντες, πάλιν εἰς τυραννικὴν ψυχὴν βλέποντες, πειρασόμεθα περὶ ὧν προὐθέμεθα ἱκανοὶ κριταὶ γενέσθαι;

Κατὰ λόγον γέ τοι ἄν, ἔφη, οὕτω γίγνοιτο ἥ τε θέα καὶ ἡ κρίσις.

How timocracy arises out of aristocracy.

Φέρε τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πειρώμεθα λέγειν, τίνα τρόπον τιμοκρατία γένοιτ' ἂν ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας. ἢ τόδε μὲν ἁπλοῦν, ὅτι πᾶσα πολιτεία μεταβάλλει ἐξ D αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔχοντος τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅταν ἐν αὐτῷ τούτῳ στάσις ἐγγένηται· ὁμονοοῦντος δέ, κἂν πάνυ ὀλίγον ᾖ, ἀδύνατον κινηθῆναι;

Ἔστι γὰρ οὕτως.

Πῶς οὖν δή, εἶπον, ὦ Γλαύκων, ἡ πόλις ἡμῖν κινηθήσεται, καὶ πῇ στασιάσουσιν οἱ ἐπίκουροι καὶ οἱ ἄρχοντες πρὸς ἀλλήλους τε καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτούς; ἢ βούλει, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος, εὐχώμεθα ταῖς Μούσαις

11. ταύτην ΑΠ: ταύτῃ Α²Μ.

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SOCRATES, GLAUCON.

p. 545. εἰπεῖν ἡμῖν, ὅπως δὴ πρῶτον στάσις ἔμπεσε, E καὶ φῶμεν αὐτὰς τραγικῶς, ὡς πρὸς παῖδας ἡμᾶς παιζούσας καὶ ἐρεσχηλούσας, ὡς δὴ σπουδῇ λεγούσας, ὑψηλολογουμένας λέγειν;

Πῶς;

p. 546. Ὧδέ πως· | χαλεπὸν μὲν κινηθῆναι πόλιν οὕτω ξυστᾶσαν· ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ γενομένῳ παντὶ φθορά ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἡ τοιαύτη ξύστασις τὸν ἅπαντα μενεῖ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ λυθήσεται. λύσις δὲ ἥδε· οὐ μόνον φυτοῖς ἐγγείοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἐπιγείοις ζῴοις φορὰ καὶ ἀφορία ψυχῆς τε καὶ σωμάτων γίγνονται, ὅταν περιτροπαὶ ἑκάστοις κύκλων περιφορὰς συνάπτωσι, βραχυβίοις μὲν βραχυπόρους, ἐναντίοις δὲ ἐναντίας. γένους δὲ ὑμετέρου εὐγονίας τε καὶ ἀφορίας, καίπερ B ὄντες σοφοί, οὓς ἡγεμόνας πόλεως ἐπαιδεύσασθε, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον λογισμῷ μετ' αἰσθήσεως τεύξονται, ἀλλὰ πάρεισιν αὐτοὺς καὶ γεννήσουσι παῖδάς ποτε οὐ δέον. ἔστι δὲ θείῳ μὲν γεννητῷ περίοδος ἣν ἀριθμὸς περιλαμβάνει τέλειος, ἀνθρωπείῳ δὲ ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ αὐξήσεις δυνάμεναί τε καὶ δυναστευόμεναι τρεῖς ἀποστάσεις, τέτταρας δὲ ὅρους λαβοῦσαι ὁμοιούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων καὶ αὐξόντων καὶ C φθινόντων, πάντα προσήγορα καὶ ῥητὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀπέφηναν· ὧν ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν πεμπάδι συζυγεὶς δύο ἁρμονίας παρέχεται τρὶς αὐξηθείς, τὴν μὲν ἴσην ἰσάκις, ἑκατὸν τοσαυτάκις, τὴν δὲ ἰσομήκη μὲν τῇ, προμήκη δέ, ἑκατὸν μὲν ἀριθμῶν ἀπὸ διαμέτρων ῥητῶν πεμπάδος, δεομένων ἑνὸς ἑκάστων, ἀρρήτων δὲ δυεῖν, ἑκατὸν δὲ κύβων τριάδος. ξύμπας δὲ

The intelligence which is alloyed with sense will not know how to regulate births and deaths in accordance with the number which controls them.

25. παρέχεται ΠΜ: παρέχηται A.
26. τῇ, προμήκη AΠ: , τῇ προμήκει M.

Republic VIII.

Socrates, Glaucon.

οὗτος ἀριθμὸς γεωμετρικός, τοιούτου κύριος, ἀμει- p. 546.
νόνων τε καὶ χειρόνων γενέσεων· ἃς ὅταν ἀγνοή-
σαντες ὑμῖν οἱ φύλακες συνοικίζωσι νύμφας νυμ- D
φίοις παρὰ καιρόν, οὐκ εὐφυεῖς οὐδ' εὐτυχεῖς παῖδες
ἔσονται· ὧν καταστήσονται μὲν τοὺς ἀρίστους οἱ
πρότεροι, ὅμως δὲ ὄντες ἀνάξιοι, εἰς τὰς τῶν πατέ-
ρων αὖ δυνάμεις ἐλθόντες, ἡμῶν πρῶτον ἄρξονται
ἀμελεῖν φύλακες ὄντες, παρ' ἔλαττον τοῦ δέοντος
ἡγησάμενοι τὰ μουσικῆς, δεύτερον δὲ τὰ γυμναστι-
κῆς· ὅθεν ἀμουσότεροι γενήσονται ὑμῖν οἱ νέοι. ἐκ δὲ
τούτων ἄρχοντες οὐ πάνυ φυλακικοὶ καταστήσονται
πρὸς τὸ δοκιμάζειν τὰ Ἡσιόδου | τε καὶ τὰ παρ' E
ὑμῖν γένη, χρυσοῦν τε καὶ ἀργυροῦν καὶ χαλκοῦν p. 547.
καὶ σιδηροῦν. ὁμοῦ δὲ μιγέντος σιδηροῦ ἀργυρῷ
καὶ χαλκοῦ χρυσῷ ἀνομοιότης ἐγγενήσεται καὶ ἀνω-
μαλία ἀνάρμοστος, ἃ γενόμενα, οὗ ἂν ἐγγένηται, ἀεὶ
τίκτει πόλεμον καὶ ἔχθραν. ταύτης τοι γενεᾶς
χρὴ φάναι εἶναι στάσιν, ὅπου ἂν γίγνηται ἀεί.

Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἔφη, αὐτὰς ἀποκρίνεσθαι φήσομεν.

Καὶ γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀνάγκη Μούσας γε οὔσας.

Τί οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο λέγουσιν αἱ Μοῦ- B
σαι;

Then discord arose and individual took the place of common property.

Στάσεως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, γενομένης εἱλκέτην ἄρα ἑκα-
τέρω τὼ γένει, τὸ μὲν σιδηροῦν καὶ χαλκοῦν ἐπὶ
χρηματισμὸν καὶ γῆς κτῆσιν καὶ οἰκίας χρυσίου τε
καὶ ἀργύρου, *τὼ δ' αὖ, τὸ χρυσοῦν τε καὶ ἀργυροῦν,
ἅτε οὐ πενομένω, ἀλλὰ φύσει ὄντε πλουσίω, τὰς

9. δεύτερον δὲ τὰ MSS.: δεύτερά τε cj. Madvig.
10. ὑμῖν ΠΜ: ἡμῖν Α. 14. σιδήρου ἀργύρῳ ΠΞ.
26. χρυσίου ΑΠ: χρυσοῦ Α²Μ. 27. τὼ δ' αὖ, τὸ cj. Schneider: τὸ δ' αὖ Μ²: τὸ δ' αὐτὸ ΑΜpr.: τὸ δ' αὖ τὸ Π.

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SOCRATES, GLAUCON.

p. 547. ψυχὰς ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν ἀρχαίαν κατάστασιν ἡγέτην. βιαζομένων δὲ καὶ ἀντιτεινόντων ἀλλήλοις, εἰς μέσον ὡμολόγησαν γῆν μὲν καὶ οἰκίας
C καταννειμαμένους ἰδιώσασθαι, τοὺς δὲ πρὶν φυλαττομένους ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὡς ἐλευθέρους φίλους τε καὶ τροφέας, δουλωσάμενοι τότε περιοίκους τε καὶ οἰκέτας ἔχοντες, αὐτοὶ πολέμου τε καὶ φυλακῆς αὐτῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι.

Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, αὕτη ἡ μετάβασις ἐντεῦθεν γίγνεσθαι.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν μέσῳ τις ἂν εἴη ἀριστοκρατίας τε καὶ ὀλιγαρχίας αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Μεταβήσεται μὲν δὴ οὕτω· μεταβᾶσα δὲ πῶς
D οἰκήσει; ἢ φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ μὲν μιμήσεται τὴν προτέραν πολιτείαν, τὰ δὲ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, ἅτ' ἐν μέσῳ οὖσα, τὸ δέ τι καὶ αὑτῆς ἕξει ἴδιον;

Οὕτως, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν τῷ μὲν τιμᾶν τοὺς ἄρχοντας καὶ γεωργιῶν ἀπέχεσθαι τὸ προπολεμοῦν αὐτῆς καὶ χειροτεχνιῶν καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου χρηματισμοῦ, ξυσσίτια δὲ κατεσκευάσθαι καὶ γυμναστικῆς τε καὶ τῆς τοῦ πολέμου ἀγωνίας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις τὴν προτέραν μιμήσεται;

Ναί.

E Τῷ δέ γε φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς σοφοὺς ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἄγειν, ἅτε οὐκέτι κεκτημένην ἁπλοῦς τε καὶ ἀτενεῖς τοὺς τοιούτους ἄνδρας ἀλλὰ μικτούς, ἐπὶ δὲ θυμοειδεῖς τε καὶ ἁπλουστέρους ἀποκλίνειν, τοὺς πρὸς
p. 548. πόλεμον μᾶλλον πεφυκότας ἢ πρὸς εἰρήνην, | καὶ

Timocracy will retain the military and reject the philosophical character of the perfect State.

4. καταννειμαμένους ἰδ. MSS.: καταννειμάμενοι ἐξιδ., cj. Madvig.

Republic VIII.

SOCRATES, GLAUCON.

τοὺς περὶ ταῦτα δόλους τε καὶ μηχανὰς ἐντίμως ἔχειν, καὶ πολεμοῦσα τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον διάγειν, αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆς αὖ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων ἴδια ἕξει; p. 548.

Ναί.

The soldier class miserly and covetous.

Ἐπιθυμηταὶ δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, χρημάτων οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἔσονται, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις, καὶ τιμῶντες ἀγρίως ὑπὸ σκότου χρυσόν τε καὶ ἄργυρον, ἅτε κεκτημένοι ταμιεῖα καὶ οἰκείους θησαυρούς, οἷ θέμενοι ἂν αὐτὰ κρύψειαν, καὶ αὖ περιβόλους οἰκήσεων, ἀτεχνῶς νεοττιὰς ἰδίας, ἐν αἷς ἀναλίσκοντες B γυναιξί τε καὶ οἷς ἐθέλοιεν ἄλλοις πολλὰ ἂν δαπανῷντο.

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ φειδωλοὶ χρημάτων, ἅτε τιμῶντες καὶ οὐ φανερῶς κτώμενοι, φιλαναλωταὶ δὲ ἀλλοτρίων δι' ἐπιθυμίαν, καὶ λάθρᾳ τὰς ἡδονὰς καρπούμενοι, ὥσπερ παῖδες πατέρα τὸν νόμον ἀποδιδράσκοντες, οὐχ ὑπὸ πειθοῦς ἀλλ' ὑπὸ βίας πεπαιδευμένοι διὰ τὸ τῆς ἀληθινῆς Μούσης τῆς μετὰ λόγων τε καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἠμεληκέναι καὶ πρεσβυτέρως γυμναστικὴν μουσικῆς C τετιμηκέναι.

Παντάπασιν, ἔφη, λέγεις μεμιγμένην πολιτείαν ἐκ κακοῦ τε καὶ ἀγαθοῦ.

The spirit of ambition predominates in such States.

Μέμικται γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· διαφανέστατον δ' ἐν αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἕν τι μόνον ὑπὸ τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς κρατοῦντος, φιλονεικίαι καὶ φιλοτιμίαι.

Σφόδρα γε, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὕτη μὲν ἡ πολιτεία οὕτω γεγονυῖα καὶ τοιαύτη ἄν τις εἴη, ὡς λόγῳ σχῆμα πολιτείας ὑπογράψαντα μὴ ἀκριβῶς ἀπεργάσασθαι D

15. οὐ ΑΠ: om. A²M.

Republic VIII.

SOCRATES, GLAUCON, ADEIMANTUS.

p. 548. διὰ τὸ ἐξαρκεῖν μὲν ἰδεῖν καὶ ἐκ τῆς ὑπογραφῆς τόν τε δικαιότατον καὶ τὸν ἀδικώτατον, ἀμήχανον δὲ μήκει ἔργον εἶναι πάσας μὲν πολιτείας, πάντα δὲ ἤθη μηδὲν παραλιπόντα διελθεῖν.

Καὶ ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.

Τίς οὖν ὁ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν ἀνήρ; πῶς τε γενόμενος ποῖός τέ τις ὤν;

The timocratic man, uncultured, but fond of culture, ambitious, contentious, rough with slaves, and courteous to freemen; a soldier, athlete, hunter; a despiser of riches while young, fond of them when he grows old.

Οἶμαι μέν, ἔφη ὁ Ἀδείμαντος, ἐγγύς τι αὐτὸν Γλαύκωνος τουτουῒ τείνειν ἕνεκά γε φιλονεικίας.

E Ἴσως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦτό γε· ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ τάδε οὐ κατὰ τοῦτον πεφυκέναι.

Τὰ ποῖα;

Αὐθαδέστερόν τε δεῖ αὐτόν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἶναι καὶ ὑποαμουσότερον, φιλόμουσον δέ, καὶ φιλήκοον μέν, p. 549. ῥητορικὸν δ' οὐδαμῶς. καὶ δούλοις | μέν τις ἂν ἄγριος εἴη ὁ τοιοῦτος, οὐ καταφρονῶν δούλων, ὥσπερ ὁ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευμένος, ἐλευθέροις δὲ ἥμερος, ἀρχόντων δὲ σφόδρα ὑπήκοος, φίλαρχος δὲ καὶ φιλότιμος, οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ λέγειν ἀξιῶν ἄρχειν οὐδ' ἀπὸ τοιούτου οὐδενός, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ ἔργων τῶν τε πολεμικῶν καὶ τῶν περὶ τὰ πολεμικά, φιλογυμναστής τέ τις ὢν καὶ φιλόθηρος.

Ἔστι γάρ, ἔφη, τοῦτο τὸ ἦθος ἐκείνης τῆς πολιτείας.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ χρημάτων, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ τοιοῦτος νέος B μὲν ὢν καταφρονοῖ ἄν, ὅσῳ δὲ πρεσβύτερος γίγνοιτο, μᾶλλον ἀεὶ ἀσπάζοιτο ἂν τῷ τε μετέχειν τῆς τοῦ φιλοχρημάτου φύσεως καὶ μὴ εἶναι εἰλικρινὴς πρὸς ἀρετὴν διὰ τὸ ἀπολειφθῆναι τοῦ ἀρίστου φύλακος;

Τίνος; ἦ δ' ὃς ὁ Ἀδείμαντος.

15. τις ἂν ΧV: τισιν ΑΠ: τις A^2M.

Republic VIII.

SOCRATES, ADEIMANTUS.

Λόγου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μουσικῇ κεκραμένου· ὃς μόνος p. 549. ἐγγενόμενος σωτὴρ ἀρετῆς διὰ βίου ἐνοικεῖ τῷ ἔχοντι.

Καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Καὶ ἔστι μέν γ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοιοῦτος ὁ τιμοκρατικὸς νεανίας, τῇ τοιαύτῃ πόλει ἐοικώς.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Γίγνεται δέ γ', εἶπον, οὗτος ὧδέ πως· ἐνίοτε πα- C τρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ὢν νέος υἱὸς ἐν πόλει οἰκοῦντος οὐκ εὖ πολιτευομένῃ, φεύγοντος τάς τε τιμὰς καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ δίκας καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην πᾶσαν φιλοπραγμοσύνην καὶ ἐθέλοντος ἐλαττοῦσθαι, ὥστε πράγματα μὴ ἔχειν —

Πῇ δή, ἔφη, γίγνεται;

The timocratic man often originates in a reaction against his father's character, which is encouraged by his mother,

Ὅταν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρῶτον μὲν τῆς μητρὸς ἀκούῃ ἀχθομένης, ὅτι οὐ τῶν ἀρχόντων αὐτῇ ὁ ἀνήρ ἐστι, D καὶ ἐλαττουμένης διὰ ταῦτα ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις γυναιξίν, ἔπειτα ὁρώσης μὴ σφόδρα περὶ χρήματα σπουδάζοντα μηδὲ μαχόμενον καὶ λοιδορούμενον ἰδίᾳ τε ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ἀλλὰ ῥᾳθύμως πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα φέροντα, καὶ ἑαυτῷ μὲν τὸν νοῦν προσέχοντα ἀεὶ αἰσθάνηται, ἑαυτὴν δὲ μήτε πάνυ τιμῶντα μήτε ἀτιμάζοντα· ἐξ ἁπάντων τούτων ἀχθομένης τε καὶ λεγούσης ὡς ἄνανδρός τε αὐτῷ ὁ πατὴρ καὶ λίαν ἀνειμένος, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ ὅσα καὶ οἷα φιλοῦσιν αἱ E γυναῖκες περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὑμνεῖν.

Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη ὁ Ἀδείμαντος, πολλά τε καὶ ὅμοια ἑαυταῖς.

and by the old servants of the household.

Οἶσθα οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι καὶ οἱ οἰκέται τῶν τοιούτων ἐνίοτε λάθρᾳ πρὸς τοὺς υἱεῖς τοιαῦτα λέγουσιν,

19. ἐν δικαστηρίοις MSS.: del. Vermehren.

p. 549. οἱ δοκοῦντες εὖνοι εἶναι, καὶ ἐάν τινα ἴδωσιν ἢ ὀφείλοντα χρήματα, ᾧ μὴ ἐπεξέρχεται ὁ πατήρ, ἤ τι ἄλλο ἀδικοῦντα, διακελεύονται ὅπως, ἐπειδὰν ἀνὴρ γένηται,
p. 550. τιμωρήσεται πάντας τοὺς | τοιούτους καὶ ἀνὴρ μᾶλλον ἔσται τοῦ πατρός. καὶ ἐξιὼν ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἀκούει καὶ ὁρᾷ, τοὺς μὲν τὰ αὑτῶν πράττοντας ἐν τῇ πόλει ἠλιθίους τε καλουμένους καὶ ἐν σμικρῷ λόγῳ ὄντας, τοὺς δὲ μὴ τὰ αὑτῶν τιμωμένους τε καὶ ἐπαινουμένους. τότε δὴ ὁ νέος πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκούων τε καὶ ὁρῶν, καὶ αὖ τοὺς τοῦ πατρὸς λόγους ἀκούων τε καὶ ὁρῶν τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα αὐτοῦ ἐγγύθεν παρὰ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἑλκόμενος ὑπ' ἀμφοτέρων τούτων, τοῦ
B μὲν πατρὸς αὐτοῦ τὸ λογιστικὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἄρδοντός τε καὶ αὔξοντος, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων τό τε ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ τὸ θυμοειδές, διὰ τὸ μὴ κακοῦ ἀνδρὸς εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ὁμιλίαις δὲ ταῖς τῶν ἄλλων κακαῖς κεχρῆσθαι, εἰς τὸ μέσον ἑλκόμενος ὑπ' ἀμφοτέρων τούτων ἦλθε, καὶ τὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀρχὴν παρέδωκε τῷ μέσῳ τε καὶ φιλονείκῳ καὶ θυμοειδεῖ, καὶ ἐγένετο ὑψηλόφρων τε καὶ φιλότιμος ἀνήρ.

Κομιδῇ μοι, ἔφη, δοκεῖς τὴν τούτου γένεσιν διεληλυθέναι.

C Ἔχομεν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τήν τε δευτέραν πολιτείαν καὶ τὸν δεύτερον ἄνδρα.

Ἔχομεν, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν μετὰ τοῦτο, τὸ τοῦ Αἰσχύλου, λέγωμεν, ἄλλον ἄλλῃ πρὸς πόλει τεταγμένον, μᾶλλον δὲ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν προτέραν τὴν πόλιν;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

6. ἀκούῃ ΑΠ. 10. καὶ αὐτοὺς Α.

Republic VIII.

Socrates, Adeimantus.

Oligarchy arises out of increased accumulation and increased expenditure amongst the citizens.

Εἴη δέ γ' ἄν, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ὀλιγαρχία ἡ μετὰ τὴν p. 550. τοιαύτην πολιτείαν.

Λέγεις δέ, ἦν δ' ὅς, τὴν ποίαν κατάστασιν ὀλιγαρχίαν;

Τὴν ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πολιτείαν, ἐν ᾗ οἱ μὲν πλούσιοι ἄρχουσι, πένητι δὲ οὐ μέτεστιν ἀρχῆς. D

Μανθάνω, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Οὐκοῦν ὡς μεταβαίνει πρῶτον ἐκ τῆς τιμαρχίας εἰς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, ῥητέον;

Ναί.

Καὶ μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τυφλῷ γε δῆλον, ὡς μεταβαίνει.

Πῶς;

Τὸ ταμιεῖον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐκεῖνο ἑκάστῳ χρυσίου πληρούμενον ἀπόλλυσι τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ δαπάνας αὑτοῖς ἐξευρίσκουσι, καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἐπὶ τοῦτο παράγουσιν, ἀπειθοῦντες αὐ- E τοί τε καὶ γυναῖκες αὐτῶν.

Εἰκός, ἔφη.

Ἔπειτά γε, οἶμαι, ἄλλος ἄλλον ὁρῶν καὶ εἰς ζῆλον ἰὼν τὸ πλῆθος τοιοῦτον αὑτῶν ἀπειργάσαντο.

Εἰκός.

As riches increase, virtue decreases: the one is honoured, the other despised; the one cultivated, the other neglected.

Τοὐντεῦθεν τοίνυν, εἶπον, προϊόντες εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν τοῦ χρηματίζεσθαι, ὅσῳ ἂν τοῦτο τιμιώτερον ἡγῶνται, τοσούτῳ ἀρετὴν ἀτιμοτέραν. ἢ οὐχ οὕτω πλούτου ἀρετὴ διέστηκεν, ὥσπερ ἐν πλάστιγγι ζυγοῦ *κείμενον ἑκάτερον ἀεὶ τοὐναντίον ῥέποντε;

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

Τιμωμένου δὴ | πλούτου ἐν πόλει καὶ τῶν πλου- p. 551. σίων ἀτιμοτέρα ἀρετή τε καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοί.

27. κείμενον ἑκάτερον cj. Madvig: κειμένου ἑκατέρου MSS.

Republic VIII.

SOCRATES, ADEIMANTUS.

p. 551. Δῆλον.

Ἀσκεῖται δὴ τὸ ἀεὶ τιμώμενον, ἀμελεῖται δὲ τὸ ἀτιμαζόμενον.

Οὕτως.

Ἀντὶ δὴ φιλονείκων καὶ φιλοτίμων ἀνδρῶν φιλοχρηματισταὶ καὶ φιλοχρήματοι τελευτῶντες ἐγένοντο, καὶ τὸν μὲν πλούσιον ἐπαινοῦσί τε καὶ θαυμάζουσι καὶ εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς ἄγουσι, τὸν δὲ πένητα ἀτιμάζουσιν.

Πάνυ γε.

In an oligarchy a money qualification is established.

Οὐκοῦν τότε δὴ νόμον τίθενται ὅρον πολιτείας B ὀλιγαρχικῆς ταξάμενοι πλῆθος χρημάτων, οὗ μὲν μᾶλλον ὀλιγαρχία, πλέον, οὗ δ' ἧττον, ἔλαττον, προειπόντες ἀρχῶν μὴ μετέχειν, ᾧ ἂν μὴ ᾖ οὐσία εἰς τὸ ταχθὲν τίμημα, ταῦτα δὲ ἢ βίᾳ μεθ' ὅπλων διαπράττονται, ἢ καὶ πρὸ τούτου φοβήσαντες κατεστήσαντο τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως;

Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

Ἡ μὲν δὴ κατάστασις ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν αὕτη.

Ναί, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ τίς δὴ ὁ τρόπος τῆς πολιτείας; C καὶ ποῖά ἐστιν ἃ ἔφαμεν αὐτὴν ἁμαρτήματα ἔχειν;

A ruler is elected because he is rich: Who would elect a pilot on this principle?

Πρῶτον μέν, ἔφην, τοῦτο αὐτό, ὅρος αὐτῆς οἷός ἐστιν. ἄθρει γάρ, εἰ νεῶν οὕτω τις ποιοῖτο κυβερνήτας ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, τῷ δὲ πένητι, εἰ καὶ κυβερνητικώτερος εἴη, μὴ ἐπιτρέποι —

Πονηράν, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὴν ναυτιλίαν αὐτοὺς ναυτίλλεσθαι.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ ἄλλου οὕτως ὁτουοῦν *ἧστινος ἀρχῆς;

Οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

Πλὴν πόλεως; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἢ καὶ πόλεως πέρι;

27. ἧστινος cj. Ast.: ἤ τινος ΑΠΜ: om. Fic.

Republic VIII.

SOCRATES, ADEIMANTUS.

Πολύ γ᾽, ἔφη, μάλιστα, ὅσῳ χαλεπωτάτη καὶ p. 551. μεγίστη ἡ ἀρχή.

Ἓν μὲν δὴ τοῦτο τοσοῦτον ὀλιγαρχία ἂν ἔχοι D ἁμάρτημα.

Φαίνεται.

Τί δέ; τόδε ἆρά τι τούτου ἔλαττον;

Τὸ ποῖον;

The extreme division of classes in such a State.

Τὸ μὴ μίαν ἀλλὰ δύο ἀνάγκῃ εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην πόλιν, τὴν μὲν πενήτων, τὴν δὲ πλουσίων, οἰκοῦντας ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἀεὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντας ἀλλήλοις.

Οὐδὲν μὰ Δί᾽, ἔφη, ἔλαττον.

They dare not go to war.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τόδε καλόν, τὸ ἀδυνάτους εἶναι ἴσως πόλεμόν τινα πολεμεῖν διὰ τὸ ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἢ χρωμένους τῷ πλήθει ὡπλισμένῳ δεδιέναι μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς πολεμίους, ἢ μὴ χρωμένους ὡς ἀληθῶς ὀλι- E γαρχικοὺς φανῆναι ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ μάχεσθαι, καὶ ἅμα χρήματα μὴ ἐθέλειν εἰσφέρειν, ἅτε φιλοχρημάτους.

Οὐ καλόν.

Τί δέ; ὃ πάλαι ἐλοιδοροῦμεν, τὸ πολυπραγμονεῖν γεωργοῦντας καὶ χρηματιζομένους | καὶ πολεμοῦντας p. 552. ἅμα τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ, ἦ δοκεῖ ὀρθῶς ἔχειν;

Οὐδ᾽ ὁπωστιοῦν.

Ὅρα δή, τούτων πάντων τῶν κακῶν εἰ τόδε μέγιστον αὕτη πρώτη παραδέχεται.

Τὸ ποῖον;

The ruined man, who has no

Τὸ ἐξεῖναι πάντα τὰ αὑτοῦ ἀποδόσθαι, καὶ ἄλλῳ κτήσασθαι τὰ τούτου, καὶ ἀποδόμενον οἰκεῖν ἐν τῇ

8. ἀνάγκῃ Bekker : ἀνάγκη ΑΠΜ : ἀνάγκην Steph. 12. τόδε A²ΠΜ : om. Apr. 13. ἴσως A in litura M : om. Π.

Republic VIII.

SOCRATES, ADEIMANTUS.

p. 552 a. πόλει μηδὲν ὄντα τῶν τῆς πόλεως μερῶν, μήτε χρηματιστὴν μήτε δημιουργὸν μήτε ἱππέα μήτε ὁπλίτην, ἀλλὰ πένητα καὶ ἄπορον κεκλημένον.

B Πρώτη, ἔφη.

Οὔκουν διακωλύεταί γε ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχουμέναις τὸ τοιοῦτον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν οἱ μὲν ὑπέρπλουτοι ἦσαν, οἱ δὲ παντάπασι πένητες.

occupation, once a spendthrift, now a pauper, still exists in the State.

Ὀρθῶς.

Τόδε δὲ ἄθρει· ἆρα ὅτε πλούσιος ὢν ἀνήλισκεν ὁ τοιοῦτος, μᾶλλόν τι τότ' ἦν ὄφελος τῇ πόλει εἰς ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν; ἢ ἐδόκει μὲν τῶν ἀρχόντων εἶναι, τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ οὔτε ἄρχων οὔτε ὑπηρέτης ἦν αὐτῆς, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἑτοίμων ἀναλωτής;

C Οὕτως, ἔφη· ἐδόκει, ἦν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ἀναλωτής.

Βούλει οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φῶμεν αὐτόν, ὡς ἐν κηρίῳ κηφὴν ἐγγίγνεται, σμήνους νόσημα, οὕτω καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον ἐν οἰκίᾳ κηφῆνα ἐγγίγνεσθαι, νόσημα πόλεως;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, τοὺς μὲν πτηνοὺς κηφῆνας πάντας ἀκέντρους ὁ θεὸς πεποίηκε, τοὺς δὲ πεζοὺς τούτους ἐνίους μὲν αὐτῶν ἀκέντρους, ἐνίους δὲ δεινὰ κέντρα ἔχοντας; καὶ ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἀκέντρων πτωχοὶ
D πρὸς τὸ γῆρας τελευτῶσιν, ἐκ δὲ τῶν κεκεντρωμένων πάντες, ὅσοι κέκληνται κακοῦργοι;

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

Δῆλον ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν πόλει οὗ ἂν ἴδῃς πτωχούς, ὅτι εἰσί που ἐν τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ ἀποκεκρυμμένοι κλέπται τε καὶ βαλλαντιατόμοι καὶ ἱερόσυλοι καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν δημιουργοί.

Where there are paupers, there are thieves

29. βαλλαντιατόμοι A: βαλλαντιοτόμοι Π: βαλαντιοτόμοι MΞ corr.

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SOCRATES, ADEIMANTUS.

Δῆλον, ἔφη. p. 552.

Τί οὖν; ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχουμέναις πόλεσι πτωχοὺς οὐχ ὁρᾷς ἐνόντας;

Ὀλίγου γ', ἔφη, πάντας τοὺς ἐκτὸς τῶν ἀρχόντων.

and other criminals.

Μὴ οὖν οἰόμεθα, ἔφην ἐγώ, καὶ κακούργους πολλοὺς E ἐν αὐταῖς εἶναι κέντρα ἔχοντας, οὓς ἐπιμελείᾳ βίᾳ κατέχουσιν αἱ ἀρχαί;

Οἰόμεθα μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ δι' ἀπαιδευσίαν καὶ κακὴν τροφὴν καὶ κατάστασιν τῆς πολιτείας φήσομεν τοὺς τοιούτους αὐτόθι ἐγγίγνεσθαι;

Φήσομεν.

Ἀλλ' οὖν δὴ τοιαύτη γέ τις ἂν εἴη ἡ ὀλιγαρχουμένη πόλις καὶ τοσαῦτα κακὰ ἔχουσα, ἴσως δὲ καὶ πλείω.

Σχεδόν τι, ἔφη.

| Ἀπειργάσθω δὴ ἡμῖν καὶ αὕτη, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ p. 553. πολιτεία, ἣν ὀλιγαρχίαν καλοῦσιν, ἐκ τιμημάτων ἔχουσα τοὺς ἄρχοντας· τὸν δὲ ταύτῃ ὅμοιον μετὰ ταῦτα σκοπῶμεν, ὥς τε γίγνεται οἷός τε γενόμενός ἐστιν.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Ἆρ' οὖν ὧδε μάλιστα εἰς ὀλιγαρχικὸν ἐκ τοῦ τιμοκρατικοῦ ἐκείνου μεταβάλλει;

Πῶς;

The ruin of the timocratical man gives birth to the oligarchical.

Ὅταν αὐτοῦ παῖς γενόμενος τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ζηλοῖ τε τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου ἴχνη διώκῃ, ἔπειτα αὐτὸν ἴδῃ ἐξαίφνης πταίσαντα ὥσπερ πρὸς ἕρματι B πρὸς τῇ πόλει, καὶ ἐκχέαντα τά τε αὐτοῦ καὶ ἑαυτόν,

1. δῆλον, ἔφη ΠΜ : om. A. 6, 9. οἰώμεθα A².

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SOCRATES. ADEIMANTUS.

p. 553. ἢ στρατηγήσαντα ἢ τιν' ἄλλην μεγάλην ἀρχὴν ἄρξαντα, εἶτα εἰς δικαστήριον ἐμπεσόντα, βλαπτόμενον ὑπὸ συκοφαντῶν, ἢ ἀποθανόντα ἢ ἐκπεσόντα ἢ ἀτιμωθέντα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἅπασαν ἀποβαλόντα.

Εἰκός γ', ἔφη.

His son begins life a ruined man and takes to money-making.

Ἰδὼν δέ γε, ὦ φίλε, ταῦτα καὶ παθὼν καὶ ἀπολέσας τὰ ὄντα δείσας, οἶμαι, εὐθὺς ἐπὶ κεφαλὴν ὠθεῖ
C ἐκ τοῦ θρόνου τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ψυχῇ φιλοτιμίαν τε καὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς ἐκεῖνο, καὶ ταπεινωθεὶς ὑπὸ πενίας πρὸς χρηματισμὸν τραπόμενος γλίσχρως καὶ κατὰ σμικρὸν φειδόμενος καὶ ἐργαζόμενος χρήματα ξυλλέγεται. ἆρ' οὐκ οἴει τὸν τοιοῦτον τότε εἰς μὲν τὸν θρόνον ἐκεῖνον τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν τε καὶ φιλοχρήματον ἐγκαθίζειν καὶ μέγαν βασιλέα ποιεῖν ἐν ἑαυτῷ τιάρας τε καὶ στρεπτοὺς καὶ ἀκινάκας παραζωννύντα;

Ἔγωγ', ἔφη.

D Τὸ δέ γε, οἶμαι, λογιστικόν τε καὶ θυμοειδὲς χαμαὶ ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν παρακαθίσας ὑπ' ἐκείνῳ καὶ καταδουλωσάμενος, τὸ μὲν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐᾷ λογίζεσθαι οὐδὲ σκοπεῖν ἀλλ' ἢ ὁπόθεν ἐξ ἐλαττόνων χρημάτων πλείω ἔσται, τὸ δὲ αὖ θαυμάζειν καὶ τιμᾶν μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ πλοῦτόν τε καὶ πλουσίους, καὶ φιλοτιμεῖσθαι μηδ' ἐφ' ἑνὶ ἄλλῳ ἢ ἐπὶ χρημάτων κτήσει καὶ ἐάν τι ἄλλο εἰς τοῦτο φέρῃ.

Οὐκ ἔστ' ἄλλη, ἔφη, μεταβολὴ οὕτω ταχεῖά τε καὶ ἰσχυρὰ ἐκ φιλοτίμου νέου εἰς φιλοχρήματον.

E Ἆρ' οὖν οὗτος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὀλιγαρχικός ἐστιν;

1. ἤ τιν M : ἢ τὴν ΑΠ.
11. ξυλλέγεται Ξ : ξυλλέγηται ΑΠΜ.
13. τὸ q : τὸν ΑΠΜ.

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SOCRATES, ADEIMANTUS.

The oligarchical man and State resemble one another in their estimation of wealth: in their toiling and saving ways, in their want of cultivation.

Ἡ γοῦν μεταβολὴ αὐτοῦ ἐξ ὁμοίου ἀνδρός ἐστι p. 553. τῇ πολιτείᾳ, ἐξ ἧς ἡ ὀλιγαρχία μετέστη.

Σκοπῶμεν δὴ εἰ ὅμοιος ἂν εἴη.

Σκοπῶμεν.

Οὐκοῦν πρῶτον μὲν τῷ χρήματα περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖσθαι ὅμοιος ἂν εἴη;

| Πῶς δ' οὔ; p. 554.

Καὶ μὴν τῷ γε φειδωλὸς εἶναι καὶ ἐργάτης, τὰς ἀναγκαίους ἐπιθυμίας μόνον τῶν παρ' αὐτῷ ἀποπιμπλάς, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἀναλώματα μὴ παρεχόμενος, ἀλλὰ δουλούμενος τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ὡς ματαίους.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Αὐχμηρός γέ τις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὢν καὶ ἀπὸ παντὸς περιουσίαν ποιούμενος, θησαυροποιὸς ἀνήρ· οὓς δὴ καὶ ἐπαινεῖ τὸ πλῆθος· ἢ οὐχ οὗτος ἂν εἴη ὁ τῇ τοι- B αύτῃ πολιτείᾳ ὅμοιος;

Ἐμοὶ γοῦν, ἔφη, δοκεῖ· χρήματα γοῦν μάλιστα ἔντιμα τῇ τε πόλει καὶ παρὰ τῷ τοιούτῳ.

Οὐ γάρ, οἶμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, παιδείᾳ ὁ τοιοῦτος προσέσχηκεν.

Οὐ δοκῶ, ἔφη· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τυφλὸν ἡγεμόνα τοῦ χοροῦ ἐστήσατο καὶ *ἐτίμα μάλιστα.

Εὖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. τόδε δὲ σκόπει· κηφηνώδεις ἐπιθυμίας ἐν αὐτῷ διὰ τὴν ἀπαιδευσίαν μὴ φῶμεν ἐγγίγνεσθαι, τὰς μὲν πτωχικάς, τὰς δὲ κακούργους, C κατεχομένας βίᾳ ὑπὸ τῆς ἄλλης ἐπιμελείας;

Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη.

Οἶσθ' οὖν, εἶπον, οἷ ἀποβλέψας κατόψει αὐτῶν τὰς κακουργίας;

22. ἐστήσατο καὶ ἐτίμα μάλιστα. Εὖ cj. Schneider: ἐστήσατο. Καὶ ἔτι μάλιστα εὖ ΑΠΜ.

Republic VIII.

SOCRATES, ADEIMANTUS.

p. 554. Ποῖ; ἔφη.

Εἰς τὰς τῶν ὀρφανῶν ἐπιτροπεύσεις, καὶ εἴ πού τι αὐτοῖς τοιοῦτον ξυμβαίνει, ὥστε πολλῆς ἐξουσίας λαβέσθαι τοῦ ἀδικεῖν.

Ἀληθῆ.

Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ τούτῳ δῆλον ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυμβολαίοις ὁ τοιοῦτος, ἐν οἷς εὐδοκιμεῖ δοκῶν δίκαιος
D εἶναι, ἐπιεικεῖ τινὶ ἑαυτοῦ βίᾳ κατέχει ἄλλας κακὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνούσας, οὐ πείθων ὅτι οὐκ ἄμεινον, οὐδ' ἡμερῶν λόγῳ, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκῃ καὶ φόβῳ, περὶ τῆς ἄλλης οὐσίας τρέμων;

The oligarchical man keeps up a fair outside, but he has only an enforced virtue and will cheat when he can.

Καὶ πάνυ γ', ἔφη.

Καὶ νὴ Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, τοῖς πολλοῖς γε αὐτῶν εὑρήσεις, ὅταν δέῃ τἀλλότρια ἀναλίσκειν, τὰς τοῦ κηφῆνος ξυγγενεῖς ἐνούσας ἐπιθυμίας.

Καὶ μάλα, ἦ δ' ὅς, σφόδρα.

Οὐκ ἄρ' ἂν εἴη ἀστασίαστος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐν ἑαυτῷ, οὐδὲ εἷς ἀλλὰ διπλοῦς τις, ἐπιθυμίας δὲ ἐπιθυ-
E μιῶν ὡς τὸ πολὺ κρατούσας ἂν ἔχοι βελτίους χειρόνων.

Ἔστιν οὕτως.

Διὰ ταῦτα δή, οἶμαι, εὐσχημονέστερος ἂν πολλῶν ὁ τοιοῦτος εἴη· ὁμονοητικῆς δὲ καὶ ἡρμοσμένης τῆς ψυχῆς ἀληθὴς ἀρετὴ πόρρω ποι ἐκφεύγοι ἂν αὐτόν.

Δοκεῖ μοι.

Καὶ μὴν ἀνταγωνιστής γε ἰδίᾳ ἐν πόλει ὁ φειδω-
p. 555. λὸς | φαῦλος ἤ τινος νίκης ἢ ἄλλης φιλοτιμίας τῶν καλῶν, χρήματά τε οὐκ ἐθέλων εὐδοξίας ἕνεκα καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀγώνων ἀναλίσκειν, δεδιὼς τὰς ἐπιθυ-

His meanness in a contest; he saves his money and loses the prize.

14. εὑρήσεις A: ἐν εὑρήσεις A[2]Π: ἐνευρήσεις M.

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μίας τὰς ἀναλωτικὰς ἐγείρειν καὶ ξυμπαρακαλεῖν p. 555. ἐπὶ ξυμμαχίαν τε καὶ φιλονεικίαν, ὀλίγοις τισὶν ἑαυτοῦ πολεμῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶς τὰ πολλὰ ἡττᾶται καὶ πλουτεῖ.

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

Ἔτι οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀπιστοῦμεν μὴ κατὰ τὴν ὀλιγαρχουμένην πόλιν ὁμοιότητι τὸν φειδωλόν τε καὶ χρηματιστὴν τετάχθαι; B

Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη.

Democracy arises out of the extravagance and indebtedness of men of family and position,

Δημοκρατίαν δή, ὡς ἔοικε, μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπτέον, τίνα τε γίγνεται τρόπον, γενομένη τε ποῖόν τινα ἔχει, ἵν' αὖ τὸν τοῦ τοιούτου ἀνδρὸς τρόπον γνόντες παραστησώμεθ' αὐτὸν εἰς κρίσιν.

Ὁμοίως γοῦν ἄν, ἔφη, ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς πορευοίμεθα.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μεταβάλλει μὲν τρόπον τινὰ τοιόνδε ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας εἰς δημοκρατίαν, δι' ἀπληστίαν τοῦ προκειμένου ἀγαθοῦ, τοῦ ὡς πλουσιώτατον δεῖν γίγνεσθαι;

Πῶς δή;

Ἅτε, οἶμαι, ἄρχοντες ἐν αὐτῇ οἱ ἄρχοντες διὰ τὸ C πολλὰ κεκτῆσθαι, οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν εἴργειν νόμῳ τῶν νέων ὅσοι ἂν ἀκόλαστοι γίγνωνται, μὴ ἐξεῖναι αὐτοῖς ἀναλίσκειν τε καὶ ἀπολλύναι τὰ αὑτῶν, ἵνα ὠνούμενοι τὰ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ εἰσδανείζοντες ἔτι πλουσιώτεροι καὶ ἐντιμότεροι γίγνωνται.

Παντός γε μᾶλλον.

Οὐκοῦν δῆλον ἤδη τοῦτο ἐν πόλει, ὅτι πλοῦτον τιμᾶν καὶ σωφροσύνην ἅμα ἱκανῶς κτᾶσθαι ἐν τοῖς πολίταις ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἢ τοῦ ἑτέρου ἀμε- D λεῖν ἢ τοῦ ἑτέρου;

24. (. .) δανείζοντες A.

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p. 555. Ἐπιεικῶς, ἔφη, δῆλον.

Παραμελοῦντες δὴ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις καὶ ἐφιέντες ἀκολασταίνειν οὐκ ἀγεννεῖς ἐνίοτε ἀνθρώπους πένητας ἠνάγκασαν γενέσθαι.

Μάλα γε.

Κάθηνται δή, οἶμαι, οὗτοι ἐν τῇ πόλει κεκεντρωμένοι τε καὶ ἐξωπλισμένοι, οἱ μὲν ὀφείλοντες χρέα, οἱ δὲ ἄτιμοι γεγονότες, οἱ δὲ ἀμφότερα, μισοῦντές τε καὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντες τοῖς κτησαμένοις τὰ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, νεωτερισμοῦ ἐρῶντες.

who remain in the city, and form a dangerous class, ready to head a revolution.

E Ἔστι ταῦτα.

Οἱ δὲ δὴ χρηματισταὶ ἐγκύψαντες, οὐδὲ δοκοῦντες τούτους ὁρᾶν, τῶν λοιπῶν τὸν ἀεὶ ὑπείκοντα ἐνιέντες ἀργύριον τιτρώσκοντες, καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκγόνους
p. 556. τόκους πολλαπλασίους κομιζόμενοι, | πολὺν τὸν κηφῆνα καὶ πτωχὸν ἐμποιοῦσι τῇ πόλει.

Πῶς γάρ, ἔφη, οὐ πολύν;

Οὔτε γ' ἐκείνῃ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ τοιοῦτον κακὸν ἐκκαόμενον ἐθέλουσιν ἀποσβεννύναι, εἴργοντες τὰ αὑτοῦ ὅπῃ τις βούλεται τρέπειν, οὔτε τῇδε, ᾗ αὖ κατὰ ἕτερον νόμον τὰ τοιαῦτα λύεται.

Two remedies: (1) restrictions on the free use of property; (2) contracts to be made at a man's own risk.

Κατὰ δὴ τίνα;

Ὃς μετ' ἐκεῖνόν ἐστι δεύτερος καὶ ἀναγκάζων ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοὺς πολίτας. ἐὰν γὰρ ἐπὶ τῷ αὑτοῦ κινδύνῳ τὰ πολλά τις τῶν ἑκουσίων ξυμ-
B βολαίων προστάττῃ ξυμβάλλειν, χρηματίζοιντο μὲν ἂν ἧττον ἀναιδῶς ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐλάττω δ' ἐν αὐτῇ φύοιτο τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν οἵων νῦν δὴ εἴπομεν.

Καὶ πολύ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Νῦν δέ γ', ἔφην ἐγώ, διὰ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τοὺς μὲν δὴ ἀρχομένους οὕτω διατιθέασιν ἐν τῇ πόλει οἱ

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ἄρχοντες· σφᾶς δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς αὑτῶν—ἆρ᾽ οὐ p. 556.
τρυφῶντας μὲν τοὺς νέους καὶ ἀπόνους καὶ πρὸς τὰ
τοῦ σώματος καὶ πρὸς τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, μαλακοὺς δὲ
καρτερεῖν πρὸς ἡδονάς τε καὶ λύπας καὶ ἀργούς; C

Τί μήν;

Αὐτοὺς δὲ πλὴν χρηματισμοῦ τῶν ἄλλων ἠμεληκότας, καὶ οὐδὲν πλείω ἐπιμέλειαν πεποιημένους ἀρετῆς ἢ τοὺς πένητας;

Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

The subjects discover the weakness of their rulers.

Οὕτω δὴ παρεσκευασμένοι ὅταν παραβάλλωσιν
ἀλλήλοις οἵ τε ἄρχοντες καὶ οἱ ἀρχόμενοι ἢ ἐν ὁδῶν
πορείαις ἢ ἐν ἄλλαις τισὶ κοινωνίαις, ἢ κατὰ θεωρίας
ἢ κατὰ στρατείας, ἢ ξύμπλοι γιγνόμενοι ἢ συστρατιῶται, ἢ καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς κινδύνοις ἀλλήλους D
θεώμενοι μηδαμῇ ταύτῃ καταφρονῶνται οἱ πένητες
ὑπὸ τῶν πλουσίων, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις ἰσχνὸς ἀνὴρ
πένης, ἡλιωμένος, παραταχθεὶς ἐν μάχῃ πλουσίῳ
ἐσκιατροφηκότι, πολλὰς ἔχοντι σάρκας ἀλλοτρίας,
ἴδῃ ἄσθματός τε καὶ ἀπορίας μεστόν, ἆρ᾽ οἴει αὐτὸν
οὐχ ἡγεῖσθαι κακίᾳ τῇ σφετέρᾳ πλουτεῖν τοὺς τοιούτους, καὶ ἄλλον ἄλλῳ παραγγέλλειν, ὅταν ἰδίᾳ
ξυγγίγνωνται, ὅτι ἄνδρες ἡμέτεροί εἰσι *παρ᾽ οὐδέν; E

Εὖ οἶδα μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἔγωγε, ὅτι οὕτω ποιοῦσιν.

A slight cause, internal or external, may produce revolution.

Οὐκοῦν ὥσπερ σῶμα νοσῶδες μικρᾶς ῥοπῆς ἔξωθεν δεῖται προσλαβέσθαι πρὸς τὸ κάμνειν, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἄνευ τῶν ἔξω στασιάζει αὐτὸ αὑτῷ, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἡ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐκείνῳ διακειμένη πόλις ἀπὸ σμι-

18. ἔχοντι ΑΜ: ἔχοντα Π.

22. παρ᾽ οὐδὲν cj. Baiter: γὰρ οὐδὲν ΑΠΜ: γρ. οἱ ἡμέτεροι πλούσιοί εἰσιν οὐδὲν Ξmg., atque ita M corr.

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p. 556. κρᾶς προφάσεως, ἔξωθεν ἐπαγομένων ἢ τῶν ἑτέρων ἐξ ὀλιγαρχουμένης πόλεως συμμαχίαν ἢ τῶν ἑτέρων ἐκ δημοκρατουμένης, νοσεῖ τε καὶ αὐτὴ αὑτῇ μάχεται, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἄνευ τῶν ἔξω στασιάζει;

p. 557. | Καὶ σφόδρα γε.

Such is the origin and nature of democracy.

Δημοκρατία δή, οἶμαι, γίγνεται, ὅταν οἱ πένητες νικήσαντες τοὺς μὲν ἀποκτείνωσι τῶν ἑτέρων, τοὺς δὲ ἐκβάλωσι, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς ἐξ ἴσου μεταδῶσι πολιτείας τε καὶ ἀρχῶν, καὶ ὡς τὸ πολὺ ἀπὸ κλήρων αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐν αὐτῇ γίγνονται.

Ἔστι γάρ, ἔφη, αὕτη ἡ κατάστασις δημοκρατίας, ἐάν τε καὶ δι' ὅπλων γένηται ἐάν τε καὶ διὰ φόβον ὑπεξελθόντων τῶν ἑτέρων.

Τίνα δὴ οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὗτοι τρόπον οἰκοῦσι;
B καὶ ποία τις ἡ τοιαύτη αὖ πολιτεία; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ δημοκρατικός τις ἀναφανήσεται.

Δῆλον, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν πρῶτον μὲν δὴ ἐλεύθεροι, καὶ ἐλευθερίας ἡ πόλις μεστὴ καὶ παρρησίας γίγνεται, καὶ ἐξουσία ἐν αὐτῇ ποιεῖν ὅ τί τις βούλεται;

Λέγεταί γε δή, ἔφη.

Democracy allows a man to do as he likes, and therefore contains the greatest variety of characters and constitutions.

Ὅπου δέ γε ἐξουσία, δῆλον ὅτι ἰδίαν ἕκαστος ἂν κατασκευὴν τοῦ αὑτοῦ βίου κατασκευάζοιτο ἐν αὐτῇ, ἥτις ἕκαστον ἀρέσκοι.

Δῆλον.

C Παντοδαποὶ δὴ ἄν, οἶμαι, ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πολιτείᾳ μάλιστ' ἐγγίγνοιντο ἄνθρωποι.

Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

10. γίγνονται xυτ : γίγνωνται ΑΠΜ.
12. φόβον Α²Μ : φόβων ΑΠ.

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Κινδυνεύει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καλλίστη αὕτη τῶν πολι- p. 557. τειῶν εἶναι· ὥσπερ ἱμάτιον ποικίλον πᾶσιν ἄνθεσι πεποικιλμένον, οὕτω καὶ αὕτη πᾶσιν ἤθεσι πεποικιλμένη καλλίστη ἂν φαίνοιτο· καὶ ἴσως μέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ταύτην, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδές τε καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες τὰ ποικίλα θεώμενοι, καλλίστην ἂν πολλοὶ κρίνειαν.

Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη.

Καὶ ἔστι γε, ὦ μακάριε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπιτήδειον D ζητεῖν ἐν αὐτῇ πολιτείαν.

Τί δή;

Ὅτι πάντα γένη πολιτειῶν ἔχει διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν, καὶ κινδυνεύει τῷ βουλομένῳ πόλιν κατασκευάζειν, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἡμεῖς ἐποιοῦμεν, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι εἰς δημοκρατουμένην ἐλθόντι πόλιν, ὃς ἂν αὐτὸν ἀρέσκῃ τρόπος, τοῦτον ἐκλέξασθαι, ὥσπερ εἰς παντοπώλιον ἀφικομένῳ πολιτειῶν, καὶ ἐκλεξαμένῳ οὕτω κατοικίζειν.

Ἴσως γοῦν, ἔφη, οὐκ ἂν ἀποροῖ παραδειγμάτων. E

The law falls into abeyance.

Τὸ δὲ μηδεμίαν ἀνάγκην, εἶπον, εἶναι ἄρχειν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει, μηδ' ἂν ᾖς ἱκανὸς ἄρχειν, μηδὲ αὖ ἄρχεσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ βούλῃ, μηδὲ πολεμεῖν πολεμούντων, μηδὲ εἰρήνην ἄγειν τῶν ἄλλων ἀγόντων, ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιθυμῇς εἰρήνης, μηδὲ αὖ, ἐάν τις ἄρχειν νόμος σε διακωλύῃ ἢ δικάζειν, μηδὲν ἧττον καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ δικάζειν, ἐὰν αὐτῷ σοι ἐπίῃ, | ἆρ' οὐ θεσπεσία καὶ p. 558. ἡδεῖα ἡ τοιαύτη διαγωγὴ ἐν τῷ παραυτίκα;

Ἴσως, ἔφη, ἔν γε τούτῳ.

24. ἐπιθυμῇς qxv : ἐπιθυμῇ ΑΠΜ.
25. ἄρχειν Ξ : ἄρχῃς ΑΜ : ἀρχῇς ex ἀρχῆς factum Π.
26. δικάζειν Ξ : δικάζῃς ΑΠ²Μ : δικάζεις Πpr.
27. τοιαύτη Π : αὐτὴ ΑΜ.

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p. 558. Τί δέ; ἡ πραότης ἐνίων τῶν δικασθέντων οὐ κομψή; ἢ οὔπω εἶδες ἐν τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ, ἀνθρώπων καταψηφισθέντων θανάτου ἢ φυγῆς, οὐδὲν ἧττον αὐτῶν μενόντων τε καὶ ἀναστρεφομένων ἐν μέσῳ, καὶ ὡς οὔτε φροντίζοντος οὔτε ὁρῶντος οὐδενὸς περινοστεῖ ὥσπερ ἥρως;

Καὶ πολλούς γ', ἔφη.

All principles of order and good taste are trampled under foot by democracy.

B Ἡ δὲ συγγνώμη καὶ οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν σμικρολογία αὐτῆς, ἀλλὰ καταφρόνησις ὧν ἡμεῖς ἐλέγομεν σεμνύνοντες, ὅτε τὴν πόλιν ᾠκίζομεν, ὡς εἰ μή τις ὑπερβεβλημένην φύσιν ἔχοι, οὔποτ' ἂν γένοιτο ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, εἰ μὴ παῖς ὢν εὐθὺς παίζοι ἐν καλοῖς καὶ ἐπιτηδεύοι τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ὡς μεγαλοπρεπῶς καταπατήσασ' ἅπαντ' αὐτὰ οὐδὲν φροντίζει, ἐξ ὁποίων ἄν τις ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ πολιτικὰ ἰὼν πράττῃ, ἀλλὰ τιμᾷ, ἐὰν φῇ μόνον εὔνους εἶναι τῷ C πλήθει;

Πάνυ γ', ἔφη, γενναία.

Ταῦτά τε δή, ἔφην, ἔχοι ἂν καὶ τούτων ἄλλα ἀδελφὰ δημοκρατία, καὶ εἴη, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡδεῖα πολιτεία καὶ ἄναρχος καὶ ποικίλη, ἰσότητά τινα ὁμοίως ἴσοις τε καὶ ἀνίσοις διανέμουσα.

Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, γνώριμα λέγεις.

Ἄθρει δή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τίς ὁ τοιοῦτος ἰδίᾳ. ἢ πρῶτον σκεπτέον, ὥσπερ τὴν πολιτείαν ἐσκεψάμεθα, τίνα τρόπον γίγνεται;

Ναί, ἔφη.

Ἆρ' οὖν οὐχ ὧδε; τοῦ φειδωλοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ ὀλι-

1. κατ' ἐνίων cj. Stephanus.

14. καταπατήσασ' *q* corr.: καταπατήσας ΑΠΜ. ἅπαντ' αὐτὰ Α: ἅπαντα ταῦτα ΠΜ.

18. γενναία Μ: γενναῖα ΑΠ. 19. ταῦτά τε Π: ταὐτατὰ τε Α: ταῦτα Μ.

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γαρχικοῦ γένοιτ' ἄν, οἶμαι, υἱὸς ὑπὸ τῷ πατρὶ τεθραμ- p. 558.
μένος ἐν τοῖς ἐκείνου ἤθεσιν; D

Τί γὰρ οὔ;

Βίᾳ δὴ καὶ οὗτος ἄρχων τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ ἡδονῶν, ὅσαι ἀναλωτικαὶ μέν, χρηματιστικαὶ δὲ μή· αἳ δὴ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι κέκληνται—

Δῆλον, ἔφη.

Which are the necessary and which the unnecessary pleasures?

Βούλει οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἵνα μὴ σκοτεινῶς διαλεγώμεθα, πρῶτον ὁρισώμεθα τάς τε ἀναγκαίους ἐπιθυμίας καὶ τὰς μή;

Βούλομαι, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Necessary desires cannot be got rid of,

Οὐκοῦν ἅς τε οὐκ ἂν οἷοί τ' εἶμεν ἀποτρέψαι,
δικαίως ἂν ἀναγκαῖαι καλοῖντο, καὶ ὅσαι ἀποτελού- E
μεναι ὠφελοῦσιν ἡμᾶς; τούτων γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων ἐφίεσθαι ἡμῶν τῇ φύσει ἀνάγκη. ἢ οὔ;

Καὶ μάλα.

Δικαίως δὴ | τοῦτο ἐπ' αὐταῖς ἐροῦμεν, τὸ ἀναγ- p. 559.
καῖον.

Δικαίως.

Τί δαί; ἅς γέ τις ἀπαλλάξειεν ἄν, εἰ μελετῷ ἐκ νέου, καὶ πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἐνοῦσαι δρῶσιν, αἱ δὲ καὶ τοὐναντίον, πάσας ταύτας εἰ μὴ ἀναγκαίους φαῖμεν εἶναι, ἆρ' οὐ καλῶς ἂν λέγοιμεν;

Καλῶς μὲν οὖν.

Προελώμεθα δή τι παράδειγμα ἑκατέρων, αἵ εἰσιν, ἵνα τύπῳ λάβωμεν αὐτάς;

Οὐκοῦν χρή.

Ἆρ' οὖν οὐχ ἡ τοῦ φαγεῖν μέχρι ὑγιείας τε καὶ
εὐεξίας καὶ αὐτοῦ σίτου τε καὶ ὄψου ἀναγκαῖος ἂν εἴη; B

12. ἂν M Vind. E : om. ΑΠ.

22. ἀναγκαίους ΠΜ : ἀναγκαίας A (?) Ξpr. 29. ἀναγκαίως Π.

p. 559. Οἶμαι.

Ἡ μέν γέ που τοῦ σίτου κατ' ἀμφότερα ἀναγκαία, ᾗ τε ὠφέλιμος ᾗ τε μὴ παῦσαι ζῶντα δυνατή.

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Ναί.

Ἡ δὲ ὄψου, εἴ πῄ τινα ὠφελίαν πρὸς εὐεξίαν παρέχεται.

but may be indulged to excess.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Τί δέ; ἡ πέρα τούτων καὶ ἀλλοίων ἐδεσμάτων ἢ τοιούτων ἐπιθυμία, δυνατὴ δὲ κολαζομένη ἐκ νέων καὶ παιδευομένη ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, καὶ βλαβερὰ μὲν σώματι, βλαβερὰ δὲ ψυχῇ πρός τε C φρόνησιν καὶ τὸ σωφρονεῖν, ἆρά γε ὀρθῶς οὐκ ἀναγκαία ἂν καλοῖτο;

Illustration taken from eating and drinking.

Ὀρθότατα μὲν οὖν.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀναλωτικὰς φῶμεν εἶναι ταύτας, ἐκείνας δὲ χρηματιστικὰς διὰ τὸ χρησίμους πρὸς τὰ ἔργα εἶναι;

Τί μήν;

Οὕτω δὴ καὶ περὶ ἀφροδισίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων φήσομεν;

Οὕτως.

Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ ὃν νῦν δὴ κηφῆνα ὠνομάζομεν, τοῦτον ἐλέγομεν τὸν τῶν τοιούτων ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν γέμοντα καὶ ἀρχόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων, D τὸν δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων φειδωλόν τε καὶ ὀλιγαρχικόν;

Ἀλλὰ τί μήν;

Πάλιν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγωμεν, ὡς ἐξ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ δημοκρατικὸς γίγνεται. φαίνεται δέ μοι τά γε πολλὰ ὧδε γίγνεσθαι.

3. μὴ ϙ: om. ΑΠΜ.

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The young oligarch is led away by his wild associates.

There are allies to either part of his nature.

Πῶς; p. 559.

Ὅταν νέος τεθραμμένος, ὡς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀπαιδεύτως τε καὶ φειδωλῶς γεύσηται κηφήνων μέλιτος, καὶ ξυγγένηται αἴθωσι θηρσὶ καὶ δεινοῖς, παντοδαπὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ ποικίλας καὶ παντοίως ἐχούσας δυναμένοις σκευάζειν, ἐνταῦθά που οἴου εἶναι ἀρχὴν αὐτῷ μεταβολῆς †ὀλιγαρχικῆς τῆς ἐν ἑαυτῷ E εἰς δημοκρατικήν.

Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

Ἆρ᾽ οὖν, ὥσπερ ἡ πόλις μετέβαλλε βοηθησάσης τῷ ἑτέρῳ μέρει ξυμμαχίας ἔξωθεν, ὁμοίας ὁμοίῳ, οὕτω καὶ ὁ νεανίας μεταβάλλει βοηθοῦντος αὖ εἴδους ἐπιθυμιῶν ἔξωθεν τῷ ἑτέρῳ τῶν παρ᾽ ἐκείνῳ, ξυγγενοῦς τε καὶ ὁμοίου;

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

Καὶ ἐὰν μέν, οἶμαι, ἀντιβοηθήσῃ τις τῷ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὀλιγαρχικῷ ξυμμαχία, ἤ ποθεν παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἢ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων, | νουθετούντων τε καὶ κακι- p. 560. ζόντων, στάσις δὴ καὶ ἀντίστασις καὶ μάχη ἐν αὐτῷ πρὸς αὑτὸν τότε γίγνεται.

Τί μήν;

Καὶ ποτὲ μέν, οἶμαι, τὸ δημοκρατικὸν ὑπεχώρησε τῷ ὀλιγαρχικῷ, καί τινες τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν διεφθάρησαν, αἱ δὲ καὶ ἐξέπεσον, αἰδοῦς τινὸς ἐγγενομένης ἐν τῇ τοῦ νέου ψυχῇ, καὶ κατεκοσμήθη πάλιν.

Γίγνεται γὰρ ἐνίοτε, ἔφη.

Αὖθις δέ, οἶμαι, τῶν ἐκπεσουσῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἄλλαι ὑποτρεφόμεναι ξυγγενεῖς δι᾽ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην τροφῆς B πατρὸς πολλαί τε καὶ ἰσχυραὶ ἐγένοντο.

Φιλεῖ γοῦν, ἔφη, οὕτω γίγνεσθαι.

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p. 560. Οὐκοῦν εἵλκυσάν τε πρὸς τὰς αὐτὰς ὁμιλίας, καὶ λάθρᾳ ξυγγιγνόμεναι πλῆθος ἐνέτεκον.

Τί μήν;

Τελευτῶσαι δή, οἶμαι, κατέλαβον τὴν τοῦ νέου τῆς ψυχῆς ἀκρόπολιν, αἰσθόμεναι κενὴν μαθημάτων τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων καλῶν καὶ λόγων ἀληθῶν, οἳ C δὴ ἄριστοι φρουροί τε καὶ φύλακες ἐν ἀνδρῶν θεοφιλῶν εἰσὶ διανοίαις.

Καὶ πολύ γ', ἔφη.

Ψευδεῖς δὴ καὶ ἀλαζόνες, οἶμαι, λόγοι τε καὶ δόξαι ἀντ' ἐκείνων ἀναδραμόντες κατέσχον τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον τοῦ τοιούτου.

Σφόδρα γ', ἔφη.

The progress of the oligarchic young man told in an allegory.

Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ πάλιν τε εἰς ἐκείνους τοὺς Λωτοφάγους ἐλθὼν φανερῶς κατοικεῖ, καὶ ἐὰν παρ' οἰκείων τις βοήθεια τῷ φειδωλῷ αὐτοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀφικνῆται, κλῄσαντες οἱ ἀλαζόνες λόγοι ἐκεῖνοι τὰς τοῦ βασιλικοῦ τείχους ἐν αὐτῷ πύλας οὔτε αὐτὴν τὴν ξυμD μαχίαν παριᾶσιν, οὔτε πρέσβεις πρεσβυτέρων λόγους ἰδιωτῶν εἰσδέχονται, αὐτοί τε κρατοῦσι μαχόμενοι, καὶ τὴν μὲν αἰδῶ ἠλιθιότητα ὀνομάζοντες ὠθοῦσιν ἔξω ἀτίμως φυγάδα, σωφροσύνην δὲ ἀνανδρίαν καλοῦντές τε καὶ προπηλακίζοντες ἐκβάλλουσι, μετριότητα δὲ καὶ κοσμίαν δαπάνην ὡς ἀγροικίαν καὶ ἀνελευθερίαν οὖσαν πείθοντες ὑπερορίζουσι μετὰ πολλῶν καὶ ἀνωφελῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν;

Σφόδρα γε.

Τούτων δέ γέ που κενώσαντες καὶ καθήραντες τὴν E τοῦ κατεχομένου τε ὑπ' αὐτῶν καὶ τελουμένου ψυχὴν μεγάλοισι τέλεσι, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἤδη ὕβριν καὶ ἀν-

20. ἰδιωτῶν MSS.: δι' ὤτων cj. Badham.

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Socrates, Adeimantus.

He becomes a rake; but he also sometimes stops short in his career and gives way to pleasures good and bad indifferently.

αρχίαν καὶ ἀσωτίαν καὶ ἀναίδειαν λαμπρὰς μετὰ p. 560.
πολλοῦ χοροῦ κατάγουσιν ἐστεφανωμένας, ἐγκωμιάζοντες καὶ ὑποκοριζόμενοι, ὕβριν μὲν εὐπαιδευσίαν καλοῦντες, ἀναρχίαν δὲ ἐλευθερίαν, ἀσωτίαν δὲ μεγαλοπρέπειαν, ἀναίδειαν δὲ ἀνδρείαν. | ἆρ' οὐχ p. 561.
οὕτω πως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, νέος ὢν μεταβάλλει ἐκ τοῦ ἐν ἀναγκαίοις ἐπιθυμίαις τρεφομένου τὴν τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων καὶ ἀνωφελῶν ἡδονῶν ἐλευθέρωσίν τε καὶ ἄνεσιν;

Καὶ μάλα γ', ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐναργῶς.

Ζῇ δή, οἶμαι, μετὰ ταῦτα ὁ τοιοῦτος οὐδὲν μᾶλλον εἰς ἀναγκαίους ἢ μὴ ἀναγκαίους ἡδονὰς ἀναλίσκων καὶ χρήματα καὶ πόνους καὶ διατριβάς· ἀλλ' ἐὰν εὐτυχὴς ᾖ καὶ μὴ πέρα ἐκβακχευθῇ, ἀλλά τι καὶ πρεσβύτερος γενόμενος τοῦ πολλοῦ θορύβου παρελ- B
θόντος μέρη τε καταδέξηται τῶν ἐκπεσόντων καὶ τοῖς ἐπεισελθοῦσι μὴ ὅλον ἑαυτὸν ἐνδῷ, εἰς ἴσον δή τι καταστήσας τὰς ἡδονὰς διάγει, τῇ παραπιπτούσῃ ἀεὶ ὥσπερ λαχούσῃ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχὴν παραδιδούς, ἕως ἂν πληρωθῇ, καὶ αὖθις ἄλλῃ, οὐδεμίαν ἀτιμάζων, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἴσου τρέφων.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

He rejects all advice,

Καὶ λόγον γ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ οὐ προσδεχόμενος οὐδὲ παριεὶς εἰς τὸ φρούριον, ἐάν τις λέγῃ, ὡς αἱ μέν εἰσι τῶν καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἡδοναί, αἱ C
δὲ τῶν πονηρῶν, καὶ τὰς μὲν χρὴ ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ τιμᾶν, τὰς δὲ κολάζειν τε καὶ δουλοῦσθαι· ἀλλ' ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ἀνανεύει τε καὶ ὁμοίας φησὶν ἁπάσας εἶναι καὶ τιμητέας ἐξ ἴσου.

Σφόδρα γάρ, ἔφη, οὕτω διακείμενος τοῦτο δρᾷ.

7. εἰς τὴν Π. 14. εὐτυχὴς ᾖ AM : εὐτυχὴς Π : εὐτυχῇ q : εὐτυχήσῃ cj. Madv.

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p. 561. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ διαζῇ τὸ καθ' ἡμέραν οὕτω χαριζόμενος τῇ προσπιπτούσῃ ἐπιθυμίᾳ, τοτὲ μὲν μεθύων καὶ καταυλούμενος, αὖθις δὲ ὑδροποτῶν καὶ D κατισχναινόμενος, τοτὲ δ' αὖ γυμναζόμενος, ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἀργῶν καὶ πάντων ἀμελῶν, τοτὲ δ' ὡς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίβων· πολλάκις δὲ πολιτεύεται, καὶ ἀναπηδῶν ὅ τι ἂν τύχῃ λέγει τε καὶ πράττει· κἄν ποτέ τινας πολεμικοὺς ζηλώσῃ, ταύτῃ φέρεται, ἢ χρηματιστικούς, ἐπὶ τοῦτ' αὖ· καὶ οὔτε τις τάξις οὔτε ἀνάγκη ἔπεστιν αὐτοῦ τῷ βίῳ, ἀλλ' ἡδύν τε δὴ καὶ ἐλευθέριον καὶ μακάριον καλῶν τὸν βίον τοῦτον χρῆται αὐτῷ διὰ παντός.

passing his life in the alternation from one extreme to another.

E Παντάπασιν, ἦ δ' ὅς, διελήλυθας βίον ἰσονομικοῦ τινὸς ἀνδρός.

Οἶμαι δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ παντοδαπόν τε καὶ πλείστων ἠθῶν μεστόν, καὶ τὸν καλόν τε καὶ ποικίλον, ὥσπερ ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν, τοῦτον τὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι· ὃν πολλοὶ ἂν καὶ πολλαὶ ζηλώσειαν τοῦ βίου, παραδείγματα πολιτειῶν τε καὶ τρόπων πλεῖστα ἐν αὐτῷ ἔχοντα.

He is not 'one, but all mankind's epitome.'

Οὗτος γάρ, ἔφη, ἔστιν.

p. 562. Τί οὖν; τετάχθω ἡμῖν κατὰ | δημοκρατίαν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνήρ, ὡς δημοκρατικὸς ὀρθῶς ἂν προσαγορευόμενος;

Τετάχθω, ἔφη.

Ἡ καλλίστη δή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πολιτεία τε καὶ ὁ κάλλιστος ἀνὴρ λοιπὰ ἂν ἡμῖν εἴη διελθεῖν, τυραννίς τε καὶ τύραννος.

Tyranny and the tyrant.

2. τότε μὲν ΠΜ : τὸ μὲν A.

16. τὸν καλὸν . . . ποικίλον ΑΠΜ : τῶν καλῶν . . . ποικίλων Φ (et cj. W. H. Thompson).

21. οὗτος A²Π : οὗτ(ω) A (?) : οὕτως M.

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Κομιδῇ γ', ἔφη. p. 562.

Φέρε δή, τίς τρόπος τυραννίδος, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, γίγνεται; ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἐκ δημοκρατίας μεταβάλλει σχεδὸν δῆλον.

Δῆλον.

Ἆρ' οὖν τρόπον τινὰ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔκ τε ὀλιγαρχίας δημοκρατία γίγνεται καὶ ἐκ δημοκρατίας τυραννίς; B

Πῶς;

The insatiable desire of wealth creates a demand for democracy, and the insatiable desire of freedom creates a demand for tyranny.

Ὃ προὔθεντο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀγαθόν, καὶ δι' οὗ ἡ ὀλιγαρχία καθίστατο — τοῦτο δ' ἦν [ὑπερ]πλοῦτος· ἦ γάρ;

Ναί.

Ἡ πλούτου τοίνυν ἀπληστία καὶ ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ἀμέλεια διὰ χρηματισμὸν αὐτὴν ἀπώλλυ.

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.

Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ ὃ δημοκρατία ὁρίζεται ἀγαθόν, ἡ τούτου ἀπληστία καὶ ταύτην καταλύει;

Λέγεις δ' αὐτὴν τί ὁρίζεσθαι;

Τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, εἶπον. τοῦτο γάρ που ἐν δημοκρατουμένῃ πόλει ἀκούσαις ἂν ὡς ἔχει τε κάλλιστον C καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἐν μόνῃ ταύτῃ ἄξιον οἰκεῖν ὅστις φύσει ἐλεύθερος.

Λέγεται γὰρ δή, ἔφη, καὶ πολὺ τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα.

Ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅπερ ᾖα νῦν δὴ ἐρῶν, ἡ τοῦ τοιούτου ἀπληστία καὶ ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ἀμέλεια καὶ ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν μεθίστησί τε καὶ παρασκευάζει τυραννίδος δεηθῆναι;

Πῶς; ἔφη.

11. ὑπέρπλουτος (vel ὑπὲρ πλοῦτος) ΑΠΜ: ἐπὶ πλοῦτος v: πλοῦτος Vind. F (Schneider): τοῦτο δ' ἦν *που πλοῦτος cj. L. C.

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p. 562. Ὅταν, οἶμαι, δημοκρατουμένη πόλις ἐλευθερίας D διψήσασα κακῶν οἰνοχόων προστατούντων τύχῃ, καὶ πορρωτέρω τοῦ δέοντος ἀκράτου αὐτῆς μεθυσθῇ, τοὺς ἄρχοντας δή, ἂν μὴ πάνυ πρᾶοι ὦσι καὶ πολλὴν παρέχωσι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, κολάζει αἰτιωμένη ὡς μιαρούς τε καὶ ὀλιγαρχικούς.

Δρῶσι γάρ, ἔφη, τοῦτο.

Freedom in the end means anarchy.

Τοὺς δέ γε, εἶπον, τῶν ἀρχόντων κατηκόους προπηλακίζει ὡς ἐθελοδούλους τε καὶ οὐδὲν ὄντας, τοὺς δὲ ἄρχοντας μὲν ἀρχομένοις, ἀρχομένους δὲ ἄρχουσιν ὁμοίους ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ ἐπαινεῖ τε καὶ τιμᾷ. E ἆρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἐν τοιαύτῃ πόλει ἐπὶ πᾶν τὸ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἰέναι;

Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Καὶ καταδύεσθαί γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, εἴς τε τὰς ἰδίας οἰκίας καὶ τελευτᾶν μέχρι τῶν θηρίων τὴν ἀναρχίαν ἐμφυομένην.

Πῶς, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγομεν;

Οἷον, ἔφην, πατέρα μὲν ἐθίζεσθαι παιδὶ ὅμοιον γίγνεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς υἱεῖς, υἱὸν δὲ πατρί, καὶ μήτε αἰσχύνεσθαι μήτε δεδιέναι τοὺς γονέας, ἵνα p. 563. δὴ ἐλεύθερος ᾖ· μέτοικον | δὲ ἀστῷ καὶ ἀστὸν μετοίκῳ ἐξισοῦσθαι, καὶ ξένον ὡσαύτως.

Γίγνεται γὰρ οὕτως, ἔφη.

The inversion of all social relations.

Ταῦτά τε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ σμικρὰ τοιάδε ἄλλα γίγνεται· διδάσκαλός τε ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ φοιτητὰς φοβεῖται καὶ θωπεύει, φοιτηταί τε διδασκάλων ὀλιγωροῦσιν, οὕτω δὲ καὶ παιδαγωγῶν· καὶ ὅλως οἱ μὲν νέοι πρεσβυτέροις ἀπεικάζονται καὶ διαμιλλῶνται καὶ ἐν λόγοις καὶ ἐν ἔργοις, οἱ δὲ γέροντες ξυγκαθιέντες B τοῖς νέοις εὐτραπελίας τε καὶ χαριεντισμοῦ ἐμπί-

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πλανται, μιμούμενοι τοὺς νέους, ἵνα δὴ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀηδεῖς εἶναι μηδὲ δεσποτικοί. p. 563.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Τὸ δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔσχατον, ὦ φίλε, τῆς ἐλευθερίας τοῦ πλήθους, ὅσον γίγνεται ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ πόλει, ὅταν δὴ οἱ ἐωνημένοι καὶ αἱ ἐωνημέναι μηδὲν ἧττον ἐλεύθεροι ὦσι τῶν πριαμένων. ἐν γυναιξὶ δὲ πρὸς ἄνδρας καὶ ἀνδράσι πρὸς γυναῖκας ὅση ἡ ἰσονομία καὶ ἐλευθερία γίγνεται, ὀλίγου ἐπελαθόμεθ' εἰπεῖν.

Οὐκοῦν κατ' Αἰσχύλον, ἔφη, ἐροῦμεν ὅ τι νῦν C ἦλθ' ἐπὶ στόμα;

Freedom among the animals.

Πάνυ γε, εἶπον· καὶ ἔγωγε οὕτω λέγω· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῶν θηρίων τῶν ὑπὸ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὅσῳ ἐλευθερώτερά ἐστιν ἐνταῦθα ἢ ἐν ἄλλῃ, οὐκ ἄν τις πείθοιτο ἄπειρος. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ αἵ τε κύνες κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν οἷαίπερ αἱ δέσποιναι, γίγνονταί τε δὴ καὶ ἵπποι καὶ ὄνοι, πάνυ ἐλευθέρως καὶ σεμνῶς εἰθισμένοι πορεύεσθαι, κατὰ τὰς ὁδοὺς ἐμβάλλοντες τῷ ἀεὶ ἀπαντῶντι, ἐὰν μὴ ἐξίστηται· καὶ τἆλλα πάντα οὕτω μεστὰ ἐλευθερίας γίγνεται. D

No law, no authority.

Τὸ ἐμόν γ', ἔφη, ἐμοὶ λέγεις ὄναρ· αὐτὸς γὰρ εἰς ἀγρὸν πορευόμενος θαμὰ αὐτὸ πάσχω.

Τὸ δὲ δὴ κεφάλαιον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πάντων τούτων ξυνηθροισμένων ἐννοεῖς, ὡς ἁπαλὴν τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν πολιτῶν ποιεῖ, ὥστε κἂν ὁτιοῦν δουλείας τις προσφέρηται, ἀγανακτεῖν καὶ μὴ ἀνέχεσθαι; τελευτῶντες γάρ που οἶσθ' ὅτι οὐδὲ τῶν νόμων φροντίζουσι γεγραμμένων ἢ ἀγράφων, ἵνα δὴ μηδαμῇ μηδεὶς αὐτοῖς ᾖ δεσπότης. E

26. προσφέρηται MSS.: προσφέρῃ cj. W. H. Thompson.

p. 563. Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, οἶδα.

Αὕτη μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, ἡ ἀρχὴ οὑτωσὶ καλὴ καὶ νεανική, ὅθεν τυραννὶς φύεται, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ.

Νεανικὴ δῆτα, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ τί τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο;

Ταὐτόν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅπερ ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ νόσημα ἐγγενόμενον ἀπώλεσεν αὐτήν, τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ πλέον τε καὶ ἰσχυρότερον ἐκ τῆς ἐξουσίας ἐγγενόμενον καταδουλοῦται δημοκρατίαν, καὶ τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἄγαν τι ποιεῖν μεγάλην φιλεῖ εἰς τοὐναντίον μετα-
p. 564. βολὴν ἀνταποδιδόναι, ἐν ὥραις τε καὶ ἐν | φυτοῖς καὶ ἐν σώμασι, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν πολιτείαις οὐχ ἥκιστα.

Εἰκός, ἔφη.

Ἡ γὰρ ἄγαν ἐλευθερία ἔοικεν οὐκ εἰς ἄλλο τι ἢ εἰς ἄγαν δουλείαν μεταβάλλειν καὶ ἰδιώτῃ καὶ πόλει.

Εἰκὸς γάρ.

Εἰκότως τοίνυν, εἶπον, οὐκ ἐξ ἄλλης πολιτείας τυραννὶς καθίσταται ἢ ἐκ δημοκρατίας, ἐξ οἶμαι τῆς ἀκροτάτης ἐλευθερίας δουλεία πλείστη τε καὶ ἀγριωτάτη.

Ἔχει γάρ, ἔφη, λόγον.

B Ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτ', οἶμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἠρώτας, ἀλλὰ ποῖον νόσημα ἐν ὀλιγαρχίᾳ τε φυόμενον ταὐτὸν καὶ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ δουλοῦται αὐτήν.

The common evil of oligarchy and democracy is the class of idle spendthrifts.

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Ἐκεῖνο τοίνυν, ἔφην, ἔλεγον τὸ τῶν ἀργῶν τε καὶ δαπανηρῶν ἀνδρῶν γένος, τὸ μὲν ἀνδρειότατον ἡγούμενον αὐτῶν, τὸ δ' ἀνανδρότερον ἑπόμενον· οὓς δὴ

12. καὶ δὴ Π : om. AM.
28, 29. ἡγούμενον αὐτῶν AM : αὐτῶν ἡγούμενον Π.

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ἀφομοιοῦμεν κηφῆσι, τοὺς μὲν κέντρα ἔχουσι, τοὺς δὲ ἀκέντροις. p. 564.

Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἔφη.

Illustration.

Τούτω τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ταράττετον ἐν πάσῃ πολιτείᾳ ἐγγιγνομένω, οἷον περὶ σῶμα φλέγμα τε καὶ χολή· ὣ δὴ καὶ δεῖ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἰατρόν τε καὶ C νομοθέτην πόλεως μὴ ἧττον ἢ σοφὸν μελιτουργὸν πόρρωθεν εὐλαβεῖσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν ὅπως μὴ ἐγγενήσεσθον, ἂν δὲ ἐγγένησθον, ὅπως ὅ τι τάχιστα ξὺν αὐτοῖσι τοῖς κηρίοις ἐκτετμήσεσθον.

Ναὶ μὰ Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς, παντάπασί γε.

Ὧδε τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λάβωμεν, ἵν' εὐκρινέστερον ἴδωμεν ὃ βουλόμεθα.

Πῶς;

Altogether three classes in a democracy.

Τριχῇ διαστησώμεθα τῷ λόγῳ δημοκρατουμένην πόλιν, ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ ἔχει. ἓν μὲν γάρ που τὸ τοι- D οὗτον γένος ἐν αὐτῇ ἐμφύεται δι' ἐξουσίαν οὐκ ἔλαττον ἢ ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχουμένῃ.

Ἔστιν οὕτως.

Πολὺ δέ γε δριμύτερον ἐν ταύτῃ ἢ ἐν ἐκείνῃ.

Πῶς;

(1) The drones or spendthrifts, who are more numerous and active than in the oligarchy.

Ἐκεῖ μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔντιμον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἀπελαύνεσθαι τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἀγύμναστον καὶ οὐκ ἐρρωμένον γίγνεται· ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ δὲ τοῦτό που τὸ προεστὸς αὐτῆς, ἐκτὸς ὀλίγων, καὶ τὸ μὲν δριμύτατον αὐτοῦ λέγει τε καὶ πράττει, τὸ δ' ἄλλο περὶ τὰ βήματα προσίζον βομβεῖ τε καὶ οὐκ ἀνέχεται τοῦ ἄλλα λέγοντος, ὥστε πάντα ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιούτου διοι- E κεῖται ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ χωρίς τινων ὀλίγων.

1. ἀφομοιοῦμεν ΑΠΜ : ἀφωμοιοῦμεν Ξ. 7. μελιτουργὸν Α : μελιττουργὸν ΠΜ. 10. ξὺν MSS. : del. W. H. Thompson.

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p. 564. Μάλα γε, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Ἄλλο τοίνυν τοιόνδε ἀεὶ ἀποκρίνεται ἐκ τοῦ πλήθους.

Τὸ ποῖον;

Χρηματιζομένων που πάντων, οἱ κοσμιώτατοι φύσει ὡς τὸ πολὺ πλουσιώτατοι γίγνονται.

(2) The orderly or wealthy class, who are fed upon by the drones.

Εἰκός.

Πλεῖστον δή, οἶμαι, τοῖς κηφῆσι μέλι καὶ εὐπορώτατον ἐντεῦθεν βλίττει.

Πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ἔφη, παρά γε τῶν σμικρὰ ἐχόντων τις βλίσειεν;

Πλούσιοι δή, οἶμαι, οἱ τοιοῦτοι καλοῦνται, κηφήνων βοτάνη.

Σχεδόν τι, ἔφη.

p. 565. Δῆμος | δ' ἂν εἴη τρίτον γένος, ὅσοι αὐτουργοί τε καὶ ἀπράγμονες, οὐ πάνυ πολλὰ κεκτημένοι· ὃ δὴ πλεῖστόν τε καὶ κυριώτατον ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ, ὅταν περ ἀθροισθῇ.

(3) The working class, who also get a share.

Ἔστι γάρ, ἔφη· ἀλλ' οὐ θαμὰ ἐθέλει ποιεῖν τοῦτο, ἐὰν μὴ μέλιτός τι μεταλαμβάνῃ.

Οὐκοῦν μεταλαμβάνει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀεί, καθ' ὅσον δύνανται οἱ προεστῶτες, τοὺς ἔχοντας τὴν οὐσίαν ἀφαιρούμενοι, διανέμοντες τῷ δήμῳ, τὸ πλεῖστον αὐτοὶ ἔχειν.

B Μεταλαμβάνει γὰρ οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὕτως.

Ἀναγκάζονται δή, οἶμαι, ἀμύνεσθαι, λέγοντές τε ἐν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ πράττοντες ὅπῃ δύνανται, οὗτοι ὧν ἀφαιροῦνται.

The well-to-do have to defend themselves against the people.

Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

9. βλίττει MSS.: βλίττεται cj. Ruhnken in Tim. Lex. s. v.
11. βλίσειε (sic) M: βλίσσειεν A: βλίσσειν Π pr: βλύσσειεν Π corr.

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Αἰτίαν δὴ ἔσχον ὑπὸ τῶν ἑτέρων, κἂν μὴ ἐπιθυ- p. 565. μῶσι νεωτερίζειν, ὡς ἐπιβουλεύουσι τῷ δήμῳ καί εἰσιν ὀλιγαρχικοί.

Τί μήν;

Οὐκοῦν καὶ τελευτῶντες, ἐπειδὰν ὁρῶσι τὸν δῆμον, οὐχ ἑκόντα, ἀλλ' ἀγνοήσαντά τε καὶ ἐξαπατηθέντα ὑπὸ τῶν διαβαλλόντων, ἐπιχειροῦντα σφᾶς ἀδικεῖν, C τότ' ἤδη, εἴτε βούλονται εἴτε μή, ὡς ἀληθῶς ὀλιγαρχικοὶ γίγνονται, οὐχ ἑκόντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ κακὸν ἐκεῖνος ὁ κηφὴν ἐντίκτει κεντῶν αὐτούς.

Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

Εἰσαγγελίαι δὴ καὶ κρίσεις καὶ ἀγῶνες περὶ ἀλλήλων γίγνονται.

Καὶ μάλα.

The people have a protector who, when once he tastes blood, is converted into a tyrant.

Οὐκοῦν ἕνα τινὰ ἀεὶ δῆμος εἴωθε διαφερόντως προΐστασθαι ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ τοῦτον τρέφειν τε καὶ αὔξειν μέγαν;

Εἴωθε γάρ.

Τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δῆλον, ὅτι, ὅταν περ D φύηται τύραννος, ἐκ προστατικῆς ῥίζης καὶ οὐκ ἄλλοθεν ἐκβλαστάνει.

Καὶ μάλα δῆλον.

Τίς ἀρχὴ οὖν μεταβολῆς ἐκ προστάτου ἐπὶ τύραννον; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι ἐπειδὰν ταὐτὸν ἄρξηται δρᾶν ὁ προστάτης τῷ ἐν τῷ μύθῳ, ὃς περὶ τὸ ἐν Ἀρκαδίᾳ τὸ τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Λυκαίου ἱερὸν λέγεται;

Τίς; ἔφη.

Ὡς ἄρα ὁ γευσάμενος τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σπλάγχνου, ἐν ἄλλοις ἄλλων ἱερείων ἑνὸς ἐγκατατετμη-

15. ἕνα τινὰ A²ΠΜ : ἕνα . . . α A : ἕνα γέ τινα cj. Cobet.

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p. 565. E μένου, ἀνάγκη δὴ τούτῳ λύκῳ γενέσθαι. ἢ οὐκ ἀκήκοας τὸν λόγον;

Ἔγωγε.

Ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὕτω καὶ ὃς ἂν δήμου προεστώς, λαβὼν σφόδρα πειθόμενον ὄχλον, μὴ ἀπόσχηται ἐμφυλίου αἵματος, ἀλλ᾽ ἀδίκως ἐπαιτιώμενος, οἷα δὴ φιλοῦσιν, εἰς δικαστήρια ἄγων μιαιφονῇ, βίον ἀνδρὸς ἀφανίζων, γλώττῃ τε καὶ στόματι ἀνοσίῳ γευόμενος φόνου p. 566. ξυγγενοῦς, καὶ ἀνδρηλατῇ καὶ ἀποκτιννύῃ | καὶ ὑποσημαίνῃ χρεῶν τε ἀποκοπὰς καὶ γῆς ἀναδασμόν, ἆρα τῷ τοιούτῳ ἀνάγκη δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ εἵμαρται ἢ ἀπολωλέναι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἢ τυραννεῖν καὶ λύκῳ ἐξ ἀνθρώπου γενέσθαι;

Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

Οὗτος δή, ἔφην, ὁ στασιάζων γίγνεται πρὸς τοὺς ἔχοντας τὰς οὐσίας.

Οὗτος.

After a time he is driven out, but comes back a full-blown tyrant.

Ἆρ᾽ οὖν ἐκπεσὼν μὲν καὶ κατελθὼν βίᾳ τῶν ἐχθρῶν τύραννος ἀπειργασμένος κατέρχεται;

Δῆλον.

B Ἐὰν δὲ ἀδύνατοι ἐκβάλλειν αὐτὸν ὦσιν ἢ ἀποκτεῖναι διαβάλλοντες τῇ πόλει, βιαίῳ δὴ θανάτῳ ἐπιβουλεύουσιν ἀποκτιννύναι λάθρᾳ.

Φιλεῖ γοῦν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, οὕτω γίγνεσθαι.

The bodyguard.

Τὸ δὴ τυραννικὸν αἴτημα τὸ πολυθρύλητον ἐπὶ τούτῳ πάντες οἱ εἰς τοῦτο προβεβηκότες ἐξευρίσκουσιν, αἰτεῖν τὸν δῆμον φύλακάς τινας τοῦ σώματος, ἵνα σῶς αὐτοῖς ᾖ ὁ τοῦ δήμου βοηθός.

C Καὶ μάλ᾽, ἔφη.

Διδόασι δή, οἶμαι, δείσαντες μὲν ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου, θαρρήσαντες δὲ ὑπὲρ ἑαυτῶν.

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Καὶ μάλα. p. 566.

Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ὅταν ἴδῃ ἀνὴρ χρήματα ἔχων καὶ μετὰ τῶν χρημάτων αἰτίαν μισόδημος εἶναι, τότε δὴ οὗτος, ὦ ἑταῖρε, κατὰ τὸν Κροίσῳ γενόμενον χρησμὸν

πολυψήφιδα παρ' Ἕρμον
φεύγει, οὐδὲ μένει, οὐδ' αἰδεῖται κακὸς εἶναι.

Οὐ γὰρ ἄν, ἔφη, δεύτερον αὖθις αἰδεσθείη.

Ὁ δέ γε, οἶμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καταληφθεὶς θανάτῳ δίδοται.

Ἀνάγκη.

The protector standing up in the chariot of State.

Ὁ δὲ δὴ προστάτης ἐκεῖνος αὐτὸς δῆλον δὴ ὅτι μέγας μεγαλωστὶ οὐ κεῖται, ἀλλὰ καταβαλὼν ἄλλους D πολλοὺς ἕστηκεν ἐν τῷ δίφρῳ τῆς πόλεως, τύραννος ἀντὶ προστάτου ἀποτετελεσμένος.

Τί δ' οὐ μέλλει; ἔφη.

Διέλθωμεν δὴ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦ τε ἀνδρὸς καὶ τῆς πόλεως, ἐν ᾗ ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος βροτὸς ἐγγένηται;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, διέλθωμεν.

Ἆρ' οὖν, εἶπον, οὐ ταῖς μὲν πρώταις ἡμέραις τε καὶ χρόνῳ προσγελᾷ τε καὶ ἀσπάζεται πάντας, ᾧ ἂν περιτυγχάνῃ, καὶ οὔτε τύραννός φησιν εἶναι ὑπισ- E χνεῖταί τε πολλὰ καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, χρεῶν τε ἠλευθέρωσε καὶ γῆν διένειμε δήμῳ τε καὶ τοῖς περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ πᾶσιν ἵλεώς τε καὶ πρᾶος εἶναι προσποιεῖται;

Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

He stirs up wars, and

Ὅταν δέ γε, οἶμαι, πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω ἐχθροὺς τοῖς

2. ἔχων ΠΜ : ἔχων . . (an ἔχων τε ?) Α.
24. καὶ ἰδίᾳ ΑΜ : ἰδίᾳ Π.

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p. 566. μὲν καταλλαγῇ, τοὺς δὲ καὶ διαφθείρῃ, καὶ ἡσυχία ἐκείνων γένηται, πρῶτον μὲν πολέμους τινὰς ἀεὶ κινεῖ, ἵν' ἐν χρείᾳ ἡγεμόνος ὁ δῆμος ᾖ.

Εἰκός γε.

p. 567. | Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἵνα χρήματα εἰσφέροντες πένητες γιγνόμενοι πρὸς τῷ καθ' ἡμέραν ἀναγκάζωνται εἶναι καὶ ἧττον αὐτῷ ἐπιβουλεύωσιν;

impoverishes the subjects by the imposition of taxes.

Δῆλον.

Καὶ ἄν γέ τινας, οἶμαι, ὑποπτεύῃ ἐλεύθερα φρονήματα ἔχοντας μὴ ἐπιτρέψειν αὐτῷ ἄρχειν, ὅπως ἂν τούτους μετὰ προφάσεως ἀπολλύῃ ἐνδοὺς τοῖς πολεμίοις; τούτων πάντων ἕνεκα τυράννῳ ἀεὶ ἀνάγκη πόλεμον ταράττειν;

Ἀνάγκη.

Ταῦτα δὴ ποιοῦντα ἕτοιμον μᾶλλον ἀπεχθάνεσθαι
B τοῖς πολίταις;

Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Οὐκοῦν καί τινας τῶν ξυγκαταστησάντων καὶ ἐν δυνάμει ὄντων παρρησιάζεσθαι καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἐπιπλήττοντας τοῖς γιγνομένοις, οἳ ἂν τυγχάνωσιν ἀνδρικώτατοι ὄντες;

Εἰκός γε.

Ὑπεξαιρεῖν δὴ τούτους πάντας δεῖ τὸν τύραννον, εἰ μέλλει ἄρξειν, ἕως ἂν μήτε φίλων μήτ' ἐχθρῶν λίπῃ μηδένα ὅτου τι ὄφελος.

He gets rid of his bravest followers.

Δῆλον.

C Ὀξέως ἄρα δεῖ ὁρᾶν αὐτόν, τίς ἀνδρεῖος, τίς μεγαλόφρων, τίς φρόνιμος, τίς πλούσιος· καὶ οὕτως εὐδαίμων ἐστίν, ὥστε τούτοις ἅπασιν ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ,

23. ὑπεξαιρεῖν ΠΜ: ὑπεξαίρειν A.

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εἴτε βούλεται εἴτε μή, πολεμίῳ εἶναι καὶ ἐπιβουλεύειν, p. 567. ἕως ἂν καθήρῃ τὴν πόλιν.

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Καλόν γε, ἔφη, καθαρμόν.

His purgation of the State.

Ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸν ἐναντίον ἢ οἱ ἰατροὶ τὰ σώματα· οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὸ χείριστον ἀφαιροῦντες λείπουσι τὸ βέλτιστον, ὁ δὲ τοὐναντίον.

Ὡς ἔοικε γάρ, αὐτῷ, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ ἄρξει.

Ἐν μακαρίᾳ ἄρα, εἶπον ἐγώ, ἀνάγκῃ δέδεται, D ᾗ προστάττει αὐτῷ ἢ μετὰ φαύλων τῶν πολλῶν οἰκεῖν, καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων μισούμενον, ἢ μὴ ζῆν.

Ἐν τοιαύτῃ, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Ἆρ' οὖν οὐχὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μᾶλλον τοῖς πολίταις ἀπεχθάνηται ταῦτα δρῶν, τοσούτῳ πλειόνων καὶ πιστοτέρων δορυφόρων δεήσεται;

Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Τίνες οὖν οἱ πιστοί; καὶ πόθεν αὐτοὺς μεταπέμψεται;

Αὐτόματοι, ἔφη, πολλοὶ ἥξουσι πετόμενοι, ἐὰν τὸν μισθὸν διδῷ.

More drones.

Κηφῆνας, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, νὴ τὸν κύνα, δοκεῖς αὖ τινάς μοι λέγειν ξενικούς τε καὶ παντοδαπούς. E

Ἀληθῆ γάρ, ἔφη, δοκῶ σοι.

Τί δέ; αὐτόθεν ἆρ' οὐκ ἂν ἐθελήσειεν;

Πῶς;

Τοὺς δούλους ἀφελόμενος τοὺς πολίτας, ἐλευθερώσας, τῶν περὶ ἑαυτὸν δορυφόρων ποιήσασθαι.

Σφόδρα γ', ἔφη· ἐπεί τοι καὶ πιστότατοι αὐτῷ οὗτοί εἰσιν.

He puts to death his

Ἦ μακάριον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις τυράννου χρῆμα,

23. τί δὲ q : τίς δὲ ΑΠΜ : τοὺς δὲ Stephanus.

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friends and lives with slaves.

p. 568. εἰ τοιούτοις φίλοις τε καὶ | πιστοῖς ἀνδράσι χρῆται, τοὺς προτέρους ἐκείνους ἀπολέσας.

Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, τοιούτοις γε χρῆται.

Καὶ θαυμάζουσι δή, εἶπον, οὗτοι οἱ ἑταῖροι αὐτὸν καὶ ξύνεισιν οἱ νέοι πολῖται, οἱ δ' ἐπιεικεῖς μισοῦσί τε καὶ φεύγουσιν;

Τί δ' οὐ μέλλουσιν;

Euripides and the tragedians praise tyranny, which is an excellent reason for expelling them from our State.

Οὐκ ἐτός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἥ τε τραγῳδία ὅλως σοφὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ὁ Εὐριπίδης διαφέρων ἐν αὐτῇ.

Τί δή;

Ὅτι καὶ τοῦτο πυκνῆς διανοίας ἐχόμενον ἐφθέγ-
B ξατο, ὡς ἄρα σοφοὶ τύραννοί εἰσι τῶν σοφῶν συνουσίᾳ. καὶ ἔλεγε δῆλον ὅτι τούτους εἶναι τοὺς σοφοὺς οἷς ξύνεστιν.

Καὶ ὡς ἰσόθεόν γ', ἔφη, τὴν τυραννίδα ἐγκωμιάζει, καὶ ἕτερα πολλά, καὶ οὗτος καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταί.

Τοιγάρτοι, ἔφην, ἅτε σοφοὶ ὄντες οἱ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποιηταὶ ξυγγιγνώσκουσιν ἡμῖν τε καὶ ἐκείνοις, ὅσοι ἡμῶν ἐγγὺς πολιτεύονται, ὅτι αὐτοὺς εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν οὐ παραδεξόμεθα ἅτε τυραννίδος ὑμνητάς.

Οἶμαι ἔγωγ', ἔφη, ξυγγιγνώσκουσιν ὅσοιπέρ γε
C αὐτῶν κομψοί.

Εἰς δέ γε, οἶμαι, τὰς ἄλλας περιιόντες πόλεις, ξυλλέγοντες τοὺς ὄχλους, καλὰς φωνὰς καὶ μεγάλας καὶ πιθανὰς μισθωσάμενοι, εἰς τυραννίδας τε καὶ δημοκρατίας ἕλκουσι τὰς πολιτείας.

Μάλα γε.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ προσέτι τούτων μισθοὺς λαμβάνουσι καὶ τιμῶνται, μάλιστα μέν, ὥσπερ τὸ εἰκός, ὑπὸ

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τυράννων, δεύτερον δὲ ὑπὸ δημοκρατίας· ὅσῳ δ' ἂν p. 568. ἀνωτέρω ἴωσι πρὸς τὸ ἄναντες τῶν πολιτειῶν, μᾶλλον ἀπαγορεύει αὐτῶν ἡ τιμή, ὥσπερ ὑπὸ ἄσθματος D ἀδυνατοῦσα πορεύεσθαι.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

'Αλλὰ δή, εἶπον, ἐνταῦθα μὲν ἐξέβημεν· λέγωμεν δὲ πάλιν ἐκεῖνο τὸ τοῦ τυράννου στρατόπεδον τὸ καλόν τε καὶ πολὺ καὶ ποικίλον καὶ οὐδέποτε ταὐτόν, πόθεν θρέψεται.

He seizes the treasures in the temples, and when these fail he feeds upon the people.

Δῆλον, ἔφη, ὅτι, ἐάν τε ἱερὰ χρήματα ᾖ ἐν τῇ πόλει, ταῦτα ἀναλώσει, — ὅποι ποτὲ ἂν ἀεὶ ἐξαρκῇ τὰ τῶν ἀποδομένων, ἐλάττους εἰσφορὰς ἀναγκάζων τὸν δῆμον εἰσφέρειν.

Τί δ' ὅταν δὴ ταῦτα ἐπιλίπῃ; E

Δῆλον, ἔφη, ὅτι ἐκ τῶν πατρῴων θρέψεται αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ συμπόται τε καὶ ἑταῖροι καὶ ἑταῖραι.

Μανθάνω, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ὅτι ὁ δῆμος ὁ γεννήσας τὸν τύραννον θρέψει αὐτόν τε καὶ ἑταίρους.

Πολλὴ αὐτῷ, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη.

They rebel, and then he beats his own parent, i.e. the people.

Πῶς [δὲ] λέγεις; εἶπον· ἐὰν δὲ ἀγανακτῇ τε καὶ λέγῃ ὁ δῆμος, ὅτι οὔτε δίκαιον τρέφεσθαι ὑπὸ πατρὸς υἱὸν ἡβῶντα, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον ὑπὸ υἱέος πατέρα, οὔτε τούτου αὐτὸν ἕνεκα | ἐγέννησέ τε καὶ κατέ- p. 569. στησεν, ἵνα, ἐπειδὴ μέγας γένοιτο, τότε αὐτὸς δουλεύων τοῖς αὑτοῦ δούλοις τρέφοι ἐκεῖνόν τε καὶ τοὺς

3. τιμή Π : τιμὴ ἡ AM.
11. ἐξαρκῇ τὰ τῶν ἀποδομένων ΑΠΜ : ἐξαρκῇ τὰ τῶν ἀπολομένων A corr. *q* : ἐξαρκῇ, καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀπολομένων cj. Baiter.
14. ἐπιλίπῃ M : ἐπιλείπῃ ΑΠ.
16. συμπόται (λῖ) ΑΠ : συμπο . . ταί M cum rasura duarum litterarum.
18. ἑταίρους ΠΜ : ἑτέρους A.
20. πῶς δὲ ΑΠΜ : πῶς Ξ. ἐὰν δὲ M*v* : ἐάν τε ΑΠ : ἐάν τι *q*.

p. 569. δούλους μετὰ ξυγκλύδων ἄλλων, ἀλλ' ἵνα ἀπὸ τῶν πλουσίων τε καὶ καλῶν κἀγαθῶν λεγομένων ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐλευθερωθείη ἐκείνου προστάντος, καὶ νῦν κελεύει ἀπιέναι ἐκ τῆς πόλεως αὐτόν τε καὶ τοὺς ἑταίρους, ὥσπερ πατὴρ υἱὸν ἐξ οἰκίας μετὰ ὀχληρῶν συμποτῶν ἐξελαύνων;

Γνώσεταί γε, νὴ Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς, τότ' ἤδη ὁ δῆμος
B οἷος οἷον θρέμμα γεννῶν ἠσπάζετό τε καὶ ηὖξε, καὶ ὅτι ἀσθενέστερος ὢν ἰσχυροτέρους ἐξελαύνει.

Πῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις; τολμήσει τὸν πατέρα βιάζεσθαι, κἂν μὴ πείθηται, τύπτειν ὁ τύραννος;

Ναί, ἔφη, ἀφελόμενός γε τὰ ὅπλα.

Πατραλοίαν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις τύραννον καὶ χαλεπὸν γηροτρόφον, καὶ ὡς ἔοικε τοῦτο δὴ ὁμολογουμένη ἂν ἤδη τυραννὶς εἴη, καί, τὸ λεγόμενον, ὁ δῆμος
C φεύγων ἂν καπνὸν δουλείας ἐλευθέρων εἰς πῦρ δούλων δεσποτείας ἂν ἐμπεπτωκὼς εἴη, ἀντὶ τῆς πολλῆς ἐκείνης καὶ ἀκαίρου ἐλευθερίας τὴν χαλεπωτάτην τε καὶ πικροτάτην δούλων δουλείαν μεταμπισχόμενος.

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, ταῦτα οὕτω γίγνεται.

Τί οὖν; εἶπον· οὐκ ἐμμελῶς ἡμῖν εἰρήσεται, ἐὰν φῶμεν ἱκανῶς διεληλυθέναι, ὡς μεταβαίνει τυραννὶς ἐκ δημοκρατίας, γενομένη τε οἵα ἐστίν;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἱκανῶς, ἔφη.

1. ἀπὸ *q*: ὑπὸ ΑΠΜ.
4. κελεύει MSS.: κελεύῃ cj. Baiter.

Θ.

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Αὐτὸς δὴ λοιπός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ τυραννικὸς ἀνὴρ p. 571. σκέψασθαι, πῶς τε μεθίσταται ἐκ δημοκρατικοῦ, γενόμενός τε ποῖός τίς ἐστι καὶ τίνα τρόπον ζῇ, ἄθλιον ἢ μακάριον.

Λοιπὸς γὰρ οὖν ἔτι οὗτος, ἔφη.

Οἶσθ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὃ ποθῶ ἔτι;

Τὸ ποῖον;

Τὸ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, οἷαί τε καὶ ὅσαι εἰσίν, οὔ μοι δοκοῦμεν ἱκανῶς διῃρῆσθαι. τούτου δὴ ἐνδεῶς ἔχοντος, ἀσαφεστέρα ἔσται ἡ ζήτησις οὗ ζη- B τοῦμεν.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἔτ' ἐν καλῷ;

A digression with a purpose.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν· καὶ σκόπει γ' ὃ ἐν αὐταῖς βούλομαι ἰδεῖν. ἔστι δὲ τόδε. τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν δοκοῦσί τινές μοι εἶναι παράνομοι, αἳ κινδυνεύουσι μὲν ἐγγίγνεσθαι παντί, κολαζόμεναι δὲ ὑπό τε τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν βελτιόνων ἐπιθυμιῶν μετὰ λόγου ἐνίων μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἢ παντάπασιν ἀπαλλάττεσθαι ἢ ὀλίγαι λείπεσθαι καὶ ἀσθενεῖς, τῶν δὲ ἰσχυρότεραι καὶ πλείους. C

12. ἐν καλῷ M: ἐνκαλῶ ΑΠ.

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p. 571. Λέγεις δὲ καὶ τίνας, ἔφη, ταύτας;

Τὰς περὶ τὸν ὕπνον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐγειρομένας, ὅταν τὸ μὲν ἄλλο τῆς ψυχῆς εὕδῃ, ὅσον λογιστικὸν καὶ ἥμερον καὶ ἄρχον ἐκείνου, τὸ δὲ θηριῶδές τε καὶ ἄγριον, ἢ σίτων ἢ μέθης πλησθέν, σκιρτᾷ τε καὶ ἀπωσάμενον τὸν ὕπνον ζητῇ ἰέναι καὶ ἀποπιμπλάναι τὰ αὑτοῦ ἤθη· οἶσθ' ὅτι πάντα ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ τολμᾷ ποιεῖν, ὡς ἀπὸ πάσης λελυμένον τε καὶ ἀπηλλαγμένον αἰσχύνης καὶ φρονήσεως. μητρί τε γὰρ ἐπι- D χειρεῖν μίγνυσθαι, ὡς οἴεται, οὐδὲν ὀκνεῖ, ἄλλῳ τε ὁτῳοῦν ἀνθρώπων καὶ θεῶν καὶ θηρίων, μιαιφονεῖν τε ὁτιοῦν, βρώματός τε ἀπέχεσθαι μηδενός. καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ οὔτε ἀνοίας οὐδὲν ἐλλείπει οὔτ' ἀναισχυντίας.

The wild beast latent in man peers forth in sleep.

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Ὅταν δέ γε, οἶμαι, ὑγιεινῶς τις ἔχῃ αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ καὶ σωφρόνως, καὶ εἰς τὸν ὕπνον ἴῃ τὸ λογιστικὸν μὲν ἐγείρας ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἑστιάσας λόγων καλῶν καὶ σκέψεων, εἰς σύννοιαν αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ἀφικόμενος, τὸ E ἐπιθυμητικὸν δὲ μήτε ἐνδείᾳ δοὺς μήτε πλησμονῇ, p. 572. ὅπως ἂν κοιμηθῇ καὶ μὴ παρέχῃ θόρυβον | τῷ βελτίστῳ χαῖρον ἢ λυπούμενον, ἀλλ' ἐᾷ αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ μόνον καθαρὸν σκοπεῖν καὶ ὀρέγεσθαί του καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι ὃ μὴ οἶδεν, ἤ τι τῶν γεγονότων ἢ ὄντων ἢ καὶ μελλόντων, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς πραΰνας καὶ μή τισιν εἰς ὀργὰς ἐλθὼν κεκινημένῳ τῷ θυμῷ καθεύδῃ, ἀλλ' ἡσυχάσας μὲν τὼ δύο εἴδη, τὸ τρίτον δὲ κινήσας ἐν ᾧ τὸ φρονεῖν ἐγγίγνεται, οὕτως ἀναπαύηται, οἶσθ' ὅτι τῆς τ' ἀληθείας ἐν τῷ

The contrast of the temperate man whose passions are under the control of reason.

1. καὶ AM : om. ΠM corr.
12. ἑνὶ λόγῳ A corr. ΠM : ἐν ὀλίγῳ Apr.?
25. ἐλθὼν Π : ἐλθὸν AM.

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τοιούτῳ μάλιστα ἅπτεται καὶ ἥκιστα παράνομοι τότε p. 572. αἱ ὄψεις φαντάζονται τῶν ἐνυπνίων. B

Παντελῶς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, οἶμαι οὕτως.

Ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν ἐπὶ πλέον ἐξήχθημεν εἰπεῖν· ὃ δὲ βουλόμεθα γνῶναι, τόδ' ἐστίν, ὡς ἄρα δεινόν τι καὶ ἄγριον καὶ ἄνομον ἐπιθυμιῶν εἶδος ἑκάστῳ ἔνεστι, καὶ πάνυ δοκοῦσιν ἡμῶν ἐνίοις μετρίοις εἶναι· τοῦτο δὲ ἄρα ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις γίγνεται ἔνδηλον. εἰ οὖν τι δοκῶ λέγειν καὶ ξυγχωρεῖς, ἄθρει.

Ἀλλὰ ξυγχωρῶ.

Recapitulation.

Τὸν τοίνυν δημοτικὸν ἀναμνήσθητι οἷον ἔφαμεν εἶναι. ἦν δέ που γεγονὼς ἐκ νέου ὑπὸ φειδωλῷ C πατρὶ τεθραμμένος, τὰς χρηματιστικὰς ἐπιθυμίας τιμῶντι μόνας, τὰς δὲ μὴ ἀναγκαίους ἀλλὰ παιδιᾶς τε καὶ καλλωπισμοῦ ἕνεκα γιγνομένας ἀτιμάζοντι. ἦ γάρ;

Ναί.

Συγγενόμενος δὲ κομψοτέροις ἀνδράσι καὶ μεστοῖς ὧν ἄρτι διήλθομεν ἐπιθυμιῶν, ὁρμήσας εἰς ὕβριν τε πᾶσαν καὶ τὸ ἐκείνων εἶδος μίσει τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς φειδωλίας, φύσιν δὲ τῶν διαφθειρόντων βελτίω ἔχων, ἀγόμενος ἀμφοτέρωσε κατέστη εἰς μέσον ἀμ- D φοῖν τοῖν τρόποιν, καὶ μετρίως δή, ὡς ᾤετο, ἑκάστων ἀπολαύων οὔτε ἀνελεύθερον οὔτε παράνομον βίον ζῇ, δημοτικὸς ἐξ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ γεγονώς.

Ἦν γάρ, ἔφη, καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ δόξα περὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον.

Θὲς τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πάλιν τοῦ τοιούτου ἤδη

5. δὲ βουλόμεθα MSS.: δ' ἐβουλόμεθα cj. W. H. Thompson.
23. ἑκάστων ΑΠ: ἕκαστον A²M.
24. ἀπολαύων Π: ἀπολαβὼν AM.

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p. 572. πρεσβυτέρου γεγονότος νέον υἱὸν ἐν τοῖς τούτου αὖ ἤθεσι τεθραμμένον.

Τίθημι.

Τίθει τοίνυν καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα περὶ αὐτὸν γιγνόμενα, ἅπερ καὶ περὶ τὸν πατέρα αὐτοῦ, ἀγόμενόν τε
E εἰς πᾶσαν παρανομίαν, ὀνομαζομένην δ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγόντων ἐλευθερίαν ἅπασαν, βοηθοῦντά τε ταῖς ἐν μέσῳ ταύταις ἐπιθυμίαις πατέρα τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους οἰκείους, τοὺς δ' αὖ παραβοηθοῦντας· ὅταν δ' ἐλπίσωσιν οἱ δεινοὶ μάγοι τε καὶ τυραννοποιοὶ οὗτοι μὴ ἄλλως τὸν νέον καθέξειν, ἔρωτά τινα αὐτῷ μηχανωμένους ἐμποιῆσαι προστάτην τῶν ἀργῶν καὶ τὰ
p. 573. ἕτοιμα διανεμομένων | ἐπιθυμιῶν, ὑπόπτερον καὶ μέγαν κηφῆνά τινα· ἢ τί ἄλλο οἴει εἶναι τὸν τῶν τοιούτων ἔρωτα;

Οὐδὲν ἔγωγε, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἀλλ' ἢ τοῦτο.|

Οὐκοῦν ὅταν περὶ αὐτὸν βομβοῦσαι αἱ ἄλλαι ἐπιθυμίαι, θυμιαμάτων τε γέμουσαι καὶ μύρων καὶ στεφάνων καὶ οἴνων καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις συνουσίαις ἡδονῶν ἀνειμένων, ἐπὶ τὸ ἔσχατον αὔξουσαί τε καὶ τρέφουσαι πόθου κέντρον ἐμποιήσωσι τῷ κηφῆνι, τότε δὴ δορυφορεῖταί τε ὑπὸ μανίας καὶ
B οἰστρᾷ οὗτος ὁ προστάτης τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ἐάν τινας ἐν αὑτῷ δόξας ἢ ἐπιθυμίας λάβῃ ποιουμένας χρηστὰς καὶ ἔτι ἐπαισχυνομένας, ἀποκτείνει τε καὶ ἔξω ὠθεῖ παρ' αὑτοῦ, ἕως ἂν καθήρῃ σωφροσύνης καὶ μανίας δὲ πληρώσῃ ἐπακτοῦ.

Παντελῶς, ἔφη, τυραννικοῦ ἀνδρὸς λέγεις γένεσιν.

'The t[...] nical [...] is m[...]

14. ἤ τι ἄλλο A. 17. ὅταν δὴ Π.
25. ἐπαισχυνομένας Π : ἐπαισχυνόμενος AM. 26. καὶ AM : om. Π.

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of lusts and appetites.

Love, drink, madness are but different forms of tyranny.

p. 573. Ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τὸ πάλαι διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον τύραννος ὁ Ἔρως λέγεται;

Κινδυνεύει, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν, ὦ φίλε, εἶπον, καὶ μεθυσθεὶς ἀνὴρ τυραννικόν τι φρόνημα ἴσχει; C

Ἴσχει γάρ.

Καὶ μὴν ὅ γε μαινόμενος καὶ ὑποκεκινηκὼς οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ καὶ θεῶν ἐπιχειρεῖ τε καὶ ἐλπίζει δυνατὸς εἶναι ἄρχειν.

Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη.

Τυραννικὸς δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ δαιμόνιε, ἀνὴρ ἀκριβῶς γίγνεται, ὅταν ἢ φύσει ἢ ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἢ ἀμφοτέροις μεθυστικός τε καὶ ἐρωτικὸς καὶ μελαγχολικὸς γένηται.

Παντελῶς μὲν οὖν.

Γίγνεται μέν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὕτω καὶ τοιοῦτος *ἀνήρ· ζῇ δὲ δὴ πῶς;

Τὸ τῶν παιζόντων, ἔφη, τοῦτο σὺ καὶ ἐμοὶ D ἐρεῖς.

Λέγω δή, ἔφην. οἶμαι γάρ, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἑορταὶ γίγνονται παρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ κῶμοι καὶ θάλειαι καὶ ἑταῖραι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ὧν ἂν Ἔρως τύραννος ἔνδον οἰκῶν διακυβερνᾷ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἅπαντα.

Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ πολλαὶ καὶ δειναὶ παραβλαστάνουσιν ἐπιθυμίαι ἡμέρας τε καὶ νυκτὸς ἑκάστης, πολλῶν δεόμεναι;

Πολλαὶ μέντοι.

Ταχὺ ἄρα ἀναλίσκονται, ἐάν τινες ὦσι πρόσοδοι.

16. ἀνήρ ΑΠΜ.

p. 573. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

E Καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο δὴ δανεισμοὶ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας παραιρέσεις.

Τί μήν;

His desires become greater and his means less.

Ὅταν δὲ δὴ πάντ' ἐπιλίπῃ, ἆρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη μὲν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας βοᾶν πυκνάς τε καὶ σφοδρὰς ἐννενεοττευμένας, τοὺς δ' ὥσπερ ὑπὸ κέντρων ἐλαυνομένους τῶν τε ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ διαφερόντως ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ Ἔρωτος, πάσαις ταῖς ἄλλαις ὥσπερ δορυφόροις ἡγουμένου, οἰστρᾶν καὶ σκοπεῖν τίς τι ἔχει, ὃν δυνατὸν ἀφελέσθαι ἀπατήσαντα ἢ βιασάμενον;

Σφόδρα γ', ἔφη.

p. 574. Ἀναγκαῖον δὴ πανταχόθεν φέρειν, ἢ | μεγάλαις ὠδῖσί τε καὶ ὀδύναις ξυνέχεσθαι.

Ἀναγκαῖον.

He will rob his father and mother.

Ἆρ' οὖν, ὥσπερ αἱ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡδοναὶ ἐπιγιγνόμεναι τῶν ἀρχαίων πλέον εἶχον καὶ τὰ ἐκείνων ἀφῃροῦντο, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸς ἀξιώσει νεώτερος ὢν πατρός τε καὶ μητρὸς πλέον ἔχειν, καὶ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, ἐὰν τὸ αὑτοῦ μέρος ἀναλώσῃ, ἀπονειμάμενος τῶν πατρῴων;

Ἀλλὰ τί μήν; ἔφη.

B Ἂν δὲ δὴ αὐτῷ μὴ ἐπιτρέπωσιν, ἆρ' οὐ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐπιχειροῖ ἂν κλέπτειν καὶ ἀπατᾶν τοὺς γονέας;

Πάντως.

Ὁπότε δὲ μὴ δύναιτο, ἁρπάζοι ἂν καὶ βιάζοιτο μετὰ τοῦτο;

Οἶμαι, ἔφη.

Ἀντεχομένων δὴ καὶ μαχομένων, ὦ θαυμάσιε, γέροντός τε καὶ γραός, ἆρ' εὐλαβηθείη ἂν καὶ φείσαιτο μή τι δρᾶσαι τῶν τυραννικῶν;

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He will prefer the love of a girl or a youth to his aged parents, and may even be induced to strike them.

Οὐ πάνυ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἔγωγε θαρρῶ περὶ τῶν γονέων p. 574.
τοῦ τοιούτου.

'Αλλ', ὦ 'Αδείμαντε, πρὸς Διός, ἕνεκα νεωστὶ φίλης καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαίας ἑταίρας γεγονυίας τὴν πάλαι φίλην καὶ ἀναγκαίαν μητέρα, ἢ ἕνεκα ὡραίου C
νεωστὶ φίλου γεγονότος οὐκ ἀναγκαίου τὸν ἄωρόν τε καὶ ἀναγκαῖον πρεσβύτην πατέρα καὶ τῶν φίλων ἀρχαιότατον δοκεῖ ἄν σοι ὁ τοιοῦτος πληγαῖς τε δοῦναι καὶ καταδουλώσασθαι ἂν αὐτοὺς ὑπ' ἐκείνοις, εἰ εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν οἰκίαν ἀγάγοιτο;

Ναὶ μὰ Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Σφόδρα γε μακάριον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔοικεν εἶναι τὸ τυραννικὸν υἱὸν τεκεῖν.

Πάνυ γ', ἔφη.

He turns highwayman, robs temples, loses all his early principles, and becomes in waking reality the evil dream which he had in sleep.

Τί δ', ὅταν δὴ τὰ πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς ἐπιλίπῃ τὸν D
τοιοῦτον, πολὺ δὲ ἤδη ξυνειλεγμένον ἐν αὐτῷ ᾖ τὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν σμῆνος, οὐ πρῶτον μὲν οἰκίας τινὸς ἐφάψεται τοίχου ἤ τινος ὀψὲ νύκτωρ ἰόντος τοῦ ἱματίου, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἱερόν τι νεωκορήσει; καὶ ἐν τούτοις δὴ πᾶσιν, ἃς πάλαι εἶχε δόξας ἐκ παιδὸς περὶ καλῶν τε καὶ αἰσχρῶν, τὰς δικαίας ποιουμένας, αἱ νεωστὶ ἐκ δουλείας λελυμέναι, δορυφοροῦσαι τὸν Ἔρωτα, κρατήσουσι μετ' ἐκείνου, αἳ πρότερον μὲν ὄναρ ἐλύοντο ἐν ὕπνῳ, ὅτε ἦν αὐτὸς ἔτι ὑπὸ E
νόμοις τε καὶ πατρὶ δημοκρατούμενος ἐν ἑαυτῷ· τυραννευθεὶς δὲ ὑπὸ Ἔρωτος, οἷος ὀλιγάκις ἐγίγνετο ὄναρ, ὕπαρ τοιοῦτος ἀεὶ γενόμενος, οὔτε τινὸς φόνου δεινοῦ ἀφέξεται οὔτε βρώματος οὔτ' ἔργου, ἀλλὰ

14. πάνυ ΑΜ: οὐ πάνυ Π.
15. ἐπιλίπῃ Μ: ἐπιλείπῃ Α: ἐπιλείπει Π.
21. δικαίας Α: δίκας ΠΜ.

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He gathers followers about him.

p. 575. | τυραννικῶς ἐν αὐτῷ ὁ Ἔρως ἐν πάσῃ ἀναρχίᾳ καὶ ἀνομίᾳ ζῶν, ἅτε αὐτὸς ὢν μόναρχος, τὸν ἔχοντά τε αὐτὸν ὥσπερ πόλιν ἄξει ἐπὶ πᾶσαν τόλμαν, ὅθεν αὐτόν τε καὶ τὸν περὶ αὐτὸν θόρυβον θρέψει, τὸν μὲν ἔξωθεν εἰσεληλυθότα ἀπὸ κακῆς ὁμιλίας, τὸν δ' ἔνδοθεν ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἀνεθέντα καὶ ἐλευθερωθέντα· ἢ οὐχ οὗτος ὁ βίος τοῦ τοιούτου;

Οὗτος μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Καὶ ἂν μέν γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὀλίγοι οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἐν B πόλει ὦσι καὶ τὸ ἄλλο πλῆθος σωφρονῇ, ἐξελθόντες ἄλλον τινὰ δορυφοροῦσι τύραννον ἢ μισθοῦ ἐπικουροῦσιν, ἐάν που πόλεμος ᾖ· ἐὰν δ' ἐν εἰρήνῃ τε καὶ ἡσυχίᾳ γένωνται, αὐτοῦ δὴ ἐν τῇ πόλει κακὰ δρῶσι σμικρὰ πολλά.

Τὰ ποῖα δὴ λέγεις;

Οἷα κλέπτουσι, τοιχωρυχοῦσι, βαλλαντιοτομοῦσι, λωποδυτοῦσιν, ἱεροσυλοῦσιν, ἀνδραποδίζονται· ἔστι δ' ὅτε συκοφαντοῦσιν, ἐὰν δυνατοὶ ὦσι λέγειν, καὶ ψευδομαρτυροῦσι καὶ δωροδοκοῦσιν.

C Σμικρά γ', ἔφη, κακὰ λέγεις, ἐὰν ὀλίγοι ὦσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι.

A private person can do but little harm in comparison of the tyrant.

Τὰ γὰρ σμικρά, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς τὰ μεγάλα σμικρά ἐστι, καὶ ταῦτα δὴ πάντα πρὸς τύραννον πονηρίᾳ τε καὶ ἀθλιότητι πόλεως, τὸ λεγόμενον, οὐδ' ἴκταρ βάλλει. ὅταν γὰρ δὴ πολλοὶ ἐν πόλει γένωνται οἱ τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἄλλοι οἱ ξυνεπόμενοι αὐτοῖς, καὶ αἴσθωνται ἑαυτῶν τὸ πλῆθος, τότε οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ τὸν τύραννον γεννῶντες μετὰ δήμου ἀνοίας ἐκεῖνον, ὃς D ἂν αὐτῶν μάλιστα αὐτὸς ἐν αὐτῷ μέγιστον καὶ πλεῖστον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τύραννον ἔχῃ.

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Εἰκότως γ', ἔφη· τυραννικώτατος γὰρ ἂν εἴη. p. 575.

Οὐκοῦν ἐὰν μὲν ἑκόντες ὑπείκωσιν· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἐπιτρέπῃ ἡ πόλις, ὥσπερ τότε μητέρα καὶ πατέρα ἐκόλαζεν, οὕτω πάλιν τὴν πατρίδα, ἐὰν οἷός τ' ᾖ, κολάσεται ἐπεισαγόμενος νέους ἑταίρους, καὶ ὑπὸ τούτοις δὴ δουλεύουσαν τὴν πάλαι φίλην μητρίδα τε, Κρῆτές φασι, καὶ πατρίδα ἕξει τε καὶ θρέψει. καὶ τοῦτο δὴ τὸ τέλος ἂν εἴη τῆς ἐπιθυμίας τοῦ τοιούτου ἀνδρός.

Τοῦτο, ἦ δ' ὅς, παντάπασί γε. E

The behaviour of the tyrant to his early supporters.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὗτοί γε τοιοίδε γίγνονται ἰδίᾳ καὶ πρὶν ἄρχειν· πρῶτον μὲν οἷς ἂν ξυνῶσιν, ἢ κόλαξιν ἑαυτῶν ξυνόντες καὶ πᾶν ἑτοίμοις ὑπηρετεῖν, ἢ ἐάν τού τι δέωνται, αὐτοὶ | ὑποπεσόντες, p. 576. πάντα σχήματα τολμῶντες ποιεῖν ὡς οἰκεῖοι, διαπραξάμενοι δὲ ἀλλότριοι;

Καὶ σφόδρα γε.

He is always either master or servant,

Ἐν παντὶ ἄρα τῷ βίῳ ζῶσι φίλοι μὲν οὐδέποτε οὐδενί, ἀεὶ δέ του δεσπόζοντες ἢ δουλεύοντες ἄλλῳ, ἐλευθερίας δὲ καὶ φιλίας ἀληθοῦς τυραννικὴ φύσις ἀεὶ ἄγευστος.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

always treacherous,

Ἆρ' οὖν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἂν τοὺς τοιούτους ἀπίστους καλοῖμεν;

Πῶς δ' οὔ;

unjust,

Καὶ μὴν ἀδίκους γε ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ὡμολογήσαμεν περὶ δικαιοσύνης, B οἷόν ἐστιν.

Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὀρθῶς γε.

the waking reality of our dream,

Κεφαλαιωσώμεθα τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸν κάκιστον.

14. τού τι M: τουτί ΑΠ.

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Socrates, Adeimantus, Glaucon.

p. 576. ἔστι δέ που, οἷον ὄναρ διήλθομεν, ὃς ἂν ὕπαρ τοιοῦτος ᾖ.

a tyrant by nature, a tyrant in fact.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Οὐκοῦν οὗτος γίγνεται ὃς ἂν τυραννικώτατος φύσει ὢν μοναρχήσῃ, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν πλείω χρόνον ἐν τυραννίδι βιῷ, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον τοιοῦτος.

Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη διαδεξάμενος τὸν λόγον ὁ Γλαύκων.

The wicked are also the most miserable.

Ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὃς ἂν φαίνηται πονηρότατος, C καὶ ἀθλιώτατος φανήσεται; καὶ ὃς ἂν πλεῖστον χρόνον καὶ μάλιστα τυραννεύσῃ, μάλιστά τε καὶ πλεῖστον χρόνον τοιοῦτος γεγονὼς τῇ ἀληθείᾳ; τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς πολλὰ καὶ δοκεῖ.

Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ταῦτα γοῦν οὕτως ἔχειν.

Like man, like State.

Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅ γε τυραννικὸς κατὰ τὴν τυραννουμένην πόλιν ἂν εἴη ὁμοιότητι, δημοτικὸς δὲ κατὰ δημοκρατουμένην, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οὕτως;

Τί μήν;

Οὐκοῦν, ὅ τι πόλις πρὸς πόλιν ἀρετῇ καὶ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, τοῦτο καὶ ἀνὴρ πρὸς ἄνδρα;

D Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

The tyrant the opposite of the King, and tyranny of the royal state.

Τί οὖν ἀρετῇ τυραννουμένη πόλις πρὸς βασιλευομένην, οἵαν τὸ πρῶτον διήλθομεν;

Πᾶν τοὐναντίον, ἔφη· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρίστη, ἡ δὲ κακίστη.

Οὐκ ἐρήσομαι, εἶπον, ὁποτέραν λέγεις· δῆλον γάρ· ἀλλ' εὐδαιμονίας τε αὖ καὶ ἀθλιότητος ὡσαύτως ἢ ἄλλως κρίνεις; καὶ μὴ ἐκπληττώμεθα πρὸς

16. ὁμοιότητι MSS.: del. Ast et Badham.
20. ἀρετῇ (γρ.) Amg.: ἄρα ἡ ΑΠΜ.

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τὸν τύραννον ἕνα ὄντα βλέποντες, μηδ' εἴ τινες p. 576. ὀλίγοι περὶ ἐκεῖνον, ἀλλ' ὡς χρὴ ὅλην τὴν πόλιν εἰσελθόντας θεάσασθαι, καταδύντες εἰς ἅπασαν καὶ E ἰδόντες, οὕτω δόξαν ἀποφαινώμεθα.

Ἀλλ' ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, προκαλεῖ· καὶ δῆλον παντὶ ὅτι τυραννουμένης μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀθλιωτέρα, βασιλευομένης δὲ οὐκ εὐδαιμονεστέρα.

The tyrant must be stripped of his externals before he is judged.

Ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα προκαλούμενος | ὀρθῶς ἂν προκαλοίμην, ἀξιῶν p. 577. κρίνειν περὶ αὐτῶν ἐκεῖνον, ὃς δύναται τῇ διανοίᾳ εἰς ἀνδρὸς ἦθος ἐνδὺς διιδεῖν καὶ μὴ καθάπερ παῖς ἔξωθεν ὁρῶν ἐκπλήττεται ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν τυραννικῶν προστάσεως, ἣν πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω σχηματίζονται, ἀλλ' ἱκανῶς διορᾷ; εἰ οὖν οἰοίμην δεῖν ἐκείνου πάντας ἡμᾶς ἀκούειν, τοῦ δυνατοῦ μὲν κρῖναι, ξυνῳκηκότος δὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ παραγεγονότος ἔν τε ταῖς κατ' οἰκίαν πράξεσιν, ὡς πρὸς ἑκάστους τοὺς οἰκείους ἔχει, ἐν οἷς μάλιστα γυμνὸς ἂν ὀφθείη τῆς τραγικῆς B σκευῆς, καὶ ἐν αὖ τοῖς δημοσίοις κινδύνοις, καὶ ταῦτα πάντα ἰδόντα κελεύοιμεν ἐξαγγέλλειν, πῶς ἔχει εὐδαιμονίας καὶ ἀθλιότητος ὁ τύραννος πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους;

Ὀρθότατ' ἄν, ἔφη, καὶ ταῦτα προκαλοῖο.

Βούλει οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, προσποιησώμεθα ἡμεῖς εἶναι τῶν δυνατῶν ἂν κρῖναι καὶ ἤδη ἐντυχόντων τοιούτοις, ἵνα ἔχωμεν ὅστις ἀποκρινεῖται ἃ ἐρωτῶμεν;

Πάνυ γε.

The tyrannical man and state compared.

Ἴθι δή μοι, ἔφην, ὧδε σκόπει. τὴν ὁμοιότητα C ἀναμιμνησκόμενος τῆς τε πόλεως καὶ τοῦ ἀνδρός, οὕτω καθ' ἕκαστον ἐν μέρει ἀθρῶν, τὰ παθήματα ἑκατέρου λέγε.

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p. 577. Τὰ ποῖα; ἔφη.

Πρῶτον μέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὡς πόλιν εἰπεῖν, ἐλευθέραν ἢ δούλην τὴν τυραννουμένην ἐρεῖς;

Ὡς οἷόν τ', ἔφη, μάλιστα δούλην.

The State is not free, but enslaved.

Καὶ μὴν ὁρᾷς γε ἐν αὐτῇ δεσπότας καὶ ἐλευθέρους.

Ὁρῶ, ἔφη, σμικρόν γέ τι τοῦτο· τὸ δὲ ὅλον, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ τὸ ἐπιεικέστατον ἀτίμως τε καὶ ἀθλίως δοῦλον.

D Εἰ οὖν, εἶπον, ὅμοιος ἀνὴρ τῇ πόλει, οὐ καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἀνάγκη τὴν αὐτὴν τάξιν ἐνεῖναι, καὶ πολλῆς μὲν δουλείας τε καὶ ἀνελευθερίας γέμειν τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ, καὶ ταῦτα αὐτῆς τὰ μέρη δουλεύειν, ἅπερ ἦν ἐπιεικέστατα, σμικρὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ μοχθηρότατον καὶ μανικώτατον δεσπόζειν;

Like a slave, the tyrant is full of meanness, and the ruling part of him is madness.

Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

Τί οὖν; δούλην ἢ ἐλευθέραν τὴν τοιαύτην φήσεις εἶναι ψυχήν;

Δούλην δή που ἔγωγε.

Οὐκοῦν ἥ γε αὖ δούλη καὶ τυραννουμένη πόλις ἥκιστα ποιεῖ ἃ βούλεται;

Πολύ γε.

E Καὶ ἡ τυραννουμένη ἄρα ψυχὴ ἥκιστα ποιήσει ἃ ἂν βουληθῇ, ὡς περὶ ὅλης εἰπεῖν ψυχῆς· ὑπὸ δὲ οἴστρου ἀεὶ ἑλκομένη βίᾳ ταραχῆς καὶ μεταμελείας μεστὴ ἔσται.

The city which is subject to him is goaded a gadf

Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Πλουσίαν δὲ ἢ πενομένην ἀνάγκη τὴν τυραννουμένην πόλιν εἶναι;

Πενομένην.

p. 578. Καὶ ψυχὴν ἄρα τυραννικὴν | πενιχρὰν καὶ ἄπληστον ἀνάγκη ἀεὶ εἶναι.

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Socrates, Glaucon.

Οὕτως, ἦ δ' ὅς. p. 578.

Τί δέ; φόβου γέμειν ἆρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη τήν τε τοιαύτην πόλιν τόν τε τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα;

Πολλή γε.

and full of misery.

Ὀδυρμοὺς δὲ καὶ στεναγμοὺς καὶ θρήνους καὶ ἀλγηδόνας οἴει ἔν τινι ἄλλῃ πλείους εὑρήσειν;

Οὐδαμῶς.

Ἐν ἀνδρὶ δὲ ἡγεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ πλείω εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ μαινομένῳ ὑπὸ ἐπιθυμιῶν τε καὶ ἐρώτων τούτῳ τῷ τυραννικῷ;

Πῶς γὰρ ἄν; ἔφη.

Εἰς πάντα δή, οἶμαι, ταῦτά τε καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα B ἀποβλέψας τήν τε πόλιν τῶν πόλεων ἀθλιωτάτην ἔκρινας—

Οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς; ἔφη.

Also the tyrannical man is most miserable.

Καὶ μάλα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς αὖ τοῦ τυραννικοῦ τί λέγεις εἰς ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἀποβλέπων;

Μακρῷ, ἔφη, ἀθλιώτατον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων.

Τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐκέτ' ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

Πῶς; ἦ δ' ὅς.

Οὔπω, ἔφην, οἶμαι, οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος μάλιστα.

Yet there is still a more miserable being, the

Ἀλλὰ τίς μήν;

Ὅδε ἴσως σοι ἔτι δόξει εἶναι τούτου ἀθλιώτερος.

Ποῖος;

Ὃς ἄν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τυραννικὸς ὢν μὴ ἰδιώτην βίον C

2. τε M : γε ΑΠ.
5. δὲ A ? Ξ : τε ΠΜ.
12. τε ΑΠ : γε M.

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p. 578. καταβιῷ, ἀλλὰ δυστυχὴς ᾖ καὶ αὐτῷ ὑπό τινος συμφορᾶς ἐκπορισθῇ, ὥστε τυράννῳ γενέσθαι.

Τεκμαίρομαί σε, ἔφη, ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων ἀληθῆ λέγειν.

tyrannical man who is a public tyrant.

Ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἀλλ' οὐκ οἴεσθαι χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀλλ' εὖ μάλα τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγῳ σκοπεῖν· περὶ γάρ τοι τοῦ μεγίστου ἡ σκέψις, ἀγαθοῦ τε βίου καὶ κακοῦ.

Ὀρθότατα, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Σκόπει δή, εἰ ἄρα τι λέγω. δοκεῖ γάρ μοι δεῖν
D ἐννοῆσαι ἐκ τῶνδε περὶ αὐτοῦ σκοποῦντας.

Ἐκ τίνων;

In cities there are many great slave-owners, and they help to protect one another.

Ἐξ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου τῶν ἰδιωτῶν, ὅσοι πλούσιοι ἐν πόλεσιν ἀνδράποδα πολλὰ κέκτηνται. οὗτοι γὰρ τοῦτό γε προσόμοιον ἔχουσι τοῖς τυράννοις, τὸ πολλῶν ἄρχειν· διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ἐκείνου πλῆθος.

Διαφέρει γάρ.

Οἶσθ' οὖν ὅτι οὗτοι ἀδεῶς ἔχουσι καὶ οὐ φοβοῦνται τοὺς οἰκέτας;

Τί γὰρ ἂν φοβοῖντο;

Οὐδέν, εἶπον· ἀλλὰ τὸ αἴτιον ἐννοεῖς;

Ναί, ὅτι γε πᾶσα ἡ πόλις ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ βοηθεῖ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν.

But suppose a slave-owner and his slaves carried off into the wilderness, what will happen

E Καλῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις. τί δέ; εἴ τις θεῶν ἄνδρα ἕνα, ὅτῳ ἔστιν ἀνδράποδα πεντήκοντα ἢ πλείω, ἄρας ἐκ τῆς πόλεως αὐτόν τε καὶ γυναῖκα καὶ παῖδας θείη εἰς ἐρημίαν μετὰ τῆς ἄλλης οὐσίας τε καὶ τῶν οἰκετῶν, ὅπου αὐτῷ μηδεὶς τῶν ἐλευθέρων μέλλοι βοηθήσειν, ἐν ποίῳ ἄν τινι καὶ

1. δυστυχὴς ᾖ ΑΠΜ: δυστυχήσῃ cj. Bekker.
25. ἢ καὶ Π.

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ὁπόσῳ φόβῳ οἴει γενέσθαι αὐτὸν περί τε αὑτοῦ καὶ παίδων καὶ γυναικός, μὴ ἀπόλοιντο ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκετῶν; p. 578.

Ἐν παντί, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἔγωγε.

then? Such is the condition of the tyrant.

Οὐκοῦν | ἀναγκάζοιτο ἄν τινας ἤδη θωπεύειν αὐτῶν τῶν δούλων καὶ ὑπισχνεῖσθαι πολλὰ καὶ ἐλευθεροῦν οὐδὲν δεόμενος, καὶ κόλαξ αὐτὸς ἂν θεραπόντων ἀναφανείη; p. 579.

Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, αὐτῷ, ἢ ἀπολωλέναι.

Τί δ', εἰ καὶ ἄλλους, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ θεὸς κύκλῳ κατοικίσειε γείτονας πολλοὺς αὐτῷ, οἳ μὴ ἀνέχοιντο, εἴ τις ἄλλος ἄλλου δεσπόζειν ἀξιοῖ, ἀλλ' εἴ πού τινα τοιοῦτον λαμβάνοιεν, ταῖς ἐσχάταις τιμωροῖντο τιμωρίαις;

Ἔτι ἄν, ἔφη, οἶμαι, μᾶλλον ἐν παντὶ κακοῦ εἴη, B κύκλῳ φρουρούμενος ὑπὸ πάντων πολεμίων.

He is the daintiest of all men, and has to endure the hardships of a prison.

Ἆρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐν τοιούτῳ μὲν δεσμωτηρίῳ δέδεται ὁ τύραννος, φύσει ὢν οἷον διεληλύθαμεν, πολλῶν καὶ παντοδαπῶν φόβων καὶ ἐρώτων μεστός· λίχνῳ δὲ ὄντι αὐτῷ τὴν ψυχὴν μόνῳ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει οὔτε ἀποδημῆσαι ἔξεστιν οὐδαμόσε, οὔτε θεωρῆσαι ὅσων δὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐλεύθεροι ἐπιθυμηταί εἰσι, καταδεδυκὼς δὲ ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τὰ πολλὰ ὡς γυνὴ ζῇ, φθονῶν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις, ἐάν τις ἔξω ἀποδημῇ καί C τι ἀγαθὸν ὁρᾷ;

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Miserable himself, he is still more miserable if he

Οὐκοῦν τοῖς τοιούτοις κακοῖς πλείω καρποῦται ἀνήρ, ὃς ἂν κακῶς ἐν ἑαυτῷ πολιτευόμενος, ὃν νῦν δὴ σὺ ἀθλιώτατον ἔκρινας, τὸν τυραννικόν, ὡς μὴ

10. κατοικίσειεν q : κατοικήσειεν ΑΠΜ.
14. εἴη Μ : εἰ εἴη ΑΠ.
28. ὡς μὴ ΑΠΜ : μὴ ὡς Stobaeus : ὡς om. x.

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p. 579. ἰδιώτης καταβιῷ, ἀλλὰ ἀναγκασθῇ ὑπό τινος τύχης τυραννεῦσαι καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ὢν ἀκράτωρ ἄλλων ἐπιχειρήσῃ ἄρχειν, ὥσπερ εἴ τις κάμνοντι σώματι καὶ ἀκράτορι ἑαυτοῦ μὴ ἰδιωτεύων ἀλλ' ἀγωνιζόμενος
D πρὸς ἄλλα σώματα καὶ μαχόμενος ἀναγκάζοιτο διάγειν τὸν βίον.

be in a public station.

Παντάπασιν, ἔφη, ὁμοιότατά τε καὶ ἀληθέστατα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, παντελῶς τὸ πάθος ἄθλιον, καὶ τοῦ ὑπὸ σοῦ κριθέντος χαλεπώτατα ζῆν χαλεπώτερον ἔτι ζῇ ὁ τυραννῶν;

He then leads a life worse than the worst,

Κομιδῇ γ', ἔφη.

Ἔστιν ἄρα τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, κἂν εἰ μή τῳ δοκεῖ, ὁ τῷ ὄντι τύραννος τῷ ὄντι δοῦλος τὰς μεγίστας θωπείας
E καὶ δουλείας καὶ κόλαξ τῶν πονηροτάτων· καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν ἀποπιμπλάς, ἀλλὰ πλείστων ἐπιδεέστατος καὶ πένης τῇ ἀληθείᾳ φαίνεται, ἐάν τις ὅλην ψυχὴν ἐπίστηται θεάσασθαι, καὶ φόβου γέμων διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου, σφαδασμῶν τε καὶ ὀδυνῶν πλήρης, εἴπερ τῇ τῆς πόλεως διαθέσει ἧς ἄρχει ἔοικεν. ἔοικε δέ· ἦ γάρ;

in unhappiness,

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

p. 580. | Οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἔτι ἀποδώσομεν τῷ ἀνδρὶ καὶ ἃ τὸ πρότερον εἴπομεν, ὅτι ἀνάγκη καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον γίγνεσθαι αὐτῷ ἢ πρότερον διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν φθονερῷ, ἀπίστῳ, ἀδίκῳ, ἀφίλῳ, ἀνοσίῳ καὶ πάσης κακίας πανδοκεῖ τε καὶ τροφεῖ, καὶ ἐξ ἁπάντων τούτων μάλιστα μὲν αὐτῷ δυστυχεῖ εἶναι, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τοὺς πλησίον αὐτῷ τοιούτους ἀπεργάζεσθαι.

and in wickedness.

13. δοκεῖ Lobcov.: δοκῇ ΑΠΜ.

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Οὐδείς σοι, ἔφη, τῶν νοῦν ἐχόντων ἀντερεῖ. p. 580.

Ἴθι δή μοι, ἔφην ἐγώ, νῦν ἤδη ὥσπερ ὁ διὰ B πάντων κριτὴς ἀποφαίνεται, καὶ σὺ οὕτω, τίς πρῶτος κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν εὐδαιμονίᾳ καὶ τίς δεύτερος, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἑξῆς πέντε ὄντας κρῖνε, βασιλικόν, τιμοκρατικόν, ὀλιγαρχικόν, δημοκρατικόν, τυραννικόν.

The umpire decides that the best is the happiest and the worst is the most miserable. This is the proclamation of the son of Ariston.

Ἀλλὰ ῥᾳδία, ἔφη, ἡ κρίσις. καθάπερ γὰρ εἰσῆλθον ἔγωγε ὥσπερ χοροὺς κρίνω ἀρετῇ καὶ κακίᾳ καὶ εὐδαιμονίᾳ καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ.

Μισθωσώμεθα οὖν κήρυκα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ αὐτὸς ἀνείπω, ὅτι ὁ Ἀρίστωνος υἱὸς τὸν ἄριστόν τε καὶ C δικαιότατον εὐδαιμονέστατον ἔκρινε, τοῦτον δ' εἶναι τὸν βασιλικώτατον καὶ βασιλεύοντα αὑτοῦ, τὸν δὲ κάκιστόν τε καὶ ἀδικώτατον ἀθλιώτατον, τοῦτον δὲ αὖ τυγχάνειν ὄντα ὃς ἂν τυραννικώτατος ὢν ἑαυτοῦ τε ὅ τι μάλιστα τυραννῇ καὶ τῆς πόλεως;

Ἀνειρήσθω σοι, ἔφη.

Ἦ οὖν προσαναγορεύω, εἶπον, ἐάν τε λανθάνωσι τοιοῦτοι ὄντες ἐάν τε μὴ πάντας ἀνθρώπους τε καὶ θεούς;

Προσαναγόρευε, ἔφη.

Εἶεν δή, εἶπον· αὕτη μὲν ἡμῖν ἡ ἀπόδειξις μία D ἂν εἴη· δευτέραν δὲ δεῖ τήνδε, ἐάν τι δόξῃ, εἶναι.

Τίς αὕτη;

Proof, derived from the three principles of the soul.

Ἐπειδή, ὥσπερ πόλις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διῄρηται κατὰ τρία εἴδη, οὕτω καὶ ψυχὴ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου τριχῇ, δέξεται, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἑτέραν ἀπόδειξιν.

5. κρῖνε ΜΞ: κρῖναι ΑΠ. 24. δὲ δεῖ Ξ: δεῖ[β] δὲ[α] Μ: δεῖ δὲ ΑΠ.
27. δέξεται Ξ: τὸ λογιστικὸν δέξεται Α: λογιστικὸν δέξεται ΠΜ: λογιστικὸν ἐπιθυμητικὸν θυμικὸν δέξεται Κ.

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p. 580. Τίνα ταύτην;

Τήνδε. τριῶν ὄντων τριτταὶ καὶ ἡδοναί μοι φαίνονται, ἑνὸς ἑκάστου μία ἰδία· ἐπιθυμίαι τε ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀρχαί.

Πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη.

Τὸ μέν, φαμέν, ἦν ᾧ μανθάνει ἄνθρωπος, τὸ δὲ ᾧ θυμοῦται, τὸ δὲ τρίτον διὰ πολυειδίαν ἑνὶ οὐκ ἔσχο- E μεν ὀνόματι προσειπεῖν ἰδίῳ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ ὃ μέγιστον καὶ ἰσχυρότατον εἶχεν ἐν αὑτῷ, τούτῳ ἐπωνομάσαμεν· ἐπιθυμητικὸν γὰρ αὐτὸ κεκλήκαμεν διὰ σφοδρότητα τῶν περὶ τὴν ἐδωδὴν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ πόσιν καὶ ἀφροδίσια καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τούτοις ἀκόλουθα, καὶ φιλοχρήματον δή, ὅτι διὰ χρημάτων μάλιστα ἀποτελοῦνται p. 581. | αἱ τοιαῦται ἐπιθυμίαι.

Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἔφη.

(1) The appetitive:

Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ φιλίαν εἰ φαῖμεν εἶναι τοῦ κέρδους, μάλιστ' ἂν εἰς ἓν κεφάλαιον ἀπερειδοίμεθα τῷ λόγῳ, ὥστε τι ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς δηλοῦν, ὁπότε τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ μέρος λέγοιμεν, καὶ καλοῦντες αὐτὸ φιλοχρήματον καὶ φιλοκερδὲς ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοῖμεν;

Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ἔφη.

Τί δέ; τὸ θυμοειδὲς οὐ πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν μέντοι φαμὲν καὶ νικᾶν καὶ εὐδοκιμεῖν ἀεὶ ὅλον ὡρμῆσθαι;

B Καὶ μάλα.

(2) The ambitious:

Εἰ οὖν φιλόνεικον αὐτὸ καὶ φιλότιμον προσαγορεύοιμεν, ἦ ἐμμελῶς ἂν ἔχοι;

Ἐμμελέστατα μὲν οὖν.

(3) The principle of

Ἀλλὰ μὴν ᾧ γε μανθάνομεν, παντὶ δῆλον ὅτι

3. ἰδία ΠΜ: ἰδίᾳ A. 17. φάμεν (sic) A.

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knowledge and truth.

πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν ὅπῃ ἔχει πᾶν ἀεὶ τέταται, καὶ χρημάτων τε καὶ δόξης ἥκιστα τούτων τούτῳ μέλει. p. 581.

Πολύ γε.

Φιλομαθὲς δὴ καὶ φιλόσοφον καλοῦντες αὐτὸ κατὰ τρόπον ἂν καλοῖμεν;

Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἄρχει ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν C μὲν τοῦτο, τῶν δὲ τὸ ἕτερον ἐκείνων, ὁπότερον ἂν τύχῃ;

Οὕτως, ἔφη.

Διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἀνθρώπων λέγωμεν τὰ πρῶτα τριττὰ γένη εἶναι, φιλόσοφον, φιλόνεικον, φιλοκερδές;

Κομιδῇ γε.

Καὶ ἡδονῶν δὴ τρία εἴδη, ὑποκείμενον ἓν ἑκάστῳ τούτων;

Πάνυ γε.

Each will depreciate the others, but only the philosopher has the power to judge,

Οἶσθ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι εἰ θέλοις τρεῖς τοιούτους ἀνθρώπους ἐν μέρει ἕκαστον ἀνερωτᾶν, τίς τούτων τῶν βίων ἥδιστος, τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστος μάλιστα ἐγκωμιάσεται; ὅ τε χρηματιστικὸς πρὸς τὸ D κερδαίνειν τὴν τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι ἡδονὴν ἢ τὴν τοῦ μανθάνειν οὐδενὸς ἀξίαν φήσει εἶναι, εἰ μὴ εἴ τι αὐτῶν ἀργύριον ποιεῖ;

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.

Τί δὲ ὁ φιλότιμος; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οὐ τὴν μὲν ἀπὸ

2. τέταται ΑΠ: τέτακται Μ. τούτων MSS.: πάντων cj. W. H. Thompson: del. Baiter.

12. λέγωμεν ΑΠ: λέγομεν Μ.

16. ὑποκείμενον ΑΠ: ὑποκείμενα ΞA^2M.

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because he alone has experience of the highest pleasures and is acquainted with the lowest.

p. 581. τῶν χρημάτων ἡδονὴν φορτικήν τινα ἡγεῖται, καὶ αὖ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ μανθάνειν, ὅ τι μὴ μάθημα τιμὴν φέρει, καπνὸν καὶ φλυαρίαν;

Οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔχει.

Τὸν δὲ φιλόσοφον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, *τί οἰώμεθα τὰς E ἄλλας ἡδονὰς νομίζειν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ εἰδέναι τἀληθὲς ὅπῃ ἔχει καὶ ἐν τοιούτῳ τινὶ ἀεὶ εἶναι μανθάνοντα; τῆς †ἡδονῆς οὐ πάνυ πόρρω; καὶ καλεῖν τῷ ὄντι ἀναγκαίας, ὡς οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων δεόμενον, εἰ μὴ ἀνάγκη ἦν;

Εὖ, ἔφη, δεῖ εἰδέναι;

Ὅτε δὴ οὖν, εἶπον, ἀμφισβητοῦνται ἑκάστου τοῦ εἴδους αἱ ἡδοναὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ βίος, μὴ ὅτι πρὸς τὸ κάλλιον καὶ αἴσχιον ζῆν μηδὲ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ ἄμεινον, p. 582. ἀλλὰ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ἥδιον καὶ ἀλυπότερον, | πῶς ἂν εἰδεῖμεν, τίς αὐτῶν ἀληθέστατα λέγει;

Οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη, ἔγωγε ἔχω εἰπεῖν.

Ἀλλ' ὧδε σκόπει· τίνι χρὴ κρίνεσθαι τὰ μέλλοντα καλῶς κριθήσεσθαι; ἆρ' οὐκ ἐμπειρίᾳ τε καὶ φρονήσει καὶ λόγῳ; ἢ τούτων ἔχοι ἄν τις βέλτιον κριτήριον;

Καὶ πῶς ἄν; ἔφη.

Σκόπει δή· τριῶν ὄντων τῶν ἀνδρῶν τίς ἐμπειρότατος πασῶν ὧν εἴπομεν ἡδονῶν; πότερον ὁ φιλοκερδής, μανθάνων αὐτὴν τὴν ἀλήθειαν οἷόν ἐστιν, B ἐμπειρότερος δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰδέναι ἡδονῆς, ἢ ὁ φιλόσοφος τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ κερδαίνειν;

5. τί οἰώμεθα cj. Graser : ποιώμεθα MSS. 6. νομίζειν ΑΠΜ : νομίζειν οὐδὲν A^{2}Ξ.

7. ἔχει AM : ἴσχει Π.

8. τῆς ἡδονῆς MSS. (τῆς ἡδονῆς A): del. Baiter : ἡδονήν; cj. Madvig : an τῆς ἀληθινῆς?

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Πολύ, ἔφη, διαφέρει. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀνάγκη γεύεσθαι τῶν ἑτέρων ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξαμένῳ· τῷ δὲ φιλοκερδεῖ, ὅπῃ πέφυκε τὰ ὄντα μανθάνοντι, τῆς ἡδονῆς ταύτης, ὡς γλυκεῖά ἐστιν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη γεύεσθαι οὐδ' ἐμπείρῳ γίγνεσθαι, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ προθυμουμένῳ οὐ ῥᾴδιον. p. 582.

Πολὺ ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διαφέρει τοῦ γε φιλοκερδοῦς ὁ φιλόσοφος ἐμπειρίᾳ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ἡδονῶν.

Πολὺ μέντοι. C

Τί δὲ τοῦ φιλοτίμου; ἆρα μᾶλλον ἄπειρός ἐστι τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι ἡδονῆς ἢ ἐκεῖνος τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ φρονεῖν;

Ἀλλὰ τιμὴ μέν, ἔφη, ἐάνπερ ἐξεργάζωνται ἐπὶ ὃ ἕκαστος ὥρμηκε, πᾶσιν αὐτοῖς ἕπεται· καὶ γὰρ ὁ πλούσιος ὑπὸ πολλῶν τιμᾶται καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ ὁ σοφός, ὥστε ἀπό γε τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, οἷόν ἐστι, πάντες τῆς ἡδονῆς ἔμπειροι· τῆς δὲ τοῦ ὄντος θέας, οἵαν ἡδονὴν ἔχει, ἀδύνατον ἄλλῳ γεγεῦσθαι πλὴν τῷ φιλοσόφῳ.

Ἐμπειρίας μὲν ἄρα, εἶπον, ἕνεκα κάλλιστα τῶν ἀνδρῶν κρίνει οὗτος. D

Πολύ γε.

The philosopher alone having both judgment and experience,

Καὶ μὴν μετά γε φρονήσεως μόνος ἔμπειρος γεγονὼς ἔσται.

Τί μήν;

Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ δι' οὗ γε δεῖ ὀργάνου κρίνεσθαι, οὐ τοῦ φιλοκερδοῦς τοῦτο ὄργανον οὐδὲ τοῦ φιλοτίμου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ φιλοσόφου.

13. τιμὴ μὲν *v* et corr. Θ : τιμὴν A : τί μὴν ΠΜ.
15. ὁ σοφὸς A²M : σοφὸς AΠ.
21. κρίνει AΠΜ : κρινεῖ cj. Bekker. οὗτος ΠΜ : οὕτως A.

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p. 582. Τὸ ποῖον;

Διὰ λόγων που ἔφαμεν δεῖν κρίνεσθαι. ἢ γάρ;

Ναί.

Λόγοι δὲ τούτου μάλιστα ὄργανον.

Πῶς δ' οὔ;

Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν πλούτῳ καὶ κέρδει ἄριστα ἐκρίνετο E τὰ κρινόμενα, ἃ ἐπῄνει ὁ φιλοκερδὴς καὶ ἔψεγεν, ἀνάγκη ἂν ἦν ταῦτα ἀληθέστατα εἶναι.

Πολλή γε.

Εἰ δὲ τιμῇ τε καὶ νίκῃ καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ, ἆρ' οὐχ ἃ ὁ φιλότιμός τε καὶ ὁ φιλόνεικος;

Δῆλον.

Ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐμπειρίᾳ καὶ φρονήσει καὶ λόγῳ;

Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ἃ ὁ φιλόσοφός τε καὶ ὁ φιλόλογος ἐπαινεῖ, ἀληθέστατα εἶναι.

p. 583. Τριῶν ἄρ' οὐσῶν τῶν | ἡδονῶν ἡ τούτου τοῦ μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς, ᾧ μανθάνομεν, ἡδίστη ἂν εἴη, καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἡμῶν τοῦτο ἄρχει, ὁ τούτου βίος ἥδιστος;

Πῶς δ' οὐ μέλλει; ἔφη· κύριος γοῦν ἐπαινέτης ὢν ἐπαινεῖ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ βίον ὁ φρόνιμος.

Τίνα δὲ δεύτερον, εἶπον, βίον καὶ τίνα δευτέραν ἡδονήν φησιν ὁ κριτὴς εἶναι;

Δῆλον ὅτι τὴν τοῦ πολεμικοῦ τε καὶ φιλοτίμου· ἐγγυτέρω γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἐστὶν ἢ ἡ τοῦ χρηματιστοῦ.

Ὑστάτην δὴ τὴν τοῦ φιλοκερδοῦς, ὡς ἔοικεν.

Τί μήν; ἦ δ' ὅς.

B Ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν οὕτω δύ' ἐφεξῆς ἂν εἴη καὶ δὶς νενικηκὼς ὁ δίκαιος τὸν ἄδικον· τὸ δὲ τρίτον ὀλυμπικῶς τῷ σωτῆρί τε καὶ τῷ Ὀλυμπίῳ Διί, ἄθρει ὅτι οὐδὲ παναληθής ἐστιν ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονὴ πλὴν τῆς

the pleasures which he approves are the true pleasures; he places (1) the love of wisdom, (2) of honour, (3) and lowest the love of gain.

True pleasure is not relative

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but absolute.

τοῦ φρονίμου οὐδὲ καθαρά, ἀλλ' ἐσκιαγραφημένη τις, ὡς ἐγὼ δοκῶ μοι τῶν σοφῶν τινὸς ἀκηκοέναι. καίτοι τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη μέγιστόν τε καὶ κυριώτατον τῶν πτωμάτων. p. 583.

Πολύ γε· ἀλλὰ πῶς λέγεις;

Ὧδ', εἶπον, ἐξευρήσω, σοῦ ἀποκρινομένου ζητῶν ἅμα. C

Ἐρώτα δή, ἔφη.

Λέγε δή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οὐκ ἐναντίον φαμὲν λύπην ἡδονῇ;

Καὶ μάλα.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ μήτε χαίρειν μήτε λυπεῖσθαι εἶναί τι;

Εἶναι μέντοι.

Μεταξὺ τούτοιν ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσῳ ὂν ἡσυχίαν τινὰ περὶ ταῦτα τῆς ψυχῆς; οὐχ οὕτως αὐτὸ λέγεις;

Οὕτως, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Ἆρ' οὐ μνημονεύεις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοὺς τῶν καμνόντων λόγους, οὓς λέγουσιν ὅταν κάμνωσιν;

Ποίους;

Ὡς οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστὶν ἥδιον τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν, ἀλλὰ σφᾶς ἐλελήθει, πρὶν κάμνειν, ἥδιστον ὄν. D

Μέμνημαι, ἔφη.

The states intermediate between pleasure and pain are termed pleasures or pains only in relation to their opposites.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν περιωδυνίᾳ τινὶ ἐχομένων ἀκούεις λεγόντων, ὡς οὐδὲν ἥδιον τοῦ παύσασθαι ὀδυνώμενον;

Ἀκούω.

Καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις γε, οἶμαι, πολλοῖς τοιούτοις αἰσθάνει γιγνομένους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἐν οἷς, ὅταν λυπῶνται, τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν ἡσυχίαν τοῦ

30. τὸ μὴ A²ΠΜ: μὴ A.

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p. 583. τοιούτου ἐγκωμιάζουσιν ὡς ἥδιστον, οὐ τὸ χαίρειν.

Τοῦτο γάρ, ἔφη, τότε ἡδὺ ἴσως καὶ ἀγαπητὸν γίγνεται, ἡσυχία.

E Καὶ ὅταν παύσηται ἄρα, εἶπον, χαίρων τις, ἡ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἡσυχία λυπηρὸν ἔσται.

Ἴσως, ἔφη.

Ὃ μεταξὺ ἄρα νῦν δὴ ἀμφοτέρων ἔφαμεν εἶναι, τὴν ἡσυχίαν, τοῦτό ποτε ἀμφότερα ἔσται, λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή.

Ἔοικεν.

Ἦ καὶ δυνατὸν τὸ μηδέτερα ὂν ἀμφότερα γίγνεσθαι;

Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.

Pleasure and pain are said to be states of rest, but they are really motions.

Καὶ μὴν τό γε ἡδὺ ἐν ψυχῇ γιγνόμενον καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν κίνησίς τις ἀμφοτέρω ἐστόν· ἢ οὔ;

Ναί.

p. 584. | Τὸ δὲ μήτε λυπηρὸν μήτε ἡδὺ οὐχὶ ἡσυχία μέντοι καὶ ἐν μέσῳ τούτοιν ἐφάνη ἄρτι;

Ἐφάνη γάρ.

Πῶς οὖν ὀρθῶς ἔστι τὸ μὴ ἀλγεῖν ἡδὺ ἡγεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ μὴ χαίρειν ἀνιαρόν;

Οὐδαμῶς.

Οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ φαίνεται, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, παρὰ τὸ ἀλγεινὸν ἡδὺ καὶ παρὰ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀλγεινὸν τότε ἡ ἡσυχία, καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς τούτων τῶν φαντασμάτων πρὸς ἡδονῆς ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ γοητεία τις.

Ὡς γοῦν ὁ λόγος, ἔφη, σημαίνει.

All pleasures

B Ἰδὲ τοίνυν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἡδονάς, αἳ οὐκ ἐκ λυπῶν

30. ἔφην A²M : ἔφην δ' AΠ : ἦν δ' q.

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are not merely cessations of pains, or pains of pleasures; e.g. the pleasures of smell are not.

εἰσίν, ἵνα μὴ πολλάκις οἰηθῇς ἐν τῷ παρόντι οὕτω p. 584. τοῦτο πεφυκέναι, ἡδονὴν μὲν παῦλαν λύπης εἶναι, λύπην δὲ ἡδονῆς.

Ποῦ δή, ἔφη, καὶ ποίας λέγεις;

Πολλαὶ μέν, εἶπον, καὶ ἄλλαι, μάλιστα δ' εἰ θέλεις ἐννοῆσαι τὰς περὶ τὰς ὀσμὰς ἡδονάς. αὗται γὰρ οὐ προλυπηθέντι ἐξαίφνης ἀμήχανοι τὸ μέγεθος γίγνονται, παυσάμεναί τε λύπην οὐδεμίαν καταλείπουσιν.

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

Μὴ ἄρα πειθώμεθα καθαρὰν ἡδονὴν εἶναι τὴν C λύπης ἀπαλλαγήν, μηδὲ λύπην τὴν ἡδονῆς.

Μὴ γάρ.

Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, εἶπον, αἵ γε διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνουσαι καὶ λεγόμεναι ἡδοναί, σχεδὸν αἱ πλεῖσταί τε καὶ μέγισται, τούτου τοῦ εἴδους εἰσί, λυπῶν τινὲς ἀπαλλαγαί.

Εἰσὶ γάρ.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ αἱ πρὸ μελλόντων τούτων ἐκ προσδοκίας γιγνόμεναι προησθήσεις τε καὶ προλυπήσεις κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχουσιν;

Κατὰ ταὐτά.

Οἶσθ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἷαί εἰσι καὶ ᾧ μάλιστα D ἐοίκασιν;

Τῷ; ἔφη.

Νομίζεις τι, εἶπον, ἐν τῇ φύσει εἶναι τὸ μὲν ἄνω, τὸ δὲ κάτω, τὸ δὲ μέσον;

Ἔγωγε.

Illustrations of the unreality of

Οἴει οὖν ἄν τινα ἐκ τοῦ κάτω φερόμενον πρὸς μέσον ἄλλο τι οἴεσθαι ἢ ἄνω φέρεσθαι; καὶ ἐν

20. προησθήσεις ΑΠΜ: προαισθήσεις Ξ.

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certain pleasures.

p. 584. μέσῳ στάντα, ἀφορῶντα ὅθεν ἐνήνεκται, ἄλλοθί που ἂν ἡγεῖσθαι εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ ἄνω, μὴ ἑωρακότα τὸ ἀληθῶς ἄνω;

Μὰ Δί', οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἔφη, ἄλλως οἶμαι οἰηθῆναι ἂν τὸν τοιοῦτον.

E 'Αλλ' εἰ πάλιν γ', ἔφην, φέροιτο, κάτω τ' ἂν οἴοιτο φέρεσθαι καὶ ἀληθῆ οἴοιτο;

Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Οὐκοῦν ταῦτα πάσχοι ἂν πάντα διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔμπειρος εἶναι τοῦ ἀληθινῶς ἄνω τε ὄντος καὶ ἐν μέσῳ καὶ κάτω;

Δῆλον δή.

Θαυμάζοις ἂν οὖν, εἰ καὶ ἄπειροι ἀληθείας περὶ πολλῶν τε ἄλλων μὴ ὑγιεῖς δόξας ἔχουσι, πρός τε ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην καὶ τὸ μεταξὺ τούτων οὕτω διάκεινται, ὥστε, ὅταν μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν φέ-
p. 585. ρωνται, ἀληθῆ τε | οἴονται καὶ τῷ ὄντι λυποῦνται, ὅταν δὲ ἀπὸ λύπης ἐπὶ τὸ μεταξύ, σφόδρα μὲν οἴονται πρὸς πληρώσει τε καὶ ἡδονῇ γίγνεσθαι, ὥσπερ δὲ πρὸς μέλαν φαιὸν ἀποσκοποῦντες ἀπειρίᾳ λευκοῦ, καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄλυπον οὕτω λύπην ἀφορῶντες ἀπειρίᾳ ἡδονῆς ἀπατῶνται;

Μὰ Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον, εἰ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει.

Ὧδέ γ' οὖν, εἶπον, ἐννόει· οὐχὶ πεῖνα καὶ δίψα
B καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κενώσεις τινές εἰσι τῆς περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἕξεως;

Τί μήν;

4. ἄλλως ΠΜ : ἀλλ' ὡς A.
11. κάτω ΠΜ : κάτα A. 13. καὶ ΑΠΜ : καὶ οἱ *v* : οἱ cj. Herm.
19. δὲ *q* : om. ΑΠΜ.

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Ἄγνοια δὲ καὶ ἀφροσύνη ἆρ᾽ οὐ κενότης ἐστὶ τῆς p. 585. περὶ ψυχὴν αὖ ἕξεως;

Μάλα γε.

Οὐκοῦν πληροῖτ᾽ ἂν ὅ τε τροφῆς μεταλαμβάνων καὶ ὁ νοῦν ἴσχων;

Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;

The intellectual more real than the sensual.

Πλήρωσις δὲ ἀληθεστέρα τοῦ ἧττον ἢ τοῦ μᾶλλον ὄντος;

Δῆλον, ὅτι τοῦ μᾶλλον.

Πότερα οὖν ἡγεῖ τὰ γένη μᾶλλον καθαρᾶς οὐσίας μετέχειν, τὰ οἷον σίτου τε καὶ ποτοῦ καὶ ὄψου καὶ ξυμπάσης τροφῆς, ἢ τὸ δόξης τε ἀληθοῦς εἶδος καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ νοῦ καὶ ξυλλήβδην αὖ πάσης ἀρετῆς; C ὧδε δὲ κρῖνε· τὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου ἐχόμενον καὶ ἀθανάτου καὶ † ἀληθείας, καὶ αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον ὂν καὶ ἐν τοιούτῳ γιγνόμενον, μᾶλλον εἶναί σοι δοκεῖ, ἢ τὸ τοῦ μηδέποτε ὁμοίου καὶ θνητοῦ, καὶ αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον ὂν καὶ ἐν τοιούτῳ γιγνόμενον;

Πολύ, ἔφη, διαφέρει τὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου.

Ἡ οὖν * τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου οὐσία οὐσίας τι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπιστήμης μετέχει;

Οὐδαμῶς.

Τί δ᾽, ἀληθείας;

Οὐδὲ τοῦτο.

— Εἰ δὲ ἀληθείας ἧττον, οὐ καὶ οὐσίας;

Ἀνάγκη.

Οὐκοῦν ὅλως τὰ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος θεραπείαν D

11. τὰ A²ΠM: om. A. οἷον A.
15. καὶ ἀληθείας MSS.: del. Madvig: an καὶ ἀληθοῦς? αὐτὸ M: αὖ τὸ A. 17. αὐτὸ ΠM: αὖ τὸ A.
20. τοῦ cj. Madvig: om. MSS.
24, 25. τοῦτο: εἰ] Lacunam inter haec verba statuit Madvig.

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p. 585. γένη τῶν γενῶν αὖ τῶν περὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς θεραπείαν ἧττον ἀληθείας τε καὶ οὐσίας μετέχει;

Πολύ γε.

Σῶμα δὲ αὐτὸ ψυχῆς οὐκ οἴει οὕτως;

Ἔγωγε.

Οὐκοῦν τὸ τῶν μᾶλλον ὄντων πληρούμενον καὶ αὐτὸ μᾶλλον ὂν ὄντως μᾶλλον πληροῦται, ἢ τὸ τῶν ἧττον ὄντων καὶ αὐτὸ ἧττον ὄν;

Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Εἰ ἄρα τὸ πληροῦσθαι τῶν φύσει προσηκόντων ἡδύ ἐστι, τὸ τῷ ὄντι καὶ τῶν ὄντων πληρούμενον E μᾶλλον μᾶλλον ὄντως τε καὶ ἀληθεστέρως χαίρειν ἂν ποιοῖ ἡδονῇ ἀληθεῖ, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἧττον ὄντων μεταλαμβάνον ἧττόν τε ἂν ἀληθῶς καὶ βεβαίως πληροῖτο καὶ ἀπιστοτέρας ἂν ἡδονῆς καὶ ἧττον ἀληθοῦς μεταλαμβάνοι.

Ἀναγκαιότατα, ἔφη.

The pleasures of the sensual and also of the passionate element are unreal and mixed.

Οἱ ἄρα φρονήσεως καὶ ἀρετῆς ἄπειροι, εὐωχίαις p. 586. | δὲ καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀεὶ ξυνόντες, κάτω, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ μέχρι πάλιν πρὸς τὸ μεταξὺ φέρονταί τε καὶ ταύτῃ πλανῶνται διὰ βίου, ὑπερβάντες δὲ τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ ἀληθῶς ἄνω οὔτε ἀνέβλεψαν πώποτε οὔτε ἠνέχθησαν, οὐδὲ τοῦ ὄντος τῷ ὄντι ἐπληρώθησαν, οὐδὲ βεβαίου τε καὶ καθαρᾶς ἡδονῆς ἐγεύσαντο, ἀλλὰ βοσκημάτων δίκην κάτω ἀεὶ βλέποντες καὶ κεκυφότες εἰς γῆν καὶ εἰς τραπέζας βόσκονται χορ- B ταζόμενοι καὶ ὀχεύοντες, καὶ ἕνεκα τῆς τούτων πλεονεξίας λακτίζοντες καὶ κυρίττοντες ἀλλήλους σιδηροῖς κέρασί τε καὶ ὁπλαῖς ἀποκτιννύασι δι᾽

1. αὐτῶν Π : αὖ τῶν AM.
4. ψυχῆς ΠΜ : τῆς ψυχῆς A.

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ἀπληστίαν, ἅτε οὐχὶ τοῖς οὖσιν οὐδὲ τὸ ὂν οὐδὲ τὸ p. 586.
στέγον ἑαυτῶν πιμπλάντες.

Παντελῶς, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων, τὸν τῶν πολλῶν, ὦ Σώκρατες, χρησμῳδεῖς βίον.

Ἆρ' οὖν οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ ἡδοναῖς ξυνεῖναι μεμιγμέναις λύπαις, εἰδώλοις τῆς ἀληθοῦς ἡδονῆς καὶ ἐσκιαγραφημέναις, ὑπὸ τῆς παρ' ἀλλήλας θέσεως
ἀποχραινομέναις, ὥστε σφοδροὺς ἑκατέρας φαίνε- C
σθαι, καὶ ἔρωτας ἑαυτῶν λυττῶντας τοῖς ἄφροσιν ἐντίκτειν καὶ περιμαχήτους εἶναι, ὥσπερ τὸ τῆς Ἑλένης εἴδωλον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Τροίᾳ Στησίχορός φησι γενέσθαι περιμάχητον ἀγνοίᾳ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς;

Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, τοιοῦτόν τι αὐτὸ εἶναι.

Τί δέ; περὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς οὐχ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι, ὃς ἂν αὐτὸ τοῦτο διαπράττηται ἢ φθόνῳ διὰ φιλοτιμίαν ἢ βίᾳ διὰ φιλονεικίαν ἢ
θυμῷ διὰ δυσκολίαν, πλησμονὴν τιμῆς τε καὶ νίκης D
καὶ θυμοῦ διώκων ἄνευ λογισμοῦ τε καὶ νοῦ;

Τοιαῦτα, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ τοῦτο εἶναι.

Both kinds of pleasures are attained in the highest degree when the desires which seek them are under the guidance of reason.

Τί οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· θαρροῦντες λέγωμεν ὅτι καὶ περὶ τὸ φιλοκερδὲς καὶ τὸ φιλόνεικον ὅσαι ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσίν, αἳ μὲν ἂν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ λόγῳ ἑπόμεναι καὶ μετὰ τούτων τὰς ἡδονὰς διώκουσαι, ἃς ἂν τὸ φρόνιμον ἐξηγῆται, λαμβάνωσι, τὰς ἀληθεστάτας τε λήψονται, ὡς οἷόν τε αὐταῖς ἀληθεῖς λαβεῖν, ἅτε
ἀληθείᾳ ἑπομένων, καὶ τὰς ἑαυτῶν οἰκείας, εἴπερ τὸ E
βέλτιστον ἑκάστῳ, τοῦτο καὶ οἰκειότατον;

Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, οἰκειότατόν γε.

Τῷ φιλοσόφῳ ἄρα ἑπομένης ἁπάσης τῆς ψυχῆς

15. ἂν A²ΠΜ : om. A.
24. ἐξηγῆται ΠΜ : ἐξηγεῖται A.

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p. 586. καὶ μὴ στασιαζούσης ἑκάστῳ τῷ μέρει ὑπάρχει εἴς τε τἆλλα τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν καὶ δικαίῳ εἶναι, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς τὰς ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστον καὶ τὰς βελ-
p. 587. τίστας καὶ εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν | τὰς ἀληθεστάτας καρποῦσθαι.

Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

Ὅταν δὲ ἄρα τῶν ἑτέρων τι κρατήσῃ, ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ μήτε τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἡδονὴν ἐξευρίσκειν, τά τε ἄλλ' ἀναγκάζειν ἀλλοτρίαν καὶ μὴ ἀληθῆ ἡδονὴν διώκειν.

Οὕτως, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν ἃ πλεῖστον φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ λόγου ἀφέστηκε, μάλιστ' ἂν τοιαῦτα ἐξεργάζοιτο;

Πολύ γε.

Πλεῖστον δὲ λόγου ἀφίσταται οὐχ ὅπερ νόμου τε καὶ τάξεως;

Δῆλον δή.

Ἐφάνησαν δὲ πλεῖστον ἀφεστῶσαι οὐχ αἱ ἐρωτικαί τε καὶ τυραννικαὶ ἐπιθυμίαι;

Πολύ γε.

B Ἐλάχιστον δὲ αἱ βασιλικαί τε καὶ κόσμιαι;

Ναί.

Πλεῖστον δή, οἶμαι, ἀληθοῦς ἡδονῆς καὶ οἰκείας ὁ τύραννος ἀφεστήξει, ὁ δὲ ὀλίγιστον.

Ἀνάγκη.

Καὶ ἀηδέστατα ἄρα, εἶπον, ὁ τύραννος βιώσεται, ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς ἥδιστα.

Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη.

Οἶσθ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅσῳ ἀηδέστερον ζῇ τύραννος βασιλέως;

The measure of the interval

Ἂν εἴπῃς, ἔφη.

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which separates the king from the tyrant,

Τριῶν ἡδονῶν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐσῶν, μιᾶς μὲν γνη- p. 587.
σίας, δυοῖν δὲ νόθαιν, τῶν νόθων εἰς τὸ ἐπέκεινα
ὑπερβὰς ὁ τύραννος, φυγὼν νόμον τε καὶ λόγον, C
δούλαις τισὶ δορυφόροις ἡδοναῖς ξυνοικεῖ, καὶ ὁπόσῳ ἐλαττοῦται οὐδὲ πάνυ ῥᾴδιον εἰπεῖν, πλὴν ἴσως ὧδε.

Πῶς; ἔφη.

Ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ τρίτος που ὁ τύραννος ἀφειστήκει· ἐν μέσῳ γὰρ αὐτῶν ὁ δημοτικὸς ἦν.

Ναί.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡδονῆς τρίτῳ εἰδώλῳ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἀπ' ἐκείνου ξυνοικοῖ ἄν, εἰ τὰ πρόσθεν ἀληθῆ;

Οὕτως.

Ὁ δέ γε ὀλιγαρχικὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ βασιλικοῦ αὖ
τρίτος, ἐὰν εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀριστοκρατικὸν καὶ βασιλι- D
κὸν τιθῶμεν.

Τρίτος γάρ.

Τριπλασίου ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τριπλάσιον ἀριθμῷ ἀληθοῦς ἡδονῆς ἀφέστηκε τύραννος.

Φαίνεται.

expressed under the symbol of a cube corresponding to the number 729,

Ἐπίπεδον ἄρ', ἔφην, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ εἴδωλον κατὰ τὸν τοῦ μήκους ἀριθμὸν ἡδονῆς τυραννικῆς ἂν εἴη.

Κομιδῇ γε.

Κατὰ δὲ δύναμιν καὶ τρίτην αὔξην δῆλον δὴ ἀπόστασιν ὅσην ἀφεστηκὼς γίγνεται.

Δῆλον, ἔφη, τῷ γε λογιστικῷ.

Οὐκοῦν ἐάν τις μεταστρέψας ἀληθείᾳ ἡδονῆς τὸν
βασιλέα τοῦ τυράννου ἀφεστηκότα λέγῃ, ὅσον ἀφ- E

κρα
9. δημοτικὸς ΑΠ: δημοκρατικὸς Μ.
12. ξυνοικοῖ A^2ΠΜ: ξυνοικεῖ Α.

p. 587. ἕστηκεν, ἐννεακαιεικοσικαιεπτακοσιοπλασιάκις ἥδιον αὐτὸν ζῶντα εὑρήσει τελειωθείσῃ τῇ πολλαπλασιώσει, τὸν δὲ τύραννον ἀνιαρότερον τῇ αὐτῇ ταύτῃ ἀποστάσει.

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Ἀμήχανον, ἔφη, λογισμὸν καταπεφόρηκας τῆς
p. 588. διαφορότητος τοῖν ἀνδροῖν, τοῦ τε δικαίου καὶ | τοῦ ἀδίκου, πρὸς ἡδονήν τε καὶ λύπην.

Καὶ μέντοι καὶ ἀληθῆ καὶ προσήκοντά γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, βίοις ἀριθμόν, εἴπερ αὐτοῖς προσήκουσιν ἡμέραι καὶ νύκτες καὶ μῆνες καὶ ἐνιαυτοί.

which is *nearly* the number of days and nights in a year.

Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, προσήκουσιν.

Οὐκοῦν εἰ τοσοῦτον ἡδονῇ νικᾷ ὁ ἀγαθός τε καὶ δίκαιος τὸν κακόν τε καὶ ἄδικον, ἀμηχάνῳ δὴ ὅσῳ πλεῖον νικήσει εὐσχημοσύνῃ τε βίου καὶ κάλλει καὶ ἀρετῇ;

Ἀμηχάνῳ μέντοι νὴ Δία, ἔφη.

B Εἶεν δή, εἶπον· ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα λόγου γεγόναμεν, ἀναλάβωμεν τὰ πρῶτα λεχθέντα, δι' ἃ δεῦρ' ἥκομεν. ἦν δέ που λεγόμενον λυσιτελεῖν ἀδικεῖν τῷ τελέως μὲν ἀδίκῳ, δοξαζομένῳ δὲ δικαίῳ· ἢ οὐχ οὕτως ἐλέχθη;

Refutation of Thrasymachus.

Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

Νῦν δή, ἔφην, αὐτῷ διαλεγώμεθα, ἐπειδὴ διωμολογησάμεθα τό τε ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὸ δίκαια πράττειν ἣν ἑκάτερον ἔχει δύναμιν.

Πῶς; ἔφη.

Εἰκόνα πλάσαντες τῆς ψυχῆς λόγῳ, ἵνα εἰδῇ ὁ ἐκεῖνα λέγων οἷα ἔλεγεν.

The triple animal who has outwardly the image of a man.

C Ποίαν τινά; ἦ δ' ὅς.

Τῶν τοιούτων τινά, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἷαι μυθολογοῦνται

5. καταπεφόρηκας ΑΠΜ : καταπεφώρακας tΞ corr. *v* (et cj. Madvig).

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Socrates, Glaucon.

παλαιαὶ γενέσθαι φύσεις, ἥ τε Χιμαίρας καὶ ἡ Σκύλ- (p. 588.) λης καὶ Κερβέρου, καὶ ἄλλαι τινὲς συχναὶ λέγονται ξυμπεφυκυῖαι ἰδέαι πολλαὶ εἰς ἓν γενέσθαι.

Λέγονται γάρ, ἔφη.

Πλάττε τοίνυν μίαν μὲν ἰδέαν θηρίου ποικίλου καὶ πολυκεφάλου, ἡμέρων δὲ θηρίων ἔχοντος κεφαλὰς κύκλῳ καὶ ἀγρίων, καὶ δυνατοῦ μεταβάλλειν καὶ φύειν ἐξ αὑτοῦ πάντα ταῦτα.

Δεινοῦ πλάστου, ἔφη, τὸ ἔργον· ὅμως δέ, ἐπειδὴ (D) εὐπλαστότερον κηροῦ καὶ τῶν τοιούτων λόγος, πεπλάσθω.

Μίαν δὴ τοίνυν ἄλλην ἰδέαν λέοντος, μίαν δὲ ἀνθρώπου· πολὺ δὲ μέγιστον ἔστω τὸ πρῶτον καὶ δεύτερον τὸ δεύτερον.

Ταῦτα, ἔφη, ῥᾴω· καὶ πέπλασται.

Σύναπτε τοίνυν αὐτὰ εἰς ἓν τρία ὄντα, ὥστε πῃ ξυμπεφυκέναι ἀλλήλοις.

Συνῆπται, ἔφη.

Περίπλασον δὴ αὐτοῖς ἔξωθεν ἑνὸς εἰκόνα, τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὥστε τῷ μὴ δυναμένῳ τὰ ἐντὸς ὁρᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔξω μόνον ἔλυτρον ὁρῶντι, ἓν ζῷον φαίνε- (E) σθαι, ἄνθρωπον.

Περιπέπλασται, ἔφη.

Will any one say that we should strengthen the monster and the lion at the expense of the man?

Λέγωμεν δὴ τῷ λέγοντι, ὡς λυσιτελεῖ τούτῳ ἀδικεῖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, δίκαια δὲ πράττειν οὐ ξυμφέρει, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο φησὶν ἢ λυσιτελεῖν αὐτῷ τὸ παντοδαπὸν θηρίον εὐωχοῦντι ποιεῖν ἰσχυρὸν καὶ τὸν λέοντα καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν λέοντα, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον λιμοκτονεῖν | καὶ ποιεῖν ἀσθενῆ, ὥστε ἕλκεσθαι ὅπῃ (p. 589.) ἂν ἐκείνων ὁπότερον ἄγῃ, καὶ μηδὲν ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ

6. δὲ MSS.: τε cj. Madvig.

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p. 589. ξυνεθίζειν μηδὲ φίλον ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐὰν αὐτὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς δάκνεσθαί τε καὶ μαχόμενα ἐσθίειν ἄλληλα.

Παντάπασι γάρ, ἔφη, ταῦτ' ἂν λέγοι ὁ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐπαινῶν.

Οὐκοῦν αὖ ὁ τὰ δίκαια λέγων λυσιτελεῖν φαίη ἂν δεῖν ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ ταῦτα λέγειν, ὅθεν τοῦ ἀν-
B θρώπου ὁ ἐντὸς ἄνθρωπος ἔσται ἐγκρατέστατος, καὶ τοῦ πολυκεφάλου θρέμματος ἐπιμελήσεται ὥσπερ γεωργός, τὰ μὲν ἥμερα τρέφων καὶ τιθασεύων, τὰ δὲ ἄγρια ἀποκωλύων φύεσθαι, ξύμμαχον ποιησάμενος τὴν τοῦ λέοντος φύσιν, καὶ κοινῇ πάντων κηδόμενος, φίλα ποιησάμενος ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ αὑτῷ, οὕτω θρέψει;

Κομιδῇ γὰρ αὖ λέγει ταῦτα ὁ τὸ δίκαιον ἐπαινῶν.

Κατὰ πάντα τρόπον δὴ ὁ μὲν τὰ δίκαια ἐγκωμιά-
C ζων ἀληθῆ ἂν λέγοι, ὁ δὲ τὰ ἄδικα ψεύδοιτο. πρός τε γὰρ ἡδονὴν καὶ πρὸς εὐδοξίαν καὶ ὠφελίαν σκοπουμένῳ ὁ μὲν ἐπαινέτης τοῦ δικαίου ἀληθεύει, ὁ δὲ ψέκτης οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδ' εἰδὼς ψέγει ὅ τι ψέγει.

Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐδαμῇ γε.

For the noble principle subjects the beast to the man, the ignoble the man to the beast.

Πείθωμεν τοίνυν αὐτὸν πρᾴως, οὐ γὰρ ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνει, ἐρωτῶντες· Ὦ μακάριε, οὐ καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ νόμιμα διὰ τὰ τοιαῦτ' ἂν φαῖμεν γεγονέναι·
D τὰ μὲν καλὰ τὰ ὑπὸ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, μᾶλλον δὲ ἴσως τὰ ὑπὸ τῷ θείῳ τὰ θηριώδη ποιοῦντα τῆς φύσεως, αἰσχρὰ δὲ τὰ ὑπὸ τῷ ἀγρίῳ τὸ ἥμερον δουλούμενα; ξυμφήσει· ἢ πῶς;

Ἐὰν ἐμοί, ἔφη, πείθηται.

17. ἀληθῆ ἂν Π : ἀλήθειαν ΑΜ.
29. ἐμοὶ W. H. Thompson e Stobaeo : μοι MSS.

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SOCRATES, GLAUCON.

A man would not be the gainer if he sold his child: how much worse to sell his soul!

Ἔστιν οὖν, εἶπον, ὅτῳ λυσιτελεῖ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ p. 589. λόγου χρυσίον λαμβάνειν ἀδίκως, εἴπερ τοιόνδε τι γίγνεται, λαμβάνων τὸ χρυσίον ἅμα καταδουλοῦται τὸ βέλτιστον ἑαυτοῦ τῷ μοχθηροτάτῳ; ἢ εἰ μὲν λαβὼν χρυσίον υἱὸν ἢ θυγατέρα ἐδουλοῦτο, καὶ E ταῦτ' εἰς ἀγρίων τε καὶ κακῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὐκ ἂν αὐτῷ ἐλυσιτέλει οὐδ' ἂν πάμπολυ ἐπὶ τούτῳ λαμβάνειν, εἰ δὲ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ θειότατον ὑπὸ τῷ ἀθεωτάτῳ τε καὶ μιαρωτάτῳ δουλοῦται καὶ μηδὲν ἐλεεῖ, οὐκ ἄρα ἄθλιός ἐστι καὶ | πολὺ ἐπὶ δεινοτέρῳ ὀλέθρῳ χρυσὸν p. 590. δωροδοκεῖ ἢ Ἐριφύλη ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ψυχῇ τὸν ὅρμον δεξαμένη;

Πολὺ μέντοι, ἦ δ' ὃς ὁ Γλαύκων· ἐγὼ γάρ σοι ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου ἀποκρινοῦμαι.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἀκολασταίνειν οἴει διὰ τοιαῦτα πάλαι ψέγεσθαι, ὅτι ἀνίεται ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ τὸ δεινόν, τὸ μέγα ἐκεῖνο καὶ πολυειδὲς θρέμμα, πέρα τοῦ δέοντος;

Δῆλον, ἔφη.

Ἡ δ' αὐθάδεια καὶ δυσκολία ψέγεται οὐχ ὅταν τὸ B λεοντῶδές τε καὶ ὀφεῶδες αὔξηται καὶ συντείνηται ἀναρμόστως;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Proofs:— (1) Men are blamed for the predominance of the lower nature,

Τρυφὴ δὲ καὶ μαλθακία οὐκ ἐπὶ τῇ αὐτοῦ τούτου χαλάσει τε καὶ ἀνέσει ψέγεται, ὅταν ἐν αὐτῷ δειλίαν ἐμποιῇ;

Τί μήν;

Κολακεία δὲ καὶ ἀνελευθερία οὐχ ὅταν τις τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, τὸ θυμοειδές, ὑπὸ τῷ ὀχλώδει θηρίῳ ποιῇ καὶ ἕνεκα χρημάτων καὶ τῆς ἐκείνου ἀπληστίας

16. τὸ δεινόν, Schneider.: sine commate cett. edd.

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p. 590. προπηλακιζόμενον ἐθίζῃ ἐκ νέου ἀντὶ λέοντος πίθηκον γίγνεσθαι;

C Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

Βαναυσία δὲ καὶ χειροτεχνία διὰ τί, οἴει, ὄνειδος φέρει; ἢ δι' ἄλλο τι φήσομεν ἢ ὅταν τις ἀσθενὲς φύσει ἔχῃ τὸ τοῦ βελτίστου εἶδος, ὥστε μὴ ἂν δύνασθαι ἄρχειν τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ θρεμμάτων, ἀλλὰ θεραπεύειν ἐκεῖνα, καὶ τὰ θωπεύματα αὐτῶν μόνον δύνηται μανθάνειν;

as well as for the meanness of their employments and character.

Ἔοικεν, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν ἵνα καὶ ὁ τοιοῦτος ὑπὸ ὁμοίου ἄρχηται οἵουπερ ὁ βέλτιστος, δοῦλον αὐτόν φαμεν δεῖν εἶναι D ἐκείνου τοῦ βελτίστου, ἔχοντος ἐν αὑτῷ τὸ θεῖον ἄρχον, οὐκ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τῇ τοῦ δούλου οἰόμενοι δεῖν ἄρχεσθαι αὐτόν, ὥσπερ Θρασύμαχος ᾤετο τοὺς ἀρχομένους, ἀλλ' ὡς ἄμεινον ὂν παντὶ ὑπὸ θείου καὶ φρονίμου ἄρχεσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν οἰκεῖον ἔχοντος ἐν αὑτῷ, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔξωθεν ἐφεστῶτος, ἵνα εἰς δύναμιν πάντες ὅμοιοι ὦμεν καὶ φίλοι τῷ αὐτῷ κυβερνώμενοι;

(2) It is admitted that every one should be the servant of a divine rule, or at any rate be kept under control by an external authority;

Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἔφη.

E Δηλοῖ δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ὁ νόμος ὅτι τοιοῦτον βούλεται, πᾶσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει ξύμμαχος ὤν· καὶ ἡ τῶν παίδων ἀρχή, τὸ μὴ ἐᾶν ἐλευθέρους εἶναι, ἕως ἂν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὥσπερ ἐν πόλει πολιτείαν καταστήσω-

p. 591. μεν, καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον θεραπεύσαντες | τῷ παρ' ἡμῖν τοιούτῳ ἀντικαταστήσωμεν φύλακα ὅμοιον καὶ ἄρχοντα ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ τότε δὴ ἐλεύθερον ἀφίεμεν.

(3) The care taken of children shows that we seek to establish in them a higher principle.

17. *οἰκεῖον ἔχοντος ἐν αὑτῷ* MSS.: *οἰκείου ἐνόντος ἐν αὑτῷ* cj. Madvig.
23. *βούλεται* Ξ corr. xv. (et sic Iamblichus et Stobaeus): *βουλεύεται* ΑΠΜ.

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Δηλοῖ γάρ, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς. p. 591.

Πῇ δὴ οὖν φήσομεν, ὦ Γλαύκων, καὶ κατὰ τίνα λόγον λυσιτελεῖν ἀδικεῖν, ἢ ἀκολασταίνειν ἤ τι αἰσχρὸν ποιεῖν, ἐξ ὧν πονηρότερος μὲν ἔσται, πλείω δὲ χρήματα ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ δύναμιν κεκτήσεται;

Οὐδαμῇ, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς.

Πῇ δ᾽ ἀδικοῦντα λανθάνειν καὶ μὴ διδόναι δίκην λυσιτελεῖν; ἢ οὐχὶ ὁ μὲν λανθάνων ἔτι πονηρότερος B γίγνεται, τοῦ δὲ μὴ λανθάνοντος καὶ κολαζομένου τὸ μὲν θηριῶδες κοιμίζεται καὶ ἡμεροῦται, τὸ δὲ ἥμερον ἐλευθεροῦται, καὶ ὅλη ἡ ψυχὴ εἰς τὴν βελτίστην φύσιν καθισταμένη τιμιωτέραν ἕξιν λαμβάνει, σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην μετὰ φρονήσεως κτωμένη, ἢ σῶμα ἰσχύν τε καὶ κάλλος μετὰ ὑγιείας λαμβάνον, τοσούτῳ ὅσῳπερ ψυχὴ σώματος τιμιωτέρα;

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

The wise man will employ his energies in freeing and harmonising the nobler elements of his nature and in regulating his bodily habits. His first aim not health but harmony of soul.

Οὐκοῦν ὅ γε νοῦν ἔχων πάντα τὰ αὑτοῦ εἰς τοῦτο C ξυντείνας βιώσεται, πρῶτον μὲν τὰ μαθήματα τιμῶν, ἃ τοιαύτην αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπεργάσεται, τὰ δὲ ἄλλ᾽ ἀτιμάζων;

Δῆλον, ἔφη.

Ἔπειτά γ᾽, εἶπον, τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἕξιν καὶ τροφὴν οὐχ ὅπως τῇ θηριώδει καὶ ἀλόγῳ ἡδονῇ ἐπιτρέψας ἐνταῦθα τετραμμένος ζήσει, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ πρὸς ὑγίειαν βλέπων, οὐδὲ τοῦτο πρεσβεύων, ὅπως ἰσχυρὸς ἢ ὑγιὴς ἢ καλὸς ἔσται, ἐὰν μὴ καὶ σωφρονήσειν μέλλῃ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ σώματι D

9. ἔτι A²M : ἔπι A : ἐπι- Π.
26. ζήσει M : ζώσει A ? : ζώσῃ ΠA².

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p. 591. ἁρμονίαν τῆς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἕνεκα ξυμφωνίας ἁρμοττόμενος φαίνηται.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἐάνπερ μέλλῃ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μουσικὸς εἶναι.

Οὐκοῦν, εἶπον, καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ τῶν χρημάτων κτήσει ξύνταξίν τε καὶ ξυμφωνίαν; καὶ τὸν ὄγκον τοῦ πλήθους οὐκ ἐκπληττόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ τῶν πολλῶν μακαρισμοῦ ἄπειρον αὐξήσει, ἀπέραντα κακὰ ἔχων;

Οὐκ οἴομαι, ἔφη.

He will not heap up riches, and he will only accept such political honours as will not deteriorate his character.

E 'Αλλ' ἀποβλέπων γε, εἶπον, πρὸς τὴν ἐν αὑτῷ πολιτείαν, καὶ φυλάττων, μή τι παρακινῇ αὐτοῦ τῶν ἐκεῖ διὰ πλῆθος οὐσίας ἢ δι' ὀλιγότητα, οὕτως κυβερνῶν προσθήσει καὶ ἀναλώσει τῆς οὐσίας καθ' ὅσον ἂν οἷός τ' ᾖ.

Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

'Αλλὰ μὴν καὶ τιμάς γε, εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀποβλέπων,
p. 592. | τῶν μὲν μεθέξει καὶ γεύσεται ἑκών, ἃς ἂν ἡγῆται ἀμείνω αὑτὸν ποιήσειν, ἃς δ' ἂν λύσειν τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἕξιν, φεύξεται ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ.

Οὐκ ἄρα, ἔφη, τά γε πολιτικὰ ἐθελήσει πράττειν, ἐάνπερ τούτου κήδηται.

He has a city of his own, and the ideal pattern of this will be the law of his life.

Νὴ τὸν κύνα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔν γε τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πόλει καὶ μάλα, οὐ μέντοι ἴσως ἔν γε τῇ πατρίδι, ἐὰν μὴ θεία τις ξυμβῇ τύχη.

Μανθάνω, ἔφη· ἐν ᾗ νῦν διήλθομεν οἰκίζοντες πόλει λέγεις, τῇ ἐν λόγοις κειμένῃ, ἐπεὶ γῆς γε οὐδαμοῦ οἶμαι αὐτὴν εἶναι.

B 'Αλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν οὐρανῷ ἴσως παράδειγμα

8. ἄπειρον ΑΠΜ : εἰς ἄπειρον Iambl.
26. νῦν ΑΠΜ : νῦν δὴ cj. Bekker.

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ἀνάκειται τῷ βουλομένῳ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὁρῶντι ἑαυτὸν p. 592. κατοικίζειν. διαφέρει δὲ οὐδὲν εἴτε που ἔστιν εἴτε ἔσται· τὰ γὰρ ταύτης μόνης ἂν πράξειεν, ἄλλης δὲ οὐδεμιᾶς.

Εἰκός γ', ἔφη.

I.

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p. 595. | Καὶ μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα περὶ αὐτῆς ἐννοῶ, ὡς παντὸς ἄρα μᾶλλον ὀρθῶς ᾠκίζομεν τὴν πόλιν, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ ἐνθυμηθεὶς περὶ ποιήσεως λέγω.

Τὸ ποῖον; ἔφη.

Τὸ μηδαμῇ παραδέχεσθαι αὐτῆς ὅση μιμητική· παντὸς γὰρ μᾶλλον οὐ παραδεκτέα νῦν καὶ ἐναργέ-
B στερον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, φαίνεται, ἐπειδὴ χωρὶς ἕκαστα διῄρηται τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς εἴδη.

Πῶς λέγεις;

Poetical imitations are ruinous to the mind of the hearer.

Ὡς μὲν πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰρῆσθαι — οὐ γάρ μου κατερεῖτε πρὸς τοὺς τῆς τραγῳδίας ποιητὰς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας τοὺς μιμητικούς — λώβη ἔοικεν εἶναι πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων διανοίας, ὅσοι μὴ ἔχουσι φάρμακον τὸ εἰδέναι αὐτὰ οἷα τυγχάνει ὄντα.

Πῇ δή, ἔφη, διανοούμενος λέγεις;

Ῥητέον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καίτοι φιλία γέ τίς με καὶ αἰδὼς ἐκ παιδὸς ἔχουσα περὶ Ὁμήρου ἀποκωλύει
C λέγειν. ἔοικε μὲν γὰρ τῶν καλῶν ἁπάντων τούτων

7. παραδεκτέα ΑΠ : παραδεκτέον A^2M.

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τῶν τραγικῶν πρῶτος διδάσκαλός τε καὶ ἡγεμὼν p. 595. γενέσθαι. ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ πρό γε τῆς ἀληθείας τιμητέος ἀνήρ, ἀλλ', ὃ λέγω, ῥητέον.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Ἄκουε δή, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀποκρίνου.

Ἐρώτα.

The nature of imitation.

Μίμησιν ὅλως ἔχοις ἄν μοι εἰπεῖν ὅ τί ποτ' ἐστίν; οὐδὲ γάρ τοι αὐτὸς πάνυ τι ξυννοῶ, τί βούλεται εἶναι.

Ἦ που ἄρ', ἔφη, ἐγὼ συννοήσω.

Οὐδέν γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἄτοπον, ἐπεὶ πολλά τοι ὀξύτερον βλεπόντων | ἀμβλύτερον ὁρῶντες πρότεροι p. 596. εἶδον.

Ἔστιν, ἔφη, οὕτως. ἀλλὰ σοῦ παρόντος οὐδ' ἂν προθυμηθῆναι οἷός τε εἴην εἰπεῖν, εἴ τί μοι καταφαίνεται, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ὅρα.

Βούλει οὖν ἐνθένδε ἀρξώμεθα ἐπισκοποῦντες, ἐκ τῆς εἰωθυίας μεθόδου; εἶδος γάρ πού τι ἓν ἕκαστον εἰώθαμεν τίθεσθαι περὶ ἕκαστα τὰ πολλά, οἷς ταὐτὸν ὄνομα ἐπιφέρομεν. ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις;

Μανθάνω.

The idea is one, but the objects comprehended under it are many.

Θῶμεν δὴ καὶ νῦν ὅ τι βούλει τῶν πολλῶν. οἷον, εἰ θέλεις, πολλαί πού εἰσι κλῖναι καὶ τράπεζαι. B

Πῶς δ' οὔ;

Ἀλλὰ ἰδέαι γέ που περὶ ταῦτα τὰ σκεύη δύο, μία μὲν κλίνης, μία δὲ τραπέζης.

Ναί.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰώθαμεν λέγειν, ὅτι ὁ δημιουργὸς ἑκατέρου τοῦ σκεύους πρὸς τὴν ἰδέαν βλέπων οὕτω ποιεῖ ὁ μὲν τὰς κλίνας, ὁ δὲ τὰς τραπέζας, αἷς ἡμεῖς

23. κλῖναι ΠΜ : κλίναι A.

p. 596. χρώμεθα, καὶ τἄλλα κατὰ ταὐτά; οὐ γάρ που τήν γε ἰδέαν αὐτὴν δημιουργεῖ οὐδεὶς τῶν δημιουργῶν· πῶς γάρ;

Οὐδαμῶς.

Ἀλλ' ὅρα δὴ καὶ τόνδε τίνα καλεῖς τὸν δημιουργόν.

C Τὸν ποῖον;

Ὃς πάντα ποιεῖ, ὅσαπερ εἷς ἕκαστος τῶν χειροτεχνῶν.

Δεινόν τινα λέγεις καὶ θαυμαστὸν ἄνδρα.

Οὔπω γε, ἀλλὰ τάχα μᾶλλον φήσεις. ὁ αὐτὸς γὰρ οὗτος χειροτέχνης οὐ μόνον πάντα οἷός τε σκεύη ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῆς γῆς φυόμενα ἅπαντα ποιεῖ καὶ ζῷα πάντα ἐργάζεται, τά τε ἄλλα καὶ ἑαυτόν, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις γῆν καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ θεοὺς καὶ [πάντα] τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ καὶ τὰ ἐν Ἅιδου ὑπὸ γῆς ἅπαντα ἐργάζεται.

The universal creator, an extraordinary person. But note also that everybody is a creator in a sense. For all things may be made by the reflection of them in a mirror.

D Πάνυ θαυμαστόν, ἔφη, λέγεις σοφιστήν.

Ἀπιστεῖς; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. καί μοι εἰπέ, τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἄν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τοιοῦτος δημιουργός, ἢ τινὶ μὲν τρόπῳ γενέσθαι ἂν τούτων ἁπάντων ποιητής, τινὶ δὲ οὐκ ἄν; ἢ οὐκ αἰσθάνει, ὅτι κἂν αὐτὸς οἷός τ' εἴης πάντα ταῦτα ποιῆσαι τρόπῳ γέ τινι;

Καὶ τίς, ἔφη, ὁ τρόπος οὗτος;

Οὐ χαλεπός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλὰ πολλαχῇ καὶ ταχὺ δημιουργούμενος· τάχιστα δέ που, εἰ θέλεις λαβὼν κάτοπτρον περιφέρειν πανταχῇ. ταχὺ μὲν ἥλιον

5. τὸν δημιουργὸν ΑΠΜ : τῶν δημιουργῶν cj. Vermehren.
11. τάχα ΑΜ : ταῦτα Π.
16. πάντα ΑΠΜ : πάντα A².

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ποιήσεις καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, ταχὺ δὲ γῆν, ταχὺ p. 596. δὲ σαυτόν τε καὶ τἆλλα ζῷα καὶ σκεύη καὶ φυτὰ E καὶ πάντα ὅσα νῦν δὴ ἐλέγετο.

Ναί, ἔφη, φαινόμενα, οὐ μέντοι ὄντα γέ που τῇ ἀληθείᾳ.

Καλῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ εἰς δέον ἔρχει τῷ λόγῳ. τῶν τοιούτων γάρ, οἶμαι, δημιουργῶν καὶ ὁ ζωγράφος ἐστίν. ἦ γάρ;

Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Ἀλλὰ φήσεις οὐκ ἀληθῆ, οἶμαι, αὐτὸν ποιεῖν ἃ ποιεῖ. καίτοι τρόπῳ γέ τινι καὶ ὁ ζωγράφος κλίνην ποιεῖ. ἢ οὔ;

Ναί, ἔφη, φαινομένην γε καὶ οὗτος.

But this is an appearance only: and the painter too is a maker of appearances.

Τί δὲ ὁ κλινοποιός; οὐκ ἄρτι | μέντοι ἔλεγες, ὅτι p. 597. οὐ τὸ εἶδος ποιεῖ, ὃ δή φαμεν εἶναι ὃ ἔστι κλίνη, ἀλλὰ κλίνην τινά;

Ἔλεγον γάρ.

Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ ὃ ἔστι ποιεῖ, οὐκ ἂν τὸ ὂν ποιοῖ, ἀλλά τι τοιοῦτον οἷον τὸ ὄν, ὂν δὲ οὔ· τελέως δὲ εἶναι ὂν τὸ τοῦ κλινουργοῦ ἔργον ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς χειροτέχνου εἴ τις φαίη, κινδυνεύει οὐκ ἂν ἀληθῆ λέγειν;

Οὔκουν, ἔφη, ὥς γ' ἂν δόξειε τοῖς περὶ τοὺς τοιούσδε λόγους διατρίβουσιν.

Μηδὲν ἄρα θαυμάζωμεν, εἰ καὶ τοῦτο ἀμυδρόν τι τυγχάνει ὂν πρὸς ἀλήθειαν.

Μὴ γάρ.

Βούλει οὖν, ἔφην, ἐπ' αὐτῶν τούτων ζητήσωμεν B τὸν μιμητὴν τοῦτον, τίς ποτ' ἐστίν;

Εἰ βούλει, ἔφη.

Three beds and three

Οὐκοῦν τριτταί τινες κλῖναι αὗται γίγνονται· μία

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p. 597. μὲν ἡ ἐν τῇ φύσει οὖσα, ἥν φαῖμεν ἄν, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, θεὸν ἐργάσασθαι. ἢ τίν' ἄλλον;

makers of beds.

Οὐδένα, οἶμαι.

Μία δέ γε ἣν ὁ τέκτων.

Ναί, ἔφη.

Μία δὲ ἣν ὁ ζωγράφος. ἦ γάρ;

Ἔστω.

Ζωγράφος δή, κλινοποιός, θεός, τρεῖς οὗτοι ἐπιστάται τρισὶν εἴδεσι κλινῶν.

Ναὶ τρεῖς.

(1) The creator. God could only make one bed; if he made two, a third would still appear behind them.

C 'Ο μὲν δὴ θεός, εἴτε οὐκ ἐβούλετο, εἴτε τις ἀνάγκη ἐπῆν μὴ πλέον ἢ μίαν ἐν τῇ φύσει ἀπεργάσασθαι αὐτὸν κλίνην, οὕτως ἐποίησε μίαν μόνον αὐτὴν ἐκείνην ὃ ἔστι κλίνη· δύο δὲ τοιαῦται ἢ πλείους οὔτε ἐφυτεύθησαν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ οὔτε μὴ φυῶσιν.

Πῶς δή; ἔφη.

Ὅτι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ δύο μόνας ποιήσειε, πάλιν ἂν μία ἀναφανείη, ἧς ἐκεῖναι ἂν αὖ ἀμφότεραι τὸ εἶδος ἔχοιεν, καὶ εἴη ἂν ὃ ἔστι κλίνη ἐκείνη, ἀλλ' οὐχ αἱ δύο.

'Ορθῶς, ἔφη.

D Ταῦτα δή, οἶμαι, εἰδὼς ὁ θεός, βουλόμενος εἶναι ὄντως κλίνης ποιητὴς ὄντως οὔσης, ἀλλὰ μὴ κλίνης τινὸς μηδὲ κλινοποιός τις, μίαν φύσει αὐτὴν ἔφυσεν.

Ἔοικεν.

Βούλει οὖν τοῦτον μὲν φυτουργὸν τούτου προσαγορεύωμεν, ἤ τι τοιοῦτον;

Δίκαιον γοῦν, ἔφη, ἐπειδήπερ φύσει γε καὶ τοῦτο καὶ τἆλλα πάντα πεποίηκεν.

1. ἐν Π : om. AM.

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Τί δὲ τὸν τέκτονα; ἆρ᾽ οὐ δημιουργὸν κλίνης; p. 597.

Ναί.

(2) The human maker.

Ἦ καὶ τὸν ζωγράφον δημιουργὸν καὶ ποιητὴν τοῦ τοιούτου;

Οὐδαμῶς.

Ἀλλὰ τί αὐτὸν κλίνης φήσεις εἶναι;

(3) The imitator, i.e. the painter or poet,

Τοῦτο, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ μετριώτατ᾽ ἂν προσ- E αγορεύεσθαι, μιμητὴς οὗ ἐκεῖνοι δημιουργοί.

Εἶεν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τὸν τοῦ τρίτου ἄρα γεννήματος ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως μιμητὴν καλεῖς;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Τοῦτ᾽ ἄρα ἔσται καὶ ὁ τραγῳδιοποιός, εἴπερ μιμητής ἐστι, τρίτος τις ἀπὸ βασιλέως καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας πεφυκώς, καὶ πάντες οἱ ἄλλοι μιμηταί.

Κινδυνεύει.

Τὸν μὲν δὴ μιμητὴν ὡμολογήκαμεν· εἰπὲ δέ μοι | περὶ τοῦ ζωγράφου τόδε· πότερα ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν p. 598. τῇ φύσει ἕκαστον δοκεῖ σοι ἐπιχειρεῖν μιμεῖσθαι ἢ τὰ τῶν δημιουργῶν ἔργα;

Τὰ τῶν δημιουργῶν, ἔφη.

whose art is one of imitation or appearance and a long way removed from the truth.

Ἆρα οἷα ἔστιν ἢ οἷα φαίνεται; τοῦτο γὰρ ἔτι διόρισον.

Πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη.

Ὧδε· κλίνη, ἐάν τε ἐκ πλαγίου αὐτὴν θεᾷ ἐάν τε καταντικρὺ ἢ ὁπῃοῦν, μή τι διαφέρει αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆς, ἢ διαφέρει μὲν οὐδέν, φαίνεται δὲ ἀλλοία; καὶ τἆλλα ὡσαύτως;

Οὕτως, ἔφη· φαίνεται, διαφέρει δ᾽ οὐδέν.

Τοῦτο δὴ αὐτὸ σκόπει· πρὸς πότερον ἡ γραφικὴ B πεποίηται περὶ ἕκαστον; πότερα πρὸς τὸ ὄν, ὡς

12. τραγωδιοποιός ΠΜ Baiter: τραγῳδοποιὸς A (et saepius).

p. 598. ἔχει, μιμήσασθαι, ἢ πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον, ὡς φαίνεται, φαντάσματος ἢ ἀληθείας οὖσα μίμησις;

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Φαντάσματος, ἔφη.

Πόρρω ἄρα που τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἡ μιμητική ἐστι καί, ὡς ἔοικε, διὰ τοῦτο πάντα ἀπεργάζεται, ὅτι σμικρόν τι ἑκάστου ἐφάπτεται, καὶ τοῦτο εἴδωλον. οἷον ὁ ζωγράφος, φαμέν, ζωγραφήσει ἡμῖν σκυτοτόμον, C τέκτονα, τοὺς ἄλλους δημιουργούς, περὶ οὐδενὸς τούτων ἐπαΐων τῶν τεχνῶν· ἀλλ' ὅμως παῖδάς τε καὶ ἄφρονας ἀνθρώπους, εἰ ἀγαθὸς εἴη ζωγράφος, γράψας ἂν τέκτονα καὶ πόρρωθεν ἐπιδεικνὺς ἐξαπατῷ ἂν τῷ δοκεῖν ὡς ἀληθῶς τέκτονα εἶναι.

Any one who does all things does only a very small part of them.

Τί δ' οὔ;

'Αλλὰ γάρ, οἶμαι, ὦ φίλε, τόδε δεῖ περὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων διανοεῖσθαι· ἐπειδάν τις ἡμῖν ἀπαγγέλλῃ περί του, ὡς ἐνέτυχεν ἀνθρώπῳ πάσας ἐπισταμένῳ τὰς δημιουργίας καὶ τἆλλα πάντα, ὅσα εἷς D ἕκαστος οἶδεν, οὐδὲν ὅ τι οὐχὶ ἀκριβέστερον ὁτουοῦν ἐπισταμένῳ, ὑπολαμβάνειν δεῖ τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὅτι εὐήθης τις ἄνθρωπος, καί, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐντυχὼν γόητί τινι καὶ μιμητῇ ἐξηπατήθη, ὥστε ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ πάσσοφος εἶναι, διὰ τὸ αὐτὸς μὴ οἷός τ' εἶναι ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην καὶ μίμησιν ἐξετάσαι.

Any one who pretends to know all things is ignorant of the very nature of knowledge.

'Αληθέστατα, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκεπτέον τήν τε τραγῳδίαν καὶ τὸν ἡγεμόνα αὐτῆς Ὅμηρον, ἐπειδή E τινων ἀκούομεν, ὅτι οὗτοι πάσας μὲν τέχνας ἐπίστανται, πάντα δὲ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια τὰ πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ κακίαν, καὶ τά γε θεῖα· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ποιητήν, εἰ μέλλει περὶ ὧν ἂν ποιῇ καλῶς ποιήσειν,

And he who attributes such universal knowledge to the poets is similarly deceived.

11. ἐξαπατῷ ΑΠΜ : ἐξαπατῴη a.

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εἰδότα ἄρα ποιεῖν, ἢ μὴ οἷόν τε εἶναι ποιεῖν. δεῖ δὴ p. 598.
ἐπισκέψασθαι, πότερον μιμηταῖς τούτοις οὗτοι ἐν-
τυχόντες ἐξηπάτηνται καὶ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν ὁρῶντες
| οὐκ αἰσθάνονται τριττὰ ἀπέχοντα τοῦ ὄντος καὶ p. 599.
ῥᾴδια ποιεῖν μὴ εἰδότι τὴν ἀλήθειαν· φαντάσματα
γάρ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ὄντα ποιοῦσιν· ἤ τι καὶ λέγουσι καὶ
τῷ ὄντι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ποιηταὶ ἴσασι περὶ ὧν δοκοῦσι
τοῖς πολλοῖς εὖ λέγειν.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἐξεταστέον.

He who could make the original would not make the image.

Οἴει οὖν, εἴ τις ἀμφότερα δύναιτο ποιεῖν, τό τε
μιμηθησόμενον καὶ τὸ εἴδωλον, ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν εἰδώλων
δημιουργίᾳ ἑαυτὸν ἀφεῖναι ἂν σπουδάζειν καὶ τοῦτο
προστήσασθαι τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ βίου ὡς βέλτιστον B
ἔχοντα;

Οὐκ ἔγωγε.

Ἀλλ' εἴπερ γε, οἶμαι, ἐπιστήμων εἴη τῇ ἀληθείᾳ
τούτων πέρι ἅπερ καὶ μιμεῖται, πολὺ πρότερον ἐν
τοῖς ἔργοις ἂν σπουδάσειεν ἢ ἐπὶ τοῖς μιμήμασι, καὶ
πειρῷτο ἂν πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἔργα ἑαυτοῦ καταλιπεῖν
μνημεῖα, καὶ εἶναι προθυμοῖτ' ἂν μᾶλλον ὁ ἐγκωμια-
ζόμενος ἢ ὁ ἐγκωμιάζων.

Οἶμαι, ἔφη· οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἴσου ἥ τε τιμὴ καὶ ἡ
ὠφελία.

If Homer had been a legislator, or general, or inventor,

Τῶν μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλων πέρι μὴ ἀπαιτῶμεν λόγον
Ὅμηρον ἢ ἄλλον ὁντιναοῦν τῶν ποιητῶν, ἐρωτῶντες C
εἰ ἰατρικὸς ἦν τις αὐτῶν ἀλλὰ μὴ μιμητὴς μόνον
ἰατρικῶν λόγων, τίνας ὑγιεῖς ποιητής τις τῶν πα-
λαιῶν ἢ τῶν νέων λέγεται πεποιηκέναι, ὥσπερ
Ἀσκληπιός, ἢ τίνας μαθητὰς ἰατρικῆς κατελίπετο,
ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος τοὺς ἐκγόνους, μηδ' αὖ περὶ τὰς
ἄλλας τέχνας αὐτοὺς ἐρωτῶμεν, ἀλλ' ἐῶμεν· περὶ

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p. 599. δὲ ὧν μεγίστων τε καὶ καλλίστων ἐπιχειρεῖ λέγειν Ὅμηρος, πολέμων τε πέρι καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ D διοικήσεων πόλεων, καὶ παιδείας πέρι ἀνθρώπου, δίκαιόν που ἐρωτᾶν αὐτὸν πυνθανομένους Ὦ φίλε Ὅμηρε, εἴπερ μὴ τρίτος ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας εἶ ἀρετῆς πέρι, εἰδώλου δημιουργός, ὃν δὴ μιμητὴν ὡρισάμεθα, ἀλλὰ καὶ δεύτερος, καὶ οἷός τε ἦσθα γιγνώσκειν, ποῖα ἐπιτηδεύματα βελτίους ἢ χείρους ἀνθρώπους ποιεῖ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, λέγε ἡμῖν, τίς τῶν πόλεων διὰ σὲ βέλτιον ᾤκησεν, ὥσπερ διὰ Λυκοῦργον Λακεδαίμων E καὶ δι' ἄλλους πολλοὺς πολλαὶ μεγάλαι τε καὶ σμικραί; σὲ δὲ τίς αἰτιᾶται πόλις νομοθέτην ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι καὶ σφᾶς ὠφεληκέναι; Χαρώνδαν μὲν γὰρ Ἰταλία καὶ Σικελία, καὶ ἡμεῖς Σόλωνα· σὲ δὲ τίς; ἕξει τινὰ εἰπεῖν;

Οὐκ οἶμαι, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων· οὔκουν λέγεταί γε οὐδ' ὑπ' αὐτῶν Ὁμηριδῶν.

p. 600. Ἀλλὰ δή τις πόλεμος ἐπὶ Ὁμήρου | ὑπ' ἐκείνου ἄρχοντος ἢ ξυμβουλεύοντος εὖ πολεμηθεὶς μνημονεύεται;

Οὐδείς.

Ἀλλ' οἷα δὴ εἰς τὰ ἔργα σοφοῦ ἀνδρὸς πολλαὶ ἐπίνοιαι καὶ εὐμήχανοι εἰς τέχνας ἤ τινας ἄλλας πράξεις λέγονται, ὥσπερ αὖ Θάλεώ τε πέρι τοῦ Μιλησίου καὶ Ἀναχάρσιος τοῦ Σκύθου;

Οὐδαμῶς τοιοῦτον οὐδέν.

Ἀλλὰ δὴ εἰ μὴ δημοσίᾳ, ἰδίᾳ τισὶν ἡγεμὼν παιδείας αὐτὸς ζῶν λέγεται Ὅμηρος γενέσθαι, οἳ ἐκεῖνον

14. Χαρώνδαν ΑΠ : Χαρωνίδην Μ.
16. οὔκουν] 'In A praescriptum est σω.' Baiter.
22. εἰς A^2ΠΜ : om. Apr.

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ἠγάπων ἐπὶ συνουσίᾳ καὶ τοῖς ὑστέροις ὁδόν τινα p. 600. παρέδοσαν βίου Ὁμηρικήν, ὥσπερ Πυθαγόρας B αὐτός τε διαφερόντως ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἠγαπήθη, καὶ οἱ ὕστεροι ἔτι καὶ νῦν Πυθαγόρειον τρόπον ἐπονομάζοντες τοῦ βίου διαφανεῖς πῃ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις;

Οὐδ' αὖ, ἔφη, τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν λέγεται. ὁ γὰρ Κρεώφυλος, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἴσως, ὁ τοῦ Ὁμήρου ἑταῖρος, τοῦ ὀνόματος ἂν γελοιότερος ἔτι πρὸς παιδείαν φανείη, εἰ τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ Ὁμήρου ἀληθῆ. λέγεται γὰρ ὡς πολλή τις ἀμέλεια περὶ C αὐτὸν ἦν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου, ὅτε ἔζη.

or had done anything else for the improvement of mankind, he would not have been allowed to starve.

Λέγεται γὰρ οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἀλλ' οἴει, ὦ Γλαύκων, εἰ τῷ ὄντι οἷός τ' ἦν παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους καὶ βελτίους ἀπεργάζεσθαι Ὅμηρος, ἅτε περὶ τούτων οὐ μιμεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ γιγνώσκειν δυνάμενος, οὐκ ἄρ' ἂν πολλοὺς ἑταίρους ἐποιήσατο καὶ ἐτιμᾶτο καὶ ἠγαπᾶτο ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ Πρωταγόρας μὲν ἄρα ὁ Ἀβδηρίτης καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος καὶ ἄλλοι πάμπολλοι δύνανται τοῖς ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν παριστάναι ἰδίᾳ ξυγγιγνόμενοι, ὡς οὔτε οἰκίαν οὔτε πόλιν τὴν αὐτῶν D διοικεῖν οἷοί τ' ἔσονται, ἐὰν μὴ σφεῖς αὐτῶν ἐπιστατήσωσι τῆς παιδείας, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ σοφίᾳ οὕτω σφόδρα φιλοῦνται, ὥστε μόνον οὐκ ἐπὶ ταῖς κεφαλαῖς περιφέρουσιν αὐτοὺς οἱ ἑταῖροι· Ὅμηρον δ' ἄρα οἱ ἐπ' ἐκείνου, εἴπερ οἷός τ' ἦν πρὸς ἀρετὴν *ὀνινάναι ἀνθρώπους, ἢ Ἡσίοδον ῥαψῳδεῖν ἂν περιιόντας εἴων, καὶ οὐχὶ μᾶλλον ἂν αὐτῶν ἀντείχοντο ἢ τοῦ χρυσοῦ καὶ ἠνάγκαζον παρὰ σφίσιν E

4. ὕστεροι AM : ὕστερον Π.
27. ὀνινάναι cj. Ast. : ὀνεῖναι ΑΠ : ὀνίναι M : ὀνῆναι cj. Bekker.

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p. 600. οἴκοι εἶναι, ἢ εἰ μὴ ἔπειθον, αὐτοὶ ἂν ἐπαιδαγώγουν ὅπῃ ᾖεσαν, ἕως ἱκανῶς παιδείας μεταλάβοιεν;

Παντάπασιν, ἔφη, δοκεῖς μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀληθῆ λέγειν.

The poets, like the painters, are but imitators;

Οὐκοῦν τιθῶμεν ἀπὸ Ὁμήρου ἀρξαμένους πάντας τοὺς ποιητικοὺς μιμητὰς εἰδώλων ἀρετῆς εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων περὶ ὧν ποιοῦσι, τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας οὐχ ἅπτεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ὁ ζωγράφος
p. 601. σκυτοτόμον ποιήσει δοκοῦντα | εἶναι, αὐτός τε οὐκ ἐπαΐων περὶ σκυτοτομίας καὶ τοῖς μὴ ἐπαΐουσιν, ἐκ τῶν χρωμάτων δὲ καὶ σχημάτων θεωροῦσιν;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Οὕτω δή, οἶμαι, καὶ τὸν ποιητικὸν φήσομεν χρώματ' ἄττα ἑκάστων τῶν τεχνῶν τοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ ῥήμασιν ἐπιχρωματίζειν αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐπαΐοντα ἀλλ' ἢ μιμεῖσθαι, ὥστε ἑτέροις τοιούτοις ἐκ τῶν λόγων
B θεωροῦσι δοκεῖν, ἐάν τε περὶ σκυτοτομίας τις λέγῃ ἐν μέτρῳ καὶ ῥυθμῷ καὶ ἁρμονίᾳ, πάνυ εὖ δοκεῖν λέγεσθαι, ἐάν τε περὶ στρατηγίας ἐάν τε περὶ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν· οὕτω φύσει αὐτὰ ταῦτα μεγάλην τινὰ κήλησιν ἔχειν. ἐπεὶ γυμνωθέντα γε τῶν τῆς μουσικῆς χρωμάτων τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν, αὐτὰ ἐφ' αὑτῶν λεγόμενα, οἶμαί σε εἰδέναι οἷα φαίνεται. τεθέασαι γάρ που.

Ἔγωγ', ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔοικε τοῖς τῶν ὡραίων προσώποις, καλῶν δὲ μή, οἷα γίγνεται ἰδεῖν, ὅταν αὐτὰ τὸ ἄνθος προλίπῃ;

15. ἀλλ' ἢ Π : ἀλλὰ AM.
16. ἑτέροις Π : ἐν τοῖς AM.
23. λεγόμενα AΠM : γενόμενα A[2].

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Παντάπασιν, ἦ δ' ὅς. p. 601.

Ἴθι δή, τόδε ἄθρει· ὁ τοῦ εἰδώλου ποιητής, ὁ μιμητής, φαμέν, τοῦ μὲν ὄντος οὐδὲν ἐπαΐει, τοῦ δὲ φαινομένου· οὐχ οὕτως; C

they know nothing of true existence.

Ναί.

Μὴ τοίνυν ἡμίσεως αὐτὸ καταλίπωμεν ῥηθέν, ἀλλ' ἱκανῶς ἴδωμεν.

Λέγε, ἔφη.

Ζωγράφος, φαμέν, ἡνίας τε γράψει καὶ χαλινόν;

Ναί.

Ποιήσει δέ γε σκυτοτόμος καὶ χαλκεύς;

Πάνυ γε.

The maker has more knowledge than the imitator, but less than the user.

Ἆρ' οὖν ἐπαΐει οἵας δεῖ τὰς ἡνίας εἶναι καὶ τὸν χαλινὸν ὁ γραφεύς; ἢ οὐδ' ὁ ποιήσας, ὅ τε χαλκεὺς καὶ ὁ σκυτεύς, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνος, ὅσπερ τούτοις ἐπίσταται χρῆσθαι, μόνος ὁ ἱππικός;

Ἀληθέστατα.

Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ περὶ πάντα οὕτω φήσομεν ἔχειν;

Πῶς;

Three arts, using, making, imitating.

Περὶ ἕκαστον ταύτας τινὰς τρεῖς τέχνας εἶναι, D χρησομένην, ποιήσουσαν, μιμησομένην;

Ναί.

Goodness of things relative to use; hence the maker of them is instructed by the user.

Οὐκοῦν ἀρετὴ καὶ κάλλος καὶ ὀρθότης ἑκάστου σκεύους καὶ ζῴου καὶ πράξεως οὐ πρὸς ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν χρείαν ἐστί, πρὸς ἣν ἂν ἕκαστον ᾖ πεποιημένον ἢ πεφυκός;

Οὕτως.

Πολλὴ ἄρα ἀνάγκη τὸν χρώμενον ἑκάστῳ ἐμπειρότατόν τε εἶναι καὶ ἄγγελον γίγνεσθαι τῷ ποιητῇ

6. ἐφ' ἡμίσεως q : ἡμισέως cj. Steph. 26. πρὸς ΠΜ : om. A.

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p. 601. οἷα ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ ποιεῖ ἐν τῇ χρείᾳ ᾧ χρῆται· οἷον αὐλητής που αὐλοποιῷ ἐξαγγέλλει περὶ τῶν αὐλῶν, E οἳ ἂν ὑπηρετῶσιν ἐν τῷ αὐλεῖν, καὶ ἐπιτάξει οἵους δεῖ ποιεῖν, ὁ δ' ὑπηρετήσει.

Πῶς δ' οὔ;

Οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν εἰδὼς ἐξαγγέλλει περὶ χρηστῶν καὶ πονηρῶν αὐλῶν, ὁ δὲ πιστεύων ποιήσει;

Ναί.

The maker has belief and not knowledge, the imitator neither.

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἄρα σκεύους ὁ μὲν ποιητὴς πίστιν ὀρθὴν ἕξει περὶ κάλλους τε καὶ πονηρίας, ξυνὼν τῷ p. 602. εἰδότι καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος ἀκούειν | παρὰ τοῦ εἰδότος, ὁ δὲ χρώμενος ἐπιστήμην.

Πάνυ γε.

Ὁ δὲ μιμητὴς πότερον ἐκ τοῦ χρῆσθαι ἐπιστήμην ἕξει ὧν ἂν γράφῃ, εἴτε καλὰ καὶ ὀρθὰ εἴτε μή, ἢ δόξαν ὀρθὴν διὰ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης συνεῖναι τῷ εἰδότι καὶ ἐπιτάττεσθαι οἷα χρὴ γράφειν;

Οὐδέτερα.

Οὔτε ἄρα εἴσεται οὔτε ὀρθὰ δοξάσει ὁ μιμητὴς περὶ ὧν ἂν μιμῆται πρὸς κάλλος ἢ πονηρίαν.

Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

Χαρίεις ἂν εἴη ὁ ἐν τῇ ποιήσει μιμητικὸς πρὸς σοφίαν περὶ ὧν ἂν ποιῇ.

Οὐ πάνυ.

B Ἀλλ' οὖν δὴ ὅμως γε μιμήσεται, οὐκ εἰδὼς περὶ ἑκάστου, ὅπῃ πονηρὸν ἢ χρηστόν· ἀλλ', ὡς ἔοικεν, οἷον φαίνεται καλὸν εἶναι τοῖς πολλοῖς τε καὶ μηδὲν εἰδόσι, τοῦτο μιμήσεται.

Τί γὰρ ἄλλο;

Ταῦτα μὲν δή, ὥς γε φαίνεται, ἐπιεικῶς ἡμῖν

2, 6. ἐξαγγέλλει (bis) ΑΠΜ : ἐξαγγελεῖ cj. Steph. : ἐξαγγέλει Ξ.

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διωμολόγηται, τόν τε μιμητικὸν μηδὲν εἰδέναι ἄξιον p. 602. λόγου περὶ ὧν μιμεῖται, ἀλλ' εἶναι παιδιάν τινα καὶ οὐ σπουδὴν τὴν μίμησιν, τούς τε τῆς τραγικῆς ποιήσεως ἁπτομένους ἐν ἰαμβείοις καὶ ἐν ἔπεσι πάντας εἶναι μιμητικοὺς ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Imitation has been proved to be thrice removed from the truth.

Πρὸς Διός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ δὲ δὴ μιμεῖσθαι τοῦτο οὐ περὶ τρίτον μέν τί ἐστιν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας; ἢ γάρ;

Ναί.

Πρὸς δὲ δὴ ποῖόν τί ἐστι τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἔχον C τὴν δύναμιν, ἣν ἔχει;

Τοῦ ποίου τινὸς πέρι λέγεις;

Τοῦ τοιοῦδε· ταὐτόν που ἡμῖν μέγεθος ἐγγύθεν τε καὶ πόρρωθεν διὰ τῆς ὄψεως οὐκ ἴσον φαίνεται.

Οὐ γάρ.

Καὶ ταὐτὰ καμπύλα τε καὶ εὐθέα ἐν ὕδατί τε θεωμένοις καὶ ἔξω, καὶ κοῖλά τε δὴ καὶ ἐξέχοντα διὰ τὴν περὶ τὰ χρώματα αὖ πλάνην τῆς ὄψεως, καὶ πᾶσά τις ταραχὴ δήλη ἡμῖν ἐνοῦσα αὕτη ἐν τῇ D ψυχῇ· ᾧ δὴ ἡμῶν τῷ παθήματι τῆς φύσεως ἡ σκιαγραφία ἐπιθεμένη γοητείας οὐδὲν ἀπολείπει, καὶ ἡ θαυματοποιία καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ τοιαῦται μηχαναί.

Ἀληθῆ.

The art of measuring given to man that he may correct

Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ τὸ μετρεῖν καὶ ἀριθμεῖν καὶ ἱστάναι βοήθειαι χαριέσταται πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐφάνησαν, ὥστε μὴ ἄρχειν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ φαινόμενον μεῖζον ἢ ἔλαττον ἢ

7. δὴ A : om. ΠΜ.
24. αἱ AM : om. Π.

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p. 602. πλέον ἢ βαρύτερον, ἀλλὰ τὸ λογισάμενον καὶ μετρῆσαν ἢ καὶ στῆσαν;

Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

E 'Αλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε τοῦ λογιστικοῦ ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἐν ψυχῇ ἔργον.

the variety of appearances.

Τούτου γὰρ οὖν.

Τούτῳ δὲ πολλάκις μετρήσαντι καὶ σημαίνοντι μείζω ἄττα εἶναι ἢ ἐλάττω ἕτερα ἑτέρων ἢ ἴσα τἀναντία φαίνεται ἅμα περὶ ταὐτά.

Ναί.

Οὐκοῦν ἔφαμεν τῷ αὐτῷ ἅμα περὶ ταὐτὰ ἐναντία δοξάζειν ἀδύνατον εἶναι;

Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ' ἔφαμεν.

p. 603. | Τὸ παρὰ τὰ μέτρα ἄρα δοξάζον τῆς ψυχῆς τῷ κατὰ τὰ μέτρα οὐκ ἂν εἴη ταὐτόν.

Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

'Αλλὰ μὴν τὸ μέτρῳ γε καὶ λογισμῷ πιστεῦον βέλτιστον ἂν εἴη τῆς ψυχῆς.

Τί μήν;

Τὸ ἄρα τούτῳ ἐναντιούμενον τῶν φαύλων ἄν τι εἴη ἐν ἡμῖν.

'Ανάγκη.

Τοῦτο τοίνυν διομολογήσασθαι βουλόμενος ἔλεγον ὅτι ἡ γραφικὴ καὶ ὅλως ἡ μιμητικὴ πόρρω μὲν τῆς ἀληθείας ὂν τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον ἀπεργάζεται, πόρρω δ' B αὖ φρονήσεως ὄντι τῷ ἐν ἡμῖν προσομιλεῖ τε καὶ ἑταίρα καὶ φίλη ἐστὶν ἐπ' οὐδενὶ ὑγιεῖ οὐδ' ἀληθεῖ.

Παντάπασιν, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Φαύλη ἄρα φαύλῳ ξυγγιγνομένη φαῦλα γεννᾷ ἡ μιμητική.

The productions of the imitative arts are

Ἔοικεν.

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bastard and illegitimate.

Πότερον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν μόνον, ἢ καὶ p. 603. κατὰ τὴν ἀκοήν, ἣν δὴ ποίησιν ὀνομάζομεν;

Εἰκός γ', ἔφη, καὶ ταύτην.

Μὴ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τῷ εἰκότι μόνον πιστεύσωμεν ἐκ τῆς γραφικῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπ' αὐτὸ αὖ ἔλθωμεν τῆς διανοίας τοῦτο, ᾧ προσομιλεῖ ἡ τῆς C ποιήσεως μιμητική, καὶ ἴδωμεν, φαῦλον ἢ σπουδαῖόν ἐστιν.

Ἀλλὰ χρή.

Ὧδε δὴ προθώμεθα· πράττοντας, φαμέν, ἀνθρώπους μιμεῖται ἡ μιμητικὴ βιαίους ἢ ἑκουσίας πράξεις, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν ἢ εὖ οἰομένους ἢ κακῶς πεπραγέναι, καὶ ἐν τούτοις δὴ πᾶσιν ἢ λυπουμένους ἢ χαίροντας. μή τι ἄλλο ᾖ παρὰ ταῦτα;

Οὐδέν.

Ἆρ' οὖν ἐν ἅπασι τούτοις ὁμονοητικῶς ἄνθρωπος διάκειται; ἢ ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν ἐστασίαζε καὶ D ἐναντίας εἶχεν ἐν ἑαυτῷ δόξας ἅμα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, οὕτω καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι στασιάζει τε καὶ μάχεται αὐτὸς αὑτῷ; ἀναμιμνήσκομαι δέ, ὅτι τοῦτό γε νῦν οὐδὲν δεῖ ἡμᾶς διομολογεῖσθαι· ἐν γὰρ ταῖς ἄνω λόγοις ἱκανῶς πάντα ταῦτα διωμολογησάμεθα, ὅτι μυρίων τοιούτων ἐναντιωμάτων ἅμα γιγνομένων ἡ ψυχὴ γέμει ἡμῶν.

They imitate opposites;

Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.

Ὀρθῶς γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἀλλ' ὃ τότε ἀπελίπομεν, νῦν μοι δοκεῖ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι διεξελθεῖν. E

Τὸ ποῖον; ἔφη.

1. καὶ A^2ΠΜ : om. A.
2. κατὰ ΑΠΜ : ἡ κατὰ *q*.
13. ἢ ΠΜ : om. A (sed cum vacuo inter utrumque vocabulum spatio).
14. ᾖ ΑΠ : ἢ Π : om. *q*.

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p. 603. Ἀνήρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπιεικὴς τοιᾶσδε τύχης μετασχών, υἱὸν ἀπολέσας ἤ τι ἄλλο ὧν περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖται, ἐλέγομέν που καὶ τότε ὅτε ῥᾷστα οἴσει τῶν ἄλλων.

Πάνυ γε.

they encourage weakness;

Νῦν δέ γε τόδ' ἐπισκεψώμεθα, πότερον οὐδὲν ἀχθέσεται, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν ἀδύνατον, μετριάσει δέ πως πρὸς λύπην.

Οὕτω μᾶλλον, ἔφη, τό γε ἀληθές.

p. 604. | Τὸ δὲ νῦν μοι περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰπέ· πότερον μᾶλλον αὐτὸν οἴει τῇ λύπῃ μαχεῖσθαί τε καὶ ἀντιτείνειν, ὅταν ὁρᾶται ὑπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων, ἢ ὅταν ἐν ἐρημίᾳ μόνος αὐτὸς καθ' αὑτὸν γίγνηται;

Πολύ που, ἔφη, διοίσει, ὅταν ὁρᾶται.

Μονωθεὶς δέ γε, οἶμαι, πολλὰ μὲν τολμήσει φθέγξασθαι, ἃ εἴ τις αὐτοῦ ἀκούοι αἰσχύνοιτ' ἄν, πολλὰ δὲ ποιήσει, ἃ οὐκ ἂν δέξαιτό τινα ἰδεῖν δρῶντα.

Οὕτως ἔχει, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν ἀντιτείνειν διακελευόμενον λόγος B καὶ νόμος ἐστί, τὸ δὲ ἕλκον ἐπὶ τὰς λύπας αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος;

Ἀληθῆ.

Ἐναντίας δὲ ἀγωγῆς γιγνομένης ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα δύο τινὲ φαμὲν ἐν αὐτῷ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι.

Πῶς δ' οὔ;

Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν ἕτερον τῷ νόμῳ ἕτοιμον πείθεσθαι, ᾗ ὁ νόμος ἐξηγεῖται;

1. τύχης Π: ψυχῆς AM.
11. ἀντιτείνειν AΠM: ἀντιτενεῖν q.
25. τινὲ q: om. AΠM. ἐν αq: om. AΠM.

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Πῶς; p. 604.

they are at variance with the exhortations of philosophy;

Λέγει που ὁ νόμος, ὅτι κάλλιστον ὅ τι μάλιστα ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν ἐν ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς καὶ μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὡς οὔτε δήλου ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ τῶν τοιούτων, οὔτε εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν οὐδὲν προβαῖνον τῷ χαλεπῶς φέροντι, οὔτε τι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἄξιον ὂν C μεγάλης σπουδῆς, ὅ τε δεῖ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὅ τι τάχιστα παραγίγνεσθαι ἡμῖν, τούτῳ ἐμποδὼν γιγνόμενον τὸ λυπεῖσθαι.

Τίνι, ἦ δ' ὅς, λέγεις;

Τῷ βουλεύεσθαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, περὶ τὸ γεγονὸς καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν πτώσει κύβων πρὸς τὰ πεπτωκότα τίθεσθαι τὰ αὑτοῦ πράγματα, ὅπῃ ὁ λόγος αἱρεῖ βέλτιστ' ἂν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ προσπταίσαντας, καθάπερ παῖδας, ἐχομένους τοῦ πληγέντος ἐν τῷ βοᾶν διατρίβειν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ἐθίζειν τὴν ψυχὴν ὅ τι τάχιστα γίγνεσθαι πρὸς τῷ ἰᾶσθαί τε καὶ ἐπανορθοῦν τὸ πεσόν τε καὶ D νοσῆσαν, ἰατρικῇ θρηνῳδίαν ἀφανίζοντα.

Ὀρθότατα γοῦν ἄν τις, ἔφη, πρὸς τὰς τύχας οὕτω προσφέροιτο.

Οὐκοῦν, φαμέν, τὸ μὲν βέλτιστον τούτῳ τῷ λογισμῷ ἐθέλει ἕπεσθαι.

Δῆλον δή.

they recall trouble and sorrow;

Τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὰς ἀναμνήσεις τε τοῦ πάθους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ὀδυρμοὺς ἄγον καὶ ἀπλήστως ἔχον αὐτῶν ἆρ' οὐκ ἀλόγιστόν τε φήσομεν εἶναι καὶ ἀργὸν καὶ δειλίας φίλον;

13. αἱρεῖ Ξ q : ἐρεῖ AM : ἔρρει Π.
15. πληγέντος Π : πλήγοντος ?A : πλήττοντος A²M.
17. τῷ q : τὸ AΠM.
18. ἰατρικῇ q Plut. Stob. : ἰατρικὴν AM : ἰατρικὴν καὶ Π. τὴν θρηνῳδίαν q.
21. βέλτιστον AΠM : βέλτιστόν που A²Ξ.

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p. 604. Φήσομεν μὲν οὖν.

E Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν πολλὴν μίμησιν καὶ ποικίλην ἔχει, τὸ ἀγανακτητικόν· τὸ δὲ φρόνιμόν τε καὶ ἡσύχιον ἦθος, παραπλήσιον ὂν ἀεὶ αὐτὸ αὑτῷ, οὔτε ῥᾴδιον μιμήσασθαι οὔτε μιμούμενον εὐπετὲς καταμαθεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ πανηγύρει καὶ παντοδαποῖς ἀνθρώποις εἰς θέατρα ξυλλεγομένοις· ἀλλοτρίου γάρ που πάθους ἡ μίμησις αὐτοῖς γίγνεται.

p. 605. | Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

Ὁ δὴ μιμητικὸς ποιητὴς δῆλον ὅτι οὐ πρὸς τὸ τοιοῦτον τῆς ψυχῆς πέφυκέ τε καὶ ἡ σοφία αὐτοῦ τούτῳ ἀρέσκειν πέπηγεν, εἰ μέλλει εὐδοκιμήσειν ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ἀγανακτητικόν τε καὶ ποικίλον ἦθος διὰ τὸ εὐμίμητον εἶναι.

they minister in an inferior manner to an inferior principle in the soul.

Δῆλον.

Οὐκοῦν δικαίως ἂν αὐτοῦ ἤδη ἐπιλαμβανοίμεθα, καὶ τιθεῖμεν ἀντίστροφον αὐτὸν τῷ ζωγράφῳ· καὶ γὰρ τῷ φαῦλα ποιεῖν πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἔοικεν αὐτῷ, B καὶ τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον τοιοῦτον ὁμιλεῖν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, καὶ ταύτῃ ὡμοίωται. καὶ οὕτως ἤδη ἂν ἐν δίκῃ οὐ παραδεχοίμεθα εἰς μέλλουσαν εὐνομεῖσθαι πόλιν, ὅτι τοῦτο ἐγείρει τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τρέφει καὶ ἰσχυρὸν ποιῶν ἀπόλλυσι τὸ λογιστικόν, ὥσπερ ἐν πόλει ὅταν τις μοχθηροὺς ἐγκρατεῖς ποιῶν παραδιδῷ τὴν πόλιν, τοὺς δὲ χαριεστέρους φθείρῃ· ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸν μιμητικὸν ποιητὴν φήσομεν κακὴν πολιτείαν ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστου τῇ ψυχῇ ἐμποιεῖν, τῷ ἀνοήτῳ αὐτῆς χαριζόμενον καὶ οὔτε τὰ C μείζω οὔτε τὰ ἐλάττω διαγιγνώσκοντι, ἀλλὰ τὰ αὐτὰ τοτὲ μὲν μεγάλα ἡγουμένῳ, τοτὲ δὲ σμικρά,

11. τε A[1]: †γε (sic) A[2].

†

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εἴδωλα εἰδωλοποιοῦντι, τοῦ δὲ ἀληθοῦς πόρρω πάνυ ἀφεστῶτα. p. 605.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Οὐ μέντοι πω τό γε μέγιστον κατηγορήκαμεν αὐτῆς. τὸ γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἱκανὴν εἶναι λωβᾶσθαι, ἐκτὸς πάνυ τινῶν ὀλίγων, πάνδεινόν που.

Τί δ' οὐ μέλλει, εἴπερ γε δρᾷ αὐτό;

How can we be right in sympathising with the sorrows of poetry when we would fain restrain those of real life?

Ἀκούων σκόπει. οἵ γάρ που βέλτιστοι ἡμῶν ἀκροώμενοι Ὁμήρου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν τραγῳδιοποιῶν μιμουμένου τινὰ τῶν ἡρώων ἐν πένθει ὄντα D καὶ μακρὰν ῥῆσιν ἀποτείνοντα ἐν τοῖς ὀδυρμοῖς ἢ καὶ ᾄδοντάς τε καὶ κοπτομένους, οἶσθ' ὅτι χαίρομέν τε καὶ ἐνδόντες ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἑπόμεθα ξυμπάσχοντες καὶ σπουδάζοντες ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς ἀγαθὸν ποιητήν, ὃς ἂν ἡμᾶς ὅ τι μάλιστα οὕτω διαθῇ.

Οἶδα· πῶς δ' οὔ;

Ὅταν δὲ οἰκεῖόν τινι ἡμῶν κῆδος γένηται, ἐννοεῖς αὖ ὅτι ἐπὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ καλλωπιζόμεθα, ἂν δυνώμεθα ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν καὶ καρτερεῖν, ὡς τοῦτο μὲν ἀνδρὸς E ὄν, ἐκεῖνο δὲ γυναικός, ὃ τότε ἐπῃνοῦμεν.

Ἐννοῶ, ἔφη.

Ἦ καλῶς οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὗτος ὁ ἔπαινος ἔχει, τὸ ὁρῶντα τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα, οἷον ἑαυτόν τις μὴ ἀξιοῖ εἶναι ἀλλ' αἰσχύνοιτο ἄν, μὴ βδελύττεσθαι ἀλλὰ χαίρειν τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖν;

Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη, οὐκ εὐλόγῳ ἔοικεν.

| Ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ ἐκείνῃ γ' αὐτὸ σκοποίης. p. 606.

Πῇ;

1. εἰδωλοποιοῦντι ΑΠΜ : εἰδωλοποιοῦντα Vind. F. pr.? $q^{corr.}$ et cj. Morgenstein.

27. εἰ ΑΜ : om. Π.

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We fail to observe that a sentimental pity soon creates a real weakness.

p. 606. Εἰ ἐνθυμοῖο ὅτι τὸ βίᾳ κατεχόμενον τότε ἐν ταῖς οἰκείαις ξυμφοραῖς καὶ πεπεινηκὸς τοῦ δακρῦσαί τε καὶ ἀποδύρασθαι ἱκανῶς καὶ ἀποπλησθῆναι, φύσει ὂν τοιοῦτον οἷον τούτων ἐπιθυμεῖν, τότ᾽ ἐστὶ τοῦτο τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν πιμπλάμενον καὶ χαῖρον· τὸ δὲ φύσει βέλτιστον ἡμῶν, ἅτε οὐχ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευμένον λόγῳ οὐδὲ ἔθει, ἀνίησι τὴν φυλακὴν τοῦ B θρηνώδους τούτου, ἅτε ἀλλότρια πάθη θεωροῦν καὶ ἑαυτῷ οὐδὲν αἰσχρὸν ὄν, εἰ ἄλλος ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς φάσκων εἶναι ἀκαίρως πενθεῖ, τοῦτον ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ἐλεεῖν· ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνο κερδαίνειν ἡγεῖται, τὴν ἡδονήν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν δέξαιτο αὐτῆς στερηθῆναι καταφρονήσας ὅλου τοῦ ποιήματος. λογίζεσθαι γάρ, οἶμαι, ὀλίγοις τισὶ μέτεστιν ὅτι ἀπολαύειν ἀνάγκη ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων εἰς τὰ οἰκεῖα· θρέψαντα γὰρ ἐν ἐκείνοις ἰσχυρὸν τὸ ἐλεεινὸν οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἐν τοῖς αὑτοῦ πάθεσι κατέχειν.

C Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

In like manner the love of comedy may turn a man into a buffoon.

Ἆρ᾽ οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τοῦ γελοίου; ὅτι, ἂν αὐτὸς αἰσχύνοιο γελωτοποιῶν, ἐν μιμήσει δὲ κωμῳδικῇ ἢ καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἀκούων σφόδρα χαρῇς καὶ μὴ μισῇς ὡς πονηρά, ταὐτὸν ποιεῖς ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐλέοις; ὃ γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ αὖ κατεῖχες ἐν σαυτῷ βουλόμενον γελωτοποιεῖν, φοβούμενος δόξαν βωμολοχίας, τότ᾽ αὖ ἀνίης, καὶ ἐκεῖ νεανικὸν ποιήσας ἔλαθες πολλάκις ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις ἐξενεχθείς, ὥστε κωμῳδιοποιὸς γενέσθαι.

20. ὅτι, ἂν cj. Schneid.: ὅτι ἂν ΑΠΜ: ὅ τι ἂν Stallb.: ὅταν ἃ cj. Madv. (cum δὴ pro δὲ v. 21).
22. μὴ μισῇς (ῇ in litura) A: μιμήσῃς Π: μιμήσῃ M: μὴ μισήσῃς xa.
25. ἀνίης Ξq: ἂν εἴης AM: ἀνείης Π.

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Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. p. 606.

Καὶ περὶ ἀφροδισίων δὴ καὶ θυμοῦ καὶ περὶ πάν- D των τῶν ἐπιθυμητικῶν τε καὶ λυπηρῶν καὶ ἡδέων ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἃ δή φαμεν πάσῃ πράξει ἡμῖν ἕπεσθαι, ὅτι τοιαῦτα ἡμᾶς ἡ ποιητικὴ μίμησις ἐργάζεται· τρέφει γὰρ ταῦτα ἄρδουσα, δέον αὐχμεῖν, καὶ ἄρχοντα ἡμῖν καθίστησι δέον ἄρχεσθαι αὐτά, ἵνα βελτίους τε καὶ εὐδαιμονέστεροι ἀντὶ χειρόνων καὶ ἀθλιωτέρων γιγνώμεθα.

Οὐκ ἔχω ἄλλως φάναι, ἦ δ' ὅς.

We are lovers of Homer, but we must expel him from our State.

Οὐκοῦν, εἶπον, ὦ Γλαύκων, ὅταν Ὁμήρου ἐπαι- E νέταις ἐντύχῃς λέγουσιν, ὡς τὴν Ἑλλάδα πεπαίδευκεν οὗτος ὁ ποιητὴς καὶ πρὸς διοίκησίν τε καὶ παιδείαν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων ἄξιος ἀναλαβόντι μανθάνειν τε καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν ποιητὴν πάντα τὸν αὑτοῦ βίον κατασκευασάμενον ζῆν, | φι- p. 607. λεῖν μὲν χρὴ καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι ὡς ὄντας βελτίστους εἰς ὅσον δύνανται, καὶ συγχωρεῖν Ὅμηρον ποιητικώτατον εἶναι καὶ πρῶτον τῶν τραγῳδιοποιῶν, εἰδέναι δὲ ὅτι ὅσον μόνον ὕμνους θεοῖς καὶ ἐγκώμια τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ποιήσεως παραδεκτέον εἰς πόλιν· εἰ δὲ τὴν ἡδυσμένην Μοῦσαν παραδέξει ἐν μέλεσιν ἢ ἔπεσιν, ἡδονή σοι καὶ λύπη ἐν τῇ πόλει βασιλεύσετον ἀντὶ νόμου τε καὶ τοῦ κοινῇ ἀεὶ δόξαντος εἶναι βελτίστου λόγου.

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

Apology to the poets.

Ταῦτα δή, ἔφην, ἀπολελογήσθω ἡμῖν ἀναμνη- B σθεῖσι περὶ ποιήσεως, ὅτι εἰκότως ἄρα τότε αὐτὴν

5. ὅτι MSS.: suspectum fuit Astio.

7. ἡμῖν ΑΠ : ἡμῶν Ξ.

27. ἀπολελογήσθω Μ : ἀπολελογίσθω ΑΠ.

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p. 607. ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀπεστέλλομεν τοιαύτην οὖσαν· ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἡμᾶς ᾕρει. προσείπωμεν δὲ αὐτῇ, μὴ καί τινα σκληρότητα ἡμῶν καὶ ἀγροικίαν καταγνῷ, ὅτι παλαιὰ μέν τις διαφορὰ φιλοσοφίᾳ τε καὶ ποιητικῇ· καὶ γὰρ ἡ λακέρυζα πρὸς δεσπόταν κύων ἐκείνη κραυγάζουσα καὶ μέγας ἐν ἀφρόνων κενεαγο-
C ρίαισι καὶ ὁ τῶν Δία σοφῶν ὄχλος κρατῶν καὶ οἱ λεπτῶς μεριμνῶντες, ὅτι ἄρα πένονται, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία σημεῖα παλαιᾶς ἐναντιώσεως τούτων. ὅμως δὲ εἰρήσθω ὅτι ἡμεῖς γε, εἴ τινα ἔχοι λόγον εἰπεῖν ἡ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ποιητικὴ καὶ ἡ μίμησις, ὡς χρὴ αὐτὴν εἶναι ἐν πόλει εὐνομουμένῃ, ἄσμενοι ἂν καταδεχοίμεθα· ὡς ξύνισμέν γε ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς κηλουμένοις ὑπ᾽ αὐτῆς· ἀλλὰ γὰρ τὸ δοκοῦν ἀληθὲς οὐχ ὅσιον προδιδόναι. ἦ γάρ, ὦ φίλε, οὐ κηλεῖ ὑπ᾽
D αὐτῆς καὶ σύ, καὶ μάλιστα, ὅταν δι᾽ Ὁμήρου θεωρῇς αὐτήν;

Πολύ γε.

Οὐκοῦν δικαία ἐστὶν οὕτω κατιέναι, ἀπολογησομένη ἐν μέλει ἤ τινι ἄλλῳ μέτρῳ;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Δοῖμεν δέ γέ που ἂν καὶ τοῖς προστάταις αὐτῆς, ὅσοι μὴ ποιητικοί, φιλοποιηταὶ δέ, ἄνευ μέτρου λόγον ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς εἰπεῖν, ὡς οὐ μόνον ἡδεῖα ἀλλὰ καὶ ὠφελίμη πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας καὶ τὸν βίον τὸν ἀνθρώπινόν ἐστι· καὶ εὐμενῶς ἀκουσόμεθα. κερδα-
E νοῦμεν γάρ που, ἐὰν μὴ μόνον ἡδεῖα φανῇ ἀλλὰ καὶ ὠφελίμη.

7. δία σοφῶν A : διὰ σοφῶν Π : διασοφῶν M.
12. εἶναι ἐν πόλει AΠ : ἐν πόλει εἶναι MΞ.
13. καταδεχοίμεθα AΠ : δεχοίμεθα A²MΞ.
19. ἀπολογησομένη AM : ἀπολογησαμένη r : ἀπολογισαμένη Π.

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Poetry is attractive but not true.

Πῶς δ' οὐ μέλλομεν, ἔφη, κερδαίνειν; p. 607.

Εἰ δέ γε μή, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, ὥσπερ οἱ ποτέ του ἐρασθέντες, ἐὰν ἡγήσωνται μὴ ὠφέλιμον εἶναι τὸν ἔρωτα, βίᾳ μέν, ὅμως δὲ ἀπέχονται, καὶ ἡμεῖς οὕτως, διὰ τὸν ἐγγεγονότα μὲν ἔρωτα τῆς τοιαύτης ποιήσεως ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν καλῶν πολιτειῶν τροφῆς, | εὖνοι p. 608. μὲν ἐσόμεθα φανῆναι αὐτὴν ὡς βελτίστην καὶ ἀληθεστάτην, ἕως δ' ἂν μὴ οἵα τ' ᾖ ἀπολογήσασθαι, ἀκροασόμεθ' αὐτῆς ἐπᾴδοντες ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, ὃν λέγομεν, καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἐπῳδήν, εὐλαβούμενοι πάλιν ἐμπεσεῖν εἰς τὸν παιδικόν τε καὶ τὸν τῶν πολλῶν ἔρωτα. †αἰσθόμεθα δ' οὖν, ὡς οὐ σπουδαστέον ἐπὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ποιήσει ὡς ἀληθείας τε ἁπτομένῃ καὶ σπουδαίᾳ, ἀλλ' εὐλαβητέον αὐτὴν ὂν τῷ ἀκροωμένῳ, περὶ τῆς ἐν αὑτῷ πολιτείας δεδιότι, B καὶ νομιστέα ἅπερ εἰρήκαμεν περὶ ποιήσεως.

Παντάπασιν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ξύμφημι.

Μέγας γάρ, ἔφην, ὁ ἀγών, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, μέγας, οὐχ ὅσος δοκεῖ, τὸ χρηστὸν ἢ κακὸν γενέσθαι, ὥστε οὔτε τιμῇ ἐπαρθέντα οὔτε χρήμασιν οὔτε ἀρχῇ οὐδεμιᾷ οὐδέ γε ποιητικῇ ἄξιον ἀμελῆσαι δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς.

Ξύμφημί σοι, ἔφη, ἐξ ὧν διεληλύθαμεν· οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἄλλον ὁντινοῦν.

Καὶ μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τά γε μέγιστα ἐπίχειρα ἀρετῆς C καὶ προκείμενα ἆθλα οὐ διεληλύθαμεν.

Ἀμήχανόν τι, ἔφη, λέγεις μέγεθος, εἰ τῶν εἰρημένων μείζω ἐστὶν ἄλλα.

The rewards of

Τί δ' ἄν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔν γε ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ μέγα γέ-

12. αἰσθόμεθα ΑΠΜ : ᾀσόμεθα cj. Madvig. : εἰσόμεθα q.
15. ὂν ΑΠΜ : om. xq.

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p. 608. νοιτο; πᾶς γὰρ οὗτός γε ὁ ἐκ παιδὸς μέχρι πρεσβύτου χρόνος πρὸς πάντα ὀλίγος πού τις ἂν εἴη.

Οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

virtue extend not only to this little space of human life but to the whole of existence.

Τί οὖν; οἴει ἀθανάτῳ πράγματι ὑπὲρ τοσούτου
D δεῖν χρόνου ἐσπουδακέναι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός;

Οἶμαι ἔγωγ', ἔφη· ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο λέγεις;

Οὐκ ᾔσθησαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ἀθάνατος ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ οὐδέποτε ἀπόλλυται;

Καὶ ὃς ἐμβλέψας μοι καὶ θαυμάσας εἶπε Μὰ Δί', οὐκ ἔγωγε· σὺ δὲ τοῦτ' ἔχεις λέγειν;

Εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ γ', ἔφην· οἶμαι δὲ καὶ σύ· οὐδὲν γὰρ χαλεπόν.

Ἔμοιγ', ἔφη· σοῦ δ' ἂν ἡδέως ἀκούσαιμι τὸ οὐ χαλεπὸν τοῦτο.

Ἀκούοις ἄν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

Λέγε μόνον, ἔφη.

Ἀγαθόν τι, εἶπον, καὶ κακὸν καλεῖς;

Ἔγωγε.

E Ἆρ' οὖν ὥσπερ ἐγὼ περὶ αὐτῶν διανοεῖ;

Τὸ ποῖον;

Τὸ μὲν ἀπολλύον καὶ διαφθεῖρον πᾶν τὸ κακὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ σῷζον καὶ ὠφελοῦν τὸ ἀγαθόν.

Ἔγωγ', ἔφη.

Everything has a good and an evil, and if not destroyed by its own evil, will not be destroyed by that of another.

Τί δέ; κακὸν ἑκάστῳ τι καὶ ἀγαθὸν λέγεις; οἷον
p. 609. ὀφθαλμοῖς | ὀφθαλμίαν καὶ ξύμπαντι τῷ σώματι νόσον, σίτῳ τε ἐρυσίβην, σηπεδόνα τε ξύλοις, χαλκῷ δὲ καὶ σιδήρῳ ἰόν, καί, ὅπερ λέγω, σχεδὸν πᾶσι ξύμφυτον ἑκάστῳ κακόν τι καὶ νόσημα;

Ἔγωγ', ἔφη.

2. πρὸς τὸν πάντα q. 29. τι M: τε ΑΠ.

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Οὐκοῦν ὅταν τῳ τι τούτων προσγένηται, πονηρόν τε ποιεῖ ᾧ προσεγένετο, καὶ τελευτῶν ὅλον διέλυσε καὶ ἀπώλεσεν; p. 609.

Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Τὸ ξύμφυτον ἄρα κακὸν ἑκάστου καὶ ἡ πονηρία ἕκαστον ἀπόλλυσιν, ἢ εἰ μὴ τοῦτο ἀπολεῖ, οὐκ ἂν ἄλλο γε αὐτὸ ἔτι διαφθείρειεν. οὐ γὰρ τό γε ἀγαθὸν μή ποτέ τι ἀπολέσῃ, οὐδὲ αὖ τὸ μήτε κακὸν μήτε ἀγαθόν. B

Πῶς γὰρ ἄν; ἔφη.

Ἐὰν ἄρα τι εὑρίσκωμεν τῶν ὄντων, ᾧ ἔστι μὲν κακόν, ὃ ποιεῖ αὐτὸ μοχθηρόν, τοῦτο μέντοι οὐχ οἷόν τε αὐτὸ λύειν ἀπολλύον, οὐκ ἤδη εἰσόμεθα, ὅτι τοῦ πεφυκότος οὕτως ὄλεθρος οὐκ ἦν;

Οὕτως, ἔφη, εἰκός.

Τί οὖν; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ψυχῇ ἆρα οὐκ ἔστιν ὃ ποιεῖ αὐτὴν κακήν;

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, ἃ νῦν δὴ διῇμεν πάντα, ἀδικία τε καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ δειλία καὶ ἀμαθία. C

Therefore, if the soul cannot be destroyed by moral evil, she certainly will not be destroyed by physical evil.

Ἦ οὖν τι τούτων αὐτὴν διαλύει τε καὶ ἀπόλλυσι; καὶ ἐννόει μὴ ἐξαπατηθῶμεν οἰηθέντες τὸν ἄδικον ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἀνόητον, ὅταν ληφθῇ ἀδικῶν, τότε ἀπολωλέναι ὑπὸ τῆς ἀδικίας, πονηρίας οὔσης ψυχῆς. ἀλλ' ὧδε ποίει· ὥσπερ σῶμα ἡ σώματος πονηρία νόσος οὖσα τήκει καὶ διόλλυσι καὶ ἄγει εἰς τὸ μηδὲ σῶμα εἶναι, καὶ ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν ἅπαντα ὑπὸ τῆς οἰκείας κακίας, τῷ προσκαθῆσθαι καὶ ἐνεῖναι διαφθειρούσης, εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀφικνεῖται — οὐχ οὕτως; D

Ναί.

18. δὴ ΑΠ: om. M.

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p. 609. Ἴθι δή, καὶ ψυχὴν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον σκόπει, ἆρα ἐνοῦσα ἐν αὐτῇ ἀδικία καὶ ἡ ἄλλη κακία τῷ ἐνεῖναι καὶ προσκαθῆσθαι φθείρει αὐτὴν καὶ μαραίνει, ἕως ἂν εἰς θάνατον ἀγαγοῦσα τοῦ σώματος χωρίσῃ;

Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε.

Ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἐκεῖνό γε ἄλογον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὴν μὲν ἄλλου πονηρίαν ἀπολλύναι τι, τὴν δὲ αὑτοῦ μή.

Ἄλογον.

E Ἐννόει γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, ὅτι οὐδ' ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν σιτίων πονηρίας, ἣ ἂν ᾖ αὐτῶν ἐκείνων, εἴτε παλαιότης εἴτε σαπρότης εἴτε ἡτισοῦν οὖσα, οὐκ οἰόμεθα δεῖν σῶμα ἀπόλλυσθαι· ἀλλ' ἐὰν μὲν ἐμποιῇ ἡ αὐτῶν πονηρία τῶν σιτίων τῷ σώματι σώματος μοχθηρίαν, φήσομεν αὐτὸ δι' ἐκεῖνα ὑπὸ τῆς αὑτοῦ κακίας νόσου οὔσης ἀπολωλέναι· ὑπὸ δὲ p. 610. σιτίων πονηρίας ἄλλων ὄντων ἄλλο | ὂν τὸ σῶμα, ὑπ' ἀλλοτρίου κακοῦ μὴ ἐμποιήσαντος τὸ ἔμφυτον κακόν, οὐδέποτε ἀξιώσομεν διαφθείρεσθαι.

*Ὀρθότατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Evil means the contagion of evil, and the evil of the body does not infect the soul.

Κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τοίνυν λόγον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐὰν μὴ σώματος πονηρία ψυχῇ ψυχῆς πονηρίαν ἐμποιῇ, μή ποτε ἀξιῶμεν ὑπὸ ἀλλοτρίου κακοῦ ἄνευ τῆς ἰδίας πονηρίας ψυχὴν ἀπόλλυσθαι, τῷ ἑτέρου κακῷ ἕτερον.

Ἔχει γάρ, ἔφη, λόγον.

Ἢ τοίνυν ταῦτα ἐξελέγξωμεν ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγο-B μεν, ἢ ἕως ἂν ᾖ ἀνέλεγκτα, μή ποτε φῶμεν ὑπὸ πυρετοῦ μηδ' αὖ ὑπ' ἄλλης νόσου μηδ' αὖ ὑπὸ σφαγῆς, μηδ' εἴ τις ὅ τι σμικρότατα ὅλον τὸ σῶμα

21. ὀρθότατα cj. Ast. : ὀρθότατ' ἂν ΑΠΜ : an ὀρθότατά γ'?

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κατατέμοι, ἕνεκα τούτων μηδὲν μᾶλλόν ποτε ψυχὴν p. 610. ἀπόλλυσθαι, πρὶν ἄν τις ἀποδείξῃ, ὡς διὰ ταῦτα τὰ παθήματα τοῦ σώματος αὐτὴ ἐκείνη ἀδικωτέρα καὶ ἀνοσιωτέρα γίγνεται· ἀλλοτρίου δὲ κακοῦ ἐν ἄλλῳ γιγνομένου, τοῦ δὲ ἰδίου ἑκάστῳ μὴ ἐγγιγνομένου, μήτε ψυχὴν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν ἐῶμεν φάναι C τινὰ ἀπόλλυσθαι.

Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε οὐδείς ποτε δείξει, ὡς τῶν ἀποθνησκόντων ἀδικώτεραι αἱ ψυχαὶ διὰ τὸν θάνατον γίγνονται.

Ἐὰν δέ γέ τις, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὁμόσε τῷ λόγῳ τολμᾷ ἰέναι καὶ λέγειν, ὡς πονηρότερος καὶ ἀδικώτερος γίγνεται ὁ ἀποθνήσκων, ἵνα δὴ μὴ ἀναγκάζηται ἀθανάτους τὰς ψυχὰς ὁμολογεῖν, ἀξιώσομέν που, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγει ὁ ταῦτα λέγων, τὴν ἀδικίαν εἶναι θανάσιμον τῷ ἔχοντι ὥσπερ νόσον, καὶ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τούτου D ἀποκτιννύντος τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει ἀποθνήσκειν τοὺς λαμβάνοντας αὐτό, τοὺς μὲν μάλιστα θᾶττον, τοὺς δ' ἧττον σχολαίτερον, ἀλλὰ μή, ὥσπερ νῦν διὰ τοῦτο ὑπ' ἄλλων δίκην ἐπιτιθέντων ἀποθνήσκουσιν οἱ ἄδικοι.

Μὰ Δί', ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐκ ἄρα πάνδεινον φανεῖται ἡ ἀδικία, εἰ θανάσιμον ἔσται τῷ λαμβάνοντι· ἀπαλλαγὴ γὰρ ἂν εἴη κακῶν· ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον οἶμαι αὐτὴν φανήσεσθαι πᾶν τοὐναντίον τοὺς ἄλλους ἀποκτιννῦσαν, εἴπερ οἷόν τε, τὸν δ' ἔχοντα καὶ μάλα ζωτι- E κὸν παρέχουσαν, καὶ πρός γ' ἔτι τῷ ζωτικῷ ἄγρυπνον· οὕτω πόρρω που, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐσκήνηται τοῦ θανάσιμος εἶναι.

16. τούτου *q* : τοῦ ΑΠΜ.
19. διὰ τοῦτο *q* : διὰ τούτου ΑΠΜ.

p. 610. Καλῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις. ὁπότε γὰρ δὴ μὴ ἱκανὴ ἥ γε οἰκεία πονηρία καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον κακὸν ἀποκτεῖναι καὶ ἀπολέσαι ψυχήν, σχολῇ τό γε ἐπ' ἄλλου ὀλέθρῳ τεταγμένον κακὸν ψυχὴν ἤ τι ἄλλο ἀπολεῖ, πλὴν ἐφ' ᾧ τέτακται.

Σχολῇ γ', ἔφη, ὥς γε τὸ εἰκός.

Οὐκοῦν ὁπότε μηδ' ὑφ' ἑνὸς ἀπόλλυται κακοῦ,
p. 611. μήτε οἰκείου μήτε ἀλλοτρίου, | δῆλον ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἀεὶ ὂν εἶναι, εἰ δ' ἀεὶ ὄν, ἀθάνατον.

Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

If the soul is indestructible, the number of souls can never increase or diminish.

Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὕτως ἐχέτω. εἰ δ' ἔχει, ἐννοεῖς, ὅτι ἀεὶ ἂν εἶεν αἱ αὐταί. οὔτε γὰρ ἄν που ἐλάττους γένοιντο μηδεμιᾶς ἀπολλυμένης, οὔτε αὖ πλείους· εἰ γὰρ ὁτιοῦν τῶν ἀθανάτων πλέον γίγνοιτο, οἶσθ' ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ θνητοῦ ἂν γίγνοιτο καὶ πάντα ἂν εἴη τελευτῶντα ἀθάνατα.

Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

B Ἀλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μήτε τοῦτο οἰώμεθα, ὁ γὰρ λόγος οὐκ ἐάσει, μήτε γε αὖ τῇ ἀληθεστάτῃ φύσει τοιοῦτον εἶναι ψυχήν, ὥστε πολλῆς ποικιλίας καὶ ἀνομοιότητός τε καὶ διαφορᾶς γέμειν αὐτὸ πρὸς αὑτό.

Πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη.

Οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀΐδιον εἶναι σύνθετόν τε ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ μὴ τῇ καλλίστῃ κεχρημένον συνθέσει, ὡς νῦν ἡμῖν ἐφάνη ἡ ψυχή.

Οὔκουν εἰκός γε.

The soul, if she is to be seen truly, should be stripped of the accidents of earth.

Ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἀθάνατον ψυχή, καὶ ὁ ἄρτι λόγος καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀναγκάσειαν ἄν· οἷον δ' ἐστὶ τῇ ἀλη-
C θείᾳ, οὐ λελωβημένον δεῖ αὐτὸ θεάσασθαι ὑπό τε τῆς τοῦ σώματος κοινωνίας καὶ ἄλλων κακῶν, ὥσπερ

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νῦν ἡμεῖς θεώμεθα, ἀλλ' οἷόν ἐστι καθαρὸν γιγνό- p. 611.
μενον, τοιοῦτον ἱκανῶς λογισμῷ διαθεατέον, καὶ
πολὺ κάλλιον αὐτὸ εὑρήσει καὶ ἐναργέστερον δι-
καιοσύνας τε καὶ ἀδικίας διόψεται καὶ πάντα ἃ νῦν
διήλθομεν. νῦν δὲ εἴπομεν μὲν ἀληθῆ περὶ αὐτοῦ,
οἷον ἐν τῷ παρόντι φαίνεται· τεθεάμεθα μέντοι
διακείμενον αὐτό, ὥσπερ οἱ τὸν θαλάττιον Γλαῦκον
ὁρῶντες οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ῥᾳδίως αὐτοῦ ἴδοιεν τὴν ἀρχαίαν D
φύσιν, ὑπὸ τοῦ τά τε παλαιὰ τοῦ σώματος μέρη τὰ
μὲν κεκλάσθαι, τὰ δὲ συντετρῖφθαι καὶ πάντως λε-
λωβῆσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν κυμάτων, ἄλλα δὲ προσπεφυκέ-
ναι, ὄστρεά τε καὶ φυκία καὶ πέτρας, ὥστε παντὶ
μᾶλλον θηρίῳ ἐοικέναι ἢ οἷος ἦν φύσει, οὕτω καὶ
τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμεῖς θεώμεθα διακειμένην ὑπὸ μυρίων
κακῶν· ἀλλὰ δεῖ, ὦ Γλαύκων, ἐκεῖσε βλέπειν.

Ποῖ; ἦ δ' ὅς.

Her true conversation is with the eternal.

Εἰς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν αὐτῆς, καὶ ἐννοεῖν ὧν ἅπ- E
τεται καὶ οἵων ἐφίεται ὁμιλιῶν, ὡς ξυγγενὴς οὖσα
τῷ τε θείῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ τῷ ἀεὶ ὄντι, καὶ οἵα ἂν
γένοιτο τῷ τοιούτῳ πᾶσα ἐπισπομένη καὶ ὑπὸ ταύ-
της τῆς ὁρμῆς ἐκκομισθεῖσα ἐκ τοῦ πόντου, ἐν ᾧ νῦν
ἐστί, καὶ περικρουσθεῖσα πέτρας τε καὶ ὄστρεα, ἃ
νῦν αὐτῇ, ἅτε γῆν ἑστιωμένῃ, | γεηρὰ καὶ πετρώδη p. 612.
πολλὰ καὶ ἄγρια περιπέφυκεν ὑπὸ τῶν εὐδαιμόνων
λεγομένων ἑστιάσεων. καὶ τότ' ἄν τις ἴδοι αὐτῆς
τὴν ἀληθῆ φύσιν, εἴτε πολυειδὴς εἴτε μονοειδής,
εἴτε ὅπῃ ἔχει καὶ ὅπως· νῦν δὲ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ
βίῳ πάθη τε καὶ εἴδη, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἐπιεικῶς αὐτῆς
διεληλύθαμεν.

2. διαθεατέον Ξ : διαθετέον ΑΠ : θεατέον Μ.
3. πολλύ γε (sic) Π. 10. κεκλάσθαι ΑΜ : ἐκκεκλάσθαι Π.

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Having put aside for argument's sake the rewards of virtue, we may now claim to have them restored.

p. 612. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τά τε ἄλλα ἀπελυσάμεθα ἐν B τῷ λόγῳ, καὶ οὐ τοὺς μισθοὺς οὐδὲ τὰς δόξας δικαιοσύνης ἐπῃνέκαμεν, ὥσπερ Ἡσίοδόν τε καὶ Ὅμηρον ὑμεῖς ἔφατε, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην αὐτῇ ψυχῇ ἄριστον εὕρομεν, καὶ ποιητέον εἶναι αὐτῇ τὰ δίκαια, ἐάν τ' ἔχῃ τὸν Γύγου δακτύλιον, ἐάν τε μή, καὶ πρὸς τοιούτῳ δακτυλίῳ τὴν Ἄϊδος κυνῆν;

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, νῦν ἤδη ἀνεπίφθονόν ἐστι πρὸς ἐκείνοις καὶ τοὺς μισθοὺς τῇ δι- C καιοσύνῃ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀρετῇ ἀποδοῦναι, ὅσους τε καὶ οἵους τῇ ψυχῇ παρέχει παρ' ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ θεῶν, ζῶντός τε ἔτι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ;

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Ἆρ' οὖν ἀποδώσετέ μοι ἃ ἐδανείσασθε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ;

Τί μάλιστα;

Ἔδωκα ὑμῖν τὸν δίκαιον δοκεῖν ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ τὸν ἄδικον δίκαιον. ὑμεῖς γὰρ ἡγεῖσθε, κἂν εἰ μὴ δυνατὸν εἴη ταῦτα λανθάνειν καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους, ὅμως δοτέον εἶναι τοῦ λόγου ἕνεκα, ἵνα αὐτὴ D δικαιοσύνη πρὸς ἀδικίαν αὐτὴν κριθείη. ἢ οὐ μνημονεύεις;

Ἀδικοίην μέντ' ἄν, ἔφη, εἰ μή.

Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κεκριμέναι εἰσί, πάλιν ἀπαιτῶ ὑπὲρ δικαιοσύνης, ὥσπερ ἔχει δόξης καὶ

2. ἀπελυσάμεθα ΑΠ : ἀπεδυσάμεθα Μ.
4. ἐπηνέγκαμεν ΠΜ : ἐπηνέγ̇καμεν Α : ἐπῃνέκαμεν A^2 : ἐπῃνέσαμεν Κ.
20. ἡγεῖσθε Π : ᾐτεῖσθε Α : ἠτεῖσθε Μ.
26. Ἐπειδὴ . . . εἰσί A^2mgΞ : ἐπειδὴ ἦν τοίνυν κεκριμέναι εἰσίν, ἐγὼ ΑΠΜ.

Republic X.

SOCRATES, GLAUCON.

παρὰ θεῶν καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἡμᾶς ὁμολογεῖν p. 612. περὶ αὐτῆς δοκεῖσθαι οὕτω, ἵνα καὶ τὰ νικητήρια κομίσηται, ἃ ἀπὸ τοῦ δοκεῖν κτωμένη δίδωσι τοῖς ἔχουσιν αὐτήν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶναι ἀγαθὰ διδοῦσα ἐφάνη καὶ οὐκ ἐξαπατῶσα τοὺς τῷ ὄντι λαμβάνοντας αὐτήν.

Δίκαια, ἔφη, αἰτεῖ. E

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο ἀποδώσετε, ὅτι θεούς γε οὐ λανθάνει ἑκάτερος αὐτῶν οἷός ἐστιν;

'Αποδώσομεν, ἔφη.

The just man is the friend of the gods, and all things work together for his good.

Εἰ δὲ μὴ λανθάνετον, ὁ μὲν θεοφιλὴς ἂν εἴη, ὁ δὲ θεομισής, ὥσπερ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς ὡμολογοῦμεν.

Ἔστι ταῦτα.

Τῷ δὲ θεοφιλεῖ οὐχ ὁμολογήσομεν, ὅσα γε ἀπὸ θεῶν | γίγνεται, πάντα γίγνεσθαι ὡς οἷόν τε ἄριστα, p. 613. εἰ μή τι ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ κακὸν ἐκ προτέρας ἁμαρτίας ὑπῆρχεν;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Οὕτως ἄρα ὑποληπτέον περὶ τοῦ δικαίου ἀνδρός, ἐάν τ' ἐν πενίᾳ γίγνηται ἐάν τ' ἐν νόσοις ἤ τινι ἄλλῳ τῶν δοκούντων κακῶν, ὡς τούτῳ ταῦτα εἰς ἀγαθόν τι τελευτήσει ζῶντι ἢ καὶ ἀποθανόντι. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὑπό γε θεῶν ποτὲ ἀμελεῖται, ὃς ἂν προθυμεῖσθαι ἐθέλῃ δίκαιος γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐπιτηδεύων ἀρετὴν εἰς ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ ὁμοιοῦσθαι θεῷ. B

Εἰκός γ', ἔφη, τὸν τοιοῦτον μὴ ἀμελεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου.

2. δοκεῖσθαι ΑΠ : διακεῖσθαι Μ.
3. ἃ Ξ : om. ΑΠ : post κτωμένη ponunt A² et M.
4. τὰ A²ΠΜ : om. A.
14. ταῦτα] Hac voce desinit Π.

Republic X.

Socrates, Glaucon.

p. 613. Οὐκοῦν περὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου τἀναντία τούτων δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι;

Σφόδρα γε.

Τὰ μὲν δὴ παρὰ θεῶν τοιαῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη νικητήρια τῷ δικαίῳ.

The unjust is the opposite.

Κατὰ γοῦν ἐμὴν δόξαν, ἔφη.

Τί δέ, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, παρ᾽ ἀνθρώπων; ἆρ᾽ οὐχ ὧδε ἔχει, εἰ δεῖ τὸ ὂν τιθέναι; οὐχ οἱ μὲν δεινοί τε καὶ ἄδικοι δρῶσιν ὅπερ οἱ δρομῆς, ὅσοι ἂν θέωσιν εὖ ἀπὸ τῶν κάτω, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν ἄνω μή; τὸ
C μὲν πρῶτον ὀξέως ἀποπηδῶσι, τελευτῶντες δὲ καταγέλαστοι γίγνονται, τὰ ὦτα ἐπὶ τῶν ὤμων ἔχοντες καὶ ἀστεφάνωτοι ἀποτρέχοντες. οἱ δὲ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ δρομικοὶ εἰς τέλος ἐλθόντες τά τε ἆθλα λαμβάνουσι καὶ στεφανοῦνται. οὐχ οὕτω καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων τὸ πολὺ ξυμβαίνει; πρὸς τέλος ἑκάστης πράξεως καὶ ὁμιλίας καὶ τοῦ βίου εὐδοκιμοῦσί τε καὶ τὰ ἆθλα παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φέρονται;

He may be compared to a runner who is only good at the start.

Καὶ μάλα.

Ἀνέξει ἄρα λέγοντος ἐμοῦ περὶ τούτων ἅπερ αὐτὸς ἔλεγες περὶ τῶν ἀδίκων; ἐρῶ γὰρ δὴ ὅτι οἱ
D μὲν δίκαιοι, ἐπειδὰν πρεσβύτεροι γένωνται, ἐν τῇ αὑτῶν πόλει ἄρχουσί τε ἂν βούλωνται τὰς ἀρχάς, γαμοῦσί τε ὁπόθεν ἂν βούλωνται, ἐκδιδόασί τε εἰς οὓς ἂν ἐθέλωσι· καὶ πάντα, ἃ σὺ περὶ ἐκείνων, ἐγὼ νῦν λέγω περὶ τῶνδε. καὶ αὖ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀδίκων, ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν, καὶ ἐὰν νέοι ὄντες λάθωσιν, ἐπὶ τέλους τοῦ δρόμου αἱρεθέντες καταγέλαστοί εἰσι
E καὶ γέροντες γιγνόμενοι ἄθλιοι προπηλακίζονται ὑπὸ ξένων τε καὶ ἀστῶν, μαστιγούμενοι καὶ ἃ ἄγροικα

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Δίκαια, ἔφη, αἰτεῖ. E

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο ἀποδώσετε, ὅτι θεούς γε οὐ λανθάνει ἑκάτερος αὐτῶν οἷός ἐστιν;

Ἀποδώσομεν, ἔφη.

The just man is the friend of the gods, and all things work together for his good.

Εἰ δὲ μὴ λανθάνετον, ὁ μὲν θεοφιλὴς ἂν εἴη, ὁ δὲ θεομισής, ὥσπερ καὶ κατ’ ἀρχὰς ὡμολογοῦμεν.

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Republic X.

SOCRATES, GLAUCON.

p. 613. Οὐκοῦν περὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου τἀναντία τούτων δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι;

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Τὰ μὲν δὴ παρὰ θεῶν τοιαῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη νικητήρια τῷ δικαίῳ.

The unjust is the opposite.

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Καὶ μάλα.

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ἔφησθα σὺ εἶναι ἀληθῆ λέγων, — εἶτα στρεβλώσονται καὶ ἐκκαυθήσονται —, πάντα ἐκεῖνα οἷου καὶ ἐμοῦ ἀκηκοέναι ὡς πάσχουσιν. ἀλλ' ὃ λέγω, ὅρα εἰ ἀνέξει. p. 613.

Καὶ πάνυ, ἔφη· δίκαια γὰρ λέγεις.

Ἃ μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ζῶντι τῷ δικαίῳ παρὰ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων | ἆθλά τε καὶ μισθοὶ καὶ p. 614. δῶρα γίγνεται πρὸς ἐκείνοις τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς οἷς αὐτὴ παρείχετο ἡ δικαιοσύνη, τοιαῦτ' ἂν εἴη.

Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, καλά τε καὶ βέβαια.

Ταῦτα τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐδέν ἐστι πλήθει οὐδὲ μεγέθει πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, ἃ τελευτήσαντα ἑκάτερον περιμένει· χρὴ δ' αὐτὰ ἀκοῦσαι, ἵνα τελέως ἑκάτερος αὐτῶν ἀπειλήφῃ τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου ὀφειλόμενα ἀκοῦσαι.

Λέγοις ἄν, ἔφη, ὡς οὐ πολλὰ ἄλλ' ἥδιον ἀκού- B οντι.

The vision of Er.

Ἀλλ' οὐ μέντοι σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, Ἀλκίνου γε ἀπόλογον ἐρῶ, ἀλλ' ἀλκίμου μὲν ἀνδρός, Ἠρὸς τοῦ Ἀρμενίου, τὸ γένος Παμφύλου· ὅς ποτε ἐν πολέμῳ τελευτήσας, ἀναιρεθέντων δεκαταίων τῶν νεκρῶν ἤδη διεφθαρμένων, ὑγιὴς μὲν ἀνῃρέθη, κομισθεὶς δ' οἴκαδε μέλλων θάπτεσθαι δωδεκαταῖος ἐπὶ τῇ πυρᾷ κείμενος ἀνεβίω, ἀναβιοὺς δ' ἔλεγεν ἃ ἐκεῖ ἴδοι. ἔφη δέ, ἐπειδή οὐ ἐκβῆναι τὴν ψυχήν, πορεύεσθαι μετὰ πολλῶν, καὶ ἀφικνεῖσθαι σφᾶς εἰς τόπον τινὰ C δαιμόνιον, ἐν ᾧ τῆς τε γῆς δυ̂' εἶναι χάσματα ἐχο-

The judgement.

3. ὅρα εἰ M : ὅραι A.
13. ἑκάτερος Ξ corr. : ἑκάτερον AM.
15. ἀκοῦσαι AM : in dubitationem traxit Stephanus.
16. ὡς A^2M : om. A.
25. ἐπειδὴ οὔ (sic) Ξ : ἐπειδὴ ὂν A : ἐπειδὴ οὖν A^2M : ἐπειδή οἱ r.

Republic X.

SOCRATES, GLAUCON.

p. 614. μένω ἀλλήλοιν καὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αὖ ἐν τῷ ἄνω ἄλλα καταντικρύ. δικαστὰς δὲ μεταξὺ τούτων καθῆσθαι, οὕς, ἐπειδὴ διαδικάσειαν, τοὺς μὲν δικαίους κελεύειν πορεύεσθαι τὴν εἰς δεξιάν τε καὶ ἄνω διὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, σημεῖα περιάψαντας τῶν δεδικασμένων ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, τοὺς δὲ ἀδίκους τὴν εἰς ἀριστεράν τε καὶ κάτω, ἔχοντας καὶ τούτους ἐν τῷ ὄπισθεν σημεῖα D πάντων ὧν ἔπραξαν. ἑαυτοῦ δὲ προσελθόντος εἰπεῖν ὅτι δέοι αὐτὸν ἄγγελον ἀνθρώποις γενέσθαι τῶν ἐκεῖ καὶ διακελεύοιντό οἱ ἀκούειν τε καὶ θεᾶσθαι πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ τόπῳ. ὁρᾶν δὴ ταύτῃ μὲν καθ' ἑκάτερον τὸ χάσμα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ τῆς γῆς ἀπιούσας τὰς ψυχάς, ἐπειδὴ αὐταῖς δικασθείη, κατὰ δὲ τὼ ἑτέρω ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἀνιέναι ἐκ τῆς γῆς μεστὰς αὐχμοῦ τε καὶ κόνεως, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἑτέρου καταβαίνειν E ἑτέρας ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καθαράς. καὶ τὰς ἀεὶ ἀφικνουμένας ὥσπερ ἐκ πολλῆς πορείας φαίνεσθαι ἥκειν, καὶ ἀσμένας εἰς τὸν λειμῶνα ἀπιούσας οἷον ἐν πανηγύρει κατασκηνᾶσθαι, καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαί τε ἀλλήλας ὅσαι γνώριμαι, καὶ πυνθάνεσθαι τάς τε ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἡκούσας παρὰ τῶν ἑτέρων τὰ ἐκεῖ καὶ τὰς ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τὰ παρ' ἐκείναις. διηγεῖσθαι δὲ ἀλλήλαις τὰς μὲν ὀδυρομένας τε καὶ κλαούσας, ἀναμιμνησκο-
p. 615. μένας | ὅσα τε καὶ οἷα πάθοιεν καὶ ἴδοιεν ἐν τῇ ὑπὸ γῆς πορείᾳ — εἶναι δὲ τὴν πορείαν χιλιέτη — τὰς δ' αὖ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ εὐπαθείας διηγεῖσθαι καὶ θέας ἀμηχάνους τὸ κάλλος. τὰ μὲν οὖν πολλά, ὦ Γλαύκων, πολλοῦ χρόνου διηγήσασθαι· τὸ δ' οὖν κεφάλαιον ἔφη τόδε εἶναι, ὅσα πώποτέ τινα ἠδίκησαν καὶ

The two openings in heaven and the two in earth, through which passed those who were beginning and those who had completed their pilgrimage.

The meeting in the meadow.

The punish-

1. ἆλλα M : ἀλλὰ A.
25. χιλιετη (sic) A : χιλιέτη Ξ : χιλιετῆ M : χιλίετιν A².

†

Republic X.

SOCRATES, GLAUCON.

ὅσους ἕκαστοι, ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων δίκην δεδωκέναι ἐν p. 615.
μέρει, ὑπὲρ ἑκάστου δεκάκις — τοῦτο δ' εἶναι κατὰ B
ἑκατονταετηρίδα ἑκάστην, ὡς βίου ὄντος τοσούτου
ment ten-fold the sin.
τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου —, ἵνα δεκαπλάσιον τὸ ἔκτισμα
τοῦ ἀδικήματος ἐκτίνοιεν, καὶ οἷον εἴ τινες πολλῶν
θανάτων ἦσαν αἴτιοι, ἢ πόλεις προδόντες ἢ στρατό-
πεδα καὶ εἰς δουλείας ἐμβεβληκότες, ἤ τινος ἄλλης
κακουχίας μεταίτιοι, πάντων τούτων δεκαπλασίας
ἀλγηδόνας ὑπὲρ ἑκάστου κομίσαιντο, καὶ αὖ εἴ τινας
εὐεργεσίας εὐεργετηκότες καὶ δίκαιοι καὶ ὅσιοι γεγο-
'Unbaptized infants.'
νότες εἶεν, κατὰ ταὐτὰ τὴν ἀξίαν κομίζοιντο. τῶν
δὲ εὐθὺς γενομένων καὶ ὀλίγον χρόνον βιούντων πέρι C
ἄλλα ἔλεγεν οὐκ ἄξια μνήμης. εἰς δὲ θεοὺς ἀσεβείας
τε καὶ εὐσεβείας καὶ γονέας καὶ αὐτόχειρας φόνου
μείζους ἔτι τοὺς μισθοὺς διηγεῖτο.

Ἔφη γὰρ δὴ παραγενέσθαι ἐρωτωμένῳ ἑτέρῳ ὑπὸ
'Ardiaeus the tyrant.'
ἑτέρου, ὅπου εἴη Ἀρδιαῖος ὁ μέγας. ὁ δὲ Ἀρδιαῖος
οὗτος τῆς Παμφυλίας ἔν τινι πόλει τύραννος ἐγε-
γόνει, ἤδη χιλιοστὸν ἔτος εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον,
γέροντά τε πατέρα ἀποκτείνας καὶ πρεσβύτερον D
ἀδελφόν, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ πολλά τε καὶ ἀνόσια εἰργασ-
μένος, ὡς ἐλέγετο. ἔφη οὖν τὸν ἐρωτώμενον εἰπεῖν,
Οὐχ ἥκει, φάναι, οὐδ' ἂν ἥξει δεῦρο. ἐθεασάμεθα
γὰρ οὖν δὴ καὶ τοῦτο τῶν δεινῶν θεαμάτων· ἐπειδὴ
ἐγγὺς τοῦ στομίου ἦμεν μέλλοντες ἀνιέναι καὶ τἆλλα
πάντα πεπονθότες, ἐκεῖνόν τε κατείδομεν ἐξαίφνης
καὶ ἄλλους, σχεδόν τι αὐτῶν τοὺς πλείστους τυράν-

1. . . ους A : οὓς A²M.
5. πολλῶν Ξ : πολλοὶ AM : πολλοῖς D corr.
14. αὐτόχειρας MSS. : αὐτόχειρος vel αὐτοχειρίας cj. Ast.
23. ἥξει AM : ἥξοι Ξ.

Republic X.

SOCRATES, GLAUCON.

Incurable sinners.

p. 615. νους· ἦσαν δὲ καὶ ἰδιῶταί τινες τῶν μεγάλα ἡμαρτη-
E κότων· οὓς οἰομένους ἤδη ἀναβήσεσθαι οὐκ ἐδέχετο τὸ στόμιον, ἀλλ' ἐμυκᾶτο, ὁπότε τις τῶν οὕτως ἀνιάτως ἐχόντων εἰς πονηρίαν ἢ μὴ ἱκανῶς δεδωκὼς δίκην ἐπιχειροῖ ἀνιέναι. ἐνταῦθα δὴ ἄνδρες, ἔφη, ἄγριοι, διάπυροι ἰδεῖν, παρεστῶτες καὶ καταμανθάνοντες τὸ φθέγμα, τοὺς μὲν διαλαβόντες ἦγον, τὸν δὲ Ἀρδιαῖον
p. 616. καὶ ἄλλους συμποδίσαντες χεῖράς τε καὶ πόδας | καὶ κεφαλήν, καταβαλόντες καὶ ἐκδείραντες, εἷλκον παρὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ἐκτὸς ἐπ' ἀσπαλάθων κνάπτοντες, καὶ τοῖς ἀεὶ παριοῦσι σημαίνοντες, ὧν ἕνεκά τε, καὶ ὅτι εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐμπεσούμενοι ἄγοιντο. ἔνθα δὴ φόβων, ἔφη, πολλῶν καὶ παντοδαπῶν σφίσι γεγονότων τοῦτον ὑπερβάλλειν τὸν φόβον, μὴ γένοιτο ἑκάστῳ τὸ φθέγμα, ὅτε ἀναβαίνοι, καὶ ἀσμενέστατα ἕκαστον σιγήσαντος ἀναβῆναι.

Καὶ τὰς μὲν δὴ δίκας τε καὶ τιμωρίας τοιαύτας
B τινὰς εἶναι, καὶ αὖ τὰς εὐεργεσίας ταύταις ἀντιστρόφους· ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῖς ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι ἑκάστοις ἑπτὰ ἡμέραι γένοιντο, ἀναστάντας ἐντεῦθεν δεῖν τῇ ὀγδόῃ πορεύεσθαι, καὶ ἀφικνεῖσθαι τεταρταίους ὅθεν καθορᾶν ἄνωθεν διὰ παντὸς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς τεταμένον φῶς εὐθύ, οἷον κίονα, μάλιστα τῇ ἴριδι προσφερῆ, λαμπρότερον δὲ καὶ καθαρώτερον. εἰς ὃ ἀφικέσθαι προελθόντες ἡμερησίαν ὁδόν, καὶ ἰδεῖν
C αὐτόθι κατὰ μέσον τὸ φῶς ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τὰ ἄκρα

7. διαλαβόντες AM : ἰδίᾳ λαβόντες Ξ : ἰδία λαβόντες A².

11. τε AM : τε ταῦτα ὑπομένοιεν x M corr. Ξ corr. : ὅτι εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ΞM corr. : εἰς ὅ τι τὸν Τάρταρον AM : εἰς ὅ, τι cj. Herm.

14. τοῦτον (ω) A² : τούτων A¹MΞ. τὸν φόβον MΞ : om. A. μὴ γένοιτο ἑκάστῳ τὸ φθέγμα, ὅτε ἀναβαίνοι A : εἰ μυκήσαιτο τὸ στόμιον MΞ.

25. προελθόντες AM : προελθόντας *q*.

Republic X.

Socrates, Glaucon.

αὐτοῦ τῶν δεσμῶν τεταμένα· εἶναι γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ φῶς p. 616.
ξύνδεσμον τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, οἷον τὰ ὑποζώματα τῶν
τριήρων, οὕτω πᾶσαν συνέχον τὴν περιφοράν· ἐκ
δὲ τῶν ἄκρων τεταμένον Ἀνάγκης ἄτρακτον, δι' οὗ
πάσας ἐπιστρέφεσθαι τὰς περιφοράς· οὗ τὴν μὲν
ἠλακάτην τε καὶ τὸ ἄγκιστρον εἶναι ἐξ ἀδάμαντος,
τὸν δὲ σφόνδυλον μικτὸν ἔκ τε τούτου καὶ ἄλλων
γενῶν. τὴν δὲ τοῦ σφονδύλου φύσιν εἶναι τοιάνδε· D
τὸ μὲν σχῆμα οἵαπερ ἡ τοῦ ἐνθάδε· νοῆσαι δὲ δεῖ
ἐξ ὧν ἔλεγε τοιόνδε αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐν ἑνὶ
μεγάλῳ σφονδύλῳ κοίλῳ καὶ ἐξεγλυμμένῳ διαμπερὲς
ἄλλος τοιοῦτος ἐλάττων ἐγκέοιτο ἁρμόττων, καθάπερ
οἱ κάδοι οἱ εἰς ἀλλήλους ἁρμόττοντες· καὶ οὕτω δὴ
τρίτον ἄλλον καὶ τέταρτον καὶ ἄλλους τέτταρας.
ὀκτὼ γὰρ εἶναι τοὺς ξύμπαντας σφονδύλους, ἐν
ἀλλήλοις ἐγκειμένους, κύκλους ἄνωθεν τὰ χείλη
φαίνοντας, νῶτον συνεχὲς ἑνὸς σφονδύλου ἀπεργα- E
ζομένους περὶ τὴν ἠλακάτην· ἐκείνην δὲ διὰ μέσου
τοῦ ὀγδόου διαμπερὲς ἐληλάσθαι. τὸν μὲν οὖν
πρῶτόν τε καὶ ἐξωτάτω σφόνδυλον πλατύτατον τὸν
τοῦ χείλους κύκλον ἔχειν, τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἕκτου δεύτερον,
τρίτον δὲ τὸν τοῦ τετάρτου, τέταρτον δὲ τὸν τοῦ
ὀγδόου, πέμπτον δὲ τὸν τοῦ ἑβδόμου, ἕκτον δὲ τὸν
τοῦ πέμπτου, ἕβδομον δὲ τὸν τοῦ τρίτου, ὄγδοον δὲ
τὸν τοῦ δευτέρου. καὶ τὸν μὲν τοῦ μεγίστου ποι-
κίλον, τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἑβδόμου λαμπρότατον, τὸν δὲ τοῦ
ὀγδόου τὸ χρῶμα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑβδόμου ἔχειν | προσλάμ- p. 617.
ποντος, τὸν δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου καὶ πέμπτου παραπλή-
σια ἀλλήλοις, ξανθότερα ἐκείνων, τρίτον δὲ λευκό-

The whorls representing the spheres of the heavenly bodies.

1. αὐτοῦ τῶν δεσμῶν AM : τῶν δεσμῶν αὐτοῦ Ξ : αὐτοῦ ἐκ δεσμῶν r M corr.

Republic X.

Socrates, Glaucon.

p. 617. τατον χρῶμα ἔχειν, τέταρτον δὲ ὑπέρυθρον, δεύτερον δὲ λευκότητι τὸν ἕκτον. κυκλεῖσθαι δὲ δὴ στρεφόμενον τὸν ἄτρακτον ὅλον μὲν τὴν αὐτὴν φοράν, ἐν δὲ τῷ ὅλῳ περιφερομένῳ τοὺς μὲν ἐντὸς ἑπτὰ κύκλους τὴν ἐναντίαν τῷ ὅλῳ ἠρέμα περιφέρεσθαι, αὐτῶν δὲ B τούτων τάχιστα μὲν ἰέναι τὸν ὄγδοον, δευτέρους δὲ καὶ ἅμα ἀλλήλοις τόν τε ἕβδομον καὶ ἕκτον καὶ πέμπτον· τρίτον δὲ φορᾷ ἰέναι, ὡς σφίσι φαίνεσθαι, ἐπανακυκλούμενον τὸν τέταρτον· τέταρτον δὲ τὸν τρίτον καὶ πέμπτον τὸν δεύτερον. στρέφεσθαι δὲ αὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς τῆς Ἀνάγκης γόνασιν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν κύκλων αὐτοῦ ἄνωθεν ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστου βεβηκέναι Σειρῆνα συμπεριφερομένην, φωνὴν μίαν ἱεῖσαν, ἕνα τόνον· ἐκ πασῶν δὲ ὀκτὼ οὐσῶν μίαν ἁρμονίαν ξυμφωνεῖν. ἄλλας δὲ καθημένας πέριξ δι᾽ ἴσου τρεῖς, ἐν θρόνῳ C ἑκάστην, θυγατέρας τῆς Ἀνάγκης, Μοίρας, λευχειμονούσας, στέμματα ἐπὶ τῶν κεφαλῶν ἐχούσας, Λάχεσίν τε καὶ Κλωθὼ καὶ Ἄτροπον, ὑμνεῖν πρὸς τὴν τῶν Σειρήνων ἁρμονίαν, Λάχεσιν μὲν τὰ γεγονότα, Κλωθὼ δὲ τὰ ὄντα, Ἄτροπον δὲ τὰ μέλλοντα. καὶ τὴν μὲν Κλωθὼ τῇ δεξιᾷ χειρὶ ἐφαπτομένην συνεπιστρέφειν τοῦ ἀτράκτου τὴν ἔξω περιφοράν, διαλείπουσαν χρόνον, τὴν δὲ Ἄτροπον τῇ ἀριστερᾷ D τὰς ἐντὸς αὖ ὡσαύτως· τὴν δὲ Λάχεσιν ἐν μέρει ἑκατέρας ἑκατέρᾳ τῇ χειρὶ ἐφάπτεσθαι.

The knees of Necessity.

Σφᾶς οὖν, ἐπειδὴ ἀφικέσθαι, εὐθὺς δεῖν ἰέναι πρὸς τὴν Λάχεσιν. προφήτην οὖν τινὰ σφᾶς πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τάξει διαστῆσαι, ἔπειτα λαβόντα ἐκ τῶν τῆς

5. αὐτῶν A²Ξ : αὐτὸν AM.
8. τρίτον q : τὸν τρίτον AM.
13. ἕνα AM : ἀνὰ t : ἄνα Ξ.
23. χρόνον A : χρόνῳ M.

Republic X.

SOCRATES, GLAUCON.

The proclamation of the free choice.

Λαχέσεως γονάτων κλήρους τε καὶ βίων παραδείγ- p. 617.
ματα, ἀναβάντα ἐπί τι βῆμα ὑψηλὸν εἰπεῖν· Ἀνάγ-
κης θυγατρὸς κόρης Λαχέσεως λόγος. Ψυχαὶ ἐφή-
μεροι, ἀρχὴ ἄλλης περιόδου θνητοῦ γένους θανατη-
φόρου. οὐχ ὑμᾶς δαίμων λήξεται, ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς δαίμονα E
αἱρήσεσθε. πρῶτος δ' ὁ λαχὼν πρῶτος αἱρείσθω
βίον, ᾧ συνέσται ἐξ ἀνάγκης. ἀρετὴ δὲ ἀδέσποτον,
ἣν τιμῶν καὶ ἀτιμάζων πλέον καὶ ἔλαττον αὐτῆς
ἕκαστος ἕξει. αἰτία ἑλομένου· θεὸς ἀναίτιος. Ταῦτα
εἰπόντα ῥῖψαι ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς κλήρους, τὸν δὲ παρ'
αὑτὸν πεσόντα ἕκαστον ἀναιρεῖσθαι, πλὴν οὗ· ἓ δὲ
οὐκ ἐᾶν· | τῷ δὲ ἀνελομένῳ δῆλον εἶναι, ὁπόστος p. 618.
εἰλήχειν· μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο αὖθις τὰ τῶν βίων παρα-
δείγματα εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν σφῶν θεῖναι ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν,
πολὺ πλείω τῶν παρόντων. εἶναι δὲ παντοδαπά·
ζῴων τε γὰρ πάντων βίους καὶ δὴ καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρω-
πίνους ἅπαντας. τυραννίδας τε γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς εἶναι,
τὰς μὲν διατελεῖς, τὰς δὲ καὶ μεταξὺ διαφθειρομένας
καὶ εἰς πενίας τε καὶ φυγὰς καὶ εἰς πτωχείας τελευ-
τώσας· εἶναι δὲ καὶ δοκίμων ἀνδρῶν βίους, τοὺς μὲν
ἐπὶ εἴδεσι καὶ κατὰ κάλλη καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἰσχύν τε
καὶ ἀγωνίαν, τοὺς δ' ἐπὶ γένεσι καὶ προγόνων ἀρε- B
ταῖς, καὶ ἀδοκίμων κατὰ ταῦτα, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ
γυναικῶν· ψυχῆς δὲ τάξιν οὐκ ἐνεῖναι διὰ τὸ ἀναγ-
καίως ἔχειν ἄλλον ἑλομένην βίον ἀλλοίαν γίγνεσθαι·
τὰ δ' ἄλλα ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ πλούτοις καὶ πενίαις,
τὰ δὲ νόσοις, τὰ δὲ ὑγιείαις μεμῖχθαι, τὰ δὲ καὶ
μεσοῦν τούτων. ἔνθα δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὦ φίλε Γλαύ-
κων, ὁ πᾶς κίνδυνος ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα μάλιστα

13. εἰλήχειν A : εἴληχε M.
24. οὐκ A : om. M.

Republic X.

SOCRATES, GLAUCON.

The complexity of circumstances, and their relation to the human soul.

p. 618. ἐπιμελητέον, ὅπως ἕκαστος ἡμῶν τῶν ἄλλων μαθη- C μάτων ἀμελήσας τούτου τοῦ μαθήματος καὶ ζητητὴς καὶ μαθητὴς ἔσται, ἐάν ποθεν οἷός τ' ᾖ μαθεῖν καὶ ἐξευρεῖν, τίς αὐτὸν ποιήσει δυνατὸν καὶ ἐπιστήμονα βίον καὶ χρηστὸν καὶ πονηρὸν διαγιγνώσκοντα, τὸν βελτίω ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν ἀεὶ πανταχοῦ αἱρεῖσθαι· ἀναλογιζόμενον πάντα τὰ νῦν δὴ ῥηθέντα καὶ ξυντιθέμενα ἀλλήλοις καὶ διαιρούμενα πρὸς ἀρετὴν βίου πῶς ἔχει, εἰδέναι, τί κάλλος πενίᾳ ἢ πλούτῳ κραθὲν D καὶ μετὰ ποίας τινὸς ψυχῆς ἕξεως κακὸν ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἐργάζεται, καὶ τί εὐγένειαι καὶ δυσγένειαι καὶ ἰδιωτεῖαι καὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ ἰσχύες καὶ ἀσθένειαι καὶ εὐμαθίαι καὶ δυσμαθίαι καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν φύσει περὶ ψυχὴν ὄντων καὶ τῶν ἐπικτήτων τί ξυγκεραννύμενα πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐργάζεται, ὥστε ἐξ ἁπάντων αὐτῶν δυνατὸν εἶναι συλλογισάμενον αἱρεῖσθαι, πρὸς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς φύσιν ἀποβλέποντα, τόν τε χείρω καὶ τὸν E ἀμείνω βίον, χείρω μὲν καλοῦντα ὃς αὐτὴν ἐκεῖσε ἄξει, εἰς τὸ ἀδικωτέραν γίγνεσθαι, ἀμείνω δὲ ὅστις εἰς τὸ δικαιοτέραν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα χαίρειν ἐάσει. ἑωράκαμεν γὰρ ὅτι ζῶντί τε καὶ τελευτήσαντι αὕτη p. 619. κρατίστη αἵρεσις. ἀδαμαντίνως | δὴ δεῖ ταύτην τὴν δόξαν ἔχοντα εἰς Ἅιδου ἰέναι, ὅπως ἂν ᾖ καὶ ἐκεῖ ἀνέκπληκτος ὑπὸ πλούτων τε καὶ τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν, καὶ μὴ ἐμπεσὼν εἰς τυραννίδας καὶ ἄλλας τοιαύτας πράξεις πολλὰ μὲν ἐργάσηται καὶ ἀνήκεστα κακά, ἔτι δὲ αὐτὸς μείζω πάθῃ, ἀλλὰ γνῷ τὸν μέσον ἀεὶ τῶν τοιούτων βίον αἱρεῖσθαι καὶ φεύγειν τὰ

9. εἰδέναι AM : καὶ εἰδέναι r.
19. ὅστις A : om. M.
28. βίον A : βίων MΞ.

Republic X.

SOCRATES, GLAUCON.

ὑπερβάλλοντα ἑκατέρωσε καὶ ἐν τῷδε τῷ βίῳ κατὰ p. 619. τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ ἐν παντὶ τῷ ἔπειτα· οὕτω γὰρ εὐδαιμονέστατος γίγνεται ἄνθρωπος. B

Καὶ δὴ οὖν καὶ τότε ὁ ἐκεῖθεν ἄγγελος ἤγγελλε τὸν μὲν προφήτην οὕτως εἰπεῖν· Καὶ τελευταίῳ ἐπιόντι, ξὺν νῷ ἑλομένῳ, συντόνως ζῶντι κεῖται βίος ἀγαπητός, οὐ κακός. μήτε ὁ ἄρχων αἱρέσεως ἀμελείτω μήτε ὁ τελευτῶν ἀθυμείτω. εἰπόντος δὲ ταῦτα τὸν πρῶτον λαχόντα ἔφη εὐθὺς ἐπιόντα τὴν μεγίστην τυραννίδα ἑλέσθαι, καὶ ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης τε καὶ λαιμαργίας οὐ πάντα ἱκανῶς ἀνασκεψάμενον ἑλέσθαι, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν λαθεῖν ἐνοῦσαν εἱμαρμένην C παίδων αὑτοῦ βρώσεις καὶ ἄλλα κακά· ἐπειδὴ δὲ κατὰ σχολὴν σκέψασθαι, κόπτεσθαί τε καὶ ὀδύρεσθαι τὴν αἵρεσιν, οὐκ ἐμμένοντα τοῖς προρρηθεῖσιν ὑπὸ τοῦ προφήτου· οὐ γὰρ ἑαυτὸν αἰτιᾶσθαι τῶν κακῶν, ἀλλὰ τύχην τε καὶ δαίμονας καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ἀνθ' ἑαυτοῦ. εἶναι δὲ αὐτὸν τῶν ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἡκόντων, ἐν τεταγμένῃ πολιτείᾳ ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ βίῳ βεβιωκότα, ἔθει ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετειληφότα. D ὡς δὲ καὶ εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ἐλάττους εἶναι ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἁλισκομένους τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἥκοντας, ἅτε πόνων ἀγυμνάστους· τῶν δ' ἐκ τῆς γῆς τοὺς πολλούς, ἅτε αὐτούς τε πεπονηκότας ἄλλους τε ἑωρακότας, οὐκ ἐξ ἐπιδρομῆς τὰς αἱρέσεις ποιεῖσθαι. διὸ δὴ καὶ μεταβολὴν τῶν κακῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταῖς πολλαῖς τῶν ψυχῶν γίγνεσθαι καὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ κλήρου τύχην· ἐπεὶ εἴ τις ἀεί, ὁπότε εἰς τὸν ἐνθάδε βίον ἀφικνοῖτο, ὑγιῶς φιλοσοφοῖ καὶ ὁ κλῆρος αὐτῷ E τῆς αἱρέσεως μὴ ἐν τελευταίοις πίπτοι, κινδυνεύει ἐκ τῶν ἐκεῖθεν ἀπαγγελλομένων οὐ μόνον ἐνθάδε

Habit not enough without philosophy when circumstances change.

Republic X.

SOCRATES, GLAUCON.

The spectacle of the election.

p. 619. εὐδαιμονεῖν ἄν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε καὶ
δεῦρο πάλιν πορείαν οὐκ ἂν χθονίαν καὶ τραχεῖαν
πορεύεσθαι, ἀλλὰ λείαν τε καὶ οὐρανίαν.

Ταύτην γὰρ δὴ ἔφη τὴν θέαν ἀξίαν εἶναι ἰδεῖν, ὡς
p. 620. ἕκασται αἱ ψυχαὶ ᾑροῦντο τοὺς βίους· | ἐλεεινήν τε
γὰρ ἰδεῖν εἶναι καὶ γελοίαν καὶ θαυμασίαν. κατὰ
συνήθειαν γὰρ τοῦ προτέρου βίου τὰ πολλὰ αἱρεῖσθαι. ἰδεῖν μὲν γὰρ ψυχὴν ἔφη τήν ποτε Ὀρφέως
γενομένην κύκνου βίον αἱρουμένην, μίσει τοῦ γυναικείου γένους διὰ τὸν ὑπ' ἐκείνων θάνατον οὐκ ἐθέλουσαν ἐν γυναικὶ γεννηθεῖσαν γενέσθαι· ἰδεῖν δὲ τὴν
Θαμύρου ἀηδόνος ἑλομένην· ἰδεῖν δὲ καὶ κύκνον
μεταβάλλοντα εἰς ἀνθρωπίνου βίου αἵρεσιν, καὶ
B ἄλλα ζῷα μουσικὰ ὡσαύτως. εἰκοστὴν δὲ λαχοῦσαν ψυχὴν ἑλέσθαι λέοντος βίον· εἶναι δὲ τὴν
Αἴαντος τοῦ Τελαμωνίου, φεύγουσαν ἄνθρωπον γενέσθαι, μεμνημένην τῆς τῶν ὅπλων κρίσεως. τὴν
δ' ἐπὶ τούτῳ Ἀγαμέμνονος· ἔχθρᾳ δὲ καὶ ταύτην
τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου γένους διὰ τὰ πάθη ἀετοῦ διαλλάξαι
βίον. ἐν μέσοις δὲ λαχοῦσαν τὴν Ἀταλάντης ψυχήν, κατιδοῦσαν μεγάλας τιμὰς ἀθλητοῦ ἀνδρός, οὐ
C δύνασθαι παρελθεῖν, ἀλλὰ λαβεῖν. μετὰ δὲ ταύτην
ἰδεῖν τὴν Ἐπειοῦ τοῦ Πανοπέως εἰς τεχνικῆς γυναικὸς ἰοῦσαν φύσιν· πόρρω δ' ἐν ὑστάτοις ἰδεῖν τὴν
τοῦ γελωτοποιοῦ Θερσίτου πίθηκον ἐνδυομένην.
κατὰ τύχην δὲ τὴν Ὀδυσσέως λαχοῦσαν πασῶν
ὑστάτην αἱρησομένην ἰέναι, μνήμῃ δὲ τῶν προτέρων

1. καὶ post ἀλλὰ om. M.

2. χθονίαν A : $\overset{\text{χθο}}{\text{χρονίαν}}$ M.

14. ὡσαύτως. εἰκοστὴν Vind. F et Plutarch. Symp. ix. 5, §§ 2, 3 ὡσαύτως εἰκός. τὴν AM : ὡσαύτως, ὡς τὸ εἰκός· τὴν Ξ.

Republic X.

SOCRATES, GLAUCON.

πόνων φιλοτιμίας λελωφηκυῖαν ζητεῖν περιιοῦσαν p. 620.
χρόνον πολὺν βίον ἀνδρὸς ἰδιώτου ἀπράγμονος, καὶ
μόγις εὑρεῖν κείμενόν που καὶ παρημελημένον ὑπὸ
τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ εἰπεῖν ἰδοῦσαν ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ ἂν ἔπραξε D
καὶ πρώτη λαχοῦσα, καὶ ἀσμένην ἑλέσθαι. καὶ ἐκ
τῶν ἄλλων δὴ θηρίων ὡσαύτως εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἰέναι
καὶ εἰς ἄλληλα, τὰ μὲν ἄδικα εἰς τὰ ἄγρια, τὰ δὲ
δίκαια εἰς τὰ ἥμερα μεταβάλλοντα, καὶ πάσας μίξεις
μίγνυσθαι.

Ἐπειδὴ δ' οὖν πάσας τὰς ψυχὰς τοὺς βίους ᾑρῆ-
σθαι, ὥσπερ ἔλαχον, ἐν τάξει προσιέναι πρὸς τὴν
Λάχεσιν· ἐκείνην δ' ἑκάστῳ ὃν εἵλετο δαίμονα, τοῦ-
τον φύλακα ξυμπέμπειν τοῦ βίου καὶ ἀποπληρωτὴν E
τῶν αἱρεθέντων. ὃν πρῶτον μὲν ἄγειν αὐτὴν πρὸς

The choice made irreversible.

τὴν Κλωθὼ ὑπὸ τὴν ἐκείνης χεῖρά τε καὶ ἐπιστροφὴν
τῆς τοῦ ἀτράκτου δίνης, κυροῦντα ἣν λαχὼν εἵλετο
μοῖραν· ταύτης δ' ἐφαψάμενον αὖθις ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς
Ἀτρόπου ἄγειν νῆσιν, ἀμετάστροφα τὰ ἐπικλω-
σθέντα ποιοῦντα· ἐντεῦθεν δὲ δὴ ἀμεταστρεπτὶ ὑπὸ
τὸν τῆς | Ἀνάγκης ἰέναι θρόνον, καὶ δι' ἐκείνου p. 621.
διεξελθόντα, ἐπειδὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι διῆλθον, πορεύ-
εσθαι ἅπαντας εἰς τὸ τῆς Λήθης πεδίον διὰ καύματός
τε καὶ πνίγους δεινοῦ· καὶ γὰρ εἶναι αὐτὸ κενὸν
δένδρων τε καὶ ὅσα γῆ φύει. σκηνᾶσθαι οὖν σφᾶς
ἤδη ἑσπέρας γιγνομένης παρὰ τὸν Ἀμέλητα ποτα-
μόν, οὗ τὸ ὕδωρ ἀγγεῖον οὐδὲν στέγειν. μέτρον μὲν
οὖν τι τοῦ ὕδατος πᾶσιν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πιεῖν, τοὺς
δὲ φρονήσει μὴ σῳζομένους πλέον πίνειν τοῦ μέτρου·
τὸν δὲ ἀεὶ πιόντα πάντων ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι. ἐπειδὴ B
δὲ κοιμηθῆναι καὶ μέσας νύκτας γενέσθαι, βροντήν

29. πιόντα AM : πίνοντα r.

p. 621. τε καὶ σεισμὸν γενέσθαι, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἐξαπίνης ἄλλον ἄλλῃ φέρεσθαι ἄνω εἰς τὴν γένεσιν, ἄττοντας ὥσπερ ἀστέρας. αὐτὸς δὲ τοῦ μὲν ὕδατος κωλυθῆναι πιεῖν· ὅπῃ μέντοι καὶ ὅπως εἰς τὸ σῶμα ἀφίκοιτο, οὐκ εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' ἐξαίφνης ἀναβλέψας ἰδεῖν ἕωθεν αὐτὸν ἤδη κείμενον ἐπὶ τῇ πυρᾷ.

Καὶ οὕτως, ὦ Γλαύκων, μῦθος ἐσώθη καὶ οὐκ
C ἀπώλετο, καὶ ἡμᾶς ἂν σώσειεν, ἂν πειθώμεθα αὐτῷ, καὶ τὸν τῆς Λήθης ποταμὸν εὖ διαβησόμεθα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν οὐ μιανθησόμεθα· ἀλλ' ἂν ἐμοὶ πειθώμεθα, νομίζοντες ἀθάνατον ψυχὴν καὶ δυνατὴν πάντα μὲν κακὰ ἀνέχεσθαι, πάντα δὲ ἀγαθά, τῆς ἄνω ὁδοῦ ἀεὶ ἑξόμεθα καὶ δικαιοσύνην μετὰ φρονήσεως παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐπιτηδεύσομεν, ἵνα καὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς φίλοι ὦμεν καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς, αὐτοῦ τε μένοντες ἐνθάδε, καὶ
D ἐπειδὰν τὰ ἆθλα αὐτῆς κομιζώμεθα, ὥσπερ οἱ νικηφόροι περιαγειρόμενοι, καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν τῇ χιλιέτει πορείᾳ, ἣν διεληλύθαμεν, εὖ πράττωμεν.

5. ἰδεῖν AM (sed ἰδεῖν supra rasuram A) : ἴδοι *q*.
6. ἤδη κείμενον M : κείμενον AΞ : κείμενον ἤδη A[2].
7. οὗτος . . ὁ μῦθος K. καὶ οὐκ] ἀλλ' οὐκ M.
17. χιλιετει (sic) A[1] : χιλίετι A[2].

CORRIGENDA.

Page 23, margin, *for*	Polemarchus,	*read*	Thrasymachus,
	Cleitophon,		Polemarchus,
	Thrasymachus.		Cleitophon.

„ 41, note, *for* δὴ ΑΠ : δὲ Μ. *read* δὴ Π : δὲ ΑΜr.
„ 61, note, *for* b. *read* Dmg.
„ 77, note, *for* ἐνενοήκαμεν *read* ἐννενοήκαμεν
„ 91, note, *for* παιὼν ΑΠ. *read* παιῶν Α : παιὼν Π.
„ 124, line 20, *for* τούτων *read* τούτου
„ 207, note, *for* παιδοπο(ι)ίαι *read* παιδοποιίαι
„ 246, margin, *for* philosopher. *read* philosophers.
„ 292, margin, *for* perception, *read* perception of
„ 316, note, *omit* 18. αὐτὰ MSS.

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CORRIGENDA.

Page 23, margin, *for* Polemarchus, Cleitophon, Thrasymachus. *read* Thrasymachus, Polemarchus, Cleitophon.

„ 41, note, *for* δή ΑΠ : δὲ Μ. *read* δή Π : δὲ ΑΜr.

„ 61, note, *for* b. *read* Dmg.

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
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PLATO'S REPUBLIC

THE GREEK TEXT

EDITED, WITH NOTES AND ESSAYS

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ST. ANDREWS

IN THREE VOLUMES

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ESSAYS

BY

THE LATE PROFESSOR JOWETT

(UNFINISHED)

ESSAY I

ON THE TEXT OF GREEK AUTHORS, AND ESPECIALLY OF PLATO

I. THAT Greek MSS. are miswritten and misspelt in various degrees;—that glosses and marginal interpretations have crept into the text;—that particular letters or combinations of letters, as for example Α, Δ, Λ,—Γ, Τ,—Є, Θ, Ο, C,—are often interchanged;—that contractions are another source of confusion;—that forms of words or usages which were allowed by Thucydides or Plato have sometimes received a more Attic impress from the hand of grammarians, or have decayed insensibly into the forms and usages of the common or Macedonian language;—that the writing is more regular and uniform than can be supposed to have proceeded from authors who lived in the days when grammar was only beginning to be studied;—that the texts of the Classics have passed through changes sometimes in the uncial sometimes in the cursive [or minuscule] stage;—that the copyists of many MSS. like modern editors had a love of emendation, which led them to improve upon the meaning or grammar of their author;—that emendation is often needed, and that many emendations are probably, almost certainly, right;—these general facts would hardly be disputed by any one who has a critical acquaintance with Greek authors.

But such general considerations do not justify the indiscriminate use of conjectural emendation. We have to distinguish the kind of mistake before we can determine whether it can be corrected. That mistakes often happen

is a safe text; the inference which is sometimes drawn that they are liable to happen equally in all authors and in all MSS., and that all therefore afford equal material for the conjectural art, is a very erroneous one. The kind of mistake may also vary from the interchange of Γ and T which is corrected at sight up to a degree of confusion in which grammar and sense are lost in anarchy. And where such mistakes are most numerous and complicated they are generally beyond the reach of human sagacity to amend. Unless new and better MSS. are discovered, the corruption must remain a corruption to the end of time. Nor can the most ingenious conjecture ever attain the certainty of a reading well supported by MS. authority. The verifying faculty is only the knowledge and moderation of the critic, who may indeed have acquired the power of seeing in the dark, or at least of seeing better than others, but who may also have found in lifelong studies only the material of his own self-deception. An art or kind of knowledge which is attractive and at the same time wanting in certain tests of truth is always liable to fall into the hands of projectors and inventors. It may be cultivated by many generations of scholars without their once making the discovery that they have been wasting their lives in a frivolous and unmeaning pursuit. From being subordinate and necessary it may come to be thought the crowning accomplishment of the scholar. But after all, to compare small things with great, ingenious conjectures are only like the hypotheses of physical science in the days when there were no experiments, which, while retaining their attractiveness, diverge further and further from the truth.

A sanguine temperament and sometimes even a good memory flush the mind and interfere with the exercise of the judgement. A little knowledge will furnish objections to an old reading or arguments in support of a new one. The inventor has a natural fondness for his own inven-

tions and is ready to offer his reputation as a guarantee of their truth. He has got into a region in which the common sense of the many is unable to control him, and in which no one can demonstrate that he is only a visionary. And as learning or imitative talent or even genius for scholarship are often unaccompanied by philosophical power, which is the natural corrective of a lively fancy, the sanction of great names has not been wanting to great mistakes. There have been Atticists in modern as well as in ancient times, who have regarded grammar as a science of rules without exceptions, and who have assumed a greater clearness and accuracy than ever existed in the text of ancient authors. Metrical canons which are not universally true have been applied with the rigour and severity of a law of nature. It has been forgotten that there was a transitional age of language in which syntax and prosody had not yet become separate studies, and that in every age the subtlety of language far exceeds the minuteness of grammatical rules. Writers like Sophocles or Thucydides or Plato have been even divested of the peculiarities of their own style, in order to satisfy some more general notion of sense and Greek. Not the value of the correction but the name and reputation of the critic have been regarded. The authority of Bentley, Porson, and Hermann has obtruded on the text of the Classics many unfounded emendations which have been allowed to remain, as a homage to their reputation.

A just estimate of the value of emendations requires a consideration, (1) of the limits of the human faculties in this sort of divination. No definite measure can be given of them; they must depend on the nature of the materials; but often the real limits are in inverse proportion to the ingenuity and facility of scholars in making emendations: (2) there must be a consideration of the nature of MSS. In textual as in historical criticism the invention or imagination which has no foundation of facts can only build castles in the air. The emendations which lie on the surface have

been generally made by previous editors, while the deeper corruptions are hardly ever remediable. And in proportion to the character of the MS. the necessity or possibility of emendation will greatly vary. No generalities about the frequency of mistakes, or the possibility of glosses, or the probability in favour of the more difficult reading can be set against the readings of MSS., which may be erroneous but cannot be corrected out of nothing. (3) There must be a consideration of authors as well as of MSS. The range of language in some is too wide or irregular or uncertain to admit even of a fair probability in the emendation of them. The Doric or Aeolic dialect is not so well known to us as the Attic; and again, conjectures in prose and verse stand on a different footing. Nor will any one say that he is as certain of the use of language in Pindar and Theocritus as in Sophocles and Euripides, or of the metre in a line of a chorus as of an Iambic or Trochaic verse, or that a fragment is equally within the range of emendation with a passage that has a context. Yet the method of conjecture which was practised by the first editors seems to have continued as a habit of mind among scholars, who do not always remember that the field for new conjectures is ever narrowing, and that the 'woods and pastures new' of fragments, to which they return, are the least likely to afford passages which can be corrected with certainty. Nothing can be more improbable than some of the conjectures of Madvig on Thucydides, when he discards a word because it is not found in later Greek and introduces a new word found in later Greek, but not in Thucydides.

Some idea of the limits of human ingenuity in restoring a text or an inscription, may be formed in this way: let a person try the experiment of emending the text of an English passage previously unknown to him miswritten for the purpose. (You may vary the conditions of prose or metre, or give a fragment without the context, or select

from an author whose style is only known in short writings; or take some writing such as an epitaph which has regular lines and set forms of speech; the words too may be wrongly divided or written without stops and without accents or breathings as in the Uncial Greek MSS.) One person is quicker at guessing the riddle than another, but in any case the critic will soon be at fault, for the simple reason that he has no materials for conjecture. No divination or second sight or knowledge of style can supply one-half of a page from the other half, nor restore with certainty a single word or even letter unless absolutely required by the context, that is to say if any other word or letter would equally fit or make sense. The general meaning may in any of these cases be clear or probable; e.g. in the case of a torn letter, or of the Inscription of which Niebuhr attempts a restoration about the burning of the tribunes; but the precise words are really irrecoverable wherever more than one word or letter or combination of words and letters may amend the miswriting or bridge or fill up the vacant space. The problem is not of the nature of the discovery of a cipher, the secret of which is really contained in certain letters or symbols which have been artificially transposed, or of the interpretation of a hieroglyphic, the signs of which are known, although the mode of reading them or the language in which they were written has been lost. The case of an Inscription again is widely different from a MS., because an Inscription is formal and regular and may be compared with other Inscriptions which are sometimes verbatim or literatim the same. Hence a single letter in a particular place may sometimes restore a whole line, but why? because the letter is found in that place in a line which is preserved elsewhere. Nor, again, is the restoration of the text of an author analogous to the restoration of a ruined building or statue, the form or structure of which is simple and uniform, and the lost features of which may be restored from a very few

indications assisted by the analogy of buildings or statues of the times. Such illustrations are misleading because they are not *in pari materia*, and when applied to the restoration of words they tend to obscure the real difficulty which is the variety and flexibility of language. To take an example: between two points in a line of Shakespeare there is a lacuna or erasure or corruption of five letters which admits of being filled up in twenty or thirty different ways; who can decide between them? A truly Shakespearian word may be found by one of our critics whom we may suppose to be playing at the game of emendation; in referring to the text the expression actually used may turn out to be less Shakespearian, or more common, or the reverse; possibly a word not elsewhere occurring in any extant play. Two very popular and familiar emendations of Shakespeare will illustrate the point which I am discussing:

(1) *Henry V*, act ii, scene 3—

> 'His nose was as sharp as a pen
> On a *table* of green *fields*' (Ff.; om. in Qq.);
>
> 'And a' *babbled* of green fields' (Cj. Theobald):

or altering the other word,

> 'On a table of green *frieze*.' (Collier MS.)

A third expedient, adopted by Pope, is to omit the whole phrase 'And . . . fields,' with the Qq. Several other conjectures by scholars of repute, including Malone, have found acceptance in their time.

(2) *Macbeth*, act v, scene 3—

> 'My *way* of life
> Is fall'n into the sere and yellow leaf.'
>
> 'My *May* of life.' (Cj. Johnson.)

The change is slight and gives an attractive reading while avoiding an apparent incongruity. But similar incongruities arising from the condensation or crowding together of imagery abound in the Shakespearian text and are not always so easily got rid of:—e.g. 'to take arms against a sea of troubles.'

The critic can only succeed when a particular word is absolutely demanded by the context, or where the error is reducible to some rule. He will more easily restore the terminations of words than their roots; mere misspellings in which the sound remains are found to occasion no difficulty to the practised eye. And much further we cannot go. The instance just given shows how in a very characteristic and remarkable passage it is impossible absolutely to decide about a single letter. Conjectural emendation is a kind of prophecy, and though there is a vast difference between the powers of one man and another while they remain within the legitimate field of knowledge, there is not much difference when they take to foretelling future events.

The argument from English to Greek and Latin scholarship is not really unfair, provided the difference be remembered between a language which has and which has not inflexions; the unfairness, however, is really in favour of English conjectural emendation. The practice of emending classical authors has come down from the revival of literature, and is fostered, at any rate in Englishmen, by the habit of Greek and Latin composition in early life. But every Englishman who applies his mind to the subject is a better judge of English than of Greek verse, for he is better acquainted with his native language than with a dead one. Even Bentley knew more of English than of Greek, and there is no paradox in saying that he was better qualified to edit Milton than to edit Homer—that is to say, not comparatively with others, but absolutely in reference to his own knowledge. In an evil hour he applied to an English poet the method or manner which he had acquired in editing the classics; and the result tends to detect his method and to raise a suspicion of his authority as an editor of the Greek and Latin classics. He finds a great deal of error in Milton; this he supposes to be due to the circumstance that Milton in his blindness dictated to his

daughters; a sort of general consideration introduced into the subject similar to the hypothesis of transposed leaves in Lucretius or Catullus. Bentley's Milton cannot be separated from Bentley's Horace; the multitude of emendations in the one tends to shake our faith in the multitude of emendations in the other. The many will hardly trust, in what they are unable to understand, a judgement which is so wild and fanciful in what is within their own range. The lesson is instructive, as showing what is indeed sufficiently apparent otherwise, that great powers may often coexist with extravagance and want of common sense.

The English parallel may throw a further light on the problem which has been started. The text of Shakespeare presents many points of similarity with the text of an ancient author. The richness and obscurity of the language, the complexity of the meaning, the variety of readings, and the uncertainty which hangs over their origin, give rise to doubts like those which have tried the text of the classics. A harvest of emendations has sprung up; Shakespeare has been treated in the same bold style by Warburton as Milton by Bentley. But the ingenuity of critics has not supplied a generally received version; only in a very few instances have conjectures found their way into the text.

Two other general facts may be adduced which are of weight in estimating the value of emendation in classical authors. 1. First the absence of *emendations* in the New Testament; there are 'old correctors' of the Gospels and Epistles, but they are not scholars of the present or last century; at least the important variations which occur in them are of an earlier date and spring from other causes; and the few emendations which have been suggested by scholars have not found their way into the text. Lachmann, when he made the attempt in the preface to the second volume of his New Testament, met with very little

success. [Of Cobet perhaps the same might have been said.] Nor does Bentley himself indulge in his bold 'meo periculo' style of criticism within the sacred precinct; it is from manuscript not from conjecture that he proposes to restore the text of the New Testament. Yet there are certainly a few passages in the New Testament which have as much apparent difficulty as the corruptions of classical authors. (It is true that in some respects the text of the New Testament is unlike that of other Greek writers, especially in the number of MSS. and versions.) The quotations in other writers are also numerous, but these create the new difficulty of an *embarras de richesses.* The circumstance that critical emendation has not been held a safe or certain path in the most important of all Greek writings is a proof that there is danger and uncertainty in the application of such a method to the text of Greek authors generally.

2. The tendency of criticism has of late years been adverse and not favourable to the use of conjecture. Manuscripts have been collated afresh and more precisely valued, and the result has rarely confirmed the previous conjectures of critics. There is no consensus of great critics in important emendations; those of Meineke and Ahrens are decried by Cobet; Porson has not generally been followed by Hermann in his corrections of the text. The ideas which inspired the last-named critic (Hermann) in his edition of Aeschylus are already out of date and certainly tend to undermine the authority of the great editor in Sophocles and Aristophanes. Madvig, the most prolific inventor of new emendations, who has laid down many sound principles which he fails to observe in practice, remarks that Bentley constantly violated the rules of his art, and that Hermann never had any; he also justly censures Dindorf in Ed. V of the Poetae Scenici for pretending to emend passages without regard to the MSS. Most persons will find that the need of conjecture diminishes as

their familiarity with an author increases; the peculiarities of his style become more apparent to them; they receive on the authority of MSS. expressions which their first thoughts would have set down as destitute of grammar and meaning; and the judgement and industry of Bekker have probably done more for the text of Greek writers than was effected by the vast powers of Bentley.

3. Lastly, some instruction may be gathered from observing the most palpable forms of delusion which prevail among conjectural critics. Their judgement is not equal to their invention; they are often deceived by parallel passages; any special knowledge which they possess of Greek dialects or metres or lexicographers tends unduly to form their opinion. They are apt to introduce a point which is not wanted, or to create a false emphasis, or to impair the due subordination of the word to the sentence or figure of speech. They are hasty in assuming that an author could not have used this or that expression or formation; and they think a regular and perfect phrase or figure or parallel better than an irregular one. They sometimes insist on uniformity of construction where uniformity is not required, or they miss the slight and subtle change from the 'oratio recta' to the 'oratio obliqua,' or conversely. A random statement of a lexicographer or grammarian or other ancient author is sometimes affirmed against the clearest evidence of the manuscript. Their perception of the context is often overpowered by their sense of some anomaly or obscurity. They do not always study an author from himself; the subtleties of which Plato and Sophocles are capable in the use of language or grammar are not made a separate matter of investigation. The transitional periods of grammar and language are confounded by them with those in which the uses of language are fixed. They do not fairly renounce impossible problems, but seem rather to find a stimulus to their imagination in hopeless corruptions of the text. They sometimes restore

an author from himself and argue from the use of a word in one passage to the use of the same word or phrase in another. Their own self-confidence in the most slippery of all arts is a reason why they should suspect themselves, and may well raise a suspicion in the mind of others; 'meo periculo,' 'away with all this,' 'apage putidissimam interpolationem;' the disdain of objectors; the repeated promise to free a beautiful passage from deformities; the improvements and re-writings of the text; the 'nihil tam metuens quam ne de se diffidere videretur,' are not indeed inconsistent with a real knowledge and study of Greek, but they are doubtful proofs of the judgement or trustworthiness of the critic. The tendency appears to grow upon them with years; their last performances are often a caricature of their earlier ones. They speak of an intuition which is peculiar to themselves; which a person who is not similarly gifted might be more ready to acknowledge, if the intuition of one critic were not sometimes at variance with the intuition of another; the older editors, as for example Casaubon in Polybius, frequently introduce emendations without distinguishing them from the text of the MS., and many late emendations, as of Hermann in Sophocles, are fast becoming established in the printed books without brackets or other signs of uncertainty. Nor does there seem any reason why the self-confidence of a discoverer should be accepted as a warrant of the truth of a discovery in restoring the text of the classics any more than in science or life.

II. The general purport of what I have been saying is that the more we reflect upon the nature of conjectural emendation of the classics—the more we put it to the test, or try it by the analogy of English—the more we think of the follies into which great scholars have been betrayed by the love of it—the narrower are the limits which we are disposed to assign to it. The nature of the

manuscripts has now to be considered. At first sight the accurate preservation or transmission of the words or ideas of ancient writers during a period of 2000 years might be deemed impossible. Yet experience supplies many facts which make this credible. The text of the Vedas is known to have remained unaltered since the fourth century before Christ. Unlike the Greek Scholiasts, the Vedic commentaries of more than 2000 years ago have exactly the same readings which are found in Vedic MSS. at the present day. This is the more remarkable when the observation is also made that, owing to the material on which they are written, they must have been frequently copied: no Sanscrit MSS. have the antiquity of Greek ones: and more remarkable still when it is considered that the commentary is purely fanciful and stands in no relation to the original text. And there are many Greek MSS., such as the Paris A of the Republic of Plato, which are remarkably good and gain in authority in proportion as they are better known. There is no probability therefore of accuracy or inaccuracy in a Greek MS. prior to an examination of the contents. No general assumption that copyists were ignorant or that 'mistakes often happen' should be allowed antecedently to influence the mind.

Thus the question which we started returns from very general considerations to very minute ones. The greater part of the science of textual criticism is contained in the valuation of MSS. That corruptions, confusion, glosses, interchanges of letters, emendations of grammarians and copyists are to be found in Greek MSS. will be readily allowed; the point at issue is whether a particular interchange of letters or the insertion of a gloss or any other special corruption is incidental to the writing of a certain scribe or of the copy which he used. An editor may feel disposed to substitute ΟϹΙΟϹ for ΘЄΙΟϹ; he has to ask himself the question whether this particular form of corruption occurs elsewhere in the MS.

Or he may feel a conviction that certain awkwardly introduced words are a gloss; again, he will have reason to doubt the correctness of his conviction should no similar example of a gloss occur elsewhere in the same MS. Once more, he may feel disposed to adopt the better or easier reading—say of a late manuscript: his hand will be held if he finds that the manuscript which is his authority offers in many other places better and easier readings where other good MSS. are perplexed or obscure. For then the intelligibility of the copy is possibly due to the corrector and not to the original text. The student or editor has to consider not all the possible errors which may be thought likely to occur in Greek MSS., but those which he discovers in the manuscript which he is perusing. There is no error of which some copyists are not capable in times and places when Greek was becoming barbarized; but the mass of Greek MSS. were written by moderately learned persons who were copying their own language. And the MSS. of the greater writers, with the exception of some passages of Aeschylus and Euripides, are as a fact extremely free from error, and would be thought still more so, if their correctness were measured by the style of the writer and not by an imaginary grammatical standard.

Some application of the doctrine of chances may serve as an illustration of the probabilities of error in MSS. (1) There is obviously a probability that the copyist will fail in difficult passages; the mind and eye require great discipline before they can write exactly words or forms of words which are unintelligible or unknown or imperfectly known to them. (2) But there is no greater probability that the copyist will err in the violation of a canon of grammar or of prosody, unless indeed in cases where the usage or grammar or metre has changed in later literature, than in any other way. (3) Thus, let us suppose the case of a manuscript which contains in all

a hundred errors or miswritings; and further that no less than twenty of these are found to consist in omissions of ἄν, or uses of ἄν with the present indicative, or of τυγχάνω as a verb of existence, or of οὐ μή with the present or 1st Aor. Act., or of unions of dissimilar tenses, or of words of doubtful analogy, or of any other violations of supposed laws of grammar—the question arises whether the proportion of grammatical errors which has been described is not greater than can be accounted for on any rational principle. Why should as many as $\frac{20}{100}$ of all the mistakes which occur be found to affect the rules of grammarians? Why, for example, should the copyists have been guilty of forty errors which are violations of the celebrated law of the Cretic in Tragic Iambic Verse? When it is remembered that the refusal to admit a spondee which is broken into two words in the fifth place is a sort of last refinement in the structure of the verse, the probability appears to be that such a law would be occasionally broken, rather than uniformly observed.

There is a further consideration which seems to strengthen this view of the subject. There are grammatical anomalies which are not found to exist equally in earlier and later Greek writers. The usages of Demosthenes are more regular than those of Thucydides or Plato. But this cannot be attributed to the greater care or skill of the transcribers; there is no reason why the words of Demosthenes should have been preserved to us with more accuracy than those of Plato. The only reason is that the MSS. exhibit a real difference of usage in earlier and later writers. Whether in historical or textual criticism, in the New Testament or in classical authors, those intimations which are opposed to the prevailing use or feeling of an age witness to their own truth. Many reasons may be given why the copyist should have altered the forms or usages of Thucydides into those of his own age; but there is no reason why he should have returned to older forms;

why for example he should have used εἰ with the subjunctive or omitted ἂν with the optative, except that such apparent anomalies existed in the original copies. That the traces of such anomalies in Plato or Thucydides or in the Greek tragedians are already becoming faint is a fact which agrees with the contemporary rise and progress of grammatical studies. The golden age of Attic tragedy was never completely purged of the remains of Epic irregularity; that the anomalous uses which are found in the MSS. retain this character is in some degree a proof of their genuineness.

Another consideration distinct from the mere correctness of a manuscript is antiquity. The superiority of the older MS. is traceable to the circumstance that the copy is not only nearer to the original but also to the Uncial MS. A manuscript like Paris A, which is supposed to have been written in the ninth century, or the Bodleian which bears the date A.D. 896, retains many Uncial forms, and has probably been transcribed from an Uncial MS. And the observation may be worth making that another interval of equal length would nearly reach back to the autograph of Plato. Many chances of error are thus excluded. The size of the character and the comparative absence of contractions prevents the letters from being minced into an illegible scrawl. On the other hand the indications which are afforded of the divisions of words by breathings and accents or of sentences by stops are generally wanting in the Uncial MSS. Nor in such matters can MSS. be held to be of any authority. It is unfortunate also that in minute questions of orthography an appeal has ever been made to them. For such questions (1) are of little importance; the correct writing of ἐπεπόνθη or of κᾆτα adds nothing to our appreciation of Greek authors and scarcely anything to philology; (2) they can seldom be determined precisely; the MSS. are constantly at variance with one another and with the precepts of the grammarians;

(3) uniformity and etymology are better principles of spelling than are supplied either by the MSS. or by the Atticist grammarians; (4) there is no reason to suppose that the classical authors of an earlier period could have known or conformed to exact rules of orthography. Such inquiries have certainly been carried far enough and need no longer be suffered to detain us from more important subjects. They would be thought ridiculous if applied to the printed text of English authors of two or three centuries ago.

Besides the estimate of a particular manuscript as distinct from manuscripts in general, there remains a further estimate to be formed of the value of manuscript authority in a particular passage or word. There are peculiar causes which may lead to error in certain places; an entanglement in the meaning of a passage will often confuse the copyist's head or hand; he will be apt either to miswrite or amend the words at which he stumbles; and as common words are often substituted for uncommon ones, common forms will also take the place of uncommon or curious ones. Similar letters at the end of one word and the beginning of another; repetitions of syllables; similar beginnings in two successive sentences, are also a frequent cause of error or omission; the omission of a word is far more usual than the insertion of one. The omission of a word may often lead to the insertion of the same word in another order or in a clause which has a common government. Again, words written at the side sometimes find their way into the text, or two passages which are really similar are absolutely identified. (Of this many examples occur in the Gospels.) Among various readings that one is preferable of which the origin may be explained on some one of these principles or which seems to be the centre or kernel of the rest. Above all the similarities of certain Greek letters both in the Uncial and the Cursive hand render particular words much more liable than others to be misspelt; which first misspelling by rendering the

passage unintelligible naturally introduces some further error. Two such lists, one of Uncial, the other of Cursive letters, should be present to the student's eye; the Uncial letters ΑΔΛ; ΓΤ; ЄΘΟC; ΗΝ; ΤΙ, Π, ΙΓΤ; Κ, ΙΣ; ΛΛ, ΑΛ, ΛΑ; ΝΙ, Μ; ΤΤ, ΙΤ, ΤΙ, ΙΓ; ΨΤ;—the Cursive letters which offer a second chance of error being λ, μ, ν; (β) υκ; ψ φ; α, ευ; τ ε. The use of Cursive [minuscule] letters together with Uncial letters is a stage of writing which must also be considered. A further source of error is the habit of contracting certain words both in Uncial and Cursive writing ΘΣ, ΠΡ, ΠΡΟΣ, ΑΝΩ, ΚΣ, ΙΗΛ, ΟΥΝΩ (*θεός, πατήρ, πατρός, ἀνθρώπῳ, κύριος, Ἰσραήλ, οὐρανῷ*), and the abbreviation of terminations.

The famous rule 'potior lectio difficilior,' seems to require some limitation. For there is plainly a degree of difficulty or obscurity which may render the acceptance of a reading improbable; nonsense which is just construable is not to be regarded as preferable to sense when offered by a MS. Some correction or alteration must be made in the rule. (1) First of all, not the more difficult reading is to be preferred, but the more remote one or the one least likely to have been invented. (2) But the question which is the more difficult reading can never be confined to this one point; repetitions of letters or syllables may tend to substitute the more remote or difficult reading for the simpler one. (3) The rule presupposes a certain degree of knowledge and intelligence in the copyist who makes the substitution, which does not always exist. (4) The meaning and agreement with the context or style of the author cannot be left out of sight in the comparative estimate of MSS.; nor lastly the character of the MS. which in some cases may be discovered to be valueless by the uniform adoption or insertion of easier readings. (5) A large allowance must be made for accident; the greater number of mistakes do not arise from the principle of the adoption of the easier reading but on no principle

at all. This famous rule seems to be chiefly suggestive and certainly cannot be allowed to supersede in particular passages the estimate of the value of MSS. taken as a whole. The canon of the more difficult reading really points to one element among many in the consideration of the text. It is not enough to say, 'this is the more difficult reading and therefore the true one.' But 'this is the more difficult reading, which at the same time makes good sense and is in harmony with the general style.'

Lastly—(*a*) the Scholia, (*β*) quotations in other Greek authors, especially lexicographers and grammarians, (*γ*) Latin versions, may be reckoned among the occasional subsidia.

(*a*) The Scholia may be regarded as a witness to the genuineness of the text of Greek authors; also as a living link with the past; moreover in a few passages they have preserved a reading which is lost in the MSS.; their language has also been tortured into the support of conjectural emendations, and the occurrence of a word in the explanation of the Scholiast has been an argument for the introduction of it into the text. It need scarcely be remarked that they are of every degree of antiquity and value and embrace observations of the most widely different kinds, learned and puerile, ethical and grammatical, according to the temper of the author. The value of each Scholiast, like that of each MS., must of course be judged alone, remembering, as is obvious in the Scholiasts on Homer, that he may often repeat or preserve the opinions of older or wiser writers than himself. Many of them, like the Scholiasts on Thucydides or on Aristotle, while deficient in grammatical knowledge and falling according to our standard into remarkable grammatical blunders, have a curious dialectical insight into the meaning of passages; they are not unfrequently chargeable with the objection 'Too much logic,' or illogical logic. That with all Greek literature lying open before them, themselves the students

of an art which, commencing with the Sophists and Alexandrian grammarians, lived and flourished for above 1500 years, they should have added so little to our knowledge either of the classics or of language generally, is a valuable warning of the tendency of such studies when pursued in a false and narrow spirit by those ὅσοι μὴ ἔχουσι φάρμακον τὸ εἰδέναι αὐτὰ οἷά ἐστι. A labour which is wholly disproportioned to the result is apt to infect the judgement and to pervert the wider comparison of the other branches of knowledge which is the safeguard against the errors of exclusive study. A man will hardly be persuaded to form a humble or uncertain estimate of the labour of many years of his life. Nor can any mere servile and unreflecting toil add much even to the stores of learning. No man who is a mere scholar can ever be a great scholar, because scholarship is not separable from other branches of knowledge, e.g. from history and philosophy. The school which is represented by Niebuhr and K. O. Müller in Germany were quite right in regarding antiquity as a whole; their error lay not there, but in the introduction of theories and conjectures in the place of facts and in not considering the nature of evidence.

(β) Quotations in old Greek writers can only be used with great hesitation as a means of correcting the text of an author. The pre-Alexandrian readings of Homer cannot with any certainty be restored from Plato or Aristotle. Quotations, in the strict sense of the term, are frequently altered to suit the context or structure of the sentence; moreover they often lose or change a word owing to a lapse of memory in the author who cites them. The citations of lexicographers, again, unless strongly supported by internal reasons, are rarely to be set against the evidence of the MSS. And although in the days of Suidas the familiar knowledge of Greek literature was beginning to be narrowed within the range of authors which have been preserved to us (any one who will be at the pains of counting

will find that the proportion of passages in Suidas which are from extant works or parts of works far exceeds the proportion which these works bear to the mass of Greek literature), yet the materials which were used by them were very large and the difficulty of accuracy proportionably increased. Nor can the testimony of grammarians about the uses of forms or words in particular authors be safely trusted when opposed to the evidence of the MSS., because (1) they have probably attempted to impress an Attic character on earlier writers; or (2) they may have drawn their precepts from copies in which the original forms had been altered.

III. One more general head remains to be considered; this is the different character of different authors or writings, under which the principal points for consideration seem to be the following:—First, the different ages of authors and our knowledge of contemporary literature. No one, for example, would attempt to restore the poems of Homer to the earliest or original form or indeed to any other but that of the Alexandrian period. Though there may be reason to think that the change which they have undergone is not great, there are no materials worth speaking of which would enable us to fix the text of the Iliad and Odyssey which was present to the eyes of Herodotus or of Plato. No critical ingenuity can penetrate the grammatical covering which the Alexandrian critics have interposed around them or distinguish the original from the restored forms of words. Again, of Attic literature alone there were at least three periods; *first*, the antegrammatical or transitional, which includes Aeschylus and Sophocles, and in Attic prose may be admitted to descend as low as Plato. *Secondly*, the age of orators, in which the language attained the perfection of grammatical and rhetorical accuracy. *Thirdly*, the age of the Atticizers, who have an affectation of purism, and mix up with the imitation of an earlier age the uses and

forms of their own. The text of each of these classes of authors has some peculiar features. The grammar in the first period is less reducible to rule and the use of words more audacious and inventive than in that of the second; there is more uncertainty in limiting the freedom of language; the forms and constructions of the old Epic poetry are not altogether banished from the tragedians; in Thucydides, again, is felt the oppression of an age which is beginning to philosophize and sometimes loses hold of grammar in the attempt to arrange multifarious relations of thought. The Tragic dialect is tinged by Homericism, and the influence of Attic verse has not yet completely harmonized the language of prose. These causes interfere with the attainment of that perfect type of Attic regularity which the grammarians of later ages found or made and sought to impose upon earlier ones. And the greater the liberty the greater also the difficulty not only of fixing the limit of usage but of restoring by conjecture what has become corrupted. The second may be regarded as the normal period of Greek grammar. (2) These differences of ages or periods of literature run into other differences of individual style or character. One measure of language must be applied to Aeschylus or Pindar; another to Sophocles; a third to Euripides — one to Thucydides, another to Xenophon; one to narrative writings, another to speeches or philosophical reflections. It is not by a general knowledge of Greek, for example, that an idea can be formed of how a particular author would have written in certain passages, as far as such an idea can be formed at all, but from the attentive study of the usages of individual authors. The abruptness of Aeschylus, the fanciful and tortuous associations and order of words in Pindar, the novelties, subtleties, experiments, refinements of Sophocles, the freedom in the use of cases and the substitution of a logical for a grammatical connexion which characterizes the language of the two first extant tragedians

as well as of Thucydides, could not have been anticipated from any general knowledge of the principles of Greek grammar. Each writer is characteristic in some degree in his grammar as well as in his style. The uses of grammar like the meaning of words are (1) chronological in some degree and require to be considered in chronological order; (2) they are individual and vary (though in a less degree) with the character and subject matter of an author. And these considerations tend to impose a check on those who are ready to maintain with authority what an author may or may not have written.

Peculiarities of dialect and metre remain to be briefly considered. As to the first (1) we obviously possess no means of determining the forms or uses of the Doric and Aeolic with the precision of the Attic; the remains of their literature are small and the notices of the grammarians comparatively unfrequent. (2) It is difficult to decide the limits of that common Doric dialect which the Tragic writers retained in their choruses, and which in a still more Doricized form is the language of Pindar. (3) The dialects themselves were never subjected to the influence of grammarians; nor equally with the Attic to the influence of writing. (4) The Tragic dialect, again, always retained some degree of metrical licence and also of Epic usage, which are seen in the double forms—μόνος, μοῦνος: κεῖνος, ἐκεῖνος, &c., and in the occasional omission of the augment. (5) General distinctions between the earlier and later Attic forms cannot be always determined with certainty on the debateable ground of Plato and Aristophanes. But the general rule may be laid down that, e.g. ἀπαλλαχθείς and not ἀπαλλαγείς would be commonly found in writers before 400 B.C. (6) That any distinction has been preserved is a testimony to the incorruptness of the MSS., which indeed contrasts with the changes in English books: no reprint of an English book of three centuries since, if not a professed facsimile, would retain the antiquated spelling of the original.

The other question of the extent of metrical licence has also an important bearing on the doctrine of emendation. Metre is a help to the emender's art, and whatever may be the uncertainty of emendations in metre it is less than of emendations in prose. For one datum which the metre gives is wanting in prose. Still the metre also introduces a new element of difficulty. For supposing the laws of the metre to be known the language must conform to those laws; and what are the laws of metre must be gathered partly from the writings of metricians and grammarians, partly from an induction of the facts. This subject may be divided for the sake of convenience into two heads: (1) the more exact metres of the dialogue, (2) the laxer metres of the choruses. It is remarkable that great precision has been attained in the conventional quantity of words and that in either kind of metre there is rarely a suspicion of difference or error.

1. The metres of the dialogue have general and inviolate rules about the admissibility of feet; they have also precepts which relate to the divisions and composition of feet. Whether these latter are of the same inviolable nature as the former is doubtful; they seem to be not so much metrical canons as unconscious refinements of the ear. The fact that some of them, as for example the rule that trisyllabic feet shall be included in single words, do not apply equally to all the tragedians, tends to show that they are not matters of rule but of ear. In the latter case they would be general rather than universal, and the lines which do not conform to them would not therefore be held to be corrupt. The probability of such rules being universal evidently depends partly on the nature of the rule, chiefly on the number of exceptions. The law of the Cretic, which has been already mentioned, may be cited as an example of a rule with several exceptions, while the rarity of the Anapaest in the third place of the Tragic Iambic would probably justify the inference that the

exception is only a corruption of the text. Again, is it not probable that some syllables may have had common or different quantities which have generally been held to be of a fixed or uniform one; if words such as *φάρη*, *ὑμῖν* and *ἡμῖν* are admitted to have had two quantities, may not *νεαρός* also have been common or uncertain? Such an inference seems a fair one where the exceptional quantity is strongly supported by the MSS. even in a single passage. It agrees generally with the fact that in the termination *-ινος* there are two quantities; we say *χειμερῐνός*, but also *ὀρθρῑνός* and *ὀπωρῑνός*.

2. The choruses of the Greek plays have a rhythmical rather than a metrical character; that is to say, the metre is hardly enough defined to be distinguishable from rhythm. Many of the metres used in them admit of such numerous exchanges of feet, and the transitions from one rhythm to another are so frequent, that there would generally be great uncertainty as to the corruption of a line in which the metre alone appeared to be at fault. There is more guidance however afforded by the correspondence of strophe and antistrophe. Still doubts will remain; (*a*) are the quantities of words absolutely certain? (*b*) has the beat of the verse no effect on them? (*c*) is no Homeric licence ever admitted? (*d*) are the corresponding feet exactly known? Such doubts are only suggested here; the tendency of them is to abate our confidence in the discovery of corruptions in the choruses of which the metre is taken as the proof.

In conclusion, let me observe that though I have endeavoured to show how small the power of divination is, and though I deeply lament that the lives of so many ingenious men should be thrown away in such a fruitless task, and though I think that the supposed corruptions of the text have been greatly exaggerated through this very 'cacoethes' or 'lues emendandi,' yet I am far from maintaining that the Greek classics are in general

free from corruption or that there can never be any place for conjectural criticism. But a passage must be proved corrupt first before it is made the subject of the emender's art: and the emendation must be the least possible (for no other has any chance of being true); it must follow the letters of the MSS., it must accord with the style and language of the author.

IV. The principles or suggestions offered for consideration in the preceding pages may now be illustrated from Plato. The text of the Republic will be conveniently treated under three heads, (1) the MSS. and recensions of the text, (2) the anomalies of language which affect the text, (3) the more remarkable conjectures, an examination of which will tend to illustrate the general principles which have been followed in this edition.

Of all the MSS. of Plato first and without a second is the Codex Parisiensis A. It contains the Cleitophon, Republic, Timaeus, Critias, Minos, Laws, Epinomis, Definitions, Epistles, the Dialogues 'De Justo' and 'De Virtute,' Demodocus, Sisyphus, Halcyon, Eryxias, Axiochus. It is written on parchment in double columns, the scholia being in small capitals, and has the annotation written at the end, *ὠρθώθη ἡ βίβλος αὕτη ὑπὸ Κωνσταντίνου μητροπολίτου ἱεραπόλεως τοῦ καὶ ὠνησαμένου.* 'This book was corrected by Constantine, metropolitan of Hierapolis, who was the purchaser of the book.' About the precise antiquity of the MS. there is some uncertainty; Bekker who is the highest authority on such subjects places the date as early as the ninth century on the ground that the writing is more ancient than that of the Bodleian or Clarkian MS. which has the date 896 written at the end. (In the latter which contains nearly every other dialogue the Republic and the Laws are wanting.) The Codex A is certainly one of the noblest of extant MSS. And considering the fate of other Greek authors we may congratulate ourselves

on having the whole writings of Plato preserved in two MSS. of the ninth century.

The authority of Paris A may be justly said to balance that of all other MSS. put together. The successive editors of Plato—Stallbaum, Schneider, Baiter, Hermann, seem to estimate more and more highly the value of this MS. The last-named scholar has made a closer approximation to its text than was ever exhibited before. Nor is this high estimate exaggerated, as may indeed be shown by a simple test. Any one who will take the very slight trouble of comparing the recension of the First Book at the beginning of the Zurich edition with the text will find that after making allowance for differences of orthography the real substantial errors are exceedingly few, being in all not more than two or three. There is considerable variation in minute points, as for example (1) the first person of the pluperfect tense which has been Atticized in the first hand of the MS. (ἑωράκη, ἐπεπόνθη A[1], ἑωράκειν, ἐπεπόνθειν A[2]); (2) also in the forms of some substantives, e.g. ὠφελία, εὐηθία: (3) in the use of the ι subscript which is most frequently adscribed; (4) most of all in the omission or addition of the aspirate, causing a frequent confusion of αὑτός and αὐτός, &c.: and (5) not unfrequent confusion in accentuation. Whether ὅταν δέοι κ.τ.λ. 333 D, which is found in several other MSS., including Vat. Θ, or οὐκοῦν followed by an optative without ἄν (ib. E) be a mistake is uncertain. But after making these deductions there remain only about three passages which must be admitted to be substantial errors; these are 327 A ἥττων for ἧττον, οἷόν τε σύ probably for οἷόν γε σύ 336 E; the interchange between T and Γ being of the commonest of MS. errors, and probably ἀποκρίνεσθαι for ἀποκρινεῖσθαι 337 C. (These last variations are cited on the authority of the Zurich edition; none of them are to be discovered in the collation of the Paris MS. made by Dübner for Didot, the various readings in which are almost confined to matters of orthography.)

On the other hand there are several probable corrections of the received text, e.g. ἐλλείπεται for ἐν λείπεται 327 C, probably the two examples of the omission of ἄν noted above (333 D, E), the explanatory ἀσύνδετον in which γάρ is wanting (ἐπειδὰν αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι for ἐπειδὰν γὰρ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι 329 C), the substitution of πιαίνειν for ποιμαίνειν, all of which are supported by the canon of the more difficult reading.

Nearly the same result follows from the examination of the Second Book, in which several erasures and a somewhat greater number of errors are found, e.g. there are six omissions: (1) ἀδικία δ' ἐπαινεῖται 358 A, (2) the words αὖ μέγα δύνανται after αἱ τελεταί 366 A, (3) εἶναι after ὅσοι φατέ 366 E, (4) ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν 367 C which is inserted in the margin, (5) the words παρὰ τὸν βασιλέα 360 B which are also found in the margin, (6) καὶ τὴν ποικιλίαν 373 A. The number of these omissions tends to weaken the authority of the MS. in other cases of omission; number (4) which is an antithetical clause and is added at the side also throws light on the character of the omission in number (1). The tendency to omission and especially to the omission of parallel clauses or words may be observed in several other passages of the MS., e.g 400 D τὸ εὐάρμοστον [καὶ ἀνάρμοστον]. Again there are errors of orthography, ὠφελίας for ὠφελείας 368 C, λύσειοι for λύσιοι 366 B, ἀμφωτέρων for ἀμφοτέρων 379 D, ἰαμβία 380 A, interchanges of υ for ν and of breathings and accents; also one or two of a more serious character, e.g. τῷ δικαίῳ for τῷ ἀδίκῳ 363 A, τῷ Γύγῃ τοῦ Λυδοῦ 359 D where the error of the other MSS. is retained. On the other hand it is possible that in ἐὰν καὶ μὴ δοκῶ 365 B, ἀποσχοίμην 367 D, this MS. has preserved the true reading.

[Professor Jowett's MS. here ends abruptly: for further observations on the text of the Republic see Essay II, pp. 67 ff. of this volume.]

ESSAY II

THE KINGDOM OF EVIL

Book I. 352 D.

οἵ γε παμπόνηροι . . . πράττειν ἀδύνατοι. Plato argues that there is no such thing as a kingdom of evil (compare Matthew xii. 25, 26—'Every kingdom divided against itself is brought to desolation; and every city or house divided against itself shall not stand; and if Satan cast out Satan, he is divided against himself: how shall then his kingdom stand?'); also that there is no unmixed evil in the individual. Cp. Lys. 220 E, 221 A *πότερον, . . . ἐὰν τὸ κακὸν ἀπόληται, οὐδὲ πεινῆν ἔτι ἔσται οὐδὲ διψῆν, οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν τοιούτων; . . . ἢ γελοῖον τὸ ἐρώτημα, ὅ τί ποτ' ἔσται τότε ἢ μὴ ἔσται; τίς γὰρ οἶδεν;* which raises the question of the connexion of evil with the desires; and Crat. 403 E, where (as in the Timaeus) evil is attributed to the accidents of the bodily state. Evil is elsewhere referred to necessities in the nature of things (Theaet. 176 A), or to pre-existing elements in the world (Polit. 273 C), or to the necessary imperfection of secondary causes (Tim. 48 A), or to the bodily constitution (Tim. 86). The contradictory nature of evil is again discussed in the Laws (i. 626 C, D), where the argument that war is the natural condition of states is carried back to individuals. The connexion of virtue and power is also observed by Aristotle, Pol. i. 6, § 3 *τρόπον τινὰ ἀρετὴ τυγχάνουσα χορηγίας καὶ βιάζεσθαι δύναται μάλιστα, καὶ ἔστιν ἀεὶ τὸ κρατοῦν ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἀγαθοῦ τινός, ὥστε δοκεῖν μὴ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς εἶναι τὴν βίαν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου μόνον εἶναι τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν.* On the other hand in Rep. X. 610 E

evil is described as having an agonized and intensified existence—τὸν δ' ἔχοντα καὶ μάλα ζωτικὸν παρέχουσαν.

It has been asked in later ages whether evil is negative or positive, to be represented under the figure of decomposition or of death. It may be replied: (1) that there is no ideal of evil; Milton or Goethe give consistency to their creations by the addition of intellect and of will; (2) all evil has some admixture of good. But again, no limit can be assigned either to the persistency, or to the consequences of evil. The difficulty of this, as of many other questions, seems to arise out of the attempt to realize in the abstract a state or nature which is essentially concrete. Cp. note on IV. 444 B.

ESSAY III

THE STATE AND THE INDIVIDUAL

Book II. 369 A ff.

The favourite analogy of the state and the individual is a figure of speech which lends a sort of elevation and interest to politics, and yet is only true partially and has frequently led to practical errors. Man is a microcosm, and 'the world is set in his heart,' and new aspects of either arise when they are reflected on each other. But the life and organization of the state are far inferior to the life and organization of the individual, nor do the virtues or parts of the one answer, as Plato supposes, to the virtues or parts of the other. The nation never attains the unity of a person and has therefore a lower degree of freedom and responsibility; a national will means the excess of the majority of wills, which often balance each other or are lost in circumstances, and thus pass into a sort of imperfect necessity. The famous expression of a 'national' or 'state' conscience is poetical and figurative only, for that consciousness which is essential to the idea of conscience in the individual becomes in a state only the aggregation of many individual consciousnesses which from sympathy or some action or tendency of circumstances are led to form the same reflection on themselves. And in judging collectively, the sense of right and wrong is apt to be blunted. When, again, a nation is said to 'rise as one man,' the very form of expression seems to imply that this unanimity is an exceptional condition, and that a nearer approach is

made to the unity of an individual at one time than at another. On the other hand the nation lasts while 'the individuals wither': it gathers up and retains many more elements than are found in any single person: it has no natural term, and may have an endless growth. The citizen of a state presupposes the state into which he is born, the laws and institutions of which are the outward barriers and limits within which his life is set, being a more durable structure than that which he himself is. Lastly, the sphere of the state is co-extensive with law and politics, the sphere of the individual with morals and religion. The exceptions to this opposition arise where individuals act for nations, or where in the leaders of states the personal character takes the place of the official and representative, or where, as in the case of a treaty or agreement, there is a definite act binding on nations just as much as on individuals. Nor must nations any more than individuals be deemed incapable of acting from any higher motive than interest; nor are they mere organizations of individuals, but they have also a national life.

Grave errors may arise in practice from the neglect of these simple considerations. When politics are confounded with ethics or the state identified with the individual, the conditions of human society are ignored; legislation has a false aim: human law is superseded by a fiction of divine law: there are aspirations after the ideal which degenerate into feebleness and tyranny. The Utopias of ancient times often fall into the theoretical errors of which the confusions of spiritual and temporal, or erroneous theories of punishment in modern times are practical illustrations.

That the state was not a larger family or magnified individual was clearly understood by Aristotle (Pol. i. 1). In the political ideal of Plato the state and the individual are in closer union (*ἐγγύτερον ἀνδρὸς ἑνός*) than in fact and experience. In the same way, the lines which distinguish the Church and the members of the Church fade away in

such expressions as—'The kingdom of Heaven is within you.'

The idea of the individual as distinct from the state or family is not one of the earliest but one of the latest of human conceptions, not having yet emerged in ancient times from the unity of the family which expanded into the state.

ESSAY IV

VERACITY

Book II. 382 A ff.

Plato allows that a doctrine of economy or accommodation may be necessary for men in certain cases, but not for the Gods; the accommodations attributed to the Gods are really erroneous conceptions of the divine nature. Falsehood is permitted by him: (1) in dealing with enemies or madmen (I. 331 C); (2) for educational purposes, provided the falsehood be a moral one (II. 377 A ff.); (3) as an engine of state, to be used by the rulers only (III. 389 B, 414 B).

Moral philosophy in modern times has a stricter rule. Every one would agree that some points of divinity or philosophy are liable to be imperfectly apprehended; also that modes of thought vary in different ages and countries, or in different individuals, according to their education and natural powers. In the communication of one age with another, some degree of error or inaccuracy thus arises naturally. Nor would any one deny that instruction is often best conveyed through fiction, or that the rule of truth and falsehood is in a measure determined by the relations of men to one another, or that received opinions, however erroneous, cannot always be rudely and immediately set aside. But we refuse to admit that any man under any circumstances may tell or preach a lie; or that the rulers of states and churches are privileged to introduce artificial economies. Extreme cases, which are sometimes put, of justifiable, or more strictly speaking, excusable falsehood, may be fairly said to prove the rule.

ESSAYS

BY

PROFESSOR CAMPBELL

ESSAY I

ON THE STRUCTURE OF PLATO'S REPUBLIC AND ITS RELATION TO OTHER DIALOGUES.

I

On the Composition of the Republic.

THE Republic parts naturally into five sections, which are marked off with elaborate forms of transition by Plato himself. § 1.

1. Book I, in which the question concerning Justice is propounded, and the views of Socrates and of the Sophist are dramatically set in opposition.

2. Books II, III, IV, in which the question is put more seriously, and partly answered through the institution of the ideal State.

3. Books V, VI, VII, developing further the ideal of the State, and expounding (*a*) the community of goods and of marriage, (*b*) the supremacy of the philosopher, (*c*) the education of the philosopher-kings, reaching up to Dialectic and to the Idea of Good.

4. Books VIII and IX, supplying the reverse picture of the declension of States and Individuals from ideal perfectness, and concluding with the ideal of evil, as embodied in the tyrannical man. This is forcibly contrasted with the kingdom of Righteousness, which each man may seek to establish 'within his own clear breast.'

5. The tenth Book forms an appendix or conclusion to the whole work, in which (1) the exclusion of the poets from education is reaffirmed, and (2) (as in the Gorgias) the rewards of another life are added to the blessedness of the just and misery of the wicked in this life as already set forth.

§ 2. Parts 1 and 2 are intimately connected.

1. (B. I.) In conversation with Cephalus, who bases happiness on a moral and religious ground, so implying that the just are happy, Socrates raises the question 'What is Justice?' Polemarchus vainly tries to answer him. Thrasymachus interposes, and in arguing with him Socrates employs, (1) the analogy of the arts, especially of medicine and navigation; (2) the comparison of the Ruler to a Shepherd, suggested by an objection of Thrasymachus; (3) the notion of ξυμφέρον, utility or expediency, which recurs afterwards in various forms and applications; while (4) the extreme opposition of the tyrant to the true ruler is ironically hinted by anticipation.

2. (Bb. II, III.) The remarks of Glaucon and Adeimantus having shown that the question is not thus disposed of, Socrates undertakes to give his own account of the matter. Observing that the nature of Justice is first to be studied in the large letters, for this purpose he 'creates the State.' The principle of 'one member one function' is first laid down, then the state of primitive simplicity imagined,—then the introduction of luxury occasions the necessity for soldiers, who in accordance with the first principle must be trained and organized as a standing army. But the protectors of the State must not only be 'good haters' but true friends, and they must be chosen and educated accordingly.

The rules for their education, (1) in liberal culture, (2) in bodily exercises, are clearly set forth, with many pregnant observations scattered by the way; then the rulers are provisionally appointed, and the army is led out to its modest quarters, the whole people having been first imbued with the Phoenician 'lie.'

(B. IV.) The objection of Adeimantus, that the highest class

is not thus made the happiest, leads to reflexions on the desirableness of unity, the dangers of wealth and poverty, and other incidental topics, concluding with the establishment of religion on a national basis. Thus the still impending task of defining Justice is further delayed. But the time for it arrives at last, and amidst various references to the opening of the inquiry, Socrates calls for a 'light.' He then suggests the method of residues, by which in the discussion of the four cardinal virtues Justice is held in reserve. When her turn arrives, the importance of the critical moment is marked by the new image of huntsmen clustering round an impenetrable thicket. And when Justice in the State has been discovered, much yet remains to do. The analogy of State and Individual (the 'large and small letters') must be verified by proving that the Soul has parts corresponding to the classes in the State. This psychological question cannot really be determined without a higher method, i.e. without going beyond psychology to find the metaphysical basis of its distinctions; but it is for the present settled provisionally in the affirmative, and the definition of Justice in the individual as the harmonious action of the three parts of the soul, is at length obtained.

The continuity of the work so far is obvious, and is § 3.
assisted by many minute links, such as (1) the question of the profitableness of justice; (2) the allusion, in II. 357, to the description of medicine as a mode of money-making in I. 342, 346; (3) the power of doing good to friends (I. 334) and of pleasing the gods (I. 331) is claimed for Injustice in II. 362, 366; (4) Justice, according to Polemarchus (I. 333), is *ἐν τῷ κοινωνεῖν*,—this prepares for the suggestion (II. 372 A) that it is *ἐν χρείᾳ τινὶ τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους*; (5) the noble 'lie' in III. 414 B recalls the *ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ψεῦδος* of II. 382, III. 389.

The end of the dialogue (Bb. VIII–X) is also subtly joined to the beginning. The tyrant, set up by Thrasymachus as having the noblest life (B. I), is cast down to the depths of infamy in B. IX, and receives his final sentence in B. X, where the picture of the world below confirms the remark of

Cephalus in I. 330 D. The question of the profitableness of injustice, whether it escape or not the observation of gods and men, which had already become ridiculous at IV. 445 A, is finally dismissed in B. IX. B. VIII resumes the conclusion of B. IV. The avoidance of poverty and wealth, hinted in B. II. 372, and repeated in IV. 421, is elaborately enforced in Bb. VIII–IX; where also the division of the soul into *νοῦς*, *θυμός*, *ἐπιθυμία*, demonstrated in B. IV, is further developed and illustrated. This division is once more referred to in B. X, *sub init.*, although not without a reservation in favour of the unity of the soul (X. 612).

§ 4. But many students of Plato[1] have been struck by the fact that the central and cardinal portion of the Republic—the third act in which the drama culminates—takes the form of a digression,—an *ἐκτροπή*, as Plato himself describes it[2]. And some have not been contented with the obvious solution that this break in the conversation belongs to Plato's concealment of his art, like the palinode of the Phaedrus, the hiccough of Aristophanes in the Symposium, the casual inroad of Alcibiades in the same dialogue, the objections of Simmias and Cebes in the Phaedo, and other similar expedients. They have proceeded to remark on the absence of allusions to V–VII in the concluding books, VIII–X, as compared with the frequent and distinct allusions in VIII–X to I–IV, and have further observed that the references to I–IV which occur in the central portion, V–VII, have more the appearance of deliberate quotation than of the subtle continuity which binds together I–IV, or VIII–X, when taken separately. A. Krohn[3] also dwells on the difference of tone and of philosophical content between V–VII on the one hand and I–IV and VIII–X on the other.

According to Krohn, in those which he regards as the earlier books, I–IV, VIII–X, the work of Socrates, as described in Xenophon's Memorabilia, is continued on the same lines; the method is that of empirical psychology; the ruling

[1] See K. F. Hermann, *Geschichte und System der platonischen Philosophie*, 1839, pp. 536 foll.

[2] viii. 543 *πόθεν δεῦρο ἐξετραπόμεθα;*

[3] *Der Platonische Staat*, &c.

conception is that of φύσις, i.e. of Becoming; the word εἶδος is frequently employed, but (1) is applied only to the virtues and the parts of the Soul, and (2) these εἴδη are not transcendent, but 'innocently immanent[1],' and are merely modes of γένεσις. These books exhibit Plato in the light of a genial optimist, who thinks by a simple effort of construction to purify nature.

But in v–vii Plato is carried off from the conception of Nature, which still rules in the early part of B. v, into a transcendental, metaphysical region. This purely intellectual act begins with contemplating the ideas of Justice, Beauty, Goodness, &c., not now dynamically but statically, and distinguishing in each kind between the one and the many. Thus a step is made beyond the old Socratic opposition of knowledge and ignorance, and room is gained for δόξα, Opinion, as an intermediate faculty. From this point onward Plato advances on his intellectualizing course by leaps and bounds, until the Good is seen radiating from beyond the realm of Being. At each new stage the foregoing position is ignored. In the series νόησις διάνοια πίστις εἰκασία the crudeness of ἐπιστήμη δόξα ἀγνωσία is silently corrected. And in B. vii, according to this writer, who takes but slight reckoning of the great allegory, even the ideas are lost in the transcendent notion of the Absolute, as the supreme end of Dialectic.

In trying to account for the subsequent addition of Bb. v–vii, Krohn avails himself of a suggestion made by F. A. Wolf and repeated by Meineke, that Aristophanes in the Ecclesiazusae (B.C. 391) aimed his ridicule at the communistic scheme of Plato, of which some hint must therefore have been already published. It is probable enough that, when the comedy was brought out, some notion of 'the monstrous regiment of women' was already in the air[2]; but the only ground for supposing a personal reference is by no means firm. The

[1] 'Harmlos immanent.'

[2] The idea of a community of wives, such as Herodotus attributes to the Agathyrsi, was already familiar to Euripides. See the fragment of his Protesilaus (655 in Nauck) κοινὸν γὰρ εἶναι χρῆν γυναικεῖον λέχος.

name Aristyllos occurs in the play (l. 647, cp. Plutus, 314 [1]), and is twisted by Meineke into a diminutive of Aristocles, which was Plato's birth-name according to Diogenes Laertius —though if it were so he had changed it before the death of Socrates, as we know from the Phaedo. On such premises Krohn builds the assumption that the 'Socratic' books (I–IV, VIII–X) were written before B. C. 391, and that after this Plato re-edited the work with the addition of the ἐκτροπή (V–VII), at the opening of which he declares his defiance of *τὰ τῶν χαριέντων σκώμματα*. This whole process is supposed to have been completed before any other of the Platonic dialogues had been composed. All the greatest ones—'which alone we need care to vindicate,' are viewed as more advanced even than B. VI, and the rest are discarded as unimportant, having little, if any, philosophical significance. Dr. E. Pfleiderer, who more recently reaffirmed Krohn's theory in a modified form, conceives on the other hand that the shorter dialogues came out in the interval between the composition of I–IV, VIII–IX, and of V–VII, in which interval also, at some uncertain time, B. X was composed.

§ 5. Krohn's cavils have been answered in detail by Zeller in the last edition of his *History of Philosophy*, and in a Latin Monograph by B. Grimmelt (*De Reipublicae Platonis compositione et unitate:* Berlin, 1887). But although his reasonings are inconclusive, his book is noticeable on several grounds.

1. It recalls attention to many coincidences between the earlier books of the Republic and the Memorabilia of Xenophon, and thus accentuates anew the supremacy of the ethical motive in Plato's life and work. With equal acuteness and candour this critic himself supplies the link which binds the metaphysics of Book VI to the 'innocent' psychology of Book IV. He looks on Plato as throughout continuing the endeavour of Socrates, who strove to

[1] It also occurs in Attic inscriptions, C. I. I. 298, n. 169, 38. This makes for the reality of the name. The jest in Ar. Eccl. would have no point unless Aristyllos were personally repulsive, which his enemies cannot have said of Plato as a young man.

counteract the disintegrating tendencies of the age. The Platonic ideas were at first merely the result of moral forces recognized by an empiric optimism. By and by, however, they assumed (*a*) a logical and (*b*) a transcendent aspect. In the former stage (*a*) moral conceptions are co-ordinated with mathematical, but in the sequel (*b*) it is found that Plato's main interest throughout has been to establish the indefeasible regulative value of moral truth, and that his guiding principle is one of ethical teleology, which his imperfect knowledge of Nature led him to blend with a vague cosmology.

2. Krohn's thesis and the controversy to which it gave rise have brought into relief some inequalities in the structure of the Republic, which, whether accidental or intentional, are really there. But his argument proves too much for his case. For, if Plato had at any time regarded the education of Books II and III as adequate, or had ever been contented with the psychological method of Book IV, instead of setting out from the point reached by Socrates, he would have fallen behind it. No Socratic dialogue, even in Xenophon, is without an appeal to reason, which is conspicuously absent here. Socrates drew a sharp line of distinction between Knowledge and Ignorance, and aimed simply at basing life on an ideal of Knowledge. Plato in these books provides for that which the method of Socrates excludes;—a life grounded on true opinions, which are determined by a rational authority and moulded by education. If instead of taking the dialogue piece-meal after Krohn's fashion, the description of the 'first state' is regarded as an integral portion of a larger whole, it reveals a conception not only in advance of the purely Socratic point of view, but also passing beyond the paradoxical attitude which Plato himself assumed when he raised the question whether virtue could be imparted otherwise than scientifically. Such a positive conception is only rendered possible by the conception of the state considered as a complex whole,—a constructive notion not anticipated in 'Socratism.' This will appear more clearly by and by in studying the relation of the Republic to the Protagoras and Meno. See below, p. 23.

3. The idea of Nature is more pervasive in the Platonic writings than Krohn is willing to admit (see Essay on Diction). The fact is that while pure 'dialectic' remains to the last an unrealized ideal, a fresh appeal to experience is continually made. At the height of the intellectual argument (vi. 506 D, E, vii. 533 E) Socrates will only go where he can take Glaucon with him. That there is some disparity between the ethical and the metaphysical books of the Republic is undeniable; the attributes of the philosophic nature are not the four cardinal virtues, nor in the series νοῦς διάνοια πίστις εἰκασία is there any recognition of the other series νοῦς θυμὸς ἐπιθυμία. But this independent treatment of different aspects of the truth is quite in the manner of Plato, and it is best to take his own account of the matter, and to say that in the earlier books it was necessary to proceed provisionally, because the true philosophers had not yet been distinguished from the false, nor had the intellectual kingdom been revealed. In passing from the lower to the higher education, and from the mere guardian or soldier to the philosopher-king, he has entered on another region of thought, and is no more compelled to continue the same method than a poet feels bound to continue the same rhythm in passing from a dramatic to a lyrical strain. In Books viii–x we descend again into the ethico-political region, and the emotional elements (which had no place in the intellectual argument) naturally reappear.

4. Krohn should be accepted as an independent and competent witness to the comparative lateness of the dialectical dialogues. His remarks on the Sophist and Philebus in their relation to the Republic are especially acceptable. For the coincidences between the Philebus and Rep. Book vi, on which Zeller lays so much stress, do not really bear out his conclusion that the Philebus is the earlier writing. It may be argued with at least equal probability, that the longer and more elaborate statement of Plato's theory of pleasure was subsequent to the cursory indication of it. See below, p. 22.

5. Plato himself has noticed the discrepancy between Bb. iii and v, with regard to the appointment of the rulers and

had prepared for it by the qualifying expression (III. 414) ὡς ἐν τύπῳ, μὴ δι' ἀκριβείας, εἰρῆσθαι. In the original constitution of the State, before the higher education had been divulged, the elder guardians were made to rule the younger. But now that the rulers are to be trained for dialectic, it is necessary to make the selection while they are still young. It does not follow that they are to rule while very young, for the training is a long one, and they are not to be admitted, even to military commands, until thirty-five; still the first provisional order is superseded by the necessities arising out of the principle that kings shall be philosophers, which has been subsequently introduced.

Precisely the same difficulty is encountered by the founders of the colony from Cnossus in the Sixth Book of the Laws. The Athenian stranger explains to them that the first appointment of the νομοφύλακες and other magistrates cannot possibly conform to the regulations as to selection and training which are to be afterwards in force (Laws VI. 751 C, D). And one of the cautions imposed by this necessity is analogous to that enjoined in Republic, Book III. The men selected to nominate the rulers are to be the eldest as well as the best, so far as possible (εἰς δύναμιν Laws VI. 754 C). This comparison of the two writings places the superficiality of Krohn's objection in a strong light[1].

The unity of the Republic is not that of a syllogistic § 6.

[1] The following passage is characteristic both of Krohn's acuteness and of his illogical logic (*Der Plat. Staat*, p. 107, ed. 1876) :—

'Hier wird der grosse Riss des Platonismus sichtbar. Der moralisirende Sokratiker hatte den ersten Entwurf geschrieben, der Metaphysiker fand eine wahrere Wesenheit. Beide treffen jetzt kämpfend auf einander, Beide verleugnen sich nicht. Der Reformer, der die Krankheit seines Volkes heilen will, muss glauben und vertraut der eigenen Kunst: aber mit der Substanz unter verfliessenden Formen besiegelt der Denker seinen Verzicht. Instinktmässig zieht der Eine die Idee auf die Erde, um sie zu gestalten, in bewusster Erkenntniss hebt sie der Andere in ein intelligibles Reich. *Aber dieser Riss des Platonismus ist der Riss, der durch das Leben aller edelen Geister geht. Sie wirken hier mit ihrer besten Kraft und wissen, dass das Hier ein flüchtiges Etwas ist.*'

This is really to say that Plato's philosophy has a body as well as a mind. But if such an antinomy is so deeply inherent in Platonism, why deny that a work in which it is found was written continuously?

treatise, but partly the unity of a philosophical movement or development and partly of a piece of literary art. Students of the Phaedo, Symposium, Phaedrus, Theaetetus, should be aware that it is Plato's way in the earlier stages of any exposition to hold much strictly in reserve. His method is 'regressive,' as it has been termed, continually passing from a partial or superficial view of the subject in hand, to another which he regards as more complete or more profound; ascending, as he himself would say, from hypothesis to hypothesis in the approach towards absolute truth. Whether the lower hypothesis is refuted, as in the Theaetetus, or discarded by a seemingly capricious impulse, as in the Phaedrus, is merely a question of form. The words of Socrates (Theaet. 187 A) are equally applicable in both cases—*ὅρα δὴ νῦν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, πάντα τὰ πρόσθεν ἐξαλείψας, εἴ τι μᾶλλον καθορᾷς, ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα προελήλυθας.*

In the Republic, as in the Phaedo, the disciples suggest difficulties which provoke the master into disclosing what he has so far kept in the background. The gradual evolution of the thought by this means is not referable to the incoherence of an unformed thinker, but to the most deliberate literary and philosophical design. To imagine Plato as in any single dialogue himself groping tentatively along the path by which he conducts his reader, or like the guide across the ford (Theaet. 200 E) taking his audience with him into depths which he has not explored, is an error no less grave than to suppose with Schleiermacher and others, that the whole body of the dialogues, the work of fifty years, was composed according to a preconcerted plan. It argues a strange insensibility both to the irony and the dialectical economy of Plato, that any one should take literally such expressions as 'whither the argument like a breeze may carry us, on that course we must proceed.' Such words express the spirit of the catechetical mode of exposition; but only a blind simplicity can believe the master serious when he professes not to know the way.

Another general feature of Plato's discourse has not been sufficiently noticed, and it is this:—the most elaborate dis-

cussion of the higher aspects of metaphysical or psychological truth does not prevent the recurrence of crude statements essentially inconsistent with the results so gained. Observe, for example, how the mythical doctrine of pre-existence is resumed in the Politicus, notwithstanding the clear dialectic of the Theaetetus and Sophist which has avowedly come between.

The unity of the Republic as a literary masterpiece hardly § 7.
needs defence. Each part has its own climax of interest, and, in spite of the intentional breaks and digressions, or rather with their aid, there is a continuous rise and fall,—as in a tragedy,—pervading the whole work.

The *peripeteia* of the drama is made by the revelation of the truth about the philosopher-king, which is disclosed, after being purposely held back by the digression on the laws of War, and by the 'coy excuses' of Socrates, precisely at the middle point of the dialogue. (The culmination of the earlier portion in the definition of Justice had been similarly heightened by ingenious delays.) The breaking of this 'third wave of the τρικυμία' of course overwhelms Glaucon with surprise. That is the rhetorical artifice. But the attentive reader of the preceding books should not be wholly unprepared for the discovery. What else is implied by the identification of ἀρχή with ἐπιστήμη in I. 342, III. 389? or by the true ruler who is unwilling to rule, I. 346, cp. VII. 520? or by the few wise men through whose wisdom the State is wise (IV. 428)? The supremacy of reason is a Socratic principle which could not be absent from any part or aspect of Plato's Commonwealth. A similar outburst of astonishment marks the importance of the discovery that the education of the philosopher is to be carried up to the Idea of Good. That is the culminating point of this central portion, which developes the intellectual and philosophical ideal. But for this surprise also there had been some preparations in the earlier books. The 'Fables' for which rules are given in Bb. II, III, are characterized in 376 E as containing elements of truth. And although this remark is merely dropped by the way, the rules themselves are determined by the motive that when the age of reason

comes, the truth may be accepted, because it harmonizes with the legends that were learned in childhood (402 A). The child so trained will have been made familiar with the elementary forms of goodness (*σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ ἐλευθεριότητος . . . καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφά*)[1], and may hope therefore to attain to true *μουσική*. And while the *τύποι θεολογίας* are thus a reflexion of the Form of Good, the law of simplicity in education and even the division of labour are associated with the philosophical coception of Abstract Unity. Lastly, the psychology of B. IV is avowedly provisional—those who would discuss the Soul and virtue adequately must go round by the 'longer way.' (This thread is explicitly resumed in VI. 503 A.) And the definition of courage, in particular, is limited by the term *πολιτική*, thus reserving a place for the intellectual courage and fortitude of the philosopher, who regards human life as a little thing and is dauntless and indefatigable in the pursuit of truth.

§ 8. Those who would break up the Republic have not observed that Bb. V–VII are linked to the preceding book by the image of a 'sea of difficulty.' The first hint of this is given at IV. 435 C, by the word *ἐμπεπτώκαμεν*, which is followed up by *ταῦτα μόγις διανενεύκαμεν* ib. 441 C. This renders less abrupt the image in V. 453 D (*ἄν τέ τις εἰς κολυμβήθραν μικρὰν ἐμπέσῃ ἄν τε εἰς τὸ μέγιστον πέλαγος μέσον, ὅμως γε νεῖ οὐδὲν ἧττον*), which gives distinct note of preparation for the continued metaphor (457 B *ἓν ὥσπερ κῦμα φῶμεν διαφεύγειν—ὥστε μὴ παντάπασι κατακλυσθῆναι*, 472 A *μόγις μοι τὼ δύο κύματε ἐκφυγόντι νῦν τὸ μέγιστον καὶ χαλεπώτατον τῆς τρικυμίας ἐπάγεις*, 473 C *εἰρήσεται δ' οὖν, εἰ καὶ μέλλει γέλωτί τε ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ κῦμα ἐκγελῶν καὶ ἀδοξίᾳ κατακλύσειν*). Socrates reverts to the figure implied in IV. 441 C, although the image of a 'swarm of arguments' (V. 450 B) had come between.

§ 9. One point affecting the structure of the Republic, which requires careful elucidation, is connected with the famous allegory of the cave at the opening of B. VII,—the passage

[1] It has been observed that this enumeration comes nearer to the list of philosophic attributes in B. VI than to the Cardinal Virtues.

which suggested the 'idola specus' to the mind of Bacon. At the end of B. VI, the Platonic Socrates had shadowed forth a hierarchy of pure ideas, constituting the supra-sensual kingdom of being and truth, presided over and vitalized by the supreme Form of Good. This is not only a turning point of the Republic, but may be regarded as marking a critical moment in the development of Platonism. The 'Reason of the Best' is said indeed in the Phaedo to be the Atlas of the World, and true causes to be more effectually approached through the examination of language and thought than through external nature; but in that dialogue there is no such clear vision of an ideal unity of knowledge as is here given. In the Phaedrus-myth the forms of Justice and Holiness appear to be raised on lofty pedestals above the rest. And it is shown that to be man at all one must understand general notions abstracted from sense. But there is no well-defined path of ascent from the first or primary generalization of experience to the height of moral vision. Now in the Republic, the conception of such an ascent is formulated in the concluding passage of B. VI, and carried further in B. VII. Plato here anticipates that gradation of mental stages, and that remotion of the Divine from Man, which, as will be presently shown, is increasingly characteristic of the later, or more constructive, phase of his philosophy.

But in passing onwards from the conclusion of B. VI to the allegory of B. VII, the ground is insensibly shifted, as the idealizing impulse gathers strength, so that not only the distinction between πίστις and εἰκασία is dropped (since from the higher point of view the sensible world consists entirely of images)[1], *all* ordinary experience being now merged in εἰκασία,

[1] Professor E. Caird writes as follows on this passage:—

'1. I do not think it need cause us any difficulty to find the whole visible world viewed as standing in the same relation to the whole intelligible world as the parts in each do to each other, after we have been told that the former is the "offspring and likeness" of the latter. In fact this gives us three pairs standing to each other as image to reality:

$$1 : 2 :: 2 : 4 :: 3 : 6$$
$$a : b :: c : d :: (a + b) : (c + d).$$ That is

εἰκασία : πίστις :: διάνοια : νόησις :: τὸ ὁρώμενον : τὸ νοούμενον.

but the actual scientific processes which rank with *διάνοια* in B. VI are now degraded to the level of ordinary experience. The geometers, the astronomers, the 'empiric' harmonists, are all found guilty of the same error, that of not rising beyond and above sensible things and narrow everyday utilities. They are still tied and bound, still watching the fleeting shadows on the wall of the den.

§ 10. The passage now to be considered extends from VI. 504 to VII. 519. The difficulty of interpretation is increased by the fact that Plato's exposition here is avowedly imperfect, being (1) relative to the immediate purpose of the dialogue, and (2) figurative from beginning to end.

Much turns on the significance of VI. 511 A, especially the words *εἰκόσι δὲ χρωμένην αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπεικασθεῖσι.* (Cp. VII. 532 C.) That *αὐτοῖς* here designates not the ideas but merely sensible objects as distinguished from their shadows, is proved by comparing supr. 510 E *αὐτὰ μὲν ταῦτα,*

'2. I suppose the difficulty in the case of the artificial figures lies in this, that it is not real beings whose shadows are seen in the cave, but marionettes, and that therefore the process of rising to true knowledge involves *two* steps: first to turn from the shadows to the marionettes, and then to discover that they are merely artificial figures, and to turn from them to the realities they copy. What Plato would suggest by this is I think, that individual things are not seen as what they are, till we have turned away from their first appearance and tried to define them. Then we find, as Plato shows in the 5th book, that they cannot be defined. They are great or small, good or bad according to the reference in which they are viewed. We thus discover that they are *σκευαστά*, combinations of elements which have no real unity, but are merely imitations of real things. We are therefore obliged to go up to the intelligible world in order to find real things, first in the sciences under their subordinate principles, and finally in dialectic which sees all things in the light of the highest principle of knowledge and reality ("sees all things in God").

'3. The sciences are conceived by Plato as starting with principles, which are hypothetical in the sense that they have not been carried back to the *first* principle. He further adds that, when this is the case, science has to help its deductions by employing sensible images: in other words he thinks that, when we do not carry back knowledge to its first principle, we are obliged, in Kantian language, to use the *Anschauung* to supply the defects of the *Begriff*, and to make demonstration possible. This is illustrated by the mathematical use of diagrams, in which we prove universal truths by means of the particular image we set before us.

'I think the principles in question are not merely the principles of mathematics, though it is the type of mathematical science that is present to Plato, and on which he conceives the other sciences to be constructed.'

ἃ πλάττουσί τε καὶ γράφουσιν, ὧν καὶ σκιαὶ καὶ ἐν ὕδασιν εἰκόνες εἰσί, τούτοις μὲν ὡς εἰκόσιν αὖ χρώμενοι, κ.τ.λ.

It follows that the ὑπόθεσις is a scientific proposition, the subject of which is not the sign but the thing signified; while the εἰκών is a sensible object, employed as the symbol of the abstraction which is the subject of such a proposition. The visible square symbolizes the ideal square, whose properties are to be mathematically determined. Διάνοια, then, in B. VI, is the intellectual process, which, starting from hypotheses (of which mathematical assumptions are the clearest example) works out results through the *mediation* of sensible figures, plane (διαγράμματα) or solid (πλάσματα).

This general view is not forgotten in the discussion of the particular sciences. Astronomy, for example, *ought* to be a process of true διάνοια, but the actual astronomers, like the actual geometers, misunderstand the case so far that they think their science has for its object the visible revolutions of the stars, and not the laws of motion which these typify.

The higher aspect of διάνοια remains as a process intermediate between sense and knowledge, but in B. VII is represented by a new image, that of the upward path, rugged and steep, from the cave into the light of day. What meanwhile becomes of the σκευαστά and of the light of the fire? This part of the figure, involving as it does a dualism from which Plato was working himself free, is almost lost sight of in what follows, being only cursorily alluded to as a part of the circumstances of the cave. It is a provisional 'hypothesis,' which Plato discards (ἀναιρεῖ) in pressing onwards and upwards. But in its place this feature also of the allegory must have its own significance, and Socrates himself gives a partial interpretation of it by saying that the light of the fire represents the power of the Sun. There is some confusion, however, even here; for the objects seen by the denizens of the cave are not lights but shadows. What, then, are the things of which our unenlightened consciousness perceives only the shadows? What are the ἀγάλματα σκευαστά, the 'manufactured articles,'

which hands unseen exhibit between the prisoners and the artificial (i.e. created) Sun? What else but the realities of *γένεσις*, Nature as the embodiment of the ideas, the facts of human experience, as they really happen, and not as they seem?

1. Plato is engaged in bringing out a twofold distinction, (1) between Nature and the Ideas, (2) between Appearance and Reality in Nature. This, and not merely the requirement of a fourth term for his analogy, was his motive for separating *πίστις* from *εἰκασία*.

2. The *ἀγάλματα* are not themselves immediately perceived by sense at all. It is only when the individual mind has been freed by Socratic questioning, and turned about, and asked What is it? (*τί ἐστι;*),—or, in more Platonic language, by a process of *διαίρεσις* and *συναγωγή*,—only, in more modern terminology, when some effort is made to distinguish, abstract, and generalize,—that the soul begins to have an inkling of the nature of that world, which was dimly represented to her in crude experience,—of a real finger, of a real square, of the Sun himself as an embodied god, &c. And she learns that these things, however perfect in their kinds (VII. 529 E), have been created after some higher pattern,—in other words, that their being is determined by universal and eternal Laws, and ultimately by the Law of the Best,—*τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέᾳ*. While not absolute *νοητά*, they are *νοητὰ μετὰ ἀρχῆς* (VI. *sub fin.*). It is not improbable that in this part of the allegory there is still some reference to the *διάνοια* of B. VI as a process intermediate between sense and reason. But the 'manufactured articles' here exhibited by unseen powers correspond, not to the *εἰκόνες* of the geometers, for example, but to the realities typified by them. Those *πλάσματα* and *διαγράμματα* were only shadows and copies of these, which answer more nearly to the subjects of their *ὑποθέσεις*.

3. In the Timaeus, the true phenomena of nature are attributed to the created gods, who are said to make and set in order the living creatures in whom soul and body are temporarily combined (Tim. 43). Similarly, the *παραφέροντες*, who are clearly *δαίμονες*, exhibit the *σκευαστά* here.

4. The ἀγάλματα or εἴδωλα of the allegory constitute a lower stage of the ideal which in Plato's language is alone the real, not the immediately visible, but the truth of phenomena, the ἓν ἐπὶ πολλῶν ἑκάστων τῶν αἰσθητῶν, the *infima species*, the first intention of the ἓν λογισμῷ ξυναιρούμενον.

Now these realities of γένεσις, τὰ φύσει ξυνεστηκότα, of which the shadows or impressions are presented to the uneducated mind, are not really known until we get above and behind them. Then they are seen to be themselves the images or copies (εἴδωλα) of higher things, and the mind reaches beyond them and lays hold on the primal cause of being and of knowing, the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

May not this notion of a 'lower stage' help to remove the difficulty which is felt in seeking to reconcile the αὐτοκλίνη of B. x with the higher teaching of B. vi? For the purpose of degrading the poets it is not necessary to mount to the ἀνυπόθετον or to the Form of Good. It is enough to have risen from shadows to objects, and from objects to their first abstraction—to the truth of γένεσις. The painted bed is the shadow of the actual bed, which is made after the pattern of the ideal bed. This we are 'disposed' (as Platonists) to say that God has made and set in nature (ἐν τῇ φύσει). But God made that, as he made the world, under the guidance of yet loftier ideals, the ideal of utility, of rest, of stability, of security, of permanence, of symmetry. However this may be, Plato's views of ontology, as seriously held by him at the time of writing the Republic, are to be gathered rather from Bb. vi, vii, than from B. x, where the reference to the doctrine of ideas is merely illustrative.

And it is worth observing that while mathematical truths are put in the forefront amongst the objects of 'hypothetical science,' because they are the most definite and distinct, moral notions are by implication co-ordinated with these. The fact is rendered manifest by the words in 517 E, where the disputants in the den are said to argue περὶ τῶν τοῦ δικαίου σκιῶν ἢ ἀγαλμάτων ὧν αἱ σκιαί, i.e. 'impressions about right, or rules of right,' the latter (τὸ νόμιμον) holding an intermediate place between abstract Justice (αὐτὸ

τὸ δίκαιον) and the actual constitutions of states in the world (*τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις νόμιμα*). This intermediate position of *τὸ νόμιμον* as *ἄγαλμα τοῦ δικαίου* may be compared to the function ascribed to Law in the Politicus. Compare also vi. 501 *πρός τε τὸ φύσει δίκαιον καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο αὖ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις*.

§ 11. Bb. viii–x, as already indicated, have less in common with vi–vii than with the earlier portion. It does not follow that they are unconnected with what immediately precedes them: still less that they could be read continuously after B. iv without leaving a deplorable gap. The 'number of the state' in viii. 546 is from a 'laboratory' of which Bb. i–iv afford no trace. And in contrasting the pleasures of the tyrant with the happiness of the philosopher-king, the account of the higher education is manifestly presupposed. The hope of conforming the individual life
x. 592 B. to the 'pattern in the sky' precisely answers to that which is left to the actual philosopher of B. vi, who lets the
vi. 496 D. storm rage past him, and strives to imitate the regular courses of the stars[1]. But the later books have also a special tone and quality of their own. If Bb. vi, vii carry us to a height of intellectual contemplation that is unsurpassed, Bb. viii, ix are even more impressive in the depth of ethical feeling which they convey. The growing intensity of earnestness, as state after state, man after man, discloses a lower circle or stage of evil, is incomparably grand, and it is expressed with extraordinary wealth and happiness of imagination. The effect is not less different from the serene and smiling optimism of Bb. iii, iv, than from the speculative abstraction of Bb. vi, vii. And when the return

[1] See Eur. Fr. Inc. 902 (N.):—

ὄλβιος ὅστις τῆς ἱστορίας
ἔσχε μάθησιν,
μήτε πολιτῶν ἐπὶ πημοσύνην
μήτ' εἰς ἀδίκους πράξεις ὁρμῶν,
ἀλλ' ἀθανάτου καθορῶν φύσεως
κόσμον ἀγήρω, πῇ τε συνέστη
καὶ ὅπῃ καὶ ὅπως.
τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοις οὐδέποτ' αἰσχρῶν
ἔργων μελέτημα προσίζει.

is made, towards the end of B. IX, from the life of the tyrant to that of the king, the philosopher is invested with new majesty. The continuity of this portion (the fourth act of the drama) is assisted by the recurrence of a few great topics, each of which is gradually amplified: (1) Wealth and poverty; (2) the three principles of intellect, anger, desire, corresponding to the ruling, defending, and industrial classes in the State; (3) the necessary and unnecessary desires; (4) the image of the drones, stinging and stingless (i. e. rogues and paupers), leading up to the description of the tyrant's master passion as a great winged drone; (5) the insurrection in the soul (an image which intensely vivifies the analogy between the individual and the State); (6) the relation of the tyrant to the *Demos* represented as that of son to father; (7) the image of the man and beasts within the man—the lion and the serpent and the many-headed brute. The management of these notions and successive images so as to characterize the evolution of ever fresh aspects of social and personal life, is most curious and instructive, even as a literary study[1].

At the beginning of B. X, Socrates reviews his creation § 12.
and finds it good. The point immediately resumed is the exclusion of the poets—which occasioned Plato more compunction than the community of wives; but, in returning to the discussion, he, as usual, takes up new ground, and glances at the conversation which has intervened. Although the allegory of the cave is not distinctly referred to, yet in defining μίμησις it is now permissible to assume the existence of an ideal world, and to speak of the artist as the maker of shadows of images, thrice removed from reality and truth. And, as Socrates says explicitly, the psychological distinctions of Bb. IV, IX, enable us now to affirm that these unrealities appeal to the lower part of the soul, i.e. to emotion and not

[1] When tested by statistical evidence, i.e. by the presence or frequency of particular modes of expression, the eighth and ninth Books are found to have as many features in common with Plato's later writings as any other part of the Republic. See Constantin Ritter's *Untersuchungen*, &c., pp. 33-47.

to reason, so rendering more difficult that control of the feelings and that abnegation of pleasure, which has been shown to be of the essence of virtue.

Thus Plato leads us back to the main question:—the intrinsic value of justice, independently of reputation and reward. Socrates claims to have established this; and now begs leave to restore what for the sake of argument had been taken away, the outward happiness attending a good life. And to crown all, he makes known the immortality of the Soul, and the future blessedness of the just: to which is added, as the natural counterpart, the punishment of the wicked[1]—the tyrannical tyrant in chief.

§ 13. Accepting the Republic from the hand of Plato as an artistic whole, we refuse to examine curiously into the exact time when the several parts were written. That the central portion may have been written last is a possibility which we neither affirm nor deny. Such speculations lie beyond the scope of criticism. That on the Republic, with all its comprehensiveness and variety, the author has impressed an unmistakable unity of design, is a proposition which no mature and sober student is likely to dispute.

II

The Republic considered in relation to other dialogues of Plato.

§ 14. From the fulness and range of its contents, and especially from the combination of moral and political with purely intellectual elements in its composition, the Republic has more affinities with other writings of Plato than are to be found elsewhere in any single dialogue.

Gorgias. To the Gorgias it stands in a close and peculiar relation. For the longer writing is in fact an elaborate endeavour to substantiate that supremacy of right, which Socrates so

[1] This has been thought inconsistent with III. 386 ff. What Plato there deprecates is the fear of death. Here he is enforcing the fear of sin. Cp. Laws V. 727 D *τὰ γὰρ ἐν Ἅιδου πράγματα πάντα κακὰ ἡγουμένης τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι ὑπείκει καὶ οὐκ ἀντιτείνει, κ.τ.λ.* The words in III. 387 C *ἴσως εὖ ἔχει πρὸς ἄλλο τι* possibly refer to the other aspect of the truth.

eloquently vindicates in refuting Gorgias and Polus. The Gorgias asserts the claims of justice. The Republic reiterates the claim and adds a definition. The counsel of perfection, 'Do right in scorn of consequences,' leaves the disciple of Socrates unsatisfied, until he finds an answer to the question 'What is right?' And this can only be obtained through the study of Man in Society. In the Republic, accordingly, the social environment of the higher life is elaborately set forth; and this constitutes a real and at first sight a very wide distinction between the two dialogues. But the difference appears less when it is considered that Plato's Commonwealth is an ideal projected into the future, and that the philosopher in the Republic, like Socrates in the Gorgias, takes no part in actual politics, but 'stands under the shelter of a wall' and lets the storm of unrighteousness VI. 496 D.
rage past him.

In Bb. I–IV of the Republic, the most characteristic positions of the Gorgias are restated and developed further. Thrasymachus may be described as a magnified and more original Polus, and like Polus he is tongue-tied at last, through fear of opinion[1]. Then, in place of the thorough-going cynicism of Callicles, who speaks openly what other men implicitly believe, the brothers Glaucon and Adeimantus give their clear philosophic exposition of the worldly principles from which their generous natures instinctively recoil. The theory, although put differently, is in both dialogues essentially the same,—that Might is Right, and that Justice (as Shakespeare's royal villain says of Conscience)

> 'is but a word that cowards use,
> Devised at first to keep the strong in awe.'

The sophistical paradox is associated in both dialogues with admiration of the tyrant as the one strong man, who by trampling upon so-called rights secures his interest and asserts his power. Adeimantus, however, introduces a new element into the discussion, when he says that the praise of Justice, as commonly enforced, is no less immoral than the

[1] I. 352 B ἵνα μὴ τοῖσδε ἀπέχθωμαι.

praise of Injustice,—that prudential morality encourages immorality.

The parallel between the Gorgias and the Republic,—not to touch on many minute coincidences, which are mentioned in the notes to this edition,—extends also to the vision of judgement with which both dialogues alike conclude, and which in the Gorgias, although briefer, is even more vivid and terror-striking than the tale of Er. The description of the tyrant's soul, naked before her judge, contains some hints of the conception of the last state of the tyrannical man, which is elaborated towards the end of the ninth book of the Republic.

Cp. Rep. I. 349.

The Gorgias also agrees with the Republic in assuming an intellectual or scientific basis for morality (Gorg. 508 A *σὺ δὲ πλεονεξίαν οἴει δεῖν ἀσκεῖν· γεωμετρίας γὰρ ἀμελεῖς*), and in the rejection of Hedonism.

Which dialogue came first in order of composition? The question is perhaps an idle one, and in the absence of adequate external evidence the answer must necessarily be uncertain. But some grounds may be adduced for the opinion that the Republic was planned after the Gorgias was written. The shorter dialogue has, comparatively speaking, some of the crudeness and also of the freshness of a sketch contrasted with an elaborate picture. The impressive figure of 'Socrates against the world' is softened, in the more finished work, with a halo of ideal optimism. 'The world is not unreasonable, could it but hear reason,' is a note that would have sounded strange in the presence of Callicles. The companion portraits of the Just and Unjust Man are completed, in the Republic, by filling in their imaginary surroundings.

Taking either dialogue as a whole, it may be fairly argued that the assertion, 'A right will is all in all,' which is the upshot of the Gorgias, is naturally previous to the inquiry, 'What is essential rectitude? and how is righteous action possible?'

§ 15. Philebus.

It has been assumed by Schleiermacher and Zeller that the passages of B. VI, where the claims of Thought and

Pleasure are contrasted (505–509, see also IX. 581–587), presuppose the composition of the Philebus. The coincidence is obvious, but not less so is the comparative simplicity of the point of view advanced in the Republic. It is possible that the principles here briefly stated may have been previously elaborated. But it is by no means necessary to assume that it was so. And it is at least equally conceivable that Plato had arrived at this general conception of the relative worth of Pleasure, Thought, and the Good, before giving to it the full and complex expression which the Philebus contains. If the assertion of Justice is held to precede the definition of Justice, it may be similarly maintained that the solemn adumbration of the Idea of Good precedes the laboured attempt to seize this Supreme Form (and, as it were, 'confine the Interminable'[1]) through metaphysical determinations. But the position of the Philebus in the series of the Platonic writings is part of the larger question of the place to be assigned to the other dialectical dialogues, to which it is manifestly akin. Some observations pertinent to this subject will be made in the sequel.

The Republic provides an approximate solution of the difficulty paradoxically raised in the Protagoras, and imperfectly met in the Meno by the theory of 'inspiration,' viz. the question 'How is virtue possible without perfect knowledge?' In the Republic, Science is more strenuously than ever asserted to be the basis of well-ordered life, but in all except the Rulers it is unconsciously so. By selecting the right natures for the reception of Culture, by the reformation (1) of mental, and (2) of physical education, the predominance of Virtue is secured even in those not yet capable of Reason, so that they may ultimately embrace her the more readily, because they have nothing irrational to unlearn. Thus the conception of the State affords the means of reconciling an opposition, which, as we learn from the Protagoras, tended to hinder, by making it seem impossible, the application of Philosophy to the bettering of human life. Protagoras professed to benefit his pupils by promoting their attainment of § 16. Protagoras, Meno.

[1] Milton.

that civic and social excellence which was shared in some degree by all the citizens of a civilized community, and which the primary education of Greek freemen was already calculated to foster, in evolving those seeds of Justice and of mutual respect which had been scattered broadcast at the remote origin of human society. Socrates denies that such a process deserves the name of teaching, or that the virtue thus communicated is really virtue. He makes the seemingly impossible requirement that a science of exact measurement should be applied to human life and action. Now the philosopher of the Republic is in possession of such a science, and he is entrusted with the control of primary education. Thus the unconscious, relative, approximate virtue of the subordinate class, who again compel the obedience of those beneath them, is essentially grounded in philosophy. And the whole State is wise, although the wise amongst its citizens are still the few. The work professed by the Sophist is now undertaken by the Philosopher, with far better assurance of a solid foundation.

§ **17.** Symposium and Phaedrus. It is more difficult to find the angle (if the figure may be allowed) at which the Republic stands towards those dialogues which symbolize philosophic enthusiasm under the form of Love. There are mystic passages in the Republic also, but in the work as a whole, what may be termed the ecstatic phase of Platonism is greatly toned down and subdued. Whether Plato is here addressing a wider audience, or has now entered on a further stage in the evolution of his thought, is a question by no means easy to determine. The points where some approximation to the spirit of the Phaedrus and Symposium occurs are chiefly two.

III. 403, 404. Even the earlier culture is not completed without a description of the modest loves of beautiful souls.

VI. 490 A, B. And in describing the philosophic nature, the love of truth is characterized in words which might have been used by Diotima :—*ὅτι πρὸς τὸ ὂν πεφυκὼς εἴη ἁμιλλᾶσθαι ὅ γε ὄντως φιλομαθής, καὶ οὐκ ἐπιμένοι ἐπὶ τοῖς δοξαζομένοις εἶναι πολλοῖς ἑκάστοις, ἀλλ' ἴοι καὶ οὐκ ἀμβλύνοιτο οὐδ' ἀπολήγοι τοῦ ἔρωτος, πρὶν αὐτοῦ ὃ ἔστιν ἑκάστου τῆς φύσεως ἅψασθαι ᾧ προσήκει*

ψυχῆς ἐφάπτεσθαι τοῦ τοιούτου· προσήκει δὲ ξυγγενεῖ· ᾧ πλησιάσας καὶ μιγεὶς τῷ ὄντι ὄντως, γεννήσας νοῦν καὶ ἀλήθειαν, γνοίη τε καὶ ἀληθῶς ζῴη καὶ τρέφοιτο καὶ οὕτω λήγοι ὠδῖνος, πρὶν δ' οὔ.

Essentially cognate to the same aspect of Platonism are the account of education as a development from within, the rising scale of Being, through sense, opinion, thought, and reason, to the idea of Good, recalling the stages leading to the ocean of Beauty in the Symposium; the upper air and sunshine of the ἀνυπόθετον in Bb. VI, VII, compared with the outer rim of Heaven in the Phaedrus-myth; the enthusiastic account of Dialectic, and the wanderings of the soul in B. X. The prayer to Pan and the Nymphs with which the Phaedrus ends, has, of course, many echoes in the Republic. Constantin Ritter, who has examined all the Dialogues by the 'statistical' method introduced by Dittenberger (in *Hermes* XVI, 1881), regards the Phaedrus and Theaetetus as belonging to the same period with the Republic. He is disposed to think that both were written while the Republic was in course of composition, and that the Theaetetus is the earlier of the two. This last opinion may be disputed on the following grounds:—

1. Not to dwell upon the signs of immaturity which some critics (Usener amongst others) have discovered in the Phaedrus, it appears inconceivable that Plato should have expressed the paradoxical preference of oral to written speech, at a time when he was himself actively engaged in preparing a written work so large and important as the Republic.

2. Those who attach any weight to L. Spengel's arguments —and some weight they certainly deserve—are bound to give the Phaedrus the earliest date which a comprehensive view of all the facts will admit. Whether the dialogue is earlier or later than Isocrates' περὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν, there are strong grounds for supposing it to have been written not long after the opening of the Academy.

3. The Theaetetus presents a matured harmony of thought and expression. The gravity of Theodorus, which tempers

the irrepressible playfulness of Socrates, is evidently in keeping with Plato's own deeper mood.

4. The soaring idealism of the Phaedrus, which reappears in the Republic, is likewise modified in the Theaetetus by an approach towards a rational psychology. This point will be further developed by and by.

§ 18. Phaedo. The doctrine of immortality (incidentally recognized in the Meno) is expressly maintained in the Phaedo, Phaedrus, and Republic. And while the line of proof is different in all three, the demonstration chosen in the Republic is closely allied to one of those in the Phaedo—that by which it is shown in answer to Simmias that the soul is not a harmony. (Phaedo 93.) The words of Socrates, (x. 611 B.) *ὅτι μὲν ἀθάνατον ψυχή, κἂν ἄλλαι φανεῖεν ἀποδείξεις, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ*, may or may not contain an allusion to the Phaedo, or to the Phaedo, Phaedrus, and Symposium in one. But it is at least tolerably clear that the Republic and Phaedo both belong to a stage of Platonism in which the doctrine of ideas had been distinctly formulated, while the logical and metaphysical bearings of the theory had not yet been thought out so clearly as in the period of which the Parmenides marks the opening stage. Coincidences between the Phaedo and Republic are the more significant, as the meditation of death is a different subject-matter from the supreme realization of life in the world.

§ 19. Theaetetus. There is a very close approximation both of style and substance between the most serious part of the Theaetetus (173–177) and Rep. vi, vii, although in the dialogue concerning knowledge, as in the Gorgias and Phaedo, the philosopher is described as withdrawn from action and as knowing nothing of his neighbour. In this he corresponds not to the King-philosopher of the Republic, but to the actual philosopher who is 'useless to his State,' who in his contemplation of realities has no time to look down on human affairs (vi. 500), and who seeing mankind replete with lawlessness is content to live apart, if only he can keep his own life pure. The contrast between the philosopher and the lawyer resembles also the description of the awkward plight of him who descends again out of the daylight into the glimmering den (vii. 517). Once

more, the nature of retribution is similarly conceived by Socrates in Theaet. 177 and by Adeimantus, while the ideal II. 363 E. pattern of the blessed life is similarly set forth in Theaet. 177, and in Rep. IX, *sub fin.* Such near agreement at once of matter and of tone as becomes perceptible on a repeated reading of these passages, albeit by no means a certain test, is more decisive than such chronological indications as the allusion to the battle of Megara (B.C. 394?), and the fact that Cleomenes, who was at that time king of Sparta, counted precisely twenty-five generations from Heracles (cp. Theaet. 175 A). These points, however clearly demonstrated, belong to the time assigned to the imaginary conversation. They cannot determine the date of its composition (except as giving a *terminus a quo*). On the other hand the dialectics of the Theaetetus evince a maturity of psychological reflexion, and a moderation and firmness of metaphysical handling, which had scarcely been attained by Plato when he wrote the Republic. This may of course be a deceptive appearance, attributable to the fact that in the larger dialogue the mind is taken off from abstract speculation, and plunged in politics and popular moralities. But there are considerations which point the other way, and which incline the balance in favour of placing the Theaetetus after rather than before the Republic.

1. The manner of approaching the subject through the criticism of earlier philosophies would seem to mark a distinct stage in the development of Plato's mind (cp. Soph. 246 ff.).

2. The allusion to the Parmenides seems to mark the Theaet. 183 E. Theaetetus as one of the same group with the Parmenides and Sophist. And in the statement of metaphysical ἀπορίαι the Theaetetus and Parmenides are companion dialogues.

3. The clear conception of Being, not-being, Unity, number, sameness, difference, similarity, diversity, as logical categories or ideas of relation, which comes out at Theaet. 184, 185, could hardly have been possible, while Plato held the doctrine of ideas in the crude and undeveloped form which is still implied in the Republic, and which the Parmenides for the first time showed to be unsatisfying.

4. The greater subtlety and accuracy of the psychological

distinction between ἐπιστήμη, δόξα, αἴσθησις, as compared with Rep. VI, *sub fin.*, and still more with the end of B. V, is also apparent, though here, too, the difference of subject may have involved disparity of treatment.

§ **20.** The further consideration of the dialectical dialogues must be postponed, until we have glanced at the Laws.

As was previously said (p. 22) with reference to the Philebus, the presumption thus raised can neither be substantiated nor set aside without taking into account the other dialectical dialogues, Parmenides, Sophistes, and Politicus. And for reasons which will presently become apparent, the consideration of these dialogues in their relation to the Republic must be postponed to some brief remarks on the great work which in subject-matter as well as in extent comes nearest to the Republic, viz. the Laws. As this dialogue, by those who acknowledge its genuineness, is admitted to be the last of Plato's writings, the contrast which it presents to the Republic is the more instructive, since difference may here be interpreted to imply some change. But the comparison must be made with caution. For two main points have to be borne in mind: (1) that Plato in the Laws is confessedly aiming only at the second best, and (2) that the work is doubly incomplete:—the composition of many portions is unfinished, and the question of Higher Education is expressly reserved, so that, to employ Plato's own metaphor (Laws VI. 752 A), the dialogue is without a head. The attempt to supply this latter defect in the Epinomis (according to a credible tradition, by Philip of Opus, the editor of the Laws) only shows how incapable Plato's immediate successors were of continuing what was most significant in his philosophy. The Platonism that survived the Master in the Old Academy was indeed

Ψυχὴ καὶ εἴδωλον, ἀτὰρ φρένες οὐκ ἔνι πάμπαν.

It may be argued, however, that both these peculiarities are indicative of changes in the philosopher's own mental attitude.

The very notion of a second-best in politics, of an aim worth striving for which yet falls short of the highest, is alien to the spirit of the Republic. Before entertaining such a notion Plato must have come to think that the realization of the Divine ideal was even more distant than in the fifth and

ninth books of the Republic he had declared it to be: that it was in fact impossible 'for such a creature as man in such a state as the present.'

Even in the Republic he had acknowledged that the State of primitive innocence could not last, and his ideal constitution presupposes the inevitableness of war. But in the Laws that constitution also, so far as it involved the principle of communism, is relegated to the reign of Cronos, and is declared to have been suited not for human government, but only for a theocracy. The Athenian Stranger finds it necessary to strike into the middle path between two extreme views: (1) that legislation is futile, seeing that 'time and chance happen unto all,' and (2) that God governs all things without the aid of man. The third or intermediate view is that human skill, taking advantage of opportunity, may imitate from afar off the principles of Divine action. And the opportunity now prayed for is one less unlikely than the union of philosophy and sovereignty in the same person. It is the conjunction of a 'temperate' sovereign with the wise legislator (Laws IV). Now such a change from 'optimism' to 'meliorism' cannot have taken place without a mental struggle. It must have cost Plato something, one would imagine, to discover that in his greatest work he had only been uttering a vain, though pious, aspiration,—ἄλλως εὐχαῖς ὅμοια λέγων. And of such a struggle, with the bitterness naturally accompanying it, there is very distinct evidence in the Politicus; where there is also a foreshadowing of the very solution arrived at in the Laws.

Through a skilful process of generalization and division, **§ 21.**
Socrates Junior has been led by the Eleatic Stranger to Politicus.
define Statesmanship as 'the art of man-herding,'—according to the figure repeatedly used by Socrates in the Republic. But on reflexion the image is found unsuitable to the actual state of the world, in which the work of tending mankind is shared by many functionaries besides the statesman or ruler. Not the human governor, but the divine superintendent of the Golden Age, may be thought to have included all these functions in his own person. Our science of politics must

condescend to the actual present world and distinguish more definitely between the art of government and the other modes of managing mankind.

This position is illustrated by the wonderful myth, in which a more serious effort is made, than was attempted in the Republic, to face the problem of the existence of evil. 'God alternately guides the world and lets it go.' There can be no doubt under which dispensation we are living. Amidst this anarchy, of which Zeus is the reputed lord, the only hope of improvement lies in cherishing some faint remembrance of the Divine Order which was once a reality. Occasionally this remembrance comes with exceptional clearness to the mind of the philosopher, who is the only law-giver. Happy is that portion of the human race, that, when he appears, is willing to listen to him, and to obey his precepts. But his time upon the earth is brief, and when he departs, like a physician going into a far country, he leaves a prescription behind him. In his absence, the only feasible rule is the observance of Law, which is better than caprice, though far inferior to the immediate rule of Mind.

§ **22.** It is sufficiently manifest how all this leads up to the point from which the Athenian Stranger makes his departure in counselling Cleinias and Megillus; although in the Politicus there is little as yet of the spirit of compromise, which appears in the Laws,—for example, in the partial adoption of election by lot, notwithstanding the often expressed scorn of Socrates.

Also in many isolated points the Statesman anticipates the Laws. (1) The distinction between oligarchy and democracy is regarded in both as non-essential. Either may be better or worse according as it is administered. And constitutional democracy is far better than unconstitutional oligarchy. (2) The *weaving together* of diverse elements in a State is a notion to which prominence is given in both dialogues; especially (3) in the provisions concerning marriage. And (4) as the name of Statesman is denied to the actual politicians in the Politicus, so the actual constitutions are contemptuously referred to in the Laws as the 'non-constitutions' (διὰ τὰς οὐ πολιτείας

ἐκείνας). They are not polities but parties. (5) The conception of an infinite past, by which Plato accounts for the growth of civilization, appears most distinctly in the Timaeus, Critias, Politicus and Laws (B. III).

Although the philosopher's practical scope has thus shifted, and numberless minute provisions are expressly made of a kind which the τρόφιμοι of the Republic were meant to discover for themselves, the reader of the Laws is often reminded of the leading thoughts of the Republic. Each individual, as far as possible, is to be not many but one. The definition of Justice, obtained with so much difficulty, is silently discarded, but Plato still glances with disfavour on the heretical view that Justice is conventional, and he still dwells on the phenomenon that self-preservation is the basis of *de facto* governments upheld by statute. At the same time he points out that no government is overthrown but by itself. The law of Charondas, by which the money-lender was left to take the risk of loss, is spoken of with emphatic approval both in the Laws and the Republic. The avoidance of the extremes of wealth and poverty is equally a principle of both. General rules (τύποι, ἐκμαγεῖα) are laid down, as in the Republic, so also in the Laws, for the censor of the poets. Early education is again regarded as an anticipation of Reason. The importance of *rhythm* in education is more than ever insisted on. The music is still to be subordinated to the words[1]. And although the paradoxical view that gymnastic also has a mental purpose does not expressly reappear (it had already been ignored in Rep. VII. 521 E), the merely utilitarian conception of physical training is not the less scornfully rejected. The neglect of education by Cyrus and Darius is held accountable for the vices of Cambyses and of Xerxes (cp. Prot., Gorg.). The supremacy of mind is vehemently asserted. The passions are in the individual what the populace are in a State. Yet here also the later phase of Plato's philosophy makes itself felt, and the conjunction of sense with intellect is introduced, not merely as the cause of error (Rep. VIII), but 546 B.

§ 23.

[1] Laws II. 669.

62 B,C. as the condition of practical wisdom (compare the Philebus). On the other hand the unity of Virtue (Justice and Temperance especially running up into a single principle), which is only hinted as a possibility in the Republic, is prescribed as a main dogma of the Higher Education, which is to be presided over by the Nocturnal Council.

§ 24. This Higher Education is spoken of in two passages of the Laws as a subject reserved for future consideration.

α′. B. VII. 818 (in speaking of the higher arithmetic, geometry and astronomy) *ταῦτα δὲ ξύμπαντα οὐχ ὡς ἀκριβείας ἐχόμενα δεῖ διαπονεῖν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀλλά τινας ὀλίγους· οὓς δέ, προϊόντες ἐπὶ τῷ τέλει φράσομεν . . . χαλεπὸν δὲ αὐτὰ προταξάμενον τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ νομοθετεῖν· ἀλλ' εἰς ἄλλον, εἰ δοκεῖ, χρόνον ἀκριβέστερον ἂν νομοθετησαίμεθα.*

β′. B. XII. 969 *ἐγὼ δ' ὑμῖν συγκινδυνεύσω τῷ φράζειν τε καὶ ἐξηγεῖσθαι τά γε δεδογμένα ἐμοὶ περὶ τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς τῆς νῦν αὖ κεκινημένης τοῖς λόγοις· τὸ μέντοι κινδύνευμα οὐ σμικρὸν οὐδ' ἑτέροις τισὶ προσφερὲς ἂν εἴη.*

The former passage (*α′*) may be compared with Rep. IV. 435 C, where Socrates remarks that for the true account of the virtues it would be necessary to take the 'longer way' (which is afterwards identified with dialectic); the latter (*β′*) is very similar to Rep. VI. 536, 537, where Socrates introduces the 'Idea of Good.' But, whereas in the Republic, Socrates at least partially satisfies expectation, the statement promised by the Athenian Stranger is deferred until a more convenient season.

The student of the Laws is consequently left in a position resembling that in which readers of the Republic would have been, had Books V, VI, VII of that dialogue remained unwritten. He is aware, indeed, that the Nocturnal Council were to comprehend the single underlying principle which gives unity to the Virtues, that they would acknowledge Wisdom to be the guide (cp. Rep. IV. 428) and Temperance the inseparable condition of them all; that their minds would have been cleared and strengthened by a *sound* training in the *necessary* truths of mathematics and astronomy; that the absolute priority of Mind to Body would be a principle deeply

infixed in their souls. But beyond this we are unable to judge how far the education and nurture which the Stranger advocates, resembled or differed from that developed in Rep. VII, or indeed whether he proposes that the members of the Nocturnal Council of this secondary State should be 'philosophers,' in what Plato at the time of writing conceived to be the highest sense of the word. Like the definition of the Philosopher projected by the Eleatic Stranger, the Athenian Stranger's account of the Highest Education seems never to have been written down by Plato[1].

We can only dimly trace some fragments of his leading thoughts, in the directions for elementary study given in B. VII, the religious principles inculcated in B. X, and some detached sentences towards the end of B. XII.

(1) Mathematics as the Truth of Nature, VII. 818 *τίνες οὖν, ὦ ξένε . . . κατὰ φύσιν ἃ λέγεις.*

(2) Priority of Mind, X. 887 ff., XII. 966 ff.

(3) Necessary existence of a '*primum mobile*,' X. 894, cp. Phaedr. 245.

(4) Eternal supremacy of the better mind over the worse, X. 897.

The author of the Epinomis has gathered up these scattered threads, but the pattern into which he has woven them is not Plato's, still less are there to be found there the traces of the untrammelled thought and free intelligence, of a mind not enslaved to its own formulae, which are absent from no genuine Platonic writing.

A theory of knowledge and of the object of knowledge is, therefore, not to be looked for in the Laws. Yet the study of dialectic has left its trace, in the pedantic elaboration of method, which marks the earlier and more finished part of the dialogue, and is analogous to the tedious classifications which the Eleatic Stranger in the Politicus remarks on and defends.

[1] 'Of a supreme or master science which was to be the coping stone of the rest, few traces appear in the Laws. He seems to have lost faith in it, or perhaps to have realized that the time for such a science had not yet come, and that he was unable to fill up the outline which he had sketched.' Jowett's Plato, vol. v, Laws, Introduction, p. 130.

§ 25. Consideration of the Dialectical dialogues resumed.

The position of the Politicus, as intermediate between the Republic and the Laws, is sufficiently evident after what has been said. Now the Politicus cannot be far removed from the Sophistes, and the Philebus in style and structure bears evidence of belonging to the same period. The Timaeus is avowedly later than the Republic.

We are therefore not left without data for the difficult inquiry:—Did Plato's theory of knowledge undergo any change after the composition of the Republic? In what direction were his thoughts moving with respect to this, which he himself regarded as the highest subject of study?

The inquiry *is* difficult. For each work of Plato's is a separate whole, in which the parts have reference, not to any previous statement, but to the particular aspect of the Truth to which for the time being the philosopher addressed himself, and in which his mind was wholly absorbed. Even such distinct references as those in the Timaeus and Laws to the Republic, or those in the Theaetetus and Sophistes to the Parmenides[1], do not involve any attempt to adjust the later dialogue to the earlier one. Yet, on a general survey of the group of dialogues above-named, from which the Parmenides and Theaetetus (perhaps even the Euthydemus) cannot altogether be separated, there is observable a greater amount of consistency, as well as of positive content, than, for example, appears in grouping together Protag., Apol., Symp., Phaedr., Phaedo, Gorg. And this general observation may be of use, if, instead of attempting a detailed harmony, or 'peering between the lines' of detached passages for the evidences of a system which is nowhere formulated, we content ourselves with marking the broad outlines, and so endeavouring to follow the main movement of Plato's thought.

The concluding passage of Rep. VI[2] contains a statement of the unity of knowledge, which may be summed up as

[1] The reference to the Sophist in Polit. 284 B ὡς ἐν τῷ Σοφιστῇ ('as in dealing with the Sophist'), is not in question here, as the Sophist and Statesman are to all intents and purposes one dialogue.

[2] See above, p. 13.

follows:—'The investigation of Truth under the conditions of human life on earth must start from assumptions based on sensible perception. But that is only the starting-point. The philosophic spirit cannot rest, until the mind's conceptions have been purified by the activity of thought from every sensible mean, and so rising from height to height of abstraction, the thinker may lay hold on the Absolute (τὸ ἀνυπόθετον), whence again descending, he may pass from Form to Form, and end with pure ideas.' Nowhere else had Plato hitherto so clearly asserted the connexion and gradation of the Forms of Being.

But if we ask, what is the nature of the connexion, or of the transition from the higher to the lower forms, the Republic yields no consistent answer.

1. In the fifth book the εἶδος is said to be related to its particulars, as the whole to the parts. Are the higher εἴδη of Book VI thus related to the lower? Do they form a series of which the extreme terms are *Summum Genus* and *Infima Species*?

2. The reader of B. X is at once presented with a different conception. The ideal Bed is not a whole of which the actual bed is part, but the Pattern after which it is made. Are the higher ideas related to the lower, as the Perfect to the Imperfect? The beginning of B. VII and the end of B. IX may lend some colour to this view; which, however, is inconsistent with the preceding.

3. Once more, in studying the educational discussions of B. VII, in which the general conception of Science is practically applied, we are led upwards from the mind's first perceptions of difference and identity, through the abstract study of number, form and motion, first to the common principles determining all such studies, then to universal principles worked out by Dialectic, and last of all to the primal, ultimate, creative, regulative, alone substantial Form of Good. Are the Ideas, then, Forms of Thought, and are the higher related to the lower as the ideas of the Reason to the categories of the Understanding, and those of the Understanding to those of pure intuition,—to use a Kantian figure?

§ 26. The truth is that Plato had not yet cleared his mind from some confusion on this subject. It may be doubted whether he ever did so completely. Three points of view, which to modern thinkers are obviously distinct, the logical, the cosmological, the psychological, repeatedly cross and recross each other in his writings.

The moment came, however, when he keenly felt the need of solving this and other metaphysical difficulties. It is generally acknowledged that the Parmenides reflects precisely such an intellectual crisis. He could no longer satisfy himself with making a vague metaphysic the imaginary basis of an empirical morality.

The Parmenides.

Plato's thought in the Parmenides is directed towards (1) the theory of general forms and (2) the opposition of the one and many, not with barren contemplation, nor yet with scepticism, but with serious inquiry. At the same time Plato's Dialectic for the first time consciously stands face to face with Eleaticism. Most of the objections afterwards brought by Aristotle against the εἴδη are here raised in the form of ἀπορίαι, which are discussed, but not finally answered. And a tentative effort is made towards a New 'Kritik' of pure truth, through a disjunctive method, which the aged Parmenides recommends as a necessary *propaedeutic*, but which nowhere recurs. The dialogue ends, after the Socratic manner of the Protagoras or the first book of the Republic, with contradiction and the confession of ignorance, but the reader has been carried into higher regions of speculation than in the purely 'Socratic' dialogues.

The Theaetetus again.

In the Theaetetus likewise the Socratic mask of irony is effectively resumed. There is much in it of the playfulness of the Phaedrus or Symposium, but without the wildness. That is sobered down through the presence of the grave Theodorus. We have again, as in the Parmenides, a chain of ἀπορήματα, most subtly reasoned out, but not finally got rid of. Once more comes back the old familiar Socratic ending—'What knowledge is, I do not know.' But just as the Parmenides breathes the profound conviction, 'No philosophy without ideas, whatever the ideas may prove to be,—nor

without the One, however our conception of Unity may have to be modified,' so the Socrates of the Theaetetus will never discourse without assuming the reality of Knowledge, nor will Theaetetus hesitate to affirm that unity and diversity, sameness and difference, number and quantity, are not perceived through any bodily organ; but the perception of them, however manifestly evoked through sensible impressions, is in each case a direct intuition of the mind. Plato in the Theaetetus is again conscious of Eleatic influence, while he reckons with Heraclitus, Protagoras, and the Cyrenaics,—perhaps also with Antisthenes.

In these two dialogues, then, the philosopher is directly grappling with the chief difficulties which surround his own as well as other theories of Knowing and Being: the Parmenides breaking ground which is afterwards to be renewed, and dealing mainly with questions of Being; the Theaetetus (in this approaching modern thought) treating the central questions of philosophy chiefly from the subjective side.

Taken together, these writings represent a time of § **27.**
strenuous mental effort, when Plato was resolutely bent on going by the 'longer way,' and on fulfilling, even 'through hours of gloom,' the 'tasks in hours of insight willed.' Whatever tedium it may cost him, whatever intellectual fatigue, he is determined to see more clearly and fix more definitely those lines and veins of truth 'according to Nature' of which he has spoken in the Phaedrus. No result of this endeavour is formulated. That is not Plato's way. But as his Socrates says to Theaetetus, *βελτιόνων ἔσῃ πλήρης διὰ τὴν νῦν ἐξέτασιν*, so the philosophy of this whole group of dialogues (Parm., Theaet., Soph., Polit., Phil., Tim.) has distinctive features which clearly separate them not only from the Phaedo or Symposium, but even from the Phaedrus and the Republic.

1. The first point to notice is the serious criticism of earlier and contemporary philosophies. As Socrates questioned with individuals, so Plato now cross-questions doctrines and methods. He had elsewhere glanced allusively at the Heracliteans, the Pythagoreans, the Cyrenaics the Mega-

rians and others,—he had perhaps satirized Antisthenes;—but it is now through the lengthened examination of whole schools of thought that he at once developes and tests his own conceptions. This is a new thing in philosophy, and argues a great advance in dialectical method.

2. Plato has had many a fling at the art of controversy (ἀντιλογική), with its love of cross distinctions (Rep. v. 454), its confusion of facts with principles (Phaedo 90 B), and all the array of sophisms which are grouped together for ridicule in the Euthydemus. But he has now discovered that in a deeper sense a cognate error lies at the root of all the intellectual confusion of the time—that an illogical logic based on abstract contradictions has been responsible not only for the vain jangling of Dionysodorus and his fellows, but for the waste of serious thought over such problems as whether false opinion is possible, whether an element can be defined, whether all discussion is not unreal, and other cognate difficulties, which were threatening the very life of philosophy. This element of contemporary speculation he traces to the Zenonian logic, in which the profound speculative thought of Parmenides had been beaten out and misapplied.

3. Hence comes his endeavour to turn the weapons of the Megarians against themselves, and to evolve, at least approximately, a theory of predication both in thought and language which, instead of hindering, may stimulate and aid the healthy growth of eager minds. His interest in dialectic is at this stage more than ever educational. And this is especially true of that aspect of it which carries on the work commenced in the Phaedrus,—the use of Classification.

§ 28. The 'dichotomies' of the Sophist and Politicus are not to be taken too seriously. They afford a method of approach to the main subject, by which the mind of the youthful hearer or reader is to be at the same time kept on the alert, and awakened to the difficulties with which the scientific treatment of any general question is surrounded. They remind us of the description in the Philebus of the charm which the logical 'one and many' had for young Athenians. They may even be regarded as bearing some analogy to the arithmetical

puzzles which the Egyptians had invented for the amusement of children. But there are turns and moments of the laborious game where some principle of method is illustrated. These are marked with special emphasis, and by attending to them we learn something of the direction of Plato's own thoughts.

In the Phaedrus the ideal of generalization and division had been left disappointingly vague. The spirit of dialectic seems there to be regarded as its own evidence in determining the outlines of Truth, as an organic whole. In generalizing, the dialectician recognizes the εἶδος of which his soul had once the vision; in dividing, he will 'follow Nature,' hitting the joints, and not hacking the limbs. It is further indicated that 'Nature' has a 'right-hand' and a 'left-hand' segment, —which may be interpreted indifferently as positive and negative, or as good and evil. But in the Sophistes, and even more in the Politicus and the Philebus, while the dialectical method is still upheld, and still subordinated to the free activity of the philosophic mind, the difficulties and hindrances attending on it are more seriously felt. The process is accompanied with much labour, and leads through 'slippery' places. The several definitions of the Sophist, all based on observation and attained through successive excursions, at first seem to have little in common. The synoptic and selective faculty must be called in, to gather from all these the characteristic difference of the creature. And it is at this point (Soph. 233) that the investigation passes from the formal to the real.

In resuming the work of 'carving' to define the statesman the young respondent is warned that he must not cut off too much at once (for fear of 'hacking the limbs'),—whereupon he asks the difficult and important question, 'How is one to know an accidental segment (μέρος) from a true form (εἶδος).' He is further made aware that the process of residues is insufficient for the purposes of science, (since, as was shown in the Sophist, negation also has a positive content), and that before I can know the nature of *this*, I must know something also of what is *not this but akin to this*. Thus dialectic becomes more concrete, no longer turning on the mere perception or intuition of elementary forms, but endeavouring to recognize

them as actualized in the complexity of the world. Hence the great value of the argument from example. Nor should the hearer of dialectic ever complain of mere length as tedious, for length and brevity are relative not to each other merely, but to the requirements of investigation and discovery. Thus, as by a side wind, is introduced the principle of *τὸ μέτριον*, which plays such an important part in the Philebus.

The same increasing consciousness of the intricate developments of real science as opposed to mere logic appears in the well-known passage of the Philebus, 16 foll., where it is shown that the lover of truth must not rest in the mere discovery of a one and many, but pursue his investigation until he ascertains 'how many.' This is not a mere return to Pythagoreanism, but a real advance towards a fuller conception of scientific truth.

§ 29. There is another aspect of this part of the subject, on which Plato dwells in different ways, but with similar emphasis, in the Parmenides, Sophistes and Politicus. The Sun of Science, as Bacon says, shines equally on the palace and the dunghill. Socrates, replying to Parmenides, is doubtful whether he ought or ought not to assume ideas of dirt and refuse. But he is assured by the philosopher that when the love of knowledge has taken hold of him, as one day it will take hold, he will neglect none of these things. And in like manner his namesake, the Younger Socrates, raises no objection when the Eleatic Stranger affirms that in the eye of Science the vermin-killer is as much a huntsman as the general, or when he reminds him afterwards that, in classification, no preference should be given to what is not ridiculous. And Socrates himself tells Protarchus (Phil. 58 c) that the art of which we are in search is not that which produces the grandest effect, but that which discovers some particle of truth, however seemingly unimportant[1].

These hints of an ideal of science are in entire keeping with the curiously modern description of the intellectual life as 'an

[1] Rep. III. 402 B *οὔτ' ἐν σμικρῷ οὔτ' ἐν μεγάλῳ ἠτιμάζομεν αὐτά*, may seem an anticipation of this, but should rather be compared with supr. II. 369 D, infr. IV. 435 A.

interrogation of all natures with the view of learning from each what it has to contribute from its particular experience towards collective wisdom' (Politicus, 272 B, C).

If in these dialogues Plato's logical method assumes a more definitely scientific aspect, his metaphysical theory undergoes modifications of a corresponding kind. § 30.

Not only is each 'natural kind[1]' to be regarded as a whole[2], but (as in the scheme foreshadowed in Rep. VI) the several wholes must be known in the light of higher conceptions, and as forming one vast totality. The primary forms or notions of unity, likeness, unlikeness, numerical difference, motion, rest, must be recognized as no less real than the attributes of each several kind. 'Quality' itself is a new abstraction which has to be named. Now this implies, what is not explicitly formulated, the admission of 'ideas' not only of existence, but of relation. Plato nowhere seems distinctly conscious of the difference between a genus and a category[3]. The terms εἶδος and γένος are used by him indifferently for both. But in the dialectical dialogues he dwells more and more on those universal conceptions which are inseparable from knowledge and being. These are the 'birds that fly everywhere about the aviary,' sameness and difference, unity and plurality, number, quantity, motion and rest. And it is in the effort to realize ideas of relation and to understand the relativity of thought that he takes in hand the central problem of Being and Not-Being, affirmation and negation. The reasoning of the Sophistes, based as it is on a critical review of previous philosophies, marks one of the most decisive moments in the history of thought, exploding the prime fallacy, which had its stronghold then in the misapplication of the great conception of Parmenides, and has since haunted many a polemical dispute, the confusion of the *Dictum Simpliciter* with the *Dictum Secundum quid.* When it is once recognized that *omnis negatio est determinatio*, a fatal obstacle is removed out of the way of science.

[1] Theaet. 157 ἕκαστον ζῷόν τε καὶ εἶδος.
[2] Ibid. 174 A τῶν ὄντων ἑκάστου ὅλου.
[3] See above, p. 35.

This great advance in Plato's central point of view has sometimes been represented as if Plato had now for the first time introduced Motion amongst the ideas. But the identity of thought and life is of the very essence of Platonism throughout,—witness the proof of immortality in the Phaedrus, and the description of the Idea of Good as the supreme efficient cause in the Republic. It was precisely because Eleaticism made this impossible, by assuming the incommunicability of Being and Becoming, One and Many, that Plato found it necessary to lay hands on 'Father Parmenides,' and to prove the maxim, Τελεωτάτη πάντων λόγων ἐστὶν ἀφάνισις τὸ πᾶν ἀπὸ πάντων ἀποχωρίζειν. (Soph. 259 E.) That 'love of the Whole' of which he speaks again and again never ceased to be his ruling passion. The more he becomes aware of the variety and intricacy of things, the more he is bent on binding them with the unity of knowledge. But in the speculative region, as in he practical, he loses something of the daring confidence of his earlier essays, and while his vision of mental phenomena becomes clearer, in speaking of the Universe he betakes himself again to Mythology.

§ 31. *Common characteristics of the dialectical dialogues.*

The preceding observations may serve to commend the view which is here maintained, viz. that the Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophistes, Politicus, Philebus, in the order named (with the doubtful insertion of the Euthydemus before or after the Theaetetus, as a πάρεργον), form a distinct group or series, and that this series, *taken as a whole*, is subsequent to the great literary effort which terminated with the Republic.

The dialogues thus grouped together have certain characteristics in common.

Condensation and comparative dryness.

1. The thought expressed in them is far more condensed, and, except in the Theaetetus, is much less richly clothed with imagination and humour, than that expressed in the dialogues which are here supposed to have preceded them.

Altered style.

2. On grounds of style as well as of substance it has been shown that the Politicus holds an intermediate place between the Republic and the Laws [1], and also that the manner of

[1] See L. Campbell's edition of the Sophistes and Politicus, 1867. The position therein assigned to the Sophistes, Politicus and Philebus, has

the Sophistes and Philebus has marked affinities to that of the Politicus. It may be added that although the Theaetetus and Parmenides are not throughout written in this later vein, the dialectical passages in both of them indicate an approach to it.

Psychological distinctness.

3. In these dialogues there is an increasing clearness and minuteness of psychological analysis and definition. Compare for example the analysis of vision in the Theaetetus with Rep. VII. 525 C, or the description of *αἴσθησις, φαντασία, μνήμη, ἀνάμνησις*, &c. in the Philebus with the tabular view of *νοῦς, διάνοια, πίστις, εἰκασία,* in Rep. VI *sub fin.*

Epistemology.

4. Plato is no longer contented with positing the existence of universals, nor even of such a hierarchy of pure ideas as he imagines at the end of Rep. VI. He is now seriously bent on discovering the nature of Knowledge and its object, and of determining the connexion and correlation of ideas.

Lists of categories.

5. From the recognition that every *εἶδος* is a *νόημα,* through the account of Being, not-being, sameness, difference, &c. as pure categories of perception, and the admission of Otherness as a mode of Being, up to the description of Measure as the Supreme Law, we trace the tendency, which is certainly less perceptible elsewhere in Plato, to define conceptions, which, while still regarded as objective, are essentially forms or modes of mind. The Philebus is rich in such determinations, which sometimes cross each other inconveniently, and even the seven forms of civic life in the Politicus, 289 B (*τὸ πρωτογενὲς εἶδος* [= *ὕλη*], *ὄργανον, ἀγγεῖον, ὄχημα, πρόβλημα, παίγνιον, θρέμμα*) may be quoted as illustrative of a similar effort after *συναγωγή*.

Metaphysical attitude.

6. Without admitting that a metaphysical system or consistent body of doctrine ('Plato's later theory of ideas') can be gathered from these dialogues, it is possible to trace in them the development of a metaphysical attitude which differs

since been given to these same dialogues on independent grounds by W. Dittenberger (*Hermes*, XVI), M. Schanz (*Hermes*, XXI), and Constantin Ritter (*Untersuchungen* 1888). The convergence of different lines of investigation towards the same result has now reached a point which must surely be acknowledged to be convincing. See *Excursus, infra* pp. 46 ff.

both from that of the Protagoras and of the Republic. The supposed incommunicableness of knowledge and sense, being and becoming, universal and particular, one and many, which had threatened to paralyze philosophy, is felt to have been practically overcome, and the unity and correlation of knowledge and of nature is re-established.

Genesis or Production.

7. That speculative interest in γένεσις,—in the origin and growth of phenomena,—in what modern thinkers call the laws of evolution,—which had been the prime motive of the Ionian physiology, but had on different grounds been discarded both by Parmenides and Socrates,—is now, therefore, once more re-awakened in Plato's mind, and is partially justified by a metaphysic, in which the absolute comprises and sustains the relative, and evil is but a necessary moment in the self-development of Good.

Decline from Optimism.

8. But this speculative advance involves what cannot but be felt as retrogression on the practical side. For by introducing the conception of infinite gradation, it defers, without destroying, the hope of perfectibility:—

οὐ ταῦτα ταύτῃ μοῖρά πω τελεσφόρος
κρᾶναι πέπρωται

is the tone to which the ear of philosophy is now attuned. The distance between Man and God is found to be greater than in the first bright vision of the Ideal it had been conceived to be.

Religious tone.

9. And the spirit of the philosopher becomes less sanguine, but more profoundly religious than before.

Democritus.

10. This phase of Platonism is marked by some obscure but not uncertain indications of a controversial attitude towards Democritus[1].

§ 32. The Timaeus.

The Timaeus is linked on to the subject of the Republic, but although both dialogues are referred to a time of public festival, they can hardly be viewed as strictly continuous. Socrates had on the previous day expounded to Timaeus, Critias, and Hermocrates his conception of an ideal state, —not, apparently, in the form of a reported conversation.

[1] The latter observations (7, 8, 9, 10) are supported by the following passages of Soph., Polit., Phileb.: viz. Soph. 216, 246–248, 265 (cp. Theaet. 173, 185 D, E); Polit. 269–275 (the myth), 278, 301, 302; Phileb. 22, 28, 30, 54, 59 A, 62, 64.

The Higher Education seems to have been cursorily mentioned, and the institution of infanticide must have been suppressed. However this may be, the Timaeus reflects the later phase of Plato's philosophy which has been just described. There is no room here for an exposition of the most difficult, if not, as some still declare it to be, the most important of Plato's dialogues. It must suffice to observe that metaphysical conceptions which are formulated in the Sophistes and Philebus are here applied, e.g. the *θατέρου φύσις*, and the *μικτὴ οὐσία*; that the new conception of matter or extension as *γενέσεως τιθήνη* is of the same order with the *πρωτογενὲς εἶδος* of the Politicus, and that the mythological colouring more resembles the myth in that dialogue, than any other of the Platonic myths, although the relation of God to the world is more nobly conceived[1]. Cosmological and Pythagorizing notions are not absent from other dialogues. The Phaedo and Republic are both influenced by them. But a comparison of passages makes it clear that the point of view implied in the Timaeus is different and more developed.

The Timaeus is only the opening page or prelude of the most magnificent prose-poem ever planned by a single mind; a complete Bible, had it been written, of philosophical imagination. The story of Creation was to have been followed up by the history of the Chosen People, of their wars with the Unbelievers, and of the final triumph of the Good. Here indeed would have been an account of Evolution. But it breaks off before the rebel *armada* had been set in array.

What stayed the hand of the veteran thinker and creator from this fair work? We can only conjecture. But the Laws afford a possible reply. His practical enthusiasm was inexhaustible. In ages far remote, it might be, the vision of that conflict of the Sons of Light with the material Power of Atlantis might operate for good. But ere then, the day of Hellas might be dim. The states for whose reform he had so cared might all have foundered. The years were closing

[1] Compare for example the desperate notion of God relinquishing the helm, with the delegation of the lower works to the demiurgi: Tim. 42 E *ὁ μὲν πάντα ταῦτα διατάξας ἔμενεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἤθει.*

round him, the setting of his life[1] was near at hand. He had no longer strength for both efforts. The speculative and imaginative powers, perhaps, were ebbing from him. But practical earnestness remained. He would attempt what still was possible. And perchance those who had turned a deaf ear to his ideal strains might listen to suggestions of reform if pitched in a somewhat lower key.

Some such reflections are naturally suggested by Plato's sudden descent from the Council Chamber of Zeus, where the Critias breaks off, to enter on the long and weary labour of the Laws.

EXCURSUS

On the position of the Sophistes, Politicus, and Philebus in the order of the Platonic Dialogues; and on some characteristics of Plato's latest writings[2].

§ 1. It had long since occurred to students of Plato that, while it appeared antecedently probable that all the shorter dialogues were previous to the Republic, the Sophistes in particular implied a philosophical point of view in advance of the definition of knowledge and opinion at the end of Republic, Book v. It seemed possible, however, that such an opinion might be coloured with some metaphysical preconception, and in editing the Sophistes I resolved to verify this observation without having recourse to 'metaphysical aid.' The objections which Socher had raised against the genuineness of this and the companion dialogue had been answered by W. H. Thompson[3], who had defended both writings as having the general characteristics of Plato's style. I felt, however, that the discrepancies to which attention had been called by Socher and Schaarschmidt[4] could not be thus easily disposed of, and must have some significance.

[1] Laws VI. 770 A ἡμεῖς δ' ἐν δυσμαῖς τοῦ βίου.

[2] From a paper read to the Oxford Philological Society in June 1890, by L. Campbell.

[3] In the Cambridge Philosophical Transactions.

[4] Rheinisches Museum.

Now, as difficulties of a similar kind had been urged with reference to the Laws, it seemed a question worth raising, whether any affinity could be established between these several works, as belonging to one and the same period of Plato's literary activity. For if the Laws were assumed to be genuine on the authority of Aristotle, the genuineness of the other dialogues would be rendered more probable, if their peculiarities were found to approximate to those of a well-authenticated writing. And the difficulty about the Laws would at the same time be lessened. For the authorities which attest their genuineness (to lay no stress on the confessions of the Athenian Stranger) represent them as Plato's latest—or even posthumous—work, and any differences either of manner or of matter between this dialogue and the Republic would be made more intelligible by the discovery of an interval and a period of transition. A step would also have been made towards the solution of the problem stated by Schleiermacher, but not satisfactorily solved by him—nor by Hermann—the order of the dialogues.

The Timaeus and Critias are avowedly subsequent to the Republic. And the right method for testing my hypothesis was, therefore, to ascertain what elements of style and diction, as well as of opinion, were 'common and peculiar' to the Sophist and Statesman with the Timaeus, Critias and Laws: i. e. what special features are shared by the members of this group, which are absent from the other dialogues, or less apparent in them. It was a method of concomitant variations. The result of a somewhat tedious inquiry was to confirm my anticipation, and to include the Philebus also amongst the works which are intermediate between the Republic and the Laws. The only support for this view which I could find in any previous writer, was the opinion expressed by Ueberweg in his *Untersuchungen über die Echtheit und Zeitfolge Platonischen Schriften*[1] (pp. 207–209), but afterwards abandoned by him in deference to the objections of Schaarschmidt.

The argument set forth in my Introductions to the **§ 2.**
Sophistes and Politicus, possibly through some fault of

[1] Wien, 1861.

exposition[1], seems to have escaped the attention of scholars. And yet, so far as it was sound, it tended to establish a fact of real significance, viz. that the Republic and Laws are separated by a period of great philosophical activity:—an activity which renders more conceivable the discrepancies which have troubled critics of the Laws, and accounts for the supposed anomalies in the intervening dialogues.

The same conclusion is now upheld in Germany on similar, but wholly independent grounds—viz. on a statistical estimate of variations in Plato's use of particles and recurring formulae. In 1881 W. Dittenberger in *Hermes* (vol. xvi, pp. 321–345)[2] called attention to the fact that the formula τί μήν—so familiar to the Platonic student,—is entirely absent from two-thirds of the genuine dialogues. From this point onwards the statistics of Platonic formulae have been pursued by successive inquirers. Dr. Martin Schanz, for example, in vol. xxi of *Hermes* (1886), pointed out a striking variation in the comparative frequency of τῷ ὄντι and ὄντως, the latter being found only in a fraction of the dialogues, while in some of these it has completely ousted τῷ ὄντι[3]. The avoidance of hiatus (noticed by Blass in 1874, *Att. Ber.* ii, p. 426) is another phenomenon of which the varying frequency points to the same result.

The accumulated outcome of seven years of this kind of inquiry is recapitulated by Constantin Ritter in his little book of *Untersuchungen* (Stuttgardt, 1888), in which he has recorded also valuable observations of his own.

Notwithstanding the tendency—which seems to be inseparable from such investigations—to aim at more precise results than the method justifies (of which Dittenberger's inference from the use of τί μάν; in Epicharmus[4] is an amusing example), yet, when minor uncertainties are discarded, there remains a strong concurrence of evidence in favour of

[1] I take this late opportunity of correcting a serious misprint. For 'Critias,' in the tabular view on p. xxxiii of the work in question, read 'Crito.'

[2] *Sprachliche Kriterien für die Chronologie der Platonischen Dialoge.*

[3] Herm. xxi. 439–459, *Zur Entwickelung des Platonischen Stils.*

[4] That Plato brought back τί μήν from his journey to Sicily.

placing the Soph., Polit., Phileb., Tim., Critias, and Laws—nearly in this order—as latest in a separate group.

When it is considered that the facts thus collected unite in corroborating the observations published in 1867, it will probably be admitted that the inference is irresistible, and that the question of the order has to this extent been solved.

It is therefore worth some pains to examine the significance of the phenomenon, the reality of which is now abundantly demonstrated. § 3.

We are really considering an important movement in the development of Greek prose writing:—the gradual prevalence over Plato's style of the rhetorical artificiality, which in the earlier periods he had alternately ridiculed and coquettishly played with.

And we are met on the threshold by one of those observations by which the mere collection of instances has to be checked. Some of the features which we are now taught to identify with Plato's later manner are already present in the Phaedrus,—the balanced cadences, the vocabulary enriched from the poets and the earlier literature, the comparative rareness of hiatus, the use of *ὄντως* for *τῷ ὄντι*, of δῆλον ὡς for δῆλον ὅτι, even the Ionic dative plural, all are represented there. But the most casual reader cannot fail to see that in the Phaedrus these are but decorations of a sort of carnival dress that is worn for the occasion only. Plato is caught by a fascination at which he himself is laughing all the while. His Socrates is *νυμφόληπτος* and a strange fluency possesses him. For Phaedrus' sake he is compelled to phrase his thoughts poetically,—he speaks in dithyrambs[1]. It would therefore be rash, as F. Blass long since observed, to argue from the avoidance of hiatus, for example, to the date of the Phaedrus. But this dialogue has, notwithstanding, a real bearing on the subject in hand. For in spite of all his

[1] Observe the suggestion of lyrical cadences—

– –̋ ⏑ – – –̋ ⏑ –́ –
ἐρρωμένως ῥωσθεῖσ' ἀγωγῇ
⏑ –̋ ⏑ ⏑ –́ ⏑ –̋ ⏑ –́ –
ἐπωνυμίαν ἔρως ἐκλήθη.

persiflage it is evident that the tricks of style which Plato there parodied were exercising a powerful charm upon his mind. In the Politicus and Laws, where, under the grander name of ῥητορεία (Polit. 303), the once ridiculed ῥητορική is admitted to have a legitimate function, the ornate manner is employed not in humorous irony, but with solemn gravity. It is therefore reasonable to regard the rhetorical flowers of the Phaedrus as the early anticipation of a habit which long afterwards becomes fixed.

§ 4. The following are some of the peculiarities of language in which the Sophistes, Politicus and Philebus are found to approximate to the Laws, and which therefore mark the transition towards Plato's later style. It may be well to take first the particles and formulae, to which Dittenberger and others have recently directed attention. For the purpose of the argument we may for the present neglect those which (like τί μήν;) bear only on the relation of the Republic (with Phaedr., Theaet.) to the earlier dialogues.

γε μήν occurs only twice in Rep., and once in each of the following:—Euthyd., Symp., Phaedr., Theaet.; but 6 times in Soph. (52 pp.)[1], 8 times in Polit. (54 pp.), 7 times in Tim. (76 pp.), and 25 times in Laws (368 pp.).

περ, added to adverbs and pronominal words:—

μέχριπερ	only in	Tim. (4), Critias (1), Laws (16).
ὅπῃπερ	,,	Soph., Tim., Laws.
ὁπόσοσπερ	,,	Polit., Laws.
ὁσαχῇπερ	,,	Tim. 43 E.

τάχ' ἴσως (combined) only in Soph. (2), Polit. (3), Phil. (3), Tim. (1), Laws (11).

σχεδόν without τι, frequent in Aristotle,—a use which first appears in Euripides[2],—is rare in Plato *except* in Soph. (26), Polit. (13), Phil. (14), Tim. (9), Criti. (4), Laws (122).

The use of ὄντως is one of many coincidences between Plato's later style and tragic Greek. According to Stephanus (*Thesaurus*) the word appears first in Euripides. It is used

[1] The pages referred to are those of the edition of Stephanus, 1578.

[2] In Soph. Trach. 43 with τι πῆμα following the omission of τι is accidental.

also by Aristophanes in burlesque of tragedy, and by Xenophon in the *Banquet* (which Dittenberger has shown to be not one of his earlier writings). In Plato—

τῷ ὄντι occurs repeatedly in Lach., Prot., Euthyd., Apol., Euthyphr., Gorg., Symp.,
In Rep. 42 times,
In Soph. once,
and hardly ever in Polit., Phileb., Tim., Critias, Laws.

ὄντως occurs not at all in Lach., Charm., Prot., Euthyd., Apol., Crito, Euthyphr., Gorg., Meno, Symp.: but
In Theaet. once.
In Phaedr. 6 times.
In Rep. 9 ,,
In Soph. 21 ,,
In Polit. 11 ,,
In Phileb. 15 ,,
In Tim. 8 ,,
In Laws 50 ,,

τὰ νῦν or *τὸ νῦν* for *νῦν* (clearly a tragic form) occurs singly in Charm., Prot., Phaedo, Theaet., Rep., not at all in Lach., Euthyd., Crat., Apol., Crit., Euthyphr., Gorg., Meno, Symp., Phaedr.,—but in Soph. 5 times, Polit. 5 times, Phileb. 9 times, Tim. 7 times, Critias 3 times, and Laws 79 times.

μῶν in questions (also tragic) occurs sporadically in Charm. (2), Euthyd. (3), Phaedo (1), Meno (3), Theaet. (4), Rep. (3): but frequently in Soph. (12), Polit. (8), Phileb. (10), Laws (29). (There are very few questions in Tim., Critias.)

χρεὼν (*ἐστί*) for *χρή* occurs *only* in Soph. (1), Polit. (1), Tim. (3), Critias (2), and Laws (57).

The suppression of *ὁ μέν* &c. in antitheses, and the use of abstract plurals (especially of the dative pl.), as in *ἀνυποδησίαις συγγίγνεσθαι* (Laws), are also tragic uses which become more frequent in the same group of dialogues.

Another marked difference appears in the preference of the more concentrated *εἰς* (or *κατὰ*) *δύναμιν* for *εἰς* (or *κατὰ*) *τὸ δυνατόν*. This occurs in

Euthyd. 1	Soph. 3
Phaedr. 1	Phil. 4
Rep. 6	Tim. 10
	Critias 1
	Laws 63.

A usage, not tragic but Ionic, which is continued in Aristotle, is the employment of καθάπερ as the equivalent of ὥσπερ. See Bonitz' *Index Aristotelicus, s. v.* καθάπερ. In the few instances in which καθάπερ appears in Lach., Euthyd., Crat., Gorg., Symp., Theaet., Phaedr., Rep. (6 times), it may generally be distinguished from ὥσπερ, which occurs in Rep. 212 times.

But in Soph., Polit., Phileb., Tim., Critias, Laws, it occurs more frequently, and with less discrimination.

ὥσπερ appears in Soph. 9 times, Polit. 16, Phil. 9, Tim. 10, Critias 2, Laws 24.

καθάπερ appears in Soph. 14 times, Polit. 34, Phil. 27, Tim. 11, Critias 5, Laws 148.

Another Aristotelian use (see Bonitz, s. v. δέ) is that of δέ for ἀλλά, e.g. in Soph. 248 D, Laws II. 666 E.

The Ionic dative plural form is a point of resemblance between the Politicus and the Laws,—although, according to the best MSS., it appears also in a few places of the Phaedrus and Republic[1].

The three such datives in the Phaedrus have an obvious rhythmical intention,—240 B ἡδίστοισιν εἶναι ὑπάρχει: 276 B ἐν ἡμέραισιν ὀκτώ: 278 B ἄλλαισιν ἄλλων ψυχαῖς (where this form prevents the concurrence of 3 spondees).

In the Republic there are only five genuine instances, for κενεαγορίαισιν in X, νώτοισιν in V occur in poetical quotations: and of these five σμικροῖσι and θεοῖσι in B. III occur in a passage that is much coloured with poetical citation; μεγάλοισι in B. IX, in a highly-wrought piece of declamation; αὐτοῖσι (*bis*) is in both instances emphatic and not attributive.

But in the Laws—especially in the later books—the use of such forms has become a confirmed trick of style. It is extended to participles, and is by no means confined to words in common use. And of the four examples in the Politicus, while one (279 E τούτοισι) is doubtful (Bekker reads τουτοισί), two at least are of the freer kind: 262 A διπλασίοισι, 304 E ἑπομένοισιν. The less rhetorical vein of the Sophistes and

[1] See Schneider's Rep. vol. I, p. 222.

Philebus may account for the absence of such forms in them.

The periphrastic tendency (noticed in the Introduction to Soph. and Polit., p. xxxiv), of which χρεών, πρέπον ἂν εἴη, λέγοις ἄν, δέον ἂν εἴη, διὰ τὸ μετέχον εἶναι (Tim. 47 B)[1], ἡ τοῦ θατέρου φύσις, τὸ τῆς ἀποπλανήσεως, &c., are examples, belongs likewise to the same preference for earfilling and rhythmically balanced expression.

The peculiar diction of these later dialogues is next to be illustrated. § 5.

In tabulating the Platonic writings so as to bring out the fact that many words were 'common and peculiar' to a certain section of them, it was formerly observed that 'the position of the Phaedrus and Parmenides'—'and,' it should have been added, 'of the Philebus'—was due to exceptional circumstances[2]. This meant that from the nature of the subject matter, and from the mode of treatment intentionally adopted, the vocabulary of the Phaedrus was exceptionally rich, while that of the Parmenides and of the Philebus, in consequence of the dry abstractedness of the discussions in them, was exceptionally poor. It follows that in order to show the bearing of the Phaedrus or of the Philebus upon the present discussion (the Parmenides is not immediately in point), a somewhat closer analysis of either dialogue becomes advisable.

(*a*) The Phaedrus has more than 170 words which occur in no other dialogue—about three for every page in the edition of Stephanus. The Theaetetus, which may be taken as representing Plato's normal style, has 93 words not occurring in other dialogues—or 1½ words for every page of Stephanus. The peculiar words of the Phaedrus are borrowed from all literature, especially poetic literature, whether Epic, Lyric, or Tragic. Such words as γάνυμαι, γλαυκόμματος, γνάθος, ἡνιοχέω, λιγυρός, μελίγηρυς, μετεωροπορέω, μήνιμα, ὁμόζυξ, τελεσιουργός, ὑποβρύχιος, ὑψαύχην, and others which the beauty of Phaedrus draws from the full breast of

[1] Cp. Laws II. 661 B ἀθάνατον εἶναι γενόμενον ὅ τι τάχιστα.
[2] General Introduction to Soph. and Polit. p. xxxiii.

Socrates, are foreign alike to the style of the Republic and the Laws. What then is the specific element of diction which the Phaedrus owns in common with Tim., Critias, Laws? It consists (1) of physiological words, (2) words borrowed from the dialect of tragedy, and (3) words having a religious or mystical significance.

(1) Not Isocrates only, but also 'Hippocrates the Asclepiad' is mentioned with commendation in the Phaedrus[1]. And whatever may be the significance attaching to that circumstance, the following words, connected with physical states or processes, occur in the Phaedrus and Timaeus, and in no other Platonic dialogue :—*βρέχω*, *γαργαλίζω*, *διαθερμαίνω*, *διαχωρέω*, *ἐπιμίγνυμι*, *ἐρείδω*, *ἰσχίον*, *κατακορής*, *κολλάω*, *πτερόν*, *συμφράττω*, *φάτνη*.

If now we include Phaedr., Tim., Critias, Laws, the following words peculiar to this small group are of the same complexion :—*ἀκέφαλος* (Phaedr., Laws), *ἀπορρέω* (Phaedr., Tim., Critias, Laws), *ἀσήμαντος* (Phaedr., Laws), *διατρέχω* (Phaedr., Laws), *ἔκφυσις* (Phaedr., Laws), *ἐμπλέκω* (Phaedr., Laws), *εὔροια* (Phaedr., Laws; cp. *εὔρους*, Tim., Laws), *προσάντης* (Phaedr., Laws), *σπάω* (Phaedr., Laws), *ὑπεραίρω* (Phaedr., Laws), *ὕψος* (Phaedr., Tim., Critias, Laws).

(2) The Phaedrus borrows at least as much from Epic and Lyric sources as from tragedy; but the poetical words which it adopts in common with Tim., Critias, Laws, are mostly of the tragic, or old Attic, type. For example, *ἀηδία* (Phaedr., Laws), *αἱμύλος* (Phaedr., Laws), *ἄκαρπος* (Phaedr., Tim.), *ἄνους* (Phaedr., Tim., Laws), *ἄπαις* (Phaedr., Laws), *ἄσιτος* (Phaedr., Laws), *ἑκασταχοῦ*[2] (Phaedr., Critias, Laws), *ἐμμανής* (Phaedr., Tim., Laws), *ἐμπεδόω* (Phaedr., Laws), *εὐπειθής* (Phaedr., Laws), *θαλλός* (Phaedr., Laws), *θήρειος* (Phaedr., Tim.), *νομή* (Phaedr., Tim., Critias, Laws), *παμμέγας* (Phaedr., Tim.), *παράνοια* (Phaedr., Laws), *πρόνοια* (Phaedr., Tim.), *συμμιγής* (Phaedr., Laws), *ταπεινός* (Phaedr., Laws), *τύμβος* (Phaedr., Laws), *ᾠδός* (Phaedr., Laws).

(3) Words having religious or mystical associations are

[1] 270 C. [2] Thucyd. III. 82.

δαιμονίως (Phaedr., Tim.), *ἐνθουσιαστικός* (Phaedr., Tim.), *ἐποπτεύω* (Phaedr., Laws), *ὀργιάζω* (Phaedr., Laws), *ὁρκωμοσία* (Phaedr., Critias), *συνεύχομαι* (Phaedr., Laws).

The Phaedrus, like the Republic, has many words unknown to the earlier literature. The following are peculiar to the Phaedrus :—*ἀνήκοος, ἀπειρόκαλος, ἀποπολεμέω, ἀχρώματος, δημωφελής, δικαιωτήριον, δοξόσοφος, ἐνθουσίασις, εὐαπάτητος, ἰσομέτρητος, κακηγορία, λογοδαίδαλος, μετεωρολογία, πολυήκοος, προσπαραγράφω, πτερορρυέω, συγκορυβαντιάω, τερατολόγος, ὑπερουράνιος, ὑψηλόνους, ψιλῶς, ψοφοδεής, ψυχαγωγία.*

(*b*) It has been admitted that the proportionate number of 'late words' in the Philebus, i. e. of words common and peculiar to it with the Timaeus, Critias, and Laws, is below that of the Republic, and even of the Phaedo and Symposium. And this fact appears at first sight to contradict the evidence of the more recent statistical inquiry, as well as the other data adduced in 1867. But the anomaly is explained, as already said, by the restricted vocabulary of a dialogue which deals so exclusively as the Philebus does with metaphysical and psychological formulae. In 55 pp. (St.) the Philebus has only 55 peculiar words, i. e. only one for a page, or one-third of the proportion of the Phaedrus. Now of these 55, notwithstanding the prosaic cast of the dialogue, the following are tragic :—*ἀναίνομαι, ἀναπολέω, ἄοινος, μισητός, περιβόητος, προχαίρω, χαρμονή, ψευδῶς,* while these are Epic—*ἀσπαστός, θέρομαι, μισγάγκεια* (but cp. Ar. Pl. 953). A good many are late derivatives—*ἀπόρημα, δυσχέρασμα, προσδόκημα, στοχασμός, ἀναχώρησις, θεώρησις, στόχασις, φάρμαξις, διδυμότης, δυσαπαλλακτία* (or -*ξία*), *εὐδοκιμία, δοξοκαλία, αὐτάρκεια, παιδαριώδης, περατοειδής, νηφαντικός, ξυλουργικός, ἀνοηταίνω.* The rest are chiefly new compounds (with *ἀνα, ἐν, ἐπι, προσ, συν, ὑπεξ*).

If we now examine the group consisting of Soph., Polit., Phil., Tim., Critias, Laws, we shall find that although the contribution of the Philebus to the special vocabulary of this group is not large, it is notwithstanding significant. It contains about

20 tragic words, including ἀμήχανος, ἄμικτος, ἐνδίκως, καίριος, λῴων, πάθη, περιφανής, τέκνον, τέρψις.

50 new compounds, including ἀποσῴζω, διαμερίζω, ἐξιάομαι, συγκεφαλαιόομαι.

10 late derivatives, including ἀναισθησία, δοξοσοφία, ἐπιχείρησις, πῆξις, σύστημα, σωμασκία.

And 13 physiological words, amongst others διάκρισις, σύγκρισις, σύγκρασις, σύμμιξις, ὑπομίγνυμι, ὑποδοχή.

The Phaedrus affects ornateness, novelty, and copiousness of diction, and in doing so anticipates some of the peculiarities which became fixed in the later vocabulary. The Philebus on the other hand is below the average of copiousness; and yet, when its characteristic features are examined not by number but by kind, it is found to partake, even in its diction, of the special characteristics which mark the Timaeus, Critias, and Laws.

§ 6. (*c*) Every reader of the Laws must have been struck by the frequency of Old Attic and Ionic words and forms. Stallbaum[1], in reply to Zeller, tried to account for this by the nature of the subject and the gravity of phrase belonging naturally to a book on legislation. But the same features are present more or less in all the six dialogues now under review. Dionysius must have had these in mind, when he coupled Plato with Thucydides as having written in the earlier Attic. The familiar observation that the later prose runs more and more into Iambic and Paeonic rhythms might also be largely illustrated from these writings.

Such obvious facts as the use of τέκνον for παιδίον, βλάβος[2] side by side with βλάβη, of κλαυθμονή for ὀλοφυρμός, of τέρψις and χαρμονή side by side with ἡδονή, the preference of full-sounding words like φράζειν, φλαῦρος, the fondness shown for νᾶμα, ἐπιρροή, γεννήτωρ, ἀμαθαίνω, and similar words, are apparent even to the cursory reader. ἡσυχαῖος is preferred to ἡσύχιος, εἵνεκα to ἕνεκα (if we may trust the MSS.), Ἀπόλλωνα to Ἀπόλλω. The mannerism of the style appears not only in the use of different forms, but in the frequency of

[1] Vol. x, pp. 57 foll.

[2] βλάβος = damage, βλάβη = hurt.

some which occur sparingly elsewhere. Thus manuscript evidence favours πτάσθαι (not πτέσθαι), φευξεῖσθαι (not φεύξεσθαι) in the Laws more than in other parts of Plato[1]. Some inflexions, although true to analogy, are altogether new—such as ἠπιστήθη (1 aor. of ἐπίσταμαι) Laws 686 D. A noticeable peculiarity is the substitution of the common γυμναστής for the specially Attic παιδοτριβής.

The following specimens are taken from a list of 150 tragic, Ionic and Old Attic words, which are found in the Laws and not elsewhere in Plato:—

ἀΐστωρ, ἀκταίνω, ἀρτίπους, βασιλίς, γαμετή, γέννα, δολιχός, ἔρεισμα, θράσος, κλαυθμονή, κλύδων, λύσιμος, νέηλυς, οἰκισμός (Solon), ὁμίλημα, ὅττα, παίδειος, παιδουργία, παπαῖ, πέλανος, πλησιόχωρος (Herodotus), ῥέζω, σφριγάω, τητάομαι, τόλμημα, φορβάς, χόρευμα, χρόνιος.

The following, on the other hand, are amongst the words which appear in the Laws for the first time. Some of these also have an Ionic flavour. Others are obviously recent derivatives and compounds:—

ἀναθόλωσις, ἀπηγόρημα, γλυκυθυμία, γοώδης, διαθετήρ, διαφωνία, δυσκληρέω, ἔνρυθμος, ἐξείλησις, ἐπιτηδειότης, ἑτεροφωνία, εὐθημονέομαι, θρασυξενία, καλλίφωνος, κηπεία, κλεμμάδιος[2], κόσμημα, λοιδόρησις, μακαριότης, μεγαλόνοια, μετακόσμησις, μοναυλία, ὀχεταγωγία, παιδοποίησις, πατρονομέομαι, σκάμμα, σωφρονιστύς, ταπείνωσις, τάφρευμα, φιλοστοργέω, φωνασκέω.

(*d*) There are marked differences of style between the Timaeus and the Laws. The high-wrought concentration, the sustained movement, the strong energy of the shorter dialogue might be effectively contrasted with the leisurely progress, the lengthy diatribes, even the tedious wordiness of a conversation, for which the longest day can hardly have sufficed. Yet the two writings have a large common element, and as compared with the Republic they both exhibit changes pointing the same way. At present we are concerned with the vocabulary. Of 81 words common and peculiar to the

[1] Schanz' Plato, vol. XII, p. 18. [2] Qu. an κλεπτάδιος?

Timaeus and Critias (considered as one dialogue) with the Laws (Tim. 68, Critias 13), about 40 are tragic, including—

ἀθλέω, ἀπειθής, δυσθυμία, ἐξαίσιος, ἐξορθόω, εὐαγής, εὔψυχος[1], *εὐψυχία, ἰσάριθμος, κύτος, κῶλον, μετάστασις, ξενών, παίδευμα, πλημμελῶς, σαλεύω, φράττω.*

Of 348 words peculiar to the Timaeus and Critias a certain number may be attributed to the special subject of the Timaeus. But more than 100 (or about one-third) belong to the language of tragedy: for example, *αἰνιγμός, ἄση, βασιλείδης, δύσφορος, εὐήμερος, θλίβω, καθαγίζω, κάρτα, κατηρεφής, κεραυνός, κτῆνος, κτυπός, μένος, νοτερός, πεδάω, περιθύμως, σκέπη, στενωπός, συντόμως, σφίγγω, τιμαλφής, τραχηλός, ὑπόστεγος, φλόξ, χειρουργέω, χλόη, ὠχρός.*

Of late forms in the Timaeus some of the most remarkable are—

ἀδιάπλαστος, ἔγερσις, ἔγκαυμα, ζύμωσις, θερμαντικός, ἱμαντώδης, κηροειδής, ὀξυήκοος, ὀργανοποιΐα, παραφορότης, φάντασις (side by side with *φαντασία*).

(*e*) It remains (under the head of diction) to show that the vocabulary of the Sophist and the Statesman, apart from the special subject matter of either dialogue, has much in common with that which has been found to belong to the Philebus, Timaeus, Critias and Laws.

The vocabulary of the Sophist (52 pp. St.) coincides in 54 instances with that of the Laws.

The Politicus (54 pp. St.) exhibits 72 such coincidences.

Between the Timaeus (with Critias) and Soph. there are 36 coincidences of diction. Between Tim., Critias, and Politicus, 42.

This estimate includes only words which are found in no Platonic dialogue, except those immediately in question.

The number of tragic words found in Soph., Polit. (taken together), and in none of the 'earlier dialogues,' is 116, of which the following are the most remarkable:—*ἀγήρως* (Polit., Phileb., Tim., Laws), *ἀντίσταθμος* (Soph.), *ἄπλετος* (Soph.,

[1] In the Laws *εὐψυχία* has the special sense of 'good mental condition,' but *εὔψυχος* = *ἀνδρεῖος*.

Laws), δεσπότις (Polit., Tim., Laws), εὐλαβής (-ῶς) (Soph., Polit., Laws), κρηπίς (Polit., Laws), κρυφαῖος (Soph., Tim.), νωθής (Polit., Tim.), πάλη (Soph., Polit., Laws), πάμπαν (Polit., Tim., Laws), σκέπασμα (Polit., Laws), στέγασμα (Polit., Tim., Critias), στέλλω (Soph., Polit., Laws), συμφυής (Soph., Tim., Laws), σύνδρομος (Polit., Laws), σύντομος (Polit., Critias, Laws), σύντροφος (Polit., Laws), τολμηρός (Soph., Laws), χαῦνος (Soph., Polit., Laws).

In adverting briefly to the less tangible subject of structure and rhythm, I may refer to the Introductions to the Sophist and Statesman, ed. 1867. A word of reply is due, however, to a friendly objector, who urges that the tone and colouring of these dialogues are dramatically suited to the presence of Timaeus, of the Eleatic friend, and of the Athenian Stranger. § 7.

(1) Why should the chief speakers in these six dialogues talk so nearly in the same curious manner?

Compare together, for example, the following places, taken almost at random:—

Soph. 258 D τὴν γὰρ θατέρου φύσιν . . . τὸ μὴ ὄν.
Polit. 284 E, 288 E.
Phileb. 53 B,C σμικρὸν ἄρα καθαρὸν . . . καλλίων γίγνοιτ' ἄν.
Ib. 67 *ad fin.* οἷς πιστεύοντες . . . ἑκάστοτε λόγων.
Tim. 53 B νῦν δ' αὖ τὴν διάταξιν . . . ξυνέψεσθε.
Laws I. 644 D θαῦμα μὲν . . . ξυνεστηκός.
Ib. I. 648 D, E.

And (2) Why, within the limits of the same dialogue, should Socrates, Critias, and Hermogenes adopt the language of Timaeus, or why should Socrates, Theodorus, Theaetetus and the younger Socrates adopt the fashion of their new acquaintance from Magna Graecia? Why should the young Protarchus ape the new-fangled affectations of his teacher? Or how is it that Kleinias and Megillus, although less instructed, have caught so readily the style of their Athenian companion for the day?

Compare once more—

Sophist. 217 C (Socrates).
,, 265 D (Theaetetus).
Polit. 257 B (Theodorus).
Phileb. 13 B, C (Protarchus).
Tim. 20 C (Hermocrates).
,, 23 C (Kritias).
,, 29 D (Socrates).
Laws IV. 713 B (Megillus).
,, VI. 752 B (Kleinias).

Surely the resemblance of style between the Cretan and Spartan, and of both to their Athenian friend, is closer than that between the several Athenian speakers in the Symposium.

I have tried to show, not only that the six dialogues, Soph., Polit., Phil., Tim., Critias, Laws, are rightly grouped together as the latest, but I have also endeavoured to describe the nature of the change in Plato's manner of writing which this fact involves. The chief characteristics of his later style are the following:—

1. A measured and elaborately balanced gravity of utterance, in which the rhetorical artifices which he had once half affected and half despised are passing into a settled habit of *ῥητορεία* and conscious impressiveness.

2. The increasing prevalence of certain particles and formulae, adopted partly for euphony, and partly to suit with an archaic and tragic colouring.

3. A range of diction passing far beyond the limits of 'Attic purity,' and reverting in a remarkable degree to the use of the Old Attic and Ionic words. Macaulay speaks of Milton's prose as 'stiff with cloth of gold.' Plato's later style is stiffened with a sort of *τραγικὸς λῆρος*, or antique embroidery, while the tendency to employ new compounds and derivatives, already active in the Republic, is present here in a more advanced stage.

4. The artificial balancing and interlacing of phrases is carried much further than even in the Phaedrus, Republic and Theaetetus.

If we turn from the form to the substance of these six § 8.
dialogues, we find in them an increasing sense of the remoteness of the ideal, without any diminution of its importance. A deepening religious consciousness is associated with a clearer perception of the distance between man and God, and of the feebleness and dependence of mankind. But the feeling is accompanied with a firm determination to face and cope with the burden and the mystery of the actual world—to provide support for human weakness, alleviations of inevitable misery. The presence of Necessity in the universe and in life is acknowledged, in order that it may be partially overcome.

The change here implied is not one of creed, but of mental attitude, induced, as we may gather from indications that are not obscure, by a large acquaintance with the contemporary world, and by the writer's own experience in wrestling with intellectual and practical difficulties. The effect is traceable (1) in metaphysics, (2) in logic, (3) in psychology, (4) in physics, (5) in politics, (6) in ethics and religion, and (7) in the conception of history.

(1) Metaphysics.

In their metaphysical aspect, these dialogues turn chiefly on a few highly abstract notions, the essential forms of Being, not-being, sameness, difference, motion, rest, limit, finite, infinite:—and these are no longer merely contemplated in their isolated reality, but in their connexion with phenomena and with one another. The method becomes less ontological and more logical. 'The idea of good' is approached not merely through Socratic definitions or figurative adumbration, but through the direct analysis and manipulation of primary conceptions—for example those of measure and

symmetry. The five γένη of the Sophist, the description of the ideas in the Politicus as τὰ τῶν πάντων στοιχεῖα, the metaphysical categories, as one may venture to term them, of the Philebus, belong to a more exact mode of philosophizing than had been thought of when the Phaedo was written, and one which was only vaguely anticipated in the Republic as 'the longer way.' The θατέρου φύσις and μικτὴ οὐσία of the Sophist and Philebus are resumed and applied in the Timaeus.—The Laws contain but few references to metaphysical problems. But this is in entire keeping with the remotion of the actual from the ideal; and the attentive student is aware of an ever-growing conviction of the significance of measure and of number, and a fixed belief in the supremacy of Mind. 'Measure' is indeed the first and last word of Plato's metaphysic—the μετρητική of the Protagoras anticipates the μέτρον of the Philebus.

(2) Logic.

The dialectical achievement in the Sophistes is the pivot of the logical movement. Plato had found that thought was being sacrificed to the instrument of thought, or rather that the instrument was itself endangered. Zeno had 'jammed' the weapon of Parmenides. The Sophist-dialogue brings for the first time into a clear light the nature of predication, of classification, and of proof, and places the science of Logic on a rational footing. The effects of the discussion, which is continued in the Politicus, are apparent in the method of that dialogue, and even in the elaborate distinctions of the Laws. As Mr. Paul Shorey observes in his able papers on the Timaeus, the practical aim of the whole business is 'to obtain a working logic.'

(3) Psychology.

The dialectical advance accompanies, and indeed occasions, a corresponding progress in psychological analysis—which is especially apparent in the Philebus. It is needless to illustrate this familiar fact. See especially Tim. 42 A, 69 D;

Laws III. 644–646, IV. 770 D (comparing this last passage with Rep. VI *sub init.*).

(4) Physics.

In all these dialogues, and not in the Timaeus only, there is an unceasing interest in production (γένεσις), and a tendency to look upon things from the point of view of the Universe rather than of Man. See especially the myth in the Politicus, and the mention of prehistoric cataclysms in the Laws:—also Soph. 265 C and Phileb. 59 A, compared with Tim. 59 C, D. The physical conditions of mental states, especially of Sensation, Pleasure and Pain, and of moral evil are more insisted on. The importance of health, and of the care of the body generally, is more fully recognized. The allusions to medicine and gymnastic in the Republic are in strong contrast to those in the Timaeus and Laws. And a great advance in clearness of cosmological conception is implied in the discussion of ἄνω and κάτω in the Timaeus, as compared with the employment of the same notion in the Phaedo and Republic.

(5) Politics.

In Rep. B. V Plato already acknowledges that it is hard to realize the ideal. Notwithstanding, he is absolutely bent on realizing it. He will not swerve aside in deference to opinion or circumstances, but will wait until circumstances favour, and till opinion shall come round. He is sure that mankind are not unreasonable, could they but hear the truth. Before he wrote the Laws, a varied intercourse with man had dashed his confidence and lessened his hope, but had not impaired his zeal for the improvement of mankind. He is now ready to adapt himself to human weakness and, the higher road having proved impracticable, to seek a *modus vivendi* that may embody as much of righteousness and wisdom as the race will bear. The work is full of the gentleness and consideration of one who lives on

Till old experience do attain
To something like prophetic strain.

Now the crisis of this tradition from Optimism to Meliorism is reflected in a very interesting manner in the Statesman-dialogue. Plato has been brought to feel that in his ideal Republic he had been grasping at the moon. He had legislated for the age of Cronos during the reverse cycle which is *said to be* under the government of Zeus. The dialogue is instinct with a suppressed bitterness, which time had mellowed when he wrote the Laws. But the author of the Politicus is not less keenly bent on finding a practicable way. The problem he sets before himself is how to bring scientific thought to bear upon the actual world. Despairing of spontaneous obedience to a perfect will, he has recourse to legislative enactment, as a second best course, by which men may be led or driven to imitate from afar off the free movement of Divine Reason. The art of legislation is compared to that of weaving (a metaphor which is repeated in the Laws). And the same stress is laid, as in many passages of the later dialogue, on the importance of combining, through breeding and education, the energetic with the gentler elements of human nature. The provision of a διάδοχος in Laws VI to supplement the work of the legislator, is in accordance with the hint given in the Politicus, and may be contrasted with the contempt that is showered on ἐπανόρθωσις in Rep. IV. 426.

The Timaeus, Critias and Hermocrates, had the trilogy been completed, would have been the outcome of another mood, but of one also differing from the spirit of the Republic. In the Republic Plato contents himself with laying down great principles. He is confident that, if these are preserved, the citizens may be trusted to discover the rest. The opening of the Timaeus makes a deeper plunge into actuality by raising the almost impossible demand :—How did the citizens of the ideal state comport themselves in that far-off time beyond our ken (Rep. VI. 499 D)? This question belongs to the firm resolution to be practical, to realize abstractions in the concrete, to make the step from οὐσία to γένεσις, which finds a less confident application in the Politicus and Laws. The same motive appears in the admission of approximate

knowledge in the Philebus as requisite 'if a man is to be able to find his way home.'

(6) Ethics and Religion.

In these last dialogues, more than elsewhere in Plato, we are made conscious, as has been already said, of the distance between Man and God. The imitation of the Divine is still the highest duty, but it is an imitation from very far away. Although the doctrine of metempsychosis is retained, and the belief in immortality is more than once very finely expressed, yet the proud claim to *ἀπαθανατισμός* the life which is a meditation of death, and even the formation of the inward man after the pattern in the Heavens, are no longer the leading notes of the new strain. The philosopher is less than ever simply bent on saving his own soul. The speakers rather strive after the partial overcoming of evil with good, the infusion of a spirit of generosity, which may leaven the inherent selfishness of men;—the institution of a rule of life which may prevent society from foundering amid the weltering sea of politics. Sympathy with Orphic observances, especially in the abstention from animal food (*ἀλλήλων ἐδωδή*) is common to the Politicus and Laws.

The human and divine *νοῦς* are kept apart in the Philebus more emphatically than in Rep. VI; and in the Timaeus the elements of soul which the Creator dispenses to the *δημιουργοί* for the creation of man are not of pristine purity *ἀλλὰ δεύτερα καὶ τρίτα*. The faintness which now attends 'the larger hope' is strikingly apparent in the Politicus-myth.

(7) History.

Lastly, in these six dialogues (to which the Menexenus may perhaps be added) we find a more distinct anticipation than elsewhere in Plato of two essentially modern ideas, the conception, namely, of a History of Philosophy and of a Philosophy of History.

(*a*) In the Sophistes, philosophical method is for the first

time expressly based on criticism (although the step had been partly anticipated in the Parmenides and Theaetetus). The same plan is carried out in parts of the Philebus.

(*b*) The Hermocrates, on the other hand, was to have been an ideal history of human good and evil. And in speculating on the nature and origin of legislation, the Athenian Stranger Laws III finds it advisable to preface his remarks with a recapitulation of the earlier History of Hellas.

ESSAY II

ON THE TEXT OF THIS EDITION OF PLATO'S REPUBLIC.

BEKKER'S text of the Republic (1817 to 1823) rests on twelve MSS., which he quotes as A Θ Ξ Π Φ 𝔇 K *q* *t*[1] *v* 𝔪[2] 𝔯, all collated by himself; he also mentions the Venetian Codex 𝔱[3], of which Schanz in editing the smaller dialogues has since made valuable use. § 1.

Stallbaum added the Florentine MSS. a b c n x α′ β′ γ′,—and Schneider, besides re-collating *q* exhaustively, collated Lobcov., Vind. D, Vind. E, Vind. F[4]. To these twenty-four MSS. is now to be added a twenty-fifth, Codex 4, Plutei xxviii, in the Malatestian Library at Cesena, which in the present edition will be quoted as M (Malatestianus). Subsequent editors, especially K. F. Hermann, have relied more exclusively than Bekker did upon the chief MS., Paris A; and Baiter in his preface to the fifth Zurich edition particularizes no other MS. authority.

[1] Collated only to p. 441 St.

[2] 'Primo libro caret,' Bekker.

[3] Schneider, Praef. p. xxxi 'Ibidem [Morellius] quartum commemorat non magis a quoquam collatum, absque numero post impressum indicem bibliothecae Marcianae additum, forma maxima sec. XII scriptum, inter alia Platonica civitatem cum scholiis continentem, sed inde a libro tertio usque ad ultimum manu sec. XV exaratum.' It is now numbered App. 4. 1. Schanz has proved that the earlier portion is derived from Paris A.

[4] Schneider's habit of marking all his MSS. anew is a drawback to the otherwise exceptional usefulness of his edition. Bekker's and Stallbaum's marks are here retained, those of Schneider being adopted only for his own MSS. He made little use of Vind. 54, in which the Republic is by a recent hand and copied from Lobcov.

§ 2. The present text was originally founded on Baiter's edition of 1881, but in the course of revision has assumed a form more nearly approaching to that of Hermann. The select list of various readings at the bottom of each page has been for the most part taken from three MSS., A Π M, with occasional reference to others of those mentioned above.

Paris. A, of the ninth century, has been re-examined several times since Bekker's edition, notably by K. F. Hermann, Dübner, and Cobet: also by Baiter, who, however, in his preface to his edition of 1881 still marked a few readings as uncertain. In order to clear up these remaining uncertainties I visited the Paris National Library in June, 1890, and found that several readings which are quite clear and unmistakable in Paris. A are still misquoted in the editions[1]. I have therefore now made a fresh collation of this MS. with the present text, which had unfortunately been partly printed off before the opportunity for this collation occurred, and a list of the corrections which are thus rendered necessary will be found in the Appendix to this Essay (Appendix I).

Bekker's quotations of Venn. Π Ξ are also not free from inaccuracy, and Professor C. Castellani, Prefect of the Library of St. Mark at Venice, has done good service by providing a complete new collation of these MSS. with Bekker's text for the purposes of the present edition. A list of Bekker's errors and omissions will be found below, Appendix III.

M. Schanz considers Ven. Π and the MSS. derived from it (D K *q* *β'* Vind. D), as bearing traces in the Republic of a tradition independent of Par. A. And it may be observed in confirmation of this opinion, that the erroneous reading *λύρα* (for *αὔρα*) in III. 401 C, now shown to be peculiar to Π, must have arisen from the misreading of a copy in uncial characters and therefore anterior to A.

A third set of MSS., having some probable readings not

[1] I refer especially to Baiter's Zurich editions since 1881.

distinctly referable to A or Π, are regarded by many recent editors as merely interpolated. To this class of 'bad' MSS. Schanz[1] has consigned the Cesena MS., our M. A full description of this MS., written by Professor Enrico Rostagno, who has collated it for this edition, is given below (Appendix IV).

In Mucciuoli's catalogue of the Malatestian Library it is described as of the twelfth century, and Signor Rostagno, whose judgement is of weight, speaks of it as for the most part written towards the end of that century. The absence of iota subscript from the portion written in the earlier hand, and the constant accentuation of the enclitic τέ, after unaccented syllables, afford some slight confirmation of this view. The portion of the MS. which is by a later hand, is referred to as *M* (*italicé*) in the critical notes to this edition (pp. 308–319).

Other MSS. occasionally referred to in the critical notes are:

b Laurentianus, 85, 6, containing Books I and II: but from II. 358 E πολλάκις τις νοῦν ἔχων in a fifteenth century hand. The earlier part, ending with περὶ γὰρ τίνος ἂν μᾶλλον was formerly quoted as of the twelfth century, but according to E. Rostagno belongs to the thirteenth.

x Laurentianus, 85, 7, thirteenth century (?).

a Laurentianus, 80, 7, fifteenth century.

γ Laurentianus, 42, thirteenth century (?).

D Parisiensis, 1810, thirteenth century.

K Parisiensis, 1642, fifteenth century.

m Vaticanus, 61, 'bombyc. aut chart.' Bekker.

r Vaticanus, 1029 a b, 'membr. f. max. foliis bipartitis,' 2 vols.

Vind. E Vindobonensis, 1, 'chart.'

[1] *Studien*, p. 67.

Vind. F Vindobonensis, 55, fourteenth century.
Vind. D Vindobonensis, 89, 'chart. f. max.'
q Monacensis, 237, fifteenth century.
Ξ Venetus, 184, fifteenth century.

§ 3. Some further observations on the more important MSS. are here subjoined[1]:

A *Parisiensis* A: Paris National Library MS. Gr. 1807: ninth century. On the left-hand margin, at the end of the volume, the following note has been written with contractions in reddish ink, and in a cursive hand:—*ὠρθώθη ἡ βίβλος αὕτη ὑπὸ κωνσταντίνου μητροπολίτου ἱεραπόλεως τοῦ καὶ ὠνησαμένου.* If this Hierapolis might be assumed to be the Metropolis of Phrygia, the question raised by Mr. T. W. Allen in the *Journal of Philology*, vol. xxi, as to the *provenance* of the group of MSS. to which A belongs, would be partly answered. But the Bishop is not to be held responsible for the more serious corrections, which were probably made by the copyist of the Scholia before the book was exposed for sale. Indeed, some of the most trivial annotations, ignorant emendations, and impossible various readings, bear a suspicious resemblance to the metropolitan's writing. The question whether the first diorthotes, who seems to have been a careful person, had before him any other MS. than that from which the first hand had copied, is important, but can hardly be resolved. In point of authority there is in fact hardly any difference between the first and second hand. It will be observed that there are several cases in which words omitted in the text are supplied in the margin, to all appearance by the second hand. The first hand corrected many slips in the

[1] For a complete catalogue of the MSS. of Plato, see Martin Wohlrab's *Die Platonhandschriften und ihre gegenseitigen Beziehungen*, Leipzig, 1887. Those left out of account in the present essay are Venetus 187 (closely related to Ξ); Vindobonensis 54, collated in part by Schneider; Mon. C. = Monacensis 490 (collated by Schneider in B. VII and part of B. X); Monacensis 514, Venetus 150, and the fragments 𝔡 (Bekker) and Palatinus (Schneider) in the Libraries of Darmstadt and Heidelberg. (On Lobcov., Φ, Θ, see below.)

course of writing, and has frequently covered the blank made by erasure with ÷ ÷ ÷ instead of writing again over the same space. Many slight omissions are supplied either by the first or second hand between the lines. Adscript iota is often added by the second hand, sometimes a little above the line (ἅιδης) which appears to have been a mode intermediate between adscription and subscription (αι and ᾳ). Many, if not most of the accents have been added after writing,—perhaps by the diorthotes. They are in a different ink, as Cobet observed.

Habits of the MS. to be noticed once for all are:

1. Spelling:—

ποιῶ not ποῶ, υἱός or ὑΐός more often than ὑός, πορρωτέρωι, ἐγγυτέρωι, &c., σώιζω, θνήισκω, &c. Paragogic ν retained before consonants: οὕτως and οὕτω interchanged.

2. Accentuation:—

a. τέ, πού, τίς (*sic*):—enclitics are constantly thus accented—especially after unaccented syllables.

b. ἄλλό τι, ἤπέρ ἐστιν, &c.

c. γ' οὖν (not γοῦν).

d. ὅστισ οὖν, &c. (generally corrected to ὁστισοῦν, &c., by a recent hand).

e. μὴ δὲ μία, &c.

f. ἐπαυτοφώρῳ, καθαυτό, αὐτοδικαιοσύνη, &c.

g. ἀφίῃ, παρίῃ, ξυνίῃ (retained in the text).

h. The accent on μέν, δέ, &c., in antitheses often doubled,—the second accent often added by another hand.

i. A singular practice of distinguishing ἄν = ἐάν, by omitting the accent and writing ἀν. In many cases the accent originally written has been erased.

k. ἔστιν and ἐστίν constantly confused.

l. τᾶλλα, not τἄλλα:—also τῆνδε, τοιᾶνδε, &c.

3. Breathings:—

a. Confusion of αὐτοῦ and αὑτοῦ, αὐτή and αὕτη, &c.

b. ὥσ αὔτως.

c. ἀθρόος, ἄσμενος, ἄττα, ἴκταρ.

4. Abbreviations are very infrequent; the commonest is ∽ for ν. Possibly, however, some errors, such as ζητεῖ for ζεῖ in IV. 440 C may be due to early compendia.

5. The persons are distinguished with : between the words and a line — in the margin. The punctuation is careful on the whole.

Later hands have busied themselves in various ways:—

1. In changing ω to ο, ι to η and vice versa, not always rightly;—ὠφελία to ὠφελεία.—ἐλλειπῆ remains unchanged.

2. In constantly changing ει of the 2nd per. sing. middle and passive to ηι, η of the plup. 1st per. sing. to ειν, and placing the mark of elision ' over ἐγῷμαι, οὐχ', &c.

3. In changing the division of syllables between lines by erasing a letter at the end of one line and inserting it at the beginning of the next, or vice versa.

4. Marking interrogation by subjoining a comma to the colon between the speeches, thus ;.

5. Adding marginal glosses, various readings and initial letters of respondents' names, inserted where a doubt seemed possible.

Π *Venetus* Π: St. Mark's Library, Venice; MS. Gr. 185: twelfth century. It contains the Republic, with the loss of about four leaves, from VI. 507 E to VII. 515 D, and from X. 612 E ἔστι ταῦτα to the end.

The first hand has been but slightly corrected while the MS. was new, but a hand of the fifteenth century has altered many readings, generally in accordance with the tradition which is now represented by Ven. Ξ. Ven. Π supplies some words that are omitted in Par. A, though it agrees with A in other places, where both have to be corrected from a different source.

The following brief description of the MS. is from the hand of Professor Castellani, Prefect of St. Mark's Library at Venice:

'Cod. 185, membr. Saec. XII[1], 348 x 260 millim., ff. 349,

[1] Morelli, *Bibl. manuscripta*, p. 109.

quadragenorum versuum. Continet, praeter Timaeum Locrum, Platonis Euthyphr., Socratis Apol., Crit., Phaed., Cratyl., Theaet., Sophist., Politicum, Parmen., Phileb., Sympos., Phaedr., Alcib. A et B, Hipparch., Amat., Clitoph., Rempublicam. In Republica vero deest finis libri sexti et initium libri septimi, duo enim folia ibi abscissa sunt: deest quoque finis libri decimi, qui desinit in verbis: ὥσπερ καὶ καταρχὰς ὡμολογοῦμεν· ἔστι ταῦτα. Accedunt nonnulla scholia, partim a manu eadem qua textus, partim a recentiore exscripta. Emendationes quoque sunt frequentes, eaeque saeculo XV adscribuntur.'

Cesenas M: 28. 4, in the Malatestian Library at Cesena: M
twelfth to thirteenth century. This MS. is here selected as a sufficient representative of the third or inferior class of MSS. which retain some readings independently of A and Π. It is older than any of the Florentine MSS.[1], and it has a close and indisputable affinity to Vaticanus m, the last of Bekker's MSS. which M. Schanz eliminated in his process of reducing the apparatus to A and Π. The age of m is not given, but Bekker's description of it as 'bombyc. aut chartac.' shows that it has no high claim to antiquity. This MS., while agreeing in very many points with M, is much more seriously interpolated, and may be assumed to represent a later stage of corruption[2]. M therefore holds a high place in the sub-family m Ξ *v t*, to which the Florentine MSS. a c γ′ may be confidently added. Of this class Schanz writes as follows:

'So liegt die Schlussfolgerung nahe, dass die Mutterhandschrift von m Ξ *v t* aus dem Parisinus A stammt. Nicht zu verwundern ist, dass bei der grossen zeitlichen Entfernung von A die Handschriften m Ξ *v t* Interpolationen und Ergänzungen der Lücken, welche A bietet,

[1] The older hand of Flor. b, was formerly attributed to the twelfth century. But E. Rostagno, who has examined both MSS. (M and b) places nearly a century between them.

[2] See this fact brought out below, pp. 87 ff.

aus der zweiten Klasse erfahren haben. So kommt es, dass mehrmals A mit seinen Weglassungen allein dasteht[1].'

§ 4. Whether or not the Cesena MS. is the 'Mutterhandschrift' in question, it will be presently shown to belong to the same sub-family, and to be much purer than m, while it is older by two centuries than Ξ *v t*, and little younger, if at all, than Π, the head MS. of the 'second class,' above referred to. Schanz's reasoning in the passage quoted is thus invalidated in so far as changes are accounted for by long lapse of time, and while every assumption in a matter of this kind may be regarded as provisional, we are in the meantime justified in regarding M as a third witness agreeing in some things with A, in others supporting Π, and also giving independent testimony for some readings which have hitherto depended on the inferior evidence of Ven. Ξ, Mon. *q*, Vind. E, or Flor. a c x *α′ γ′*. This opinion rests upon the following grounds:

A M *versus* Π

I. It is admitted that M agrees with A in many points where Π diverges from both.

		A M	Π
I.	328 D	°ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς—ἰέναι	*om.*
„	D	νεανίαις	νεανίσκοις
„	D	†χαίρω	χαίρω γε
	330 A	°πάνυ τι—ἐπιεικῆς	*om.*
	342 B	°ἢ οὔτε αὐτῆς	*om.*
	343 A	χρῆν	χρὴ
	346 E	°ἀλλ', ὅπερ—παρασκευάζει	*om.*
II.	358 E	†τί ὄν τε	τί οἷόν τε
	365 C	°ἀλάθειαν	ἀλήθειαν
	366 A	†*om.*	αὖ μέγα δύνανται
	367 A	°ξύνοικος ᾖ	ξυνοικοίη
	372 C	°σύκων	συκῶν
	373 A	*om.*	καὶ τὴν ποικιλίαν

[1] Hermes XII. p. 181 (Berlin, 1877).

	A M	Π
II. 377 E	°κακῶς τῷ	κακῶ οὐσίαν τῷ
379 A	*om.*	ἐάν τε ἐν μέλεσιν
381 A	*om.*	καὶ ἀμφιέσματα
382 E	*om.*	οὔτε κατὰ φαντασίας
383 B	°παιῶν'	παιὼν
III. 389 D	†κολάσεως A: κολάσαι ὡς M	κολάσει ὡς
394 D	°ἐγώ—γὰρ δὴ	*om.*
401 C	°αὔρα	λύρα
402 C	οἰόμεθα	οἰώμεθα
403 B	°δόξει	δόξῃ
404 D	°ἐν τῷ	ἐν τῇ
405 C	°λυγιζόμενος	λογιζόμενος
407 B	°μὲν	μὲν γὰρ
408 C	ὀρθότατα	ὀρθότατά γε
411 D	†γενομένου	γενομένου
414 E	°δημιουργουμένη	δημιουργουμένου
416 C	παρασκευάσασθαι	παρεσκευάσθαι
IV. 421 A	°ἔχουσιν	ἔχωσιν
423 B	αὐξομένη	αὐξανομένη
425 C	τὰ ἀγοραῖα	τάδε τὰ ἀγοραῖα
427 E	μὴ οὐ βοηθεῖν	μὴ βοηθεῖν
429 A	°εὑρῆσθαι	εἰρῆσθαι
437 C	†ἐρῶντος (corr. from ἐρωτῶντος A)	ἐρωτῶντος
„ D	ᾗ οὐ A (corr.): ᾗ οὗ M	που (που A² mg. corr.)
438 C	δὴ δεῖ	δεῖ
443 B	†τελευταῖον	τέλεον (et A² mg.)
V. 451 B	φόνου καὶ καθαρὸν	φόνου καθαρὸν
460 D	τιτθαῖς	τίτθαις
461 C	°τούτων	τῶν τοιούτων
462 C	°κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν—κατὰ ταὐτὰ (M *om.* πόλει)	*om.*
463 B	°οἱ δ'	*om.*

	A M	Π
V. 464 E	°ἀνάγκην	ἀνάγκῃ
465 C	°παιδοτροφίαι A παιδοτροφία M	παιδοτρόφῳ
466 B	°φαμὲν	ἔφαμεν
468 C	°μηδενὶ	καὶ μηδενὶ
469 A	°ἀνθρώπων—θεοῦ	*om.*
470 A	φοβησόμεθα	φοβηθησόμεθα
472 B	τόδε χρὴ	χρὴ τόδε
„ C	°τελέως	*om.*
„ D	°ἀποδεῖξαι	ἐπιδεῖξαι
478 B	°φαμέν	ἔφαμεν
„ C	°φανότερον	φανερώτερον
„ D	°ἐντὸς	ἑνὸς
479 C	°ᾧ (ὦ M)	ὡς
479 C D	°μὴ εἶναι—μᾶλλον	*om.*
VI. 487 C	†ταύτην	ταύτῃ
488 A	χαλεπὸν πάθος	χαλεπὸν τὸ πάθος
490 D	†τοὺς	τοὺς μὲν
„ D	τῆς διαβολῆς	τῆς ἤδη διαβολῆς
504 B	ἄλλη	ἀλλ' ἡ
„ C	ἀπολείπων	ἀπολειπὼν
505 A	ᾗ	ᾗ καὶ
506 B	τελέως	παντελῶς
507 B	°ἔστι ταῦτα	*om.*
VII. 522 C	ποῖον	τὸ ποῖον
529 C	†ἐξ ὑπτίας μὲν	ἐξ ὑπτίας νέων
533 A	μοι	ἐμοὶ
„ B	ἢ πρὸς θεραπείαν	ἢ καὶ πρὸς θεραπείαν
536 A	τὰ τοιαῦτα σκοπεῖν	πάντῃ τὰ τοιαῦτα σκοπεῖν
538 C	°πρὸς τοὺς ἀπτομένους	προσαπτομένους
540 B	°κοσμεῖν	κατακοσμεῖν
„ E	δέκ' ἐτῶν	δεκετῶν
VIII. 543 B	°ὧν	ὡς
„ C	°διεληλυθὼς	διελήλυθας
544 C	καὶ ἡ πασῶν	καὶ πασῶν

		A M	Π
VIII.	547 E	τοιούτους	τοὺς τοιούτους
	554 B	°τοῦ χοροῦ	τοῦ χρόνου
	556 A	οὔτε γ'	καὶ οὔτε γ'
	559 C	°τὸν τῶν	τὸν
	560 B	°ὑποτρεφόμεναι	ὑποστρεφόμεναι
	,, E	°εὐπαιδευσίαν	ἀπαιδευσίαν
	561 A	τὴν τῶν	εἰς τὴν τῶν
	,, A	°μάλα	μάλιστα
	562 B	προὔθεντο	προύθετο
	,, B	ἀπώλλυ	ἀπόλλυ
	,, D	αὐτῆς	αὐτοῦ
	564 A	καὶ ἐν πολιτείαις	καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν πολιτείαις
	,, E	σμικρὰ	σμικρὸν
	569 C	°πῦρ δούλων	πῦρ δοῦλον
IX.	571 C	καὶ τίνας	τίνας
	572 A	°ἐᾷ	ἐὰν
	,, A	ἐλθὸν	ἐλθὼν
	,, D	ἕκαστον	ἑκάστων
	573 A	ὅταν	ὅταν δὴ
	,, A	αἱ ἄλλαι	καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι
	,, D	°διακυβερνᾷ	διακυβερνῶ
	574 C	°πάνυ γε	οὐ πάνυ γε
	578 E	ἢ πλείω	ἢ καὶ πλείω
	579 C	καρποῦται ἀνὴρ	καρποῦται ὁ ἀνὴρ
	581 A	°ἀεὶ ὅλον	δεῖ ὅλον
	584 B	τοῦτο	τούτῳ
X.	597 B	ἢ τῇ φύσει	ἢ ἐν τῇ φύσει
	598 B	°πόρρω ἄρα που	πόρρω που ἄρα που
	600 D	ἐπιστατήσωσι τῆς παιδείας	τῆς παιδείας ἐπιστατήσωσι
	601 A	†ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις	ἑτέροις τοιούτοις
	,, E	°ὑπηρετήσει	ὑπηρέτης εἶ
	602 A	°πάνυ γε—ἐπιστήμην	*om.*
	,, D	καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι	καὶ ἄλλαι
	603 E	†ψυχῆς	τύχης

	A M	Π
X. 604 D	ἰατρικὴν θρηνῳδίαν	ἰατρικὴν καὶ θρηνῳδίαν
606 A	°εἰ ἐκείνῃ	ἐκείνῃ
„ C	°αἰσχύνοιο	αἰσχύνοις
„ C	°ἂν εἴης	ἀνείης
610 E	°ἐσκήνηται	ἐσκήνωται
611 D	κεκλάσθαι	ἐκκεκλάσθαι

The fifty-five places which are marked with ° in the foregoing list afford ample evidence that the main text of M is independent of Π. But for the purpose of testing the relationship between M and A, these passages may be neglected, for they merely show that both MSS. agree so far in a sound tradition. What is correct in both comes from the archetype and does not prove any closer affinity.

In one place, IV. 437 D, M is free from the suspicion of error which attends the reading of A. In another, III. 389 D, the reading of M is intermediate, and accounts for the corruption of Π. It remains then to consider those places in which A and M agree in readings (1) erroneous or (2) doubtful.

(1) In the twelve places, which are here marked with an obelus †, the two MSS. are clearly following the same mistaken original. But it is still an open question whether the later is derived from the earlier, or whether they are both derivatives from an older copy in which these errors were already to be found. Such changes as those in III. 411 D (from γενομένου to γενομένου), VI. 487 C (from ταύτηι to ταύτην), X. 603 E (from ψυχῆς to τύχης), may have occurred at an early stage of the tradition.

In IV. 437 C A hesitates between two readings, the first hand having written ἐρωτῶντος, and the diorthotes having corrected this to ἐρῶντος, which is the reading of M. This being so, it is not a little remarkable that in II. 383 B, M gives ἐνδυτεῖσθαι, the reading of A[1], but *not* of the diorthotes, who has changed it to ἐνδατεῖσθαι. The reading μὲν for νέων (529 C) is so widely spread that it may be assumed

to be an early corruption, and νέων is by no means certain.

There remains τί ὄν τε (II. 358 E), a mistaken reading, but one into which an early copyist might easily have fallen, and ἐν τοῖς for ἑτέροις (X. 601 A), which forms part of a phrase supplied in the margin by the diorthotes of A, and therefore not with certainty attributable to the MS. from which A was copied.

(2) So much for the erroneous agreement of M with A. There remain fifty-one places which may be considered doubtful. In most of these the reading of Π has been rejected by recent editors in deference to the authority of A. If they are right in this, the same argument recurs:— A and M agree in following the archetype, which proves nothing as to their special affinity. Where all three MSS. are in error, as in X. 604 D, Π shows a further stage of corruption, and the error is not one which commenced with A. For it is presupposed in Π, which *ex hypothesi* is independent of the A tradition. In IV. 437 D there is a reading which appears significant. A seems originally to have read που, the reading of Π. An early corrector changed this to ἦ οὐ, and wrote που in the margin. M has ἦ οὖ, and ἦ οὖ is the true reading. In IX. 576 D, on the other hand, the true reading ἀρετῇ is absent from A Π M, but is given as a variant by A^2 in the margin. If M were copied from A, the scribe would surely have availed himself of this. With regard to the omissions not marked with °, viz. II. 373 A, 379 A, 381 A, 382 E, it may be reasonably argued that Π is right, although not demonstrably so, for the words supplied are not necessary to the sense. But the error, if so be, is one which may have occurred at any period. Even in the few cases, such as III. 408 C, V. 451 B, VI. 488 A, VIII. 564 A, where it may be thought that the advantage is on the side of Π, this would indicate affinity between A and M, but would not prove the derivation of the later from the earlier MS.

When all is said, the amount of agreement here exhibited

proves a close relationship between A and M, but does not necessitate the inference of direct derivation.

§ 5. II. What then is to be inferred from the places in which M agrees with Π while differing from A?

In the following list A = A + A², that is the places are discounted in which the reading of Π M is anticipated by an early corrector of A.

A *versus* **Π M**

		A	Π M
I.	330 C	ἥπερ	°ᾗπερ
	332 C	ἔφη ὦ πρὸς	ἔφη πρὸς
	339 B	καὶ δίκαιον φῇς	°δίκαιον φῇς
	342 A	δεῖ αἰεὶ	°δεῖ
	344 E	οὐδέ τι	οὐδὲ
	345 C?	πιαίνειν c. γρ. ποιμαίνειν	°ποιμαίνειν
	347 C	δεῖ δὲ	°δεῖ δὴ
	349 B	πλεῖον	πλέον
	352 D	ὥστ' ἐμοὶ	°ὥς γέ μοι
II.	358 A	*om.*	°ἀδικία δ' ἐπαινεῖται
	„ E	πλέονι	πλέον
	359 C	ἐπαυτοφώρῳ	ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ
	„ C	νόμῳ δὲ βίᾳ	νόμῳ δὲ καὶ βίᾳ
	„ D	μυθολογοῦσι	°ἃ μυθολογοῦσι
	„ D	ἄλλο μὲν	°ἄλλο μὲν ἔχειν
	360 E	τί οὖν	τίς οὖν
	364 D	λιστοὶ δὲ στρεπτοί τε	°στρεπτοὶ δέ τε
	„ D	*om.*	τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη
	366 A	ἀζήμιοι	ἀζήμιοι μόνον
	374 B	οἰκοδόμον, ἵνα—γίγνοιτο	οἰκοδόμον ἀλλὰ σκυτοτόμον, ἵνα—γίγνοιτο Π οἰκοδόμον ἵνα — γίγνοιτο, ἀλλὰ σκυτοτόμον M
	„ C	σκυτοτόμων	σκυτοτομῶν
	378 D	τοιαῦτα μᾶλλον	°τοιαῦτα λεκτέα μᾶλλον
III.	387 C	ὑπὸ	°ὑπὲρ
	390 A	νεανικεύματα	νεανι(σκ)εύματα

		A	Π M
III.	392 A	περιορίζομεν οἷς	°πέρι ὁριζομένοις
	395 C	ἵνα ἐκ τῆς μιμήσεως	°ἵνα μὴ ἐκ τῆς μιμήσεως
	396 D	ἑαυτοῦ	°ἑαυτὸν
	398 A	τε εἰς	τ' ἂν εἰς
	399 C	ἀποβαίνοντα	°τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα
	401 C	ἀνεμόμενοι	°νεμόμενοι
	402 D	διότι	°δὴ ὅ τι
	404 A	τε καὶ ἀνάγκη	°τε ἀνάγκη
IV.	421 D	διαφέρει	°διαφθείρει
	431 A	τὸν	°τὸ
	432 C	φράσεις	°φράσῃς
	433 E	τοῦτο	°τούτου
	434 C	ὧδε λέγωμεν	°ὧδε λέγομεν
	435 B	ἑαυτῇ	°αὐτῇ
	439 D	ἕτερον	°ἑταῖρον
	440 E	εἶδος	°τι εἶδος
	443 A	μὲν καὶ	°μὴν καὶ
	,, D	*om.*	°αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ . . . ἑαυτῷ
V.	450 A	ταὐτὰ	°ταῦτα
	,, C	πειρῶ ἂν	πειρῶ οὖν
	451 B	λέγειν δὲ	°λέγειν δὴ
	453 E	ὁμολογοῦμεν	$\overset{\omega}{\text{ὁ}}$μολογοῦμεν Π °ὡμολογοῦμεν M
	466 A	φύλακας ποιοῦμεν	°φύλακας ποιοῖμεν
	469 E	βαλόντος	βάλλοντος
VI.	491 C	πάντως	°παντὸς
	496 C	τῷ δικαίῳ	τῶν δικαίων
	,, D	ἀποστάς	ὑποστάς
	497 B	ἐκπίπτειν	ἐκπίπτει
	498 B	φιλοσοφίᾳ	φιλοσοφίαν
	502 B	ἔσθ' ὅστις	ἔσθ' ὅτις
	504 D	*om.*	°ἢ γυμναζομένῳ· ἤ, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, τοῦ μεγίστου τε
VII.	516 E	ὅτι οὗτος	°ὁ τοιοῦτος
	518 D	δεῖ . μηχανήσασθαι	°διαμηχανήσασθαι

		A	Π M
VII.	521 B	οἱ περὶ	°οἳ περὶ
	526 D	προσιὸν	°προϊὸν (*M*)
	527 C	καὶ δὴ καὶ πρὸς	καὶ δὴ πρὸς
	528 D	μετὰ ταύτην	μετ' αὐτὴν (so Bekker)
	534 D	πάντα ταῦτα	ταῦτα πάντα
	537 E	καλὸν	°κακὸν
VIII.	552 D	τί οὖν ;	°δῆλον ἔφη : τί οὖν ;
	558 B	ἅπαντ' αὐτὰ	ἅπαντα ταῦτα
	561 A	τὸ μὲν	°τότε μὲν
	567 B	ὑπεξαίρειν	°ὑπεξαιρεῖν
IX.	582 D	οὕτως	°οὗτος
	584 D	ἀλλ' ὡς	°ἄλλως
	585 C	ἀληθείας καὶ αὖ τὸ	°ἀληθείας καὶ αὐτὸ
X.	597 E	τραγῳδοποιός	τραγωδιοποιός
	601 D	ἣν ἂν	°πρὸς ἣν ἂν
	602 B	τὸ δὲ δὴ	τὸ δὴ

§ 6. Schanz's theory would assume that in these places M has been emended from a MS. of the family of Π. Is this assumption probable? Let us first consider the places where omissions are supplied or words added :—

II. 358 A, 359 C, D (*bis*), 364 D, 366 A, 374 B, 378 D; III. 395 C, 398 A; IV. 443 D; VI. 504 D; VIII. 552 A.

Of these II. 358 A, 359 D *bis*, 378 D, 395 C; IV. 443 D; VI. 504 D; VIII. 552 A (eight in all) are probably genuine readings, and in that case need not be accounted for by derivation from Π, while they certainly point to a source independent of A. But if they are not genuine, the supposition that they are borrowed by M from Π is weakened by the fact that the not less plausible additions in II. 366 A, 373 A, 379 A, 381 A, 382 E, have not been similarly borrowed. (*See* above, pp. 74, 75.)

The interpolations in II. 366 A μόνον and 374 B ἀλλὰ σκυτοτόμον must indeed be due either to Π or to an ancestor of Π, it is impossible to say how far removed. But the

different position of the words ἀλλὰ σκυτοτόμον in the two MSS., makes against the supposition that they came directly from Π to M. And it is not impossible that they are genuine: see below, p. 112.

Two passages, V. 453 E and VI. 485 A ὡμολογήσθω, in which the reading of M is offered as an alternative in Π, ὁμολογείσθω (with ὡ and η written above) M, ὡμολογήσθω Π (with ὁ and ει written above), rather point to the conclusion that M's text, here differing from A, is independent also of Π, since Π is here corrected from the archetype of M. The omission of λιστοὶ δὲ in II. 364 D is clearly right, and is not likely to have been derived from Π, supposing M to have been copied from a derivative of A. The interpolation of μόνον (perhaps corrupted from an earlier μέν) in II. 366 A, and the insertion of ἀλλὰ σκυτοτόμον at different points in 374 B, are wholly insufficient grounds on which to establish any connexion between M and Π. They rather point to a source anterior to both, which may or may not be earlier than A. If the forty-seven readings marked with ° in the foregoing list, or any of them, are genuine, the common source of Π and M represents a tradition independent of A. Besides retaining the words which A omits, in particular the forty letters in VI. 504 D, that source in all probability gave ποιμαίνειν (I. 345 C), πλέον (349 B), στρεπτοὶ δέ τε (II. 364 D), ἀζήμιοι †μόνον (366 A), ἀλλὰ σκυτοτόμον in mg. (374 B), μήν (IV. 443 A), ὡμολογοῦμεν (V. 453 E), ὁμολογείσθω (VI. 485 A), παντός (491 D), τῶν δικαίων (496 C), ὑπηρεσίαν †φιλοσοφίαν (498 B), ἔσθ' †ὅ τις (502 B), μετ' αὐτήν (VII. 528 D).

The amount of variation and corruption which is here implied, may easily have come into existence long before the ninth century. The certainty of corruption after all is limited to the three places here marked with †.

III. So far a presumption has been raised, (1) that M, while closely related to A, is not necessarily derived from it; (2) that where A and M differ, the difference need not be accounted for by the correction of M through Π. This

A Π *versus* M

view has still to be confirmed by considering the passages in which M differs from A and Π.

§ 7. 1. M upholds the following sixteen correct readings which have hitherto rested on weak MS. authority, as they are ignored both by A and Π:

I. 330 B ποῖ' M K x *v* Vind. F ποῖ A Π
347 A ὧν M b c a α′ γ′ *t* ᾧ A οὗ Π
„ E πότερον ἀληθεστέρως M x *v* Vind. F πότερον ὡς ἀληθεστέρως A Π
III. 402 B καὶ εἰκόνας M Ξ *q* x *v* β′ καὶ εἰ εἰκόνας A Π
406 D μακρὰν M Ξ x μικρὰν A Π
IV. 425 D δικῶν λήξεως M Φ *q* K *v* α′ β′ δικῶν λήξεις A Π
„ D τὸ παράπαν M K a c τὸ πάμπαν A Π
441 C ἑνὸς ἑκάστου M Ξ *q* r x ἑνὶ ἑκάστου A Π
V. 462 B ξυνδῇ M Ξ x *q* r K *v* ξυνδεῖ A Π
472 A λόγον λέγειν τε M Ξ a c x λέγειν λόγον τε A Π
VI. 492 E ἐξαιρῶμεν M Fic. ἐξαίρωμεν A Π
VIII. 564 E βλίσειε M m a c x γ′ βλίσσειεν A βλίσσειν Π pr.
IX. 574 D ἐπιλίπῃ M Ξ r m ἐπιλείπῃ A ἐπιλείπει Π
X. 607 B ἀπολελογήσθω M Ξ *q* c ἀπολελογίσθω A Π
611 C θεατέον M m a c α′ γ′ (διαθεατέον Ξ) διαθετέον A Π

N.B.—The reading ᾧ καὶ ἐφ' οὗ, V. 479 C, in which M agrees with a c x α′ γ′ m *v* Vind. D, E, F, Athen., now proves to be the reading of Par. A.

And in X. 606 E ἄξιος, for which Π used to be the single early witness, is now supported by A Π M.

2. In the following places, M, while differing from A[1] Π, is anticipated by a corrector of A, though not in every case by the diorthotes:

	A Π	M A[c]
III. 411 C	γεγένηται	γεγένηνται
415 C	σίδηρος φύλαξ	σιδηροῦς φύλαξ
IV. 424 B	ἐπιφρονέουσιν	ἐπιφρονέουσ'
430 E	φαίνονται	λέγοντες
V. 471 A	οὐ πολέμιοι	ὡς οὐ πολέμιοι
474 D	ἐπαινεθήσεται	ἐπαινεῖται

		A Π	M A^c
VI.	486 C	ἀνόητα	ἀνόνητα
	505 B	εἰδέναι	εἶναι
VII.	525 D	δύο ὡς	ὡς (*M*)
	537 E	ἐμπίπλαται	ἐμπίμπλανται A^c ἐμπίπλανται M
VIII.	548 B	οὐ φανερῶς	φανερῶς
	549 A	τισιν	τις
	557 A	φόβων	φόβον
IX.	582 C	σοφὸς	ὁ σοφὸς
	584 B	ἔφην δ'	ἔφην
X.	613 E	ὅρα	ὅρα εἰ

It will perhaps be said that in these passages the copyist of M or its original had before him the emended text of A; but if so, why in other instances should he have preferred the first hand to the corrector? See Book I. 351 C, II. 383 B, VII. 524 D (*M*), X. 612 B. The argument is not a strong one, but it at least suggests the alternative possibility, that, in the preceding instances, A may have been corrected from an ancestor of M. And it is observable in this connexion, that while alternative readings occur frequently on the margin of M, in the places here referred to the readings of A[1] do not appear at all.

3. The following readings, for which M is the oldest witness, are improbable or doubtful:

		A Π	M
I.	332 E	ἐν τῷ	*om.*
	340 A	αὐτὸς γὰρ Θρασύμαχος	αὐτὸς Θρασύμαχος
II.	365 B	παρασκευασαμένῳ	παρεσκευασμένῳ
	370 B	πρᾶξιν	πράξει
III.	403 B	αὔτη ἡ ἡδονή	αὐτὴν ἡδονή (η and ν confused)
V.	475 B	τιμᾶσθαι	τιμῶνται
VI.	495 A	ὅταν	ὃς ἂν
	496 A	πάνσμικρον A, πᾶν σμικρὸν Π	πάνυ σμικρὸν

	A Π	M
VI. 496 C	γενόμενοι	γευόμενοι
499 E	ἀλλοίαν	ἀλλ' οἵαν
VIII. 546 C	τῇ, προμήκη	τῇ προμήκει
X. 598 D	πάσσοφος	πᾶν σοφὸς
607 C	δία σοφῶν A διὰ σοφῶν Π	διασοφῶν
612 A	ἀπελυσάμεθα	ἀπεδυσάμεθα

§ **8.** 4. The evidence so far has tended to show (1) that M in a few passages confirms the genuineness of a text which is otherwise supported only by late MSS. (2) That while thus to some extent independent both of A and Π, it agrees very closely with A and still more closely with the text from which A has been corrected. (3) That it notwithstanding diverges from that text in more than seventy places, where it stands in agreement with Π. (4) That it is not sufficiently removed from Π in point of time to make it probable that in these places it has been altered through contamination with derivatives of Π.

It remains to support the position that, of the inferior MSS., M may be safely taken as the most competent witness. Schanz, in the article already referred to, Hermes XII. p. 181, concludes a careful examination of the MSS. which he regards as derivatives of A by stating that Vat. m is the only one about which for some time he hesitated in forming this conclusion; or rather, he takes Ξ m *v t* as a sub-family of which m is the oldest representative. The relation of M to m (whose age is uncertain) is therefore now to be exemplified.

M and m M is (1) closely related to m, and (2) it is far more free from corruption. Both points may be illustrated from a passage taken almost at random, viz. III. 390 B—V. 465 A.

(1) Close agreement of M m:

		M m	A &c.
III.	390 B	ἢ βία	ἢ Δία
	392 A	οἷς οἵους	οἵους
	394 D	ἴσως δὲ καὶ	ἴσως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἴσως δὲ καὶ
	398 C	ποῖα ἄττα δοκεῖ	ποῖ' ἄττα δεῖ
	403 A	ὕβρις	ὕβρει
	415 C	σιδηροῦς (et A')	σίδηρος
IV.	420 E	ἐπικλίναντες	κατακλίναντες
	425 D	περὶ ξ συμβολαίων	περὶ ξυμβολαίων
	428 C	ἔφη	ἔχοι
V.	457 B	ἐπὶ γυμναῖς ταῖς γυναιξὶ (so quoted by Eusebius and Theodoret)[1]	ἐπὶ γυμναῖς γυναιξὶ
	461 A	θύσας	φύσας
	465 A	πρὸς πρεσβύτερον	πρεσβύτερον

In particular these MSS. show coincidences of a minute kind in the elision of final vowels, and this although M frequently avoids elision (e. g. II. 361 C ἀλλὰ ἤτω, III. 408 C εἰ δὲ αἰσχροκερδής, X. 614 B κομισθεὶς δὲ οἴκαδε). The following are a few out of many such coincidences:

II.	357 C	τί δ' ὁ αὐτό τε	IV.	423 E	μᾶλλον δ' ἀντὶ
	374 E	οἶμαι ἔγωγ', ἦ δ' ὅς	V.	477 E	εἰς τοῦτ', ἔφη
III.	390 C	οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἦ δ' ὅς	VIII.	569 A	νὴ Δί', ἦ δ' ὅς
	399 D	τί δ' αὐλοποιούς			

(2) The following list of corruptions of M and m within the same limits, viz. in V. 466–480, may serve to substantiate the second assertion, that M is considerably less corrupt than m:

	M	m
466 A	εὔδαιμον *om.* pr. (perhaps rightly?)	
A	καὶ ἀμείνων *om.* pr.	
		B ποι for πῃ (Ξ)
B	μηδ' ἀρκέσῃ	B μηδ' ἀρκέσῃ (Ξ)

[1] The agreement of M m in this place with the quotations of the Fathers, affords an additional argument for the independence of the M tradition.

	M	m
466		C τῷ ὄντι *om.*
		D εἰ for ἢ
		E τῶν *om.*
467		B δή που for εἴ που (Ξ)
		C οὐκ for καὶ οὐκ Π
	C διαφέρειν	C διαφέρειν
468		A αὐτὸν for αὐτῶν (r Ξ)
		A γεωργῶν for γεωργόν
	B χρῆναι *om.* (perhaps rightly?)	
		C τἀριστεῖον (τὸ ἀρ. Ξ)
		D διηνεκέεσι (Ξ)
469		A εὐδαιμόνων (r)
	C οὖν after ἂν erased	C οὖν after ἂν *om.* (Ξ)
		C ἢ οὐκ ἢ for ἢ οὐ (Ξ)
		D δὲ δὴ for δὲ
	E μέλλῃ for μέλῃ (Ξ)	
	E σκυλεύσεις } διακωλύσεις	E σκυλεύσεις } διακωλύσεις
470	A καὶ τμήσεως for τμήσεως	A καὶ τμήσεως for τμήσεως
		B μὲν *om.*
		B οὖν *om.* (Ξ)
		B οὐδέ for οὐδέν
		D ὡμολογουμένη for ὁμολογουμένη
	E καὶ (before σφόδρα) *om.*	E καὶ (before σφόδρα) *om.*
471	A ὡς οὐ for οὐ	A ὡς οὐ for οὐ
		B ἐθέλουσι for ἐθελήσουσι
		C ταῦτά γε (Ξ)
		C μνησθήσεται
	D μάχοιτο τὸ	D μάχοιτο τὸ
	D στρατεύοιτο pr. for συστρατεύοιτο	D στρατεύοιτο for συστρατεύοιτο
		E ἢ (before πολιτεία) *om.*

	M	m
472	A συγγιγνώσκει	A συγγιγνώσκει
		A καὶ ἴσως for ἴσως (Ξ)
	A λέγεις for λέγῃς (sic A^1)	
	B γίγνεται for γίγνεσθαι	B γίγνεται for γίγνεσθαι (Ξ)
		B ζητοῦντι for ζητοῦντες
	C οἱ νῦν for ἡμῖν	
	D $\overset{\text{οι}}{\text{ἐκείνης}}$	
	D ἱκανῶς misplaced	
		D ῇ for εἴη (Ξ)
	E δυνατόν τ' ἂν sed in rasura, for δυνατώτατ' ἂν	
473	A οὕτως *om.* pr.	
	B ἂν before ἀγαπῴην *om.* (r Ξ)	
	E λέγειν *om.* pr. (probably right?)	
	E εὐδοκιμήσειεν for εὐδαιμονήσειεν (but mg. γρ. εὐδαιμονήσειεν)	E εὐδοκιμήσειεν (Ξ pr.)
		E οὐ *om.*
474		A γυμνοῦν for γυμνοὺς
		A τὸ for τῷ
		B σοὶ for σὺ (before οὕτω)
		B λέγοντας for λέγοντες
	D ἐπαινεῖται for ἐπαινεθήσεται (given as an alternative by A^2)	D ἐπαινεῖται for ἐπαινεθήσεται
475	A φιλοτίμως	A φιλοτίμως
	B τούτου *om.* pr.	
	D πολὺ pr. for πολλοὶ	D πολὺ for πολλοὶ
		D ὅς δ' for ὥς γ'
		E τοὺς for τοῦτο
		E αὐτῷ for αὐτὸ

	M	m
475	E ἄλλων pr. for ἄλλον	E ἄλλων for ἄλλον
476	C ὃ for ᾧ	C ὃ for ᾧ
	D τι before αὐτὸ *om.* pr.	
		D καὶ before οὔτε *om.*
	D χαλεπήνῃ (Ξ)	
477	A πλειοναχῇ	A πλειοναχῇ
	B ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ ὄντι	
	C τι *om.* pr. after γένος	C δὴ for τι
		C βλέπων for ἀποβλέπων (Ξ)
	D ἐκάλεσαν	
	D ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τεταμένην (r)	
479	A οὐδαμοῦ for οὐδαμῇ	A οὐδαμοῦ for οὐδαμῇ
	A καὶ . . . ἄδικον *om.* pr.	A καὶ . . . ἄδικον *om.*
	E ἀλλὰ for ἀλλ' οὐ	E ἀλλὰ for ἀλλ' οὐ
480	A τινὰς for καλὰς	A τινὰς for καλὰς
	A τὸ ἓν for τὸ ὂν	

It will be seen at once that the errors of m are not only more numerous, but more grave. And it is also noticeable that of the variants which belong to the M tradition one, λέγεις 472 A, agrees with the first hand of A, another, ἐπαινεῖται 474 D, was acknowledged by the diorthotes (or an early corrector) of A, while some of the variants in which M stands alone, e. g. the omissions in 466 A, 468 B, 473 E, and χαλεπήνῃ (476 D) in which Ξ agrees, are defensible readings. There remain thirty-six errors in M to fifty-seven in m.

m The character of Vat. m sufficiently appears from what has been already said. Vat. m is referred to in this edition only where in consequence of the lacuna in VI and VII the direct evidence of M is not available.

§ 9. r Vat. Θ (Vaticanus 266), which was highly valued by Stallbaum, is shown by M. Schanz to be derived from Ven. t as far as III. 389 D, and in the remainder of the

Republic from Π. It is said to be the second volume of Vat. Δ, which is in close agreement with the Bodleian MS. It has now and then a peculiar reading, but where it has any pretentions to independence it generally agrees with Vat. r, which on the whole seems to have a higher claim. The Raudnitz MS. (Schneider's Lobcovicianus), is of the same family, which with rare exceptions comes into use only where there is a lacuna in Π. It may be mentioned incidentally, though it is a matter of slight consequence, that the corrector of M and the writers of the supplementary leaves (*M*) are frequently in agreement with r. This MS. (with Lob. Θ Vind. E) supplies at least one indisputable reading I. 354 B ἐγώ μοι (A Π ἐγῷμαι).

Here and elsewhere it is uncertain whether an obviously correct reading, appearing only in a comparatively late MS., is derived from earlier tradition or from Byzantine conjecture. Critics have been fond of adopting this last supposition; the rashness of which, however, becomes evident, when it is considered that the reading ἐπαινεῖται V. 474 D, formerly supposed peculiar to some of the later MSS., has now been found in a text of the twelfth century, and is given as an alternative by the diorthotes of Par. A. Be that as it may, no text of the Republic can be constituted aright without placing some reliance on late MSS. Par. K for example, like Par. D, is in the main a derivative K from Π: but, besides agreeing in special points with *q*, it has here and there a singular reading, which it would be unwise to neglect, and one at least, which although clearly interpolated is demonstrably early, and cannot possibly be due to conjecture (Schneider vainly argues against this position). In IX. 580 D, the reading of K (fifteenth century) λογιστικὸν ἐπιθυμητικὸν θυμικὸν is manifestly anterior to the readings of A τὸ λογιστικὸν, and Π λογιστικὸν, and helps to account for them. This being so, it deserves consideration whether the reading πολλοῖς in X. 615 B, though only a correction of πολλοὶ in Par. D, may not be D

the original of the impossible reading πολλοὶ in Par. A, for which Ξ gives πολλῶν, the received reading. It is on the whole most probable that the copyists or correctors of the fifteenth century MSS. from which the first printed editions were chiefly taken, paid more respect to earlier MSS. than to the conjectures of their contemporaries. Conjecture has of course played a certain part in the interpolation of texts, but MS. conjecture is generally traceable to some mis-writing having introduced obscurity which the scribe has instinctively sought to remove. This process began early and was never discontinued. It has aggravated corruption, but, except in the removal of the simplest clerical errors, can seldom be credited with the restoration of an original text.

§ 10. Ξ The MS. Venetus Ξ, 184, of the M family (closely related to A), was written in the fifteenth century by a scholar, Johannes Rhosus, for the learned Cardinal Bessarion, who like the Bishop of Hierapolis, amused himself with corrections of the text. The following is Signor Castellani's description of it.

'Cod. 184, membr. Saec. XV, 433 × 280 millim., foll. 494, quinquagenorum versuum. Continet post Introductionem Alcinoi in Lectionem Platonis, Platonis Dialogos omnes, praeter Eryxiam, quibus subjungitur Timaei Locri De Anima Mundi: Plutarchi De Animae procreatione. In calce primi folii r. legitur: Κτῆμα Βεσσαρίωνος καρδηναλέως τοῦ τῶν Τούσκλου, et in calce ejusdem primi folii v.: Platonis omnia opera: Liber pulcherrimus et correctissimus Bessarionis Cardinalis Tuscularis. Codex, litteris aureis picturisque exornatus, totus exaratus est manu Joannis Rhosi, qui addidit in marginibus Scholia locupletissima nitidis etsi minutis characteribus exscripta. Accedunt emendationes complures partim ab eodem Rhoso, partim ab ipso Bessarione recensitae.'

Venetus Ξ is of some historical interest, as it appears to

have been a chief source of the *editio princeps*, the Aldine Plato of 1513. In more than thirty-six places where Ξ differs from A Π M, the Aldine follows this MS.:—even in some passages where the Basle editions and Stephanus give a different reading. These coincidences include two lacunae:

VII. 533 E ἀλλ' . . . ἐν ψυχῇ *om.* Ξ Ald. Steph. (where the reading of Ξ is unnoticed by Bekker);

X. 604 D ἰατρικῇ τὴν *om.* Ξ Ald. Steph.:

and such distinctive readings as

II. 359 E δακτύλιον φέρειν ὄν

367 D ἀδικίαν ὃ βλάπτει

VIII. 544 E ῥεύσαντα

562 B ἀπόλλυσιν (again unnoticed by Bekker).

Places where Aldus agrees with Ξ against Steph. are:

II. 360 E διαισθάνεσθαι Ξ (διεσθάνεσθαι Ald.): διαισθάνεται Steph.

IV. 433 C ὑποληφθὲν Ξ Ald. (and A[1]): ὑπολειφθὲν Steph.

IX. 587 E ἥδιστον Ξ (not quoted by Bekker) Ald.: ἥδιον Steph.

X. 607 D ἀπολογησαμένη Ξ Ald. (and A[1]): ἀπολογησομένη Steph.

620 C περιοῦσαν Ξ Ald.: περιιοῦσαν Steph.

These facts are enough to raise a strong presumption. But Aldus was not tied to one MS. For in II. 358 E he read τί τε ὂν τυγχάνει with Flor. b, in 377 E κακῶς οὐσίας with the same MS., and in VIII. 560 A ἐπιστρεφόμεναι with *q* D K (a correction of ὑποστρεφόμεναι the reading of Π).

In II. 363 B he may have corrected ἀδικίας, the reading of Ξ, to εὐδικίας by referring to the Odyssey.

Ξ still remains the chief or sole authority for the reading of several places which have gone wrong in A Π M. It is enough to point to—

I. 331 D ἔφην ἐγώ . . . ἔφη ἐγώ A Π M

III. 407 C τινὰς . . . τινὸς A Π M

IV. 434 E ἐκεῖνο . . . ἐκεῖ A Π M

440 E τοῦ λογιστικοῦ . . . τὸ λογιστικὸν A Π M

IV. 440 E καὶ τούτου . . . καὶ τοῦτο Α Π Μ
442 C ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου . . . ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων Α Π Μ
„ E τοῦτο αὐτὸν . . . τοῦτον αὐτὸν Α Π Μ (τοῦτον αὐτὸ cj. Schneider)
444 B τῷ τοῦ . . . τοῦ δ' αὖ δουλεύειν Α Π Μ
V. 465 A ἄλλως . . . ἄλλος Α Π Μ
VII. 534 A ὅσων . . . ὅσον Α Π Μ
VIII. 544 C διαφέρουσα . . . διαφεύγουσα Α Π Μ
557 E ἄρχειν καὶ δικάζειν . . . ἄρχῃς καὶ δικάζῃς Α Π Μ (δικάζεις Π pr.)
IX. 590 E βούλεται Ξ^c (x v Iambl. Stob.) . . . βουλεύεται Α Π Μ
X. 604 C αἱρεῖ (Ξ q) . . . ἐρεῖ Α Μ (ἔρρει Π)
611 C διαθεατέον . . . διαθετέον Α Π : θεατέον Μ
614 A ἑκάτερος Ξ corr. . . . ἑκάτερον Α Μ (lacuna in Π)
615 B πολλῶν . . . πολλοὶ Α Μ (πολλοῖς D corr.)

See also VII. 532 D διέλθωμεν, now supported by M.

On the important fact of the occasional agreement of Ξ with the papyrus fragment of the Phaedo, see below, p. 98.

x Flor. x is another MS. without which the apparatus criticus would be imperfect. It is of the M family, but has been corrected from other sources. See especially VIII. 549 A δούλοις τις ἄν.

§ 11. *q* Flor. β′ is also a 'learned' MS. (Laurent. 80. 19) with which *q* (Munich 237, fifteenth century) constantly agrees. The date of β′ being uncertain, it is hard to say which is derived from its fellow, but as *q* has been collated not only by Bekker, but after him by Schneider in the most complete manner, it has been thought safer to refer to *q*. Bekker's high estimate of this MS. is on the whole justified, although Hermann has rightly rejected many of its readings in deference to the authority of Par. A. The two MSS. *q* β′ represent a recension based on the Π tradition, partly preserved also in Paris. D K, in which the defects of that tradition have been somewhat boldly supplemented with interpolations which the examination of other MSS. enables us to detect.

For example:

I. 333 E φυλάξασθαι καὶ μὴ παθεῖν
II. 358 E τί οἴονται
360 B περιθεῖτο *om.*
364 E μετά τινων ἑορτῶν τε καὶ θυσιῶν (for διὰ θυσιῶν)
365 C πρόθυρα μὲν γὰρ
366 D ὡρμήθη (et Par. K pr.)
„ E αὐτὸ δ' ἑκάτερον *om.* pr.
368 C φαύλου
381 D βίον δώροις (supplying an object for ἀγείρουσαν)
IV. 437 D ἢ ποτοῦ (conflatum ex ἢ οὐ et που)
V. 450 D καλῶς εἶχε παραμυθεῖσθαι
„ E οὐ φαύλων (for φίλων)
459 B δεῖ ἄκρων (for δεῖ ἄκρων εἶναι)
475 B οὗ ἄν τινα (for ὃν ἄν τινος)
„ D ἐπιθέουσι (for περιθέουσι)
476 B ὑπ' αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν
VI. 501 C ὅτε (for ὅτι)
502 B καὶ πῶς and γενόμενος *om.*
VII. 529 C ἐν θαλάττῃ ἢ ἐν γῇ (for ἐν γῇ ἢ ἐν θαλάττῃ)
VIII. 544 E ῥίψαντα *q* corr. (ῥήψαντα *q* pr.)
545 E μὴ τραγικῶς *q*, μὴ inter versus (with ὡς δὲ σπουδῇ following)
548 A περὶ ταὐτοῦ for περὶ ταῦτα
553 C μετὰ for κατὰ
IX. 575 A τῶν αὑτοῦ for τῶν αὐτῶν
X. 595 C τούτων *om.*
619 C σκέψαιτο

This recension, however, remains responsible for some true readings which it would be unsafe to assume to be conjectural.

See for example:

	q	Α Π Μ
II. 365 D	οὐδ' ἡμῖν μελητέον	καὶ ἡμῖν μελητέον
370 A	ῥᾷον	ῥᾴδιον
III. 397 A	μᾶλλον μιμήσεται	μᾶλλον διηγήσεται

		q	Α Π Μ
III.	414 E	δεῖ	δὴ
IV.	429 C	γεγουνίας	γεγουνῖαν
	444 C	τὸ δίκαια	τὰ δίκαια
V.	454 D	καὶ ἰατρικὸν	καὶ ἰατρικὴν
VI.	500 A	ἢ οὐκ ἐὰν	ἢ καὶ ἐὰν
VII.	529 B	νοήσει	νοήσειν (*M*)
	537 D	τούτους	τούτοις
VIII.	553 C	τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν	τὸν ἐπιθυμητικόν
	559 B	ᾗ τε μὴ παῦσαι	ᾗ τε παῦσαι
	567 E	τί δὲ	τίς δὲ
IX.	585 A	ὥσπερ δὲ	ὥσπερ
X.	604 B	δύο τινὲ	δύο
	„ B	φαμὲν ἐν	φαμὲν
	„ D	πρὸς τῷ	πρὸς τὸ
	610 D	τούτου	τοῦ
	„ D	διὰ τοῦτο	διὰ τούτου
	617 B	τρίτον	τὸν τρίτον Α Μ

The interpolations, or would-be emendations, of *q* and *q* corr., so far weaken the authority of this MS. as to render it an unsafe guide (for which reason several possible readings adopted by Bekker and Stallbaum have been rejected). And in accepting the readings above-mentioned, it may remain an open question whether they are conjectural or not. This question, which has been already touched upon, will be more fully considered below.

Glosses of MSS.

The principal MSS. of the Republic may accordingly be classified as follows :

1. A b α′ γ′
2. (1) Π D *q** β′* K* : (2) r Φ Θ : (3) Vind. D E F
3. M Ξ* m a c x* *t v*

Ven. t and Flor. n are not referred to.

* Those marked with the asterisk are emended MSS., i. e. they admit readings derived from various sources and sometimes conjectural.

Textual Errors and Emendations.

The discovery of fragments of classical texts in Egypt on papyrus rolls, some of which are known to have been written before the Christian era, has brought out some unexpected results. 1. The texts so far deciphered, where they differ from our MSS. of the ninth and tenth centuries, differ almost always for the worse. 2. For the most part they confirm the received tradition. 3. Very rarely, and then only in minute particulars, have they confirmed the conjectural emendations of modern scholars. 4. On the other hand, they do occasionally support the authority of readings which have hitherto rested on the evidence of some late MS. **§ 12.**

These remarks may be illustrated from the long fragment of the Phaedo discovered by Mr. Flinders Petrie and published by Professor Mahaffy. See an article by the present writer in the *Classical Review* for October and December, 1891, pp. 363–365, and 454–457.

1. The papyrus, besides several patent errors of slight importance, exhibits at least two striking variants, ἀνδραποδώδη for εὐήθη in 68 E, and ὧι δὲ αὐτὴ προσέχει for ὃ δὲ αὐτὴ ὁρᾶι in 83 B. In the former case the scribe being familiar with the text has awkwardly anticipated a point which is presently to be made (viz. in 69 B); cp. Theaet. 158 C where for ὅτῳ χρή the Bodleian MS. gives ὅτῳ χρόνῳ χρή, anticipating the mention of the *time* which occurs eight lines lower down. See also in the same dialogue 149 C where ἀτόποις is written in the Bodleian MS. for ἀτόκοις with ἀτοπώτατος half a page higher up. A somewhat similar instance occurs in Rep. V. 469 E in the v. r. διασκυλεύσεις for διακωλύσεις with σκυλεύειν occurring, as a prominent notion, in the same passage. In the latter of the two cases in the Phaedo, 83 B, a prosaic and somewhat late mode of expression is substituted for the simple and vivid language of Plato.

2. The only matter of any consequence in which the papyrus tends to invalidate the existing text is in 81 D, the passage about apparitions. Here our MSS. appear to have omitted a phrase which in the papyrus is unfortunately illegible. This *lacuna* has never been suspected by any scholar.

3. In the space which the papyrus covers there are nineteen places where modern scholars have proposed emendations, all of which have appeared to Schanz deserving of mention in his critical notes. Only one of these is confirmed by the papyrus. This is the rejection of the words ἕνεκά φασιν in 83 E, which was proposed at one time by K. F. Hermann but afterwards withdrawn by him.

4. On comparing the readings of the papyrus with the existing *apparatus criticus*, they are found, in eight instances at least, to be in agreement with Ξ and the corrector of Π, both of the fifteenth century, and with no other MS. of Plato. These readings, then, which have hitherto been referred to the fifteenth century A.D., are found to have existed already in the third century B.C.

The same lessons, of caution in conjecture, and of trust in the persistence of tradition, have been taught by other similar discoveries. Among the papyri published in Mr. Kenyon's *Classical Texts* (1891) is one containing a great part of the third 'Letter of Demosthenes,' on which F. Blass has written an instructive monograph in Fleckeisen's *Jahrbuch für Klassischen Philologie* for 1892, pp. 33–44. He observes:—

(1) That in eleven pages of Reiske's edition, the papyrus gives sixty new readings which are clearly right.

(2) That twelve of these had been anticipated by conjecture, but except the proper name Εὐθύδικον for Εὔδικον (Blass' own emendation) only in matters of light moment (such as ἀγνώμοσι for ἀγνῶσι, τιν' for τήν, γενέσθαι for γενήσεσθαι).

(3) Out of nineteen places in which Blass had admitted

conjectures into the text, nine only agree with the papyrus.

(4) On the other hand the papyrus supports the principle of not relying exclusively on one MS. in constituting a text. The readings of the later MSS. are in some instances confirmed.

Blass remarks that in another part of Demosthenes the proportion of successful conjecture might prove larger; but he adds that the reverse might be the case, *as in the passage of the Phaedo*.—(The emendation of an 'Epistle' is easier, because the language is less highly wrought; the orations would be copied with greater care, and they exist in more MSS. of the highest class.)

The observation of such facts is the best corrective for § 13.
the extravagances to which textual criticism has been always liable; proceeding, as it does, at one time by the wholesale excision of supposed 'accretions,' at another by the detection of 'lacunae,' now relying on close resemblances of written characters, now on the hypothesis of the frequent substitution of glosses for the words which they explain. Each of these methods has a show of scientific precision, but, when indiscriminately applied, involves rash and unwarranted generalization from scattered instances. Palaeography, in particular, has supplied the textual critic with an armoury of weapons, in which as Bacon would have said 'opinio copiae causa est inopiae'; the *ductus literarum* often drawing the mind away insensibly from the context, which is the principal thing. The other main requirement, familiarity with the individual author, is also apt to be forgotten, and an attempt is made to emend Plato on the same principles which have proved applicable to Demosthenes or Isocrates. No MS. is without errors: but the most recent discoveries have tended to show that the preservation of ancient texts of the greatest authors has on the whole been extraordinarily successful. It is hardly paradoxical to say that all interpolation comes by way of

emendation, and that to 'emend' is mostly to interpolate. The various modes of so-called 'scientific' emendation are liable to one and the same fallacy, that of assuming, because a thing is known to have happened sometimes, that it must have happened indefinitely often. Whereas the available evidence tends to show, that the changes in MSS. between the tenth and fifteenth centuries were greater in the most important texts than in the ten centuries preceding.

§ 14. In the multiplication of MSS. at the revival of learning, all copies must have diverged from very few centres; since the remnants of the Classics which had found their way from Constantinople to Western Europe were enshrined in the comparatively small number of MSS. which had been rescued by the men who prized them. But in the earlier periods, those who (whether at Alexandria or at Constantinople) were preparing a copy that should be valued as authentic, had a choice of almost countless apographa of high repute at their disposal; and if the scribe followed too closely his immediate archetype, or himself fell prone into some error, the *diorthotes* who revised his work, in many cases the same person who wrote out the scholia, was able to correct the first hand and add alternative readings by the comparison of other texts, thus increasing the solid value of the recension. Under such conditions corruption would not proceed in an increasing ratio. At the same time this process has aggravated the difficulty of tracing the affiliation of MSS., readings belonging to different families having continually crossed each other, thus causing a mixture of traditions. The question remains, whether amongst the manifold corruptions of the fifteenth century, some grains of genuine tradition may not be preserved, having descended by some fortunate accident from the text or margin of some MS. which was then extant and has since been lost. There is a balance of probabilities here. On the one hand such MSS. must have been few and far between, but on the other hand the feebleness of conjecture

at best, and especially in the infancy of criticism, makes it antecedently improbable that Rhosus or Cardinal Bessarion, for example, should have hit, by mere intuition, on readings which had been lost for sixteen centuries. Between the time of the occupation of Constantinople by the Latins and its destruction by the Turks, notwithstanding the decline of learning, many copies even of classical works must have still existed which perished in the final conflagration. The example of Vat. r shows that Plato was sometimes written in two volumes. Is it likely that Arethas, the deacon of Patrae, would procure, or that Constantine, the Metropolitan of Hierapolis, would purchase, an incomplete book? If otherwise, there must have existed, perhaps for centuries, a second volume of 𝔄 (the Bodleian MS.) and a first volume corresponding to A, and on the margin of these correctors of the tenth century probably wrote many various readings from other recensions. This belief is justified by the instances in which the Petrie papyrus supports Ξ and the corrector of Π against the Bodleian. And the inference here indicated bears a striking analogy to Messrs. Hort and Westcott's conclusion respecting certain 'cursive' MSS. of the New Testament, which together with variations due 'to ordinary degeneracy of transmission,' contain others which 'supply important documentary evidence. They are virtually copies of minute fragments of lost MSS.' Introduction, pp. 144, 145; § 197.

Textual Errors.

1. *Simple Clerical Errors.* § 15.

(*a*) The mere mistaking between forms of letters is a less frequent cause of error than is often supposed, and almost always the mistaken letter has suggested some familiar word. For example:—

a for ω: ἀφελείας for ὠφελείας Π, III. 398 B.

o for ε: προσῆκον for προσῆκεν (?) A (προσῆκεν is the reading of Stobaeus), IV. 442 B.

η for ν: Confusion of η and ν. ζῶν for ζῴη A¹, I. 344 E: κακονοίας for κακοηθείας Π, III. 401 A: αὑτὴν for αὕτη ἡ M, III. 403 B.

ν for ι: τῶν δικαίων for τῷ δικαίῳ Π M, VI. 496 C.

ν and υ: γενόμενοι for γενόμενοι M, VI. 496 C.

λ for α: λύρα for αὔρα Π, III. 401 C: ἀπολλύειν for ἀπολαύειν A², X. 606 B.

δ for λ: ἀπεδυσάμεθα for ἀπελυσάμεθα M, X. 612 A.

τ for γ: Confusion of τε and γε passim; πλήττοντος for πληγέντος A, X. 604 C (this confirms the correction of V. 472 A): ἡτεῖσθε for ἡγεῖσθε A, X. 612 C.

τ and ψ: τύχης and ψυχῆς, II. 366 C, X. 603 E.

Compendia—The signs for καί and ὡς have perhaps been confused in V. 471 A, where the v. r. ὡς οὐ πολέμιοι (A mg. M) perhaps stands for καὶ οὐ πολέμιοι [1].

(*b*) More frequently the sound has been mistaken, as between ο, ω and ου; between η and ε; between ε and αι; between η and οι; between ει and η and ι; between υ and οι; π for φ: πάνυ for φάναι M pr., X. 610 C; αβ for αυ: ἀπολαβὼν for ἀπολαύων IX. 572 D (A M); ἀπολαβεῖν for ἀπολαύειν X. 606 B, an error shared by A Π M; cp. VIII. 544 C, where διαφεύγουσα for διαφέρουσα (A Π M) is attributed by Schneider to a similar cause, the burring pronunciation of γ; and lastly, but only in late MSS., between ευς and εψ, e.g. ῥεύσαντα for ῥέψαντα (Ξ) VIII. 544 E. (Similarly οφ for αυ: ἐκκοφθήσεται for ἐκκαυθήσεται M, II. 361 E.)

(*c*) Letters added or omitted.

a. Letters *added*: ἀνεμόμενοι for νεμόμενοι A, III. 401 C: διαστάσεις for διατάσεις A, III. 407 C: ζητεῖ for ζεῖ A Π M, IV. 440 C: διατεταγμένους for διατεταμένους A pr., V. 474 A (ξυντεταγμένως A¹, VI. 499 A): παραγενόμενοι for παραγόμενοι A,

[1] It is less apparent what 𝒪 the sign for ἥλιον, first written, then marked with dots and then erased, in Π after τιμήν in II. 359 C can have meant. Perhaps it originated in dittographia of ἥν.

VI. 487 B: ὑποστρεφόμεναι for ὑποτρεφόμεναι Π (corr. to ἐπιστρ. in *q* D K), VIII. 560 A: προσεστὼς for προεστὼς A, VIII. 565 E: so perhaps ἐπηινέγκαμεν A[1], X. 612 B: ἰδίᾳ λαβόντες (ἰδία A[c]) A[c] Ξ, X. 615 E.

Dittographia or repetition. Not only single letters but words and even whole phrases are accidentally repeated, and in a MS. like Π, which has been little emended, this fault is more perceptible. Thus in IX. 561 B the words μέρη . . . ἐκπεσόντων were written over again in this MS., and there are many other examples of the same mistake.

β. More commonly letters and syllables are *omitted*, where the word thus formed is in some way possible: cp. Theaet. 185 D ὀργανίδιον for ὄργανον ἴδιον Bodleian MS.: IV. 421 D διαφέρει for διαφθείρει A: V. 461 B φήσομεν for ἀφήσομεν A: IX. 574 D δίκας for δικαίας Π M: X. 611 C διαθετέον for διαθεατέον A Π.

Many such errors have been corrected by the first or second hand in Par. A; for example, in VIII. 548 D. the first hand wrote οἶμεν, which is corrected by the second hand to οἶμαι μὲν. A similar mistake remained uncorrected in all MSS. and editions in VIII. 554 B καὶ ἔτι(μα) μάλιστα until Schneider's conjecture. See also corrections of the third epistle of Demosthenes mentioned above (p. 98) as confirmed by Mr. Kenyon's papyrus.

A single letter is often put for the double, and vice versa, especially in the case of λ, ρ, ν: thus μέλει and μέλλει are often confused; II. 375 B ἐνενόηκα Π for ἐννενόηκα: III. 401 A ἀρυθμία is written for ἀρρυθμία, and there is a doubt between βαλάντιον and βαλλάντιον A, VIII. 552 D: μελιτουργὸς and μελιττουργὸς A, VIII. 564 C.

One of two similar syllables is very apt to be lost; e.g. ὂν after the neuter adjective. See especially VIII. 564 C ἐκτέτμησθον for ἐκτετμήσεσθον A: X. 600 D ὀνεῖναι for ὀνινάναι A.

Homoeoteleuton. In the MSS. of the Republic there are many instances of omission due to the recurrence of the same word or syllable, the eye of the scribe having reverted

to the wrong place. Venetus Π, which had not the benefit of correction until three centuries after it was written, supplies seventeen examples of this fault, of which the following seven occur in Book I:—328 D δεῦρο ἰέναι [ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς . . . δεῦρο ἰέναι] : 330 A ὁ ἐπιεικὴς [πάνυ τι ῥᾳδίως . . . ὁ μὴ ἐπιεικὴς] : 335 B εἰς τὴν τῶν ἵππων [εἰς τὴν τῶν ἵππων . . . εἰς τὴν τῶν ἵππων]. A clear example in A is III. 400 A εἴποιμι [ποῖα δὲ ποίου βίου μι]. See also II. 379 B, 380 E. So in M, II. 377 C ὃν δ' ἂν μή, ἀποκριτέον is omitted after ἐγκριτέον [1]. And in Lobcov. VIII. 550 A καὶ αὖ . . . ὁρῶν *om.*

Another cause of such omission is the dropping of a line or more than one line. Thus, in I. 335 C ἀμούσους . . . ἱππικῇ (forty-two letters) *om.* Π : II. 367 C φρονεῖν . . . γόνιμα τῇ (forty-three letters) *om.* Π : III. 400 B ἄλλον τροχαῖον . . . βραχύτητας (thirty-nine letters) *om.* Π : 410 C ὅσοι ἂν . . . σκληρότητος, καὶ (seventy-five letters or two lines) *om.* Π. Two very striking examples occur in X. 607 A ὕ[μνους θεοῖς καὶ ἐγκώμια τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ποιήσεως παραδε]κτέον (forty-five letters) *om.* Π, leaving the vox nihili ὑκτέον, which is changed in *q* D K to ἐκτέον : and 616 C εἶ[ναι . . . ὑποζώμα]τα *om.* (forty-eight letters) D K in absence of Π, which has a lacuna here : εἶτα remained unsuspected, as a good Greek word.

For similar omissions in A[1] see II. 376 D, IV. 443 D, VI. 493 D, VII. 528 B, X. 601 A, B, 609 B.

(*d*) Division of words.

α. As the words were not divided in the earliest MSS., some confusion has arisen in consequence, e.g. in IV. 442 B, where the best MSS. give φυλάττοι τὴν for φυλαττοίτην (corrupted to φυλάττοι· τῷ in Ξ St.), III. 403 B, where A wrote νομοθέτης εἶς for νομοθετήσεις and X. 620 B ὡσαύτως εἰκός. τὴν MSS. for ὡσαύτως. εἰκοστὴν.

β. Conversely, words are unduly run together ; as in III. 415 C φυλάξῃ for φύλαξ ᾖ Ξ : VI. 496 B ἀνέλθοι for ἂν ἔλθοι A : IX. 577 B ἀνοφθείη for ἂν ὀφθείη A.

[1] The termination of γίγνονται in VIII. 563 C possibly hides such an omission, e.g. ⟨σεμνύνονται⟩.

(*e*) Transposition of words or letters; often corrected by the scribe :—

a. Of letters, as in VII. 538 D *καταλάβῃ* (for *καταβάλῃ*) A: IV. 437 D *ἐν ὀλίγῳ* (for *ἑνὶ λόγῳ*) MSS.: IX. 571 D *ἐν ὀλίγῳ* (for *ἑνὶ λόγῳ*) seems to have been the reading of A^1.

β. A new word is made by transposition of two letters in III. 400 A where for *εἴποιμι* Π reads *ἐπίοιμι*. Cp. VII. 530 C *ἀρχῆς του* (for *ἀχρήστου*) A^1. Words are transposed in III. 412 D *εἰ* $\overset{\beta}{\mu\grave{\eta}}$ $\overset{\alpha}{\delta\grave{\epsilon}}$ M. For inversion without such marks see III. 404 D *δοκεῖ ταῦτα* (for *ταῦτα δοκεῖ*) M.

It may be remarked generally with reference to the preceding examples that the scribe often misunderstood the meaning, but he generally knew a Greek word when he saw it or fancied that he saw it.

2. *Errors due to mental association.*

(*a*) False construction. By a kind of spurious attraction § 16.
the case of a noun or pronoun is altered to what the immediate context suggests. This is most frequent in late MSS., but occurs even in A, e.g. III. 391 D **ἄλλου** *θεοῦ παῖδα* for *ἄλλον θ. π.*: VII. 529 E *διαφέροντος* (sc. *γραφέως*) for **διαφερόντως**. (The similar mistakes in I. 338 E *τίθεται . . τοὺς νόμους* **ἑκάστῃ** *ἡ ἀρχὴ*, for *ἑκάστη ἡ ἀ.* and VII. 521 E *γυμναστικὴ . . μουσικὴ* for *γυμναστικῇ*, &c., have not been transmitted, having probably been obliterated through the disuse of the ι adscript in the twelfth century.) VIII. 550 E *γυναῖκες αὐτῷ* (sc. *τῷ νόμῳ*) for *γυναῖκες αὐτῶν* A: VIII. 561 B *ἑαυτῷ ἐνδῷ* for *ἑαυτὸν ἐνδῷ* A. Prepositions are also confused, e.g. *ὑπὸ* for *ἀπό*, *ὑπὸ* for *ὑπέρ*, *περὶ* for *παρά*.

(*b*) Confusion of tenses and moods. There is often a doubt between the perfect and aorist, I. 330 E *ἠδίκη*$\overset{\sigma}{\kappa}$*εν* A^2, present and aor. subj. VII. 538 D *ἐξελέγ*$\overset{\xi}{\chi}$*ῃ* A, aor. and future middle V. 474 A *ἐργασαμένους* for *ἐργασομένους* A pr. Π; X. 607 D *ἀπολογησαμένη* changed to *ἀπολογησομένη* (A); As the feeling for the moods grew weaker, subjunctive and

optative were confused through itacism: I. 333 D δέοι (A) for δέῃ. Also indicative with optative or subjunctive, e.g. II. 376 A πεπόνθει (οι written above) for πεπόνθῃ M; V. 450 D δοκοῖ Ξ, δοκεῖ Π, for δοκῇ. The omission of ἄν, when favoured by other causes of error, may often be thus accounted for, e.g. I. 353 A ἀμπέλου, for ἂν ἀμπέλου, A Π M.

(*c*) A word of frequent recurrence is apt to be substituted for the word in the text, I. 352 C δικαίους A[1] for δὴ καὶ οὗς: II. 365 A ἐπισπόμενοι for ἐπιπτόμενοι *q* D K; IX. 579 C τούτῳ A[1] for ἑαυτῷ. In IV. 437 C where ἐρωτῶντος is wrongly changed to ἐρῶντος, some Platonic ἔρως must have been haunting the mind of the corrector. By a converse error in II. 375 B ἀλλοτρίοις is written for ἄλλοις. So in Theaet. 148 C ἀκριβῶν for ἄκρων Bodl. pr., IV. 440 C ζητεῖ for ζεῖ, VIII. 568 E συμπολῖται for συμπόται.

(*d*) Again, the context suggests the wrong word in place of the right one: e.g. V. 469 E where an early corrector of M proposes διασκυλεύσεις for διακωλύσεις. In VI. 510 D M reads εἰρημένοις for ὁρωμένοις which seemed to contradict εἴδεσι; VI. 510 B confusion of μιμηθεῖσιν A and τμηθεῖσιν M and VI. 511 A τετμημένοις A[1] for τετιμημένοις A[2]; X. 606 C μιμήσῃς for μὴ μισῇς Π, where μίμησις is in question. So in Polit. 279 A παραδειγματείαν for πραγματείαν, where παράδειγμα is the subject under discussion. Other associations, possibly from the reminiscence of a different part of Plato, give rise to various readings, for example V. 458 E γυμνοῦσθαι for μίγνυσθαι A M, cp. Laws VI. 772 A.

§ 17. (*e*) Logical confusions, especially between affirmative and negative, positive and privative, are peculiarly frequent in the text of Plato. There are more than fifty instances of this form of error in the Republic; mostly, however, amongst the later MSS.

a. The following examples of the omission of the negative are the most important, and in some of these the earliest MSS. are involved. II. 365 D οὐδ' ἡμῖν μελητέον *q*, καὶ ἡμῖν

μελητέον A[1]; III. 395 C ἵνα μὴ Π M, ἵνα A; IV. 429 C ἢ οὐ τοῦτο ἀνδρείαν καλεῖς; οὐ omitted by Π and ten other MSS.; V. 454 B τὸ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν Ξ, τὸ τὴν αὐτὴν A Π M; 455 E γυμναστικὴ δ' ἄρα οὔ A, καὶ γυμναστικὴ, ἡ δ' ἄρα οὔ Ξ; VI. 511 C ἱκανῶς μὲν οὔ Ξ, ἱκ. μ. οὖν A; VII. 537 E καλὸν A, κακὸν Π M; VIII. 548 B οὐ φανερῶς A pr. Π, οὐ erased in A and omitted in M; 559 B ᾗ τε παῦσαι most MSS., for ᾗ τε μὴ παῦσαι *q*; IX. 574 C οὐ πάνυ Π, πάνυ A.

β. In the following cases a negative is wrongly added: I. 330 B οὔ τοι ἕνεκα Π b (οὔτοι Π), οὗτοι A M; 336 E οἷον, μὴ οἷον *q* K; IV. 437 D ἢ οὔ, ἢ οὐ A; V. 451 A ὥστε εὖ με παραμυθεῖ A Π M, ὥστε οὐκ εὖ *q*; VII. 526 E ὃ δεῖ, οὐ δεῖ A[1].

It is doubtful whether the following belongs to α or β:— VI. 500 A ἢ καὶ ἐὰν οὕτω A Π M, ἢ οὐκ ἐὰν οὕτω *q*. See note.

γ. Positive and privative are confused in II. 363 A τῷ δικαίῳ most MSS. for τῷ ἀδίκῳ (*q*); 363 B ἀδικίας for εὐδικίας Ξ; VIII. 560 E ἀπαιδευσίαν for εὐπαιδευσίαν Π.

The following list of similar errors in inferior MSS. might possibly be augmented.

(1) Negative omitted:

I. 352 C	οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπείχοντο	ἢ γὰρ ἂν M (ἢ *t*)
II. 373 E	οὔτι σμικρῷ	ὄντι σμικρῷ r
III. 388 D	καὶ μὴ καταγελῷεν	καὶ δὴ καταγελῷεν r
398 D	τοῦ μὴ ᾀδομένου	τοῦ ἡμῖν ᾀδομένου *q*
IV. 421 E	πῶς δ' οὔ	πῶς δὴ Φ
428 C	οὐκ ἄρα	καὶ ἆρα *q*
429 C	ἢ οὐ τοῦτο	ἢ τοῦτο Π r
V. 462 C	τό τε ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἐμὸν	τό τε ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ ἐμὸν Π
479 E	ἆρ' οὐ γιγνώσκειν	ἆρ' οὖν *q* corr. ἆρα Ξ
„ E	ἀλλ' οὐ δοξάζειν	ἀλλὰ δοξάζειν M
VI. 484 B	πλανώμενοι οὐ φιλόσοφοι	πλανώμενοι οἱ φιλόσοφοι r
489 A	οἱ φιλόσοφοι οὐ τιμῶνται	οἱ φιλόσοφοι τιμῶνται M

VI.	500 C	**μὴ** μιμεῖσθαι	μιμεῖσθαι M
	504 E	**μὴ** μεγίστας	μεγίστας M
	511 D	ἀλλ' **οὐ νοῦν**	ἀλλ' **οὖν** Ξ
VII.	521 A	πλούσιοι, **οὐ** χρυσίου	πλούσιοι χρυσίου Π r
	527 E	**οὐχ** ὁρῶσιν	ὁρῶσιν M
	„ E	ἢ **οὐ** πρὸς οὐδετέρους	ἢ πρὸς οὐδετέρους *M*
	530 A	τί δ' **οὐ** μέλλει	τί δὲ μέλλει r
IX.	585 D	πῶς γὰρ **οὔ**;	πῶς γάρ; *q* Vind. E F
X.	608 A	ὡς **οὐ** σπουδαστέον	ὡς σπουδαστέον D K
	„ D	τὸ **οὐ** χαλεπὸν	τὸ χαλεπὸν *q*

(2) Negative added:

I.	330 C	καὶ κατὰ τὴν χρείαν	καὶ **οὐ** κατὰ τὴν χρείαν *t v*
II.	377 A	πρότερον δ' ἐν τοῖς ψευδέσιν	πρότερον δ' **οὐ** τοῖς ψευδέσιν m
III.	388 C	εἰ δ' **οὖν** θεούς	εἰ δ' **οὐ** θεούς r
	393 C	φήσομεν· τί γάρ;	φήσομεν· τί γὰρ οὔ; Ξ
	398 E	**σὺ** γὰρ μουσικός	**οὐ** γὰρ μουσικός *t*
	416 C	**εἰ** μέλλουσι τὸ μέγιστον	**μὴ** μέλλουσι τὸ μέγιστον M
	„ D	**εἰ** τοιόνδε τινὰ τρόπον	**οὐ** τοιόνδε τινὰ τρόπον r
IV.	426 A	καὶ μὴν **οὗτοί** γε	καὶ μὴν **οὔ τοί** γε *q* corr.
	„ E	χαριέστατοι **οἱ** τοιοῦτοι	χαριέστατοι **οὐ** τοιοῦτοι m
	431 B	καὶ ἀκόλαστον	καὶ **οὐκ** ἀκόλαστον r
	435 B	γενῶν ἄλλ' ἄττα πάθη	γενῶν **καὶ οὐ κατ'** ἄλλ' ἄττα πάθη Ξ corr.
	438 A	**ἀλλὰ** χρηστοῦ σίτου	**καὶ οὐ** χρηστοῦ σίτου Φ
V.	452 E	καὶ καλοῦ αὖ σπουδάζει	καὶ **οὐ** καλοῦ αὖ σπουδάζει *q* β'
	478 B	ἆρ' οὖν τὸ μὴ ὂν δοξάζει	ἆρ' **οὐκ** οὖν τὸ μὴ δοξάζει m
VI.	484 C	ἢ οὖν δοκοῦσί τι	ἢ οὖν **οὐ** δοκοῦσί τι *q* β'
	492 C	οἰχήσεσθαι	**οὐκ** οἰχήσεσθαι r
	503 C	ἀλλ' **οἱ** τοιοῦτοι	ἀλλ' **οὐ** τοιοῦτοι r
VIII.	562 D	ἆρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη	**οὐκ** ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη Π
	564 E	χρηματιζομένων **που** πάντων	χρηματιζομένων **που οὐ** πάντων *q*

IX. 581 D νομίζειν πρὸς — νομίζειν οὐδὲν πρὸς Ξ M corr.

„ 585 E καὶ βεβαίως — καὶ οὐ βεβαίως r M corr.

In several of the above instances, other causes may be assigned; but it is manifest that in most of them 'logical confusion' has been at work. In some also we may perhaps trace the effect of bias; a sort of pedantic euphemism having stolen into the mind of the scribe.

3. *Complex errors.* § 18.

In several of the preceding examples, two or more of the causes specified are combined, for example in μιμήσῃς for μὴ μισῇς there is itacism and false association assisting the wrong division of words; but still more confusion arises where an initial error of the simpler kind leads to the interpolation of a letter or syllable on the part of a corrector, who in the attempt to retrieve matters goes far to make them irretrievable. For example, in III. 403 B, where for νομοθετήσεις following ἔοικε the first hand of A wrote νομοθέτης εἶς, an early corrector supposing the ν to belong to ἔοικεν, and ο to be the article, supplied the apparently missing syllable νο (ἔοικεν ὁ νομοθέτης εἶς)[1]. Similarly the reading of the Bodleian MS. in Theaet. 152 E ἐξαίσιοι σοφοὶ for ἑξῆς οἱ σοφοὶ may be thus accounted for: an early hand wrote ε for η; this was again changed through similarity of sound to αι, making ἐξαίσοι, which a later scribe assumed to be miswritten for ἐξαίσιοι.

In X. 604 C ἐρεῖ (A) having been written for αἱρεῖ was again changed to ἔρρει (Π), ὅπῃ ὁ λόγος ἔρρει = 'which way reason moves.' In X. 610 E several MSS. including M r have expanded ζωτικῷ to ζῶντι κακῷ by some similar process. In V. 468 B τί δέ; δεξιωθῆναι, the second δε has been regarded as dittographia, and ἐξιωθῆναι has con-

[1] See also III. 401 C, where νεμόμενοι was changed first to ἀνεμόμενοι then to ἀνιμώμενοι ('drawing up'), and III. 391 E οἱ ζηνὸς ἐγγύς, ὧν where οἱ having been dropped ζηνὸς ἐγγὺς ὧν became the reading of A: VI. 499 A προσώπου for τρόπου A M (this may be due to a compendium).

sequently been changed to ἐξιαθῆναι. In VI. 498 B ὑπηρεσίαν φιλοσοφίᾳ A, ὑπηρεσίαν φιλοσοφίαν Π, ὑπηρεσίᾳ φιλοσοφίαν M r. In VIII. 556 D παραχθεὶς having been accidentally written for παραταχθεὶς in some MSS. of the Π tradition (D K *q*) (supr. 1 (*c*)), the scribe of β′ has changed this to ταραχθεὶς. See also the curious variant I. 342 B M mg. ἢ ὡς ἡ σφαῖρα for ἔωσπερ ἂν. In VIII. 568 D πωλουμένων, having been written πωλομένων, was altered first to πολομένων then to ἀπολομένων, with supposed reference to the proscription of the tyrant's enemies, and was further changed, with a view to the nearer context, into ἀποδομένων, by a corrector who was aware of the frequent interchange between λ and δ.

§ 19. 4. *Accretions.*

Few errors of this description can be detected with any confidence in the older MSS. The supposed redundancies which recent scholars have excised on the ground of their omission in Par. A (II. 358 A, &c., see above), more probably belong to the class of omissions through homoeoteleuton. Now that the words in II. 366 A αὖ μέγα δύνανται prove to be extant in the first hand of Π, the argument in favour of this view is considerably strengthened. In the Byzantine period scholars contented themselves with adding here and there a single word such as (I. 329 C) γὰρ and (II. 359 C) καὶ. But towards the fifteenth century, as it became fashionable to discourse on Plato, attempts were made here and there to supply real or apparent defects in the tradition by explanatory phrases, which in several instances found their way into the text of that period. In I. 341 D, *q* adds, after ἄλλο, οὗ προσδεῖται, ἢ ἐξαρκεῖ ἑκάστη αὐτὴ ἑαυτῇ; in II. 371 A for οἷα καὶ ὅσα ἐκείνοις ὧν ἂν δέωνται, *q* reads οἷα καὶ ὅσα ἐκείνοις ἄξουσιν, οἳ μεταδώσουσιν ὧν ἂν δέωνται. In III. 407 E for οἱ παῖδες αὐτοῦ, ὅτι τοιοῦτος ἦν the correctors of Π M introduce δεικνύοιεν with or without ἂν before ὅτι, and in this they are followed by most of the later MSS., one of which, however, *v*, has ποιοῦσιν (to be construed with δῆλον) instead. In VII. 529 B (after συμμεμυκὼς) *q* adds τούτων τι μανθάνῃ ἐὰν

δ' ἄνω που κεχηνὼς ὁτιοῦν—a conflation of interpolated texts. VII. 532 C Ξ adds ἐνταῦθα δὲ πρὸς φαντάσματα after φ. θεῖα. In X. 616 A the case appears more complicated. Here A reads ὧν ἕνεκά τε καὶ εἰς ὅ τι τὸν Τάρταρον ἐμπεσούμενοι ἄγοιντο. A sense may be obtained by excising τὸν Τάρταρον as a gloss—'the causes wherefore and the place whereinto they were to be thrown.' But it has been more commonly assumed that εἰς ὅ τι has arisen by simple transposition from ὅτι εἰς. Adopting this view, and feeling still unsatisfied, the correctors of M Ξ and the scribe of x supplied the phrase ταῦτα ὑπομένοιεν before καὶ. In the passage immediately succeeding this, there is a cognate difficulty. The words τὸν φόβον which seem genuine but are dropped in A have been preserved by M and Ξ, while the words μὴ γένοιτο ἑκάστῳ τὸ φθέγμα appear to have been lost in the archetype of M, which gives for them the inferior substitute εἰ μυκήσαιτο (legendum μυκήσοιτο) τὸ στόμιον. Here a marginal gloss or scholium seems to have taken the place of the original text.

See also II. 368 E where *v* and Vind. F read πρῶτον ἐν τῷ μείζονι ζητήσωμεν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι. A similar process may be traced at a somewhat earlier stage in III. 388 E, where, the verb having been lost through the simple error of writing ἔφην for ἐφῆι, a recent hand in Par. A adds κατέχοιτο after ἰσχυρῷ, while the r subfamily and *q* adopt the different expedient of reading γέλωτι ἁλῷ, following the suggestion of a scholar whose note has been preserved on the margin of Vind. D, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ ἁλῶ προσθεῖναι.

The only manifest accretions in Par. A besides IX. 580 D τὸ λογιστικὸν, spoken of elsewhere, are (1) VII. 525 E the addition of δύο to δεινοὺς :—it is an early interpolation, for it is shared by Π, and is difficult to account for ;—possibly the scribe of some early MS. had begun to write δεινοὺς over again, and on discovering his mistake had proceeded without erasing the superfluous letters: and (2) II. 364 D λιστοὶ δὲ στρεπτοί τε a gloss in the text. In IX. 581 E a gloss

ἡδονῆς has supplanted ἀληθινῆς, which would seem to have been the original reading. In Π, at II. 377 E, a singular reading *κακῶ οὐσίαν* (sic) for *κακῶς* has obtained a place. A cognate reading *κακῶς οὐσίας* was adopted by Aldus from some other MS., probably Flor. b. This interpolation may have arisen from an early dittographia of the letters *ος*. Some doubtful cases remain to be considered. In V. 459 E the word *ἔσονται* Ξ Fic. proves to be absent from all the chief MSS. including A. It is harmless but can well be spared. In the Cesena MS., M, some words are omitted, which could be dispensed with, but for the authority of A. In I. 335 D *βλάπτειν ἔργον, ἔργον om.* M pr. (Some MSS. read *ἔργον βλάπτειν*, changing the order.)

In I. 346 D *ἡ τοῦ μισθοῦ λῆψις om.* M pr.: λῆψις is marked as doubtful in A.

In V. 466 A *τοῦτο εὔδαιμον πλάττοιμεν, εὔδαιμον om.* M.

In V. 468 B *δοκεῖ σοι χρῆναι, χρῆναι om.* M.

In V. 475 B *παντὸς τοῦ εἴδους τούτου, τούτου om.* M pr.

Of the phrases omitted by A which recent editors have bracketed or cancelled, only three are really open to suspicion, II. 382 E *οὔτε κατὰ φαντασίας*: 378 C *καὶ ποικιλτέον* and 379 A *ἐάν τε ἐν μέλεσιν*: and considering the grounds on which the other phrases are retained it would be illogical to reject them [1].

The confusing interpolation in IV. 444 B *τοῦ δ' αὖ δουλεύειν* (A Π M) has probably arisen from dittographia. Some other words which have been rejected as accretions may possibly be right after all. Thus in II. 374 A *ἱκανοὶ διαμάχεσθαι* is the reading of Π, and ib. B the words *ἀλλὰ σκυτοτόμον* occur in the text both of Π and M, although

[1] The slightest external evidence would justify the rejection of VI. 504 E *ἄξιον τὸ διανόημα*, suspected by Schleiermacher. But with the testimony of all the MSS. in its favour, it would be rash to cancel either this, or the troublesome *εἰς βραχύ . . . γιγνόμενον* in III. 400 B. The word *ἄξιον* in VI. 496 A is inconvenient, but the reading of Π (*ἄξιον ὡς*) suggests that, instead of cancelling it, we should read *ἀξίως*. In II. 376 D the words *ἵνα μὴ ἐῶμεν . . . διεξιῶμεν* (om. A pr.) could be dispensed with.

differently placed (in Π before, in M after the clause ἵνα ... γίγνοιτο). They probably existed as a various reading on the margin of some copy from which M is derived, and may therefore be due to earlier tradition. As an explanatory gloss they seem unnecessary, and they may have been originally dropped after οἰκοδόμον through homoeoteleuton. If genuine they might be accounted for by the wish of Socrates emphatically to impress the principle of the division of labour on Glaucon's mind. In IX. 572 A καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι could well be spared, and confuses the sense. A troublesome obscurity, perhaps due to an accretion, occurs in VII. 533 E ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν μόνον δηλοῖ πρὸς τὴν ἕξιν σαφηνείᾳ ὃ λέγει (λέγειν M, λέγεις A²) ἐν ψυχῇ. It might be justifiable to follow Ξ Steph. in omitting these words altogether[1]. Of single words which have been suspected, in V. 468 C καὶ μηδενί, καὶ proves to be absent in A, and now rests on the sole authority of Π. The progressive corruption of the later MSS. may be illustrated from the Darmstadt Fragment 𝔡, in which several passages, instead of being copied, are briefly paraphrased, as if from memory. The interpolations in Theaet. 156 C, 190 C may be compared with some of the above.

Textual Emendations.

Mistakes occurred in the earliest MSS.; and the attempt to rectify them immediately followed, not always with success. In one of the oldest and best papyrus fragments, that of Iliad XXIII and XXIV, lately published by Mr. Kenyon, the habit of correction, by writing between the lines, and putting a dot over a superfluous letter, is already begun. If nothing but Π in its original condition had come down to us, or even if we depended solely on A as at first written, before it was revised, whether by the first or second hand, not to mention other early correctors, no human ingenuity § 20.

[1] Perhaps also in V. 477 B the words κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν ἑκατέρα τὴν αὑτῆς, which are likewise omitted in Ξ, and are variously read in other MSS.

could have brought the text of Plato to its present state. Even if the lacunae were suspected, they could not have been filled. Modern criticism could at best have provided some such stop-gaps as were adopted by scribes and diorthotae of the Renaissance, in the absence of the best tradition. On the other hand, it cannot be assumed that in every case where the text of A has been preferred, a contrary decision might not be justified by the discovery of some earlier authority. In several instances, where the evidence of A had been misinterpreted through the silence of Bekker, it now proves that its witness goes the other way, and turns the scale in favour of a rejected reading; e.g. in III. 391 C *ὥρμησαν* not *ὥρμησεν*: in VI. 496 C *τῷ δικαίῳ* not *τῶν δικαίων*: X. 606 E *ἄξιος* not *ἄξιον* is the reading of A. The later MSS. exhibit an increase both of corruption and of attempted emendation; but we have seen reason to believe that in the few instances in which the readings of these MSS. are alone to be relied on, it is quite possible that by some happy accident they have preserved an earlier tradition.

The simplification of the *apparatus criticus* by the supposed affiliation of all the MSS. to one, is sometimes alleged to justify the license of conjecture. But the argument is fallacious. For the comparison of independent traditions is a firmer ground on which to base conjecture than a breakdown in the evidence of a single document. There are few places in the Republic, however, about which any serious doubt remains. Those most intimately acquainted with the text are the least inclined to emend it conjecturally. Schneider, the most accurate of critical editors, and the author of the certain emendation in VIII. 554 B *ἐτίμα μάλιστα* for *ἔτι μάλιστα*, was even extreme in his conservatism. He defended places which are indefensible, and where the remedy when once suggested cannot admit of doubt. For example, in Book I. 352 E he maintains *φαμὲν* with the MSS. against *φαῖμεν*, the reading of

Stephanus, Ast, Bekker and Stallbaum. In IV. 445 B he defends ἀποκνητέον, in VI. 494 B ἐν πᾶσιν against ἐν παισὶν, and in VI. 497 D argues with great subtlety, but doubtful success, against Bekker's emendation, οὐ πάντων ῥᾷστον for οὐ πάντως ῥᾷστον. He only adopted στραγγευομένῳ (V. 472 A) on finding it anticipated by an early corrector of Vind F., and to the last refused to treat τὸ λογιστικὸν (IX. 580 D) as a gloss in the text, on the insufficient ground that Par. K is manifestly derived from Ven. Π. He was also willing to retain δικῶν λήξεις in IV. 425 D, with the transposition of the words into a different order which he found in Vat. Θ.

Passages still open to suspicion, where no convincing remedy seems to be attainable are:— § 21.

II. 358 E οἷόν τε καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε. The reading of Aldus and the editions before Bekker τί τε ὂν τυγχάνει καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε has very weak manuscript authority; being confined so far as we know to Flor. b, which in this passage and what follows it, is in a very late hand. The expression is therefore probably a conjectural expansion of the same kind with the addition of δεικνύοιεν ἂν in III. 407 E. τί ὄν τε is the reading of A M Ξ; but gives a poor sense, requiring τί ὂν γέγονε to be joined. The reading of Π τί οἷόν τε καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε, taking οἷόν τε in two words, may be explained 'what, and of what nature, and from whence, justice has arisen.' The choice lies between this and the simpler reading of Flor. x οἷόν τε καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε, 'The nature and origin of justice.' The slight obscurity of this may be defended by supposing Plato to remember that he is speaking of the γένεσις not of the οὐσία of justice. But after all it is quite possible that τί ὄντε is a mis-writing for τί ἐστί. Bekker adopted τί οἴονται and wrote γεγονέναι.

II. 359 C τῷ [Γύγου] τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ. There is clearly something wrong here; but the emendation is doubtful: see note in loco.

III. 387 C φρίττειν δὴ ποιεῖ ὡς οἴεται (ὡς οἷόν τε q). Neither of these readings is satisfactory, and conjecture is at fault.

IV. 439 E ποτὲ ἀκούσας τι πιστεύω τούτῳ. For various suggested interpretations of this passage, see note in loco. Perhaps it is one of those in which a negative has been omitted (see above p. 107). π. ἀ. τι οὐ πιστεύω τ., 'I once heard a story told which *prevents* me from accepting that.' But the emendation remains uncertain.

VII. 533 E ὃ ἂν μόνον δηλοῖ πρὸς τὴν ἕξιν σαφηνείᾳ λέγει^{ς} ἐν ψυχῇ. The whole is omitted in Ξ and may possibly be an accretion. For an attempt to treat the text as it stands in the MSS., see note in loco.

VIII. 562 B τοῦτο δ' ἦν ὑπέρπλουτος. The compound substantive is anomalous, and the attempts at emendation are hitherto unsuccessful. For the grounds of the conjecture τοῦτο δ' ἦν *που πλοῦτος, see the notes.

VIII. 567 E τί δέ; (or τίς δὲ) αὐτόθεν (τοὺς δὲ Steph.).

VIII. 568 D ἀποδομένων. Reasons are given above, p. 110, for the conjecture *πωλουμένων.

IX. 581 E τῆς ἡδονῆς οὐ πάνυ πόρρω. See above (pp. 111, 112) for the conjecture τῆς ἀληθινῆς: but certainty is unattainable in a passage which has to be emended in more places than one. The difficulty in IX. 585 C εἰ δὲ ἀληθείας κ.τ.λ. may be due to some want of logical precision in Plato, but Madvig's theory of a lacuna must also be considered.

IX. 590 D οἰκεῖον ἔχοντος. Here again the grammatical inaccuracy may be due to Plato, but one cannot exclude the supposition that there is some corruption in the text arising from the words ἔχοντος ἐν αὑτῷ preceding. Madvig's οἰκείου ἐνόντος may be right.

X. 603 C μή τι ἄλλο ᾖ. Ast very probably conjectured μή τι ἄλλο ἦν.

X. 615 C for αὐτόχειρας Ast conjectured αὐτόχειρος or αὐτοχειρίας. Once more, in X. 616 A, the passage considered above, p. 111, it is difficult to arrive at a perfectly definite conclusion.

The following are the places, twenty-nine in all, in which the present text relies on conjecture:— § 22.

	Steph.		MSS.
I.	330 B	τουτοισί Bekker	τούτοισιν
	336 E	οἷον γε σὺ Bekker	οἷον τε σὺ
	341 B	ὃν νῦν Benedictus	ὃ νῦν (ο in erasure A)
	352 E	φαῖμεν Stephanus	φαμὲν
II.	361 C	ἴτω Neukirch	ἥτω (but η from ι ? A)
III.	392 B	ζητοῦμεν Hermann	ἐζητοῦμεν
	401 E	χαίρων καὶ δυσχεραίνων τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἐπαινοῖ καὶ Vermehren	δυσχεραίνων τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἐπαινοῖ καὶ χαίρων καὶ (χαίρων καὶ om. *q*)
	410 C	ἀμφοτέρα Schneider	ἀμφότερα
IV.	431 C	ἐν παισὶ H. Wolf	ἐν πᾶσι
	437 B	ἂν ἀλλήλοις Baiter	ἀλλήλοις
	D	ἑνὶ λόγῳ Cornarius	ἐν ὀλίγῳ, cp. IX. 571 D
	440 C	διὰ τοῦ (*bis*) L. Campbell	διὰ τὸ
	443 B	ἄλλο . Ἔτι τι Hermann	ἄλλο ἔτι . Τί
	445 B	ἀποκμητέον Bekker	ἀποκνητέον
V.	465 B	δέος δὲ τοῦ Madvig	δέος δὲ τὸ
VI.	492 C	ποίαν Cobet	ποίαν ἂν
	493 B	ἑκάστας G. van Prinsterer	ἕκαστος (ἑκάστοις, ἑκάστοτε)
	494 B	παισὶν Geer	πᾶσιν
	497 D	πάντων Bekker	πάντως
	499 B	κατηκόῳ Schleiermacher	κατήκοοι
	505 B	κεκτῄμεθα Bekker	κεκτήμεθα
VIII.	551 C	ἥστινος Ast	ἥ τινος
	554 B	ἐστήσατο καὶ ἐτίμα μάλιστα. Εὖ Schneider	ἐστήσατο. Καὶ ἔτι μάλιστα εὖ
	556 E	παρ' οὐδὲν Baiter	(γὰρ) οὐδὲν

Steph.		MSS.
IX.	581 D τί οἰώμεθα Graser	ποιώμεθα
	585 C τοῦ (*bis*) Madvig	*om.*
	590 A τὸ δεινόν , ἐκεῖνο Schneider	τὸ δεινὸν ἐκεῖνο
X.	600 D ὀνινάναι Ast	ὀνεῖναι or ὀνίναι
	606 C ὅτι, ἂν Schneider	ὅτι ἂν

The following rest only on slight manuscript authority:—II. 363 A τῷ ἀδίκῳ *q* x and Muretus cj.: III. 388 E ἐφῇ Vind. D mg. (ἔφην A) and Hermann cj.: V. 472 A στραγγευομένῳ Vind. F. corr. and C. Orelli cj. (στρατευομένῳ cett.).

A few others depend on citations of ancient writers:—II. 361 C τῶν ἀπ', Euseb. Theodoret (τῶν ὑπ' MSS.): V. 461 B ἀφήσομεν, Euseb. Theodoret (φήσομεν MSS.): VII. 540 C ξυναναιρῇ Aristides (ξυναιρῇ MSS. except Vind. E which has ξυνανέρῃ): IX. 589 D ἐμοί Stobaeus (μοι MSS.).

§ 23. The most important conjectures on the text of the Republic in recent years have been those of Cobet, Madvig, W. H. Thompson, and Ingram Bywater (see Baiter's Preface). Still more recently Mr. Herbert Richards has contributed many ingenious suggestions in the *C. R.* for 1893. It may be not unprofitable to examine at some length the most considerable of the fifty-seven emendations of the Republic proposed by Cobet in *Variae Lectiones*, ed. II, pp. 526–535. We shall best obey his favorite precept νᾶφε καὶ μέμνασ' ἀπιστεῖν by not yielding blindly to his authority.

To begin, then, with those passages in which he appeals to the authority of the chief MS.

X. 612 B ἐπῃνέκαμεν for ἐπηνέγκαμεν. The former is really the reading intended in Paris. A, where the η has ι adscript and there is a dot over the γ̇ (sic ἐπηινέγ̇καμεν), which is thus marked by the diorthotes as superfluous. In Politicus 307 A, where ἐπῃνέκαμεν is the best reading, the Bodleian gives ἐπηνέγκαμεν, and in both passages there is a variant ἐπῃνέσαμεν. And although ἐπηνέγκαμεν in the Republic

admits of a possible meaning, the pointed reference in ἐπῃνέκαμεν (or ἐπῃνέσαμεν?) to II. 367 D τοῦτ' οὖν αὐτὸ ἐπαίνεσον δικαιοσύνης . . . μισθοὺς δὲ καὶ δόξας πάρες ἄλλοις ἐπαινεῖν— is the more probable, as the context shows that Plato has that passage distinctly before him. Cobet failed to remark, however, that, if ἐπῃνέκαμεν is right the perfect is used together with the aorist ἀπελυσάμεθα. So that ἐπῃνέσαμεν, the reading of Par. K, should perhaps in strictness be preferred; and it may be still argued in favour of ἐπηνέγκαμεν that notwithstanding the reference to II. 367 D this need not involve the repetition of the same words.

VI. 503 B διεσπασμένα for διεσπασμένη. Here the critic has been less fortunate: διεσπασμένη is the reading of Paris. A (not διεσπασμένα as he supposed). It is also (*subaudiendo* ἡ φύσις) the more idiomatic reading. The variant διεσπασμένα is due to the tendency, noted elsewhere by Cobet himself, to adapt terminations to the nearest word. See above, p. 105.

The remaining passages may be taken in their order of sequence.

I. 343 B *διακεῖσθαι for διανοεῖσθαι (so Faesi). If there were any evidence for διακεῖσθαι the word might be accepted. But the familiar truth that κεῖσθαι is an equivalent for the perfect passive of τίθημι is not a sufficient proof that διανοεῖσθαί πως πρός τινα is bad Greek.

II. 362 B ξυμβάλλειν for ξυμβάλλειν, κοινωνεῖν. The exact equivalence of these two words is not proved by the fact that Socrates in I. 333 A leads Polemarchus by gentle transition from *contracts* to *partnerships*. The use of both words here recalls the preceding conversation more effectually.

II. 376 A οὐδὲ ἕν for οὐδὲν δέ. Cobet's suggestion is very ingenious, and may be right, but the reading of the inferior MSS. οὐδὲν δή is at least equally plausible.

III. 411 A *καταντλεῖν (so Van Heusde) for καταυλεῖν καὶ καταχεῖν. καταυλεῖν sc. αὐτοῦ or τῆς ψυχῆς. Cobet's assumption that the construction must be καταυλεῖν τῆς ψυχῆς τὰς

ἁρμονίας is wholly gratuitous. The words καὶ καταχεῖν κ.τ.λ. are an expansion of the notion of καταυλεῖν. The idea underlying many of these suggestions, that Attic Greek loves parsimony in expression, is peculiarly inapplicable to the language of Plato.

III. 412 E ἐπιλανθανόμενοι to be omitted? There is some awkwardness in the introduction of the word in this place, considering what follows in 413 B κλαπέντας . . . τοὺς ἐπιλανθανομένους, but Plato has elsewhere admitted similar tautology and verbal inconsistency.

V. 452 E ἄλλον τινὰ σκοπὸν προστησάμενος for πρὸς ἄλλον τινὰ σκοπὸν στησάμενος. An ingenious but doubtful way of correcting a doubtful text. Ib. ἡ φύσις ἡ θήλεια for φύσις ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη ἡ θήλεια. Cobet seems to have forgotten the reference to the lower animals in 451 D, E.

V. 477 E θήσομεν for οἴσομεν. This seems to be a genuine conjecture, although anticipated by Θ Φ r (see Bekker and Schneider) and also by the corrector of M. Cobet's logic sometimes coincides with that of the later scribes. οἴσομεν is really unobjectionable. Ficinus has *dicemus* (φήσομεν?).

VI. 491 B ⌊εἰ τελέως μέλλοι φιλόσοφος γενέσθαι⌋, 'verba soloece concepta sententiam onerant et impediunt.' The imputed solecism is really a Platonic idiom. To get rid of all such *impedimenta*, many pages would have to be re-written.

VI. 496 C ἤ γάρ πού τινι [ἄλλῳ] ἢ οὐδενί. 'Attic parsimony' is again assumed; but the passages quoted are not exactly in point, and it is Plato's manner in employing an idiom to adapt it to the immediate context.

VII. 521 C οὐσίαν ἐπάνοδος for οὖσαν ἐπάνοδον. Cobet's emendation, εἰς ἀληθινὴν τοῦ ὄντος οὐσίαν ἐπάνοδος still leaves the expression cumbrous, and περιαγωγὴ . . . εἰς . . . ἐπάνοδον is in close agreement with the description in 515 C–E.

VII. 527 E οὐδὲ πρὸς ἑτέρους for οὐ πρὸς οὐδετέρους. Neat, but not certain.

VII. 528 C *μεγαλαυχούμενοι for μεγαλοφρονούμενοι. Cobet

objects to μεγαλοφρονεῖν as a late Greek word and to the use of the middle, but many compounds and singular uses of the middle voice occur for the first time in Plato.

VII. 538 C προσποιουμένων for ποιουμένων. For similar uses of ποιεῖσθαι see note in loco.

VIII. 555 A and IX. 576 C [ὁμοιότητι]. The argument from parsimony is again misplaced, and the same gloss is not very likely to have crept into the text in both places. In the latter passage the word had been previously cancelled by Ast and Badham.

X. 615 C ἀπογενομένων for γενομένων. The suggestion is ingenious but unnecessary. Not birth, but death, is the pervading notion of the passage, and is therefore more easily understood. Not 'those who *died* immediately' (on birth) 'but those' (whose death occurred) 'as soon as they were *born*.'

X. 618 A διὰ τέλους for διατελεῖς. The adverbial phrase διὰ τέλους would require a *participle* such as κατεχομένας, which the adjective dispenses with. Cobet proceeds on the assumption that the Athenians always expressed the same thing in the same way. The same fallacy underlies his emendation in VIII. 565 C of ἕνα γέ τινα for ἕνα τινά.

Some of Madvig's suggestions, in spite of their acuteness, § **24.** are decidedly wanting in good taste. For example, his proposal to change φαντάσματα θεῖα VII. 532 C to φαντάσματα ἄδεια is almost ludicrous, and reminds one of modern Greek. Not much happier is his suggestion of χωλαί for πολλαί in V. 473 D supported by referring to VII. 535 D. The two passages stand in no relation to each other, and the abrupt introduction of the metaphorical word is foreign to the manner of Plato. Such hariolations as these tend to disable a critic's judgement, and to cast suspicion on other proposals of his which are at first sight more plausible. The most ingenious of Madvig's suggestions are in VIII. 546 D δεύτερά τε for δεύτερον δὲ τά, and X. 608 A ᾀσόμεθα for αἰσθόμεθα, but in the latter case it appears more probable that

the corrupt *αἰσθόμεθα* has taken the place of some expression answering to the *ὥσπερ* clause, such as *ἀφεξόμεθα*. In X. 606 C there is much to be said for his conjecture *ἂν κατεῖχες* for *αὖ κατεῖχες*.

W. H. Thompson, in IX. 585 A, with great plausibility conjectured *πρὸς λύπην οὕτω τὸ ἄλυπον* for *πρὸς τὸ ἄλυπον οὕτω λύπην*, but see note in loco. Another very probable suggestion which he does not seem to have communicated to Baiter, is in VIII. 545 B *ἀλλ' ἤ* for *ἄλλο· ἤ*. For other conjectures of the same critic, see notes on VIII. 563 D, 567 D, and IX. 573 C.

Charles Badham is responsible for a conjecture which Cobet approved, and Baiter received into his text, VIII. 560 D *δι' ὤτων* for *ἰδιωτῶν*. Reasons against adopting this and in support of *ἰδιωτῶν* are given in the commentary to this edition. He also proposed to cancel *μισθωτοί* in IV. 419 A.

Prof. Bywater's chief suggestion is V. 476 A *ἀλλ' ἄλλων* for *ἀλλήλων* in a passage where needless difficulty has been felt. See note in loco. In VI. 504 A Orelli's *ἄθλοις* for *ἄλλοις* would be convincing, if *ἆθλος* had been a usual word in Plato, but he uses it only in the Timaeus and Laws.

In VII. 532 B, C Nägelsbach's *ἔτι ἀδυναμία* for *ἐπ' ἀδυναμίᾳ* is exceedingly plausible and is supported by the quotation of Iamblichus. But it hardly bears examination ; see note in loco. Even if the absence of *ἡ* may be excused, the construction with the infinitive, instead of *ἡ ἀδυναμία* τοῦ *βλέπειν*, is hardly Greek. In Theaet. 156 A, where *δύναμιν ἔχον* is construed with the infinitive, probably the closest parallel, the case is altered by the presence of the participle. For *δύναμιν ἔχειν* = *δύνασθαι*.

Of Mr. Richards' conjectures on I–V, the most persuasive are :—

III. 407 E *Δῆλον, ἔφη,* ὅτι τοιοῦτος *ἦν· καὶ οἱ παῖδες αὐτοῦ οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὅτι κ.τ.λ.* It would be quite as easy, however, to

cancel ὅτι . . . ἦν as an 'accretion'; and in either case the received reading gives a preferable rhythm.

IV. 430 E κρείττω δὴ αὑτοῦ *ἀποφαίνοντες κ.τ.λ.

433 D καὶ δούλῳ καὶ ἐλευθέρῳ ⟨καὶ γεωργῷ⟩ καὶ δημιουργῷ.

444 C *αὐτὰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα (so Stob.). Probably right.

V. 457 C *ἄγε δή, ἴδω for λέγε δή, ἴδω. This is better than Cobet's *φέρε δή. But neither is required. See Goodwin, *M. and T.* 257.

462 C ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ for ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό. This is possibly right.

468 A λέγ', ἔφη, ποῖα δή for λέγ', ἔφη, ποῖ' ἄν. If the text is corrupt, this is the most likely way of emending it.

On Muretus' conjecture in II. 364 C, ᾄδοντες for διδόντες, see note in loco.

The present editor has suggested the following conjectural changes, which he has not, however, ventured to introduce into the text:— § **25.**

II. 358 E τί *ἐστι καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε

III. 387 C φρίττειν δὴ ποιεῖ ὡς *ἐτεά

IV. 439 E ἀκούσας τι *οὐ πιστεύω

442 E τοῦτον *αὐτό for τοῦτο αὐτόν (τοῦτον A Π M)

V. 471 A ὄντες, *καὶ οὐ πολέμιοι (ὡς οὐ π. A mg. M)

479 D *ὡμολογήσαμεν (for ὡμολογήκαμεν)

VI. 496 A φρονήσεως *ἀξίως ἀληθινῆς ἐχόμενον (ἄξιον A: ἄξιον ὡς Π)

500 A ἢ οὐκ (sic *q*) . . . ἀλλοίαν *τε φήσεις . . . ;

VII. 518 D ἐγγύς τι *τείνειν τῶν τοῦ σώματος

VIII. 562 B τοῦτο δ' ἦν *που πλοῦτος for τοῦτο δ' ἦν ὑπέρπλουτος

563 C οἷαίπερ αἱ δέσποιναι γίγνονται, ⟨σεμνύνονταί⟩ τε δὴ καὶ ἵπποι καὶ ὄνοι

568 D τὰ τῶν *πωλουμένων for τὰ τῶν ἀποδομένων

IX. 581 E τῆς *ἀληθινῆς οὐ πάνυ πόρρω; for τῆς ἡδονῆς, οὐ π. π.

IX. 585 C *καὶ* ***ἀληθοῦς** for *καὶ* **ἀληθείας**

X. 610 A *ὀρθότατά* **γ'** for *ὀρθότατα*

And the following readings, mostly of inferior authority, are recommended for further consideration:—

I. 333 E *δεινὸς φυλάξασθαι* [*καὶ*] *μὴ παθεῖν q*

335 D *βλάπτειν* (omitting *ἔργον*) M

340 A *αὐτὸς θρασύμαχος* (omitting *γάρ*) M

346 D *ἡ τοῦ μισθοῦ λῆψις om.* M

II. 358 E **πλέον** *δὲ* **κακῷ** Π M

367 A *ἕκαστος* **ἄριστος** *φύλαξ* Π

370 B *ἐπ' ἄλλου ἔργου* **πράξει** M

374 B *μήτε* **οἰκοδόμον**, *ἀλλὰ σκυτο***τόμον** Π

III. 409 D *καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις* M

IV. 435 D *ἄλλ***η** *γὰρ a* Galen.

436 A **τούτων** *ἕκαστα q* corr.

442 B *προσῆκεν q* Stobaeus

444 C *αὐτὰ μὲν οὖν* Stob. et cj. H. Richards 1893

V. 459 E *ἔσονται om.* A Π M

468 B *χρῆναι om.* M

VI. 489 B *τἀληθῆ λέγει* D

497 B *ἀλλότριον εἶδος* Ξ

499 B *παραβάλῃ* Ξ

509 D *οὐρανοῦ* Ξ

510 B *μιμηθεῖσιν* A Proclus

VII. 522 A *πρὸς τοιοῦτόν τι* **ἄγον** (*γρ.*) Π mg.

525 A *ταὐτὸν πέπονθε* **τοῦτο** Π

528 C *κωλυόμενα* Ξ pr.

532 E *τίνες* **αἱ** *ὁδοί* r

VIII. 554 D *ἐνευρήσεις* A^2 Π M

IX. 587 E *καταπεφώρακας* r Ξ corr. *v*

X. 601 B *αὐτὰ ἐφ' αὑτῶν* **γενόμενα** A^2

„ C *ἐφ' ἡμίσεως q*

603 B **καὶ ἡ** *κατὰ τὴν ἀκοήν q*

607 D *ἀπολογησαμένη* r (et forsitan A pr)

612 C *ᾐτεῖσθε* A

615 B *πολλοῖς* D corr.

It may not be out of place to quote an example of the manner in which a scholar of the sixteenth century approached the task of emendation:— § 26.

'Enimvero quum in plerisque locis fidem eorundem librorum a me frustra implorari viderem, alii autem non suppeterent, ad coniecturas, tanquam ad δεύτερον πλοῦν, me convertere necesse habui. Sed quum intelligerem quàm periculose sint coniecturae, et quàm fallaciter plerunque suis coniecturis adblandiantur, ex ingenio meo profectas emendationes non in ipsum recepi contextum (ut antea etiam cum vulgo appellavi) sed partim margini adscripsi, partim Annotationibus reservavi, ubi earum rationem etiam reddere daretur. . . .

'Quinetiam contingebat interdum ut quantumvis pectus concuterem (non foecundum illud quidem, sed nec omnino, quorundam iudicio, infoecundum) nihil quicquam ex eo egrederetur, antequam loci in quibus haerebam excusi essent: simulatque autem iam excusos relegerem, ex eo illorum emendatio velut sponte sua prodire videretur. Ex eorum numero duos mihi nunc suggerit memoria: quorum unus habet, ἵνα μὴ μεμφῇς, alter δ' ἕξειν: horum enim emendationem assequi coniectura non potueram antequam paginae in quibus erant, excusae essent: at quum operae meae penso suo manum extremam imponerent, ego superveniens, perinde ac si longè quàm antea perspicacior factus essem, pro [μὴ] μεμφῇς quidem [μή] με φθῇς[1] [Polit. 266 E]: pro δ' ἕξειν autem, δείξειν scribendum esse, primo ferè aspectu animadverti.'

'*Henricus Stephanus lectori*:' Preface to Plato ed. 1578.

Plato is one of a select number of Greek authors whose text is known to us as it existed in the ninth century A.D. The Byzantine MSS. of that period were not only carefully written, but carefully revised; with the aid, as there is good

[1] This conjecture is partly confirmed by Bodl. Vat. Δ reading μήτ' ἔφθης.

reason to think, of other MSS. besides the one immediately in hand. Some of the errors in these early copies have still to be corrected by the help of later ones, into which, as it now appears, some grains from a yet earlier tradition have in some way filtered down. There remains little scope for conjecture. Such achievements of intuition as Schneider's ἐτίμα μάλιστα and Orelli's στραγγενομένῳ remain isolated instances of success. Plato's language is so highly wrought, so various, and so full of unexpected turns, that the task of emending him is like that of emending poetry. In a so-called epistle of Demosthenes there is more room for 'certain conjecture' than in a whole tragedy of Aeschylus or Sophocles, where the most brilliant suggestions, such as Conington's λέοντος ἶνιν or Jebb's λυτήριον λώφημα, are still open to doubt; or in one of those plays of Euripides, where the judgement is sufficiently perplexed by the discrepancies of thirteenth century MSS. without having recourse to vain *hariolatio*. The thesis might be maintained, however, that the more a text requires emendation (either from bad copying, or from the use of technical terms, as in the musical or mathematical writers, or from obscurity or singularity of style), the less possible it is to emend it. Take, for example, the portion of the Oresteia which is lost in the Medicean MS., or again the Supplices of Aeschylus, which is manifestly corrupt in the Medicean MS. without having any other independent MS. authority. Conjecture has been active, with but little of agreement in the result. In the case of Pindar, although we have no MS. earlier than the twelfth century, those we have seem to give evidence of a constant and authentic tradition. The difficulty is at its height in the later part of the Bacchae, 755 ff., where there is only one MS. and that of an inferior description: or again in the case of such an author as Marcus Aurelius, where the critic has to choose between late MSS. and a printed text founded on an earlier MS. now lost.

It would be unsafe to argue from the analogy of Latin

authors; the great variety of style and dialect in Greek of all periods involving ever fresh uncertainty[1]. Lucretius or Catullus may be emended with more probability than Aeschylus or the fragments of Alcman. Different literatures admit of different treatment. Bentley in his proposals for a text of the New Testament says expressly that he is well aware that conjecture can have no place in the sacred text. This may have been intended to soothe orthodox apprehensions, but it at least involves an admission of the precariousness of conjecture[2].

The invention of so-called Canons of Criticism introduces § **27.** an appearance of scientific precision, which is really fallacious. The rule of the more difficult reading, 'Potior lectio difficilior,' may often prove misleading. The balance is in favour of the less common word, if equally in point: e. g. ψέγει for λέγει. But when an absurd reading has once found its way into an approved text, the conservatism of tradition will often maintain it for centuries against common sense. The true reading meanwhile may have passed down through weaker channels, and may be supported, though less authoritatively, by independent evidence. For example, in IV. 442 B ὧν οὐ προσῆκόν αὐτῷ γένει, προσῆκον is the harder reading, and is supported by the better MSS.; but the change from ε to ο might be made early, and once made would remain in one line of tradition, and the easier reading προσῆκεν, having the support of Stobaeus, would

[1] Yet it is not to be overlooked that here also the unwisdom of employing one manuscript authority exclusively has been clearly shown. See Prof. Ellis' 'Praefatio' to his *Noctes Manilianae* (Clarendon Press, 1891):—'Gemblacensis Codex . . . ueterrimus ille quidem, utpote saec. XI scriptus, et integerrimus est omnium; ita tamen, ut si absit Vossianus is secundus Iacobi, cui scriba suus annum 1470 in fine addidit, uera manus poetae relicta sit in incerto, idque plurifariam.' The same scholar adds his testimony to the general fact—'antiquos codices ita praestare recentibus ut his tamen supersederi nequeat.'

[2] It is also a strong instance of the general fact that the more reverently an author is handled the fewer are the conjectures which find their way into his text.

seem to be traditional in *q*. It should be remarked, however, that the best MS. of Stobaeus is, according to Gaisford, of the fourteenth century.

Nor is the 'ductus literarum' in every instance a safe guide. Many other causes beside the forms of letters have been at work, as we have seen above, and the only effect of an apparently simple change may be to 'skin and film the ulcerous place.' Who could have supposed that between the syllables of ἐκτέον, the reading of D K in x. 607 A, there lurked a lacuna of forty-three letters? Or what palaeographer could have corrected χρησμὸν λέγοντας in Solon fr. 36, l. 9, to χρείους φυγόντας, which the Ath. Pol. now proves to be the true reading? What critic could have guessed it? Or, if he had, who could have assured us that he was right?—The errors of printed books present only a distant analogy to those of classical MSS., which in the great authors, have often been more carefully revised. Yet even here conjecture has proved of little avail. Of innumerable emendations of Shakespeare by far the greater number have been rejected by recent editors, and very few have the certainty of Johnson's 'no more, but *e'en* a woman, —(Foll. '*in*')—*Ant. and Cleo.* iv. 15, l. 73. Who shall emend with certainty 1 *Henry IV*, Act iv. 1, ll. 98, 99 'All plumed like estridges that with the wind | Baited like eagles having lately bathed,' or supply the 'missing word' in Sonnet 146 'Poor soul, the centre of my sinful earth, ... by these rebel powers that thee array'? or in *Hamlet* iv. 1, ll. 40, 41 'And what's untimely done ... | Whose whisper o'er the world's diameter,' &c. Or, to take a more modern instance, what but documentary evidence can determine between 'an unbodied joy' and 'an embodied joy' in Shelley's *Skylark*?

Yet it must be admitted that Shelley's text affords some examples of conjectural emendation subsequently corroborated by documentary evidence. The subtle criticism of W. M. Rossetti suggested several corrections of the printed text which examination of the MSS. has since

confirmed[1]. *Julian and Maddalo* (vol. ii. p. 324, l. 18) 'and *even* at this hour:' *ever* cj. Rossetti and so Shelley's MS. *Letter to Maria Gisborne* (vol. iii. p. 48, l. 1) 'or those in *philosophic* councils met:' *philanthropic* cj. Rossetti[2] and so Shelley's MS. *Hellas* (vol. ii. p. 145, l. 20) 'The caves of the Icarian isles *Hold* each to the other in loud mockery:' *Told* cj. Rossetti and so the MS., and also a list of errata in Shelley's handwriting.

I understand also that in Chaucer five conjectural readings of Tyrwhitt's have been found in the Ellesmere MS. which is supposed to have been unknown to him. But his examination of MSS. may have been more minute than appears on the surface of his edition. Have all the twenty-four MSS. mentioned by him been identified and thoroughly collated?

The history of classical texts presents few such examples. In Soph. Philoctetes 29 Lambinus suggested κτύπος for τύπος, and this was afterwards found in the Laurentian MS., and as a marginal variant in Γ. In Phil. 689 Auratus suggested κλύων for κλύζων, and this has also received some MS. confirmation. The correction of errors in the third epistle of Demosthenes, confirmed by the British Museum Papyrus as noted above, is perhaps the most striking example hitherto of such success.

Of Platonic editors probably Heindorf and Schneider have come nearest—Schleiermacher and K. F. Hermann being not far behind. Two conjectures of Schleiermacher though turning on a very slight change of letters are of distinguished merit:—in Rep. VI. 499 B κατηκόῳ for κατήκοοι and Protag. 328 C ὀνῆσαι for νοῆσαι. C. Orelli's στραγγευομένῳ for στρατευομένῳ (V. 472 A) confirmed by Vind. F corr. is the best example in the Republic[3]. It is also rather a striking

[1] I quote the earlier readings from ed. 1847 (reprint of Mrs. Shelley's edition).

[2] 'The epithet "philosophic" does not appear specially apposite; should it be "theosophic" or "philanthropic"?' W. M. Rossetti, note to vol. ii. p. 245 of his edition, 1870.

[3] For several instances in which conjecture has coincided with MS.

fact that τὴν τῷ δικαίῳ βοήθειαν, which Schneider adopted from Vind. F pr. in place of τ. τῶν δικαίων β. in VI. 496 D, now proves to be the reading of Par. A.

In some cases, where all the MSS. are at fault, the true reading has been found in a quotation by some ancient writer, as Galen, Athenaeus, Stobaeus, and the Fathers Eusebius and Theodoretus. A doubt may arise, where the consent of the oldest MSS. is opposed to the reading of some inferior MS. supported by such quotation. When the author who gives the quotation is preserved in MSS. say of the tenth century, the evidence is nearly balanced,—the only remaining uncertainty being that which attends upon all quotations. The commentary of Proclus also supplies some evidence; but the Scholia to Plato, for the most part, throw but little light upon his text. They are full of Neo-platonic fancies, and few of them can be referred to the Alexandrian time. This is the more unfortunate, because, as a general rule, the best emendations have been those to which scholars have been led by some discrepancy between the explanation of a scholiast and the traditional text. The best emendation of a Sophoclean passage is Boeckh's φονώσαισιν for φονίαισιν in Ant. 117, founded on the scholion ταῖς τῶν φονῶν ἐρώσαις λόγχαις. Another, almost equally good, without such help, is ἀνῇ (Auratus and Pierson), in Phil. 639, confirmed by the gloss in L, παρῇ.

Were the corruptions and interpolations of the text of the Republic as numerous as recent scholars have imagined, the difference of meaning involved would be still infinitesimal. Some feature of an image might be obscured, or some idiomatic phrase enfeebled, but Plato's philosophy would remain uninjured. That is not a reason for careless treatment, but it is a consideration deserving to be set against the natural bias which minute and long-continued attention to the details of criticism is apt to produce.

evidence (in Euthyphr. Apol.) see Wohlrab *Platonhandschriften*, &c., p. 651.

The fashion of Greek orthography has changed somewhat since this text was printed. Exact scholars, whose eyes are accustomed to recent classical editions, will miss *θνῄσκει, σῴζω, ποεῖν, μείξας, ὑεῖς,* and other forms, which inscriptions show to have been usual in Attica from about 400 B.C. The new-old spelling is hardly yet finally established, and a text which is *arrière* in this respect may perhaps have some compensating advantages for those who in their school days were familiar with the former practice; to whom ὑὸς *μαίας μάλα γενναίας τε καὶ βλοσυρᾶς* (Theaet. 149 A) still presents an awkward ambiguity, and who are for the moment puzzled when, in perusing a Latin treatise on Greek races, they come across the familiar patronymic, 'Jones.' The retention of *φιλόνεικος, φιλονεικεῖν, φιλονεικία* (against *φιλόνικος,* &c.) deserves a more serious defence. (See an elaborate note on the point in Leopold Schmidt's *Ethik der alten Griechen*[1].) There is no doubt that Greeks in Plato's time and afterwards associated the word with *νίκη.* But Greek etymological fancies are hardly solid ground to rest upon; and the derivation from *νεῖκος* appears more probable: cp. *φιλαπεχθήμων.* The accentuation of *ἀφίῃ* (VII. 520 A) is indefensible. But I have followed the MSS. and editions. No scholar has yet suggested the adoption of the *ι* adscript in our ordinary texts. But this, together with the abolition of capitals and the recasting of our type in imitation of the earliest uncials, may follow in time.

[1] Vol. i. p. 386.

APPENDIX I.

Collation of the Present Text with Paris A (1807).

The purpose of these pages is to supplement and partly to correct the list of various readings subjoined to the Text of this edition. Where my collation agrees substantially with Baiter's report, I give my own observation without any distinctive mark. An asterisk is placed against items believed to be new. And where these tend either to confirm or to alter the text as it stands, the reading of **A** is printed in larger type. It will be observed that in six places the new collation turns the scale against readings formerly adopted: III. 391 C **ὥρμησαν** not *ὥρμησεν*: IV. 428 D **τελέους** not *τελέως*: VI. 496 C **τῷ δικαίῳ** not *τῶν δικαίων*: 503 B **διεσπασμένη** not *διεσπασμένα*: X. 606 E **ἄξιος** not *ἄξιον*: 607 D **ἀπολογησαμένη** not *ἀπολογησομένη*.

L. C.

For the List of Errata in Text, see the last page of this volume. And for general peculiarities of Paris **A**, neglected here, see above, p. 70.

	Page.	Line.	Steph. p.	Text.	Par. A
Rep. I.	2	30		Critical note on l. 6	*γρ. ἓν*
	3	15	328 D	*ὡς παρὰ φίλους τε*	in mg.: *om.* pr.
		24	E	*αὐτὸ*	*αὐτὸς* A²
	5	2	329 E	*σου*	*σοῦ* (corr. rec.)
	6	2	330 C	*αὑτῶν*	*αὐτῶν* (et sic saepius)
	*	23	E	*ἠδίκηκεν*	*ἠδίκησκεν* A²
	9	13	332 C	*τί οἴει; ἔφη*	The persons were at first divided with : after *ἔφη*. This was afterwards erased
		23	D	*τίσι*	*τισίν* (sic saepius)
	11	21	333 C	*τί*	*τι* (et saepius)
		31	D	*δέῃ*	*δέοι*
	*12	18	333 E	*φυλάξασθαι, καὶ λαθεῖν*	*φυλάξασθαι καὶ λαθεῖν* (sic)

Rep. I.

Page.	Line.	Steph. p.	Text.	Par. A
*12	29		Cr. n. 12	οὐκ ἂν οὖν in mg. m. vet. The ν of ἂν partly eaten away
15	22	335 C	ἄρα	ἆρα pr.
18	17	337 A	ἀνεκάγχασε	ἀνεκάγ | χασε in two lines, but a recent hand has erased γ and written κ at the beginning of the next line
19	30	E	ἀποκρίναιτο	ἀποκρίναιτο: ναι is written over an erasure of two letters
21	15	338 E	ἑκάστῃ	ἑκάστηι (ι adscript)
*23	9	339 E	οὑτωσὶ δίκαιον εἶναι ποιεῖν τοὐναντίον ἤ	οὑτωσὶ δίκαιον εἶναι ποιεῖν τοὐναντίον, ἤ (sic)
25	4	341 A	ἄρχων ἐστὶ	ἄρχων ἔστι pr.
	9		εἶεν	Corrected by a recent hand to εἶέν and so constantly elsewhere
*	31		Cr. n. 20	ὃ is written over an erasure in A
26	18	D	ἔστι τι	ἔστιν τι (et saepius)
	30	342 A	αὐτῇ	αὖ . . pr., αὐτῇ corr.
27	7	B	σκέψεται	σκέψεται (ται in erasure)
	12		αὐτῇ	αὔτη
	31		Cr. n. 4	δεῖ αἰεὶ A
*31	10	344 E	ζῴη	ζων pr.: corr. p. m.
32	12	345 D	μέλει	μέλλει pr.
	31		Cr. n. 7	ποιμαίνειν A² mg.
*34	3	346 D	λῆψις	λῆψις́
	7		ἑκάστῃ	ἑκάστῃ (η in erasure)
35	4	347 A	ξυνίῃς	ξυνιεῖς
36	8	E	ἔγωγε, ἔφη	ἔγωγ᾽ ἔ φη (sic)
	13	348 A	πείθωμεν	πείθοιμεν pr.
	17		αὖ	corr. from ἂν by p. m.
37	30		Cr. n. 20, 21	ut videtur A; viz. — : σὺ δὲ . . . λέγειν :
*39	31		Cr. n. 19 ὁ δὲ μὴ	ὁ δὲ, μὴ A²

	Page.	Line.	Steph. p.	Text.	Par. A
Rep. I.	41	19 & 31	350 C	ὁ δὴ Θρ.	ὁ δὲ θρ.
	42	5	350 E	ἐᾷς	ἐᾷσ. . followed by an erasure
		31		Cr. n. 14	The breathing of εἴπερ has absorbed the sign ˉ for ν
	43	5 & 31	351 C	εὖ γε σὺ ποιῶν	εὖ γε σοι ποιῶν: pr. (as if there were a change of persons)
				Cr. n. 5	γρ. σὺ A^2 mg.
	*	28	E	οὐδὲν ἧττον	οὐδὲν with ἧττον in mg. by A^2
	44	1		τοιάνδε τινὰ	τοιᾶνδέ τινα (et alibi)
	*	24	352 C	δὴ καὶ οὖς	δικαίους pr.
	*45	7 & 30	D	ὡς ἐμοὶ	ὥστέμοι corr. to ὡσ γ' ἐμοὶ by A^2
	47	31		Cr. n. 6	πραξαισ (ο above) A^2
	48	10	354 A	Βενδιδείοις	Βενδιδίοις
Rep. II.	*49	21	357 C	εἶπον	εἶπον (ο in erasure)
	*50	3		φαῖμεν	φαῖμεν (ι from μ)
	52	31		Cr. n. 24	μυθολογοῦσιν A
	53	14	360 B	τῶν παρὰ τὸν βασιλέα	*om.*: supplied in mg. by A^2
		27	C	καίτοι	καί το pr. καί $\overset{\text{ι}}{\text{τό}}$ A^2
	54	7	D	ἀνοητότατος	Corrected to ἀνοητοτάτοις
	*55	13	361 C	ἴτω	ἤτω: but η from ι p. m.
	57	13	363 A	ἀπ' αὐτῆς	ὑπ' αὐτῆς pr.
	*59	17	364 D	ἀνάντη	καὶ τραχεῖαν added in mg. by A^2
	60	9	365 A	ἐπιπτόμενοι	Changed to ἐφιπτάμενοι by m. rec. with καὶ ἐπιπτώμενοι in mg.
	62	14	366 D	ὡς δέ	ὡ^cδὲ (sic) A^1 or A^2?
		19		εἰπεῖν	εἰπεν corr. to εἰπεῖν by A^1 or A^2
	63	19	367 C	ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν	*om.*: supplied in mg. by A^2
		23		μὲν	*om.*: inserted above the line by A^2

Page.	Line.	Steph. p.	Text.	Par. A	
*64	5	367 D	κελεύεις	κελεύοις : ι in erasure (it never was κελεύεις)	Rep. II
	24	368 B	χρήσωμαι	Changed to χρήσομαι by A[2]	
	29		Cr. n. 2	The words γρ. ἀποδεχοίμην are by A[2]	
68	25	370 D	χαλκῆς	χαλκεῖς : ει by A[2] in space of two or more letters	
	31		εἶς ἓν	So corrected by A[2]	
69	15	E	κενὸς	κ . ε . νὸς (ε in space of four letters)	
71	11	371 E	ηὔξηται ἡ πόλις	ηὔξηται ἡ πόλις (sic)	
	20	372 A	διαιτήσονται	διαιτήσωνται pr.	
*72	29	E	εἰ δ' αὖ . . . ἀποκωλύει	Point erased after βούλεσθε and οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει marked off with :. . . : as Glaucon's by A[2]	
	31		Cr. n. 11	σύκων (sic) is the reading of A	
*73	29		Cr. n. 2	κλῖναί is the reading of A	
74	9	373 D	ἐκείνοις	ἐκείνης pr.	
	19	E	καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ	*om.* : add. in mg. A[2]	
78	19	376 A	προπεπονθὼς	προ ÷ πεπονθὼς corr. to προ÷πεπονθὸς by A[2]	
79	7	C	φιλόσοφον	*om.* pr.: add. in mg. A[2]	
	18	D	ἵνα μὴ . . . διεξίωμεν	In mg. (διεξιῶμεν primitus) by A[2]	
*84	10	379 B	μὴ βλάπτει . . . ὅ δέ γε	*om.*: supplied in mg. by A[2]	
*86	27	380 E	καὶ κινεῖται . . . σιτίων τε	*om.*: supplied in mg. by A[2]	
*89	15	382 B	ἐψεῦσθαι καὶ	First omitted and then supplied by A[1]	
90	27	E	οὔθ' ὕπαρ	ὕπαρ corr. to οὔθ' ὕπαρ by A[2]	
			οὔτ' ὄναρ	οὐδ' ὄναρ	
*91	25		Cr. n. 2	**γόητας ὄντας** is the reading of **A**	
			,,	αὐτῆς is the correction of A[2]	

	Page.	Line.	Steph. p.	Text.	Par. A
Rep. II.	*91	27		Cr. n. 12	παιῶν' (with M Ξ)
Rep. III.	95	18	388 B	ἀμφοτέρῃσι	ἀμφοτέραισι (ηι above) A[2]: no mark of quotation here
	96	8	D	σχολῇ	σχόλῃι with gloss, ἀντὶ τοῦ οὐδαμῶς
		19	E	ἰσχυρῷ	A recent hand has added κατέχοιτο in mg.
	97	12	389 C	τοιούτους	*om.*: add. in mg. A[2]
		18		τις	τῆς (ι above)
		21		ἄν	ἀν = ἐὰν without accent here and elsewhere, e.g. 411 C
	*99	5	390 B	ὡς μόνος . . . ἐπιθυμίαν	Marked off with :. . . : as a separate speech
		19	D	ἠνίπαπε	ἠνείπαπε (ι above)
	100	7	391 A	δι'	δὴ with accent over erasure: perhaps δὴ (ι above)
	*101	1	C	ὥρμησαν	ὤρμησαν
		2	D	ἄλλον	ἄλλοὺ (sic)
		17	E	*οἱ Ζηνὸς ἐγγύς, ὧν	Ζηνὸς ἐγγὺς ὧν
	109	9	396 C	αὐτὸς	αὔτὸς pr.
	*110	4	397 A	δὴ ἐλέγομεν	διελέγομεν pr.
	*	5		βρ άς τε	βροντάς γε
		31			For 3 in cr. n. read 5
				Cr. n. 18	σμικραὶ A[2]: σμικρὰ A
	113	10	398 E	συντονολυδιστὶ	συντονο‿λυδιστὶ A[2]
		21 & 31		αἵτινες	αυτινες pr.: αἵτινες A[2]: αὖ τινες in mg. m. vet.
	*	30		Cr. n. 7	**οὐ γὰρ οὖν** is the reading of A
	*115	23	400 A	εἴποιμι· ποῖα δὲ ποίου βίου μιμήματα	εἴποι μιμήματα
	117	13	401 A	ἀρρυθμία	ἀρυθμία A: ἀρρυθμία A[2]
	*118	29		Cr. n. 6	**αὖρα** is the reading of A
	121	3	403 B	ὡς ἔοικε, νομοθετήσεις	ὡς ἔοικενο | μοθετὴς εἷς A ὡς ἔοικενόνο | μοθετὴς εἷς A[2]
	123	3	404 B	ἐπὶ στρατείας	ἐπὶ στρατιᾶς

Page.	Line.	Steph. p.	Text.	Par. A	
127	11	407 B	τῷ μὴ μελετῶντι, ἢ νοσοτροφία	τῷ μὴ μελετῶντι ἢ νοσοτροφία	Rep. III.
	22	C	ἀεὶ	αἰεὶ	
	28		Cr. n. 15–17	Et A Socrati tribuit cum : . . . : et — in mg.	
129	3	408 B	τραγῳδιοποιοί	τραγῳδοποιοί (A on the whole favours τραγῳδιοποιός)	
	28	E	ᾗ	ἠ (sic pr.: ᾗ rec.)	
*	31		ᾗ	ηι pr.: ᾗ corr. p. m.	
134	3	411 C	κομιδῇ	(. . .) κομιδῇ	
	4		γυμναστικῇ	ὸς γυμναστικῇ A^2	
	21	E	ἀρρυθμίας	ἀρυθμίας pr.: ἀρρυθμίας A^2	
	22		ἀχαριστίας	σί ἀχαριστίας A^2	
	24		ἐπὶ δὴ	ἐπειδὴ	
*	31		Cr. n. 13	**οὔτε ζητήματος** is the reading of A	
142	22	416 D	ἐπαροῖ	ἐπάρῃ	
151	24	424 B	ἐπιφρονέουσιν	ἐπιφρονέουσιὺ (sic) A^2	Rep. IV.
152	31		Cr. n. 7	αὐτὴ A	
153	30		Cr. n. 18	ὂν A (non inter versus)	
154	24	426 A	ὑγιεῖς	ὑγιὴς	
155	1	B	αὐτὸν	αὐτῶν A^2	
	24	D	ἔγωγ', ἔφη,	ἔγωγ', ἔφη : (sic)	
157	29	428 A	ἐκεῖνο	ῶ ἐκεῖνο A^2	
159	5	D	ἑαυτῆς	αὑτῆς	
*	10		τελέους	**τελέους** (not τελέως) is the reading of A	
160	23	429 C	παρήγγειλεν	ε παρήγγειλλεν	
163	7	430 E	λέγοντες	φαίνονταί (sic) cum γρ. λέγοντες A^2	
165	23	432 B	τοῦτό ἐστιν	τοῦτ' ἐστὶν	
*167	21	433 C	ὑπολειφθὲν	ὑπολ(η)φθὲν pr.?	
*	31		Cr. n. 26	ἡ ὁμοδοξία (ἡ not *om.*)	
168	18	E	τούτου	τοῦτο	
	30		Cr. n. 13	γρ. εἰ σαυτῷ mg.	
*169	27	434 D	ἄλλῃ	ἄλλη pr.	

	Page.	Line.	Steph. p.	Text.	Par. A
Rep. IV.	*170	4 & 29	434 D	ἐκεῖνο	ἐκεῖ is the reading of A; so that for ἐκεῖνο we are thrown back on Ξ D *q*
	172	22	436 B	ὥστ' ἐάν που	ὥστε ἄν που
	174	21	437 C	ἐρωτῶντος	ἐρῶ(τῶ)ντος
	175	6	D	ἐστὶ δίψα ἆρά γε	— ἐστὶ ⁚ δίψα ⁚ ἆράγε
		29		Cr. n. 5	ἢ οὐ γρ. ποῦ (it was at first που γρ. η ου)
	*179	9	439 E	τι †πιστεύω	τι, πιστεύω (sic)
	183	19	442 B	τούτω	τούτω· (letter erased)
	184	29	443 A	οὐδέν' ἂν	οὐδὲν ἂν
	185	19 & 32	B	τέλεον	τελευταῖον γρ. τέλεον mg.
	*186	31		Cr. n. 16	ἢ περὶ τὰ ἴδια with Π M
Rep. V.	191	7	449 A	ἔφη	*om.*
	*193	29		Cr. n. 5	**μέτρον** is the reading of A
	*195	24	451 E	καὶ διδακτέον	καὶ *om.* pr.
		31		Cr. n. 23	καὶ τοῖς A
	200	2	454 C	καὶ τὴν	*om.*: add. in mg. A^2
	*	4	D	μόνον	μόνον ὂν A^2
		5		ἰατρικὸν μὲν καὶ ἰατρικὸν	ἰατρικὸν (ἰατρικῶν pr.) μὲν καὶ ἰατρικὴν
	201	10 & 31	455 B	τὸν μὲν	τὸ μὲν pr. τὸν μὲν A^2
	202	24	456 A	ἢ	*om.*
				ἰσχυροτέρα	ἰσχυροτέρα (ό above) A^2
	204	28	457 B	γυμναζομέναις	γυναζομέναις
		29		ἀτελῆ	γρ. ἅτε δὴ A^2 mg.
	207	29	459 A	παιδοποιίαις	παιδοποιίαι (ι adscript)
	208	16	B	ἢ	ἢ̂
	*209	17 & 31	E	νομοθετητέαι ἔσονται	**νομοθετητέαι** (omitting ἔσονται)
	211	7	460 E	εἰκοσιέτιδος	εἰκοσιετίδος pr.
		8		τετταρακονταέτιδος	τετταρακονταετίδος pr.
	*	18 & 30	461 A	φύς, ἂς ἐφ' ἑκάστοις	φύσας. ἃς ἑκάστοις : γρ. ἐφ' ἑ. A^2 mg.
		31		Cr. n. 27	φήσομεν A (no corr.)
	*212	30		Cr. n. 8	μὴ δέ γ' ἓν (sic) A^2
	213	1	E	ἑπομένη	ἑπομένηι
		2		βελτίστη	βελτίστηι

Page.	Line.	Steph. p.	Text.	Par. A	
213	15	462 B	ξυνδῇ	ξυνδεῖ	Rep. V.
*218	26	465 A	ἄλλως	ἄλλος: (ἄλλως Ξ *q*)	
223	24	468 A	ποῖ' ἂν	ποῖ ἂν	
224	10	B	τί δέ; δεξιωθῆναι	τί δαὶ δ' $\overset{\alpha}{\text{ἐξιωθῆναι}}$ cum γρ. (mg.) τί δὲ ἐξιαθῆναι: A^2	
*	16 & 31	C	καὶ μηδενὶ	μηδενὶ (καὶ *om.*)	
229	28	471 C	αὕτη	*om.* add. in mg. A^2	
231	1	472 B	γ'	*om.* add. A^2	
	16	D	μοῖραν	μοῖραν ἂν pr. (ἂν erased)	
233	11	473 D	βασιλῆς	βασιλεῖς (ει over erasure of three letters)	
*	22	E	ἄλλῃ	ἄλλη	
236	31		Cr. n. 26	Delete (?): ·μα· μαθητικοὺς A^2	
237	22	476 B	που	ποι	
*243	31		Cr. n. 25	ᾧ (ὧι, sic, not ὧν)	
246	10	484 B	ἑξῆς	ἑξῆς: ἐξ ἀρχῆς A^2 mg.	Rep. VI.
250	19	486 C	πλέως	πόλεως ? pr.	
	30		Cr. n. 22	γρ. ἀνόνητα A^2 mg.	
*251	31		Cr. n. 1	μὴν (not μὴ)	
252	29		Cr. n. 1	παραγόμενοι A^2 mg.	
253	27	488 C	ἀποκτιννύντας	ἀποκτιννύντας (ιννύ in erasure): κτεινὸ A^2 mg.	
	31		Cr. n. 8	γρ. τὸ πλῆθος A^2 mg.	
260	10	492 D	φήσειν	φησιν pr.	
*262	7	493 D	εἴτε δὴ . . . ὁμιλῇ	*om.* pr. add. in mg. A^2	
*263	23	494 D	ἐξαρεῖν	ἐξαιρεῖν	
	28		κτήσει	κτίσει pr.	
265	13	495 D	εἱργμῶν	ε εἰργμῶν A^2	
266	11	496 A	ἦν δ' ἐγώ	ἔφη ἦν δ' ἐγώ	
*	18	B	ἂν ἔλθοι	ἀνέλθοι	
*267	1 & 30	C	τῷ δικαίῳ	τῷ δικαίῳ	
269	3	497 E	δεῖ	δὴ pr.	
270	13	498 E	πολὺ	λλ ὶ πολὺ A^2	
			τοιαῦτ' ἄττα ῥήματα	γρ. τοιαυτὶ ῥήματα A^2 mg.	
	22	499 A	ἐπήκοοι	ἐπήκοι (sic)	
*	23		ξυντεταμένως	ξυντεταγμένως pr. (γ erased)	
			τρόπου	πρόσώπού γρ. τρόπου A^2 mg.	

	Page.	Line.	Steph. p.	Text.	Par. A
Rep. VI.	*270	31		Cr. n. 22	ὁιὼν A^2
	*273	4	500 C	ἀγάμενος	ὁ ἀγάμενος (sic)
	*	18 & 22	E	χαλεπανοῦσι	χαλεπαινοῦσι pr.
	275	20 & 30	502 A	τις	τίς
	**277	11 & 23	503 A, B	παρακαλυπτομένου . . . διεσπασμένη	**παρακαλυπτομένου** and **διεσπασμένη** are the readings of A
	280	32		Cr. n. 26	εἰ δέναι (sic) A^2
	*284	4	507 A	κομίσασθε	κομίσασθαι pr.: κομίσασθε with θαι in mg. A^2
		16	B	αὐτὸ δὴ καλὸν	αὐτοδηκαλὸν (sic)
Rep. VII.	293	3	514 A	ἰδὲ	ἴδε pr.
		7	B	εἴς τε τὸ πρόσθεν	εἴς τε πρόσθεν pr.: εἴς τε τὸ πρόσθεν A^2
		12		ἰδὲ	ἴδε
	295	4	515 D	μᾶλλόν τι	τι μᾶλλόν (sic)
	*300	28		Cr. n. 1	τούτου is the reading of A
		31		Cr. n. 14	χρήσιμόν τε A
	304	28	521 E	γυμναστικῇ . . . μουσικῇ	γυμναστικὴ . . . μουσικὴ
	311	28 & 31	525 E	ὡς	δύο ὡς (A^1 or ^{2})
	312	28	526 C	ἂν εὕροις	ἀνεύροις
	313	20	E	ὃ δεῖ	οὐ δεῖ pr.: οὗ δεῖ A^2
	314	30		Cr. n. 13	γρ. εὐομολόγητον A^2 mg.
	316	8	528 B	τε	*om.* pr.: supr. lin. add. A^2
	*	10		οὐκ ἂν . . . μεγαλοφρονούμενοι	*om.* pr.: in mg. add. A^2
	*317	22	529 B	ἴσως . . . εὐηθικῶς	: ἴσως . . . εὐηθικῶς : A^1 or ^{2} (i. e. given to Glaucon)
	*	29		Cr. n. 19	η pr.: ᾗ A^2
	*319	30		Cr. n. 16	ἐξ ἀχρήστου A^2
	*320	25	531 B	φθεγγομένων	ο **φθεγγόμένων** (sic) A^2
	321	6	C	ἀνίασιν	ἀνιᾶσιν pr.
		31		Cr. n. 27	οἵ μὴ
	322	6	532 A	αὐτὰ τὰ ἄστρα	αὐτὰ ἄστρα
		12	B	τῷ τοῦ	τῷ pr.: τοῦ τῷ A^2
	324	4	533 B	ἅπασαι	ἅπασα
	*325	31		Cr. n. 25	**φήσεις** (not οὐδὲν φήσεις)

Page.	Line.	Steph. p.	Text.	Par. A	
326	1	534 D	ἐπικαταδαρθάνειν	ἐπικαταδαρθανεῖν ? pr.	Rep. VII.
*327	30		Cr. n. 11	**πάντῃ** (not πάντα)	
329	25	537 A	ἐφ' ὃ	ἐφ' ὧ corr.	
331	20	538 A	χρόνῳ, ᾧ	ω χρόνῳ pr. : χρόνῷ A^2	
*	30		Cr. n. 9	**ἐμπίμπλανται** A^2	
332	4	B	αἰσθόμενον	αἰσθόμενος pr. : αἰσθόμενος A^2	
	26	D	ἐξελέγχῃ	ξ ἐξελέγχῃ	
334	9	539 C	μιμήσεται	γρ. μεμνήσεται A^2 mg.	
335	21	540 C	ἀπείργασαι	ρ ἀπείγασαι pr. : ἀπείγασαι m. vet.	
337	17	543 C	εἰς	*om.* pr. : add. A^2	Rep. VIII.
	21		Cr. n. 20	ἀλλά γ' (not ἀλλά γε)	
339	14	544 D	ἠθῶν τῶν	τῶν ἠθῶν pr. : ἠθῶν A^2	
	21	E	ἤδη	ἤ δη pr. : δη A^2	
341	26, 27	546 C	ἑκατὸν (bis)	ἕκαστον (bis) pr.	
*	30		Cr. n. 25	**παρέχεται** (not παρέχηται) is the reading of A	
342	19	547 A	φήσομεν	φήσωμεν	
	25	B	τὼ γένει	τῷ γένει pr. : τὼ γένεε A^2	
	27		ἀργυροῦν	ουν ὂν ἀργύρεον : ἀργύρεον A^2	
*	28		πενομένω . . . πλουσίω	πενομένων . . . πλουσίων pr. (ν erased, bis)	
344	5	548 A	οἱ τοιοῦτοι	τοι οἱ οὗτοι pr. : οἱ οὗτοι A^2	
*345	8	D	οἶμαι μέν	μαι οἶμεν pr. : οἶ μὲν A^2	
*	15 & 31	549 A	τις ἂν	τισ . . with space for two letters, but what was first written is uncertain	
347	30		Cr. n. 10	καὶ αὐτοὺς rec. (not A)	
348	2	550 C	τοιαύτην	*om.* pr. : add. in mg. A^2	
	18	E	γυναῖκες αὐτῶν	γυναῖκες αὐτῷ	
349	13	551 B	ᾗ οὐσία	ἡ οὐσία	
350	12 & 30	551 D	ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τόδε	ἀλλὰ μὴν | οὐδε pr. : καὶ μὴν **οὐδὲ** | **τόδε** corr. rec. (οὐδὲ being written in the right-hand margin)	

	Page.	Line.	Steph. p.	Text.	Par. A
Rep. VIII.	351	29 & 31	552 D	βαλλαντιατόμοι	βαλαντιατόμοι pr.: βαλλαντιοτόμοι A^{2}
	354	30		Cr. n. 22	: καὶ ἔτι μάλιστα | εὖ (two lines)
	355	31		Cr. n. 14	ἐν ευρήσεις A^{2}
	356	6	555 A	μὴ κατὰ	μὴ κατὰ (sic)
	358	26	556 E	ἔξωθεν	Written over an erasure of seven or eight letters
	359	1		ἐπαγομένων . . . συμμαχίαν	*om.* pr.: add. in mg. A^{2}
	*360	25 & 30	557 E	καὶ ἄρχειν	καὶ ἀρχῆς A: καὶ ἄρχης A^{2}
	362	12	558 D	εἶμεν	εἰμὲν A^{2}
		30		Cr. n. (for 12 read 13)	δικαίως ἀναγκαῖαι
	*			Cr. n. (for 22 read 9 and 22)	**ἀναγκαίους** (not ἀναγκαίας) is the reading of A
	363	8	559 B	ἢ τοιούτων	ἡ τοιούτων
	364	9	E	ἔφη	*om.*: in mg. add. A^{2}
		10		μετέβαλλε	α ει μετέβαλλε A^{2}
	366	6	561 A	πως	:πῶς: as a separate speech
		17	B	ἑαυτὸν ἐνδῷ	ἑαυτῷ ἐνδῷ
	367	5	D	ἀργῶν καὶ	ἀργῶν . . . καὶ (erasure of eight letters)
	372	30		Cr. n. 7	μελιττουργὸν A corr.
	*375	4	565 E	προεστώς	προσεστὼς is the reading of A
	377	6	567 A	πρὸς τῷ	πρὸς τὸ pr.
	*378	8	D	ἀνάγκῃ	ἀνάγκη
	380	12	568 D	ἀποδομένων	λ ἀποδομένων
	*	17	E	ἦν	ἔφην pr.
Rep. IX.	382	21		Cr. n. 12	ἐγκαλῶ A (not ἐν καλῶ)
	383	22	572 A	του	*om.* pr.: supplied by first hand at end of line
				καὶ	**κα** in erasure
	*386	18	D	σὺ	.σὺ· (sic)
	*389	25	575 C	ἴκταρ	ἴκταρ
	391	23	576 D	ἀρετῇ	ἆρα ἡ: γρ. ἀρετῇ in mg. A^{2}

Rep. IX.

Page.	Line.	Steph. p.	Text.	Par. A
391	31		Cr. n. (23 not 20)	ἆρα ἡ A
*392	18	577 B	ἂν ὀφθείη	ἀνοφθείη
*394	5 & 30	578 A	ὀδυρμοὺς δὲ	ὀδυρμούς τε is the reading of A
*395	1 & 30	C	ἦ	η pr.: corr. m. vet.
396	14	579 B	εἴη	ἐι εἴη (sic)
	27	C	ἑαυτῷ	ταυτῷ pr.
*398	29		Cr. n. 5	κρῖνε A (not κρῖναι)
	30		Cr. n. 27	τὸ λογιστικὸν δέξεται A[1] or [2]
*399	17	581 A	φαῖμεν	φαμεν (sic) (ι above)
400	31		Cr. n. 16	ὑποκείμενον A (α above)
*401	6 & 28	D	νομίζειν	(sic: no οὐδὲν)
	8 & 31	E	τῆς †ἡδονῆς	ʽτῆς ἡδονῆς (sic)
	29		Cr. n. 6	Dele A[2] after οὐδὲν
*402	13 & 29	582 C	τιμή μέν	τί μὴν (sic) A
	15		καὶ ὁ σοφὸς	καὶ σοφὸς pr.: καὶ ὁ σοφὸς A[2]
*403	21	583 A	ὧν . . . βίον	ὧν pr.: βίον (sic)
404	9	C	λύπην	πην pr.: λύπην A[2]
407	11 & 30	584 E	κάτω	κάτα pr.: κάτω corr. A[1] or [2]
	25	585 A	πεῖνα	πείνη pr.: πείνη A[2]
408	17	C	τοῦ μηδέποτε	μηδέποτε (om. τοῦ) MSS. Ast corr.
409	4 & 31	585 D	ψυχῆς	τῆς ψυχῆς (sic)
410	31		Cr. n. 24	ἐξηγῆται A[2]
411	13	587 A	ἐξεργάζοιτο	ἐξεργάζοι pr.: ἐξεργάζοιτο A[2]
412	2	B	νόθαιν	νόθοιν (but οι in erasure)
414	30	589 A	ἐκείνων	ἐκείνω pr.: ἐκείνων A[2]
417	13	590 D	ἐν αὐτῷ	ἐν ἑαυτῷ A[2]
	18		ἐν αὐτῷ	ἐν αὐτῷ
	25	E	ἐν αὐτοῖς	ἐν ἑαυτοῖς
418	22	591 C	ἀλλ'	ἄλλα
	26		ζήσει	ζω . . . pr.: ζώιη corr. rec.
419	11	E	αὐτῷ	ἑαυτῷ A[2]
*	13		πλῆθος	πλήθους pr.

Page.	Line.	Steph. p.	Text.	Par.
Rep. X. *422	31		Cr. n. 23	add. 'but the accent is by a recent hand' (κλῖναι infr. 597 B)
*423	11	596 C	τάχα	τάχα (the accent and χ in erasure)
*424	13	E	φαινομένην γε	φαινομένην pr.: φαινομένην (˙γε above) A²
*428	11	599 A	μιμηθησόμενον	μηθησόμενον pr.: μηθησόμενον (·μι above) A²
*429	16–18 & 30	E	οὔκουν . . . ὁμήρου	The mark for the change of persons (—:) is before οὔκουν, not before ἀλλὰ (Not 'praescriptum est σω.')
430	27 & 31	600 D	*ὀνινάναι	ὀνίναι A²
43	15	601 A	αὐτὸν . . . ἑτέροις	*om.* pr.: add. in mg. A², with ἐν τοῖς for ἑτέροις
	18	B	ἐν μέτρῳ . . . λέγεσθαι	*om.* pr.: add. in mg. A²
434	11	602 C	τῶν	τὸ A²
	21	D	αὕτη	αὐτὴ
438	7	604 C	ὅ τε δεῖ	ὅτι δεῖ
*	18 & 31		ἰατρικῇ	ἰατρικῇ . A² (letter erased)
439	4	E	αὐτὸ	*om.* pr.: add. in mg. A²
	11 & 31	605 A	τε	γε (τ above) (γ in erasure)
*440	31		Cr. n. 27	εἰ ἐκείνη (εἰ not omitted)
441	14	606 B	ἀπολαύειν	ἀπολαύειν (^ above) A²
	30		Cr. n. 22	μὴ μισῇς (μὴ corr. from μι)
*442	14	E	ἄξιος	**ἄξιος** (not ἄξιον) is the reading of A
443	4	607 B	ποιητικῇ	ποιητικῇ (μιμ above) A²
*	32		Cr. n. 19	**ἀπολογησαμένη** (sic legendum) corrected by erasure to ἀπολογησομένη
445	5	608 D	οὐχ	*om.* pr.: add. in mg. A²
	24	E	ἔγωγ', ἔφη	ἔγωγέ τουτό γ' ἔφη A²
446	16	609 B	ψυχῇ ἄρα . . . ἃ νῦν	*om.* pr.: add. in mg. A²

Page.	Line.	Steph. p.	Text.	Par. A	
448	22	610 D	φανεῖται	φαίνεται is given as an alternative by A[1] or [2]	Rep. X.
452	3	612 D	ἃ	Inserted after κτωμένη by A[2]	
	7	E	αἰτεῖ	αἰτῇ (sic)	
	15		γε	τε (γ above)	
454	1	613 E	λέγων	γρ. λέγοντα A[2] mg.	
	25 & 32	614 B	ἐπειδὴ οὐ	ἐπειδὴ οὖ A : ἐπειδὴ οὖν A[2]	
455	10	D	θεᾶσθαι	θε · â · σθαι (â in space of three letters)	
	18	E	ἀπιούσας	ἀπιούσας A[2] (ἐ above)	
456	1	615 A	ὅσους	· · οὓς (two letters erased)	
457	14	616 A	τοῦτον	τοῦτον A[2] (ω above; ο in erasure)—primitus scriptum τουτων	
*	24	B	προσφερῇ	προσφερῇ A[2] (ές above)	
460	7	617 E	συνέσται	συνεστε pr.?	
	11		ἔ δὲ	ἔδει A[2]	
	27	618 B	ὑγιείαις	ὑγείαις pr.	
462	6	619 B	νῷ	om. pr.: supra lineam add. A[2]	
465	5	621 B	ἕωθεν	γρ. ἄνωθεν A[2] mg.	
	6		ἤδη	om. pr., then add. at end of line	
	17	D	χιλιέτει	χιλιετει pr.: χιλίετι A[2]	

APPENDIX II.

Errors of the First Hand in Par. A.

N.B.—To avoid undue length some slight clerical errors such as *οὔ τοι* for *οὖ τοι* (I. 330 B), *ἥπερ* for *ᾗπερ* (ibid. C), *ῇ πῶς* for *ᾗ πῶς* (ib. 337 C), *ἡγεῖται* for *ἡγῆται* (V. 479 A), *πάντως* for *παντὸς* (VI. 491 C)—although sometimes confusing enough—are omitted in the following list.

A^2, for the sake of simplicity, is here made to include, together with readings of the Diorthotes, some corrections by A^1, and some by other early hands, and only manifest errors are admitted.

It will be observed (1) that only thirty-three out of 170 errors of the first hand (about $\frac{1}{5}$) are corrected by A^2; (2) that the correction in forty-one places is due to Π as the earliest witness, in fourteen places to **M** pr. m., in twenty-five places to Ξ, and in twenty-four places to *q*. Of the remainder x is responsible for three corrections, Vind. D for one, Vind. F for three, and 𝔯 for one; three rest on the testimonies of ancient writers[1], and nineteen are conjectural.

Errors of **A** p.m.	Corrected to	By
I. 331 D *ἔφη ἐγώ*	*ἔφην ἐγώ*	Ξ
333 D *δέοι*	*δέῃ*	Π M
,, E *οὐκοῦν*	*οὐκ ἂν οὖν*	A^2 mg.
336 E *οἷου τε σὺ*	*οἷου γε σὺ*	Bekker (*οἷόν γε* Ξ)
339 B *καὶ αὐτὸς*	*καὶ αὐτὸ*	A^2
342 A *δεῖ αἰεὶ*	*δεῖ*	Π M
345 C *πιαίνειν*	*ποιμαίνειν*	A^2 mg.
346 A *οἷοι*	*οἷον*	A^2
,, B *ξυμφέρον*	*ξυμφέρειν*	*q*
347 A *ὧι*	*ὧν*	M
,, C *δεῖ δὲ*	*δεῖ δὴ*	Π M
,, E *πότερον ὡς*	*πότερον*	M
348 E *ῥᾶιον*	*ῥᾴδιον*	x
351 A *ἔφη*	*ἔφην*	*q*
,, C *σοι*	*σὺ*	A^2
,, D *διαφέρωμεν*	*διαφέρωμαι*	Π

To these perhaps two more should be added:—

IV. 442 B *προσῆκεν* Stobaeus.

444 C *αὐτὰ μὲν οὖν* Stobaeus.

Errors of A p.m.	Corrected to	By
I. 352 E φαμὲν	φαῖμεν	Steph.
354 B ἐγῶμαι	ἐγώ μοι	r
II. 360 E ἑαυτῷ	ἑαυτοῦ	Π M
361 C ὑπ' αὐτῆς	ἀπ' αὐτῆς	Eusebius
363 A τῷ δικαίῳ	τῷ ἀδίκῳ	q
364 D λιστοὶ δὲ στρεπτοίτε	στρεπτοὶ δέ τε	Π M
365 D καὶ ἡμῖν	οὐδ' ἡμῖν	q
366 A αἱ τελεταὶ	αἱ τελεταὶ αὖ μέγα δύνανται	Π
,, D ὧδε	ὡς δὲ	A^2
367 D ἀποσχοίμην	ἀνασχοίμην	Ξ
370 A ῥᾴδιον	ῥᾷον	q
,, E εἴη	ἴῃ	q
375 B ἀλλοτρίοις	ἄλλοις	q
376 D γίγνεται·	γίγνεται; ἵνα μὴ . . . διεξίωμεν.	A^2
378 B δοκῶ	δοκεῖ	x
,, C μᾶλλον	λεκτέα μᾶλλον	Π M
383 B τοῖς αὐτοῖς	τοῖς αὐτῆς	A^2
,, B ἐνδυτεῖσθαι	ἐνδατεῖσθαι	A^2
III. 387 C ὡς οἴεται	ὡς οἷόν τε ?	q
,, C ὑπὸ	ὑπὲρ	Π M
,, E ἄρα	ἄρ' ἂν	Π M
388 E ἔφην	ἐφῇ	Vind. D mg.
389 C τῆς	τις	A^2
,, D κολάσεως	κολάσει ὡς	Π
391 D τιν' ἄλλου	τιν' ἄλλον	Π
,, E ζηνὸς ἐγγύς, ὧν	οἱ ζηνὸς ἐγγύς, ὧν	Bekker (ὧν some MSS.)
395 A μιμήματά τε	μιμήματε	q
,, C ἵνα	ἵνα μὴ	Π M
396 D ἑαυτοῦ	ἑαυτὸν	Π M
397 B σμικρὰ	σμικραὶ	A^2
400 A εἴποι μιμήματα	εἴποιμι· ποῖα δὲ ποίου βίου μιμήματα	M
401 C ἀνεμόμενοι	νεμόμενοι	Π M
402 B καὶ εἰ εἰκόνας	καὶ εἰκόνας	M
,, D διότι	δὴ ὅ τι	Π M
404 A τε καὶ ἀνάγκη	τε ἀνάγκη	Π M

Errors of A p.m.	Corrected to	By
III. 406 D μικρὰν	μακρὰν	M
407 C κεφαλῆς τινὸς	κεφαλῆς τινὰς	Ξ q
411 D γενομένου	γενόμενον	q
,, E εἶπερ εργον	εἰ πάρεργον	II
414 E δὴ	δεῖ	q
IV. 421 D διαφέρει	διαφθείρει	Π M
425 D λήξεις	λήξεως	M
430 E φαίνονται	λέγοντες	A^2 mg.
431 C ἐν πᾶσι	ἐν παισὶ	H. Wolf
434 D ἐκεῖ	ἐκεῖνο	Ξ
436 A τὸ περὶ	ὃ περὶ	Ξ q
437 D ἐν ὀλίγῳ	ἐνὶ λόγῳ	Cornarius
439 B ὥσπερ θηρίου	ὥσπερ θηρίον	Ξ
,, D ἡδονῶν ἕτερον	ἡδονῶν ἑταῖρον	Π M
440 C ζητεῖ	ζεῖ	Ξ
,, E τὸ λογιστικὸν	τοῦ λογιστικοῦ	Ξ
441 C ἐν ἑνὶ ἑκάστου	ἐν ἑνὸς ἑκάστου	M
,, D καὶ ἀνδρείαν	ἀνδρείαν	Ξ
442 C τῶν λόγων	τοῦ λόγου	Ξ
,, E τοῦτον αὐτὸν	τοῦτο αὐτὸν	Ξ (τοῦτον αὐτὸ cj. L. C.)
443 A ἐκτὸς ὢν	ἐκτὸς ἂν	A^2
,, B τελευταῖον	τέλεον	A^2 mg.
,, D περὶ ἑαυτῶν	περὶ ἑαυτὸν	Π M
,, D αὐτὸν καὶ	αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ καὶ κοσμήσαντα καὶ φίλον γενόμενον ἑαυτῷ καὶ	Π M
444 B τοῦ δ' αὖ δουλεύειν ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὄντι	τῷ τοῦ ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὄντι	Ξ
,, C τὰ δίκαια	τὸ δίκαια	q
445 B ἀποκνητέον	ἀποκμητέον	Bekker
V. 450 C πειρῶ ἂν	πειρῶ οὖν	Π M (πειρῶ δὴ cj. Baiter)
451 B ἅ ποτε	ἃ τότε	Ξ
454 B τὴν αὐτὴν	μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν	Ξ
,, D ἰατρικὸν μὲν καὶ ἰατρικὴν	ἰατρικὸν μὲν καὶ ἰατρικὸν	q

Errors of **A** p.m.	Corrected to	By
V. 455 B τὸ μὲν	τὸν μὲν	A^2
458 E γυμνοῦσθαι	μίγνυσθαι	Π
460 D προθυμούμεθα	προὐθέμεθα	x Stob.
461 A φύσας· ἃς ἑκάστοις	φύς, ἃς ἐφ' ἑκάστοις	Ξ (γρ. ἐφ' ἑ. A^2)
,, B φήσομεν	ἀφήσομεν	Eusebius
,, D ἐκείνου	ἐκεῖνα	Ξ
467 E διδαξομένους	διδαξαμένους	*q* (corr.)
472 A στρατευομένῳ	στραγγευομένῳ	Vind. F (corr.)
,, A λέγειν λόγον	λόγον λέγειν	M
,, D ἐκείνης	ἐκείνοις	M Ξ (corr.)
477 A οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ	οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶ ἐπὶ	Hermann (οὐκοῦν εἰ ἐπὶ *q*)
,, B κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν	κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν	Vind. F
VI. 486 C ἀνόητα	ἀνόνητα	A^2
487 B παραγενόμενοι	παραγόμενοι	A^2
,, C ταύτην	ταύτῃ	Π
493 B ἐφ' οἷς ἕκαστος	ἐφ' οἷς ἑκάστας	Prinsterer (ἃς ἐφ' ἑκάστοις *q*)
,, D εἴτε δὴ . . . ὁμιλῇ *om.*	add.	A^2
494 B πᾶσιν	παισὶν	Geer
495 A ἄρα	ὁρᾷς	Π M
499 B κατήκοοι	κατηκόῳ	Schleierm.
,, D αὐτὴ ἡ Μοῦσα	αὕτη ἡ Μοῦσα	Π
501 A διενεγκεῖν	διενέγκοιεν	*q*
504 D ἢ γυμναζομένῳ . . . μεγίστου τε *om.*	add.	Π M
511 A τετμημένοις	τετιμημένοις	A^2
VII. 516 E ὅτι οὗτος	ὁ τοιοῦτος	Π M
525 E δύο ὡς	ὡς	A^2
529 B νοήσειν	νοήσει	*q*
,, C μὲν	νέων	Π
530 C ἐξ ἀρχῆς του	ἐξ ἀχρήστου	A^2
533 E σαφηνείᾳ λέγει	σαφηνείᾳ ὃ λέγει ?	*q*
537 E καλὸν	κακὸν	Π M
538 D καταλάβῃ	καταβάλῃ	M (corr.) Ξ
540 B φιλοσοφίαν	φιλοσοφίᾳ	A^2
VIII. 544 C καὶ ἡ πασῶν	καὶ πασῶν	Π

Errors of A p.m.	Corrected to	By
VIII. 544 C δ.αφεύγουσα	διαφέρουσα	Ξ
546 D ἡμῖν	ὑμῖν	Π M
549 A τισιν	τις ἂν	x
551 C ἤ τινος	ᾗστινος	Ast
,, D οὐδὲ καλόν	οὐδὲ τόδε καλόν	A²
553 B ἢ τὴν ἄλλην	ἤ τινα ἄλλην	M
,, C τὸν ἐπιθυμητικόν	τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν	*q*
554 B καὶ ἔτι μάλιστα	καὶ ἐτίμα μάλιστα	Schneider
556 E εἶσι γὰρ οὐδὲν	εἶσι παρ' οὐδὲν	Baiter
557 E ἐπιθυμῇ	ἐπιθυμῇς	*q*
,, E ἄρχῃς καὶ δικάζῃς	ἄρχειν καὶ δικάζειν	Ξ
562 B ἦν ὑπερπλοῦτος	ἦν *που πλοῦτος	L. Campbell
567 E τίς δὲ αὐτόθεν	τί δέ; αὐτόθεν	*q*
568 D τιμὴ ἡ	τιμή	Π
,, D τὰ τῶν ἀποδομένων	τὰ τῶν πωλουμένων	L. Campbell
,, E ἑτέρους	ἑταίρους	Π M
569 A ὑπὸ	ἀπὸ	*q*
IX. 571 B ἐγκαλῶ	ἐν καλῷ	M
,, D ἐν ὀλίγῳ ?	ἐνὶ λόγῳ	A²
572 D ἀπολαβὼν	ἀπολαύων	Π
573 B ἐπαισχυνόμενος	ἐπαισχυνομένας	Π
576 D ἆρα ἡ	ἀρετῇ	A² mg.
580 D δεῖ δὲ	δὲ δεῖ	M (corr.) Ξ
,, D τὸ λογιστικὸν δέξεται	δέξεται	Ξ
581 D ποιώμεθα	τί οἰώμεθα	Graser
,, E τῆς ἡδονῆς	τῆς ἀληθινῆς	L. Campbell
582 C τί μὴν	τιμὴ μὲν	Θ (corr.) *v*
584 B ἔφην δ' ἐγώ	ἔφην ἐγώ	A²
,, E κάτα	κάτω	A²
585 D τῆς ψυχῆς	ψυχῆς	A²
590 E βουλεύεται	βούλεται	x (Ξ corr.)
591 B ἔπι	ἔτι	A²
,, C ζῶ . . .	ζήσει	M
X. 600 D ὀνεῖναι	ὀνινάναι	Ast
601 A αὐτὸν . . . ἑτέροις *om.*	add.	A² (ἐν τοῖς for ἑτέροις) Π
,, B ἐν μέτρῳ . . . λέγεσθαι *om.*	add.	A²

Errors of A p.m.	Corrected to	By
X. 603 B ἢ κατὰ	ἢ καὶ κατὰ	A²
„ E ψυχῆς	τύχης	Π
604 C ἐρεῖ	αἱρεῖ	Ξ
„ C πλήγοντος	πληγέντος	Π
„ D ἰατρικὴν θρηνῳδίαν	ἰατρικῇ θρηνῳδίαν	*q*
607 B ἀπολελογίσθω	ἀπολελογήσθω	M
608 A αἰσθόμεθα	εἰσόμεθα ?	*q*
609 B ψυχῇ ἄρα . . . ἃ νῦν *om.*	add.	A²
610 A ὀρθόταт' ἂν	ὀρθότατά γ'	L. Campbell
611 C διαθετέον	διαθεατέον	Ξ (θεατέον M)
612 B ἐπηνινέγκαμεν	ἐπηνινέκαμεν (sic)	A²
„ D ἐπειδὴ ἦν τοίνυν κεκριμέναι εἰσίν, ἐγὼ	ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κεκριμέναι εἰσί	A² mg.
613 E ὅρα	ὅρα εἰ	A²
614 A ἑκάτερον	ἑκάτερος	Ξ (corr.)
615 B πολλοὶ	πολλῶν	Ξ (πολλοῖς D corr.)
616 A εἰς ὅ τι τὸν τάρταρον	ὅτι εἰς τὸν τάρταρον	Ξ
617 B τὸν τρίτον	τρίτον	*q*
620 B ὡσαύτως εἰκός. τὴν	ὡσαύτως· εἰκοστὴν	Vind. F Plutarch

APPENDIX III.

Correction of Errors and Omissions in Bekker's Collation of Π and Ξ. By C. Castellani.

Steph.		Bekker (1823)		Venetus Π
Rep.	p.	p.	l.	
I.	330 B	9,	7	οὖτοι (not οὗτοι)
	335 B	19,	6–8	ἀλλ' οὐ ἣ εἰς τὴν τῶν ἵππων ἀρετήν; (omitting εἰς τὴν τῶν ἵππων. ἆρ' οὖν . . . εἰς τὴν τῶν ἵππων)
	336 E	22,	6	εἰ γάρ τι
	340 E	30,	14	ἀκριβολογεῖ
	,, E	,,	,,	καὶ ὁ ἄρχων ἥμαρτε *om.*
	342 A	33,	1–3	καὶ τῇ . . . σκέψεται (not omitted)
	,, B	,,	3	ἢ οὔτε αὐτῆς *om.*
	343 B	35,	6	ἢ ὡς ἀληθῶς
	,, E	36,	10	τοῖς τε οἰκείοις
	350 D	49,	9	ἡμῖν placed after κείσθω
	351 A	50,	9	τῇδ' ἐπισκέψασθαι
	,, D	51,	7	καὶ μίση
	352 D	53,	4	ὅτι *om.*
	353 B	54,	9–11	ἔστιν ἔργον; Ναί. (omitting ἔστιν. ἆρ' οὖν . . . ἦν τι ἔργον;)
II.	358 B	59,	7	ἐάν σοι ταῦτα δοκῇ
	364 D	70,	19	στρεπτοὶ δέ τε καὶ
	366 A	73,	11	αὖ μέγα δύνανται καὶ οἱ
	370 C	81,	6	ἓν κατὰ (not ἓν ἢ κατὰ)
	371 E	84,	1	ἔχουσιν
	372 D	85,	11	σπουδίουσι (not σπουδιοῦσι)
	374 A	88,	6	ἱκανοὶ διαμάχεσθαι
	380 A	99,	10	ἰαμβία (not ἰάμβια)
III.	387 B	109,	12	ἀλείβαντας
	397 C	128,	5	καὶ σφόδρα
	399 D	132,	9	παραδέξει
	400 C	134,	4	ἔγωγε *om.*
	404 A	141,	2	στρατίαις

Steph.		Bekker (1823)		Venetus Π
Rep.	p.	p.	l.	
III.	405 D	144,	1	ὡς οἶμαι *om.*
	408 D	149,	2	οὐχ ὁμοιοῦν πρᾶγμα
	411 D	154,	6	οὔτε ζητήματος
	413 E	158,	13	ἔν τε (not ἐάν τε)
IV.	422 C	170,	10	τοῦτο ποιοῖ
	,, E	171,	11	ᾗ (not ᾗ)
	423 B	172,	6	μέχρι οὗ
	,, C	,,	16	αὐτὸν (not αὐτῶν)
	425 A	175,	8	κείνοις
	428 A	180,	18	τὰ omitted
	429 A	182,	16	ἦν (not ἦν καὶ)
	435 A	194,	3	βεβαιωσόμεθα
	440 B	203,	22	μὴ δεῖν
	441 D	206,	18	ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ
	442 A	207,	11	οὐκ αὐτὰ (not οὐκ αὖ τὰ)
	444 C	211,	15	τὸ ἄδικα πράττειν
	,, C	,,	16	αὐτὰ (not αὖ τὰ)
V.	451 A	219,	3	παραμυθεῖ
	452 C	221,	15	πρῶτοι
	467 D	250,	3	παραδόξων
	468 C	251,	9	καὶ μηδενὶ
	477 B	268,	2	κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν
	478 C	270,	9	οὐδέτερα (not οὐδετέρα)
VI.	484 A	274,	2	μακροῦ τινὸς
	489 D	284,	17	ἀληθὲς (not τἀληθὲς)
	492 A	288,	18	σπαρεῖσά τε καὶ φυτευθεῖσα
	493 C	291,	16	ᾗ οὖν τι τούτου δοκῇ διαφέρειν ὁ τὴν
	494 E	294,	1	δὲ πρὸς
	496 A	296,	10	πᾶν σμικρὸν
	,, B	,,	17	ἂν ἔλθοι
	501 C	306,	6	σωφρονοῦσιν
	503 D	309,	19	χρήσαιτο
	506 B	315,	1	τὸ δ' αὑτοῦ
	507 E	317,	20	Π should not be cited here, as (by Bekker's own showing) this part of the Republic is wanting in Π
VII.	516 E	330,	15	θᾶκον
	518 E	334,	5	ἔθεσι καὶ (*om.* τε)

Steph.		Bekker (1823)		Venetus Π
Rep.	p.	p.	l.	
VII.	518 E	334,	9	χρήσιμόν τε καὶ
	519 A	,,	12	ταῦτα
	524 C	344,	17	ἐρέσθαι
	526 D	348,	19	ἐν αὐταῖς τε ταῖς
	,, E	,,	21	λογισμὸν
	529 B	353,	16	τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐπιχειρῇ μανθάνειν
	539 D	372,	17	ἔτι διπλάσια ἢ τότε
	540 D	374,	9	ἄλλῃ ᾗ εἴρηται
	,, E	,,	16	διασκευωρίσωνται
	541 A	,,	20	οἱ γονεῖς
VIII.	543 D	377,	12	τὸν ἐκείνῃ ὅμοιον . . . ἄνδρα repeated by first hand
	544 A	,,	16	ἀνομοίους (not αὖ ὁμοίους)
	547 B	383,	6	γένει
	,, B	,,	8	αὖ τὸ (not αὐτὸ)
	,, D	384,	5	κατεσκευάσθαι
	,, E	,,	9	κεκτημένην
	558 C	403,	11	ταῦτά τε δὴ
	559 A	404,	16	ἀναγκαίως
	560 A	406,	9	τὸν (not τὸ)
	562 C	410,	18	διὰ ταῦτα ἐν μόνῃ ταύτῃ
	566 B	418,	4	πολλοθρύλητον (sic)
	,, E	419,	5	καὶ before ἰδίᾳ omitted
	567 E	421,	4	τίς δε αὐτόθεν
IX.	571 B	425,	8	ἐγκαλῶ
	581 D	445,	1	εἴ τι αὐτῶν
X.	597 E	471,	12	τὸν μὲν δὴ
	598 C	472,	15	περὶ τοῦ
	,, D	,,	20	πᾶς σοφὸς
	602 A	479,	13	περὶ ὧν ἂν ποιῇ
	603 C	482,	3	ἡ μιμητικὴ βιαίους ἢ
	604 E	484,	17	αὐτὸ *om.*
	,, E	,,	,,	μιμουμένου
	607 C	489,	20	κηλεῖ
	611 A	496,	11	ἐλάττονος

N.B.—Some of the above corrections have been anticipated by Stallbaum and others; see Schneider's Preface, p. xxxi. The general result is to raise somewhat the character of Π and also to establish more clearly its affinity to the later MSS. D K *q* β′. L. C.

Steph.		Bekker (1823)		Venetus Ξ
Rep.	p.	p.	l.	
I.	350 A	48,	8	ἀλλ' ἴσθι
	,, B	,,	10	ἴσως (not ἴσθι)
II.	358 B	59,	1	ἐάν σοι ταῦτα δοκῇ
	364 A	69,	13	τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη *om.*
	376 C	92,	15	δεῖ not δεῖν
	,, C	,,	16	δὴ (not δεῖ) after φιλόσοφος
	,, C	,,	19	ὑπάρχη not ὑπάρχῃ
III.	387 B	109,	12	ἀλείβαντας
	389 B	112,	16	θεοῖσι
	390 D	15,	14	μὲν (for μὲν δὴ)
	391 C	116,	19	νοσήματε (sic)
	400 B	133,	13	Δάμωνος
	413 C	157,	18	ὡς ποιητέον τοῦτο
	415 B	160,	19	ἀργυροῦν καὶ ἐξ ἀργυροῦ
	,, C	161,	10	φυλάξῃ
IV.	425 A	175,	7	παίζειν παῖδες
	426 E	178,	19	τέμνουσι (sic)
	429 C	183,	14	εἶναι τινὰ (sic)
	434 A	192,	10	δοκεῖ μέγα βλάψαι
	437 E	199,	3	είη προσῆ (sic)
	440 B	204,	1	αἴσθεσθαι
	444 C	211,	15	τὸ ἄδικα πράττειν
	445 D	213,	21	λέγε, ἔφην, τίνες
V.	464 C	244,	3	μὴ διασπᾶν τὴν πόλιν
	,, C	,,	4	οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ
	469 C	253,	12	οὐ ᾗ (sic)
	474 B	262,	6	παρέχει
	,, C	,,	15	ἁμηγέπη (sic)
	477 B			κατὰ . . . αὐτῆς *om.*
VI.	484 A	274,	2	μακροῦ τινὸς
	492 B	289,	5	πότε δέ (sic pr.)
	498 A	300,	2	μεγάλα ἡγοῦνται
	502 C	307,	20	ἐλέγομεν
	520 C	336,	19	ὑμῖν (not ἡμῖν)
	533 C	361,	9	μόνη
	,, E	,,	20,21	ἀλλ' . . . ἐν ψυχῇ *om.*
	537 D	368,	16	καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις

Steph.		Bekker (1823)		Venetus Ξ
Rep.	p.	p.	l	
VII.	520 B	336,	19	ὑμῖν τε αὐτοῖς
	527 C	350,	6	ας εἶπες
VIII.	557 B	401,	13	ἕκαστος ἂν κατασκευὴν
	,, B	,,	4	ἑκάστῳ ἀρέσκοι
	561 D	409,	12	ν ἔπεστι
	563 C	412,	18	ἐν ταύτη (sic)
	564 A	414,	12	πλείστη καὶ (*om.* τε)
IX.	577 A	436,	8	ἐκπλήττηται
	581 C	444,	19	θέλεις
	585 C	452,	9	κρῖνε
	587 E	457,	4	ἥδιστον
X.	597 E	471,	10	τοῦτ' ἄρα
	,,	,,	,,	μιμητίς
	600 A	475,	11	Ἀναχάρσιδος
	601 A	477,	6	περὶ σκυτοτομίας (*om.* τῆς)
	602 A	479,	13	περὶ ὧν ἂν ποιῇ
	,, D	480,	20	ἢ καὶ στῆσαν
	603 B	481,	17	τὴν ὄψιν μόνον
	604 C	484,	5	πλήττοντος
	612 D	499,	11	ἐγὼ πάλιν
	620 B	513,	16	ἔχθρᾳ (not ἔχθραι)

APPENDIX IV.

[By E. Rostagno.]

De Cod. 4 Plutei xxviii, qui Caesenae in Bibl. Malatestiana asservatur.

Codex est bombycinus, exeunte saeculo xii maiore ex parte, ut videtur, exaratus, foliis 418, versibus plerumque quadragenis, aut singulis et quadragenis. Ad formam voluminis quod attinet, hanc ita sum mensus: 0, 228-40 × 0, 339–41. Complectitur autem 52 quaterniones, qui octonis foliis constant, praeter quaternionem 40 [μ′], cui unum deficit: in textu tamen nulla lacuna hic deprehenditur. Singulorum quaternionum seriem numeri, graecis literis exarati, atque in infimo ultimae paginae margine rubro charactere depicti, repraesentant. Postremo quaternio 49 [μθ′], quamquam unius paginae lacuna laborat (vide sis Πολιτειῶν ϛ′, p. 510 d) nihilo minus octo foliis et ipse constat.

Notandum interim est, in hisce 52 quaternionibus haud contineri tria ff., quibus volumen incipit, quaeque seorsim ab illis in vol. collocata sunt.

Insunt praeterea in ipso voluminis ingressu duo ff. membranacea, interioris integumenti locum obtinentia (ut vulgo dicunt 'fogli di guardia'), binis columnis exarata, saeculoque circiter xiv conscripta. De re theologica in illis agitur, ut textus quidem docere nos videtur. Hinc, speciminis ergo, quae sequuntur exscripsi:

'Quia [?] in superioribus consideramus qualiter deus sit secundum se ipsum, restat considerandum qualiter sit in cogitatione nostra, id est, quomodo cogitetur a creaturis. Circa hoc quaeruntur xiii. Primo utrum aliquis intellectus creatus possit essentiam dei videre. Secundo utrum dei essentia videatur ab intellectu per animi [?] speciem creatam. Tertio utrum oculo corporeo dei essentia possit videri.' Et q. s.

Provenisse hae duae paginae videntur ex eodem libro atque opere, e quo nonnulla alia folia avulsa sunt, ut interioris integumenti locum,

ut ita dicam, obtinerent in codd. qui sunt 3 Plut. xxviii[1], Cod. 2 Plut. xxviii[2]; Cod. 5 Plut. xxviii[3]; Cod. 3 Plut. xxvii[4].

In fine autem codicis una pagina bombycina locum interioris integumenti obtinet.

Primo aspectu codex bifariam dividi posse videtur: altera enim pars voluminis e charta dente, ut dicunt, polita constat, altera (4^r–171^v) e charta obsoleta, minus levigata, ut bibulam eam prope dicas. Ex quo fit, ut in hac priore parte folia 12^r–43^v et 113^r–171^v, cum atramenti sucum, ut ita dicam, charta elicuisset, nigrescentem speciem prae se ferant. Alterius autem partis paginae charactere ad rubrum vergente plerumque sunt exaratae.

Quod ad manus, ut dicunt, attinet, duas in primis scripturas codex, de quo agitur, exhibet: altera, satis quidem elegans atque nitida, qua maior operis pars exarata est, minutis characteribus constat, nitidis atque subrubentibus; altera autem incompta, deflexis characteribus, saepius nigricantibus, impolitis crassioribusque constans, duorum scriptorum imperitiorem manum redolet. Ut de duobus hisce scriptoribus, seu mavis, duabus hisce manibus nonnulla subiciam, hoc arbitror animadversione dignum in primis esse, duas scilicet has scripturas per alternas vices saepius ita continuari, ut altera alteram vel in mediis paginis plerumque subsequatur: quod nimirum ut in promptu esset, paginas describendas curavi, incompta—ut in superioribus dixi—scriptura crassioreque charactere exaratas, et duas manus illas redolentes. Hinc luculenter patebit dimidiam ferme paginam saepius altera manu conscriptam esse, quam paulo sequioris aevi esse merito dicas.

Altera manu igitur haec ff. exarata sunt:

Altera pars f.	88^r.	Folium	122^v.
Inferior „ „	99^r.	„	123^v.
„ „ „	112^r.	„	124^v.
Folium	116^r, 116^v.	„	125^v.
„	118^r.	„	126^v.
„	119^v.	„	128^r.
„	120^v.	„	129^r.
„	121^v.	„	130^r.

[1] Cod. 3 Plut. xxviii duo ff. exhibet, ut in voluminis principio, ita in fine: alterum folium autem cum codicis ligneo integumento compactum est.

[2] Cod. 2 Plut. xxviii duo ff. exhibet in principio, quorum alterum cum ligneo codicis integumento compactum est.

[3] Cod. 5 Plut. xxviii duo ff. exhibet in fine.

[4] Cod. 3 Plut. xxvii duo ff. exhibet in principio.

Folium	131^{v}.	Maior pars folii	168^{v}.
,,	132^{v}.	,, ,, ,,	169^{r}.
,,	135^{r}.	Folium	170^{v}.
,,	136^{r}.	Inferior pars folii	171^{r}.
,,	137^{v}.	Folium	171^{v}.
,,	139^{v}.	,,	172^{v}.
,,	140^{v}.	,,	174^{r}, 174^{v}.
,,	141^{v}.	,,	175^{v}.
,,	142^{v}.	,,	177^{v}.
,,	144^{v}.	,,	179^{r}.
,,	145^{v}.	,,	180^{r}.
,,	147^{r}.	,,	181^{v}.
,,	148^{r}.	,,	184^{r}.
,,	149^{v}.	,,	186^{r}.
,,	151^{r}.	,,	188^{r}.
,,	152^{r}.	,,	190^{r}.
,,	153^{r}.	,,	191^{r}.
,,	154^{r}.	,,	192^{r}.
Maior pars folii	155^{r}.	,,	200^{r}.
Folium	156^{r}.	,,	202^{r}.
,,	157^{r}.	Altera pars folii	207^{v}.
,,	158^{v}.	Folium	208^{v}.
,,	160^{v}.	,,	210^{r}.
,,	161^{v}.	,,	211^{r}.
,,	163^{r}.	Altera pars folii	211^{v}.
,,	166^{v}.		

Altera autem manu haec ff. sunt conscripta:

Folium	214^{r}.	Folium	246^{r}.
,,	215^{r}.	,,	247^{v}.
,,	216^{v}.	,,	248^{v}.
,,	217^{v}.	,,	249^{v}.
,,	231^{v}.	,,	256^{v}.
,,	232^{v}.	,,	260^{v}.
,,	233^{v}.	,,	265^{v}.
,,	235^{r}.	,,	272^{r}.
,,	236^{r}.	,,	275^{v}.
,,	237^{r}.	,,	277^{r}.
,,	242^{v}.	,,	279^{v}.
,,	243^{v}.	,,	283^{r}.
,,	245^{r}.	,,	293^{v}.

Folium 295r.
„ 298v.
Folium 341v inde e verbis "τοῦτο δὲ δὴ νοεῖ αὐτῷ, τοῖς μὲν ἐχθροῖς βλάβην ὀφείλεσθαι κ.τ.λ." (cf. Πολιτ. α', p. 335 E).
Folium 344r inde e verbis "πάντα τούτων τἀναντία ὑπάρχει. λέγω γὰρ ὅνπερ νῦν κ.τ.λ." (cf. sis Πολιτ. α', p. 343 E sqq.).
Folium 344v.
„ 357r.
„ 371v.
„ 375r.
Folium 379r inde e verbis "ἔχθρα στάσις κέκληται, ἐπὶ δὲ τῇ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου πόλεμος κ.τ.λ." (cf. Πολιτ. ε', p. 470 B).
Folium 379v.

Folium 393 (sc. 393r, 393v) erectioribus litteris atque rotundis exaratum est. In hac autem parte τῆς Πολιτείας literam ι subscriptam reperimus, quam nusquam in decem libris codex exhibet.

Folium 392 (sc. 392r, 392v) deflexo maioreque charactere est exaratum, eodem nimirum atque folia 1, 2r, quae εἰσαγωγὴν τοῦ ἀλβίνου complectuntur. F. 392 autem ceteris glutino connexum est.

Pag. 198r et alteram partem pag. 199r diversa manus conscripsisse videtur. Postremo ff. 12–35 nigricante scriptura quae ceteris insignia sunt gravique et crasso charactere: paulo sequiori aevo haec diversaque manu exarata videntur.

Ad scholia quod attinet, quibus marginalibus codex est adspersus, duabus diversis manibus conscripta ea esse constat; pars enim scriptura nitidissima, alia contra inelegante ac recentiore exarata sunt. Quod autem ad Πολιτείας decem libros spectat, tres manus deprehendi hic possunt: nonnulla enim multo recentior manus notavit, characteribus minutis nexibusque plerumque implicitis.

Horum schol. speciminis loco quae sequuntur ita exscripsi, ut signum quod est * recentioribus apposuerim.

Πολιτ. α', 328 D extr. ὡς εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ἔμοιγε κ.τ.λ.] σημείωσαι λόγων ἡδοναὶ
„ 329 A. παλαιὰν παρανομίαν] περὶ "ἀεὶ κολοιὸς ποτὶ κολοιὸν ἰζάνει"
„ 330 D. σημ. τοῦ ἰουστίνου τὸν λόγον
„ 337 A. ὑπὸ ὑμῶν τῶν δεινῶν] δεινῶν*
„ β', 359 D. ἱστορία τοῦ γύγου
„ 372 B. κριθῶν ἄλφιτα — πέψαντες; πυρῶν ἄλευρα — μάξαντες
„ 372 C extr. καὶ τραγήματά που] τραγήματα
„ „ E. τρυφῶσαν πόλιν
„ „ E extr. ἀληθινὴ καὶ ὑγίης πόλις

Πολιτ. β′, 372 E extr. φλεγμαίνουσα πόλις

,, 378 B. θεῶν οἱ πρῶτοι τὲ καὶ μέγιστοι] σημ. τίνας πρώτους καὶ μεγίστους θεῶν λέγει*

,, ,, D extr. ὑπόνοια*

,, 379 B. πρῶτος τύπος θεολογίας, ὅτι οὐκ αἴτιος τῶν κακῶν ὁ θεός

,, ,, C. πολὺ ἐλάττω τἀγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν*

,, 380 D. δεύτερος τύπος θεολογίας, ὅτι ὁ θεὸς ἀμετάβλητος :—

,, 382 A init. τρίτος τύπος θεολογίας, ὅτι ἀληθὴς ὁ θεός

,, ,, B. ἡ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἄγνοια] τὸ ψεῦδος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ πρῶτον*

,, γ′, 388 C. μέγιστος θεῶν ὁ Ζεύς

,, 392 C. τὰ μὲν δὴ λόγων κ.τ.λ.] λόγων, λέξεως*

,, 394 D. ἐνταῦθα σαφέως δηλοῖται τί τὸ "λόγων" τί τὸ "λέξεως" σημαίνει*

,, 398 E. μιξολυδιστὶ καὶ συντονολυδιστὶ } θρηνώδεις*

,, ,, E extr. ἰαστὶ καὶ λυδιστὶ } μαλακαὶ*

,, 399 A. δωριστὶ καὶ φρυγιστὶ } ἀνδρώδεις*

,, ,, D. σημ. ὀνόματα ὀργάνων [illegible]ῶν*

,, 400 B. οἶμαι δέ με ἀκηκοέναι, κ.τ.λ.] ῥύθμων ὀνόματα*

,, ,, E. τί εὐήθεια

,, 402 E. περὶ τῶν ἀγόνων [illegible]*

,, 403 E. τῶνδε τῶν ἀσκητῶν] ἀσκηταί*

,, 404 A. κομψοτέρας δή τινος κ.τ.λ.] τίς στρατιωτῶν ἄσκησις

,, ,, B. ἀκροσφαλὴς εἰς ὑγίειαν*

,, ,, B. ἑστιᾶ*

,, ,, E. ἀπεικάζοντες*

,, 405 D. φύσας τε καὶ κατάρρους] φύση | κάταρρος*

,, 406 A. ἐπιξυσθέντα*

,, ,, A. ὅτι τῇ παιδαγωγικῇ κ.τ.λ.] ἡ νῦν ἰατρική, παιδαγωγικὴ τῶν νοσημάτων

Et alia multa id genus.

,, 416 D. κοινὸν βίον καὶ εὐτελῆ τοῖς φύλαξι βιωτέον

,, δ′, 421 D. πλοῦτος καὶ πενία διαφθείρει τοὺς δημιουργούς

,, ,, E extr. βλαβεραὶ τῇ πόλει πλοῦτος καὶ πενία

,, 436 B. Δῆλον ὅτι ταὐτὸν τἀναντία κ.τ.λ.] σημ. τὴν πρότασιν ταύτην

,, ε′, 470 B extr. σημ. τί διαφέρει πόλεμος στάσεως

Πολιτ. ε′, 477 B. ἐπ' ἄλλῳ ἐπιστήμη, κατὰ κ.τ.λ.] ἴσως οὕτω δεῖ γράφεσθαι. ναί . . κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν ἢ κατ' ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην δύναμιν ἑκατέρα τῆς αὐτῆς οὕτως

,, ϛ′, 499 C extr. ἄπειρὸς (sic) ὁ παρεληλυθὼς χρόνος

,, ζ′, 518 D extr. αἱ μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλαι ἀρεταὶ κ.τ.λ.] αἱ μὲν ἀρεταὶ κτηταὶ, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἔμφυτος τῇ ψυχῇ*

,, 534 E. θριγκὸς τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἡ διαλεκτική*

,, η′, 545 C extr. πῶς ἐστι ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας τιμοκρατία*

,, θ′, 580 B. βασιλικὸν, τιμοκρατικὸν, ὀλιγαρχικὸν, δημοκρατικὸν, καὶ τυραννικόν*

,, ι′, 608 D. σημ. ὅτι ἀθάνατος ἡ ψυχή*

,, 611 A. σημ. ὅτι ἀεί ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ οὐ μεταβάλλεται*

,, ,, D extr. σημ. ὅτι συγγενὴς ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ θεῷ*

,, 615 B. σημ. ὅτι δεκαπλασίους ἀποδίδονται τιμωρίαι (sic)*

,, 617 C. σημ. περὶ τῶν μοιρῶν*

,, 621 A. εις τὸ τῆς Λήθης πεδίον] σημ. περὶ τοῦ ποταμοῦ τοῦ τῆς Λήθης

De scholiis hactenus.

Iam vero paucis absolvam de iis quae codex complectitur: in quibus recensendis editione Lipsiensi usus sum Hermanni MD.CCC.LXIV (voll. 6).

F. 1r. Rubris literis et maioribus legitur: "εἰσαγωγὴ εἰς τὴν τοῦ Πλάτωνος βίβλον ἀλβίνου πρόλογος."

Incipit "ὅτι τῷ μέλλοντι ἐντεύξεσθαι τοῖς Πλάτωνος διαλόγοις, προσήκει πρότερον ἐπίστασθαι αὐτὸ τοῦτο τί ποτέ ἐστιν ὁ διάλογος."

Desinit (f. 2r): "καὶ ὅπως αὐτοῖς καὶ ὅντινα τρόπον προσφέρεσθαι κακουργοῦσι περὶ τοὺς λόγους."

,, 2v. vacuum est scriptura. Tum occurrit tabula, rubris literis exarata, quae titulos ac seriem scriptorum repraesentat. Haec est inscriptio eius:

,, 3r. διαλόγων Πλάτωνος ἀκριβὴς πίναξ.

,, 4r. Sequitur deinde: "βίος Πλάτωνος συγγραφεὶς παρὰ λαερτίου Διογένους (haec autem rubris literis leguntur)."

Incipit "Πλάτων ἀρίστωνος καὶ περικτιόνης ἢ πωτώνης ἀθηναῖος κ.τ.λ."

Desinit (f. 11v): "τὰ μὲν περὶ πλάτωνος τοσαῦτα ἦν ἐς τὸ δυνατὸν ἡμῖν συναγαγεῖν φιλοπόνως διειλήσασι τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ τἀνδρός." | τέλος τοῦ πλάτωνος βίου.

A pag. 12^r incipiunt Platonis opera, et quidem hoc ordine[1]:

F. 12^r. εὐθύφρων ἢ περὶ ὁσίου :
,, 16^v. σωκράτους ἀπολογία.
,, 24^r. κρίτων ἢ περὶ πρακτοῦ.
,, 28^r. φαίδων ἢ περὶ ψυχῆς.
,, 49^r. κρατύλος ἢ περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος.
,, 63^r. θεαίτητος ἢ περὶ ἐπιστήμης.
,, 82^v. σοφιστὴς ἢ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος.
,, 97^v. πολιτικὸς ἢ περὶ βασιλείας.
,, 114^r. παρμενίδης ἢ περὶ ἰδεῶν.
,, 126^v. φίληβος ἢ περὶ ἡδονῆς.
,, 143^r. συμπόσιον ἢ περὶ ἔρωτος.
,, 158^v. φαῖδρος ἢ περὶ καλοῦ.
,, 174^r. ἀλκιβιάδης ἢ περὶ φύσεως ἀνθρώπου.
,, 183^r. ἀλκιβιάδης β' ἢ περὶ προσευχῆς.
,, 187^r. ἵππαρχος ἢ φιλοκερδής.
,, 189^r. ἐρασταὶ ἢ περὶ φιλοσοφίας.
,, 191^v. θεάγης ἢ περὶ σοφίας.
,, 194^v. χαρμίδης ἢ περὶ σωφροσύνης.
,, 202^r. λάχης ἢ περὶ ἀνδρίας.
,, 209^v. λύσις ἢ περὶ φιλίας.
,, 215^r. εὐθύδημος ἢ ἐριστικός.
,, 216^r. πρωταγόρας ἢ σοφισταί.
,, 242^r. γοργίας ἢ περὶ ῥητορικῆς.
,, 266^r. μένων ἢ περὶ ἀρετῆς.
,, 274^r. ἱππίας μείζων ἢ περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ.
,, 282^r. ἱππίας ἐλάττων ἢ περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ.
,, 286^r. ἴων ἢ περὶ ἰλιάδος.
,, 289^v. μενέξενος ἢ ἐπιτάφιος.
,, 294^r. περὶ δικαίου. πλάτωνος νοθευόμενοι α'.
,, 295^r. περὶ ἀρετῆς.
,, 296^v. δημόδοκος ἢ περὶ τοῦ ξυμβουλεύεσθαι.
,, 298^v. σίσυφος ἢ περὶ τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι.
,, 300^r. ἀλκυὼν ἢ περὶ μεταμορφώσεως.
,, 301^r. ἐρυξίας ἢ περὶ πλούτου· ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐρασίστρατος.
,, 306^r. ἀξίοχος ἢ περὶ θανάτου.
,, 308^v. τέλος τῶν νοθευομένων.
,, ,, κλειτοφῶν ἢ προτρεπτικός.
,, 310^r. τίμαιος ὁ μικρός (Incipit: "Τίμαιος ὁ Λοκρὸς τάδ' ἔφα")

[1] Tituli omnes rubris maioribusque literis constant.

F. 313^r. τίμαιος ἢ περὶ φύσεως.
" 332^r. κριτίας ἢ ἀτλαντικός.
" 336^r. μίνως.
" 338^v. πυθαγόρου σαμίοιο ἔπη τάδ' ἔνεστι τὰ χρυσᾶ :— (cf. Cod. 9 Plut. 85, Bibl. Laurentianae, pag. 3^r).

Incipiunt haec carmina :

ἀθανάτους μὲν πρῶτα θεοὺς, νόμω ὡς διάκειται
τούς τε καταχθονίους σέβε δαίμονας ἔννομα ῥέζων κ.τ.λ.

Desinit ibid. : "ἔσσεαι ἀθάνατος θεὸς ἄμβροτος οὐκέτι θνητός :—

Demum f. 339^r "πλάτωνος πολιτεῖαι :—

Reliquum vol. hic dialogos complectitur, qui f. 418^v desinit.

In infimo margine pag. 418^v literis evanidis legitur : 'opr̄a Platonis. dialogi n̄ro 50.'

In dialogis huiusce codicis nomina τῶν προσώπων desunt : locus vero est relictus ad literas saltem eorum initiales ponendas.

Codex demum, de quo hactenus actum est, elegantiorem perpoliti operis speciem quondam prae se tulisse videtur. Oblita enim auro folia circum iam fuere : ad hoc lignea integumenta, corio contecta candentis ferri stigmate perbelle impresso, clavis vel bullis aeneis etiamnunc sunt transfixa.

ESSAY III.

ON PLATO'S USE OF LANGUAGE.

PART I.

On Style and Syntax.

THE purpose of the following pages is to bring into a general view some forms of expression and tendencies of grammatical construction, which, although not confined to Plato, more frequently occur in him than in other Greek writers. In treating of his writings, principally from a grammatical point of view, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to separate absolutely between questions of syntax and questions of style; since in the Platonic dialogue, syntactical peculiarities have often a rhetorical motive. Whilst the subject is treated generally, the Republic, as the work immediately in hand, will furnish most of the examples; but reference will occasionally be made to other parts of Plato, and, now and again, to various Greek writers. A distinction will be maintained between those dialogues which represent the earlier or middle style of Plato (e. g. the Symposium, Phaedrus, &c.) and those which reflect his later manner (e. g. the Politicus, Philebus, Laws, &c.)[1].

[1] Explanation of references: 'Digest, § ,' refers to the digest of Platonic idioms in James Riddell's edition of the Apology; Oxford, 1877. 'M. and T.. § ,' refers to Professor W. W. Goodwin's *Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb*; London, 1889.

I. Style.

§ 1. Plato has not one style but several. No great prose writer has command of an instrument so varied, or an equal power of adapting modes of expression to moods of thought and imagination[1]. Without breaking harmony, he passes often from extreme simplicity to the extreme of complexity, according to the subject handled and the spirit in which he is approaching it.

The ground may be cleared by distinguishing between, (1) simple narration, (2) ornate narration, (3) passages of moral elevation, (4) question and answer, and (5) continuous dialectic.

(1) *Simple statement or narration.*—The narrative passages which introduce the dialogues or are interspersed in them are in many places perfectly limpid and clear. Hardly less so is the language in which Plato often clothes his fictitious tales (Egyptian or Phoenician), using a series of short sentences connected with the ingenuous *naïveté* of the λέξις εἰρομένη. The simplicity of the language often strikingly contrasts with the incredibility of the myth, as, for example, where Protagoras describes the creation of man, or where the Judgement of the Dead is reported by Socrates in the Gorgias, or in Republic X. Plato's simpler style, as Littré has remarked, bears some affinity to that of the genuine writings of Hippocrates.

(2) *Ornate narration.*— But there are other mythical discourses in which the language becomes more elevated and at the same time more complex, such as the account of the Soul's Migrations in the Phaedrus, the description of subterranean and supramundane regions in the Phaedo, or of the allegorical cavern in the seventh book of the Republic. Here the sentences are longer, and are complicated with explanations, illustrations, maxims, reflexions, and incidental statements, free play being given to fancy,

[1] See Phaedr. 277 C παναρμονίους λόγους.

while the effort to surround the marvellous with an air of naturalness and credibility is still maintained.

(3) *Passages of moral elevation.*— Distinct from both these narrative modes is the sustained eloquence of such passages as the discourse of Diotima (Symp. 211 D ff.), the reflections of Socrates addressed to Theodorus on the happiness of the philosophic life (Theaet. 172 D–177 C), or the description of the misery of the tyrant in Rep. IX (579 and 591–592); also, to notice some of Plato's later works, the creation of the world in the Timaeus (29–30); the summing up of religious duties in the Laws (V. 726 ff.); or again, in the same dialogue the remarks on the commerce of the sexes (VIII. 835 D ff.), and on the sin of Atheism (X. 887 C–888 D). In these, notwithstanding occasional exuberances, there is uninterrupted harmony and continuity. But there is an entire absence of formality, and only an approach to that rhetorical smoothness and concinnity which Plato well knew how to assume, as is shown by the speech of Agathon in the Symposium.

(4) *Question and answer.*—As in tragedy στιχομυθία is followed by ῥῆσις, so in Plato the pervading dialectic is at one time broken up, at another continuous and concentrated. Socrates everywhere begins with questions, but often (as is explicitly stated in the Gorgias and the Protagoras) he finds it necessary to take the argument into his own hands. In the questioning stage the logical steps are sometimes so numerous and so minute as to seem little more than verbal; sometimes, as in the conversation with Polemarchus (Rep. I. 331 D–336 A), they have a sophistical effect, and, as Adeimantus complains (Rep. VI. 487 B, C), lead the respondent unawares to a paradoxical conclusion. In the Republic, while dramatic effect is nowhere relinquished, the use of question and answer, after the contention with Thrasymachus in Book I, is retained more in form than in substance. But in laying afresh the foundations of the doctrine of Ideas, Socrates

again becomes minutely dialectical (Rep. V. 476 ff., VII. 523 ff.—cp. X. 608 E).

(5) *Continuous dialectic.*—In departing from the strictly catechetical method, the style becomes in one way more condensed, and in another more expansive; more condensed, because Socrates does not wait so often for the respondent to come up with him, more expansive, because, as he flows along in talk, illustrations multiply. It is to be observed also that the more constructive method of the Republic is assisted by the choice of the respondents, Adeimantus and Glaucon, who, although they are more life-like than the Aristoteles of the Parmenides and have many picturesque differences of character which are dramatically maintained, are, on the whole, predisposed to follow the lead of Socrates (V. 474 A), and are carried for the most part unresistingly by the full stream of Platonic discourse. And, as they are made to stand for the objectors, the adversary is often found more amenable to reason than would be the case if he were present in person (VI. 502 E, cp. Soph. 217 D, 246 D, Parm. 136 B, Theaet. 146 B, 162 B).

§ 2. These remarks lead up to the general question: What relation is there between Plato's use of language and the form in which his works are cast?

Consisting of argument embodied in fiction, his writings fall under conditions both of exactness and inexactness which are peculiar to them [1]. His style is consequently distinguished on the one hand (1) by conversational liveliness and freedom, and on the other (2) by dialectical precision.

[1] The following passage from Antony Trollope's autobiography shows the consciousness of a modern writer as to the conditions of written dialogue:—'The novel-writer in constructing his dialogue must so steer between absolute accuracy of language—which would give to his conversation an air of pedantry—and the slovenly inaccuracy of ordinary talkers,—which, if closely followed, would offend by an appearance of grimace,—as to produce upon the ear of his readers a sense of reality. If he be quite real, he will seem to attempt to be funny. If he be quite correct, he will seem to be unreal.'

(1) Thought and expression in Plato are in continual movement. Inchoate conceptions grow while being put into words. Illustrations are amplified until they threaten to supplant the original statement, on which they also react. Qualifications are perpetually inserted: abstractions are unexpectedly personified. The more *vivid* of two possible constructions is constantly preferred. Attention is kept on the alert by small dramatic surprises, as when Adeimantus suddenly remembers the ideal state in connexion with the philosopher who is in need of a city, VI. 497 C, or when Glaucon, who thinks that in the tyrannical man he has discovered the most miserable of human beings, is told of one who is yet more miserable, IX. 578 B. Interrogations, adjurations, apostrophes, are abruptly interposed. Crises of the argument are marked by increased liveliness, as when Socrates turns to his respondent with ὦ θαυμάσιε, or when he delights in exaggerating the audacious image of the laughing wave, V. 473 C. At one time, that which is imagined is treated as real, at another, Socrates returns to sad realities, with an outburst of emotion, VII. 536 C. From irony, he sometimes passes to direct seriousness, or with humorous gravity calls attention to some familiar fact, IX. 578 D. And beneath the ebb and flow of outward inconsistencies there is produced a deep impression of advance and growth. (See esp. III. 412 C, VII. 535 ff.)

Closely connected with this ever-fresh vivacity, indeed another aspect of it, is the obvious freedom from restraint. Plato's sentences are less tied down than those of other writers, even in Greek, to a predetermined form. Constructions are often found to shift through the interposition of some afterthought. Corrections, explanations, restrictions, digressions, break the regularity of grammar and occasion either a new construction or a pleonastic resumption of the previous statement, very often both. One protasis has more than one apodosis and *vice versa*. The

meaning is followed at the expense of concord (as in the agreement of neuter with feminine, or singular with plural) or, conversely, the nearer construction is chosen at the expense of the meaning. The grammatical order of words is modified by emphasis and by the desire of euphony. Verbs and participles are absorbed by the neighbourhood of kindred words. Not only cases but tenses and moods are employed κατὰ σύνεσιν. The language is at one time more explicit, at another more elliptical than would be allowable in a treatise or set speech. Lastly, the tendency which is common in Greek, wherever there are long sentences, to make the construction of the later clauses independent of the main construction, is peculiarly common in the long sentences of Plato.

But through all this licence, which the grammarian is apt to censure for irregularity, the hand of the creative artist is clearly discernible. Plato is not, like Thucydides, continually struggling with a medium of expression which he has imperfectly mastered; but the medium itself is one which has not yet attained to perfect lucidity. He moulds contemporary language to his purpose with the greatest skill. But the formal correctness of Isocrates would ill have suited him. It would be unnatural in 'dear Glaucon' though it is natural enough in Polus to 'speak like a book.' When this is once acknowledged, the meaning is almost always clear, although the combination of subtlety with laxity does sometimes lead to ambiguity. The conversational tone, however, is sometimes fused with rhetoric, and invites comparison with the orators. For sustained force, directness, and rapidity, no style is equal to that of Demosthenes. But the oratorical style of Plato contrasts favourably with the monotonous equability of Isocrates, the plain seriousness of Andocides, and the simple passionateness of Lysias. In ornate passages, Plato often betrays familiarity with poetry; but in his middle period, to which the Republic belongs, epic and lyric elements are more distinctly present

than echoes of tragedy. His language coincides, in some points, with that of comedy, but this will become more apparent in considering his vocabulary. (See Part II: *Platonic Diction.*) Tragic phrases become more frequent in his later writings, especially the Laws.

(2) While the dialogue of Plato has a conversational, and § 3.
sometimes a rhetorical, it also has a dialectical cast. This gives rise to some refinements of construction, and also to an occasional complexity appearing chiefly in two specific ways, (*a*) coordination, (*b*) remote connexion.

(*a*) *Coordination.*—The disjunctive question, or negation, in which two statements are bound together under a single negative, or interrogative—signifying that they cannot or should not both be true at once—a form of sentence peculiarly Greek, attains a high degree of complexity in Plato. See below, VIII.

(*b*) *Remote connexion.*—In Plato, as sometimes in tragedy, the formula of assent or dissent, instead of referring merely to the concluding words of the question, often reverts to the very beginning of a long speech, implying in the respondent a remarkable power of continuous attention (below, X). Similarly, the whole work is bound together with links of allusion to what has preceded, and preparations for what is to come, demanding a sustained interest far surpassing that of ordinary conversation.

2. Syntax.

A Chapter in Grammar.

It follows from what has been said that the sentence in § 4.
Plato, when looked at from a grammatical point of view, presents exceptional features both of irregularity and also of regularity, the ordinary structure being modified at once by conversational freedom, and by the effort to be precise and clear. This general statement will now be illustrated

by a series of quotations from the Republic and other dialogues under the following heads:—

I. Tenses, Moods, and Voices of the Verb.
II. Cases and numbers of Nouns.
III. Article and Pronoun.
IV. Adverbs and Prepositions.
V. Particles and Conjunctions.
VI. Ellipse and Pleonasm.
VII. Apposition.
VIII. Coordination of Sentences.
IX. Deferred apodosis: (Digression and Resumption).
X. Remote Reference.
XI. Imperfect Constructions.
XII. Changes of Construction.
XIII. Rhetorical figures.
XIV. Order of words.
XV. Grammatical irregularities considered in relation to the text.

I. The Verb.

§ 5. 1. TENSES.

(*a*) The '*aorist* of the immediate past,' referring to what has just been said or felt, though less common than in tragedy, is not infrequent in Plato.

I. 348 E ἀλλὰ τόδε **ἐθαύμασα**, κ.τ.λ. 'But this surprises me' (in what has just been said).

(*b*) The '*gnomic aorist*,' stating a general fact, often occurs, especially in describing mental phenomena.

VII. 523 D οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ ἡ ὄψις αὐτῇ ἅμα **ἐσήμηνε** τὸν δάκτυλον τοὐναντίον ἢ δάκτυλον εἶναι. 'Sight nowhere tells her that the finger is the opposite of a finger.'

Obs. 1.—In general statements Plato often passes from the *present* to the *aorist* and *vice versa*.

I. 338 D, E **τίθεται** δέ γε τοὺς νόμους ἑκάστη ἡ ἀρχή . . . **θέμεναι** δὲ **ἀπέφηναν**, κ.τ.λ.

VIII. 551 A φιλοχρήματοι . . . **ἐγένοντο**, καὶ τὸν μὲν πλούσιον **ἐπαινοῦσι** . . . τότε δὴ νόμον **τίθενται**, κ.τ.λ.

Obs. 2.—The *imperfect* is used in correlation with this as with the ordinary (preterite) aorist.

VII. 524 C *μέγα μὴν καὶ ὄψις καὶ σμικρὸν* **ἑώρα** *. . . διὰ δὲ τὴν τούτου σαφήνειαν μέγα αὖ καὶ σμικρὸν ἡ νόησις* **ἠναγκάσθη** *ἰδεῖν.*

VIII. 547 B **εἱλκέτην** . . . **ἡγέτην** . . . **ὡμολόγησαν.**

IX. 572 D **κατέστη** *εἰς μέσον ἀμφοῖν τοῖν τρόποιν, καὶ μετρίως δή, ὡς* **ᾤετο**, *ἑκάστων ἀπολαύων οὔτε ἀνελεύθερον οὔτε παράνομον βίον* **ζῇ**.

Obs. 3.—The aorist infinitive without *ἄν* is used in assured anticipation.

V. 457 D *οἶμαι . . . πλείστην ἀμφισβήτησιν γενέσθαι.* (So the MSS.) See Goodwin, *M. and T.*, § 127.

Of course *ἄν* might easily drop out before *ἀμφ.*

(*c*) The imperfect tense of *εἰμί* has two special uses in Plato and in other philosophical writers:

α. In reference to what has been previously said or assumed—

III. 406 E *ὅτι* **ἦν** *τι αὐτῷ ἔργον.* 'Because as we suggested (405 C) he has something to do.'

IX. 587 C *ἐν μέσῳ γὰρ αὐτῶν ὁ δημοτικὸς* **ἦν**.

So (according to Ast's conjecture) in X. 603 C *μή τι ἄλλο* ***ἦν** (MSS. *ᾖ*) *παρὰ ταῦτα.* Cp. ib. D *ἐστασίαζε . . .* **εἶχεν**.

β. In stating the result of an enquiry, because what a thing is found to be at the end of search, that it *was* before the search began.

IV. 428 A *δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο ἔτι* **ἦν** *ἢ τὸ ὑπολειφθέν.* 'It was all along nothing else.'

IV. 436 B, C *ἐάν που εὑρίσκωμεν ἐν αὐτοῖς ταῦτα γιγνόμενα, εἰσόμεθα ὅτι οὐ ταὐτὸν* **ἦν** *ἀλλὰ πλείω.* 'They were all the while more than one.'

VI. 497 C *τότε δηλώσει ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν τῷ ὄντι θεῖον ἦν.* 'This was from the beginning undoubtedly divine.'

(*d*) The *perfect* sometimes signifies a fixed habit (cp. Monro's *Homeric Grammar*, p. 28).

VII. 521 E *γυμναστικὴ μέν που περὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον* **τετεύτακε**—'is constantly employed.'

VII. 533 B *αἱ μὲν ἄλλαι πᾶσαι τέχναι . . . πρὸς θεραπείαν . . . ἅπασαι* **τετράφαται**—'apply themselves continually.'

So in VI. 511 A *εἰκόσι δὲ χρωμένην αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω*

ἀπεικασθεῖσι καὶ ἐκείνοις πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ὡς ἐναργέσι **δεδοξασμένοις** τε καὶ **τετιμημένοις**—'usually esteemed and held in honour.'

§ 6. 2. MOODS.

(*a*) *Conjunctive.*—The familiar combination of the 'deliberative subjunctive' with βούλει, βούλεσθε, occurs in

II. 372 E εἰ δ' αὖ βούλεσθε . . . θεωρήσωμεν, οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει. This was misunderstood by the diorthotes of Paris. A. See E. on Text, p. 135.

IX. 577 B βούλει . . . προσποιησώμεθα, κ.τ.λ., and elsewhere.

Obs.—In such expressions as τί λέγομεν; πῶς λέγομεν; the MSS. often leave it doubtful whether τί λέγωμεν; &c. should not be read.

(*b*) *Optative.*—Plato's optatives are sometimes a little difficult to explain, depending rather on the drift of the sentence than on grammatical rule. The following are the chief places in the Republic requiring special treatment.

I. 337 E πῶς . . . ἄν τις ἀποκρίναιτο πρῶτον μὲν **μὴ εἰδὼς** . . . ἔπειτα, εἴ τι καὶ οἴεται περὶ τούτων, **ἀπειρημένον** αὐτῷ **εἴη** . . . ;

The condition implied in the participial clause μὴ εἰδώς becomes explicit as the sentence proceeds, and is expressed as if εἰ μὴ εἰδείη had followed πῶς ἄν τις ἀποκρίναιτο. Cp. Protag. 327 D **εἰ δέοι** αὐτὸν κρίνεσθαι πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, **οἷς** μήτε παιδεία ἐστὶ μήτε δικαστήρια, . . . ἀλλ' **εἶεν** ἄγριοί τινες.

Here the condition introduced in εἰ δέοι regains its force towards the end of the sentence, which is continued as if the whole from οἷς downwards were a single relative clause (e.g. οἳ μὴ ἔχουσιν or ἔχοιεν, κ.τ.λ.). See Xen. Symp. VIII. 17.

I. 352 E τί δέ; **ἀκούσαις** ἄλλῳ ἢ ὠσίν;

II. 360 B οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο, **ὡς δόξειεν**, οὕτως ἀδαμάντινος, ὃς ἂν μείνειεν, κ.τ.λ.

The clause ὡς δόξειεν, although not conditional, seems to fall under Goodwin's law of assimilation (*M. and T.*, §§ 558, 531). But it is to be observed also that the whole of Glaucon's speech proceeds on the assumption that he is putting the case of another (359 B ὡς ὁ λόγος: 361 E μὴ ἐμὲ

οἷον λέγειν), and the mood is affected by the sense of indirect discourse. Cp. IV. 420 C *ἐναληλιμμένοι εἶεν.*

II. 361 C **ἄδηλον οὖν** *εἴτε τοῦ δικαίου εἴτε τῶν δωρεῶν . . . ἕνεκα* **τοιοῦτος εἴη**. Glaucon's reasoning is hypothetical, though he tries to treat his supposition as a matter of fact. The language therefore wavers between the indicative and optative: i. e. *εἴτε . . . εἴη* is brought in, as if *εἰ δόξει . . . ἔσονται . . . ἄδηλον* had been *εἰ δοκοίη . . . εἶεν ἂν . . . ἄδηλον ἂν εἴη.*

II. 382 D, E *ἀλλὰ δεδιὼς τοὺς ἐχθροὺς* **ψεύδοιτο**; In both these cases the construction is continued from a preceding sentence having the optative with *ἄν*. In the former some editors insert *ἄν*, and it may possibly have dropped out before **ἄλλῳ**.

III. 403 B *νομοθετήσεις . . . οὕτως ὁμιλεῖν* **πρὸς ὅν τις σπουδάζοι**. 'In Attic Greek an optative in the relative clause sometimes depends on a verb of *obligation* . . . with an infinitive. . . . E.g.

Ἀλλ' ὃν πόλις στήσειε, τοῦδε χρὴ κλύειν,

Soph. Ant. 666.' Goodwin, *M. and T.*, § 555.

III. 410 B, C *οἱ καθιστάντες μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδεύειν οὐχ οὗ ἕνεκά τινες οἴονται* **καθιστᾶσιν, ἵνα** *τῇ μὲν τὸ σῶμα* **θεραπεύοιντο** *τῇ δὲ τὴν ψυχήν.*

Madvig would read *καθίστασαν*. But this accords ill with *κινδυνεύουσιν* following. And for the tense cp. VIII. 566 B *ἐξευρίσκουσιν*. The indirect discourse here depends on a general statement, which, as Riddell would say, 'belongs to all time' (*Digest*, § 74), or as Goodwin puts it (*M. and T.*, § 323) 'implies a reference to the past as well as the present.' He quotes Dem. XII. 11 *τοῦτον* **ἔχει** *τὸν τρόπον ὁ νόμος, ἵνα μηδὲ πεισθῆναι μηδ' ἐξαπατηθῆναι* **γένοιτ'** *ἐπὶ τῷ δήμῳ.*

IV. 428 C, D *ἔστι τις ἐπιστήμη ἐν* **τῇ ἄρτι** *ὑφ' ἡμῶν* **οἰκισθείσῃ** *. . . ᾗ . . . βουλεύεται . . . ὅντινα τρόπον . . . πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις ἄριστα* **ὁμιλοῖ**.

Here 'a reference to the past' is implied in the words *ἐν τῇ ἄρτι οἰκισθείσῃ*. Or the reference to time is altogether vague. Hence in the indirect discourse *ὁμιλοῖ*, not *ὁμιλῇ*.

VI. 490 A ἆρ' οὖν δὴ οὐ μετρίως **ἀπολογησόμεθα** ὅτι πρὸς τὸ ὂν **πεφυκὼς** εἴη ἁμιλλᾶσθαι ὅ γε ὄντως φιλομαθής, κ.τ.λ. 'Shall we not make a reasonable defence in saying (what we have already indicated),' &c. There is an implied reference to the definition of the philosopher in Bk. V sub fin. This is Professor Goodwin's ingenious explanation of the difficulty, which others have met by conjecturing ἀπελογησάμεθα or ἀπελογισάμεθα,—neither of which is justified by the context: for V. 474 B ff. is neither, strictly speaking, an 'apology' nor a 'reckoning.' (*M. and T.*, § 676.)

(*c*) The imperfect *indicative* in the apodosis of an unreal supposition is made more vivid by the absence of ἄν (*M. and T.*, § 431).

V. 450 D, E **πιστεύοντος** μὲν γὰρ ἐμοῦ ἐμοὶ εἰδέναι ἃ λέγω, καλῶς **εἶχεν** ἡ παραμυθία. 'Had I been confident in my knowledge of the things I say, your comfort were indeed welcome.'

(*d*) *Imperative.* The third person imperative has a special use in dialectic, viz. in stating or admitting a postulate or assumption.

VIII. 553 A **ἀπειργάσθω** δή, κ.τ.λ. 'I may assume that our description of oligarchy is complete.'

§ 7. (*e*) *Infinitive.* The construction of an infinitive can sometimes be gathered only imperfectly from the context :—

V. 467 C τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα ὑπαρκτέον, θεωροὺς πολέμου τοὺς παῖδας ποιεῖν, **προσμηχανᾶσθαι** δ' αὐτοῖς ἀσφάλειαν, καὶ καλῶς ἕξει· ἢ γάρ;

προσμηχανᾶσθαι is governed by the notion of obligation (δεῖ or χρή) implied in ὑπαρκτέον, and the construction is assisted by the inf. ποιεῖν coming between. This point will be further illustrated in considering *imperfect constructions* (below, XI).

Epexegetic uses of the infinitive: *a.* following an adjective:—

I. 330 C **χαλεποὶ** οὖν καὶ **ξυγγενέσθαι** εἰσίν. 'Troublesome to converse with.'

VII. 537 B ἀδύνατός τι ἄλλο πρᾶξαι. 'Incapable of (admitting) any other employment.'

Obs.—In the difficult place I. 333 E καὶ λαθεῖν οὗτος δεινότατος ἐμποιῆσαι, unless something is wrong with the text, there is a double construction of this kind:—'most clever to implant,' 'most clever to escape notice (in implanting).' Schneider's emendation ἐμποιήσας saves the grammar at the expense of natural emphasis.

β. In apposition with a noun:

VII. 531 C ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰς προβλήματα ἀνίασιν, ἐπισκοπεῖν, κ.τ.λ.

VIII. 566 B τὸ δὴ τυραννικὸν αἴτημα . . . ἐξευρίσκουσιν, αἰτεῖν, κ.τ.λ.

The *infinitive*, instead of the participle as elsewhere, sometimes follows φαίνεσθαι:

IV. 432 D φαίνεται πρὸ ποδῶν ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς κυλινδεῖσθαι. 'It has manifestly been rolling (ἐκυλινδεῖτο) at our feet all the while.'

(*f*) The *participle*. In expanding his sentences Plato § 8.
makes continual use of participial expressions.

1. For pleonastic (or epexegetic) uses see especially III. 397 C ἢ τῷ ἑτέρῳ τούτων ἐπιτυγχάνουσιν . . . ἢ τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἢ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τινὶ ξυγκεραννύντες. 'They hit on one or other of these modes, or on a third, which they compound out of both.'

VI. 494 E τί οἰόμεθα δράσειν . . . οὐ πᾶν μὲν ἔργον, πᾶν δ' ἔπος λέγοντάς τε καὶ πράττοντας;

VII. 527 A ὡς γὰρ . . . πράξεως ἕνεκα πάντας τοὺς λόγους ποιούμενοι λέγουσι τετραγωνίζειν τε καὶ παρατείνειν καὶ προστιθέναι καὶ πάντα οὕτω φθεγγόμενοι.

A more doubtful instance is VI. 496 A οὐδὲν γνήσιον οὐδὲ φρονήσεως ἄξιον ἀληθινῆς ἐχόμενον, where the awkwardness may be obviated by reading ἀξίως (ἄξιον ὡς Ven. Π).

2. *Alternation of participle with infinitive*. In Plato's long sentences the participle sometimes alternates with the infinitive:

VI. 488 B ff. (in the allegory of the mutinous crew)

στασιάζοντας . . . φάσκοντας μηδὲ διδακτὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν λέγοντα ὡς διδακτὸν ἑτοίμους κατατέμνειν, αὐτοὺς δὲ αὐτῷ ἀεὶ τῷ ναυκλήρῳ περικεχύσθαι, κ.τ.λ.

The infinitive περικεχύσθαι may have been occasioned, but is not grammatically accounted for, by κατατέμνειν coming between. This point will be more fully illustrated below, under Changes of Construction.

Obs.—As the use of the participle with the article after the preposition instead of the infinitive is doubtfully admitted by some editors in several passages of Thucydides (I. 2, § 5; IV. 63, § 1; V. 7, § 2; VI. 84, § 10: VIII. 105, § 2), it may be worth observing that in Rep. I. 346 B διὰ τὸ ξυμφέρειν the best MSS. have διὰ τὸ ξυμφέρον. Cp. Phileb. 58 C, Laws VIII. 831 E.

3. The participle passive, mostly neuter, denoting a mode of action or existence, occurs in VIII. 561 A ἐκ τοῦ ἐν ἀναγκαίοις ἐπιθυμίαις τρεφομένου: X. 596 D (τρόπος) ταχὺ δημιουργούμενος, 'a manner in which it is easy to produce the effect:' cp. Theaet. 184 C τὸ δὲ εὐχερὲς . . . καὶ μὴ . . . ἐξεταζόμενον, 'an easy-going method, without strict examination.'

4. The accusative and participle, with or without ὡς, have the effect of a reported statement. With ὡς: I. 345 E ὡς οὐχὶ αὐτοῖσιν ὠφελίαν ἐσομένην, 'implying that they would not profit thereby.' II. 383 A ὡς μήτε αὐτοὺς γόητας ὄντας κ.τ.λ., 'conveying the impression that the Gods themselves are not impostors.' III. 390 A, B τί δέ; ποιεῖν . . . δοκεῖ σοι ἐπιτήδειον εἶναι . . . ἀκούειν νέῳ . . . ἢ Δία . . . ὡς . . . ἐπιλανθανόμενον, 'do you think it fitting that a young man should hear such a poetical description, or that he should hear Zeus described as forgetting,' &c. VI. 511 D ὡς . . . τὴν διάνοιαν οὖσαν. VIII. 560 D ὡς ἀγροικίαν . . . οὖσαν. Cp. Phaedrus 245 A πεισθεὶς ὡς . . . ἐσόμενος. Without ὡς: VI. 511 A νοητὸν μὲν τὸ εἶδος ἔλεγον, ὑποθέσεσι δ' ἀναγκαζομένην ψυχὴν χρῆσθαι περὶ τὴν ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ, 'I spoke of this kind as intellectual, but (said) that the mind was compelled to use hypothesis in investigating it.'

Obs. 1.—In X. 604 B the transition from the genitive to the

accusative ὡς οὔτε δήλου ὄντος . . . οὔτε . . . προβαῖνον is occasioned by the impersonal verb.

Obs. 2.—The subject of an infinitive or participle following a verb is accusative even when the same with the main subject, if this happens to be considered in two aspects. X. 621 B ἰδεῖν . . . αὑτὸν . . . **κείμενον** ἐπὶ τῇ πυρᾷ. 'He saw that he himself was lying.' The previous narrative referred to the disembodied soul.

Obs. 3.—The idiomatic use of the aorist participle with γε in a reply = 'Let me first,' &c. (Phaedr. 228 D δείξας γε πρῶτον, ὦ φιλότης, κ.τ.λ.) occurs in VI. 507 A **διομολογησάμενός γ'**, ἔφην, κ.τ.λ. 'Not until I have come to a clear understanding.' Cp. I. 338 C ἐὰν μάθω γε πρῶτον with similar ellipse.

For a slightly different idiom with the present participle, see VIII. 554 A αὐχμηρός γέ τις . . . ὤν, 'Ay, because he is a shabby fellow,' and the note in loco.

Obs. 4.—The gerundive in -τέον is construed with the accusative: III. 400 D **ταῦτά** γε λόγῳ ἀκολουθητέον.

So also in V. 467 E **διδαξαμένους** . . . ἀκτέον, 'we must have them taught and bring them,' where see note, and cp. Tim. 88 B, C **τὸν** δὴ **μαθηματικὸν** . . . καὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀποδοτέον κίνησιν, 'the hard student must give his body corresponding exercise.'

Obs. 5.—The subordination of participle to participle is very frequent:

VIII. 555 E **ἐνιέντες** ἀργύριον **τιτρώσκοντες**. 'Stinging by inserting money.'

N.B.—A little-noticed idiom, occurring also in Herodotus and Thucydides, is the use of the aorist participle referring to a time subsequent to that of the principal verb. Parm. 127 D τὸν . . . γενόμενον (= ὃς ὕστερον τούτων ἐγένετο). Goodwin, *M. and T.*, § 152.

3. VOICES. § 9.

(*a*) *Active.*

α. Impersonal. X. 604 B ὡς οὔτε δήλου ὄντος . . . οὔτε εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν οὐδὲν **προβαῖνον** τῷ χαλεπῶς φέροντι.

IX. 580 D **δέξεται**, sc. τὸ πρᾶγμα (Theaet. 200 E δείξειν αὐτό. Phaedo 73 B σαφέστατα κατηγορεῖ).

β. With a neuter subject, which signifies some condition, aspect, or attitude of mind.

IV. 442 E εἴ τι ἡμῶν ἔτι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ **ἀμφισβητεῖ**. 'If there be

any objection lurking in our mind.' More often in the participle (cp. Thucydides).

IV. 439 B τοῦ διψῶντος καὶ ἄγοντος . . . ἐπὶ τὸ πιεῖν. 'The appetite of thirst, that drags him to the act of drinking.'

γ. Intransitive with cognate subject.

V. 463 D αὗται . . . ἢ ἄλλαι φῆμαι . . . ὑμνήσουσιν . . . ; 'are not these and none but these the strains that will resound in song?'

(*b*) *Passive.*—Verbs not strictly transitive acquire a passive voice.

α. With the cognate accusative of the active for implied subject.

VI. 490 A τοῖς νῦν δοκουμένοις. Cp. X. 612 D δοκεῖσθαι.

β. With the remote object of the active for subject.

I. 336 E, 337 A ἡμᾶς . . . ὑπὸ ὑμῶν . . . χαλεπαίνεσθαι (= ὑμᾶς χαλεπαίνειν ἡμῖν).

X. 602 A συνεῖναι τῷ εἰδότι καὶ ἐπιτάττεσθαι (sc. ὑπὸ τοῦ εἰδότος, i.e. τὸν εἰδότα ἐπιτάττειν αὐτῷ).

This use, of which πιστεύεσθαί τι, 'to be entrusted with anything,' is the most familiar example, is extended in the later dialogues to ἐπιχειρεῖσθαι (Tim. 53 B ὅτε . . . ἐπεχειρεῖτο κοσμεῖσθαι τὸ πᾶν), διακονεῖσθαι (Laws VI. 763 A), δυστυχεῖσθαι, ἀσεβεῖσθαι (Laws IX. 877 E ὅταν οὖν τις ἅμα δυστυχηθῇ καὶ ἀσεβηθῇ τῶν οἴκων, 'when some habitation has received the taint of misfortune and of crime'), νομοθετεῖσθαι, 'to be legislated for' (Laws XI. 925 E, 926 A, where the passive ἐπιτάττεσθαι again occurs).

Cp. πλεονεκτεῖσθαι in Xen. Mem. III. 5, § 2 πλεονεκτούμενοι ὑπὸ Θηβαίων.

γ. Passive impersonal.

VII. 530 C ὡς νῦν ἀστρονομεῖται, 'as Astronomy is now pursued.'

§ 10. (*c*) *Middle.*

α. The Middle Voice in Plato has still frequently a subtle force—accentuating some relation in which the action stands to the agent.

I. 344 E βίου διαγωγήν, ᾗ ἂν **διαγόμενος**, 'conducting his own life.'

I. 349 E ἁρμοττόμενος λύραν, 'tuning a lyre for himself to play upon.'

III. 405 B τὸ πολὺ τοῦ βίου . . . κατατρίβηται, 'wastes the greater part of his life.'

Obs.—The distinction of τιθέναι and τίθεσθαι, 'to institute and to adopt a law,' is well discussed by Mr. Postgate in *Journ. of Phil.* XV. 29 (1886). See a good example of this in Laws VII. 820 E τοὺς θέντας ἡμᾶς ἢ καὶ τοὺς θεμένους ὑμᾶς.

β. On the other hand, the voice is sometimes varied almost capriciously.

VI. 484 D μηδὲν . . . ἐλλείποντας . . . μὴ ἐλλείποιντο: cp. Laws IX. 853 C **νομοθετούμενοι** . . . ἐνομοθέτουν: XI. 913 B ἀνελών . . . **ἀνελόμενος**.

γ. A vague reference to self is implied in what has been called the subjective middle voice, of which παρέχομαι, ἀποδείκνυμαι, περιφέρομαι are instances. παρέχεσθαι, for example, is 'to furnish from one's own resources,' or 'to produce by one's own inherent power.'

IV. 421 D ὄργανά γε μὴ ἔχων **παρέχεσθαι**, IV. 443 B ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν, ἢ τοὺς τοιούτους ἄνδρας τε **παρέχεται** καὶ πόλεις: cp. Phaedr. 240 C ἡ . . . χρόνου ἰσότης . . . φιλίαν **παρέχεται**.

δ. The reciprocal use appears most prominently in ὁμολογεῖσθαι, 'to agree together.'

IV. 436 C ἔτι τοίνυν ἀκριβέστερον **ὁμολογησώμεθα**: VIII. 544 A **ὁμολογησάμενοι** τὸν ἄριστον καὶ τὸν κάκιστον ἄνδρα.

This is sometimes emphasized with reference to λόγος by the addition of the reflexive pronoun.

V. 457 C τὸν λόγον αὐτὸν αὑτῷ **ὁμολογεῖσθαι**: cp. Phaedr. 265 D τὸ αὐτὸ αὑτῷ **ὁμολογούμενον**.

ε. A special use of the middle voice, combined with the construction noted above (the accusative as subject of the verbal in -τέον), gives the most probable solution of the difficulty in V. 467 E καὶ **διδαξαμένους** ἱππεύειν, 'and when

they (the guardians) have had them (the young people) taught to ride.' See above, p. 179, *Obs.* 4.

Obs.—When the above cases are considered such an isolated use of the middle voice as μεγαλοφρονούμενοι in VII. 528 C appears less remarkable. Another rare use of the middle, VII. 535 B ποῖα δὴ διαστέλλει; 'what distinction do you propose to yourself?' is supported by Aristotle, Pol. II. 8, § 17 μικρὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ **διαστείλασθαι** βέλτιον. For a similar use of the middle voice in connexion with the dialectical process cp. Phaedo 101 E ἅμα δὲ οὐκ ἂν **φύροιο** . . . περί τε τῆς ἀρχῆς διαλεγόμενος καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἐκείνης ὡρμημένων.

II. The Noun Substantive.

§ 11. 1. CASES.

(*a*) *Nominative and Accusative.*

a. The preference for the nominative, where the subject is identical with that of the principal verb, extends to instances where the clause is headed by ὥστε, πρίν, or even by a preposition. This is quite regular, but the point is sometimes overlooked.

I. 345 D ἐπεὶ τά γε αὐτῆς ὥστ' εἶναι **βελτίστη**, ἱκανῶς δήπου ἐκπεπόρισται (βελτίστη agrees with the subject of ἐκπεπόρισται, which is perfect *middle* = 'she has provided for herself').

III. 402 A πρὶν λόγον **δυνατὸς** εἶναι λαβεῖν: VI. 501 A πρὶν . . . **αὐτοὶ** ποιῆσαι.

III. 416 C εἰ μέλλουσι τὸ μέγιστον ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ **ἥμεροι** εἶναι.

V. 454 A διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι . . . **διαιρούμενοι**, κ.τ.λ.

VII. 526 B εἴς γε τὸ **ὀξύτεροι** αὐτοὶ αὑτῶν γίγνεσθαι.

Laws X. 885 D βελτίους ἢ . . . παρατρέπεσθαι **κηλούμενοι**.

(Cp. Xen. Hell. VII. 5, § 5 εἴ τινες δὴ πόλεις **διὰ τὸ σμικραί** τε εἶναι καὶ ἐν μέσαις ταύταις οἰκεῖν ἠναγκάζοντο.)

Obs.—The accusative occurs in a similar connexion V. 457 B φῶμεν . . . λέγοντες, ὥστε . . . **τιθέντας**.

β. In the absence of a definite construction, the accusative is the case usually preferred, and the case sometimes reverts to the accusative, although the construction has been previously in the dative (as in the familiar instance,

Sophocles, Electra 479 ὕπεστί μοι θράσος | ἀδυπνόων κλύουσαν | ἀρτίως ὀνειράτων). See note on VIII. 559 B.

γ. It has sometimes been assumed (*Digest*, § 11) that all substantives apparently out of construction are accusatives in apposition. This point will be treated more fully below under Changes of Construction. Meanwhile, it is enough to adduce as an instance of the nominativus pendens VII. 532 B ἡ δέ γε . . . λύσις τε . . . καὶ μεταστροφή, κ.τ.λ., where, as the sentence proceeds, the nominative is changed to an accusative in C ταύτην . . . τὴν δύναμιν.

A good example of the accusative in apposition is II. 365 C πρόθυρα μὲν καὶ σχῆμα, κ.τ.λ.

This idiom is peculiarly frequent in the Timaeus. A common form of it in most dialogues is ἄλλο τι ἤ . . . (Gorg. 470 B, &c.), a special case of the familiar idiom of which Theaet. 195 E ἃ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ διανοεῖταί τις is an example. Cp. Rep. IV. 420 A οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ φρουροῦντες. For ἄλλο τι without ἤ following see below, under Apposition.

Under this heading, whether as nominative or accusative, may be brought the abrupt exclamations in VIII. 557 E τὸ δὲ μηδεμίαν ἀνάγκην . . . εἶναι ἄρχειν, κ.τ.λ. : VIII. 563 B τὸ δέ γε . . . ἔσχατον . . . τῆς ἐλευθερίας τοῦ πλήθους.

δ. An adverbial accusative is sometimes abruptly introduced.

IV. 436 D ὡς οὐ . . . τὰ τοιαῦτα τότε μενόντων.

V. 460 B εἴτε ἀνδρῶν εἴτε γυναικῶν εἴτε ἀμφότερα.

VI. 492 B ὑπερβαλλόντως ἑκάτερα.

So in such expressions as Symp. 204 C τί τῶν καλῶν ἐστὶν ὁ Ἔρως ;

ε. The cognate accusative (or accusative of the internal object,—too common to be noticed here) has its correlative in the cognate *subject* of the passive voice. This use is especially frequent in the participial form (see above, p. 178, 3), and in the adverbial accusative of the verbal noun ; VI. 510 B τοῖς τότε τμηθεῖσιν (if the reading is sound).

ζ. The accusative, equally with the dative, accompanies

the verbal in -τέον, IV. 421 B, 424 C: for dative see III. 413 C, V. 468 A πῶς ἐκτέον σοι τοὺς στρατιώτας, where the accusative would have given another (i.e. an active) meaning to ἐκτέον. Cp. Tim. 88 C τὸν δὴ μαθηματικόν . . . τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀποδοτέον κίνησιν. So in V. 467 E, see above, p. 179, *Obs.* 4.

§ 12. (*b*) *Genitive.*—The genitive, like the accusative, sometimes stands in a loose construction with what follows, the construction being afterwards, in some cases, made more definite.

V. 463 B ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν τῶν ἀρχόντων, κ.τ.λ.

V. 470 A τί δέ; γῆς τε τμήσεως τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς καὶ οἰκιῶν ἐμπρήσεως ποῖόν τί σοι δράσουσιν οἱ στρατιῶται πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους;

Cp. Symp. 221 C τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων τάχ' ἄν τις . . . εἴποι when περί follows, but in construction with another word.

See also—

II. 375 E οἶσθα γάρ που τῶν γενναίων κυνῶν, ὅτι τοῦτο φύσει αὐτῶν τὸ ἦθος (where αὐτῶν supplies the link).

IX. 571 B ἐνίων μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἢ . . . ἀπαλλάττεσθαι ἢ ὀλίγαι λείπεσθαι . . . τῶν δὲ . . . καὶ πλείους. 'In the case of some men,' &c., where ἐνίων might be construed with ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, but the context shows this not to be the construction.

Special uses of the genitive are—

a. '*Consisting in*' (*Digest*, § 24).

IV. 433 D ἡ τοῦ . . . τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν δύναμις.

β. *Objective* = πρός with acc.

II. 359 A ξυνθήκας αὐτῶν. 'Contracts with one another.'

III. 391 C ὑπερηφανίαν θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων. 'Haughtiness towards gods and men.'

VIII. 566 E ἡσυχία ἐκείνων, 'he has tranquillity in regard to them.'

A doubtful instance is VIII. 558 A ἡ πραότης ἐνίων τῶν δικασθέντων, κ.τ.λ. (see note in loc.). See also IX. 573 D ὧν ἂν Ἔρως, κ.τ.λ. 'Whatever things are the objects of the passion,' &c. (Prof. Jowett construed the genitive with τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἅπαντα, 'of whatsoever men love masters the whole soul.')

γ. *Partitive.*

X. 615 D ἐθεασάμεθα . . . καὶ τοῦτο **τῶν δεινῶν θεαμάτων**, 'this was amongst the terrible sights we beheld.'

VI. 496 C **τούτων** δὴ **τῶν ὀλίγων** οἱ γενόμενοι. Cp. Laws VI. 754 D οἱ δὲ δὴ γενόμενοι **τῶν ἑπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα.**

δ. '*Requiring.*'

III. 414 C πεῖσαι δὲ **συχνῆς πειθοῦς**, 'but much persuasion is required to convince men of its truth.'

X. 615 A **πολλοῦ χρόνου** διηγήσασθαι.

Cp. Phaedr. 246 A οἷον μέν ἐστι, πάντῃ πάντως **θείας** εἶναι **καὶ μακρᾶς διηγήσεως**, ᾧ δὲ ἔοικεν, **ἀνθρωπίνης** τε **καὶ ἐλάττονος**: Parm. 135 B **ἀνδρὸς** πάνυ μὲν **εὐφυοῦς** τοῦ δυνησομένου μαθεῖν: Laws V. 730 A **πολλῆς** οὖν **εὐλαβείας, κ.τ.λ.**

ε. '*In respect of.*'

II. 365 A ὡς . . . ἔχουσι τιμῆς, 'how they are disposed to regard them.'

VII. 518 B εὐδαιμονίσειεν ἂν **τοῦ πάθους** τε καὶ βίου: VII. 531 D **τοῦ προοιμίου.**

IX. 571 D ὅταν . . . ὑγιεινῶς τις ἔχῃ **αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ** ('in comparison with himself') καὶ σωφρόνως.

This does not occur with other adverbs than those in ως.

Cp. Xen. Hell. V. 4, § 25 ἀπολυτικῶς **αὐτοῦ** εἶχον, and Hdt. VII. 188, 3 τοῖσι οὕτω εἶχε **ὅρμου.**

The genitive in ejaculations is closely allied to this:—VI. 509 C Ἄπολλον, ἔφη, **δαιμονίας ὑπερβολῆς.**

So perhaps IX. 576 D **εὐδαιμονίας** . . . καὶ **ἀθλιότητος** ὡσαύτως . . . κρίνεις: cp. Laws I. 646 D **τῆς . . . διατριβῆς** . . . διανοητέον.

Phaedo 99 B πολλὴ ἂν καὶ μακρὰ ῥᾳθυμία εἴη **τοῦ λόγου.**

Obs.—Double and even triple genitives are not uncommon, the second being sometimes epexegetic of the first, as in VII. 534 B τὸν λόγον ἑκάστου . . . **τῆς οὐσίας.**

For other examples see—

VII. 525 C ῥᾳστώνης τε **μεταστροφῆς, κ.τ.λ.**

„ 537 C εἰς σύνοψιν οἰκειότητος **ἀλλήλων** τῶν μαθημάτων καὶ **τῆς τοῦ ὄντος φύσεως.** (Cp. Soph. 254 C **κοινωνίας ἀλλήλων** πῶς ἔχει δυνάμεως.)

VIII. 544 D ἀνθρώπων εἴδη . . . **τρόπων.**

„ 560 B δι' ἀνεπιστημοσύνην **τροφῆς** πατρός.

§ 13. *c. Dative.*

a. The dative of the person interested has an extended use in Plato.

I. 334 E πονηροὶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰσίν. 'For their friends are bad.'

I. 335 E τοῦτο δὲ δὴ νοεῖ αὐτῷ. 'And this expression means, as employed by him.'

I. 343 A ὅς γε αὐτῇ οὐδὲ πρόβατα οὐδὲ ποιμένα γιγνώσκεις. 'Since she leaves you in ignorance of the difference between shepherd and sheep.'

III. 394 C εἴ μοι μανθάνεις. 'If I take you with me' (where some would read εἴ μου μ.).

III. 415 B ὅ τι αὐτοῖς τούτων ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς παραμέμικται. 'What alloy they find in the souls of their young charges.'

V. 451 D εἰ ἡμῖν πρέπει ἢ οὔ. 'Whether we find it suitable or not, for our purpose.'

V. 462 A ἆρα . . . εἰς μὲν τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἴχνος ἡμῖν ἁρμόττει. 'Whether we find that our proposals fit into the lines of good.'

VIII. 549 C, D ἀχθομένης, ὅτι οὐ τῶν ἀρχόντων αὐτῇ ὁ ἀνήρ ἐστιν. 'Aggrieved to find that her husband is not in the government.'

In X. 602 E, with a participle (τούτῳ δὲ . . . μετρήσαντι, κ.τ.λ.), it has nearly the force of an absolute clause, i.e. 'when this faculty of measurement has done its work, it finds after all,' &c. See note in loco.

Obs. 1.—It may be worth observing that the dative so used (except when amplified as in the last instance) is seldom or never emphatic.

Obs. 2.—The dative of reference, in combination with a participle, often introduces a concomitant circumstance or condition, as in the familiar phrase ἐν δεξιᾷ εἰσιόντι &c.—

V. 451 C κατ' ἐκείνην τὴν ὁρμὴν ἰοῦσιν.

VI. 484 A μέλλοντι.

IX. 589 C σκοπουμένῳ.

β. The dative of manner may be added to another dative without any feeling of confusion.

II. 359 C *νόμῳ δὲ βίᾳ παράγεται ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἴσου τιμήν.* 'But is forcibly diverted by law and custom into a respect for equality.'

VIII. 552 E *οὓς ἐπιμελείᾳ βίᾳ κατέχουσιν αἱ ἀρχαί.* It is added pleonastically in VIII. 555 A, IX. 576 C *ὁμοιότητι*, and it is sometimes expanded by an additional word.

IX. 575 C *πονηρίᾳ τε καὶ ἀθλιότητι πόλεως.* It has the effect of an absolute clause in IX. 578 C *τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγῳ*, also perhaps in IX. 579 C *τοῖς τοιούτοις κακοῖς*. The reading has been questioned in both passages, see notes in locis, but cp. X. 598 D *ὑπολαμβάνειν δεῖ τῷ τοιούτῳ, κ.τ.λ.*

γ. In VI. 490 A *παρὰ δόξαν τοῖς νῦν δοκουμένοις*, the dative follows a prepositional phrase as if it were an adjective, e.g. *ἐναντίον*, and in 496 C *τὴν τῷ δικαίῳ βοήθειαν* it is construed with a verbal noun. So in later dialogues, Tim. 23 C *φθορὰν ὕδασιν*, Laws III. 698 B *ἡ Περσῶν ἐπίθεσις τοῖς Ἕλλησιν.*

δ. The dative of the measure of excess occurs in the remarkable expression in VI. 507 E *οὐ σμικρᾷ . . . ἰδέᾳ*, 'by the measure of no unimportant nature,' and has been applied to the interpretation of IX. 579 C cited above.

Obs.—The Ionic form of the dative plural in *σι(ν)* according to the best MSS. occurs only in Phaedr. Rep. Polit. Tim. Laws. In the Phaedrus and Republic, however, it is merely an occasional ornament, whereas in the Laws it is of constant recurrence. (F. Blass finds examples in the earlier orators.) Of the five[1] examples occurring in the Republic (I. 345 E; III. 388 D, 389 B; VIII. 560 E, 564 C), two are of the definitive pronoun I. 345 E, VIII. 564 C *αὐτοῖσι* (very emphatic in both cases); two of familiar adjectives III. 388 D *σμικροῖσι*, VIII. 560 E *μεγάλοισι* and one of *θεός*, III. 389 B, in a passage coloured by frequent quotations from Homer. All these are of the second declension (*κενεαγορίαισι* in X. 607 B, like *νώτοισιν* in V. 468 D, is in a poetical quotation, and should not be counted). In the Laws according to C. Ritter, op. cit., there are eighty-five instances of the form, which here extends, although more sparingly, to feminines of the first declension. The four instances in the Politicus include the participle *ἑπομένοισιν* (304 E).

[1] C. Ritter (*Untersuchungen*, &c.) mentions six; but he seems to include the quotation in X. 607 B.

§ 14. 2. NUMBER OF NOUNS.

(*a*) The plural of an abstract word is often used to express its exemplification in the concrete. This happens especially when other words in the sentence are in the plural.

II. 364 C κακίας πέρι εὐπετείας διδόντες. 'Offering easy occasions for vice.'

II. 373 D ἰατρῶν ἐν χρείαις. 'In frequent need of the physician.'

V. 449 A περί τε πόλεων διοικήσεις.

VIII. 547 D γεωργιῶν ἀπέχεσθαι τὸ προπολεμοῦν αὐτῆς. 'That its military class abstains from agricultural employments.'

X. 611 C δικαιοσύνας τε καὶ ἀδικίας. 'Its various modes of justice and injustice.'

(*b*) In X. 618 A, B πενίας . . . πτωχείας . . . πλούτοις καὶ πενίαις the plurals serve to emphasize the variety and complexity of human conditions. Cp. Tim. 65 C τραχύτησί τε καὶ λειότησιν: Laws V. 733 B σφοδρότησιν ἰσότησί τε, 734 A πυκνότησιν.

(*c*) The plural is used with the meaning of the singular to express either admiration or scorn. Cp. Symp. 218 B, Theaet. 169 B.

Rep. III. 387 B Κωκυτούς, κ.τ.λ.

III. 391 B ἕλξεις . . . σφαγάς . . . (D) ἁρπαγάς.

VI. 495 A πλοῦτοί τε καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη παρασκευή.

VIII. 553 C τιάρας τε καὶ στρεπτοὺς καὶ ἀκινάκας.

(*d*) The plural of abstract verbals and other adjectives is often preferred to the singular.

II. 375 D ταῦτα δὲ ἀδυνάτοις ἔοικε.

III. 387 B ἀποβλητέα.

VI. 498 A μεγάλα ἡγοῦνται.

(*e*) The singular neuter is often used in a collective sense.

IV. 442 B τὸ δὲ προπολεμοῦν.

IX. 577 C σμικρόν γέ τι τοῦτο.

For the combination of neuter with masculine or feminine see below, Imperfect Constructions.

III. Article and Pronoun.

1. THE ARTICLE is sometimes— § 15.

(*a*) *Correlative*, i.e. it marks each of two correlative words.

I. 338 D, E *τίθεται . . .* **τοὺς** *νόμους ἑκάστη* **ἡ** *ἀρχή* (where it may also be regarded as distributive (*b*)).

V. 455 D *κρατεῖται ἐν ἅπασιν . . .* **τὸ** *γένος* **τοῦ** *γένους*. '*The one* sex is beaten by *the other*.'

(*b*) Sometimes *distributive*—

VII. 540 B *ὅταν δὲ* **τὸ** *μέρος ἥκῃ*. 'When the turn of each arrives.'

(*c*) The article of *reference* in *οἱ ἄλλοι, οἱ πολλοί*, is to be distinguished from the common use of these phrases.

V. 453 E *τὰς δὲ ἄλλας φύσεις*. 'These natures which have been described as different.'

X. 596 A *θῶμεν . . . ὅ τι βούλει τῶν πολλῶν*. 'Let us put the case of any one you will of things which exist in plurality.'

(*d*) In the idiomatic use with a future participle the article often resumes an indefinite pronoun—

I. 342 A *δεῖ* **τινὸς** *τέχνης* **τῆς** *. . . σκεψομένης*.

I. 348 B *δικαστῶν* **τινῶν τῶν** *διακρινούντων*.

(*e*) For the 'deictic' use with a personal or reflexive pronoun, see Theaet. 166 A *τὸν ἐμέ*, Phaedr. 258 A.

Obs. 1.—The article is sometimes repeated merely for emphasis—

I. 334 E *τὸν δοκοῦντά τε . . . καὶ τὸν ὄντα χρηστόν*.

Obs. 2.—The article is omitted—

(1) With common nouns used as proper names, as **λιμήν**, *ἀγορά*, &c. (for the harbour, market-place, &c. of the town where the scene is laid).

Theaet. 142 A *οὐ γὰρ ἦ κατὰ πόλιν* (i.e. in Megara).

Theaet. 142 A *εἰς λιμένα καταβαίνων*. 'As I went down to the harbour' (of Megara).

Rep. II. 371 C *καθήμενος ἐν ἀγορᾷ*.

(2) With a noun used in a general sense, but without pointed reference to others from which it is distinguished—

I. 332 E *ἰατρός . . . κυβερνήτης*.

II. 369 B γίγνεται . . . **πόλις**.

VI. 499 C ἄκροις εἰς φιλοσοφίαν . . . **πόλεως** . . . ἐπιμεληθῆναι.

VIII. 562 A **τυραννίς** τε καὶ **τύραννος**.

X. 611 B ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἀθάνατον **ψυχή**.

And sometimes arbitrarily to avoid cumbrous repetition (in many cases it *may* have accidentally been dropped, yet it is needless to restore it as H. Richards proposes in IV. 434 A ⟨τὰς⟩ τιμάς)—

IV. 438 C καὶ αὖ βαρύτερα πρὸς κουφότερα καὶ θάττω πρὸς τὰ βραδύτερα.

V. 475 A καὶ μὴν φιλοτίμους, κ.τ.λ.

VIII. 545 A καὶ ὀλιγαρχικὸν αὖ καὶ δημοκρατικὸν καὶ τὸν τυραννικόν (supra *Obs.* 1).

Phaedr. 254 A τῷ σύζυγί τε καὶ ἡνιόχῳ.

Obs. 3.—The substantival use of the neut. adj. does not always necessitate the article.

V. 478 C **μὴ ὄντι** μὴν ἄγνοιαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀπέδομεν, **ὄντι** δὲ γνῶσιν.

VII. 518 A, B εἰς φανότερον ἰοῦσα ὑπὸ **λαμπροτέρου** μαρμαρυγῆς ἐμπέπλησται (where, even if βίου is to be supplied with φανότερον, λαμπροτέρου at least is neuter).

Symp. 218 A ὑπὸ ἀλγεινοτέρου.

Obs. 4.—The omission of the article with ἀνήρ so constant in MSS. is proved by the examples in tragedy, where the α is long (e. g. Soph. Aj. 9, 324, 783, &c. all in senarii), to be often due to the scribes; but it is uncertain whether in such instances as IX. 573 C γίγνεται . . . οὕτω καὶ τοιοῦτος ἁνήρ the Platonic idiom requires us to write ἀνήρ or not. Cp. Phaedr. 266 C ἄνδρες, 267 C δεινὸς ἀνὴρ γέγονε (this Thompson leaves unaltered), 268 C μαίνεται ἄνθρωπος.

§ 16. 2. The Pronouns.

The pronouns, especially the demonstratives (with their adverbs οὕτως, ὧδε, ὡσαύτως, &c.) have a widespread use in the Platonic dialogues, in which resumption, reference, antithesis, are necessarily so frequent.

(*a*) *Demonstratives.*

α. The demonstratives and the oblique cases of αὐτός, as in Thucydides, often refer to an antecedent which although implied in the preceding context has not been fully expressed. The same thing happens in the case of the adverb αὐτόθι.

I. 334 A κινδυνεύεις παρ' Ὁμήρου μεμαθηκέναι **αὐτό**.

I. 339 A, B πρόσεστι δὲ δὴ **αὐτόθι** τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος.

II. 371 C τὴν διακονίαν . . . **ταύτην**.

II. 371 E τὴν τιμὴν **ταύτην**.

II. 373 C **τοῦτο** γὰρ ('the care of swine') ἡμῖν ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ πόλει οὐκ ἐνῆν.

III. 399 D ἢ οὐ **τοῦτο** (αὐλός from αὐλοποιούς) πολυχορδότατον.

IV. 424 D ἡ . . . παρανομία . . . **αὕτη** (sc. ἡ ἐν μουσικῇ).

VI. 491 C λαβοῦ . . . ὅλου **αὐτοῦ** ὀρθῶς.

VI. 507 D παρούσης δὲ χρόας ἐν **αὐτοῖς** (sc. τοῖς ὁρωμένοις).

X. 597 B τὸν μιμητὴν **τοῦτον**.

β. οὗτος is sometimes simply the thing or person in question.

VII. 523 C μηδὲν μᾶλλον **τοῦτο** ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον. Cp. Theaet. 180 A κἂν **τούτου** ζητῇς λόγον λαβεῖν, τί εἴρηκεν, ἑτέρῳ πεπλήξει, κ.τ.λ.

Theaet. 199 B μὴ γὰρ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην **τούτου** οἷόν τε, ἀλλ' ἑτέραν ἀντ' ἐκείνης. Hence in Rep. IV. 436 A if we read with most MSS. εἰ τῷ αὐτῷ **τούτῳ** ἕκαστα πράττομεν, τούτῳ means the thing in question—having no distinct antecedent.

γ. ὅδε and οὗτος are less markedly distinguishable in Plato than, for example, in Xenophon. The familiar rule that ὅδε points to what is present in perception, οὗτος to what is present in thought, applies to the Platonic instances, but with modifications arising from the liveliness of the discourse and sudden changes of the aspect in which a thing is regarded. § **17.**

Both pronouns are used to indicate what is familiar in daily experience, as distinguished from what is imaginary or remote.

III. 403 E **τῶνδε** τῶν ἀσκητῶν.

VIII. 544 C ἡ Κρητική τε καὶ Λακωνικὴ **αὕτη** (πολιτεία).

Gorg. 470 D τὰ . . . ἐχθὲς καὶ πρώην γεγονότα **ταῦτα**. So probably οὕτω in II. 377 B ἆρ' οὖν ῥᾳδίως οὕτω ('as is usually done') παρήσομεν, although this may be merely idiomatic like νῦν οὕτως, &c. (VI. 490 A σφόδρα οὕτω).

δ. In the same spirit the antithesis of οὗτος and ἐκεῖνος does not necessarily correspond to what is 'latter' and 'former' in the sentence. But whichever term is imagined as in some way nearer to the mind is marked with οὗτος, and that which in the same aspect is more remote, with ἐκεῖνος. Thus, in the opening of the Euthydemus (p. 271), it is a mistake to suppose, because Critobulus is last mentioned, that he is meant by οὗτος. Crito modestly speaks of his own son as 'gawky' (σκληφρός), and admiringly of the stranger who is more immediately in question.

II. 370 A **οὕτω** ῥᾷον ἢ **'κείνως**, 'the familiar way is easier than the novel plan proposed,' i. e. οὕτω and 'κείνως do not refer to the order in which they have been mentioned but to the order in which they occur to the mind or which is more familiar in use and experience.

III. 416 A πῶς, ἔφη, αὖ **τοῦτο** λέγεις διαφέρειν **ἐκείνου**; 'How does the plan you now prefer differ from that which you condemn?'

IV. 421 B εἰς τὴν πόλιν ὅλην βλέποντας θεατέον εἰ **ἐκείνῃ** ἐγγίγνεται.

In VI. 511 A **ἐκείνοις** πρὸς **ἐκεῖνα** *both* terms are remote, because they are the segments of τὸ ὁρατόν, and τὸ νοητόν is immediately in question. See note in loco.

ε. The vividness of Plato's style sometimes anticipates, as already present to the mind, something to which attention is for the first time directed. Hence οὗτος (ἐνταῦθα, &c.) are sometimes used where ὅδε (ἐνθάδε, &c.) might rather have been expected.

IV. 430 E ὥς γε **ἐντεῦθεν** ἰδεῖν, 'from the point of view at which I am standing.'

VI. 510 C **τούτων** προειρημένων, 'when I have stated what I have now to state.'

VII. 514 A **τοιούτῳ** πάθει, 'to a condition such as I am now imagining.'

So probably VI. 488 A νόησον . . . **τοιουτονὶ** γενόμενον, 'conceive

the occurrence of such a situation as I (have in mind and) am about to describe.'

ζ. *οὗτος* is used vaguely for *ὁ τοιοῦτος*.

III. 395 C *τὰ* **τούτοις** *προσήκοντα*.

Obs. 1.—*οὗτος* occurs twice in the same sentence with different references in VII. 532 C *πᾶσα* **αὕτη** *ἡ πραγματεία* . . . **ταύτην** *ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν*, where *αὕτη* refers to the sciences, *ταύτην* to their educational effect.

Obs. 2.—*ἐκεῖνος* in the progress of a sentence often refers to what has previously been denoted by an oblique case of *αὐτός* or *οὗτος*. See especially III. 405 C, VI. 511 A, VII. 533 A.

η. **τοιοῦτος** (especially in *ἕτερα τοιαῦτα*) and *ὁ τοιοῦτος* are often used to avoid the repetition of an adjective. § **18.**

IV. 424 A *φύσεις χρησταὶ* **τοιαύτης** (sc. *χρηστῆς*) *παιδείας ἀντιλαμβανόμεναι*.

Ib. E *παρανόμου γιγνομένης αὐτῆς καὶ παίδων* **τοιούτων** (sc. *παρανόμων*).

IV. 429 A *δι' ὃ* **τοιαύτη** (sc. *ἀνδρεία*) *κλητέα ἡ πόλις*.

VIII. 560 C *κατέσχον τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον τοῦ* **τοιούτου** (sc. *τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀκρόπολιν τοῦ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ γιγνομένου*).

Similarly in VIII. 546 C *ἑκατὸν* **τοσαυτάκις** probably means *ἑκατὸν ἑκατοντάκις*.

Obs. 1.—*τοιοῦτος* is used euphemistically in V. 452 D *πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα*: and in III. 390 C *δι' ἕτερα τοιαῦτα* the euphemism conveys also contempt.

Obs. 2.—*οἷος*, *τοιοῦτος*, &c., as in other Greek, gain a peculiar force from the context or intonation.

IX. 588 B *οἷα ἔλεγεν*, 'what a preposterous statement he was guilty of.'

Obs. 3.—The derisive use of *ποῖος* (Theaet. 180 B *ποίοις μαθηταῖς, ὦ δαιμόνιε*;) is applied in Rep. I. 330 B *ποῖ' ἐπεκτησάμην*; to express the gentle amusement of Cephalus at the suggestion that he may have augmented his ancestral fortune.

θ. The deictic form *τουτοισί* is rightly restored by Bekker in I. 330 B. Cp. *τοιουτονί* VI. 488 A.

(The deictic use of pronominal adverbs may be

illustrated from IV. 430 E *ἐντεῦθεν*, 445 B *δεῦρο*, V. 477 D, VII. 527 E *αὐτόθεν*. This adds vividness to the style.)

(*b*) *Indefinite Pronoun.*

§ 19. *a.* **Τὶς** added to the predicate with the force of *πού* or *πώς* as in Soph. Ajax 1266 *τοῦ θανόντος ὡς ταχεῖά* **τις** *βροτοῖς* | *χάρις διαρρεῖ.*

II. 358 A *ἀλλ' ἐγώ* **τις**, *ὡς ἔοικε, δυσμαθής*, 'but I am a slow sort of person it would seem.'

VIII. 548 E *δούλοις μέν* **τις** *ἂν ἄγριος εἴη.*

β. Combined with other pronouns:

I. 346 C **τινὶ** *τῷ αὐτῷ προσχρώμενοι.*

III. 412 A *τοῦ τοιούτου* **τινός.**

VIII. 562 A *τρόπον* **τινὰ** *τὸν αὐτόν.*

γ. With indirect allusion to a person:

Phaedr. 242 B *λόγῳ* **τινί**, 'a speech of mine.'

Phaedo 63 A *λόγους* **τινὰς** *ἀνερευνᾷ*, 'one's arguments,' i. e. mine.

II. 372 E *ταῦτα γὰρ δή τισιν . . . οὐκ ἐξαρκέσει* ('Glaucon and fine gentlemen like him').

δ. **Πότερος** *indefinite.*

VI. 499 C *τούτων δὲ* **πότερα** *γενέσθαι ἢ ἀμφότερα, κ.τ.λ.*

This is rare in other writers but not infrequent in Plato. See IV. 439 E, Theaet. 145 A, 178 C.

ὁπότερον in IX. 589 A seems only to be a more emphatic *πότερον.*

(*c*) *Reflexive.*

§ 20. *a.* *Ἑαυτοῦ* has sometimes an indefinite antecedent.

IV. 434 C *τῆς* **ἑαυτοῦ** *πόλεως*, ib. 443 D.

The authority of the MSS. about breathings is very slight, and it is sometimes difficult to decide whether to read *αὑτοῦ* or *αὐτοῦ*, &c., e. g. I. 344 A, II. 359 A, 367 C.

β. The personal is sometimes used for the reflexive pronoun, giving special point to a relation or antithesis.

V. 450 D *πιστεύοντος . . . ἐμοῦ ἐμοί.* Cp. Gorg. 482 B *οὔ σοι ὁμολογήσει Καλλικλῆς, ὦ Καλλίκλεις.*

(*d*) The *Relative Pronoun* ὅς is sometimes used where an indefinite antecedent is implied.

I. 352 C **οὓς** φαμεν, κ.τ.λ., 'any persons of whom we say,' &c.

This differs from οὓς ἂν φῶμεν in assuming that we do thus speak.

(*e*) *Indirect Interrogatives.*

When an interrogative is repeated, if there is any ground for using the indirect form, this is usually done.

IX. 578 E ἐν ποίῳ ἄν τινι καὶ **ὁπόσῳ** φόβῳ οἴει, κ.τ.λ. Even without repetition the indirect form is sometimes preferred—with the ellipse of εἰπέ or the like.

I. 348 B **ὁποτέρως** οὖν σοι . . . ἀρέσκει. Cp Euthyd. 271 A **ὁπότερον** καὶ ἐρωτᾷς.

(*f*) *Personal Pronouns.* § 21.

α. The explicit use of the nominative in such phrases as εὖ γε **σὺ** ποιῶν (I. 351 C), **ἐγὼ** δὲ λέγω (III. 382 B), where the sentence and not the subject of it is really emphasized, deserves a passing notice; also the idiomatic use of ἡμεῖς for ἐγώ (sometimes a cause of ambiguity).

β. One usage (though again rather rhetorical than grammatical) seems to claim notice as characteristic of the Platonic dialogue,—what may be termed the *condescending* use of the first person plural for the second person singular or plural, the speaker identifying himself with the person or persons addressed. It belongs to the 'maieutic' manner of Socrates, who deals gently with his patient and asks at intervals 'How are we now?' A clear example occurs in Theaet. 210 B ἦ οὖν ἔτι κυοῦμέν τι καὶ ὠδίνομεν, ὦ φίλε, περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἢ πάντα ἐκτετόκαμεν;

Somewhat similar to this are such places in the Republic as

II. 368 D ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἡμεῖς οὐ δεινοί, κ.τ.λ.

II. 373 E πολεμήσομεν (i. e. πολεμήσουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ τρόφιμοι), and the more distinctly ironical use in

I. 337 C ἐάν τε ἡμεῖς ἀπαγορεύωμεν ἐάν τε μή.

In the mouth of the respondent this use becomes a mere *façon de parler*, II. 377 E πῶς . . . λέγομεν;

(*g*) *Pronominal phrases*, i. e. phrases which take the place of nouns.

It is sufficient to glance at such expressions as ἀνήρ, οὗτος ἀνήρ, τοὐναντίον, τὸ εἰρημένον, τὸ πολλάκις ἤδη λεγόμενον and other such phrases which avoid the repetition of a noun. See especially II. 368 A ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός: VIII. 560 C τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον τοῦ τοιούτου (sc. τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀκρόπολιν), and cp. Symp. 212 A ᾧ δεῖ . . . ᾧ ὁρατὸν τὸ καλόν.

This habit increases in the later dialogues and is especially frequent in the Philebus, when it has an effect of mannerism. Something like it occurs already in Thuc. VIII. 92, § 3 where the phrase ἐφ' οἷσπερ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀεὶ κατηγόρει is used to avoid repeating what Theramenes has been represented as saying twice before.

IV. Adverbs and Prepositions.

§ 22. 1. ADVERBS.

(*a*) The predicative use of adverbs (cp. Thuc. I. 21, § 1 ἀπίστως) though not frequent is noticeable.

I. 332 A μὴ **σωφρόνως** (= μὴ σώφρων ὢν) ἀπαιτοῖ expressing the condition of the agent rather than the mode of the action.

III. 406 C ὃ ἡμεῖς **γελοίως** (= γελοῖοι ὄντες).

(*b*) The adverb also takes the place of an epithet.

VII. 537 C τά τε **χύδην** μαθήματα (with γενόμενα following by an afterthought)—'the subjects indiscriminately taught.'

VIII. 564 A ἡ . . . **ἄγαν** ἐλευθερία . . . εἰς **ἄγαν** δουλείαν.

§ 23. 2. PREPOSITIONS.

(*a*) **διά**.

α. A questionable use of διά with the accusative occurs in IV. 440 C, D ξυμμαχεῖ τῷ δοκοῦντι δικαίῳ καὶ **διὰ τὸ** πεινῆν καὶ **διὰ τὸ** ῥιγοῦν . . . ὑπομένων καὶ νικᾷ καὶ οὐ λήγει . . . (so the MSS. and edd.), a place which Madvig has rewritten. See

notes and v. rr. On the whole it seems necessary to obviate the difficulty by reading διὰ *τοῦ in both places as is done in this edition. The use of διά will then be the same as in VI. 494 D ἆρ' εὐπετὲς οἴει εἶναι εἰσακοῦσαι **διὰ** τοσούτων κακῶν;

The notion of persistence and of obstacles overcome is common to both passages.

N.B.—To take διά = 'on account of' and the whole phrase as equivalent to ἕνεκα τοῦ πεινῆν . . . οὐ λήγει, κ.τ.λ. (καὶ νικᾷ being διὰ μέσου) is hardly a tenable view.

(*b*) **ἐπί.**

α. With gen. after λέγειν, = 'in the case of.' This seems a slight extension of the use after αἰσθάνεσθαι, νοεῖν, &c.

V. 475 A **ἐπ' ἐμοῦ** λέγειν.

VII. 524 E ὥσπερ **ἐπὶ τοῦ δακτύλου** ἐλέγομεν.

β. With accusative = 'extending to.'

VI. 491 A ἐπὶ πάντας, cp. Prot. 322 C. Tim. 23 B ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους.

(*c*) **μετά.** A frequent and characteristic use is that of conjoining correlated attributes. § **24.**

IX. 591 B σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην **μετὰ φρονήσεως** κτωμένη, ἢ σῶμα ἰσχύν τε καὶ κάλλος **μετὰ ὑγιείας** λαμβάνον.

Theaet. 176 B, Phaedr. 249 A, 253 D.

Similarly with article prefixed.

VIII. 548 B Μούσης τῆς μετὰ λόγου, κ.τ.λ.

(*d*) **παρά** (with accusative).

α. 'In the course of.'

II. 362 B παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ὠφελεῖσθαι: IV. 424 B; VII. 530 E. Cp. τὸ παράπαν, and see Hdt. II. 60 ταῦτα **παρὰ πᾶσαν** πόλιν . . . ποιεῦσι.

β. In VI. 492 E παρὰ τὴν τούτων παιδείαν πεπαιδευμένον, it is doubted whether παρά means 'in consequence of' (cp. Thuc. I. 141, § 7 παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν, Xen. Hipparch, § 5), or 'contrary to.'

(*e*) **περί.**

α. Like ὑπέρ, 'on behalf of.'

II. 360 D ὁ περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου λέγων.

β. For περί pleonastic, see esp. :

IV. 427 A τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδος νόμων πέρι.

VII. 539 C τὸ ὅλον φιλοσοφίας πέρι.

(*f*) **πρός.**

α. πρός τινι εἶναι or γίγνεσθαι, 'to be engaged (or absorbed) in a thing.'

VIII. 567 A **πρὸς** τῷ καθ' ἡμέραν . . . εἶναι, 'to be engrossed with their daily avocations,' Phaedo 84 C, Phaedr. 249 C, D.

β. But in IX. 585 A **πρὸς** πληρώσει . . . γίγνεσθαι, 'to be close upon repletion.' So in Phaedr. 254 B **πρὸς αὐτῷ** τ' ἐγένοντο, κ.τ.λ.

γ. With accusative.

VIII. 545 B **πρὸς** . . . ταύτην, 'in comparison with this' (emphatic).

§ 25. (*g*) **ὑπέρ.** The less common use with the genitive, nearly = περί, 'concerning,' is clearly present in II. 367 A ταῦτα . . . Θρασύμαχός τε καὶ ἄλλος πού τις **ὑπὲρ δικαιοσύνης** τε καὶ ἀδικίας λέγοιεν ἄν (Thrasymachus is not imagined as speaking *in behalf of* Justice). For other instances in Plato see Apol. 39 E ἡδέως ἂν διαλεχθείην **ὑπὲρ** τοῦ γεγονότος, κ.τ.λ., Laws VI. 776 E ὑπὲρ τοῦ Διὸς ἀγορεύων. And, for several in Aristotle, Bonitz' *Index Aristotel.* s. v. ὑπέρ, 1 *b*.

(*h*) **μεταξύ.**

α. μεταξὺ τῶν λόγων, 'by the by,' Phaedr. 230 A.

β. With a participle, μεταξὺ ἀναγιγνώσκων Phaedr. 234 D.

γ. τὸ μεταξύ, 'during the interval until.'

See Mr. Herbert Richards' note in the *Classical Review* for December, 1888, p. 324 : 'Instead of a thing being between A and B, it is sometimes said to be between B, so that μεταξύ practically means "on this side of," "short of," "before reaching."'

Clear instances are Soph. O. C. 290, 291 τὰ δὲ | μεταξὺ τούτου, 'in the interval before Theseus arrives,' Dem. de Cor. p. 233 sub fin. τὸν μεταξὺ χρόνον τῶν ὅρκων, 'the interval before the ratification.'

For the same idiom in regard to place, see Thuc. III. 51, § 3.

Cp. also Eur. Hec. 436, 437, Aristoph. Ach. 433, 434, Arist. Rhet. III. 5, § 2.

So, probably, Rep. VI. 498 A *ἄρτι ἐκ παίδων τὸ μεταξὺ οἰκονομίας καὶ χρηματισμοῦ*, 'just after boyhood, in the interval before keeping house and engaging in business.'

V. Particles and Conjunctions (*Digest*, §§ 132–178).

The use of particles acquires its full development in Plato, who employs them with extreme subtlety, variety and precision, not only to mark with minute clearness the progress of the argument, the degrees of assent and dissent, and the modes of inference, but also to give the light and life of oral conversation to each successive clause.

Platonic particles have lately been made a subject of 'statistical' investigation, and W. Dittenberger and others have attempted with some success to test the relative age of different dialogues by the absence or comparative frequency of certain particles in them. The results have been summed up by Constantin Ritter, *Untersuchungen über Plato*, Stuttgart, 1888. The Republic is shown to come with Phaedrus and Theaetetus about midway between the Symposium on the one hand and the Politicus Philebus Laws on the other.

1. Καί. **§ 26.**

(*a*) **Καί** *adverbial.*

a. The anticipatory use, though common in Greek, is still worth noticing, from the liveliness which it adds to many sentences:

I. 327 A *καλὴ μὲν οὖν μοι* **καὶ** *ἡ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων πομπὴ ἔδοξεν εἶναι, οὐ μέντοι ἧττον ἐφαίνετο πρέπειν ἣν οἱ Θρᾷκες ἔπεμπον.*

II. 375 D *ἴδοι μὲν ἄν τις* **καὶ** *ἐν ἄλλοις ζῴοις, οὐ μέντ᾽ ἂν ἥκιστα ἐν ᾧ ἡμεῖς παρεβάλλομεν τῷ φύλακι.*

β. *ἵνα καί.*

IV. 445 C *δεῦρο . . . ἵνα* **καὶ** *ἴδῃς.* 'Come hither . . . that you may really descry.'

γ. In interrogative phrases:

IV. 434 D τί . . . καὶ ἐροῦμεν; 'What, after all, are we to say?'

IV. 445 C ἵνα . . . ἴδῃς ὅσα καὶ εἴδη ἔχει ἡ κακία, 'that you may see how many, in point of fact, are the varieties of vice.'

Cp. Gorg. 455 A ἴδωμεν τί ποτε καὶ λέγομεν περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς.

δ. In affirmative sentences, giving additional emphasis:

I. 328 C διὰ χρόνου γὰρ καὶ ἑωράκη αὐτόν, 'for indeed it was long since I had seen him.'

ε. καὶ ταῦτα = 'in this too.'

I. 341 C οὐδὲν ὢν καὶ ταῦτα = 'discomfited as usual;' or 'as you would be if you attempted to shave a lion.'

ζ. At once pointing and softening an asyndeton (cp. αὖ, πάντως).

I. 350 D τότε καὶ εἶδον ἐγώ, πρότερον δὲ οὔπω, Θρασύμαχον ἐρυθριῶντα. See note in loco.

η. With implied preference for an alternative:—'as well' = 'rather' (cp. Phil. 33 B ἔτι καὶ εἰσαῦθις).

III. 400 B ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ μετὰ Δάμωνος βουλευσόμεθα. 'For the matter of that, said I, I had rather we conferred with Damon.'

V. 458 B ἀναβαλέσθαι καὶ ὕστερον ἐπισκέψασθαι.

IX. 573 D τοῦτο σὺ καὶ ἐμοὶ ἐρεῖς, '*that*, it would be as well (i. e. better) for *you* to tell *me*.'

θ. With ὥστε, emphasizing the *clause*.

IV. 421 D ὥστε καὶ κακοὺς γίγνεσθαι, 'I mean so as to deteriorate.'

Cp. the idiomatic use with ὡς εἰπεῖν in X. 619 D ὡς δὲ καὶ εἰπεῖν, where καί really belongs to the whole sentence.

ι. Displacement (hyperbaton or trajection) of καί. A possible instance is VI. 500 A ἤ, καὶ ἐὰν οὕτω θεῶνται, where (see note in loco) the difficulty may be solved by joining καὶ οὕτω,—'If they look at it in this light rather (supra § 5) than in the other.' But the reading is doubtful, and perhaps ἢ οὐκ, ἐάν should be read, with *q*, merely changing τοι in what follows to τε.

(*b*) **Καί** *conjunctive.*

α. In narrative, indicating prompt sequence (as in the familiar phrase καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον). § 27.

I. 327 B κελεύει ὑμᾶς, ἔφη, Πολέμαρχος περιμεῖναι. **καὶ** ἐγὼ μετεστράφην τε, κ.τ.λ. 'Whereupon I turned about,' &c.

β. In abrupt questions with a tone of surprise (as in καὶ πῶς;) to which καί gives emphasis.

I. 338 C τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος φῂς ξυμφέρον δίκαιον εἶναι. **καὶ** τοῦτο, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, τί ποτε λέγεις; 'Pray, Thrasymachus, what can you mean by that?'

Obs.—Similarly καίτοι interposes a sudden question.

I. 350 E **καίτοι** τί ἄλλο βούλει; 'What else in the name of common sense would you have?'

II. 376 B **καίτοι** πῶς οὐκ ἂν φιλομαθὲς εἴη;

VII. 522 D **καίτοι** ποῖόν τιν' αὐτὸν οἴει στρατηγὸν εἶναι;

(*c*) **καί** virtually *disjunctive* (§ 7).

III. 411 A δειλὴ καὶ ἄγροικος, '*either* cowardly *or* rude' (the former being the effect of music without gymnastic, the latter of gymnastic without music).

VII. 518 B καὶ εἰ γελᾶν, κ.τ.λ.

In these cases καί is possibly preferred to ἤ on account of euphony. The result is a slight inexactness of expression.

Obs.—The former of two correlatives καί . . . καί = 'both . . . and' is brought in after the beginning of the sentence in VII. 536 B τἀναντία πάντα **καὶ** πράξομεν καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἔτι πλείω γέλωτα καταντλήσομεν. This gives additional emphasis='not only . . . but also.' Cp. IV. 440 D ὑπομένων **καὶ** νικᾷ καὶ οὐ λήγει, κ.τ.λ. 'It not only prevails but perseveres,' &c.

2. Ἀλλά. § 28.

(*a*) In animated conversation ἀλλά often opposes what is now advanced to the position *attributed in thought* to the other speaker. Thus in the opening scene of the Republic (327 B)—ἀλλὰ περιμένετε. ἀλλὰ περιμενοῦμεν—the first ἀλλά opposes the entreaty that they should remain to their apparent intention of departing; the second ἀλλά opposes their willingness to remain to the supposed necessity of

further entreaty. So on the following page (328 B) the first ἀλλά emphasizes entreaty as before, the second opposes Socrates' present assent to his previous show of reluctance. Cp. 338 C ἀλλὰ τί οὐκ ἐπαινεῖς; ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐθελήσεις.

(*b*) ἀλλ' ἤ. This familiar idiom occurs frequently after negatives, e. g. IV. 427 C οὐδὲ χρησόμεθα ἐξηγητῇ ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ πατρίῳ, 'we will consult no other authority, but only that which our fathers consulted.'

Also after an interrogative with negative meaning, IV. 429 B τίς ἂν . . . εἰς ἄλλο τι ἀποβλέψας . . . εἴποι ἀλλ' ἢ εἰς τοῦτο, κ.τ.λ. See L. and S., s. v. ἀλλ' ἤ.

(*c*) Since δέ often takes the place of ἀλλά in the Laws and in Aristotle (see Bonitz, *Ind. Ar.* s.v. δέ, p. 167 *a* l. 19), it is worth while to notice the use of δέ after the negative in—

I. 349 B, C εἰ τοῦ μὲν δικαίου μὴ ἀξιοῖ πλέον ἔχειν . . . τοῦ **δὲ** ἀδίκου.

I. 354 A ἄθλιόν γε εἶναι οὐ λυσιτελεῖ, εὐδαίμονα **δέ**.

IV. 422 D οὐδ' ἡμῖν θέμις, ὑμῖν **δέ**.

§ 29. 3. Μέντοι.

Μέντοι is a particle having a distinct and prominent office in Platonic dialogue.

(*a*) In *affirmation* it marks that what is now said alters the case.

I. 328 C χρῆν **μέντοι**. Cephalus pleads that Socrates should make an exception to his general rule by visiting the Piraeus:—'But you really should.'

I. 331 E ἀλλὰ **μέντοι** . . . τοῦτο **μέντοι**. μέντοι here is not merely adversative, but implies *reflection*.

IV. 440 A οὗτος **μέντοι**, ἔφην, ὁ λόγος σημαίνει, κ.τ.λ.

(*b*) In *questions* it calls attention to some fact or previous statement which has been overlooked and is inconsistent with what has just been said.

I. 339 B οὐ καὶ πείθεσθαι **μέντοι** τοῖς ἄρχουσι δίκαιον φῂς εἶναι; 'But, by the by, is it not your view that it is right to obey authority?'

I. 346 A οὐχὶ ἑκάστην **μέντοι** φαμὲν ἑκάστοτε τῶν τεχνῶν τούτῳ ἑτέραν εἶναι;

In such expressions μέντοι not only, like δήπου, claims assent, but also implies that the new statement is one which affects the argument.

(*c*) In *replies*, it often expresses deliberate assent (after reflection) to an objection or suggestion which alters the point of view.

I. 332 A ἄλλο **μέντοι** νὴ Δί', ἔφη. 'There you are right, he said; he meant something different from that.'

II. 374 E ἡμέτερον **μέντοι**.

4. Τοι. § 30.

Τοι, 'I may tell you.' For idiomatic uses see

I. 330 B οὔ τοι ἕνεκα ἠρόμην. 'Well, that was just my motive for asking.'

I. 343 A ὅτι **τοί** σε, ἔφη, κορυζῶντα περιορᾷ. 'Why,' said he, 'because she lets you drivel.'

Gorg. 447 B ἐπ' αὐτό γέ **τοι** τοῦτο πάρεσμεν. 'Indeed, that is just why we are here.'

Prot. 316 B ὦ Πρωταγόρα, πρὸς σέ **τοι** ἤλθομεν ἐγώ τε καὶ Ἱπποκράτης οὑτοσί.

The use of τοι is often a delicate way of bespeaking attention to what is said.

5. Μέν.

Μέν is used without δέ following not only in the phrases εἰκὸς μέν, δοκῶ μέν, but in other connexions, as in III. 403 E ἀθληταὶ **μὲν** γὰρ οἱ ἄνδρες τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγῶνος. 'For, to begin with,' &c. V. 466 C ἐμοὶ μὲν . . . ξυμβούλῳ χρώμενος, κ.τ.λ.

Obs.—In v. 475 E ἀλλ' ὁμοίους **μὲν** φιλοσόφοις the δέ is supplied by the respondent; τοὺς **δὲ** ἀληθινούς, ἔφη, τίνας λέγεις; Cp. II. 380 E ὑπὸ **μὲν** ἄλλου . . . 381 B **Ἀλλ'** ἆρα αὐτὸς αὑτόν, κ.τ.λ.

6. Γε. § 31.

Besides its ordinary use (very frequent in Plato) in giving a qualified or intensified assent, γε also

(*a*) limits the application of a statement:

I. 331 B ἀλλά **γε** ἓν ἀνθ' ἑνός, κ.τ.λ.

VI. 506 E τοῦ **γε** δοκοῦντος ἐμοὶ τὰ νῦν, and

(*b*) usually with participles it emphasizes what is put forward as the ground of a preceding statement.

Polit. 260 C ἢ μᾶλλον τῆς ἐπιτακτικῆς ὡς ὄντα αὐτὸν τέχνης θήσομεν, δεσπόζοντά γε; 'Or shall we rather assign him to the preceptive art, since he commands?'

Rep. VIII. 547 A ἀνάγκη Μούσας γε οὔσας.

So also perhaps

V. 478 B μὴ ὄν **γε** (sc. τὸ μὴ ὄν). 'Not-being, *since non-existent*, should be called no-thing.'

And, without a participle:

I. 331 D τῶν **γε** σῶν, i. e. 'of the argument, since it is your property.'

VI. 485 E ὅ **γε** τοιοῦτος, 'since that is the description of him.'

(*c*) δέ γε ('yes, but') often introduces a second statement, which in some way modifies the first.

I. 335 D ὁ **δέ γε** δίκαιος ἀγαθός.

VIII. 547 E, 549 B, 553 C, 556 B, 561 E, &c.

7. Γάρ.

(γε ἄρα remain uncompounded in Theaet. 171 C.)

(*a*) Explaining something implied or understood. Cp. Hdt. IX. 92, § 2 μετὰ σφέων γάρ, κ.τ.λ.: VI. 111, § 2 ἀπὸ ταύτης γάρ σφι τῆς μάχης, κ.τ.λ.

Rep. II. 365 D ἐπὶ γὰρ τὸ λανθάνειν ('there is a difficulty, but it is not insuperable; for,' &c.).

III. 413 B νῦν γάρ που μανθάνεις; '(I have said enough); for I suppose you understand me now.'

VI. 491 C ἔχεις γὰρ τὸν τύπον ὧν λέγω.

So commonly in replies = 'yes, for —,' 'no, for —,' &c.

(*b*) Introducing an inference under the form of a reason, 'the truth is,' 'the fact is.' Lit. 'That is because.'

I. 338 D βδελυρὸς γὰρ εἶ, 'that shows your malignity.'

Cp. Gorg. 454 D δῆλον γὰρ αὖ ὅτι οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν, 'that is another proof of their difference.'

8. Δή. § 32.

Δή marks what is said as manifest, either in itself, or in connexion with a preceding statement: 'you know,' 'of course,' 'to be sure.' Sometimes *ironicè*, 'forsooth' (as in ὡς δή). In questions it demands proof or certainty, or asks for something more explicit.

(*a*) Idiomatic combinations of δή with adverbs and conjunctions:

α. With adverbs of time = 'just,' νῦν δή, 'just now' (passim), αὐτίκα δὴ μάλα, 'just immediately' (I. 338 B), τότε δή, 'even then' (Symp. 184 E).

β. καὶ . . . δή and καὶ δὴ καί, singling out the most prominent *item* in an enumeration or series:

I. 352 A (ᾧ ἂν ἐγγένηται, εἴτε πόλει τινὶ εἴτε γένει εἴτε στρατοπέδῳ . . .) **καὶ** ἐν ἑνὶ **δή**.

II. 367 C οἷον ὁρᾶν, ἀκούειν, φρονεῖν, **καὶ** ὑγιαίνειν **δή**, 'and in particular the being well and strong.'

VIII. 563 E, 564 A ἐν ὥραις τε καὶ ἐν φυτοῖς καὶ ἐν σώμασι, **καὶ δὴ καὶ** ἐν πολιτείαις οὐχ ἥκιστα (καὶ δή om. Par. A). Cp. Men. 87 E, Theaet. 156 B.

γ. δὴ οὖν: οὖν δή.

II. 382 D κατὰ τί **δὴ οὖν** τούτων τῷ θεῷ τὸ ψεῦδος χρήσιμον; 'On which, *then*, of these grounds, *in particular*, is falsehood useful to God?'

VI. 497 C δῆλος **δὴ οὖν** εἶ ὅτι μετὰ τοῦτο ἐρήσει . . . '*Now, then*, I see plainly that the next thing you will ask is . . .'

VII. 526 D ἀλλ' **οὖν δή**, εἶπον, πρὸς μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα βραχύ τι ἂν ἐξαρκοῖ . . . , 'Howbeit, it is manifest, said I . . .'

VIII. 545 D πῶς **οὖν δή**, εἶπον, . . . ἡ πόλις ἡμῖν κινηθήσεται; 'How, then, in point of fact, shall our city be disturbed?'

(*b*) δή, with imperatives, giving peremptory emphasis:

φέρε δή, ἴθι δή (passim), σκόπει δή (I. 352 D), ἔχε δή (ib. 353 B).

Hence Baiter's emendation of V. 450 C πειρῶ ***δή** for πειρῶ ἄν (Par. A) is at least plausible, although the reading of Π M πειρῶ οὖν is perhaps preferable, because less abrupt.

(*c*) ὡς δή, 'since forsooth!'

I. 337 C **ὡς δὴ** ὅμοιον τοῦτο ἐκείνῳ, 'as if there was any comparison between the two cases.' Quite different from this is the effect of ὡς δή τοι.

II. 366 C **ὡς δή** τοι . . . πολλήν που συγγνώμην ἔχει, κ.τ.λ., 'since truly, as you are aware.'

§ 33. **9. Μήν.**

Μήν bespeaks attention for a fresh topic, generally in combination with a conjunction, καὶ μήν, ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . γε, οὐδὲ μήν, &c.

Plato shows a growing fondness for this particle, and employs it in new ways, especially in questions, asking for something fresh or different from what has been said.

(*a*) μήν alone:

VII. 520 E παντὸς **μὴν** μᾶλλον ὡς ἐπ' ἀναγκαῖον . . . εἶσι τὸ ἄρχειν, 'let me observe, however.'

VII. 524 C μέγα **μὴν** καὶ ὄψις καὶ σμικρὸν ἑώρα, 'you will observe that vision too had perception of great and small.'

VII. 528 A φθονοῖς **μὴν** οὐδ' ἂν ἄλλῳ, κ.τ.λ., 'though, to be sure, you would not grudge any incidental benefit which another may reap.' Cp. Phaedr. 244 B, Theaet. 193 D.

(*b*) Ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . γε:

VI. 485 D **ἀλλὰ μὴν** ὅτῳ **γε** εἰς ἕν τι αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι σφόδρα ῥέπουσιν, κ.τ.λ., 'well but, observe —.'

(*c*) μήν in combination with an interrogative:

a. In such expressions there is generally an ellipse of ἄλλο—i. e. an implied contrast or antithesis. In other words, μήν gives to the interrogative an intonation = 'what else?' or 'what then?'

I. 362 D ἀλλὰ **τί μήν**; εἶπον, 'but what more, then, would you desire? said I.'

VII. 523 B οὐ πάνυ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔτυχες οὗ λέγω. ποῖα μήν, ἔφη, λέγεις; 'You have not hit my meaning.' 'But what, then, are the things you mean?'

β. Hence τί μήν; acquires the force of strong assent: 'what else?' i.e. 'that, certainly.'

VI. 508 D ὅταν δέ γ', οἶμαι, ὧν ὁ ἥλιος καταλάμπῃ, σαφῶς ὁρῶσι, κ.τ.λ. **τί μήν**; 'of course.'

Obs.—W. Dittenberger has shown (*Hermes*, XVI. pp. 321 ff.) that *τί μήν;* is absent from two-thirds of the Platonic dialogues, but increasingly frequent in Phaedr. (12 times), Rep. (35), Theaet. (13), Soph. (12), Polit. (20), Phileb. (26), Laws (48).

The combination γε μήν, which is very frequent in the later dialogues, above all in the Laws, occurs only twice in the Republic:

I. 332 E μὴ κάμνουσί γε μήν, κ.τ.λ., 'well but, if men are not ill,' &c.

V. 465 B τά γε μὴν σμικρότατα τῶν κακῶν, κ.τ.λ.

10. Αὖ and πάντως. § 34.

Αὖ and πάντως, though not conjunctions, serve to connect sentences which are otherwise in asyndeton.

IV. 427 B τελευτησάντων **αὖ** θῆκαι, 'moreover, how the dead are to be buried' (v. r. τε αὖ).

VI. 504 E **πάντως** αὐτὸ οὐκ ὀλιγάκις ἀκήκοας.

Theaet. 143 C, Symp. 174 B, Gorg. 497 B, Polit. 268 E.

So **εἶτα**—as in other Greek—expressing impatience:

I. 338 D **εἶτ'** οὐκ οἶσθα, κ.τ.λ., Protag. 359 E:
and **αὐτίκα** in adducing an example, Protag. 359 E, &c.

This last idiom occurs also in a subordinate clause,

I. 340 D ἐπεὶ αὐτίκα ἰατρὸν καλεῖς, κ.τ.λ.

11. Ἄρα. § 35.

Ἄρα is not only a particle of inference (like οὖν) but also, and in Plato more frequently, a sign of reference. This has sometimes been overlooked by interpreters. Socrates and other speakers are often engaged in developing opinions which they do not endorse, or in relating what

is matter of hearsay. In such passages, ἄρα is constantly used to direct attention to the fact that the speaker is not uttering his own thought. The light particle enables Plato to dispense with such clumsy additions as (*a*) 'as my informant said,' (*b*) 'according to the theory I am expounding,' or (*c*) with reference to other speakers, 'according to the theory which they uphold,' or 'which you uphold,' or 'as we are expected to think.'

(*a*) II. 364 B ὡς **ἄρα** καὶ θεοὶ πολλοῖς . . . βίον κακὸν ἔνειμαν, 'that, as they declare,' &c.

(*b*) II. 362 A τὸ δὲ τοῦ Αἰσχύλου πολὺ ἦν **ἄρα** ('is really, according to their view') ὀρθότερον λέγειν κατὰ τοῦ ἀδίκου.

X. 598 E ἀνάγκη . . . εἰδότα **ἄρα** ποιεῖν, 'he must, according to them, make his poetry with perfect knowledge.'

(*c*) I. 332 E χρήσιμον **ἄρα** καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ δικαιοσύνη; 'Justice is useful in peace also, according to you?'

X. 600 C, D Πρωταγόρας μὲν **ἄρα** ('according to the view in question') . . . Ὅμηρον δ' **ἄρα**, κ.τ.λ.

12. που.

που = 'I presume,' appealing to the knowledge or recollection of the respondent; often used in recalling what has been previously said.

VI. 490 C μέμνησαι γάρ **που**.

IX. 582 D διὰ λόγων **που** ἔφαμεν δεῖν κρίνεσθαι.

Hence perhaps also in VIII. 562 B we should read τοῦτο δ' ἦν ***που** πλοῦτος.

§ 36. 13. Negative Particles—and Interrogative Phrases.

It is needless to do more than to cite a few scattered uses which appear to be specially Platonic. (Uses of μὴ οὐ, for example, in Plato fall under the headings now given in L. and S. s.v. μή)—

(*a*) Οὐ in negation.

a. There is a courteous, reassuring use of οὐδέν, οὐδαμῶς,

&c., which is not intended to be taken seriously, but only to prepare for a modified restatement. This may in some cases be formally accounted for by supplying ἄλλο, &c. (below, p. 216 β), but not, for example, in

IX. 578 D τί γὰρ ἂν φοβοῖντο;

Οὐδέν, εἶπον· ἀλλὰ τὸ αἴτιον ἐννοεῖς; 'Why indeed?' said I. 'But do you know the cause?'

V. 472 B ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτό γ'; ἔφη.

Οὐδέν· ἀλλ' ἐὰν εὕρωμεν, κ.τ.λ., 'Oh, merely to find,' &c.

The courtesy is sometimes ironical: as in

IV. 424 D Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐργάζεται, ἔφη, ἄλλο γε ἢ κατὰ σμικρόν, κ.τ.λ., 'Oh!' said he, 'it is innocent enough, I dare say. All that it does is to undermine morality,' &c.

These examples may justify a similar rendering of

V. 461 C, D πατέρας δὲ καὶ θυγατέρας . . . πῶς διαγνώσονται ἀλλήλων;

Οὐδαμῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἀλλ' ἀφ' ἧς, κ.τ.λ., 'Oh! simply in this way, said I.'

Although it is of course possible to take the words to mean literally 'not at all,' i. e. they will never know their actual parents.

β. **Οὐ πάνυ** in Plato has various shades of meaning, from (1) 'not quite,' to (2) 'not at all.'

(1) V. 474 D **οὐ** γὰρ **πάνυ** γε ἐννοῶ, 'I cannot quite recall it,' rather than, 'I have it not at all in mind.'

(2) VI. 504 E οἴει τιν' ἄν σε . . . ἀφεῖναι . . .;

Οὐ πάνυ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, 'Certainly not, said I.'

The stronger meaning may, however, be sometimes indirectly implied,—the speaker, as so often in Greek, saying less than he means.

IV. 429 A **οὐ πάνυ** χαλεπόν, 'not so very difficult,' i.e. 'surely not difficult at all.'

(*b*) *Interrogatives.* **37.**

a. The regular interrogative use of *οὐ* in confident questions (='don't you think' &c.) is to be distinguished

from the negative assertion with interrogative meaning, assuming a negative reply (=' you don't think so, surely?'):

II. 362 D οὔ τί που οἴει, . . . , ὦ Σώκρατες, ἱκανῶς εἰρῆσθαι περὶ τοῦ λόγου;

β. Slightly different from both is the use in

V. 455 E (again assuming an affirmative answer) γυμναστικὴ δ' ἄρα οὔ, οὐδὲ πολεμική; 'And (will you tell me that) there is not an athletic nor yet a warlike woman?' Cp. Theaet. 145 A ἆρ' **οὐδὲ** γεωμετρικός; 'But will you tell me that he is not a geometrician?'

γ. **ἦ** and **ἆρα**, emphatically interrogative, commonly anticipate a negative reply.

(1) I. 348 C ἦ τὴν δικαιοσύνην κακίαν; 'Do you mean to tell me that Justice is Vice?' (The particle here might ironically anticipate an affirmative answer, but the following examples confirm the above rendering.)

III. 396 B τὰ τοιαῦτα ἦ μιμήσονται; 'Shall we allow them to imitate such things as these?'

V. 469 C ἦ καλῶς ἔχει; 'Is that an honourable thing?'

VIII. 552 A ἦ δοκεῖ ὀρθῶς ἔχειν;

(2) VII. 523 E τί δὲ δή; τὸ μέγεθος . . . **ἆρα ἱκανῶς** ὁρᾷ; (resumed with ἆρ' οὐκ ἐνδεῶς immediately afterwards).

δ. But ἆρα; with ironical emphasis is sometimes practically equivalent to ἆρ' οὐ;

VI. 484 C τόδε δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἆρα δῆλον . . . ; Καὶ πῶς, ἔφη, οὐ δῆλον;

Cp. Soph. 221 D ἆρ', ὦ πρὸς θεῶν, ἠγνοήκαμεν, κ.τ.λ., 'Can it be that we have failed to recognize their kinship?' i.e. 'Are they not, after all, akin?'

ε. And ἦ in ἦ γάρ; 'Surely that is so?' puts a strong affirmation with an interrogative tone (cp. supra α).

Gorg. 449 D ἡ ὑφαντικὴ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἱματίων ἐργασίαν· **ἦ γάρ**; 'Surely that is so?'

In X. 607 C, however, this use is 'mixed' with the ordinary interrogative use of οὔ.

ἦ γάρ . . . οὐ κηλεῖ ὑπ' αὐτῆς καὶ σύ; 'Do not you feel her charm? Surely you do?'

Obs.—This use of ἦ may be pressed into service to account for VI. 500 A ἦ, καὶ ἐὰν οὕτω θεῶνται. But ἦ **καὶ ἐάν** may be corrupted from ἦ **οὐκ** ἐάν, through dittographia of ε and dropping of ου.

ζ. For ἆρα μή, μῶν, μῶν μή (I. 351 E, VI. 505 C) in doubtful questions, see the Lexica.

(*c*) Exceptional uses of μή. These mostly occur where § 38.
either some generalized notion, or some idea of prohibition, has been implied.

α. Where a relative has preceded:

II. 357 B ὅσαι ἀβλαβεῖς καὶ **μηδὲν** . . . γίγνεται ἄλλο, κ.τ.λ. (See above, p. 174, 2 (*b*).)

VIII. 559 B ᾗ τε **μὴ** παῦσαι ζῶντα δυνατή (so *q*). See note.

X. 605 E οἷον ἑαυτὸν . . . **μὴ** ἀξιοῖ εἶναι. Μή is here used in putting the case generally.

In Hipp. Maj. 295 C οἳ ἂν δοκῶσι τοιοῦτοι εἶναι οἷοι **μὴ** δυνατοὶ ὁρᾶν, the hypothetical turn of expression follows οἳ ἂν δοκῶσιν.

β. In *oratio obliqua* (*M. and T.*, § 685).

I. 346 E διὰ δὴ ταῦτα ἔγωγε . . . καὶ ἄρτι ἔλεγον **μηδένα ἐθέλειν** ἑκόντα ἄρχειν—recalling the *general* statement in 345 E τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς . . . ὅτι **οὐδεὶς ἐθέλει** ἄρχειν ἑκών.

X. 602 A πότερον ἐκ τοῦ χρῆσθαι ἐπιστήμην ἕξει ὧν ἂν γράφῃ, εἴτε καλὰ καὶ ὀρθὰ εἴτε **μή**;

Theaet. 155 A μηδέποτε **μηδὲν** ἂν μεῖζον . . . γενέσθα . . . τοῦτο **μήτε** αὐξάνεσθαί ποτε μήτε φθίνειν. Socrates is recording the 'postulates' or *a priori determinations* of the mind. Ἄν in the former sentence adds the notion of impossibility. So τίς ἄν in Apol. 27 D **τίς ἂν** ἀνθρώπων θεῶν μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῖτο **εἶναι**, θεοὺς δὲ μή;

γ. A shadowy sense of prohibition seems present in VIII. 553 D where οὐδέν . . . ἐᾷ λογίζεσθαι is followed by τιμᾶν μηδέν, as if ἀναγκάζει or some such word had preceded. So possibly in III. 407 D οὐκ ἐπιχειρεῖν . . . μὴ οἴεσθαι δεῖν θερα-

πεύειν, the change to μή is occasioned by some reminiscence of καταδεῖξαι . . . προστάττειν, preceding. See note in loco.

Obs.—For idiomatic accumulation of negatives, see especially x. 610 A–C ἢ τοίνυν . . . ἀπόλλυσθαι.

§ 39. **14. Formulae.**

(*a*) Of question—ἦ οὔ; τίς μηχανὴ μὴ οὐ, &c. For ἦ γάρ; see above p. 210, ε.

(*b*) Of reply—πάνυ γε, σφόδρα γε, καὶ μάλα. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. φαίνεται, οὐ φαίνεται, δοκεῖ γε δή. πῶς γάρ; πῶς γὰρ οὔ; τί μὴν (sc. ἄλλο); (See above, under μήν, p. 206.)

The degree of assent or dissent implied in each case varies somewhat with the context.

(*c*) Of connexion, τί δέ; τὸ δὲ γε, ἄλλο τι ἤ (cp. Herod. II. 14, &c.), ἄλλο τι; ἄλλο τι οὖν;

α. The question whether τί δέ and τί δὲ δή are to form a separate sentence, or to be joined to the words that follow them, is one that can only be determined by the immediate context. See especially I. 349 B, C, E; V. 468 A and notes in locis.

β. For ἄλλο τι in apposition to the sentence, see below, p. 221.

Obs. 1.—Single words habitually used in parenthesis are not treated as breaking the unity of a clause, but may be immediately followed by an enclitic. This applies, not only to οἴει and the like (for which see especially VIII. 564 A), but to a vocative, e.g. I. 337 E πῶς γὰρ ἄν, **ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ βέλτιστε,** τὶς ἀποκρίναιτο;

Obs. 2.—For the common transference of ἤδη, ἔτι, πω from temporal to logical succession, see especially II. 370 D, IV. 430 D—432 B.

Obs. 3.—ἀληθῶς, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ὄντως, τῷ ὄντι may be taken under the present head. M. Schanz has shown that in the later dialogues ὄντως gradually takes the place of τῷ ὄντι. But when he argues that because ὄντως occurs five times in Bb. V–VII while it is absent from

Bb. I–IV, Bb. V–VII are 'late,' he loses sight of his own observation that τῷ ὄντι is naturally avoided in conjunction with other cases of ὤν.

VI. Ellipse and Pleonasm. § 40.

1. Ellipse.

To maintain the effect of conversation and to avoid monotony, Plato constantly represents his speakers as omitting what, although essential to the meaning, is assumed to be obvious to the hearers. Hence a frequent duty of the interpreter is to supply the word or words 'understood':—especially (*a*) in references, (*b*) in replies, (*c*) in antitheses, (*d*) in transitions, and (*e*) where a word of simple meaning is *absorbed* in some neighbouring word. Under this head should also be noticed (*f*) familiar abbreviations.

(*a*) *In references.*

I. 341 B τὸν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν (sc. οὕτω προσαγορευόμενον). The incomplete expression is explained by the reference to 340 D λέγομεν τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως.

(*b*) *In replies.*

I. 334 D μηδαμῶς (sc. οὕτω τιθῶμεν).

I. 349 B οὐδὲ τῆς δικαίας (sc. πράξεως).

IV. 428 E πολύ, ἔφη, χαλκέας (sc. πλείους οἶμαι ἐνέσεσθαι τῇ πόλει).

V. 451 D κοινῇ, ἔφη, πάντα (sc. οἰόμεθα δεῖν αὐτὰς πράττειν τοῖς ἄρρεσιν).

V. 468 A λέγ', ἔφη, ποῖ' ἄν (sc. καταφαίνοιτό σοι).

V. 473 A ἃ σὺ ἐπιτάττεις (sc. ἀποφαίνειν ὡς δυνατά ἐστι καὶ ᾗ).

VI. 508 C ὅταν δέ γ', οἶμαι, ὧν ὁ ἥλιος καταλάμπῃ (sc. ἐπ' ἐκεῖνά τις τρέπῃ τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς).

VIII. 552 C ἐδόκει (sc. τῶν ἀρχόντων εἶναι).

IX. 585 D σῶμα δὲ αὐτὸ ψυχῆς οὐκ οἴει οὕτως; (sc. ἧττον ἀληθείας τε καὶ οὐσίας μετέχειν).

Cp. Phaed. 73 A ἑνὶ μὲν λόγῳ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, καλλίστῳ (sc.

ταῦτα ἀποδείκνυται supplied from ποῖαι τούτων αἱ ἀποδείξεις; preceding).

Obs. 1.—In continuing a conversation, the indirect form is sometimes used with the ellipse of εἰπέ. Rep. I. 348 B ὁποτέρως . . . ἀρέσκει; Euthyd. 271 B. Cp. Polit. 261 E ὁπότερον ἂν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ξυμβαίνῃ (sc. ὀνομάσομεν).

Obs. 2.—A special idiom is the ellipse of the apodosis with a new protasis, participial or otherwise.

Phaedr. 228 D δείξας γε πρῶτον, ὦ φιλότης (see above, p. 179, *Obs.* 3).
Rep. I. 338 C ἐὰν μάθω γε πρῶτον;
I. 340 A ἐάν σύ γ', ἔφη, αὐτῷ μαρτυρήσῃς.

Obs. 3.—Note the occasional omission of a comparative with ἤ following.

I. 335 A προσθεῖναι . . . ἢ . . . ἐλέγομεν.
Symp. 220 E ἐμὲ λαβεῖν ἢ σαυτόν.

(*c*) *In antitheses.*

II. 360 A ἔξω δὲ δήλῳ (sc. **ἔξω δὲ** αὐτῷ στρέφοντι τὴν σφενδόνην **δήλῳ** γίγνεσθαι).

III. 412 D μὴ δέ, τοὐναντίον (sc. εἰ **δὲ** οἴοιτο ἐκείνου **μὴ** εὖ πράττοντος, ξυμβαίνειν καὶ ἑαυτῷ κακῶς πράττειν).

IV. 444 D τὸ δὲ νόσον παρὰ φύσιν, κ.τ.λ. (sc. **τὸ δὲ νόσον** ποιεῖν ἐστὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ σώματι **παρὰ φύσιν** καθιστάναι, κ.τ.λ.).

(*d*) *In transitions*:—i. e. in passing from one alternative to another, or to a new topic.

I. 351 B ἢ ἀνάγκη αὐτῇ μετὰ δικαιοσύνης (sc. τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην ἔχειν);

II. 366 D ὡς δέ (sc. οὕτως ἔχει), δῆλον.

IV. 428 C τί δέ; τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ χαλκοῦ (sc. διὰ τὴν . . . σκευῶν ἐπιστήμην);

VI. 493 D ὅτι μὲν γάρ, κ.τ.λ. (sc. δῆλόν ἐστι, from δοκεῖ preceding).

Obs.—In Plato, as in other Greek, the affirmative notion is often assumed in passing from a negative—e. g. ἕκαστος supplied from οὐδείς in

II. 366 D οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν δίκαιος, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ ἀνανδρίας . . . ψέγει τὸ ἀδικεῖν.
VI. 500 B οὐδὲ γὰρ . . . σχολὴ . . . βλέπειν . . . ἀλλὰ (καιρὸς) μιμεῖσθαι

And sometimes the word to be supplied is more *general* than that which precedes—e. g.

V. 469 C **μηδὲ** *Ἕλληνα ἄρα δοῦλον ἐκτῆσθαι* (sc. *δεῖ* from **δοκεῖ** *δίκαιον, κ.τ.λ.* preceding).

Somewhat similarly in VIII. 557 E *μηδὲ αὖ, ἐάν τις ἄρχειν νόμος σε διακωλύῃ ἢ δικάζειν,* **μηδὲν ἧττον καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ δικάζειν,** the general notion of 'no compulsion' (sc. *ἐξεῖναι*) is continued from *μηδεμίαν ἀνάγκην* supra. 'There is nothing to compel you any the less for that to be a ruler and judge,' i. e. there is nothing any more on that account to prevent you from exercising both functions.

(*e*) *Absorption by a neighbouring word.* The want of the word omitted is not felt because of another word which suggests it to the mind. Cp. Herod. II. 87 *τοὺς τὰ πολυτελέστατα* (sc. *σκευαζομένους*) *σκευάζουσι νεκρούς.* § 41.

II. 358 D *εἴ σοι βουλομένῳ* (sc. *λέγω*) *ἃ* **λέγω.**

II. 364 A *πονηροὺς πλουσίους* (sc. *ὄντας*) *καὶ ἄλλας δυνάμεις* **ἔχοντας.**

II. 366 E *ἄλλως ἢ δόξας* (sc. *ἐπαινοῦντες, κ.τ.λ.*).

II. 372 E *καὶ ὄψα* (sc. *ἔχειν*) *ἅπερ καὶ οἱ νῦν* **ἔχουσι.**

IV. 421 B *ὁ δ' ἐκεῖνο* **λέγων** . . . (sc. *ἔλεγεν*).

IV. 439 A *τῶν τινός* (sc. *ὄντων* suggested by **εἶναι** following). See note in loco.

V. 452 A *παρὰ τὸ ἔθος* (sc. *φαινόμενα*) *γελοῖα ἂν* **φαίνοιτο.**

VI. 488 A *ναύκληρον* (sc. *μὲν*) *μεγέθει* **μέν,** *κ.τ.λ.*

VI. 510 B *ἀλλ' αὖθις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ* (sc. *μαθήσει,* which follows soon).

VII. 517 D *φαίνεται . . . γελοῖος* (sc. *ὢν*) . . . *ἀμβλυώττων.*

IX. 589 C *ὁ δὲ ψέκτης οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς* (sc. *λέγει*, from *ἀληθεύει* preceding or *ψέγει* following) *οὐδ' εἰδὼς ψέγει ὅ τι ψέγει.*

X. 615 B, C *τῶν δὲ εὐθὺς γενομένων* (sc. *ἀποθανόντων*: the whole passage relating to the dead). See Essay on Text, p. 121.

Obs.—Such omissions are not purely accidental, but are due to instinctive avoidance of cumbrous tautology.

(*f*) *Familiar abbreviations.*

a. Certain adjectives readily dispense with the verb substantive. The idiom is frequent with *ἄξιος* and *ἕτοιμος* (Parm. 137 C *ἕτοιμός σοι, ὦ Παρμενίδη*) but is extended by Plato to other words.

II. 358 A *ἀλλ' ἐγώ τις, ὡς ἔοικε, δυσμαθής.*

III. 407 B *ἀβίωτον τῷ μὴ μελετῶντι.*

X. 598 D *εὐήθης τις ἄνθρωπος.*

Obs.—The substantive verb is similarly omitted with *ἀνάγκη, τίς μηχανή,* &c., also in *εἰ μὴ εἴ, κ.τ.λ.*: III. 411 E, IX. 581 D. In II. 370 E *ὧν ἂν αὐτοῖς χρεία,* the subjunctive *ᾖ* is dropped.

β. Ἄλλος is constantly omitted with interrogatives and negatives.

I. 332 C *ἀλλὰ τί οἴει* (sc. *ἄλλο*);

I. 348 C *ἀλλὰ τί μήν* (sc. *ἄλλο*);

V. 461 D *οὐδαμῶς* (sc. *ἄλλως*).

V. 472 B *οὐδέν* (sc. *ἄλλο*).

Also in the hypothetical formula *εἰ μή τι ἀλλά.*

On *ἄλλο τι,* which is sometimes called an ellipse, see below, p. 221, *Obs.* 2. Another phrase which is appositional not elliptical is *ἓν ἀνθ' ἑνός* (I. 331 B).

γ. The indefinite subject is dropped, as in the common idiom, *κωλύει ἐν τῷ νόμῳ,* &c.

IV. 445 A *ἐάν τε* **λανθάνῃ** *ἐάν τε μή* (sc. *ὁ δίκαιά τε πράττων καὶ καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύων*).

V. 478 B *ἆρ' οὖν τὸ μὴ ὂν* **δοξάζει** (sc. *ὁ δοξάζων*).

VI. 498 B, C *ὅταν δὲ . . . πολιτικῶν δὲ καὶ στρατειῶν ἐκτὸς* **γίγνηται** (sc. *ὁ ἄνθρωπος*). Cp. Cratylus 410 B *ἴσως οὖν* **λέγει** (sc. *ὁ ἀέρα λέγων*).

δ. Transitive verbs used absolutely, i. e. without express object.

I. 335 D *ψύχειν . . . ὑγραίνειν . . . βλάπτειν.*

II. 368 B *ὅ τι* **χρήσωμαι** (sc. *ὑμῖν* or *τῷ λόγῳ*).

III. 392 D *περαίνουσιν.*

III. 411 A *ὅταν μέν τις . . .* **παρέχῃ**.

III. 411 E διαπράττεται.

IV. 420 C ἀπολαβόντες.

VII. 525 D οὐδαμῇ ἀποδεχόμενον.

IX. 585 E χαίρειν ἂν ποιοῖ (sc. τὸν ἄνθρωπον).

Obs.—Several of these words (χρῆσθαι, περαίνειν, ἀπολαμβάνειν, ἀποδέχεσθαι) belong to the technical language of the dialectical method. See also

v. 467 B οἷα . . . φιλεῖ (sc. γίγνεσθαι).

VIII. 565 E οἷα δὴ φιλοῦσι (sc. ποιεῖν).

ε. In some technical phrases a feminine abstract substantive is suppressed, as e.g. τέχνη in ἡ ἰατρική, &c. (*sexcenties*). Similarly

III. 397 B πρὸς τὴν αὐτήν (sc. χορδήν), 'in the same tone.' See note in loco.

IV. 432 A δι' ὅλης (sc. τῆς λύρας).

Ibid. διὰ πασῶν (sc. τῶν χορδῶν).

ζ. One of two alternative or correlative expressions is sometimes dropped.

VI. 486 C (πότερον) εὐμαθὴς ἢ δυσμαθής.

Obs.—Thus ὁ μέν is omitted where ὁ δέ follows, e.g. Phaedr. 266 A σκαιά, τὰ δὲ δεξιά. This idiom appears more frequently in the later dialogues (Tim. 63 E &c.).

N.B.—For the special idiom with μεταξύ (VI. 498 A) see above, p. 198, γ.

η. Other conversational ellipses are

I. 343 C οὕτω πόρρω εἶ (sc. τῆς γνώσεως).

V. 467 C ὅσα ἄνθρωποι (γιγνώσκουσιν).

2. PLEONASM. § 42.

As the omission of words gives an impression of ease and familiarity, so their redundancy enhances the appearance of leisure and freedom (cp. Theaet. 172 C foll.). Plato's periods 'are not made but grow' (cp. Phaedr. 264); he drifts down the wind of his discourse (Rep. II. 365 D). Hence when a new thought or mode of expression has occurred to the speaker, he does not wait to round off the

sentence before introducing it, but weaves it into that which is half finished, often to the sacrifice of formal coherency. Thus rhetoric interferes with grammar.

A good instance of Plato's love of amplification occurs in II (380 A foll.), where Socrates insists that evil must not be attributed to God:

Ἀλλ' ἐάν τις ποιῇ ἐν οἷς ταῦτα τὰ ἰαμβεῖα ἔνεστι, τὰ τῆς Νιόβης πάθη, ἢ τὰ Πελοπιδῶν ἢ τὰ Τρωϊκὰ ἤ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, ἢ οὐ θεοῦ ἔργα ἐατέον αὐτὰ λέγειν, ἢ εἰ θεοῦ, ἐξευρετέον αὐτοῖς σχεδὸν ὃν νῦν ἡμεῖς λόγον ζητοῦμεν, καὶ λεκτέον, ὡς ὁ μὲν θεὸς δίκαιά τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ εἰργάζετο, οἱ δὲ ὠνίναντο κολαζόμενοι· ὡς δὲ ἄθλιοι μὲν οἱ δίκην διδόντες, ἦν δὲ δὴ ὁ δρῶν ταῦτα θεός, οὐκ ἐατέον λέγειν τὸν ποιητήν. ἀλλ', εἰ μὲν ὅτι ἐδεήθησαν κολάσεως λέγοιεν, ὡς ἄθλιοι οἱ κακοί, διδόντες δὲ δίκην ὠφελοῦντο ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἐατέον· κακῶν δὲ αἴτιον φάναι θεόν τινι γίγνεσθαι ἀγαθὸν ὄντα, διαμαχητέον παντὶ τρόπῳ μήτε τινὰ λέγειν ταῦτα ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ πόλει, εἰ μέλλει εὐνομήσεσθαι, μήτε τινὰ ἀκούειν, μήτε νεώτερον μήτε πρεσβύτερον, μήτε ἐν μέτρῳ μήτε ἄνευ μέτρου μυθολογοῦντα, ὡς οὔτε ὅσια ἂν λεγόμενα, εἰ λέγοιτο, οὔτε ξύμφορα ἡμῖν οὔτε σύμφωνα αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς.

Here observe (1) the accumulation of examples characteristically summed up with ἤ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, (2) the disjunctive mode of statement, put first affirmatively (*either one or other*), then negatively (*not both*); then affirmatively again, then once more negatively with increased explicitness and emphasis, and with the characteristic qualification εἰ μέλλει εὐνομήσεσθαι. Observe also (3) the addition of the participle μυθολογοῦντα, and of εἰ λέγοιτο. Note further (4) the pleonastic φάναι anticipating λέγειν, and (5) the clinching of the argument in the last clause, ὡς οὔτε ὅσια, κ.τ.λ. The examination of this one passage may prepare the student for much that he will find elsewhere. Cp. especially VI. 489; II. 374 B–D Ἀλλ' ἄρα . . . παρασχομένῳ; IV. 421 B–C. A simile or illustration is often expanded in this way, e.g. III. 402 A ὥσπερ ἄρα, κ.τ.λ. See also the pleonastic use of participles in Symp. 218 A, B.

(*a*) The most ordinary pleonasms are those in which § 43.
a notion already implied is made explicit in a subsequent phrase.

II. 358 E πλέονι δὲ κακῷ ὑπερβάλλειν, κ.τ.λ.

II. 371 D καπήλων . . . γένεσιν ἐμποιεῖ.

VI. 486 D ζητῶμεν δεῖν.

VI. 490 A παρὰ δόξαν τοῖς νῦν δοκουμένοις.

VIII. 555 B τοῦ προκειμένου ἀγαθοῦ, τοῦ ὡς πλουσιώτατον δεῖν γίγνεσθαι.

(*b*) Specially Platonic is the expletive use of ἐπιχειρεῖν, φιλεῖν, κινδυνεύειν, ἔχομαι and other verbs as auxiliaries. See also VI. 500 D μελετῆσαι εἰς ἀνθρώπων ἤθη . . . τιθέναι: VII. 520 B ἐκτίνειν . . . προθυμεῖσθαι. So Cephalus, in his garrulous talk about old age, speaks of the time when one *comes near* to *thinking* that he is about to die, ἐπειδάν τις ἐγγὺς ᾖ τοῦ οἴεσθαι τελευτήσειν (I. 330 D). For the pleonastic or expletive use of participles (ἔχων, &c.) see above, p. 177 (*f*).

(*c*) The amplifying, expansive tendency of Plato's language has a distinct bearing on the treatment of the text. The excision of supposed 'glosses' and 'accretions' by which editors have tried to prune away such redundancies, must be carried far beyond the limit of even plausible conjecture, if the tendency itself is to be disproved. (See Essay on Text, p. 110.)

V. 477 B, C φήσομεν δυνάμεις εἶναι γένος τι τῶν ὄντων, αἷς δὴ καὶ ἡμεῖς δυνάμεθα ἃ δυνάμεθα καὶ ἄλλο πᾶν ὅ τί περ ἂν δύνηται, οἷον λέγω ὄψιν καὶ ἀκοὴν τῶν δυνάμεων εἶναι, εἰ ἄρα μανθάνεις ὃ βούλομαι λέγειν τὸ εἶδος.

Obs.—The addition of an equivalent phrase often adds a touch of admiration or scorn.

I. 331 A ἡδεῖα ἐλπὶς . . . καὶ ἀγαθὴ γηροτρόφος.

II. 364 E διὰ θυσιῶν καὶ παιδιᾶς ἡδονῶν.

(*d*) A special idiom, not exclusively Platonic (see L. and S., s. v. II. 8), is the pleonastic (or adverbial) use of ἄλλος.

Cp. especially Hom. Odys. IX. 367 μήτηρ ἠδὲ πατὴρ ἠδ'

ἄλλοι πάντες ἑταῖροι: Herod. IV. 179, § 1 **ἄλλην** τε ἑκατόμβην καὶ δὴ καὶ τρίποδα χάλκεον.

a. ἄλλος attributive.

II. 368 B ἐκ τοῦ **ἄλλου** τοῦ ὑμετέρου τρόπου, 'from your manner of life, not from your words.'

II. 371 A γεωργῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δημιουργῶν . . . καὶ δὴ καὶ τῶν **ἄλλων** διακόνων, 'and *also* of that ministering class.'

III. 404 A, B πολλὰς μεταβολὰς . . . μεταβάλλοντας ὑδάτων τε καὶ τῶν **ἄλλων** σίτων, 'enduring many changes of drinking-water and *also* of food.'

β. In other cases ἄλλος is predicative or adverbial, but still pleonastic:

X. 617 B **ἄλλας** δὲ καθημένας πέριξ, κ.τ.λ., 'and sitting there, *moreover*, round about.'

The Fates are thus contradistinguished from the Sirens (or perhaps 'there were others . . . daughters of necessity,' &c.). Cp. the idiomatic ἄλλως in Gorg. 470 D συγγενόμενος ἂν γνοίης, **ἄλλως** δὲ αὐτόθεν οὐ γιγνώσκεις.

(*e*) Αὐτός τε καί, with expansion of the correlative phrase:

III. 398 A αὐτός τε καὶ τὰ ποιήματα **βουλόμενος ἐπιδείξασθαι**, 'bringing his poems for exhibition with him too.'

IV. 427 D αὐτός τε καὶ **τὸν ἀδελφὸν παρακάλει**, 'and call your brother also to assist.'

VII. 535 E ἢ ἂν . . . χαλεπῶς φέρῃ αὐτή τε καὶ ἑτέρων ψευδομένων **ὑπεραγανακτῇ**.

(*f*) Double comparative and superlative:

I. 331 B οὐκ ἐλάχιστον . . . χρησιμώτατον.

II. 362 C θεοφιλέστερον . . . εἶναι μᾶλλον προσήκειν.

§ 44. **VII. Apposition.**

One very frequent consequence of Plato's discursiveness is what may be loosely termed the apposition of sentences,—the second being often not the exact equivalent, but an explanation or expansion of the first. Cp. Herod. I. 23, § 2 θῶυμα μέγιστον . . . Ἀρίονα . . . ἐπὶ δελφῖνος ἐξενειχθέντα:

VI. 117, § 2 θῶυμα γενέσθαι τοιόνδε, Ἀθηναῖον ἄνδρα Ἐπίζηλον . . . τῶν ὀμμάτων στερηθῆναι.

Three cases may be distinguished:—

1. Where a pronoun or a pronominal phrase or adverb resuming a preceding statement is followed by a restatement of the same thing, more or less expanded or modified.

I. 337 C καὶ σὺ **οὕτω ποιήσεις**; **ὧν ἐγὼ ἀπεῖπον, τούτων τι ἀποκρινεῖ**;

II. 365 C ἐπὶ **τοῦτο** δὴ **τρεπτέον** ὅλως· πρόθυρα μὲν καὶ σχῆμα κύκλῳ περὶ ἐμαυτὸν σκιαγραφίαν ἀρετῆς **περιγραπτέον, κ.τ.λ.**

III. 416 B μὴ **τοιοῦτον . . . ποιήσωσι** πρὸς τοὺς πολίτας, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῶν κρείττους εἰσίν, ἀντὶ ξυμμάχων εὐμενῶν δεσπόταις ἀγρίοις **ἀφομοιωθῶσιν.**

IV. 429 E, 430 A **τοιοῦτον** . . . ὑπόλαβε . . . **ἐργάζεσθαι** καὶ ἡμᾶς . . . μηδὲν οἷον ἄλλο **μηχανᾶσθαι** ἤ, κ.τ.λ.

VII. 517 B τὰ δ' οὖν ἐμοὶ φαινόμενα **οὕτω** φαίνεται, ἐν τῷ γνωστῷ . . . **μόγις ὁρᾶσθαι**, κ.τ.λ.

VII. 532 A **οὕτω** καὶ ὅταν τις τῷ διαλέγεσθαι **ἐπιχειρῇ**, ἄνευ πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων διὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐπ' αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον **ὁρμᾷ** (*subjunctive*) καὶ μὴ ἀποστῇ, κ.τ.λ. Here the *protasis* is expanded.

X. 605 B **ταὐτὸν** καὶ τὸν μιμητικὸν ποιητὴν φήσομεν **κακὴν πολιτείαν . . . ἐμποιεῖν.**

Obs. 1.—The frequent formula of transition with the interrogative follows the analogy of this mode of construction—

I. 332 E **τί δὲ** ὁ δίκαιος; ἐν τίνι πράξει, κ.τ.λ. *et passim.*

This form is better suited to the majority of cases than the other punctuation **τί δέ**; ὁ δίκαιος ἐν τίνι πράξει, κ.τ.λ.

VII. 515 B τί δὲ τῶν παραφερομένων; οὐ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο;

although the latter is also sometimes required by the context:

VII. 517 D τί δέ; τόδε οἴει τι θαυμαστόν, κ.τ.λ.

Obs. 2.—So ἄλλο τι, when not followed by ἤ, forms virtually a separate clause in apposition.

I. 337 C ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἔφη, καὶ σὺ οὕτω ποιήσεις; 'You mean to say that that is what you are going to do?'

So I. 331 B ἓν ἀνθ' ἑνός: VI. 498 B πᾶν τοὐναντίον.

Also τὸ δέ (Soph. 248 D; Laws III. 676 C).

VII. 527 A τὸ δ' ἔστι που πᾶν τὸ μάθημα, κ.τ.λ. (*Digest*, § 22).

Obs. 3.—Similarly, the relative pronoun, although not forming a separate clause, often introduces a long sentence, towards which it stands in apposition. (*Digest*, §§ 10 ff.)

II. 368 D *οἵανπερ ἂν εἰ, κ.τ.λ.* 'A method similar to that we should have adopted, if' &c.

IV. 434 D *ἐκτελέσωμεν τὴν σκέψιν, ἣν ᾠήθημεν, κ.τ.λ.*

Cp. Phaedr. 249 D *περὶ τῆς τετάρτης μανίας, ἥν, κ.τ.λ.*

Protag. 352 E, 353 A *τὸ πάθος, ὅ φασιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡττᾶσθαι.*

So *οἷον*, VI. 488 A *οἷον οἱ γραφῆς, κ.τ.λ.* 'As painters do, when they delineate monsters.'

§ 45. 2. Apposition of Clauses,—where a statement is immediately followed by a parallel statement, in the same construction, with no conjunction between (Asyndeton).

I. 329 C, D *παντάπασι γὰρ τῶν γε τοιούτων ἐν τῷ γήρᾳ* **πολλὴ εἰρήνη γίγνεται** *καὶ ἐλευθερία, ἐπειδὰν αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι παύσωνται κατατείνουσαι καὶ χαλάσωσι, παντάπασι* **τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους γίγνεται, δεσποτῶν** *πάνυ πολλῶν* **ἔστι** *καὶ μαινομένων* **ἀπηλλάχθαι.** (Some MSS. insert *γάρ* after *ἐπειδάν*.)

II. 359 B, C *εἰ* **τοιόνδε ποιήσαιμεν** *τῇ διανοίᾳ·* **δόντες ἐξουσίαν . . . ἐπακολουθήσαιμεν.**

V. 457 C *λέγε δή, ἴδω.*

VII. 530 A *οὐκ οἴει . . . τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ;*

VII. 540 E **διασκευωρήσωνται . . . ἐκπέμψωσιν.**

VIII. 557 C *κινδυνεύει . . . καλλίστη αὕτη τῶν πολιτειῶν εἶναι· ὥσπερ ἱμάτιον ποικίλον . . . καὶ αὕτη . . . καλλίστη ἂν φαίνοιτο.*

IX. 589 D *τοιόνδε τι γίγνεται, λαμβάνων, κ.τ.λ.* Cp. Phaedo 95 C; Gorg. 493 E.

Obs. 1.—Between clauses thus related a question is sometimes interposed,

VII. 540 E *ὅταν . . . διασκευωρήσωνται . . . :* **Πῶς;** **ἔφη** *: . . . ἐκπέμψωσιν.*

Obs. 2.—Slightly different from the foregoing is the emphatic repetition, with asyndeton, of what has been said—

(*a*) giving the effect of a second apodosis:

I. 339 E *οἴου τοίνυν . . . ὡμολογῆσθαι . . . ὅταν . . ., ἆρα τότε . . . οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον συμβαίνειν, κ.τ.λ.*

I. 340 B *τοῦτο ποιητέον εἶναι, κ.τ.λ.*

II. 372 B *θρέψονται . . . εὐωχήσονται.*

So III. 413 C; VI. 497 B.

N.B.—The case of VIII. 545 B ὄνομα γὰρ οὐκ ἔχω . . . ἄλλο· ἢ τιμοκρατίαν, κ.τ.λ. is peculiar and should probably be met as W. H. Thompson suggested by reading ἀλλ' ἢ τιμοκρατίαν, κ.τ.λ.

(β) The protasis is likewise (1) repeated with variation, or (2) an additional protasis subjoined.

(1) VII. 529 B ἐάν τέ τις ἄνω κεχηνὼς . . . ἐπιχειρῇ μανθάνειν, οὔτε μαθεῖν ἄν ποτέ φημι αὐτόν, κ.τ.λ.

(2) I. 331 C εἴ τις λάβοι . . . εἰ μανεὶς ἀπαιτοῖ. Cp. Theaet. 210 B, C ἐὰν τοίνυν . . . ἐγκύμων ἐπιχειρῇς γίγνεσθαι . . . ἐάν τε γίγνῃ . . . ἐάν τε κενὸς ᾖς, where the two alternative hypotheses are subordinate to the principal one.

Obs. 3.—This, like other Platonic idioms, is used with greater abruptness in the Laws. See especially, Laws IV. 708 B ὅταν μὴ τὸν τῶν ἑσμῶν γίγνηται τρόπον, ἓν γένος ἀπὸ μιᾶς ἰὸν χώρας οἰκίζηται.

VIII. Co-ordination (Parataxis). § 46.

While in all syntax the subordination of clauses gradually supersedes their co-ordination, this tendency is checked in Greek by the fondness for analytical and antithetical expression, not only giving to co-ordination a temporary survival, but also favouring some independent developments of it, which interfere with the complete regularity of subordination. The crossing of the two methods may confuse the interpreter, but it enriches the style.

1. Interposition of one or more co-ordinate or parallel clauses with μέν or τέ after the sentence is begun.

(*a*) μέν.

II. 367 E καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας, ἀεὶ μὲν δὴ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ τε Γλαύκωνος καὶ τοῦ Ἀδειμάντου ἠγάμην, ἀτὰρ οὖν καὶ τότε πάνυ γε ἥσθην.

III. 407 C, D φῶμεν καὶ Ἀσκληπιὸν τοὺς μὲν φύσει . . . τὰ δ' εἴσω . . . θεραπεύειν (see notes in loco).

III. 415 A ἅτε οὖν ξυγγενεῖς ὄντες πάντες τὸ μὲν πολὺ ὁμοίους ἂν ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς γεννῷτε, ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἐκ χρυσοῦ γεννηθείη ἂν

ἀργυροῦν καὶ ἐξ ἀργυροῦ χρυσοῦν ἔκγονον καὶ τἄλλα πάντα οὕτως ἐξ ἀλλήλων.

IV. 421 A, B εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡμεῖς **μὲν** . . . ὁ δ' ἐκεῖνο λέγων . . . ἄλλο ἄν τι ἢ πόλιν λέγοι.

VIII. 552 B ἢ ἐδόκει **μὲν** τῶν ἀρχόντων εἶναι, τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ οὔτε ἄρχων οὔτε ὑπηρέτης ἦν αὐτῆς, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἑτοίμων ἀναλωτής; Cp. Laws VI. 765 E ἄνθρωπος δέ, ὥς φαμεν, ἥμερον, κ.τ.λ., where although μέν is omitted, the mode of expression is virtually the same.

(*b*) τέ.

II. 357 A ὁ γὰρ Γλαύκων ἀεί **τε** ἀνδρειότατος ὢν τυγχάνει πρὸς ἅπαντα, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε . . . οὐκ ἀπεδέξατο.

III. 404 C καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ἔφη, ἴσασί **τε** καὶ ἀπέχονται.

See also II. 359 D ἄλλα **τε** δὴ [ἃ] μυθολογοῦσι θαυμαστά, κ.τ.λ., when the same idiom may perhaps justify the omission of ἅ, as in Par. A.

2. Δέ *in apodosi.*

The use of δ' οὖν in resumption is a special case of this. The general idiom is too common to require further illustration. See, however, Symp. 183 C ἐπειδὰν δέ . . . μὴ ἐῶσι . . . εἰς **δὲ** ταῦτά τις αὖ βλέψας, κ.τ.λ., for a striking example of its effect.

Δέ is also added to a participle subjoined to a sentence, VIII. 544 C δευτέρα καὶ δευτέρως ἐπαινουμένη, **καλουμένη δ'** ὀλιγαρχία: IX. 572 E εἰς πᾶσαν παρανομίαν, **ὀνομαζομένην δ'** . . . ἐλευθερίαν ἅπασαν.

3. Two complex sentences, opposed with μέν and δέ, are bound together by a single interrogative or negative. This may fairly be regarded as a speciality of Platonic syntax, though not unknown to other Greek writers. In a simpler form it occurs, e.g. in Aesch. Prom. 507, 508—

μή νυν βροτοὺς **μὲν** ὠφέλει καιροῦ πέρα,
σαυτοῦ **δ'** ἀκήδει δυστυχοῦντος.

Eur. Bacch. 311, 312—

μηδ', ἢν δοκῇς **μέν**, ἡ **δὲ** δόξα σου νοσεῖ,
φρονεῖν δόκει τι.

Cp. Shakespeare, *M. of V.*, i. 3, 180:

'I like not fair terms and a villain's mind.'

Macb. ii. 2, 12:

'The attempt and not the deed confounds us;'

and a complete example occurs in Lysias, contra Eratosth. § 36 *οὐκοῦν δεινόν, εἰ τοὺς* **μὲν** *στρατηγούς, οἳ ἐνίκων ναυμαχοῦντες . . . θανάτῳ ἐζημιώσατε . . . τούτους* **δέ**, *οἳ . . . ἐποίησαν ἡττηθῆναι ναυμαχοῦντας . . . οὐκ ἄρα χρὴ . . . ταῖς ἐσχάταις ζημίαις κολάζεσθαι.* (See also Xen. Mem. I. 4, § 17: III. 4, § 1.)

This form is employed where the combination of the two statements is deprecated or denied, i.e. to signify either that they ought not to be true together or cannot be so. The enormity or impossibility is marked more pointedly by the union of the two contradictories in a continuous sentence.

I. 336 E *μὴ γὰρ δὴ οἴου, εἰ* **μὲν** *χρυσίον ἐζητοῦμεν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἡμᾶς ἑκόντας εἶναι ὑποκατακλίνεσθαι ἀλλήλοις ἐν τῇ ζητήσει καὶ διαφθείρειν τὴν εὕρεσιν αὐτοῦ, δικαιοσύνην* **δὲ** *ζητοῦντας, πρᾶγμα πολλῶν χρυσίων τιμιώτερον, ἔπειθ' οὕτως ἀνοήτως ὑπείκειν ἀλλήλοις καὶ οὐ σπουδάζειν ὅ τι μάλιστα φανῆναι αὐτό.*

II. 374 B, C *'Αλλ' ἄρα τὸν* **μὲν** *σκυτοτόμον . . . ἢ οὕτω ῥᾴδιον, ὥστε καὶ γεωργῶν τις ἅμα πολεμικὸς ἔσται . . . πεττευτικὸς* **δὲ** *ἢ κυβευτικὸς ἱκανῶς οὐδ' ἂν εἷς γένοιτο μὴ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐκ παιδὸς ἐπιτηδεύων;*

III. 406 C *ὃ ἡμεῖς γελοίως ἐπὶ* **μέν** *. . . ἐπὶ* **δέ** *. . . οὐκ, κ.τ.λ.*

III. 407 A, B *ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διδάξωμεν, πότερον μελετητέον τοῦτο τῷ πλουσίῳ καὶ ἀβίωτον τῷ μὴ μελετῶντι, ἢ νοσοτροφία τεκτονικῇ* **μὲν** *καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις ἐμπόδιον τῇ προσέξει τοῦ νοῦ, τὸ* **δὲ** *Φωκυλίδου παρακέλευμα οὐδὲν ἐμποδίζει.*

IV. 445 A *γελοῖον ἔμοιγε φαίνεται τὸ σκέμμα γίγνεσθαι ἤδη, εἰ τοῦ* **μὲν** *σώματος τῆς φύσεως διαφθειρομένης δοκεῖ οὐ βιωτὸν εἶναι . . , τῆς* **δὲ** *αὐτοῦ τούτου ᾧ ζῶμεν φύσεως ταραττομένης καὶ διαφθειρομένης βιωτὸν ἄρα ἔσται, κ.τ.λ.*

V. 456 C *οὐκ ἄλλη* **μὲν** *ἡμῖν ἄνδρας ποιήσει παιδεία, ἄλλη* **δὲ** *γυναῖκας.*

IX. 589 D, E εἰ μέν . . . εἰ δέ . . . οὐκ ἄρα ; and, without μέν, V. 456 A.

Similarly, but with the second statement deferred, VIII. 556 B, C σφᾶς δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς αὐτῶν—ἆρ' οὐ τρυφῶντας μὲν τοὺς νέους, κ.τ.λ. (three lines), αὐτοὺς δὲ πλὴν χρηματισμοῦ τῶν ἄλλων ἠμεληκότας, κ.τ.λ.

X. 600 C ἀλλ' οἴει, ὦ Γλαύκων, κ.τ.λ.

N.B.—Such introductory words as δεινὸν εἰ, γελοῖον εἰ, have the force of a negative.

Obs. 1.—A clause is sometimes prefixed or appended to such composite sentences, just as if the meaning had been simply expressed, e. g.

V. 456 C πρός γε τὸ φυλακικὴν γυναῖκα γενέσθαι, οὐκ ἄλλη μέν, κ.τ.λ.

Obs. 2.—Sometimes instead of introducing the sentence with a negative, two alternative suppositions are co-ordinated and followed by an apodosis relating to both combined; so as to point the antithesis between what is preferred and its opposite.

IV. 421 A, B εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡμεῖς μέν . . . ποιοῦμεν . . . ὁ δ' ἐκεῖνο λέγων . . . —ἄλλο ἄν τι ἢ πόλιν λέγοι.

§ 47. 4. *Disjunctives.*

A clause, apparently pleonastic, is often introduced with ἤ to enforce a rule by adding to it the sanction of a penalty. This formula is especially frequent in the Republic.

III. 401 B προσαναγκαστέον τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἰκόνα ἤθους ἐμποιεῖν τοῖς ποιήμασιν ἢ μὴ παρ' ἡμῖν ποιεῖν, 'else they shall be prohibited.'

III. 401 B διακωλυτέον τὸ κακόηθες . . . μήτε . . . ἐμποιεῖν, ἢ ὁ μὴ οἷός τε ὢν οὐκ ἐατέος παρ' ἡμῖν δημιουργεῖν. See p. 219 (*a*).

V. 463 D περί . . . τοῦ ὑπήκοον δεῖν εἶναι τῶν γονέων, ἢ μήτε πρὸς θεῶν μήτε πρὸς ἀνθρώπων αὐτῷ ἄμεινον ἔσεσθαι.

VI. 490 A ἦν (sc. ἀλήθειαν) διώκειν . . . ἔδει ἢ ἀλαζόνι ὄντι μηδαμῇ μετεῖναι φιλοσοφίας.

VI. 503 A τὸ δόγμα τοῦτο μήτ' ἐν πόνοις μήτ' ἐν φόβοις . . . φαίνεσθαι ἐκβάλλοντας, ἢ τὸν ἀδυνατοῦντα ἀποκριτέον.

VII. 525 B τῆς οὐσίας ἁπτέον εἶναι γενέσεως ἐξαναδύντι, ἢ μηδέποτε λογιστικῷ γενέσθαι.

(Cp. Isocr. Aeginet. § 27 οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀπελθεῖν οἷόν τ' ἦν, ἢ δοκεῖν ἀμελεῖν.)

Obs.—Another mode of introducing such a sanction,—not falling under the same grammatical heading,—is the incidental assertion of a condition in a hypothetical or participial clause, in which the word μέλλω generally occurs—

II. 365 C, D ἀλλ' ὅμως, **εἰ μέλλομεν** εὐδαιμονήσειν, ταύτῃ ἰτέον, ὡς τὰ ἴχνη τῶν λόγων φέρει.

II. 372 D ἐπί τε κλινῶν κατακεῖσθαι, οἶμαι, **τοὺς μέλλοντας** μὴ ταλαιπωρεῖσθαι, κ.τ.λ.

So in VI. 491 B **εἰ** τελέως **μέλλοι** φιλόσοφος γενέσθαι, words unduly suspected by Cobet.

5. *Minute or verbal antithesis.* § 48.

The Greek love of antithesis gives rise to forms of expression which, if taken literally, are over-emphatic or even inaccurate.

(*a*) Thus αὐτός is sometimes emphatically used where the antithesis is too minute to be pressed.

II. 370 E ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . κατοικίσαι γε **αὐτὴν** τὴν πόλιν εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον, κ.τ.λ. 'The city,' as distinguished from the citizens.

II. 371 B ἐν **αὐτῇ** τῇ πόλει.

Antithetical formulae are also used ironically to suggest the equivalence of an alternative of which one side is tacitly preferred.

II. 373 E **μήτ' εἴ τι** κακὸν **μήτ' εἰ** ἀγαθὸν ὁ πόλεμος ἐργάζεται (cp. Herod. VIII. 87, § 5 οὔτε εἰ . . . οὔτε εἰ).

Cp. I. 339 B **σμικρά** γε ἴσως, ἔφη, προσθήκη. οὔπω δῆλον οὐδ' εἰ **μεγάλη**.

Such antithetical redundancies as I. 346 A **ἑκάστην** . . . **ἑκάστοτε**, V. 462 D **μέρους** πονήσαντος **ὅλη**, VII. 516 B **αὐτὸν** καθ' **αὐτὸν** ἐν τῇ **αὑτοῦ** χώρᾳ, and such reduplications in climax as III. 406 A, B πρῶτον μὲν καὶ μάλιστα, V. 449 D μέγα . . . καὶ ὅλον are extremely frequent.

The following are more noticeable :

IV. 441 C τὰ **αὐτὰ** μὲν ἐν πόλει, **τὰ αὐτὰ** δ' ἐν . . . τῇ ψυχῇ.

X. 605 B, C **οὔτε** τὰ μείζω **οὔτε** τὰ ἐλάττω διαγιγνώσκοντι.

X. 618 C βίον **καὶ** χρηστὸν **καὶ** πονηρὸν διαγιγνώσκοντα.

(*b*) The love of antithesis often gives a negative turn to a sentence ; VIII. 556 C, D ὅταν . . . μηδαμῇ . . . καταφρονῶνται . . . ἀλλά, κ.τ.λ.

6. Introduction of the reverse or contrary statement. In dwelling on one side of a distinction or antithesis the other side is introduced with apparent irrelevancy where it is not immediately in point. This is another way in which *co-ordination* breaks the smoothness of *subordination.*

A clear example is VII. 528 A ἀλλὰ σαυτοῦ ἕνεκα τὸ μέγιστον ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους, **φθονοῖς μὴν οὐδ' ἂν ἄλλῳ**, κ.τ.λ.

See also :

I. 349 B, C εἰ τοῦ μὲν δικαίου μὴ ἀξιοῖ πλέον ἔχειν μηδὲ βούλεται ὁ δίκαιος, **τοῦ δὲ ἀδίκου** ;

II. 358 A πάλαι ὑπὸ Θρασυμάχου ὡς τοιοῦτον ὂν ψέγεται, **ἀδικία δ' ἐπαινεῖται** (*om.* Par. A).

II. 371 D ἢ οὐ καπήλους καλοῦμεν τοὺς . . . διακονοῦντας ἱδρυμένους ἐν ἀγορᾷ, **τοὺς δὲ πλάνητας ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις ἐμπόρους** ;

II. 374 C μὴ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐκ παιδὸς ἐπιτηδεύων, **ἀλλὰ παρέργῳ χρώμενος** ;

V. 455 E, 456 A πολεμική, **ἡ δ' ἀπόλεμος.**

VI. 490 E τὰς φθοράς, ὡς διόλλυνται ἐν πολλοῖς, **σμικρὸν δέ τι ἐκφεύγει.**

VII. 520 D οὐκ ἐθελήσουσι ξυμπονεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἕκαστοι ἐν μέρει, **τὸν δὲ πολὺν χρόνον μετ' ἀλλήλων οἰκεῖν ἐν τῷ καθαρῷ** ;

VIII. 546 D (if the text is sound) ἡμῶν (τῶν Μουσῶν) πρῶτον ἄρξονται ἀμελεῖν . . . ἔλαττον τοῦ δέοντος ἡγησάμενοι τὰ μουσικῆς, **δεύτερον δὲ τὰ γυμναστικῆς** (δεύτερά τε γυμν. Madv. cj.).

VIII. 552 A τὸ ἐξεῖναι πάντα τὰ αὑτοῦ ἀποδόσθαι, **καὶ ἄλλῳ κτήσασθαι τὰ τούτου.**

VIII. 559 C ὃν νῦν δὴ κηφῆνα ὠνομάζομεν, τοῦτον ἐλέγομεν τὸν τῶν τοιούτων ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν γέμοντα καὶ ἀρχόμενον

ὑπὸ τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων, τὸν δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων φειδωλόν τε καὶ ὀλιγαρχικόν;

Obs. 1.—The same love of completeness shows itself in the frequent addition of limiting or qualifying clauses, such as ὅταν γίγνηται, ἂν μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, ὅσα ἄνθρωποι, ὅσον γέ μ' εἰδέναι, κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν or εἰς τὸ δυνατόν and the like, also in the addition of single words which remind the reader that there is another point of view, especially of δοκῶν, καλούμενος, λεγόμενος, or νῦν λεγόμενος, &c. to mark what belongs to ordinary unphilosophic opinion. For other examples of similar fulness of expression, see

IV. 430 C καὶ γὰρ ἀποδέχου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πολιτικήν γε.

VI. 492 A ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον λόγου.

VII. 523 A τό γ' ἐμοὶ δοκοῦν.

Obs. 2.—Note also, as illustrating the same over-emphatic or exaggerating tendency, the multiplication of pronominal words in the same sentence:—τοιούτους γε καὶ οὕτω (III. 416 A), μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς (Laws VI. 777 E), εἴτε ὅπῃ ἔχει καὶ ὅπως,—also the addition of the negative side in such expressions as ἀλλὰ σμικρὸν οἴει διαφέρειν, καὶ οὐκ ἄξιον κινδύνου, θεωρεῖν ἢ μή. A striking example of this sort of thing occurs in II. 369 C where in introducing the division of labour, Socrates is not contented with saying that different men have different wants and need various helpers, ἄλλον ἐπ' ἄλλου . . . χρείᾳ, but adds τὸν δ' ἐπ' ἄλλου, 'and this man yet another, for another want,' to show not only that different men need different helpers, but that each requires more than one.

IX. Deferred Apodosis.

Digression and Resumption. § 49.

1. It is a natural consequence of the expansion of sentences, and especially of the tendency of parentheses[1] and subordinate clauses to take an independent form, that the main statement at first intended is thrust aside, and, if not wholly lost, can no longer be expressed in strict continuation of the original construction. The sentence becomes like a tree whose leading stem has been distorted or broken. This is particularly apt to occur in the course of those elaborate similes of which Plato is fond. Cp. Lysias, contra Eratosth. § 6, Xen. Mem. IV. 2, § 25.

[1] See Prof. Jowett's note on Rom. ii. 16.

I. 337 A, B εὖ οὖν ᾔδησθα ὅτι εἴ τινα ἔροιο, κ.τ.λ. (four lines intervene) δῆλον οἶμαί σοι ἦν, κ.τ.λ. Cp. V. 471 C.

I. 352 B–D ὅτι μὲν γὰρ (twelve lines intervene) ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, κ.τ.λ.

III. 402 A, B ὥσπερ ἄρα . . . γραμμάτων πέρι τότε ἱκανῶς εἴχομεν, ὅτε . . . (eight lines intervene) . . . ἆρ' οὖν, ὃ λέγω, . . . οὐδὲ μουσικοὶ πρότερον ἐσόμεθα.

IV. 428 A ὥσπερ τοίνυν, κ.τ.λ.

VI. 495 D, E οὗ δὴ ἐφιέμενοι πολλοὶ ἀτελεῖς μὲν τὰς φύσεις, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν τε καὶ δημιουργιῶν ὥσπερ τὰ σώματα λελώβηνται, οὕτω καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ξυγκεκλασμένοι τε καὶ ἀποτεθρυμμένοι διὰ τὰς βαναυσίας τυγχάνουσιν, κ.τ.λ. The apodosis, if any, comes half a page below, ποῖ' ἄττα φῶμεν γεννᾶν . . . ἆρ' οὐ . . . σοφίσματα;

VIII. 562 B ὃ προὔθεντο, κ.τ.λ.

X. 609 C ὥσπερ σῶμα, κ.τ.λ.

Theaet. 197 C ὥσπερ εἴ τις ὄρνιθας ἀγρίας, κ.τ.λ

Hence τε occurs without a distinct correlative.

V. 463 D περί τε τοὺς πατέρας, κ.τ.λ.

VII. 522 B αἵ τε γὰρ τέχναι, κ.τ.λ.

VIII. 568 D ἐάν τε ἱερὰ χρήματα, κ.τ.λ. (if *πωλουμένων is read. See note in loco).

IX. 575 A τὸν ἔχοντά τε αὐτόν, κ.τ.λ.

Obs.—The apodosis is sometimes given in the reply;
IX. 577 A, B εἰ οὖν οἰοίμην . . .: Ὀρθότατ' ἂν . . . προκαλοῖο.
IX. 582 E ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐμπειρίᾳ . . .: Ἀνάγκη . . . εἶναι.

§ 50. 2. As in all conversation the consciousness of imperfect expression is apt to occasion the attempt to recover preciseness by the introduction of superfluous words, so in the conversational style of Plato it often happens that what has been already stated or implied is resumed with some increase of explicitness, often with the addition of a formula of reference, such as ὃ λέγω, ὅπερ εἶπον, &c. Thus the effort to be exact leads to further irregularity of structure and sometimes even to a degree of confusion.

(*a*) The simplest case is where the antecedent to a relative or correlative clause is made explicit with *τοῦτο, ταῦτα* or some other demonstrative word. This is common in Greek and is used more for emphasis than for clearness.

The same remark applies to *αὐτός τε καί* and to *καὶ ταῦτα*. See above, p. 220 (*e*).

In some instances, however, the demonstrative is thus inserted from the fear of losing the thread of the discourse, when the phrase that has been put emphatically foremost has been amplified:

IV. 440 B *ταῖς δ' ἐπιθυμίαις αὐτὸν κοινωνήσαντα . . . οἶμαί σε οὐκ ἂν φάναι . . .* **τοῦ τοιούτου** *αἰσθέσθαι*, where the construction also becomes more definite.

So I. 331 B *τὸ γὰρ μηδὲ ἄκοντά τινα ἐξαπατῆσαι . . . μέγα μέρος εἰς* **τοῦτο**, κ.τ.λ.

Or, where there is no amplification, but the order has been disturbed by emphasis, the chief word is resumed with an oblique case of *αὐτός*.

V. 477 D *ἐπιστήμην πότερον δύναμίν τινα φῂς εἶναι* **αὐτήν**, κ.τ.λ.

Cp. Gorg. 483 E where the construction is disturbed by the substitution of a general for a particular expression, *ἢ* **ἄλλα μυρία** *ἄν τις ἔχοι τοιαῦτα λέγειν*.

(*b*) In an explanatory clause, the chief word in the sentence to be explained is often resumed by a synonym:

II. 359 B *ἀγαπᾶσθαι . . .* **τιμώμενον**.

II. 359 C *εἴη δ' ἂν ἡ ἐξουσία . . . οἵαν ποτέ φασι* **δύναμιν**, κ.τ.λ.

X. 611 C, D *τεθεάμεθα . . . ὥσπερ οἱ . . . ὁρῶντες οὐκ ἂν . . . ἴδοιεν . . . , οὕτω . . .* **θεώμεθα**, κ.τ.λ.

(*c*) In resuming a deferred apodosis, a conjunction is often introduced; and, as *μὲν οὖν* usually introduces a digression, so *δ' οὖν* is the regular formula for resumption.

I. 330 E *καὶ αὐτός,—ἤτοι ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ γήρως ἀσθενείας ἢ καὶ ὥσπερ ἤδη ἐγγυτέρω ὢν τῶν ἐκεῖ μᾶλλόν τι καθορᾷ αὐτά— ὑποψίας* **δ' οὖν** *καὶ δείματος μεστὸς γίγνεται καὶ ἀναλογίζεται ἤδη καὶ σκοπεῖ, εἴ τινά τι ἠδίκηκεν*.

This, reduced to normal syntax, might be thus ex-

pressed:—ἤτοι ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ γήρως ἀσθενείας, ἢ ὑπὸ τοῦ μᾶλλόν τι καθορᾶν τὰ ἐκεῖ, ὑποψίας καὶ δείματος μεστὸς γίγνεται. But the addition of ὥσπερ ἐγγυτέρω ὤν, by occasioning the change to the indicative, disturbs this orderly arrangement and requires the insertion of δ' οὖν.

Cp VIII. 562 B ὃ προὔθεντο . . . ἀγαθόν . . . τοῦτο δ' ἦν *που πλοῦτος . . . ἡ πλούτου τοίνυν ἀπληστία, κ.τ.λ.

X. Remote Reference.

§ 51. The power of holding firmly by a complex thought appears (1) in the continuation of the main construction in spite of interruptions; and (2) in the pertinence of replies, showing that the respondent has fully grasped the main question, although the previous statement has been complicated by digressions.

(1) III. 413 E, 414 A τόν . . . ἀκήρατον ἐκβαίνοντα καταστατέον ἄρχοντα . . . καὶ τιμὰς δοτέον καὶ ζῶντι καὶ τελευτήσαντι, . . . μέγιστα γέρα λαγχάνοντα. Cp. Phaedo 81 A οὕτω μὲν ἔχουσα . . . ἀπέρχεται . . . οἷ ἀφικομένῃ ὑπάρχει αὐτῇ εὐδαίμονι εἶναι, πλάνης . . . ἀπηλλαγμένῃ, ὥσπερ δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τῶν μεμυημένων . . . μετὰ τῶν θεῶν διάγουσα [1].

VII. 540 D ξυγχωρεῖτε . . . εἰρηκέναι. Then follows a sentence of nineteen lines with a break and appositional asyndeton in the middle, then the construction with the infinitive is resumed with πλεῖστα ὀνήσειν 541 A.

(2) III. 405 B, C ἢ δοκεῖ σοι . . . τούτου αἴσχιον εἶναι . . . (ten lines) . . . οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ', ἔφη, ἐκείνου ἔτι αἴσχιον.

IV. 439 D οὐ δὴ ἀλόγως . . . (five lines) . . . οὔκ, ἀλλ' εἰκότως.

VI. 491 E οὔκ, ἀλλά, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὕτως (see note in loco).

VIII. 558 B, C ἡ δὲ συγγνώμη . . . (nine lines) . . . πάνυ γ', ἔφη, γενναία.

IX. 573 E ἆρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη . . . (six lines) . . . σφόδρα γ', ἔφη.

[1] διάγουσα is supported by the Petrie papyrus against διαγούσῃ, Heindorf's conjecture.

XI. Imperfect Constructions.

Attraction, Hypallage, Zeugma.

Very often, however, as in all Greek, the attraction of the nearest word, or an agreement that is apparent only, prevails over logic. The speaker is contented with a prima facie appearance of concord. The frequent redundancy of expression causes this anomaly to be more common than it would otherwise be. § 52.

1. *Construction with the nearest word.* (What is commonly known as *Attraction* is a special case of this.)

II. 370 E ἵνα οἵ τε γεωργοὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀροῦν **ἔχοιεν** βοῦς, οἵ τε οἰκοδόμοι πρὸς τὰς ἀγωγὰς μετὰ τῶν γεωργῶν **χρῆσθαι ὑποζυγίοις** (i. e. ἔχοιεν ὑποζύγια ὥστε χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς).

III. 392 D **πάντα,** ὅσα . . . λέγεται, διήγησις **οὖσα** τυγχάνει.

III. 409 D ἀρετὴ δὲ φύσεως παιδευομένης χρόνῳ. Mr. H. Richards would read παιδευμένη. But if precise exactness is required, should it not be χρηστὴ φύσις παιδευομένη?

III. 416 A **αἴσχιστον ποιμέσι** τοιούτους . . . τρέφειν κύνας (ποιμέσι in construction with αἴσχιστον takes the place of ποιμένας the subject of τρέφειν). Ib. ἐπιχειρῆσαι τοῖς προβάτοις κακουργεῖν. Madvig would omit κακουργεῖν. But the pleonastic infinitive is rendered easier by the frequent use of ἐπιχειρεῖν with infinitive in Plato so that ἐπιχειρεῖν κακουργεῖν τὰ πρόβατα is also suggested.

IV. 421 C ἐατέον **ὅπως** ἑκάστοις τοῖς ἔθνεσιν ἡ φύσις **ἀποδίδωσι τοῦ μεταλαμβάνειν** εὐδαιμονίας (where the meaning is ἐατέον τὰ ἔθνη μεταλαμβάνειν εὐδαιμονίας οὕτως ὅπως ἡ φύσις ἑκάστοις ἀποδίδωσιν).

V. 454 D διαφέρον sing. agreeing with γένος, instead of plur.

V. 459 B δεῖ **ἄκρων** εἶναι τῶν ἀρχόντων.

V. 472 D **παράδειγμα οἷον** ἂν εἴη ὁ κάλλιστος ἄνθρωπος (οἷον is neuter because of παράδειγμα).

V. 473 D καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ταὐτὸν συμπέσῃ, δύναμίς τε πολιτικὴ καὶ φιλοσοφία. τοῦτο is singular by prolepsis. H. Richards

would read ταῦτα. But cp. IV. 435 A ὅ γε ταὐτὸν ἂν τις προσείποι, κ.τ.λ.

VII. 520 D **ἐν πόλει ᾗ** ἥκιστα πρόθυμοι ἄρχειν . . . **ταύτην** ἄριστα . . . ἀνάγκη **οἰκεῖσθαι** (for πόλιν ἐν ᾗ, κ.τ.λ.).

VII. 526 C ἅ γε **μείζω** πόνον παρέχει . . . οὐκ ἂν ῥᾳδίως **οὐδὲ πολλὰ** ἂν εὕροις **ὡς τοῦτο** (ὡς is said as if οὕτω μέγαν and not μείζω had preceded; and this is occasioned by οὐδὲ πολλά coming between. 'You will not *easily* find any that give *more* trouble; not *many* that give *as much*.'

VII. 534 A ἵνα μὴ ἡμᾶς **πολλαπλασίων** λόγων ἐμπλήσῃ ἢ **ὅσων** οἱ παρεληλυθότες—a place at which the critics have stumbled. It may no doubt be explained by supplying ἢ ὅσων λόγων οἱ παρεληλυθότες λόγοι ἐνέπλησαν ἡμᾶς. But it seems more probable that ὅσων (for ὅσοι) follows the case of πολλαπλασίων.

Obs. 1.—In comparisons the antecedent is often attracted into the relative clause.

VI. 485 D αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι . . . ἀσθενέστεραι, ὥσπερ ῥεῦμα . . . **ἀπωχετευμένον**.

VII. 539 D μὴ ὡς νῦν ὁ τυχὼν καὶ οὐδὲν προσήκων ἔρχεται ἐπ' αὐτό.

X. 610 D μή, ὥσπερ νῦν διὰ τοῦτο ὑπ' ἄλλων . . . ἀποθνήσκουσιν οἱ ἄδικοι.

A striking example in Phaedo 84 A is supported by the Petrie papyrus, Πηνελόπης τινὰ ἐναντίως ἱστὸν **μεταχειριζομένης**.

Obs. 2.—The mood of a verb is affected by an intervening conjunction, though not strictly in construction with it.

IX. 591 C, D **οὐχ ὅπως** . . . ἐνταῦθα τετραμμένος ζήσει, ἀλλ' οὐδέ . . . τοῦτο πρεσβεύων, **ὅπως** . . . καλὸς **ἔσται**, ἐὰν **μή** . . . **μέλλῃ** . . . **ἀλλ'** ἀεὶ . . . **φαίνηται**. φαίνηται should have been φανεῖται depending on the first ὅπως. Cp. V. 466 E διακονεῖν, sc. δεήσει.

Obs. 3.—The verb of a relative clause is often attracted into the infinitive of *oratio obliqua*: VI. 492 C; X. 614 C; 619 C &c., cp. Herodotus.

Obs. 4.—The conclusion or answer, instead of following the main sentence, sometimes takes the nearer construction:

I. 336 E μὴ γὰρ δὴ οἴου . . . (five lines intervene) ὑπείκειν . . . καὶ οὐ σπουδάζειν . . . **οἴου γε σύ** (sc. σπουδάζειν ἡμᾶς):—the original sentence μὴ γὰρ δή, κ.τ.λ., is lost sight of.

IV. 421 E **ἕτερα** δή . . . εὑρήκαμεν . . . ποιᾶ **ταῦτα**; **Πλοῦτός** τε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ **πενία.**

The nominatives really answer to the accusative ἕτερα, but this is lost sight of, the case of ταῦτα being ambiguous.

VI. 492 C, D ἐν δὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ τὸν νέον . . . τίνα οἴει καρδίαν ἴσχειν; ἢ *ποίαν αὐτῷ παιδείαν . . . ἀνθέξειν, ἣν οὐ . . . οἰχήσεσθαι . . . καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσειν, κ.τ.λ.

Πολλή . . . ἀνάγκη.

The answer refers to the last clauses of the preceding sentence, and takes no notice of the question.

2. *Parallelism.* § 53.

(*a*) The action of a verb is extended to several nouns although it is strictly applicable to one only ('zeugma').

VIII. 553 C τιάρας τε καὶ στρεπτοὺς καὶ ἀκινάκας **παραζωννύντα**: the participle is strictly applicable only to ἀκινάκας.

(*b*) On the other hand, a preceding construction is continued, although some other construction is really required.

V. 453 D ἤτοι **δελφῖνα** . . . ὑπολαβεῖν ἂν ἤ τινα ἄλλην ἄπορον **σωτηρίαν** (φανῆναι ἄν).

IV. 431 C **τὰς** δέ γε **ἁπλᾶς** τε καὶ **μετρίας** . . . ἐν ὀλίγοις τε **ἐπιτεύξει**, κ.τ.λ. The accusative is carried on from ἁπλᾶς τε καὶ παντοδαπὰς ἐπιθυμίας, supra.

V. 467 C προσμηχανᾶσθαι governed by δεῖ in ὑπαρκτέον.

VI. 510 B τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ . . . ψυχὴ ζητεῖν **ἀναγκάζεται** ἐξ ὑποθέσεων . . . τὸ δ' αὖ ἕτερον τὸ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον . . . ἰοῦσα (sc. ζητεῖ) where to two parallel clauses a single expression is applied, which is only suitable to the former of them. The higher dialectic is above Necessity.

VII. 528 C ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν . . . κολουόμενα, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ζητούντων, λόγον οὐκ ἐχόντων καθ' ὅ τι χρήσιμα.

(*c*) In replies the construction is sometimes continued from the previous sentence, although involving some harshness in the immediate context.

VI. 507 E **τίνος** δὴ λέγεις; here the genitive may be explained as = περὶ τίνος; see above, p. 184 (*b*), but it is more

probably occasioned by a reference to what precedes: *τίνος*, sc. *μὴ παραγενομένου*.

VII. 531 D τοῦ προοιμίου . . . ἢ τίνος λέγεις; A construction may be found for *τίνος* by supplying *τὸ ἔργον*, but the genitive is more probably occasioned by assimilation to the preceding construction.

VIII. 547 E τῷ δέ γε φοβεῖσθαι, κ.τ.λ. The dative is parallel to *πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις* (supra D) but is inconsistent with what follows (548 A) τὰ πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων ἴδια ἕξει;

VIII. 558 A. The words *αὐτῶν μενόντων* have a possible construction with *εἶδες*, supra, but really follow the case of *ἀνθρώπων* which is genitive absolute.

Obs. 1.—An imperfect construction is sometimes supplemented by epexegesis.

V. 464 B ἀπεικάζοντες . . . πόλιν σώματι πρὸς μέρος αὐτοῦ . . . ὡς ἔχει.

Obs. 2.—The parallelism not only of cases and moods, but also of adverbs should be noted.

V. 475 E πῶς αὐτὸ λέγεις;

Οὐδαμῶς . . . ῥᾳδίως ('not in a way easy to explain'). Cp. Symp. 202 C πῶς τοῦτο, ἔφην, λέγεις; καὶ ἥ, Ῥᾳδίως, ἔφη.

§ 54. 3. *Interchange of subject and attribute* (*Hypallage*).

The common idiom by which the attribute of a subordinate word (such as an infinitive) is attached to the subject of the main verb,—e.g. *δίκαιός εἰμι ποιεῖν*,—has an extended use in Plato.

VII. 537 B οὗτος γὰρ ὁ χρόνος . . . ἀδύνατός τι ἄλλο πρᾶξαι.

VIII. 559 B ᾗ τε μὴ παῦσαι ζῶντα δυνατή, 'in that one cannot suppress it while one lives.' See note in loco.

Hence VI. 489 A ταῖς πόλεσι . . . τὴν διάθεσιν ἔοικε = τῇ τῶν πόλεων διαθέσει ἔοικε, and in VIII. 562 A τίς τρόπος τυραννίδος . . . γίγνεται; appears to be equivalent to *τίνα τρόπον γίγνεται τυραννίς*;

See also VI. 496 A προσήκοντα ἀκοῦσαι σοφίσματα = οἷς προσήκει ἀκοῦσαι σ. ('to be so described'). Cp. Eur. Or. 771 οὐ προσήκομεν κολάζειν τοῖσδε = οὐ προσήκει τοῖσδε κολάζειν ἡμᾶς.

4. *Mixed Constructions.* § 55.

As a word is sometimes attracted out of its proper construction, so the speaker sometimes hesitates between two constructions and fuses both into one. Familiar instances are—

I. 347 A ὧν δὴ ἕνεκα, ὡς ἔοικε, μισθὸν **δεῖν** ὑπάρχειν.

VI. 485 A ὃ . . . ἐλέγομεν, τὴν φύσιν . . . **δεῖν** καταμαθεῖν.

VIII. 560 D ὡς ἀγροικίαν . . . οὖσαν πείθοντες ὑπερορίζουσι (πείθοντες . . . εἶναι, ὑπερορίζουσιν ὡς . . . οὖσαν).

Cp. Theaet. 157 A (B. Gildersleeve, *American Journal of Philology*, vii. 2, No. 26, p. 175) ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐλέγομεν, οὐδὲν **εἶναι** ἓν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό.

(*a*) *Apparent solecisms.*

I. 351 C εἰ μέν, ἔφη, **ὡς** σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες, **ἔχει**, ἡ δικαιοσύνη **σοφία**. Cp. Theaet. 204 A **ἐχέτω** δή, ὡς νῦν φαμέν, **μία ἰδέα** . . . γιγνομένη ἡ συλλαβή.

II. 378 C **πολλοῦ δεῖ** γιγαντομαχίας τε **μυθολογητέον**, κ.τ.λ. (πολλοῦ δεῖ is treated as an adverbial phrase = οὐδαμῶς).

III. 414 C **οὐδ' οἶδα εἰ** (i.e. μόλις) γενόμενον ἄν. Cp. Tim. 26 B οὐκ ἂν οἶδα εἰ δυναίμην.

IV. 444 B τοιούτου ὄντος . . . οἵου πρέπειν αὐτῷ δουλεύειν. 'Τοιούτου ὄντος οἵου δουλεύειν would be Greek. So would τοιούτου ὄντος ὥστε π. α. δουλεύειν. But the text as it stands is not Greek at all.' H. Richards. It may stand as Platonic Greek.

V. 478 D εἴ τι φανείη **οἷον** ἅμα ὂν τε καὶ μὴ ὄν (confusion of οἷον εἶναι with φανείη ὄν).

X. 615 D οὐδ' ἂν ἥξει (expressing more of certainty than ἥκοι ἄν, more of modality than ἥξει: Cobet cj. οὐδὲ *μὴ ἥξει).

Perhaps also in the doubtful passage, I. 333 E λαθεῖν . . . δεινότατος ἐμποιῆσαι, there is a confusion of δεινότατος λαθεῖν ἐμποιήσας with δεινότατος λαθὼν ἐμποιῆσαι, the position of δεινότατος suggesting the construction of ἐμποιῆσαι. But see note in loco.

(*b*) Fusion of the objective and subjective aspects of the same notion.

IV. 434 D ἐὰν . . . εἰς ἕνα ἕκαστον τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἰὸν τὸ εἶδος τοῦτο ὁμολογῆται, κ.τ.λ. ('It is not the εἶδος which goes or turns to individual men.' H. Richards, who proposes ἰοῦσιν.)

IV. 442 D μή πῃ ἡμῖν ἀπαμβλύνεται . . . δικαιοσύνη. 'Justice' here is the *notion* of justice as formerly conceived.

V. 450 E θαρραλέον, 'fearless,' i.e. not dangerous, a thing to be attempted without fear. Cp. Soph. Phil. 106 οὐκ ἆρ' ἐκείνῳ γ' οὐδὲ προσμῖξαι θρασύ;

(*c*) *Abstract and concrete.*

a. Attributes are personified.

II. 382 D ποιητὴς . . . ψευδὴς ἐν θεῷ οὐκ ἔνι, 'The lying poet has no place in our idea of God.'

VIII. 554 D τὰς τοῦ κηφῆνος ξυγγενεῖς . . . ἐπιθυμίας.

IX. 575 C, D ὃς ἂν . . . πλεῖστον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τύραννον ἔχῃ.

β. In X. 617 D ἀρχὴ ἄλλης περιόδου θνητοῦ γένους, 'the beginning of another cycle of mortal race' is put abstractedly for 'the beginning of your time for again belonging to the race of mortals.'

γ. Name and thing.

V. 470 B ὥσπερ καὶ ὀνομάζεται δύο ταῦτα ὀνόματα, πόλεμός τε καὶ στάσις, οὕτω καὶ εἶναι δύο, ὄντα ἐπὶ δυοῖν τινοῖν διαφοραῖν.

(*d*) *General with particular.*

IV. 435 A ὅ γε ταὐτὸν ἄν τις προσείποι, κ.τ.λ. 'That which receives the same appellation' is the just, whether just man or just state, but these, although univocal, are not one thing. Cp. V. 473 D καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ταὐτὸν συμπέσῃ, κ.τ.λ. (p. 233).

(*e*) *Part with whole* (synecdoche).

II. 371 E πλήρωμα . . . πόλεώς εἰσι . . . καὶ μισθωτοί, 'Hirelings will *help* to make up our population.'

(*f*) Constructions κατὰ σύνεσιν may be included here.

V. 455 D κρατεῖται takes a genitive in the sense of ἡττᾶται.

XII. Changes of Construction.

§ 56. 1. From the relative to the definitive pronoun.

It is a well-known peculiarity of Greek syntax that in

continuing a relative sentence, a definitive or demonstrative pronoun takes the place of the relative.

I. 353 D ἔσθ' **ὅτῳ** ἄλλῳ ἢ ψυχῇ δικαίως ἂν αὐτὰ ἀποδοῖμεν καὶ φαῖμεν ἴδια **ἐκείνης** εἶναι.

VI. 511 C **αἷς** αἱ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαὶ καὶ διανοίᾳ μὲν ἀναγκάζονται . . . **αὐτὰ** θεᾶσθαι οἱ θεώμενοι.

IX. 578 C **ὃς** ἄν . . . ᾖ καὶ **αὐτῷ** . . . ἐκποριισθῇ, κ.τ.λ.

Gorg. 452 D **ὃ** φῂς σὺ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι . . . καὶ σὲ δημιουργὸν εἶναι **αὐτοῦ**.

Obs.—In Plato although the sentence passes out of the relative construction it is still partially affected by it.

II. 357 B αἱ ἡδοναὶ **ὅσαι** ἀβλαβεῖς καὶ **μηδὲν** . . . διὰ **ταύτας** γίγνεται ἄλλο. See above, p. 211, *a*.

So in passing from a participial clause which is equivalent to a relative.

I. 337 E πρῶτον μὲν **μὴ εἰδὼς** . . . ἔπειτα . . . ἀπειρημένον **αὐτῷ εἴη**, where μὴ εἰδὼς = ὃς μὴ εἰδείη.

2. Another consequence of the comparative laxity of the Greek sentence is the frequent change from a dependent to an independent construction. (See esp. Hom. Il. XV. 369, Lysias, c. Eratosth, § 38.) § **57**.

II. 383 A **ὡς** μήτε αὐτοὺς γόητας **ὄντας** . . . μήτε ἡμᾶς ψεύδεσι **παράγειν**. Here παράγειν returns to construction with λέγειν, the subordinate clause, ὡς . . . ὄντας, being ignored.

IV. 426 C τὴν μὲν κατάστασιν . . . μὴ **κινεῖν** . . . ὃς δ' ἂν . . . θεραπεύῃ . . . οὗτος ἄρα ἀγαθὸς . . . **ἔσται** (H. Richards would read οὗτος ⟨ὡς⟩ ἄρα).

V. 465 E γέρα δέχονται . . . **ζῶντές** τε καὶ τελευτήσαντες ταφῆς ἀξίας **μετέχουσιν**. Here μετέχουσιν is co-ordinated with δέχονται, passing out of the subordinate participial construction.

VIII. 549 C, D **ὅταν** . . . τῆς μητρὸς **ἀκούῃ** ἀχθομένης . . . ἔπειτα **ὁρώσης** . . . καί . . . **αἰσθάνηται**. αἰσθάνηται which has the same subject with ὁρώσης, κ.τ.λ., passes out of the participial construction, and is construed immediately with ὅταν.

IX. 590 C ὅταν τις ἀσθενὲς . . . **ἔχῃ** τὸ . . . εἶδος, ὥστε μὴ ἂν **δύνασθαι** ἄρχειν . . . ἀλλὰ θεραπεύειν . . . καὶ τὰ θωπεύματα . . .

μόνον δύνηται μανθάνειν; δύνηται passes out of the construction with ὥστε, and returns to the construction with ὅταν. The last two instances might also be referred to mistaken parallelism: see above, p. 235. The reading of II. 364 C (βλάψει) may be sustained as an example of this tendency, and, in the same passage, 365 A περιμένει is to be retained.

Obs.—Note also the converse return from the finite verb to the participle.

VII. 531 A φασὶν . . . ἀμφισβητοῦντες.

and from inf. to partic.

III. 403 B, C οὕτως ὁμιλεῖν . . . εἰ δὲ μή . . . ὑφέξοντα.

§ 58. 3. *Change of subject.*

This frequently occurs when there is some alternation between the active and passive voice.

I. 333 C ὅταν μηδὲν δέῃ αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι ἀλλὰ κεῖσθαι;

II. 359 E, 360 A ἀφανῆ αὐτὸν γενέσθαι . . . καὶ διαλέγεσθαι ὡς περὶ οἰχομένου.

II. 377 B μάλιστα γὰρ δὴ τότε πλάττεται καὶ ἐνδύεται τύπος.

III. 409 E, 410 A. The subject changes from the *arts* to the professors of either art respectively.

III. 414 D ταῦτα . . . πάσχειν τε καὶ γίγνεσθαι περὶ αὐτούς.

4. *Limitation of subject.*

V. 465 C ὧν ἀπηλλαγμένοι ἂν εἶεν (sc. οἱ πολῖται) . . . κολακείας τε πλουσίων πένητες, κ.τ.λ.

VIII. 556 C, D ὅταν . . . ἀλλήλους θεώμενοι (sc. οἱ πολῖται) μηδαμῇ ταύτῃ καταφρονῶνται οἱ πένητες ὑπὸ τῶν πλουσίων.

5. From the dative in regimen to the accusative in agreement with the subject of an infinitive. (This change occurs in other Greek writers from Homer downwards.

Il. IV. 341, 342 σφῶϊν μέν τ' ἐπέοικε μετὰ πρώτοισιν ἐόντας | ἑστάμεν.)

IV. 422 B, C εἰ ἐξείη . . . ὑποφεύγοντι . . . ἀναστρέφοντα κρούειν;

6. *Suspended constructions.*

In many sentences, the notion which it is intended to

make prominent is put forward either in the nominative or accusative (see above, p. 183, γ), and is left with no definite construction, the turn of the sentence being subsequently modified. (Cp. Soph. El. 1364–1366 *τοὺς γὰρ ἐν μέσῳ λόγους,* | *πολλαὶ κυκλοῦνται νύκτες ἡμέραι τ' ἴσαι,* | *αἳ ταῦτά σοι δείξουσιν,* Ἠλέκτρα, *σαφῆ.*)

II. 365 A **ταῦτα πάντα . . . λεγόμενα** . . . *τί οἰόμεθα ἀκουούσας νέων ψυχὰς ποιεῖν.* Here the shadow of a construction is supplied by *ἀκουούσας.*

II. 365 B **τὰ** *μὲν γὰρ* **λεγόμενα** . . . *ὄφελος οὐδέν φασιν εἶναι.*

III. 391 B *τὰς τοῦ* . . . *Σπερχειοῦ ἱερὰς τρίχας* Πατρόκλῳ *ἥρωϊ, ἔφη, κόμην ὀπάσαιμι φέρεσθαι.*

V. 474 E *μελιχλώρους δὲ καὶ τοὔνομα, κ.τ.λ.*

VI. 487 B *παραγόμενοι* . . . *μέγα τὸ σφάλμα* . . . *ἀναφαίνεσθαι.*

VIII. 565 D, E *ὡς ἄρα* **ὁ γευσάμενος** . . . *ἀνάγκη δὴ* **τούτῳ** *λύκῳ γενέσθαι.*

VIII. 566 E **πρὸς τοὺς** *ἔξω* **ἐχθροὺς τοῖς** *μὲν καταλλαγῇ, κ.τ.λ.*

7. Addition of a summary expression, without a conjunction, to clinch a series or enumeration which has been given whole or in part. § 59.

II. 373 A *κλῖναί τε προσέσονται* . . . **ἕκαστα τούτων παντοδαπά.**

IV. 434 A *πάντα τἄλλα μεταλλαττόμενα.*

VIII. 547 D *πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις.*

X. 598 B *τοὺς ἄλλους δημιουργούς.*

Obs.—A conjunction is sometimes inserted.

VII. 523 D *καὶ πᾶν ὅ τι τοιοῦτον.*

8. In resumption after a digression (see above, pp. 229 ff.) the construction is often changed. See especially, in the rambling speech of Pausanias in the Symposium, the passage 182 D–183 D **ἐνθυμηθέντι γὰρ** . . . *ἐνθάδε νομίζεσθαι,* where, amongst other irregularities, the dative *ἐνθυμηθέντι* is in no construction, because the 'deferred apodosis' is resumed (183 C) with a fresh turn of expression, *ταύτῃ μὲν οὖν οἰηθείη*

ἄν τις, κ.τ.λ., in which the original construction is forgotten. (Badham proposed to read γε for γάρ.)

Rep. VII. 532 B, C ἡ δέ γε . . . λύσις τε ἀπὸ τῶν δεσμῶν καὶ μεταστροφὴ . . . πᾶσα αὕτη ἡ πραγματεία . . . ταύτην ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν.

The passage has been already quoted above, p. 183 γ, but it is a strong instance of the peculiarity here spoken of.

§ 60. 9 From interrogative with negative meaning to direct negative :—

III. 390 A–C τί δέ; ποιεῖν ἄνδρα . . . (fifteen lines); οὐδὲ Ἄρεώς τε καὶ Ἀφροδίτης . . . δεσμὸν δι' ἕτερα τοιαῦτα.

10. *Other anacolutha.*

The laxity of the conversational style admits of changes which can hardly be brought under the preceding heads. Some words have only the 'shadow' of a construction, the sentence continuing as if that had been expressed which is only implied, or else returning to a connexion from which the intervening clauses have broken loose; or some new connexion or antithesis is suggested in the act of speaking.

II. 362 B τὰ κεδνὰ βλαστάνει βουλεύματα, πρῶτον μὲν ἄρχειν . . . ἔπειτα γαμεῖν . . . ἐκδιδόναι . . . ξυμβάλλειν, κοινωνεῖν οἷς ἂν ἐθέλῃ . . . εἰς ἀγῶνας τοίνυν ἰόντα . . . περιγίγνεσθαι . . . Here ἄρχειν and the following infinitives are in apposition with βουλεύματα, but in περιγίγνεσθαι the sentence has reverted to the construction with φήσουσι (supra A).

III. 387 D, E φαμὲν δὲ δή, ὅτι . . . τὸ τεθνάναι οὐ δεινὸν ἡγήσεται . . . οὐκ ἄρα . . . ὀδύροιτ' ἄν . . . ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε λέγομεν, ὡς . . . ἥκιστα ἑτέρου προσδεῖται . . . ἥκιστα ἄρ' αὐτῷ δεινὸν στερηθῆναι . . . ἥκιστ' ἄρα καὶ ὀδύρεσθαι (sc. φήσομεν). (Cp. VI. 501 D ἢ ἐκείνους φήσειν μᾶλλον, where see note.) The last infinitive, while perhaps occasioned by στερηθῆναι, which is in a different construction, must borrow its government from φαμέν and λέγομεν preceding. Others would supply προσήκει from δεινόν.

III. 388 E, 389 A οὔτε ἄρα ἀνθρώπους . . . ἄν τις ποιῇ, ἀποδεκτέον, πολὺ δὲ ἧττον, ἐὰν θεούς.

III. 389 C **κάμνοντι** . . . **λέγειν** . . . *μὴ τὰ ὄντα* **λέγοντι** (the participle co-ordinate with the infinitive).

III. 399 A, B *κατάλειπε . . . τὴν ἁρμονίαν, ἣ ἔν τε πολεμικῇ πράξει* **ὄντος ἀνδρείου** . . . *μιμήσαιτο φθόγγους . . . καὶ* **ἀποτυχόντος** . . . **ἀμυνομένου** *τὴν τύχην· καὶ ἄλλην αὖ ἐν εἰρηνικῇ . . . πράξει ὄντος, ἢ . . . πείθοντος . . . ἢ . . . ἄλλῳ . . . μεταπείθοντι ἑαυτὸν* **ἐπέχοντα**. To obtain a construction for *ἐπέχοντα* one must go back to *μιμήσαιτο* or to *κατάλειπε*.

III. 407 C, D **φῶμεν** *καὶ Ἀσκληπιὸν τοὺς μὲν . . . ὑγιεινῶς ἔχοντας . . . τούτοις μὲν . . .* **καταδεῖξαι** *ἰατρικὴν . . . τὰ νοσήματα* **ἐκβάλλοντα** . . . **προστάττειν** *δίαιταν . . . τὰ δ' εἴσω . . . νενοσηκότα σώματα* **οὐκ ἐπιχειρεῖν** *διαίταις . . . ἀπαντλοῦντα . . . μακρὸν καὶ κακὸν βίον ἀνθρώπῳ ποιεῖν, καὶ ἔκγονα αὐτῶν . . . ἕτερα τοιαῦτα* **φυτεύειν**, *ἀλλὰ τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον . . . ζῆν* **μὴ οἴεσθαι** *δεῖν θεραπεύειν.*

Goodwin (*M. and T.*, 685) quotes several instances of the exceptional use of *μή* in oratio obliqua after *φαίην ἄν, πάντες ἐροῦσι, τίς ἂν . . . ἡγοῖτο.* (I omit those in which *μή* is combined with *ἄν*, and also Rep. I. 346 E *ἔλεγον μηδένα ἐθέλειν*, for which see above, p. 211 *β*.)

These examples may justify the supposition that the change from *οὐκ ἐπιχειρεῖν* to *μὴ οἴεσθαι* is merely capricious. But I would suggest, 1st, that it is occasioned by the *sound* of *μὴ δυνάμενον*, and 2nd, more doubtfully, that while *ἐπιχειρεῖν* is *parallel* to *ἐπιδεῖξαι*, *οἴεσθαι* is in regimen after it—he prescribed that the physician should not think, &c. A further doubt occurs whether the subject of *φυτεύειν* is *Ἀσκληπιόν, τὸν ἰατρόν*, or *τοὺς ἀνθρώπους* from *ἀνθρώπῳ*, supra. See note in loco.

IV. 424 B *ὅπως ἂν . . . φυλάττωσι, τὸ μὴ νεωτερίζειν . . . ἀλλ' ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα φυλάττειν.*

The infinitive *φυλάττειν* is co-ordinate with *νεωτερίζειν*, but the construction is forgotten. Plato would not consciously have said *φυλάττωσι τὸ φυλάττειν.* The infinitive is taken as a vague imperative, or as depending on *ἀνθεκτέον*.

VI. 488 C *αὐτοὺς δὲ . . . περικεχύσθαι δεομένους, κ.τ.λ.*

In what follows the infinitive takes the place of the

participle, e.g. ἄρχειν, πλεῖν. Then there is a return to the participle in ἐπαινοῦντας . . . ψέγοντας. Then, if the MSS. are right, the nominative takes the place of the accusative in ἐπαΐοντες . . . οἰόμενοι possibly suggested by the nominatives, πείθοντες and βιαζόμενοι, which have intervened.

VI. 492 C ἦν οὐ κατακλυσθεῖσαν . . . οἰχήσεσθαι . . . καὶ φήσειν. The subject is changed, and the sense continued as if no negative particle had preceded.

VI. 510 E τούτοις μὲν . . . χρώμενοι, ζητοῦντές τε αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα ἰδεῖν. But perhaps δέ should be read.

VII. 517 A ἆρ' οὐ γέλωτ' ἂν παράσχοι . . . καὶ . . . ἀποκτιννύναι ἄν. If the text is sound the construction reverts to ἐννόησον supra 516 E.

VII. 530 B καὶ ζητεῖν appears to depend immediately on ἄτοπον ἡγήσεται, losing count of the intermediate words.

VIII. 556 C, D ὅταν παραβάλλωσιν . . . ἢ καὶ . . . ἀλλήλους θεώμενοι μηδαμῇ ταύτῃ καταφρονῶνται. θεώμενοι really takes the place of a subj. θεῶνται καὶ ἔπειτα, κ.τ.λ.

IX. 581 D ὅ τε χρηματιστικὸς . . . τί δὲ ὁ φιλότιμος . . . τὸν δὲ φιλόσοφον.

Obs.—A curious instance of wilful ambiguity occurs in

I. 344 E ἐγὼ γὰρ οἶμαι . . . τουτὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν; Ἔοικας, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

Thrasymachus says, 'you see, my view is different from yours,' meaning that injustice is profitable.

Socrates replies, 'You do seem to take a different view,' meaning 'you seem to think the question unimportant.'

In several of the above instances, those who do not allow for the extent of irregularity in Platonic syntax have recourse to conjecture.

§ 61. 11. Specially noticeable are the frequent interchanges or combinations (*a*) of singular and plural, (*b*) of masculine or feminine and neuter (in speaking of abstractions), (*c*) of the artist with his art, (*d*) of a city with her citizens, (*e*) of the soul (or some part or function of the soul) with the person; and, what is equally noticeable, the opposition of the soul to the man.

(*a*) Singular and plural—

I. 344 B, C *ἐπειδὰν δέ τις πρὸς τοῖς τῶν πολιτῶν χρήμασι καὶ αὐτοὺς ἀνδραποδισάμενος δουλώσηται, ἀντὶ τούτων τῶν αἰσχρῶν ὀνομάτων* **εὐδαίμονες καὶ μακάριοι κέκληνται** . . . *ὅσοι ἂν πύθωνται* **αὐτόν**, *κ.τ.λ.*

III. 399 D *αὐλοποιοὺς ἢ αὐλητὰς* . . . *ἢ οὐ* **τοῦτο** *πολυχορδότατον.*

III. 411 B, C *καὶ ἐὰν μὲν* . . . *λάβῃ* . . . *ἔμπλεῳ.*

VI. 496 C, D *τούτων* . . . *οἱ γενόμενοι,* . . . *λογισμῷ* **λαβών**, *κ.τ.λ.*

VI. 498 B, C *ὅταν* . . . *ἐκτὸς* **γίγνηται** . . . **ἀφέτους** *νέμεσθαι, κ.τ.λ.*

VIII. 554 B, C *ἐν αὐτῷ* . . . *αὐτῶν.*

VIII. 558 A *ἀνθρώπων καταψηφισθέντων* . . . **περινοστεῖ** *ὥσπερ ἥρως.*

IX. 571 C **τὰς** *περὶ τὸν ὕπνον* . . . **ἐκείνου.**

Cp. II. 376 E ; III. 411 B, C *τὸν θυμὸν ὀξύρροπον ἀπειργάσατο* . . . *ἀκρόχολοι οὖν, κ.τ.λ.*: IV. 426 A *τόδε* **αὐτῶν** *οὐ χαρίεν* . . . *ἔχθιστον ἡγεῖσθαι τὸν* . . . *λέγοντα, ὅτι πρὶν ἂν μεθύων, κ.τ.λ.*: ib. 426 C *ἀποθανουμένους ὃς ἂν τοῦτο δρᾷ.*

So with transition from particular to general VIII. 554 A *θησαυροποιὸς ἀνήρ· οὓς δὴ καὶ ἐπαινεῖ τὸ πλῆθος.*

Obs. 1.—A collective plural has sometimes a singular verb (V. 462 E, 463 A *ἔστι μέν* . . . *ἄρχοντές τε καὶ δῆμος*) and a collective singular, a plural relative (VI. 490 E *σμικρὸν δέ τι* . . . *οὕς, κ.τ.λ.*). In III. 399 D, quoted above, **τοῦτο** is a collective singular.

Obs. 2.—When two things are joined or brought under a single notion, they are spoken of as one (IV. 435 A *ταὐτὸν* . . . *μεῖζόν* *ε καὶ ἔλαττον*: V. 473 D *καὶ τοῦτο* . . . *δύναμίς τε* . . . *καὶ φιλοσοφία*). Hence we have the part in apposition to the whole (VII. 526 A *τὸ ἓν* . . . *ἴσον* . . . *ἕκαστον πᾶν παντί*), and singular and plural are correlated where the former is universal, the latter particular (X. 601 D *χρώμενον* **ἑκάστῳ** . . . **οἷα** *ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ* . . . **ᾧ** *χρῆται*).

(*b*) Masculine or feminine alternating with neuter—

II. 359 C **πλεονεξίαν, ὃ** *πᾶσα φύσις, κ.τ.λ.*

II. 363 A *αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην.*

III. 401 D ὅ τε ῥυθμὸς καὶ ἁρμονία . . . **φέροντα.**

III. 410 E ἀνεθέντος **αὐτοῦ** (sc. τῆς φύσεως).

IV. 428 A κατάδηλον . . . ἡ σοφία.

IV. 428 B τοῦτό γε αὐτό, ἡ εὐβουλία.

V. 449 D κοινωνίαν . . . ὀρθῶς . . . γιγνόμενον.

X. 611 B τοιοῦτον εἶναι ψυχήν, κ.τ.λ.

Obs.—Even where a concrete masculine noun is used abstractly, it has a neuter correlative.

II. 382 E ὁ θεὸς ἁπλοῦν.

VI. 494 D **νοῦς** οὐκ ἔνεστιν αὐτῷ . . . **τὸ** δὲ οὐ κτητόν.

(*c*) The artist and his art.

III. 409 E, 410 A οὐκοῦν καὶ ἰατρικὴν . . . μετὰ τῆς τοιαύτης δικαστικῆς κατὰ πόλιν νομοθετήσεις, **αἳ** τῶν πολιτῶν σοι τοὺς μὲν εὐφυεῖς . . . θεραπεύσουσι, τοὺς δὲ μή . . . **αὐτοὶ** ἀποκτενοῦσιν;

Mr. H. Richards would read αὐταί. But observe that in that case ἐάσουσιν and ἀποκτενοῦσιν would *both* refer as θεραπεύσουσι does to ἰατρική and δικαστική combined.

The plural here is κατὰ σύνεσιν as the dual in VIII. 550 E πλούτου ἀρετὴ διέστηκεν . . . τοὐναντίον ῥέποντε. So dialectic and the dialecticians in VII. 537 E τὸ νῦν περὶ **τὸ διαλέγεσθαι** κακὸν . . .: παρανομίας . . . **ἐμπίπλανται.**

(*d*) The city and her citizens.

IV. 435 E ἐν **ταῖς πόλεσιν** . . . **οἳ** δὴ καὶ ἔχουσι ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν.

VIII. 551 D τὴν μὲν πενήτων, τὴν δὲ πλουσίων, οἰκοῦντας ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ.

On the other hand the city is opposed to the citizens (as in Thuc.): II. 370 E αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν, IV. 428 C, D οὐχ ὑπὲρ **τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει τινὸς** βουλεύεται, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ **ἑαυτῆς ὅλης.**

(*e*) The man and his mind. (This may also be regarded as a point of style. Cp. esp. Phaedo, pp. 82, 83.)

III. 411 A, B οὗτος τὸ μὲν πρῶτον . . . ὥσπερ σίδηρον ἐμάλαξε (τὸ θυμοειδὲς) . . . ὅταν δ' ἐπέχων μὴ ἀνίῃ . . . τήκει . . . ἕως ἂν . . . ἐκτέμῃ ὥσπερ νεῦρα ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς, κ.τ.λ. (with ἄθυμον infra ψυχήν is to be supplied).

IV. 440 C, D ὅταν τις οἴηται . . . πραϋνθῇ.

VI. 486 A ᾗ οὖν ὑπάρχει διανοίᾳ . . . οἷόν τε οἴει τούτῳ μέγα τι δοκεῖν εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον;

VI. 503 C, D τὰ βέβαια αὖ ταῦτα ἤθη . . . χάσμης ἐμπίπλανται. The plural requires a masculine subject.

VI. 503 D, E δεῖν αὐτῷ (masc.) μεταδιδόναι . . . σπάνιον αὐτὸ οἴει ἔσεσθαι . . . βασανιστέον δὴ . . . εἰ . . . δυνατή (sc. ἡ φύσις αὕτη).

X. 620 E ἄγειν αὐτὴν . . . κυροῦντα ἣν λαχὼν εἵλετο μοῖραν.

XIII. Rhetorical Figures. § 62.

1. *Personification* enters largely into Greek idiom and is very characteristic of Plato. The argument (λόγος) is of course continually personified. A strong instance occurs in

VI. 503 A παρεξιόντος καὶ παρακαλυπτομένου τοῦ λόγου, πεφοβημένου κινεῖν τὸ νῦν παρόν.

Hence in VI. 484 A διὰ μακροῦ τινὸς διεξελθόντος λόγου, this reading (A Π M) is probably to be retained in preference to διεξελθόντες (x *v*).

Amongst many personifications perhaps the most striking is that in VIII. 568 D describing the difficulty experienced by tragic poetry in mounting 'constitution hill,' ὥσπερ ὑπὸ ἄσθματος ἀδυνατοῦσα πορεύεσθαι. Books VIII and IX indeed abound with bold personifications: see esp. IX. 573 A δορυφορεῖταί τε ὑπὸ μανίας, IX. 587 C δορυφόροις ἡδοναῖς.

The use of personifying words often adds a touch of liveliness to the style.

ἐθέλω (cp. Herod.): IV. 436 B ταὐτὸν τἀναντία ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν . . . οὐκ ἐθελήσει ἅμα. Cp. II. 370 B.

V. 459 C μὴ δεομένοις μὲν σώμασι φαρμάκων, ἀλλὰ διαίτῃ ἐθελόντων ὑπακούειν.

νοεῖν (I. 335 E), λέγειν, ἐπαινεῖν, ψέγειν, καλεῖν of words and phrases (IV. 431 A τοῦτο λέγειν τὸ κρείττω αὑτοῦ, κ.τ.λ.).

ἀμφισβητῶ: IV. 442 E εἴ τι ἡμῶν ἔτι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀμφισβητεῖ.

ζητῶ: III. 388 E ἰσχυρὰν καὶ μεταβολὴν ζητεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον.

To this head belongs the adjectival use of ἀδελφός, ἑταῖρος III. 404 B, IV. 439 D.

ποιῶ: a special use of ποιεῖν (intrans. = 'to behave') may be noticed here because occurring sometimes with an impersonal subject.

II. 365 A *τί οἰόμεθα ἀκουούσας νέων ψυχὰς* **ποιεῖν**.

IV. 432 A *οὐχ οὕτω* **ποιεῖ** ('acts') *αὕτη*.

So probably in VII. 523 E *ὧδε ποιεῖ ἑκάστη αὐτῶν* (*τῶν αἰσθήσεων*).

For the same use with a personal subject see V. 474 D *ἢ οὐχ οὕτω ποιεῖτε πρὸς τοὺς καλούς*; 'Is not this your way?'

III. 416 B *μὴ τοιοῦτον . . . ποιήσωσι, κ.τ.λ.*

V. 469 B *πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους πῶς ποιήσουσιν*;

§ 63. 2. *Continued Metaphor.* The two chief examples in the Republic of this figure, which serves at once to enliven and to connect discourse, are the image of the wave in Book V, and the allegory of the cave in Book VII. The former is a good instance of the way in which an image *grows* in Plato.

It may possibly have been suggested by some preparatory hints in Book IV. See esp. 441 C *ταῦτα . . . μόγις* **διανενεύκαμεν**. This renders more natural the incidental remark in V. 453 D *ἄν τέ τις εἰς κολυμβήθραν μικρὰν ἐμπέσῃ ἄν τε εἰς* **τὸ μέγιστον πέλαγος** *μέσον, ὅμως γε νεῖ οὐδὲν ἧττον*: (ibid.) *οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡμῖν νευστέον καὶ πειρατέον σώζεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ λόγου, ἤτοι δελφῖνά τινα ἐλπίζοντας ἡμᾶς ὑπολαβεῖν ἂν ἤ τινα ἄλλην ἄπορον σωτηρίαν.* So far, although the image of a 'sea of difficulty' has appeared in connexion with the fear of ridicule and the mockery of comic poets (452 B), there is no hint of combining the notion of laughter with that of the waves. Four pages afterwards (457 B, C) we are found to have escaped from the first great 'wave' which had threatened to swamp us. And, after a still longer interval,—the digression about usages of war having intervened,—it appears at 472 A that the three stages of difficulty are distinctly thought of as a **τρικυμία**, of which the

third and greatest wave is now impending. Hence, as the result of all this, when the discussion culminates, and the moment has arrived for the audacious figure of the laughing wave, it is introduced without any effect of violence, (473 C) εἰρήσεται δ' οὖν, εἰ καὶ μέλλει γέλωτί τε ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ κῦμα ἐκγελῶν ('bursting in laughter') καὶ ἀδοξίᾳ κατακλύσειν.

Similarly, the descriptions of the evil states in Books VIII, IX are linked together by the growing image of the *drones* in the hive (distinguished as stinging and stingless) which culminates in the description of the master passion in the tyrannical individual as a mighty winged drone—ὑπόπτερον καὶ μέγαν κηφῆνά τινα (IX. 573 A).

Again, the incidental phrase βίου κατασκευή (VIII. 557 B) helps to render more natural the impressive conception of the inward πολιτεία, 'the kingdom of Heaven within,' at the close of Book IX. 592 B ἐν οὐρανῷ . . . παράδειγμα ἀνάκειται τῷ βουλομένῳ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὁρῶντι ἑαυτὸν κατοικίζειν. Also in IX. 588 E the words καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν λέοντα serve to make less abrupt the introduction of the serpent element—τὸ ὀφεῶδες (ib. 590 B).

Other instances of Plato's love of climax and gradation are the elaborate account of the misery of the tyrant in IX. 576–588, and the demonstration of the unreality of poetry in X. 598, 599. (Cp. the treatment of Pleasure in the Philebus.)

3. *Cumulative illustration.* The effect of liveliness and § 64.
also of fertility of conception is often produced by the substitution of one illustration for another before there has been time for the first to be applied. Thus in the quick succession of examples with which Socrates poses Polemarchus, after showing that the just man is inferior to the draught-player as a partner in draughts, to the builder in the laying of bricks, &c., instead of simply asking, 'to whom then is he superior, and in what?' he brings in a fresh example at the moment of asking.

I. 333 B ἀλλ' εἰς τίνα δὴ κοινωνίαν ὁ δίκαιος ἀμείνων κοινωνὸς τοῦ κιθαριστικοῦ, ὥσπερ ὁ κιθαριστικὸς τοῦ δικαίου εἰς κρουμάτων; Cp. Theaet. 147 A where in showing the absurdity of the definition of πηλός—πηλὸς ὁ τῶν χυτρέων καὶ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν ἰπνοπλαθῶν καὶ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν πλινθουργῶν—an unexpected addition is made to it,—εἴτε ὁ τῶν κοροπλαθῶν προσθέντες, εἴτε ἄλλων ὡντινωνοῦν δημιουργῶν.

So in IV. 421 A—where he has been arguing from the examples of the husbandman and potter that the life of the guardians must be arranged so as to secure their devotion to their proper work,—instead of proceeding to say that this is the more necessary in proportion to the high importance of their function, he suddenly introduces to our notice the class of 'botchers,' whose work is the least important of all:—νευρορράφοι γὰρ φαῦλοι γενόμενοι, κ.τ.λ.

Hence it is probable that in V. 479 B—τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ἑστιάσεσιν, κ.τ.λ.—there are *two* illustrations and not one only. See note in loco.

§ 65. 4. *Irony and Litotes.* The tendency to under-statement, which in Thucydides and elsewhere renders οὐχ ἧσσον = μᾶλλον and the like, is strengthened by the peculiar irony of Plato. In a few places this irony has been a cause of obscurity, e. g.—

(*a*) I. 337 C ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἔφη, καὶ σὺ οὕτω ποιήσεις; 'I suppose, then, that is what you mean to do?'

IV. 423 C–E φαῦλον . . . φαυλότερον . . . φαῦλα.

V. 451 A ὥστε εὖ με παραμυθεῖ.

VII. 529 A οὐκ ἀγεννῶς (cp. Phaedr. 264 B).

It gives rise to doubt about οὐ πάνυ, μὴ πάνυ τι, &c. See above, p. 209 β.

Obs.—The alternation between irony and seriousness, which Plato sometimes introduces with marked effect, has also given rise to misapprehension.

I. 344 E ἐγὼ γὰρ οἶμαι, ἔφη ὁ Θρασύμαχος, τουτὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν. Ἔοικας, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. (See note in loco.)

(*b*) The constant insertion of qualifying phrases, to avoid the appearance of dogmatism, belongs to the same tendency. To this may be referred the frequent use of *τάχ' ἄν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, εἰς τὸ δυνατόν, ἂν μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, εἰς ὅσον ἐνδέχεται*, and VII. 527 A *καὶ σμικρά*.

(*c*) Ironical collocation of words (*παρὰ προσδοκίαν*) II. 373 A *ἑταῖραι καὶ πέμματα*. (See note on II. 373 B *θηρευταί*.)

5. *Recurring phrases.*

Besides the qualifying expressions mentioned in the last paragraph, Plato employs certain recurring phrases or *façons de parler*, partly (*a*) to maintain the resemblance to ordinary conversation, and partly (*b*) to keep before the mind the pervading antithesis between the actual and the ideal.

(*a*) Of the former sort are *ὥρα ἂν εἴη, τίς μηχανή; τὸ λεγόμενον, πάσῃ τέχνῃ, εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ, εἰ μή τι* (sc. *ἄλλο*), *εἰ μὴ σὺ κελεύεις*, and the 'pronominal' phrases noticed above, p. 196 (*g*).

The frequent use of *ὦ δαιμόνιε, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ὦ πρὸς Διός*, &c. marks the rising interest of the discussion. See esp. IX. 574 B *ἀντεχομένων δὴ καὶ μαχομένων*, **ὦ θαυμάσιε**, *γέροντός τε καὶ γραός, κ.τ.λ.* A similar effect is produced by the repetition of *ἦ δ' ὅς* in the course of a reported speech. Cp. *ἔφη λέγων* in Herodotus.

(*b*) To the latter motive,—the contrast of actual and ideal,—is to be ascribed the constant use of *δοκῶν, λεγόμενος, καλούμενος, δοξαζόμενος εἶναι, οἰόμενος* (I. 336 A, III. 395 D &c.): also of *ποιούμενος*='esteemed' in VI. 498 A, VII. 538 C,—where see notes. Special uses of *οὗτος, ἐκεῖνος, ὅδε, ἐνθάδε, ἐκεῖ, νῦν* (VI. 489 C *τοὺς νῦν πολιτικοὺς ἄρχοντας*) are grounded on the same antithesis.

6. *Tautology and Repetition.* § 66.

(*a*) Plato is not in the least afraid of repeating the same word and often does so accidentally in the same passage with a difference of meaning. This happens very frequently with *δοκεῖν, δόξα*, and other words which have both a vernacular and a philosophical sense. Especially noticeable are:

III. 415 C τὴν ... προσήκουσαν τιμὴν ἀποδόντες ... τιμήσαντες : where H. Richards would read τιμήσαντες ⟨κατ' ἀξίαν⟩.

V. 449 D ἄλλης ἐπιλαμβάνει πολιτείας, 'You are taking up another form of State,' with V. 450 A ἐπιλαβόμενοί μου, 'taking me up,' i. e. 'checking my discourse' immediately following.

VIII. 546 D ἄρχοντες . . . καταστήσονται, 'rulers will be appointed' (passive).

Ibid. καταστήσονται . . . τοὺς ἀρίστους, 'they will appoint the best men to be their rulers' (middle voice).

Cp. Laws VIII. 840 E, 841 A τίνα δὴ συμβουλεύεις αὐτοῖς τίθεσθαι νόμον, ἐὰν ὁ νῦν τιθέμενος αὐτοὺς ἐκφύγῃ; where τίθεσθαι is middle, and τιθέμενος passive.

For Rep. VIII. 547 E ἁπλοῦς . . . ἁπλουστέρους see note in loco.

Obs.—There are limits to this as to other anomalies and it is very improbable that in VI. 499 E ff. ἀλλοίαν . . . δόξαν should mean, first, 'a different opinion from what they now have' and then 'a different opinion from that which we maintain,' or that in X. 601 D, E τὸν χρώμενον . . . ἄγγελον γίγνεσθαι τῷ ποιητῇ οἷα ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ ποιεῖ . . . ᾧ χρῆται· οἷον αὐλητής . . . περὶ τῶν αὐλῶν . . . ἐπιτάξει οἵους δεῖ ποιεῖν, the words οἷα ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ ποιεῖ . . . ᾧ χρῆται should mean 'what *the instrument does* well or ill,' and not 'what specimens of the instrument *the maker makes* well or ill.'

(*b*) On the other hand the language is varied without apparent reason.

VII. 530 E ἐξῆκον . . . ἀφήκειν and often elsewhere.

§ 67. **XIV. Order of Words.**

(Cp. *Digest*, §§ 287–311.)

The freedom of conversation allows of great variety in the order of words, and Plato has used this liberty for purposes of effect, sometimes putting words to the front to give importance to them, sometimes reserving a surprise, and sometimes merely avoiding harsh collocations. Thus

unusual order is employed (1) for emphasis, (2) for euphony, or (3) for both together. (The general rule that the more emphatic notion stands *first* in Greek—not *last*, as often in English—of course holds in Plato as in other writers.)

1. (*a*) A phrase is rendered more emphatic by separating the words of which it is composed and placing unemphatic words between. (Phaedr. 247 B ἄκραν . . . ἁψῖδα.)

I. 339 E ἆρα τότε . . . οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον συμβαίνειν **αὐτὸ** οὑτωσὶ δίκαιον εἶναι ποιεῖν **τοὐναντίον** ἢ ὃ σὺ λέγεις (see note in loco).

VI. 492 A ἐὰν μή **τις** αὐτῇ βοηθήσας **θεῶν** τύχῃ.

VI. 499 C **πόλεώς** τις ἀνάγκη **ἐπιμεληθῆναι.**

IX. 572 B **καὶ πάνυ** δοκοῦσιν ἡμῶν ἐνίοις **μετρίοις** εἶναι.

IX. 582 C **ἀπό γε τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι,** οἷόν ἐστι, πάντες **τῆς ἡδονῆς** ἔμπειροι (i. e. πάντες ἔμπειροι τῆς γε ἀπὸ τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι ἡδονῆς, οἷόν ἐστι).

(*b*) In order to bring an emphatic notion into prominence, a relative, interrogative, or negative word is postponed.

II. 363 A **τοῖς ὁσίοις** ἅ φασι θεοὺς διδόναι.

II. 377 E **ὅ** τε αὖ **Κρόνος** ὡς ἐτιμωρήσατο.

III. 390 B **μόνος ἐγρηγορὼς** ἃ ἐβουλεύσατο.

III. 413 C **τοῦτο** ὡς ποιητέον.

IV. 437 D **οἷον δίψα ἐστὶ δίψα** ἆρά γε, κ.τ.λ., where the inversion has led to an error of punctuation (see v. rr.).

V. 453 D **οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία,** ἔφη, οὐ γὰρ εὐκόλῳ ἔοικεν (=οὐ γὰρ εὐκόλῳ ἔοικεν, οὔ, μὰ τὸν Δία).

2. Euphony. § 68.

(*a*) The interlacing of clauses has sometimes no obvious motive except a more euphonious rhythm.

III. 396 C **ὁ** μέν μοι δοκεῖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, **μέτριος ἀνήρ.**

Phaedo 99 C **τὴν** δὲ τοῦ **ὡς οἷόν τε βέλτιστα αὐτὰ τεθῆναι** δύναμιν **οὕτω νῦν κεῖσθαι.**

(*b*) A special case is the displacement of adverbs through the adherence of the preposition to its noun. (See Vahlen on Ar. Poet. 1457 A, 31 μὴ ἐκ σημαινόντων: 'quae collocatio et apud Ar. ipsum multa habet *exx.*, et apud alios.')

Cp. Herod. II. 27 κάρτα ἀπὸ θερμῶν χωρέων: Dem. de Cor. § 288 ὡς παρ' οἰκειοτάτῳ.

III. 391 D ὥρμησαν **οὕτως** ἐπὶ **δεινὰς** ἁρπαγάς.

VI. 492 A **μὴ** ἐν **προσηκούσῃ**.

IX. 590 A **πολὺ** ἐπὶ **δεινοτέρῳ** ὀλέθρῳ.

§ 69. 3. Both emphasis and euphony seem to be consulted in the displacement or trajection of αὖ, ἤδη, καί.

(*a*) The habitual postponement of αὖ to the negative at once emphasizes the negation, and, in the case of οὐκ αὖ, avoids an undesirable hiatus. The use of μὴ αὖ probably follows the other idiom by assimilation.

III. 393 D ἵνα δὲ μὴ εἴπῃς, ὅτι **οὐκ αὖ** μανθάνεις.

IV. 442 A ὃ τηρήσετον μὴ . . . πολὺ καὶ ἰσχυρὸν γενόμενον **οὐκ αὖ** τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττῃ.

VI. 499 D τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς . . . ὅτι **οὐκ αὖ** δοκεῖ, ἐρεῖς;

Cp. Theaet. 161 A οἴει . . . ἐρεῖν ὡς **οὐκ αὖ** ἔχει οὕτω ταῦτα.

Crat. 391 C ἀλλ' εἰ **μὴ αὖ** σε ταῦτα ἀρέσκει, κ.τ.λ.

Aristoph. Pax 281 τί ἔστι; μῶν **οὐκ αὖ** φέρεις;

Αὖ comes even between the preposition and the noun:

II. 371 D τοῖς δὲ ἀντὶ **αὖ** ἀργυρίου.

IX. 577 B καὶ ἐν **αὖ** τοῖς δημοσίοις κινδύνοις.

(*b*) An emphatic ἤδη is placed foremost although in meaning really attached to a word from which it is thus separated. In some cases this arrangement avoids cacophony.

V. 452 B ἀλλ' καὶ **ἤδη** τὰς πρεσβυτέρας.

VII. 531 E ἀλλὰ **ἤδη**, εἶπον, [οἱ] μὴ δυνατοί τινες (s. τινος) ὄντες, κ.τ.λ. (avoiding μὴ ἤδη).

(*c*) Similarly καί is sometimes separated (ὑπερβάτως) from its word.

V. 470 B, C ὅρα δὴ **καὶ** εἰ **τόδε** πρὸς τρόπον λέγω.

[VI. 500 A ἤ, **καὶ** ἐὰν **οὕτω** θεῶνται, κ.τ.λ. (joining καὶ οὕτω, but see note in loco and supra, p. 200 ι).]

In IX. 573 D τοῦτο σὺ καὶ ἐμοὶ ἐρεῖς, καί although joined to ἐμοί really emphasizes both pronouns.

Cp. Laws III. 680 A Πολιτείας δέ γε ἤδη **καὶ** τρόπος ἐστί τις **οὗτος**.

It is sometimes postponed together with the interrogative, though belonging to the whole sentence.

IX. 571 C λέγεις δὲ καὶ τίνας . . . ταύτας (i. e. τίνας καὶ λέγεις);

Cp. Hdt. VIII. 89, § 1 ὀλίγοι δέ τινες καὶ Ἑλλήνων, where καί belonging to the whole clause is attracted by the emphasis to Ἑλλήνων. See also ib. III. 36, § 4 Σὺ καὶ ἐμοὶ τολμᾷς συμβουλεύειν.

(*d*) ἀλλὰ . . . δή are widely separated in V. 467 D ἀλλὰ γάρ, φήσομεν, καὶ παρὰ δόξαν πολλὰ πολλοῖς δὴ ἐγένετο.

(*e*) Observe the position of τε in λέγειν λόγον τε in V. 472 A, according to Par. A, and of μέν in VI. 508 E, but see notes in locis.

4. Words introduced διὰ μέσου by an afterthought may sometimes disturb the order of the sentence.

IV. 425 E ὥσπερ τοὺς κάμνοντάς τε καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλοντας ὑπὸ ἀκολασίας ἐκβῆναι πονηρᾶς διαίτης, where the position of ὑπὸ ἀκολασίας belongs to the whole phrase οὐκ ἐθέλοντας ἐκβῆναι.

V. 467 C καὶ οὐκ ἄξιον κινδύνου (see note in loco).

5. Parenthetical words are introduced sometimes before an enclitic, sometimes between a preposition and its case.

I. 337 E πῶς γὰρ ἄν . . . ὦ βέλτιστε, τὶς κ.τ.λ.

VIII. 564 A ἐξ οἶμαι τῆς ἀκροτάτης ἐλευθερίας.

So in Phaedr. 227 B οὐκ ἂν οἴει, κ.τ.λ. the parenthetical word divides ἄν from the verb.

N.B.—All these peculiarities of rhythmical arrangement become more marked in the later dialogues, especially the Timaeus and Laws.

XV. Grammatical irregularities considered in relation to the text. § 70.

It will probably be objected that in these remarks too little account has been taken of the alterations introduced by recent editors into the Platonic text. The emendations of Cobet, Madvig, Badham, and W. H. Thompson are manifestly deserving of attention. But before adopting them wholesale, or even to the extent to which they were embodied in the fourth Zürich edition, several considerations should be

carefully weighed. (1) The balance of anterior probability is against the best founded conjecture when this is opposed to the consent of the MSS. (2) How few of the changes confidently proposed by Schleiermacher, van Heusde, Ast, Heindorf, and K. F. Hermann, are at this moment accepted as certain! (3) In the last resort the context must decide. But in judging of the context, it is not enough to be well skilled in grammar and logic, or in the law of parsimony that presides over a terse literary style. The special conditions of Attic dialogue should be taken into account, and, as these are chiefly to be learned from Plato, some such synoptical survey as has been here attempted is required to assist the student in comparing Plato with himself. If the result of such an endeavour, based on the traditional text, is to bring out a series of phenomena which to those who are intimately acquainted with Greek and with the nature of language commend themselves even in their irregularities as *natural* and consistent, it follows that the number of places in which conjecture is found necessary will be considerably reduced. If, on the contrary, the redundancies and anomalies to which reference has been made are to be regarded as unworthy of the great stylist and dialectician, and the acknowledgement of them inconsistent with true reverence for him, the process of conjectural emendation, precarious as it is at best, must be largely extended before all such unsightlinesses can be removed. And should this labour be completed, the doubt may ultimately recur whether Plato's image has not suffered like that of the great English poet, whose bust (according to Sir Henry Taylor) was 'sadly smoothed away into nothingness at the instance of some country neighbour of Wordsworth's, whose notions of refinement could not be satisfied without the obliteration of everything that was characteristic and true.'

There is an extreme to be avoided in both directions, and rational critics will probably be found to admit that

the distinction between what is sound and unsound often turns upon a question of degree. There are emendations which secure acceptance by their convincing quality—which 'jump to the eyes' of the reader as well as of the emender at the first flash. Such is Schneider's ἐτίμα μάλιστα for ἔτι μάλιστα in Rep. VIII. 554 B, such is Geer's παισίν for πᾶσιν in VI. 494 B, and Mr. Archer Hind's ἐν τῷ μέρει for ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν μέρει Theaet. 190 C. There are others of which a high degree of probability may be safely predicated, such as van Prinsterer's ἑκάστας for ἕκαστος (v. r. ἑκάστοτε) in VI. 493 B. Such simple changes as πάντων for πάντως (VI. 497 D), κατηκόῳ for κατήκοοι (VI. 499 B), τὼ δ' αὖ, τό for τὸ δ' αὐτό (VIII. 547 B), when they have the effect of restoring a smooth and idiomatic context, may be accepted without cavil. The transposition of χαίρων καί in III. 401 E (based on a reference in Aristotle—but cp. Laws VI. 751 D) although supported by the similar syllables in δυσχεραίνων, and even Graser's τί οἰώμεθα in IX. 581 D can only be regarded as highly probable (the same may be said of ὅσοι for ὅσων in VII. 534 A, οἰκείου ἐνόντος for οἰκεῖον ἔχοντος in IX. 590 D, αὐτόχειρος for αὐτόχειρας in X. 615 C), and there is good reason for rejecting the seemingly simple alteration of διδόντες to ᾄδοντες (II. 365 D)[1], and that of βλάψει to βλάψειν (a MS. emendation) in the preceding context, II. 364 C. Madvig's ingenious conjecture in X. 608 A, ᾀσόμεθα for αἰσθόμεθα, may well appear convincing at first sight. It gets rid of a non-classical form; it merely presupposes the miswriting of CΘO for CO; and it seems naturally enough to echo ἐπᾴδοντες in the sentence immediately preceding. But on closer inspection, the use of δ' οὖν requires the resumption not of what immediately precedes (with only εὐλαβούμενοι . . . τὸν τῶν πολλῶν ἔρωτα coming between) but of the main apodosis answering to the words in the comparison, ὥσπερ . . . βίᾳ μέν, ὅμως δὲ ἀπέχονται.

[1] Although supported by the v. r. διδομένου (Ven. Π) for ᾀδομένου in III. 398 D. But there is no reason for assuming corruption. See note in loco.

Either ἀφεξόμεθα, therefore, or some equivalent word, and not ᾀσόμεθα, is what the context requires.

§ 71. Accretions consequent on the admission of glosses into the text, are a form of corruption to which all classical writers[1] are liable. The assumption of such alteration has been of late extensively applied to Plato. It is supported by such manifest instances as Theaet. 190 C, Rep. IX. 580 D, and it cannot be denied to have a legitimate place, although the condition of some dialogues, such as the Phaedo and Cratylus, is found in point of fact to give more scope for it than is the case with others. But the editors who, after the manner of Hirschig, have bracketed or excised every phrase that could not conveniently be tied upon the trellis-work of logic, should be asked to pause and consider whether these 'overgrowths' do not belong to the native exuberance of the Athenian language in its times of leisure (Theaet. 172 C, D). Their ideal of trimness seems too like that of the old English (or Dutch) gardener—

> 'Go thou, and like an executioner,
> Cut off the heads of too fast growing sprays,
> That look too lofty in our commonwealth.
> All must be even in our government[2].'

But, it will be said, some superfluous clauses in the Republic are omitted in Par. A, the earliest and most authoritative MS. This is perfectly true, but, before drawing conclusions from the fact, it is right to understand the nature and extent of it. First, then, account should be taken of the observation, which is easily verified, that in most of these instances there is present either 'homoeoteleuton' or some other condition slippery for scribes; e. g.—

II. 358 A ψέγεται [ἀδικία ἢ ἐπαινεῖται].

360 A τῶν ἀγγέλων γενέσθαι [τῶν παρὰ τὸν βασιλέα, add. in mg.].

[1] See especially Hdt. iv. 127, § 5.
[2] Shakespeare, *Richard II*, iii. 4, 33-36.

II. 364 A ἡ σωφροσύνη [τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη].

366 A αἱ τελεταὶ [αὖ μέγα δύνανται].

367 C ψέγειν [ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν add. in mg.] with ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν in preceding line.

373 A [καὶ τὴν ποικιλίαν], καὶ χρυσόν, κ.τ.λ.

„ E [καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ] κακὰ γίγνεται add. in mg.

376 C [φιλόσοφον] καὶ φιλομαθῆ.

378 C τοιαῦτα [λεκτέα].

379 A ἐάν τέ τις αὐτὸν ἐν ἔπεσι ποιῇ [ἐάν τε ἐν μέλεσιν] ἐάν τε ἐν τραγῳδίᾳ.

This argument is greatly strengthened by considering the omissions in Ven. Π, also due to homoeoteleuton, or in some cases to the dropping of a line. See E. on Text, pp. 103, 104.

§ 72. Secondly, it is by no means an indifferent circumstance that these omissions all come within a certain limited space in the Republic. We should have to search far in order to gather an equal number from elsewhere, and those which do occur in the later portions of the dialogue for the most part involve the loss of indispensable words, and are to be accounted for by the accidental dropping of a line.

Thirdly, that some of them at least were the errors of a scribe appears from the omitted words being supplied in the margin by the diorthotes, either from the archetype of A or from another MS. And it should be observed that the words bracketed are *not* in every case superfluous. It would be rash to cancel αὖ μέγα δύνανται (II. 366 A), though they had been omitted in more MSS. than one, and the clause ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν (ib. 367 C) would have to be supplied if it had been omitted by all the scribes. But if these omissions are due to the copyists, the others can not be assumed not to be so. And the redundance, even where indisputable, has been shown to be not inconsistent with the manner of Plato. The case of IX. 580 D where A reads τὸ λογιστικὸν δέξεται, and another MS. (Par. K) λογισ-

τικὸν ἐπιθυμητικὸν θυμικὸν δέξεται, for the simple δέξεται, stands on a different footing (see note in loco), and it may be admitted that a somewhat similar corruption may have crept into VII. 533 E ὃ ἂν μόνον δηλοῖ πρὸς τὴν ἕξιν σαφηνείᾳ ὃ λέγει ἐν ψυχῇ, though the interpolation is here less manifest and correction consequently more difficult, if not impossible. The whole sentence is omitted in Ven. Ξ. (E. on Text, pp. 112, 113.)

PART II.

PLATONIC DICTION.

i. NEW DERIVATIVES AND COMPOUNDS.
ii. SELECTION AND USE OF WORDS.
iii. PHILOSOPHICAL TERMINOLOGY.

§ 1. Plato's vocabulary is that of highly educated Athenians of the fourth century B.C., enriched with special elements derived (*a*) from the Socratic love of homely illustration, (*b*) from poetic and other literature, in the way of quotation, adaptation, imitation, and allusion, (*c*) from the innovations of the Sophists, both rhetorical and eristic, and (*d*) from habits of speech fostered within the Academy as a philosophical school.

i. New Derivatives and Compounds.

The restrictive or selective tendency of Attic Greek, reserving one word for one idea, and rejecting many synonyms, has been repeatedly illustrated[1].

'No Attic writer would have used it (Εὐφρόνη) for νύξ: but not only does it occur in Herodotus more frequently than the soberer term, but even a scientific writer like Hippocrates employs it. Again, if we compare the usage of πάλος and κλῆρος, it will be seen that the more picturesque of the two words has in all Attic, but that of Tragedy,

[1] See Rutherford, *New Phrynichus*, pp. 13 ff.

been ousted by the colourless term, though in Ionic prose the former remained the commoner.'

The converse or complementary tendency, to have a word for everything and to invent new terms to express novel distinctions, has been less observed. Yet in comparing Plato's language with that of Thucydides or Antiphon, or the tragic poets, or even Lysias or Isocrates, it is impossible not to be aware that the discarding of picturesque or 'coloured' synonyms was accompanied with the invention of many novelties in the expression of abstract notions. This increasing copiousness, forming part of the improvement and development of prose-writing, is of unquestionable significance, and exercised a marked influence on all the subsequent literature.

Plato himself remarks on the introduction of new-fangled terms by Protagoras and others[1], and on Prodicus' affected love of minute verbal distinctions. He himself might have been asked by a malicious questioner why he should employ δικαιότης and διαφορότης when such old friends as δικαιοσύνη and διαφορά were available. The answer is that similar changes were multiplying on every side, and had become a part of the natural medium of cultivated expression. 'Correct' writers like Isocrates might be sparing in their use, but the extent to which they had found their way into general currency may be estimated from Xenophon. Δικαιότης, for example, is one of a large number of derivative words that are found in Plato and Xenophon, and *in no earlier writer*.

A few others, of which the same remark is true, may be cited here in passing. To name them all would occupy more space than can be fitly given to a mere collateral illustration. § 2.

ἀνδρείκελον	ἀμελέτητος
ἀπειροκαλία	ἀνυπόστατος
ἀνυποδησία	ἀνύσιμος

[1] Ὀρθοέπειά γέ τις . . . καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ καλά Phaedr. 267 c.

ἀξιομνημόνευτος	δυσωπέομαι
ἀπατητικός	ζημιώδης
ἀπειλητικός	εὐαγωγός
ἀπορρᾳθυμεῖν	θεραπευτής
ἄπταιστος	θυμοειδής
ἀμεταστρεπτί	ἰδιωτεία
βαλλαντιοτομεῖν	κηδεστής
βλακικός	κυβερνητικός
βουλευτικός	λιχνεία
γενειάσκω	μεγάλειος
γεώδης	ξεναγέω
δαπανηρός	παιδοτροφία
δημηγορικός	τεχνίτης
διευκρινέομαι	

§ 3. Some doubt is thrown on the whole inquiry, because it is necessarily limited to the extant remains of Greek literature. It is impossible to trace the steps by which the change referred to was gradually realized. But the following list of derivative and compound words which are found in Plato and in no earlier writer[1] may serve roughly to indicate the general fact that in the time of Plato a large class of words had recently come into use (he may even have added to the number) to express abstract notions of various kinds. This effervescence of language is naturally correlated to the stir and eager alacrity of thought which the Sophists set in motion and to which Socrates himself contributed. We may trace the beginnings of it in Antiphon's use of such derivative words as *μιαρία*, *αἰτίασις*, *βιαιότης*[2]. It would be interesting, were it only possible, to ascertain how far the language of Democritus or of Hippocrates had advanced in this direction. But Democritus is too often paraphrased by those who quote him, and the works ascribed

[1] It has been assumed for the purpose of this Essay that the first occurrence of a word in Greek literature is pretty sure to have been noted in the edition of Stephanus' *Thesaurus* by Dindorf and others.

[2] Or, to go further back, in the use of *ἀπορία* by Herodotus IV. 134.

to Hippocrates are of doubtful authenticity. For this reason no account is taken here of many words which are common to Plato and Hippocrates, or the Pseudo-Hippocrates. Where a word recurs in later writers, I have added the names of those by whom it is used. The influence of Plato on the subsequent usage is often apparent.

(a) *New Derivatives.*

a. Substantives in § 4.

-εια :—

ἀπρέπεια Rep. 465 C: Aristot., Athenaeus.
ἀπρομήθεια Lach. 197 B: Josephus.
ἀσάφεια Rep. 478 C: Plutarch: Dionys. Hal.
ἀψεύδεια Rep. 485 C: Aristotle.
εὐμάθεια Rep. 490 C: Callimachus.
νώθεια Phaedr. 235 D, Theaet. 195 C: Lucian.
ὀρθοέπεια (due to Protagoras) Phaedr. 267 C: Dionys. Hal.
φιλομάθεια Rep. 499 E, Tim. 90 B: Plut., Strabo.

-εία :—

γοητεία Rep. 584 A: Diodor., Lucian, Dio C.
ἐθελοδουλεία Symp. 184 C: Lucian.
εἰρωνεία Rep. 337 A: Aristot., Plut., Dionys. Hal.
ἐπιτροπεία Phaedr. 239 E (*ἐπιτροπία* (sic) occurs in a fragment of Lysias): Dionys. Hal.
κολακεία Gorg. 463, 465, Rep. 590 B: Dem., Lucian.
προπαιδεία Rep. 536 D: Clem. Alex.

-ία :—

ἀβελτερία Theaet. 174 C, Symp. 198 D: Aristot., Plut.
ἀθεραπευσία Rep. 443 A: Diodor., Polyb.
ἀκαιρία Symp. 182 A: Dem., Aristot.
ἀλληλοφθορία Prot. 321 A: Joseph., Dionys. Hal.
ἀλλοδοξία (-έω) Theaet. 189 B: Dio C.
ἀμελετησία Phaedr. 275 A, Theaet. 153 B: Philo.
ἀμετρία Rep. 486 D: Lucian, Plut.

ἀναλογία Rep. 534 A. Frequent in later Greek.
ἀναρμοστία Phaedo 93 C: Lucian, Plut.
ἀπεργασία Prot. 312 D: Plut.
ἀρρενωπία Symp. 192 A: Zeno Stoic.
ἀρρυθμία Rep. 401 A: Lucian.
ἀσυμμετρία Gorg. 525 A: Aristot., Theophr.
βασκανία Phaedo 95 B: Aristot., Philo.
βωμολοχία Rep. 606 C: Aristot., Plut.
γιγαντομαχία Rep. 378 C: Plut., Diodor.
γνωμολογία Phaedr. 267 C: Aristot., Plut.
γυμνασία Theaet. 169 C: Aristot., Dionys. Hal., Dio C., Polybius.
**εἰκονολογία* Phaedr. 267 C, 269 A.
ἐλεεινολογία Phaedr. 272 A: Schol. in Sophocl.
εὐθυωρία Rep. 436 E: Aristot., Plut.
θεολογία Rep. 379 A: Aristot. Meteor., Theodoret.
ἰσορροπία Phaedo 109 A: Plut.
ἱστουργία Symp. 197 A: Theophr.
κηδεμονία Rep. 463 D: Dio C., Philo.
μακρολογία Prot. 335 B, Gorg. 449 C: Aristot.
μεγαλαυχία Lys. 206 A, Theaet. 174 D: Plut.
μελοποιία Symp. 187 D: Aristot.
μετεωρολογία Phaedr. 270 A: Plut.
μισανθρωπία Phaedo 89 D: Dem., Stobaeus.
μισολογία Phaedo 89 D: Plut.
**νεκροσυλία* Rep. 469 E.
νοσοτροφία Rep. 407 B: Aelian.
οἰκειοπραγία Rep. 434 C: Porphyr., Stobaeus.
οἰκοφθορία Phaedo 82 C: Plut.
**ὀλιγογονία* Prot. 321 B.
ὁμοδοξία Rep. 433 C: Aristot., Olympiod.
παιδεραστία (-έω) Symp. 181 C: Plut., Athen., Lucian (the verb only).
παιδογονία Symp. 208 E: Heliod., Theodoret.
παραμυθία Phaedo 70 B, Rep. 450 D, al.: Plut., Longin.

* Words marked with an asterisk are found in Plato only.

πιθανολογία Theaet. 163 A: Euseb., Phot., St. Paul.
πολυγονία Prot. 321 B: Aristot., Plut., Galen.
πολυειδία Rep. 580 D: Cyrill. Alex.
πολυχορδία Rep. 399 C: Plut., Athen.
ῥαψῳδία Ion 533 B, Tim. 21 B: Aristot., Athen., Lucian, &c.
σκιαγραφία Phaedo 69 B, Rep. 365 C: Aristot., Euseb.
συμφωνία Crat. 405 D, al.: Aristot., Plut.
συντομία Phaedr. 267 B: Aristot., Diodor., Dionys. Hal.
φαντασία Theaet. 161 E, al.: Aristot., Plut.
φιλεραστία (-ής) Symp. 213 D: Aristaen. (-ία), Aristot. (-ής).
φιλογυμναστία (-έω, -ικός) Symp. 182 C, al.: Athen., Plut. (verb only).
ψυχαγωγία Phaedr. 261 A, 271 C: Plut., Polyb., Lucian.

-ιον (Diminutives):— § 5.

ῥηματίσκιον Theaet. 180 A: Theodoret., Themist. ap. Budaeum.
σκολύθριον Euthyd. 278 B: Pollux.
τεχνίον Rep. 495 D: Athen., Dio C.
τεχνύδριον Rep. 475 E: Clem. Alex.
ψυχάριον Rep. 519 A, Theaet. 195 A: Julian, Lucian, Galen.

-μα (neut.):—

αἴτημα Rep. 566 B: Aristot., Dionys. Hal., Plut., Lucian.
ἀμφισβήτημα Theaet. 158 B: Plut.
*ἀναλόγισμα Theaet. 186 C.
*ἀπείκασμα Crat. 402 D, 420 C.
ἀποβλάστημα Symp. 208 B: Theophr.
ἀπολόγημα Crat. 436 C: Plut.
ἀπόσπασμα Phaedo 113 B: Galen.
*ἀφομοίωμα Rep. 395 B.
διακόνημα Theaet. 175 E: Aristot.
δυσχέρασμα Phileb. 44 D: Suidas.
*καρτέρημα Meno 88 C.
κοινώνημα Rep. 333 A: Aristot., Plut.
κύημα Rep. 461 C: Aristot., Plut., Galen.
*λήρημα Gorg. 486 C.

μυθολόγημα Phaedr. 229 C: Plut., Lucian.
νεανί(σκ)ευμα Rep. 390 A: Lucian.
ὁμολόγημα Phaedo 93 D, al.
**περίπτωμα* Prot. 345 B.
πρόσρημα Charm. 164 E, Phaedr. 238 B: Plut.
**σκιαγράφημα* Theaet. 208 E.
χειρούργημα Gorg. 450 B: Dionys. Hal.

-μός :—

βαδισμός Charm. 160 C, al.
νεωτερισμός Rep. 422 A, al.: Plut., Lucian.
σφαδασμός Rep. 579 E: Eustath.
σχηματισμός Rep. 425 B, 494 D: Plut.
χωρισμός Phaedo 67 D: Theophr., Plut.

§ 6. **-της** (fem.) :—

ἀθλιότης Rep. 545 B, al.: Plut.
ἀλλοτριότης Symp. 197 C: Dem., Plut.
ἀνισότης Phaedo 74 B: Aristot.
ἀνωμαλότης Tim. 57 E, al.: Plut.
διαφορότης Theaet. 209 A, Rep. 587 E, Parm. 141 B, C: Stobaeus.
ἑτεροιότης Parm. 160 D: Eustath.
μαλακότης Theaet. 186 B, Rep. 523 E: Plut.
ὀλιγότης Theaet. 158 D, Rep. 591 E: Aristot., Theophr.
ὁμαλότης Tim. 57 E: Aristot., Plut.
πιθανότης Crat. 402 A: Aristot., Plut., Philo, Polyb.
ποιότης Theaet. 182 A: Aristot., Hermog.
στρογγυλότης Meno 73 E: Aristot., Theophr.
ὠχρότης Rep. 474 E: Aristot., Plut., Lucian.

-σύνη :—

ἀλλοτριοπραγμοσύνη Rep. 444 B: Proclus.
φιλοπραγμοσύνη Rep. 549 C: Dem., Pollux, Strabo.

§ 7. **-σις** :—

ἀλλοίωσις Rep. 454 C: Aristot., M. Aurel., Theodoret.
ἀνάδυσις Euthyd. 302 E: Theophr., Plut.
**ἀνομοίωσις* Theaet. 166 B.

ἀντιβόλησις Symp. 183 A: Themist.
ἀπόφασις Crat. 426 D: Aristot., Themist.
αὔλησις Prot. 327 B: Aristot., Stobaeus.
διακόσμησις Symp. 209 A: Plut.
διήγησις Phaedr. 246 A: Aristot., Hermog., Polyb.
**ἐπιπίστωσις* Phaedr. 266 E.
εὐδοκίμησις Rep. 358 A, 363 A: Themist., Phot., Lucian.
ἡνιόχησις Phaedr. 246 B: Philostr., Philo, Dio Chrys.
ἰάτρευσις Rep. 357 C: Aristot.
ἰδίωσις Rep. 462 B: Plut.
ἵδρυσις Rep. 427 B: Plut., Strabo.
καρτέρησις Symp. 220 A: Musonius ap. Stob.
κατάλειψις Phaedr. 257 E: C. I. 4369: Hesych.
κήλησις Euthyd. 290 A, Rep. 601 B: Plut., Phot., Lucian. Diog. Laert., Porphyr.
κοίμησις Symp. 183 A: Josephus, Sirach.
κόλασις Apol. 26 A, Prot. 323 E, al.: Aristot., Theophr., Plut.
κόσμησις Gorg. 504 D: Aristot., Plut., Dionys. Alex. ap. Euseb.
κύησις Menex. 238 A, Polit. 274 A: Plut., Eustath., Galen.
μετάληψις Theaet. 173 B, Rep. 539 D, Parm. 131 A: Aristot., Plut., Polyb.
**μετάσχεσις* Phaedo 101 C.
**μετοίκησις* Apol. 40 C, Phaedo 117 C.
**νώμησις* Crat. 411 D.
ὁμοίωσις Theaet. 176 B, Rep. 454 C: Aristot., Theophr., Ep. of James.
ὄσφρησις Phaedo 111 B, Theaet. 156 B: Aristot., Theophr., Galen.
πολλαπλασίωσις Rep. 587 E: Aristot., Iambl. ap. Stob.
**προήσθησις* Rep. 584 C.
**προλύπησις* Rep. 584 C.
**πρόστεξις* Rep. 407 B. Def.
πρόσληψις Theaet. 210 A: Plut., Diog. L., St. Paul.
πτόησις Prot. 310 D, Symp. 206 D, Crat. 404 A: Aristot., Hesych., 1 Ep. Pet.

πτῶσις Rep. 604 C: Aristot., Plut., Lucian, &c.

ῥῖψις Rep. 378 D: Plut., Pollux.

συγκοίμησις Phaedr. 255 E, Rep. 460 B: Plut., Dio C.

**συμπίεσις* Crat. 427 A.

σύναψις Theaet. 195 D, Tim. 40 C: Aristot., Plut., Suidas, Porphyr.

σύνερξις Rep. 460 A, Tim. 18 D: Dio C., Galen, Plotinus.

σύνοψις Rep. 537 C, al.: Polyb., Pollux, Dionys. Hal., &c.

σχίσις Phaedo 97 A, 101 C: Aristot., Theophr., Plut.

§ 8. **-της** (masc.):—

**αἰσθητής* Theaet. 160 D.

ἀναλωτής Rep. 552 B, C: Dio C.

ἀποπληρωτής Rep. 620 E: Hierocl., Iambl., Plotinus.

ἀποστερητής Rep. 344 B: Antioch., Theophil. (Cp. Ar. Nub. 730 *ἀποστερητρίς*.)

παγκρατιαστής Rep. 338 C, al. (C. I.): Plut., Polyb., Lucian.

παιδευτής Rep. 493 C: Plut., Polyb., Diog. L.

παρασκευαστής Gorg. 518 C: Ep. regis Antigoni ad Zenonem, Jo. Chrys.

πλάστης Rep. 588 C: Plut., Philo.

φοιτητής Rep. 563 A: Theodoret., Eustath.

-τήριον:—

δικαιωτήριον Phaedr. 249 A: Philostr., Suidas, Hesych.

-ιον:—

παντοπώλιον Rep. 557 D: Plut., Jo. Chrys.

Verbals in -α or -η:—

ἄνθη Phaedr. 230 B: Theophr., Philostr., Aelian, Pollux.

κολυμβήθρα Rep. 453 D: Diodor. Sic. ap. Athen., Galen, Philostr.

**μεταστροφή* Rep. 525 C, 532 B.

συμπλοκή Soph. 262 C: Aristot., Polyb., Lucian, Dionys. H.

§ 9. *β.* Adjectives in

-δης:—

ἀειδής Phaedo 79 A, al.: Aristot., Theophr., Plut., Philo, Dio C.

ἀλιτηριώδης Rep. 470 D : Plut., Pollux, Dio C.
θνητοειδής Phaedo 86 A : Plut., Julian.
κηφηνώδης Rep. 554 B : Cleomedes.
κολλώδης Crat. 427 B : Aristot., Theophr., Plut., Athen., Galen.
λεοντώδης Rep. 590 B : Aristot., Plut.
μονοειδής Phaedo 78 D, al. : Theophr., Polyb.
*σειληνώδης Symp. 217 D.

-ιος :—

αἰώνιος Rep. 363 D, al. : Diodor., Porphyr., Hebr., John, Peter, Clem. Alex., Olympiod.

-κός :— § 10.

ἀγανακτητικός Rep. 604 E : Clem. Alex., Aelian, Lucian.
ἀγορανομικός Rep. 425 D : Aristot., Dionys. Hal., Plut.
*ἀγοραστικός Crat. 408 A.
ἀναλωτικός Rep. 558, 559 : Clem. Alex.
ἀνατρεπτικός Rep. 389 D : Euseb., Pollux.
ἀπεργαστικός Rep. 527 B : Diodor., Clem. Alex., Galen.
ἀριθμητικός Gorg. 453 E : Aristot., Plut.
ἀριστοκρατικός Rep. 587 D : Aristot., Plut., Polyb., &c.
ἀστρονομικός Rep 530 A : Theophr., Philo.
ἀστυνομικός Rep. 425 D : Aristot.
*αὐλοποιϊκός Euthyd. 289 C.
γεωμετρικός Rep. 546 C : Aristot., Plut., Athen.
δοξαστικός Theaet. 207 C : Aristot.
*ἐλλιμενικός Rep. 425 D.
ἐπιθυμητικός Rep. 439 E : Aristot., Plut.
ζητητικός Meno 81 D, Rep. 528 B : Philo, Photius.
ἡνιοχικός Phaedr. 253 C : Philo, Eustath.
κολακευτικός Gorg. 464 C : Pollux, Lucian.
κολακικός Gorg. 502 D, al. : Polyb. (superlative).
λογογραφικός Phaedr. 264 B : Pollux, &c.
*λογοποιϊκός Euthyd. 289 C.
*μεταστρεπτικός Rep. 525 A : Iambl. (μετατρεπτικός).
μετρητικός Prot. 357 D.

μιμητικός Rep. 395 A, al.: Aristot., Plut., Lucian.
**μισθωτικός* Rep. 346 A.
μυθικός Phaedr. 265 C: Plut., Athen., Dionys. Hal.
μυθολογικός Phaedo 61 B: Pollux.
νομοθετικός Gorg. 464 C, al.: Aristot., Theodorus Metoch.
οἰκοδομικός Charm. 170 C: Aristot., Theophr., Plut.
ὁμονοητικός Phaedr. 256 B, Rep. 554 E: Aristot.
παρακελευστικός Euthyd. 283 B: Pollux.
παρακλητικός Rep. 523 D: Dionys. Hal. (-*κῶς*, Clem. Alex., &c.).
πεττευτικός Charm. 174 B, al.: Eustath.
πιστευτικός Gorg. 455 A: Aristot.
ποιμενικός Rep. 345 D: Theocr., Opp., Galen.
**προμνηστικός* Theaet. 150 A.
προστατικός Rep. 565 D: Plut., Polyb.
πυκτικός Gorg. 456 D: Aristot., Plut.
**ῥαψῳδικός* Ion 538 B.
**σειληνικός* Symp. 222 C.
σπουδαστικός Rep. 452 E: Aristot., Plut.
στατικός Charm. 166 B: Aristot., Strabo, Arrian.
στοχαστικός Gorg. 463 A: Aristot., Clem. Alex.
συνοπτικός Rep. 537 C: Budaeus in Dionys. Areop.
σφενδονητικός Lach. 193 B: Schol. in Lyc. 633.
τελεστικός Phaedr. 248 D: Plut., Tetrab. in Ptolemaeum, Budaeus.
ὑφαντικός Crat. 388 C: Aristot., Plut., Pollux, Aelian, Theodoret.
**φιλογυμναστικός* Rep. 456 A.

-λός :—

αἰσχυντηλός Charm. 160 E: Aristot., Plut.

-ρός :—

αἰσχυντηρός Gorg. 487 B: Hesych.

-τος :—

**ἀναμνηστός* Men. 87 B.
ἁπτός Rep. 525 D: Aristot., Plut., Galen.

*παιδευτός Prot. 324 B.
παραληπτός Meno 93 B: Plut.
*παρασκευαστός Prot. 319 B, 324 A, C.
πλανητός Rep. 479 D: Hesych.
πρόκριτος Rep. 537 D: Aristot., Dio C.
προσποίητος Lys. 222 A: Aristot., Dem., Dio C., Philo, Dionys. Hal., &c.
σκευαστός Rep. 510 A: Aristot., Theophr., Euseb.
σταθμητός Charm. 154 B: Pollux, Suidas.
σύσπαστος Symp. 190 E: Athen., Pollux, Hesych.

γ. Adverbs in § II.

-ως :—

ἀγαμένως[1] Phaedo 89 A: Aristot.
ἀπαρακαλύπτως Euthyd. 294 D: Heliodorus.
*ἀπταίστως Theaet. 144 B.
*ἐμποδιζομένως[1] Crat. 415 C.
*ἐπιθυμητικῶς Phaedo 108 A.
*ἡμαρτημένως[1] Meno 88 E.
*καρτερούντως[1] Rep. 399 B.
*μεμελημένως[1] Prot. 344 B.
παγίως Rep. 434 D: Aristot.
παρακινδυνευτικῶς Rep. 497 E: Longinus.
παρατεταγμένως[1] Rep. 399 B: Iamblichus.
πεπλασμένως[1] Rep. 485 D: Aristot.
προσποιήτως Theaet. 174 D: Dio C.
*συγγραφικῶς Phaedo 102 D.
*ὑφαντικῶς Crat. 388 C.

-ί :—

ἀγελαστί Euthyd. 278 E: Plut., Lucian.
ἀψοφητί Theaet. 144 B: Aristot., Themist., Lucian.

-ῇ :—

*πλεοναχῇ Rep. 477 A.

-σε :—

*μηδαμόσε Rep. 499 A.

[1] From participles.

-κις :—

ἀρτιάκις Parm. 144 A : Plut.

§ 12. δ. Verbs in

-αίνω :—

ἀμαθαίνω Rep. 535 E : Themist., Plotinus.

-είω :—

γελασείω Phaedo 64 B : Damasc. ap. Suid., Euseb.

-εύω :—

γνωματεύω Rep. 516 E : Eustath., Philostratus.
γοητεύω Phaedo 81 B : Plut., Lucian.

-έω, -έομαι :—

ἀβουλέω Rep. 437 C : Plut., Dio C., Philo.
αἰσχρολογέω Rep. 395 E : Aristot., Diod. Sic.
ἀκριβολογέομαι Rep. 340 E, Crat. 415 A : Dem., Aeschin., Theophr., Dionys. Hal., Lucian.
ἀλλοτριονομέω Theaet. 195 A : Dio C.
*ἀναρμοστέω Rep. 462 A.
ἐρεσχηλέω Rep. 545 E : Lucian, Philo.
λευχειμονέω Rep. 617 C : Herodian, Strabo.
μετεωροπορέω Phaedr. 246 C : Plotinus, Philostr., Aelian.
ὁμοδοξέω Phaedo 83 D : Theophr., Strabo, Polyb.
παιδοσπορέω Phaedr. 250 E : Aelian.
παρασιτέω Lach. 179 C : Diphilus ap. Athen., Plut.
ταριχοπωλέω Charm. 163 B : Lucian.
ὑψηλολογέομαι Rep. 545 E : Themist.
φιλογυμναστέω Prot. 342 C : Plut., Athen., Iambl.
φιλοτεχνέω Prot. 321 E : Epictetus, Athen., Aelian, Polyb., Diod.

§ 13. -ζω, -ζομαι :—

ἀποστοματίζω Euthyd. 277 A : Aristot., Plut., Themist., Athen., St. Luke.
αὐθαδίζομαι Apol. 34 D : Themist.
γαργαλίζω Phaedr. 251 C : Clem. Alex.
*ἐνθουσιάζω Apol. 22 C, al. (elsewhere -άω).

ἐπαμφοτερίζω Rep. 479 B: Aristot., Plut., Lucian.

μεσημβριάζω Phaedr. 259 A: Porphyr.

τετραγωνίζω Theaet. 148 A, Rep. 527 A: Aristot., Pseudo-Lucian.

ψελλίζομαι Gorg. 485 B: Aristot., Plut., Philostr., Heliodor.

-όω, -όομαι:—

ἀνομοιόω Rep. 546 B: Themist.

(*b*) *New Compounds.* § 14.

α. Substantives:—

ἀντίστασις Rep. 560 A: Aristot., Plut., Plotinus.

ἀπόλογος Rep. 614 B: Aristot., Plut., Aristid.

κλινοποιός Rep. 596 E: Dem.

**κλινουργός* Rep. 597 A.

συνοπαδός Phaedr. 248 C: Themist., Iambl., Clem. Al.

φιλοχρηματιστής Rep. 551 A: Pollux.

ψευδόμαρτυς Gorg. 472 B: Aristot., Athanas., Cyrill., Pollux.

β. Adjectives:—

ἀδιανόητος Soph. 238 C: Athen., Olympiod.

ἀδιάφθορος Phaedo 106 D: Dem., Plut., Aelian.

**ἄθερμος* Phaedo 106 A.

ἄκεντρος Rep. 552 C: Plut., Philo, Athen.

ἀκροσφαλής Rep. 404 B: Plut., Hesych., Themist., Polyb., Clem. Al.

ἀμερής Theaet. 205 E: Aristot., Lucian, Plotinus.

ἀμέριστος Theaet. 205 C: Aristot., Pollux, Hierocl., Clem. Al., Iambl., Dionys. A.

ἀμετάστατος Rep. 361 C: Plut., Themist., Pollux.

ἀμετάστροφος Rep. 620 E: Themist.

ἄναιμος Prot. 321 B: Aristot., Plut.

ἀναφής Phaedr. 247 C: Plut., Lucian, Philo, Dionys. A.

ἀνέγγυος Rep. 461 B: Plut., Dio C.

ἀνεμέσητος Symp. 195 A: Aeschin., Plut., Lucian, Heliod.

ἀνεξέταστος Apol. 38 A: Aeschin., Dem., Plut., Themist.

ἀνερμάτιστος Theaet. 144 A: Plut., Themist., Theodoret., Dio C.

ἀνομολογούμενος Gorg. 495 A: Aristot.

ἀνυπόθετος Rep. 510 B: Aristot., Plut., Iambl.

ἀνώλεθρος Phaedo 88 B: Aristot., Theophr., Plut., Plotinus, Lucian.

**ἀξιοκοινώνητος* Rep. 371 E.

**ἄρρατος* Rep. 535 C, Crat. 407 D.

ἀρτιμελής Rep. 536 B: Dio C., Themist.

ἀρτιτελής Phaedr. 251 A: Himer., Nonn.

ἀσύμφωνος Rep. 402 D: Theophr., Plut., Lucian.

ἀσύνθετος Phaedo 78 C: Dem., Aristot., Theodor., Polyb.

ἀσχημάτιστος Phaedr. 247 C: Plut., Plotin.

ἀσώματος Phaedo 85 E: Aristot., Plut.

ἄτηκτος Phaedo 106 A: Aristot., Galen.

αὐλοποιός Rep. 399 D: Aristot., Plut., Galen.

ἄφρουρος Phaedr. 256 C: Aristot., Plut.

**ἄψυκτος* Phaedo 106 A.

βραχυλόγος Gorg. 449 C: Plut., Suid.

βραχύπορος Rep. 546 A: Plut., Philostr.

βραχυτράχηλος Phaedr. 253 E: Aristot., Diodor.

δοξόσοφος Phaedr. 275 B: Aristot., Clem. Al.

**δυσγοήτευτος* Rep. 413 E.

δυσδιερεύνητος Rep. 432 C: Dio C., Themist.

δυσκοινώνητος Rep. 486 B: Plut., Themist., Pollux.

**δωδεκάσκυτος* Phaedo 110 B.

ἐθελόδουλος Rep. 562 D: Aristaen., Philo.

**ἐπεισαγώγιμος* Rep. 370 E.

ἐπεξέλεγχος Phaedr. 267 A: Aristot.

**θησαυροποιός* Rep. 554 A (quoted by Pollux).

κακόσιτος Rep. 475 C: Aelian, Arrian.

λογοδαίδαλος Phaedr. 266 E: Pollux.

μεγαλόθυμος Rep. 375 C: Eustath.

μελανόμματος Phaedr. 253 D: Aristot., Pollux.

μελίρρυτος Ion 534 A: Eustath., Nonn.

μελίχλωρος Rep. 474 E: Nicand., Theocr.

μετεωρολέσχης Rep. 489 C: Plut., Lucian.

**μετεωροσκόπος* Rep. 488 E.

μισόλογος Phaedo 89 C, al.: Galen, Pollux.

**μυθολογικός* Phaedo 61 B (Pollux).

μυθολόγος Rep. 392 D: Manetho.

μυθοποιός Rep. 377 B: Lucian.

νεοτελής Phaedr. 250 E: Lucian, Phot., Hesych., Himer. ap. Phot.

νομογράφος Phaedr. 278 E: Suid., Diodor.

νυμφόληπτος Phaedr. 238 D: Plut., Pollux, Synes.

**οἰκτρόγοος* Phaedr. 267 C.

ὁλόκληρος Phaedr. 250 C: Aristot., Polyb., Philo.

ὁμοήθης Gorg. 510 C: Aristot., Eustath., Pollux.

ὁμοιοπαθής Rep. 409 B: Aristot., Theophr., Plotin., Acta Apost.

ὁμοπαθής Rep. 464 D: Aristot., Plut., Plotin.

ὁμοφυής Phaedo 86 A: Theodoret., Cyrill., Psellus.

ὀξύρροπος Theaet. 144 A, Rep. 411 B: Theophr., Pollux, Aristaen., Theodoret.

**παγγέλοιος* Phaedr. 260 C, al.

πάμμεγας Phaedr. 273 A, al.: Lucian.

παμπάλαιος Theaet. 181 B: Aristot., Plut., Athen., Themist.

παναρμόνιος Phaedr. 277 C, Rep. 399 C: Lucian, Dio C., Suidas, Jo. Chrys.

πάνδεινος Rep. 610 D: Dem., Dio C., Lucian, Galen.

περιαλγής Rep. 462 B: Aristot., Plut., Philo.

πολλαπλοῦς Rep. 397 E: Themist., Aristid., Hesych.

πολυήκοος Phaedr. 275 A: Philostr., Cleobul. ap. Stob., Damasc. ap. Suid.

πολυθεάμων Phaedr. 251 A: Bud., Stob., Pollux.

πολυθρύλητος Phaedo 100 B, Rep. 566 B: Polyb., Lucian, Galen, Theodoret.

πολυκέφαλος Rep. 588 C: Aristot., Plut., Lucian, Julian.

πολυμελής Phaedr. 238 A: Pollux.

**πτερώνυμος* Phaedr. 252 C.

**σιμοπρόσωπος* Phaedr. 253 E (Pollux).

συμμαθητής Euthyd. 272 C: Pollux, Phryn.
*συμπεριαγωγός Rep. 533 D.
σύμψηφος Gorg. 500 A: Dem., Plut., Diodor.
τερατολόγος Phaedr. 229 E: Philostr., Liban.
τετανόθριξ Euthyphr. 2 B: Aristaen., Clem. Al., Pollux.
ὑπόχρυσος Rep. 415 C: Lucian, Heliodor., Jo. Chrys., Philo.
ὑψηλόνοος Phaedr. 270 A: Plut., Themist., Damasc.
φιλαναλωτής Rep. 548 B: Pollux, Dio C.
φιλεραστής Symp. 192 B: Aristot.
φιλήκοος Rep. 535 D: Plut., Lucian, Polyb.
φιλογέλως Rep. 388 E: Aristot., Diodor., Athen., Philostr.
φιλογυμναστής Rep. 535 D, al.: Philo, Pollux.
φιλογύναιξ Symp. 191 D: Aristaen.
φιλοθεάμων Rep. 475 D: Plut., Lucian.
*φιλοποιητής Rep. 607 D.
*φιλόρτυξ Lys. 212 D.
φιλοσώματος Phaedo 68 B: Plut., Pollux, Philo, Euseb.
φιλότεχνος Rep. 476 A: Plut., Diodor., Pollux.
χιλιέτης Phaedr. 249 A, Rep. 615 A, 621 D: Athen., Strabo, Iambl.
ψοφοδεής Phaedr. 257 D: Plut., Lucian, Dionys. Hal.

§ 15. γ. Verbs:—

ἀναβιώσκομαι Phaedo 71 E: Theophr.
ἀναβρυχάομαι Phaedo 117 D: Philostr., Suid.
ἀνακαγχάζω Euthyd. 300 D: Plut., Lucian, Athen.
ἀναπεμπάζομαι Lys. 222 E: Aristid., Plut., Lucian, Clem. Al.
ἀνασοβέω Lys. 206 A: Plut., Lucian, Polyb., Aristaen.
ἀνείλλω Symp. 206 D: Hesych., Suid.
ἀνερευνάω Phaedo 63 A: Plut., Dio C., Lucian, Philo.
ἀνομολογέομαι Symp. 200 E: Dem., Plut., Lucian.
ἀνταδικέω Theaet. 173 A: Dem. ap. Polluc.
ἀντερωτάω Euthyd. 295 B: Plut., Clem. Al.
ἀντιδέομαι Lach. 186 D: Liban., Herenn.
ἀντιδοξάζω Theaet. 170 D: Diog. L.
*ἀντικακουργέω Crit. 49 C.

ἀντικαταλείπω Rep. 540 B: Iambl.

ἀντιπαρατείνω Phaedr. 257 C: Iambl., Dio C.

ἀντίφημι Gorg. 501 C: Aristot., Polyb., Diodor.

*ἀντοίομαι Theaet. 178 C.

ἀπαθανατίζω Charm. 156 D: Aristot., Lucian, Diodor.

ἀπαναισχυντέω Apol. 31 C: Dem., Cyrill., Porphyr.

ἀπανθαδίζομαι Apol. 37 A: Plotin., Euseb., Olympiod.

ἀποδέω Symp. 190 E: Aristot., Theophr.

ἀποθρύπτω Rep. 495 E: Joseph.

ἀπομαντεύομαι Rep. 505 E: Dio C., Galen, Iambl.

ἀπομεστόομαι Phaedr. 255 C: Plotin.

ἀπομηκύνω Prot. 336 C: Plut., Lucian, Themist., Dionys. Hal.

ἀπονεύω Theaet. 165 A: Aristot., Theophr., Plut., Polyb., Lucian.

ἀποπληρόω Prot. 329 C: Aristot., Plut., Lucian.

*ἀποπολεμέω Phaedr. 260 B.

ἀποσαφέω Prot. 348 B: Lucian, Dio C., Galen, Joseph.

ἀποσκιάζω Rep. 532 C: Dio C., Budaeus.

ἀποσκώπτω Theaet. 174 A: Lucian, Dio C.

ἀποστοματίζω Euthyd. 277 A: Aristot., Plut., St. Luke, Pollux, Themist., Athen.

ἀποτίκτω Theaet. 150 C: Aristot., Lucian, Philostr.

ἀποτοξεύω Theaet. 180 A: Dio C., Lucian.

ἀποτορνεύω Phaedr. 234 E: Plut., Dionys. Hal., Hermog.

ἀποτυπόω Theaet. 191 D: Theophr., Lucian, Porphyr.

ἀποχετεύω Rep. 485 D: Plut., Philostr., M. Anton.

ἀποχραίνω Rep. 586 B: Theophr., Pollux, Budaeus.

*διαμαστιγόω Gorg. 524 E.

*διασκευωρέω Rep. 540 E.

ἐξαγριαίνω Lys. 206 B: Plut., Philo, Joseph., Dio C.

*μεταδοξάζω Rep. 413 C.

μεταρρέω Theaet. 193 C: Aristot., Galen, Athen., Joseph., Philostr.

παραζώννυμι Rep. 553 C: Theophr., Lucian, Dio C., Dionys. Hal.

παρακαλύπτομαι Rep. 440 A: Plut., Lucian, Aristaen.
*παραποδύομαι Theaet. 162 B.
περικρούω Rep. 611 E: Plut., Themist., Plotin.
περιπλάττω Rep. 588 D: Aristot., Theophr., Athen., Nicand.
προδοξάζω Theaet. 178 E: Aristot.
προθεραπεύω Rep. 429 E: Plut., Joseph., Clem. Al.
προκολακεύω Rep. 494 C: Plut.
προλυπέομαι Phaedr. 258 E: Aristot., Dio C.
προομολογέω Phaedo 93 D: Aristot., Philo.
προπαιδεύω Rep. 536 D: Aristot., Plut., Clem. Al., Synes.
προσανατρίβω Theaet. 169 C: Theophr., Plut., Aelian.
προσδιατρίβω Theaet. 168 A: Plut., Aristid., Joseph.
προσηλόω Phaedo 83 D: Dem., Plut., Lucian, Diodor., Galen, Joseph., Iambl. ap. Stob.
προσκρούω Phaedo 89 E: Alciphr., Dem., Aeschin., Aristot., Plut., Themist.
προσλάμπω Rep. 617 A: Plut.
συγκορυβαντιάω Phaedr. 228 B: Euseb., Suid., Synes.
συμπαρακαθίζομαι Lys. 207 B: Dem., Themist.
*συμπένομαι Meno 71 B.
συμπεριπατέω Prot. 314 E: Plut., Themist., Lucian, Athen.
συμπεριφέρω Phaedr. 248 A: Aeschin., Aristot., Lucian, Polyb., Diog. L.
*συμπροσμίγνυμι Theaet. 183 E.
συναιωρέομαι Phaedo 112 B: Plut., Aristaen.
συναπεργάζομαι Rep. 443 E: Aristot., Plut.
συναποτίκτω Theaet. 156 E: Pollux.
συνδέομαι Parm. 136 D: Dem., Plut., Dio C.
συνδιαπεραίνω Gorg. 506 B: Gregor.
*συνδιαπέτομαι Theaet. 199 E.
συνδιασκοπέω Prot. 349 B: Philo, Joseph., Athanas.
συνδιατελέω Phaedo 91 B: Dem.
συνεξερευνάω Theaet. 155 E: Act. Anon. Combefis. Hist. Monothel.
συνεπιστατέω Rep. 528 C: Eustath.
συνεπιστρέφω Rep. 617 C: Plut., Philo.

*συνθαμβέω Ion 535 E.
συνοδύρομαι Menex. 247 C: Plut., Gregor.
*συνοίομαι Rep. 500 A.

Obs.—The above list is not exhaustive, and in particular, it does not include what has been characterised as the peculiar vocabulary of the later dialogues [1]. § 16.

This is marked (1) by a further stage of the process which has now been described. Such words as the following are foreign not only to earlier Greek, but to most of the dialogues of Plato.

ἀδιάπλαστος Tim. 91 D.
ἀθεότης Polit. 308 E, Laws XII. 967 C.
ἀναζήτησις Critias 110 A.
ἀναισθησία Phil. 34 A, Tim. 52 B, 74 E.
ἀνοηταίνω Phil. 12 D.
ἀπταισία Laws II. 669 E.
ἀστρωσία Laws I. 633 C.
ἀφοβία Laws I. 649 A, B, C.
βλάψις Laws XI. 932 E.
γεώργημα Laws II. 674 C.
δυσχέρασμα Phil. 44 D.
ἑόρτασις Laws II. 657 D.
ἐπίστημα Laws XII. 958 E.
ἐπιτηδειότης Laws VI. 778 A.
ἐψευσμένως Laws X. 897 A.
θεώρησις Phil. 48 A.
κάμψις Tim. 74 A.
κωμῴδημα Laws VII. 816 D.
νομοθέτησις Laws IX. 876 D.
παραφορότης Tim. 87 E.
ῥύψις Tim. 65 E.
στασιωτεία Laws IV. 715 B, VIII. 832 C.
συγκαταγήρασις Laws XI. 930 B.
φάντασις Tim. 72 B.
φιλοχρημονέω Laws V. 729 A.
φιλοχρημοσύνη Laws XI. 938 C.

(2) The late dialogues show an increasing tendency to return to earlier Attic or Ionic, and especially to tragic forms. When Dionysius couples Plato with Thucydides as employing the earlier Attic style, he must be thinking of the Laws and kindred dialogues. The occasional use of τέκνον for παιδίον is one of many examples of this. Another is the preference of φλαῦρος to φαῦλος [2]. Note also the increasing frequency of the Dative Plural of the first and second declension in -σι(ν).

(3) Certain changes in Plato's philosophical terminology will be noticed under a separate head.

[1] For a full treatment of this subject see Sophistes and Politicus of Plato, edited by L. Campbell, Oxford University Press, 1867, and compare the Essay on Structure, &c., Excursus, above, p. 46 ff.

[2] See also αἰνιγμός, κλαυμονή, πάθη, τέρψις, χαρμόνη, &c.

§ 17. ii. **Selection and Use of Words.**

The foregoing enumeration serves to illustrate some novelties of diction which had become rife in Plato's time. Certain peculiarities in his choice of words, and in his special employment of them, may be treated more briefly under the following heads:—

(*a*) Vernacular words, including those borrowed from the arts of life.

(*b*) Picturesque uses (1) borrowed, or (2) imitated from Epic, Tragic, and Lyric poetry.

(*c*) Metaphorical Generalization.

(*d*) Playing with words (1) ironically, and (2) etymologically.

(*a*) *Vernacular words.*

Words of common life.

Plato's use of such expressions may be illustrated by reference to the writers of the Old Comedy. Compare, for example, the use of the following words in Plato and Comic poets.

ἀμέλει	Phaedo 82 A	Ar. Nub. 877
ἀνακογχυλιάζω	Symp. 185 D	Eupolis Phil. 5
ἀστεῖος	Phaedo 116 D, Rep. I. 349 B	Ar. Ach. 811
βαλανεύς	Rep. I. 344 D	,, Ran. 710
βδελυρός	Rep. I 338 D	,, ,, 465
βλίττω	Rep. VIII. 564 E	,, Eq. 794
εἶτα	Theaet. 148 E	,, Plut. 79
ἐξ ἑωθινοῦ	Phaedr. 227–8	,, Thesm. 2
κανθήλιος	Symp. 221 E	,, Lys. 290
κροῦμα	Rep. I. 333 B	,, Thesm. 120
κύρβεις	Polit. 298 D	,, Av. 1354
λαβή	Phaedr. 236 B	,, Eq. 841
λυγίζομαι	Rep. III. 405 C	Eupolis incert. 44
μᾶζα	Rep. II. 372 B	Ar. Eq. 55

μελαγχολᾶν	Phaedr. 268 E	Ar. Av. 14
μινυρίζω	Rep. III. 411 A	„ „ 1414
μορμολυκεῖον	Phaedo 77 E	„ Thesm. 417
μορμολύττομαι	Gorg. 473 D	„ Av. 1245
ναυτιάω	Theaet. 191 A	„ Thesm. 882
νεοττιά	Rep. VIII. 548 A	„ Av. 642
νευρορράφος	Rep. IV. 421 A	„ Eq. 739
περινοστέω	Rep. VIII. 558 A	„ Plut. 494
πόπανον	Rep. V. 455 C	„ Thesm. 285
σκίμπους	Prot. 310 C	„ Nub. 254
σποδίζω	Rep. II. 372 C	„ Vesp. 329
τέλμα	Phaedo 109 B	„ Av. 1593
τίτθη	Rep. I. 343 A	„ Eq. 716
τρίβων	Prot. 335 D	„ Ach. 184
χώνη (χοάνη)	Rep. III. 411 A	„ Thesm. 18
ψῆττα	Symp. 191 D	„ Lys. 115

We may distinguish (*α*) trivial or familiar expressions, (*β*) 'household words,' in the literal sense (*τὰ οἰκετικὰ ὀνόματα* Soph. 226 A, B), (*γ*) words belonging to special arts and handicrafts. And we shall not depart from Plato's own view of the matter if we include under this head the 'cant' or 'slang' terms of the rhetorical schools.

(*α*) Amongst the familiar idioms which Plato adopted to give the natural effect of conversation to his writings, the following may be specially noted:—

The insertion of *ὦ δαιμόνιε, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ὦ μακάριε, ὠγαθέ, ὦ τᾶν*, and other appellative formulae, some probably the humorous inventions of Socrates or Plato.

The familiar *ἦ δ' ὅς* &c. (found in Cratinus and Aristophanes). The phrase is a survival from the Old Attic speech.

Socrates' familiar oath *νὴ τὸν κύνα*.

The pleonastic use of *ἥκω* with participles to denote recurrence (Phaedo 60 C *ἥκειν δή, κ.τ.λ.*: Rep. V. 456 B *ἥκομεν ἄρα εἰς τὰ πρότερα περιφερόμενοι*).

ποῖος, denoting various moods of amusement or scorn, as in Rep. I. 330 A ποῖ' ἐπεκτησάμην; Gorg. 490 D ποίων ἱματίων;

The epexegetic ἰδεῖν with adj. (Phaedr. 253 D λευκὸς ἰδεῖν &c.).

The deictic οὑτοσί Rep. I. 330 B.

πολλάκις (='perhaps'), ποιέω ('I behave myself so and so'), ποιοῦμαι pass. ('I am accounted so and so'), αἰτίαν ἔχω, 'I am reputed' (Theaet. 169 A): the words ἀγαπῶ ('I am content'), ἀδολέσχης, ἀκκίζομαι, κινδυνεύω ('I am likely,' cp. Hdt. IV. 105), μελαγχολῶ, ναρκῶ, ναυτιῶ, νεανικός, περικρούω, σκληφρός, τρίβων, χαμαίζηλος, χαμεύνιον, and the expletive use of ἐπιχειρεῖν.

Obs. 1.—The idiomatic use of ποιῶ with adverbs = '*I behave myself* so and so,'—cp. Thuc. II. 59 ποιοῦντας ἅπερ αὐτὸς ἤλπιζεν—occurs in Rep. I. 330 C, II. 360 C, 365 A, III. 416 B, VI. 494 C.

Obs. 2.—The special use of ποιοῦμαι (passive) is more dubious, but see the notes on Rep. VI. 498 A, VII. 538 C, where it appears that the meaning 'are esteemed or held to be' is alone suitable.

But in Laws XI. 930 D τῶν ποιουμένων = 'of those who claim it as their child.'

Obs. 3.—Plato sometimes quotes vernacular idioms from other dialects—

Rep. IX. 575 D μητρίδατε, Κρῆτές φασι.

Phaedo 62 A ἴττω Ζεύς, ἔφη, τῇ αὑτοῦ φωνῇ εἰπών.

Obs. 4.—Other idiomatic uses, obviously derived from common parlance, are the following:—

λαμπρός, of a distinguished entrance, 'making a great impression,' Rep. VIII. 560 E (cp. Soph. El. 685, Eur. Heracl. 280, Phoen. 1246, Dem. de Cor. § 313 ἐν τίσιν οὖν σὺ νεανίας καὶ πηνίκα λαμπρός;).

παιδαγωγέω, 'I conduct personally' (I. Alc. 135 D): cp. Rep. X. 600 E αὐτοὶ ἂν ἐπαιδαγώγουν. 'They would have been his inseparable followers.'

κεῖμαι, 'I am ruined' or 'undone' (cp. Herod. VII. 176, § 8 τὸ πλέον αὐτοῦ (τοῦ τείχους) ἤδη ὑπὸ χρόνου ἔκειτο), Rep. IV. 425 A, V. 451 A.

νεανικός, 'glorious,' Rep. II. 363 C, 'vehement' (cp. Hippocr. Vet. Med. 15, 79) Rep. VI. 491 E.

αἱρέω, 'I gain an advantage,' Rep. II. 359 A, III. 410 B. αἱροῦντος λόγου, the common idiom, Rep. IV. 440 B, slightly modified, Rep. X. 607 B ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἡμᾶς ᾕρει.

οὐ δοκῶν, 'pretending not,' VIII. 555 E οὐ . . . δοκοῦντες . . . ὁρᾶν, 'pretending not to see' (cp. Eur. Med. 67 οὐ δοκῶν κλύειν).

δράττομαι, 'I seize by handfuls,' Lys. 209 E.

ἔλυτρον, 'case,' 'outside,' Rep. IX. 588 E.

(β) 'Household words.' Cooking, nursing, familiar objects, &c. § 18

ἀμφιδρόμια Theaet. 160 E.
ἀνεμιαῖον Theaet. 151 E.
ἄνθη Phaedr. 230 B.
ἀπομύττω Rep. I. 343 A.
βαλανεύς Rep. I. 344 D.
βράττω Soph. 226 B.
γυρῖνος Theaet. 161 D.
διαττῶ Soph. 226 B, Crat. 402 C.
ἕψω Euthyd. 285 C.
ἥδυσμα Rep. I. 332 D.
λίσπη Symp. 193 A.
λύγξ Symp. 185 D.
οὖλα Phaedr. 251 C.
ὄψον Gorg. 518 B.
πέμμα Rep. II. 373 A.
σκίμπους Prot. 310 C.
σκολύθριον Euthyd. 278 B.
σποδίζω Rep. II. 372 C.
τεμάχιον Symp. 191 E.
τίτθη Rep. I. 343 A.
φορμίσκος Lys. 206 E.
χαλεστραῖον Rep. IV. 430 A.
χώνη Rep. III. 411 A.

Obs. 1.—Words belonging to games of strength or skill are intermediate between this and the next heading,—i.e. they are at once vernacular and technical—

ἀπὸ τῶν ἄνω θεῖν (?) Rep. X. 613 B.
ἀποδειλιάω Prot. 326 B, Rep. VI. 504 A.
ἀποκλείομαι Rep. VI. 487 C (as a term in draughts).
ἀρτιάζω Lys. 206 E.
ἀσκωλιάζω Symp. 190 D.
ἀστραγαλίζω Lys. 206 E.
δρόμου ἀκμή Rep. V. 460 E.
λαβή Phaedr. 236 B.
λυγίζομαι Rep. III. 405 C.
ὀλυμπικῶς Rep. IX. 583 B.
παρακινέω ('flinch') Rep. VII. 540 A.
παρακρούω Lys. 215 C.
στρόβιλος Rep. IV. 436 D.
ὕσπληξ Phaedr. 254 E.

Obs. 2.—Allusions to banqueting customs are of course frequent;

and amongst these may possibly be reckoned τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ἑστιάσεσιν . . . ἐπαμφοτερίζουσιν ἔοικε Rep. V. 479 B. See note in loco.

§ 19. (γ) Handicrafts and other arts.

Agriculture.

ἀποχετεύω Rep. VI. 485 D.
ἄφετος Rep. VI. 498 C. Cp. Prot. 320 A.
βδάλλω Theaet. 174 D.
βλίττω Rep. VIII. 564 E.
[δίνω] Soph. 226 B (MS. διακρίνειν).
κανθήλιος Symp. 221 E.
κυρίττω Rep. IX. 586 B.
μελιττουργός Rep. VIII. 564 C (v.l. μελιτουργός).
νεοττιά Rep. VIII. 548 A.
σμινύη Rep. II. 370 D.
σύνερξις Rep. V. 460 A.
τέλμα Phaedo 109 B.

Hunting.

θάμνος Rep. IV. 432 B.
ἴχνος Rep. IV. 432 D.
κυνηγέσιον Rep. III. 412 B.

Medicine.

ἰλιγγιάω Phaedo 79 C.
ἴλιγγος Rep. III. 407 C.
κατάρρους Crat. 440 D.
ναρκῶ Meno 80 B.
ὀμφαλητομία Theaet. 149 D.
ῥεῦμα Rep. III. 405 D. Cp. Crat. 440 D.
σφύζω Phaedr. 251 D.
φλέγμα Rep. VIII. 564 B.
φλεγμαίνω Rep. II. 372 E.
φλεγματώδης Rep. III. 406 A.
φῦσα Rep. III. 405 D.
χάσμη Rep. VI. 503 D (χασμάομαι Charm. 169 C).
χολή Rep. VIII. 564 B.
ψωράω Gorg. 494 C.

Music, dancing, the drama.

ἁρμονία Theaet. 175 E.
διὰ πασῶν Rep. IV. 432 A[1].
δρᾶμα Rep. V. 451 C. Cp. Symp. 222 D.
ἐργολάβος Rep. II. 373 B.
λυδιστί &c. Laches 188 D.
μελοποιία Symp. 187 D.
νεάτη Rep. IV. 443 D.
ποιεῖν, 'to dramatize' (a fable), Rep. II. 379.
ῥαψῳδός Ion 530 C.
ὑπάτη Rep. IV. 443 D.

[1] Prob. also πρὸς τὴν αὐτήν (sc. χορδήν) Rep. III. 397 B.

ὑποκριτής Charm. 162 D.
χορευτής Phaedr. 252 D.
χορός Euthyd. 279 C.
ὁ διὰ πάντων κριτής Rep. IX. 580 B (see note in loco).

Painting, statuary, pottery.

ἀνδρείκελον Crat. 424 E.
ἀποχραίνω Rep. IX. 586 B.
διαγράφω Rep. VI. 500 E.
διαζωγραφῶ Tim. 55 C.
ἐκκαθαίρω Rep. II. 361 D.
ἐκμαγεῖον Tim. 72 C.
ζῷον, 'a figure,' Rep. IV. 420 C, VII. 515 A, and probably Phaedr. 264 C. Cp. Polit. 277 C.
ἰπνοπλάθος Theaet. 147 A.
κοροπλάθος Theaet. 147 B.
μελίχλωρος Rep. V. 474 E.
πλινθουργός Theaet. 147 A.
σμίλη Rep. I. 353 A.
χυτρεύς Rep. IV. 421 D.

Spinning, weaving and clothes-making.

ἤτριον Phaedr. 268 A.
κατάγω Soph. 226 B.
κερκίζω Soph. 226 B, Crat. 388 A.
νευρορράφος Rep. IV. 421 A.
νῆσις Rep. X. 620 E.

Obs.—Allusions to the arts of the fuller (*γναφεύς*), currier (*ἐκλεαίνω*), dyer, *ἁλουργόν*, *ἄνθος*, *δευσοποιόν*, *ἐκκλίζειν*, *βαφεύς*, &c., are also frequent.

Navigation.

κελεύειν, to act as coxswain, Rep. III. 396 A.
θέοντες ἤδη τότε ἐγγύτατα ὀλέθρου Rep. III. 417 sub fin.
κυβερνήτης Rep. I. 341 C.
ναύκληρος Prot. 319 D.
πλωτήρ Rep. VI. 489 A.
τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν Phaedo 99 D.

The Mysteries.

ἐποπτεύω Laws XII. 951 D.
ἐποπτικά Symp. 209 E.
θρόνωσις Euthyd. 277 D.
μυεῖσθαι Symp. 209 E, Phaedr. 250 C, Gorg. 497 C, Phaed. 81 A, Men. 76 E.
ναρθηκοφόρος, *βάκχος* Phaed. 69 C.

Rhetorical Schools.

δείνωσις Phaedr. 272 A.
διπλασιολογία Phaedr. 267 C.
εἰκονολογία Phaedr. 267 C.
ἐπιπίστωσις Phaedr. 266 E.

ὀρθοέπεια Phaedr. 267 C.	πιθανολογία Theaet. 162 E.
παράψογος Phaedr. 267 A.	ὑπερβατόν Prot. 343 E.
παρέπαινος Phaedr. 267 A.	

§ 20. (*b*) Epic, Lyric, and Tragic elements.

(Rep. VIII. 545 E φῶμεν αὐτὰς **τραγικῶς**, ὡς πρὸς παῖδας ἡμᾶς παιζούσας καὶ ἐρεσχηλούσας, ὡς δὴ σπουδῇ λεγούσας, ὑψηλολογουμένας λέγειν;)

Plato's dialect is for the most part the purest Attic. But, besides quotations from poetry, which he occasionally weaves (with adaptations) into his prose, he frequently makes conscious use of words borrowed from the poets, and properly belonging to the diction of an earlier time. In adorning his style with these, sometimes half-humorously, sometimes in genuine earnest, he not unfrequently modifies their meaning by adding an ethical significance to what in the earlier and simpler use was merely physical. (E.g. βλοσυρός in Homer means 'rugged in appearance,' in Plato 'sturdy in character,' &c.)

(*a*) It must suffice here to give a short list of the more striking examples: the graphic language of Herodotus being counted for this purpose as poetic diction

ἀδελφός (adj.) Rep. IV. 421 C[1].	ἴκταρ Rep. IX. 575 C.
ἀκτίς Tim. 78 D.	ἰνδάλλομαι Rep. II. 381 E.
ἀλγηδών Phaedo 65 C.	καθαιμάσσω Phaedr. 254 E.
ἄλκιμος Rep. X. 614 B.	κυμαίνω Phaedo 112 B.
ἀνακηκίω Phaedr. 251 B.	μελίγηρυς Phaedr. 269 A.
ἀπτώς Rep. VII. 534 C.	μήνιμα Phaedr. 244 D.
εἱμαρμένη Phaedo 115 A.	ναυτίλλομαι Rep. VIII. 551 C.
θαμίζω Rep. I. 328 C.	οἶμος Rep. IV. 420 B.
θέμις Symp. 188 D.	ὅμαδος Rep. II. 364 E.
θεοειδής Phaedo 95 C.	παραπαίω Symp. 173 E.
θεοείκελος Rep. VI. 501 B.	πολυάρατος Theaet. 165 E.
θεσπέσιος Rep. II. 365 B.	πόριμος Symp. 203 D.

[1] This use is rare in Attic prose, but see Isocrates, Paneg. p. 55, § 71 (Bekker).

πότιμος Phaedr. 243 D.
σταθερός Phaedr. 242 A.
ταυρηδόν Phaedo 117 B.
ὑπηχέω Phaedr. 230 C.
ὑψηλόφρων Rep. VIII. 550 B.
χαμαιπετής Symp. 203 D.
χαρτός Prot. 358 A.
χήτει Phaedr. 239 D.
χθόνιος Rep. X. 619 E.
χλιδή Symp. 197 D.

(β) In this connexion it is right to observe the frequent transference from a physical to an ethical meaning.

ἄβυθος Parm. 130 D.
ἀδαμαντίνως Rep. X. 618 E.
αἴθων Rep. VIII. 559 D.
ἀκέραιος Rep. I. 342 B.
ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι Rep. I. 336 B.
ἀντίτυπος Crat. 420 D.
ἀπομαραίνομαι Theaet. 177 B.
ἀρρενωπία Symp. 192 A.
αὐστηρός Rep. III. 398 A.
αὐχμός Meno 70 C.
βλοσυρός Rep. VII. 535 B.
ἐκκαθαίρω Rep. II. 361 D.
ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι (cp. Herodot.) Phaedo 79 A.
ἐσμός Rep. V. 450 B.
κερματίζω Rep. VII. 525 E, (κατα-) Rep. III. 395 B.
καταχώννυμι Gorg. 512 B.
μετάβασις Rep. VIII. 547 C.
νυστάζω Rep. III. 405 C.

A similar (although more naïve) use of graphic words to express mental things is observed in Herodotus: e.g. χαλεπῶς ἐλαμβάνετο (II. 121 δ), &c.

(γ) Poetic Allusions. These will be mentioned in the notes. In a few cases the reference is doubtful, as in ἡ Διομηδεία λεγομένη ἀνάγκη in Rep. VI. 493 D.

Καδμεία νίκη (Laws I. 641 C) involves some mythical allusion to which the key is lost. The supposed reference to the σπαρτοί is not sufficiently clear.

(δ) Parody and Imitation.

For humorous imitations of poetic diction, see especially Rep VIII. 545 E ὅπ(π)ως δὴ πρῶτον στάσις ἔμπεσε.

Phaedr. 237 A, B ἄγετε δή, ὦ Μοῦσαι, . . . ξύμ μοι λάβεσθε τοῦ μύθου.

Ibid. 252 B, C (ἐκ τῶν ἀποθέτων ἐπῶν) τὸν δ' ἤτοι θνητοὶ μὲν Ἔρωτα καλοῦσι ποτηνόν, | ἀθάνατοι δὲ Πτέρωτα, διὰ πτερόφοιτον ἀνάγκην.

Rep. VIII. 550 C ἄλλον ἄλλῃ πρὸς πόλει τεταγμένον.

In a similar spirit, if the reading be sound, a humorous turn is given to the quotation from Homer in Rep. III. 388 A τοτὲ δ' ὀρθὸν ἀναστάντα | πλωΐζοντ' ἀλύοντ' ἐπὶ θῖν' ἁλὸς ἀτρυγέτοιο.

§ 21. (*c*) Metaphorical Generalization.

In all philosophical writing, thought inevitably reacts on language. The effort to define, distinguish, generalize, leads insensibly to novel uses of words. And Plato's method, like that of his master Socrates, largely consists in the attempt to rise to universal conceptions through the analysis of ordinary speech. At the same time he casts his thoughts in an imaginative mould, and his turn of mind, as exhibited in his writings, is eminently plastic and creative. Hence it is difficult, in describing his use of words, to draw an exact line between the work of fancy and that of logic, between metaphor and classification.

The extension of the meaning of θηρευτής, for example, in Rep. II. 373 B (side by side with that of μιμητής) appears at first sight to justify the remark ταῦτ' ἐστὶ ποιητικὰς λέγειν μεταφοράς. But in the Sophistes it is gravely stated that the genus *Huntsman* comprises several species, as General, Lover, Sophist, Fisherman, &c. Thus what a modern reader would assign to fancifulness — in this particular instance tinged with irony — Plato himself attributes to συναγωγή.

a. The use of μουσική in the Republic is here directly in point. Because in Plato's view melody is inseparable from words, and words from thoughts, not only μουσική, but the cognate terms ἁρμονία and ῥυθμός are used by him in a greatly extended sense. See especially

Prot. 326 B πᾶς γὰρ ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εὐρυθμίας τε καὶ εὐαρμοστίας δεῖται.

Phaedo 61 A ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὔσης μεγίστης μουσικῆς.

Theaet. 175 E οὐδέ γ' ἁρμονίαν λόγων λαβόντος, κ.τ.λ.

β. Under the same heading of figurative abstraction may be fairly brought the graphic use of words denoting physical states to indicate mental phenomena. See above, p. 287 (*b*).

(1) *ἀνατίθεμαι*, 'I retract,' literally 'take back a move' (in draughts), Phaedo 87 A.

διαβολή, 'prejudice,' lit. 'calumny,' Rep. VI. 489 D.

ἕταιρος (adj.), 'akin to,' lit. 'companion of,' Rep. X. 603 B.

θήρα, 'pursuit,' lit. 'chase,' Phaedo 66 C.

θρέμμα, 'creature' (used of an argument personified), Phaedr. 260 B.

κέρας, 'an offensive weapon,' Rep. IX. 586 B.

κυρίττω, 'I attack,' Rep. IX. 586 B.

μοῦσα, extended to include philosophy, Rep. VI. 499 D.

ὄναρ, 'dream,' i.e. 'impression,' Rep. VIII. 563 D.

ὀνειρώττω, 'I have vague (unverified) impressions,' Rep. VII. 533 C; cp. V. 476 C.

ὄχημα, 'vehicle,' i.e. ground of belief, Phaedo 85 D.

παναρμόνιος, transferred from music to discourse, Phaedr. 277 C.

συλλαβή, transferred from letters to ideas, Theaet. 203 C.

ὕπαρ, 'with clear thoughts,' Rep. V. 476 C, D.

φυτόν, 'organized being,' 'organism,' Rep. II. 380 E, VI. 491 D.

ψυχαγωγία, extended to include rhetoric, Phaedr. 261 A. (The usual meaning appears in *ψυχαγωγός* Aesch. Pers. 687, Eur. Alc. 1128.)

Obs.—A word which properly belongs to an aggregate is applied to a constituent part, which is thus regarded in a more general aspect.

πλήρωμα Rep. II. 371 E.

So *ἱκανὸν λόγον*, Rep. II. 376 D, means one which is necessary to completeness.

(2) For bold graphic uses, see

ἀναζωπυρέω, 'to re-illumine' (the eye of the mind), Rep. VII. 527 D.

ἄρρατος, 'indefatigable' (in Cratyl. 407 D = *σκληρός*), Rep. VII. 535 B.

θόρυβος, 'turmoil,' Phaedo 66 D; cp. Rep. VIII. 561 B, IX. 571 E.

§ 22. (*d*) Playing with words.

The Cratylus shows what might be made of the Greek language by 'victorious analysis' at play. The freedom which is there sportively abused has left many traces in other dialogues. Sometimes ironically, but sometimes also quite gravely, words are employed in new senses suggested by analytical reflexion.

a. Ironical Catachresis.

β. Etymological Analysis.

a. The exact meaning is made evident by the context. A good instance is the singular use of *νεωκορεῖν* in Rep. IX. 574 D, to denote an act of sacrilege, 'He will industriously clean out some temple.' For other instances consult the Lexicon under the 'facetious words' *ἀγεννής*, *ἀστεῖος*, *γεννάδας*, *γενναῖος*, *γλισχρός*, *εὐδαίμων*, *καλός* (especially VIII. 562 A), *κομψός*, *ὑγιαίνω*, *φαῦλος*, *χαρίεις*, *χρηστός*.

It may be observed by the way that the word *εἰρωνεία*, from meaning 'dissimulation,' generally acquires in Plato the specific meaning of 'pretended ignorance.'

Obs. 1.—A return is sometimes made (above, p. 250) from the ironical to the serious meaning.

Rep. I. 339 B **Σμικρά** *γε ἴσως, ἔφη, προσθήκη: οὔπω δῆλον οὐδ' εἰ μεγάλη.*

Rep. IV. 426 A, B *τόδε αὐτῶν οὐ* **χαρίεν**; . . . . *οὐ πάνυ χαρίεν.*

Obs. 2.—The constant use of *ἐπιεικής* for *χρηστός* or *ἀγαθός*, although not ironical, partakes somewhat of the general tendency to understatement. So also *μετρίως*, *ἱκανῶς* (Rep. VI. 499 A), &c.

β. Etymological Analysis.

(1) Sometimes a word is used quite simply in the etymological sense, which, however, is indicated by the context: Theaet. 149 B *ὅτι* **ἄλοχος** *οὖσα τὴν λοχείαν εἴληχε*, 'the goddess of childbirth, although not a mother.'

Other examples are: Theaet. 199 D *ἀγνωμοσύνη*, Symp. 197 D *ἄδωρος* (active), Rep. III. 411 B *ἄθυμος*, Phaedr. 230 A *ἄτυφος*, Rep. VI. 500 A *ἄφθονος*, Rep. I. 348 D, III. 400 E *εὐήθεια*, Theaet. 157 E *παραισθάνεσθαι*, Rep. X. 596 D *ποιητής*, Rep. VII. 521 D *προσ-έχειν*.

(2) More frequently the play on words takes the form of an oxymoron or a downright pun.

Rep. II. 382 A *τό γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος*.

Symp. 198 A *ἀδεὲς . . . δέος*.

Phaedr. 247 C, D *τό γε ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ περὶ ἀληθείας*.

Rep. VI. 509 D *ἵνα μὴ* **οὐρανὸν** *εἰπὼν δόξω σοι σοφίζεσθαι*.

Rep. VI. 507 A *κίβδηλον ἀποδιδοὺς τὸν* **λόγον τοῦ τόκου**.

Rep. VII. 527 A, IX. 574 B, C *ἀναγκαῖος*.

Rep. VII. 540 C *δαίμοσιν . . . εὐδαίμοσι*.

Rep. IX. 580 B, C *ὁ Ἀρίστωνος υἱὸς τὸν ἄριστον, κ.τ.λ.*

Obs. 1.—This tendency becomes exaggerated in Plato's later manner:—Soph. 254 A *τριβῇ*, Tim. 90 C *εὐδαίμων*, Phileb. 64 E *ξυμφορά*, Tim. 55 C *ἄπειρος*, Laws II. 656 C *παιδεία*, ib. IV. 717 B *νόμος*.

Obs. 2.—Plato's fanciful etymologies afford no real ground for critical judgement on his text. See note on Rep. I. 338 A, B *φιλονεικεῖν* (cp. IX. 581 A, B), E. on Text, p. 131.

iii. **Philosophical expression.**

It has been suggested in the preceding section that § **23.** the growth of reflexion and, in particular, the Socratic search for definitions had in Plato's time already exercised a natural and inevitable influence on words. This was the beginning of a process which tended ultimately to give an approximately fixed connotation to the chief terms of constant use in mental and moral philosophy. But the result was still far distant, and even in Aristotle the appearance of definiteness is often illusory.

In all ages philosophers have been apt to dream of a language which should be the exact, unvarying counter-

part of true conceptions[1]. The dream has not been realized, and if it were, would not the very life and progress of thought be arrested? Philosophy reacts on common language, and in employing it again, is sure to modify it further. But the process cannot have, and ought not to have, either finality or absolute fixity. In some departments of knowledge, Mathematics, Chemistry, Astronomy, Anatomy, Jurisprudence, such an aim is obviously legitimate;—the use of technical terms in them is clearly necessary. But Mental Philosophy is in danger of becoming hidebound, if it be not permitted to her to draw afresh, and to draw freely, from the fountains of common speech.

In Plato, at all events, philosophical terminology is incipient, tentative, transitional. And although this remark applies with especial force to what have been called the 'dialogues of search,' where the method is 'peirastic' or 'maeeutic,' leading to an avowedly negative result, it is a serious error even in dealing with the more positive and constructive dialogues to assume strict uniformity of expression. In a few rare instances the metaphysical significance acquired by a word or phrase in one dialogue may be thought to have influenced the use or application of the same term in another. Thus in the Timaeus the meaning attached to *οὐσία* (35 B), and to *θατέρου φύσις* (35 B, 74 A), may bear some relation to the definitions in the Philebus (26 D) and Sophist (257 D). But even where such connexion may doubtfully be traced, it by no means precludes the occurrence of other philosophical uses, still less the continued employment of the word or phrase in its ordinary vernacular sense. And the instances which have been adduced are quite exceptional. The contrary

[1] See Ward in *Encyc. Brit.* ed. ix. Art. *Psychology*: 'It seems the fate of this science to be restricted in its terminology to the ill-defined and well-worn currency of common speech, with which every psychologist feels at liberty to do what is right in his own eyes, at least within the wide range which a loose connotation allows.'

practice is more frequent. The special meanings assigned to διάνοια and πίστις in Rep. VI. 511, VII. 534 A are not to be found elsewhere in Plato. Even the definition of Justice, so carefully elaborated in Rep. IV, though once alluded to in IX. 586 E, can hardly be said to affect the connotation of the term elsewhere[1]. Nor does the definition of δύναμις by the young mathematicians in Theaet. 148 B for a moment supplant either the ordinary or the scientific uses of the word.

Thus, while attempts are made to give a precise meaning to words denoting philosophical conceptions, such attempts are inchoate, intermittent and casual. The very nature of dialectic, as an 'interrogation' of language, forbids the assumption of technicalities, nor can Plato's literary instinct tolerate the air of pedantry, which such buckram stiffening involves. The formal terminology of Rhetors and Sophists (ὀρθοέπεια, ἀπορροή, &c.) is the object of his frequent ridicule. In two of the most elaborate of his dialogues[2] he reminds the reader that precise verbal distinctions, such as Prodicus affected, are rarely of any use in philosophy, and warns young men that a liberal indifference to mere words is the condition of growth in wisdom; just as in the Cratylus he had long since pronounced against looking for the truth of things in words[3]. That second course (δεύτερος πλοῦς), for which Socrates declares in the Phaedo[4] as preferable to the bare assertion of an unapplied first cause, —the endeavour to find in the mirror of language, however confusedly, some reflexion of eternal truths,—is really a method which dissolves the apparent fixity of ordinary speech, and awakens thought to new conceptions which, the more firmly they are held, can be more freely and variously expressed.

These remarks are here to be exemplified by the con-

[1] See esp. Laws I. 631 C.
[2] Theaet. 184 C; Polit. 261 E.
[3] Cratylus 439 A, B.
[4] Phaedo 99 D.

sideration of a few cardinal expressions[1], which may be roughly classified as (*a*) Metaphysical, (*b*) Psychological, and (*c*) Dialectical, although such distinctions are not clearly present to the mind of Plato.

§ 24. (*a*) METAPHYSICAL TERMS.

Εἶδος.

This word, which Aristotle and others have made the symbol of Platonism, is used by Plato himself with entire freedom, and very seldom with a pronounced metaphysical intention. He has nowhere defined it.

Ordinary meanings.

The word was in common use amongst contemporary writers.

a. Εἶδος was still used, as in Homer, in the literal sense of 'outward appearance,' 'visible form.'

(1) Xen. Cyrop. IV. 5, § 57 ἐκλεξάμενος αὐτῶν τοὺς τὰ **εἴδη** βελτίστους.

(2) In Xenophon (Cyn. 3, § 3 αἱ δὲ **σκληραὶ τὰ εἴδη** [κύνες]: ib. 4, § 2 ἰσχυραὶ **τὰ εἴδη**), εἶδος nearly = δέμας, bodily constitution or condition.

b. But it had acquired the secondary meaning—

(1) Of 'a mode of action or operation'; so in Thuc. II. 41, § 1 ἐπὶ πλεῖστ' ἂν **εἴδη** . . . τὸ σῶμα αὔταρκες παρέχεσθαι, 'to adapt himself to the most varied forms of action,' ib. 50, § 1 τὸ **εἶδος** τῆς νόσου, 'the course of the disease,' III. 62, § 3 ἐν οἵῳ **εἴδει** . . . τοῦτο ἔπραξαν, 'the peculiarity of the course they took,' VI. 77, § 2 ἐπὶ τοῦτο τὸ **εἶδος** τρεπομένους, 'betaking themselves to this policy,' VIII. 56, § 2 τρέπεται ἐπὶ τοιόνδε **εἶδος**, 'had recourse to such a method of proceeding,' ib. 90, § 1 ἐναντίοι ὄντες τῷ τοιούτῳ **εἴδει**, 'opposed to this policy' or 'platform' (εἶδος here seems more definite than ἰδέα in τῇ αὐτῇ ἰδέᾳ preceding).

(2) In the language of rhetoric this use was naturally transferred from action to speech, so that in Isocrates,

[1] ἵνα μὴ ταραττώμεθα ἐν πολλοῖς (Soph. 254 c).

Antid. § 80 *ὅλοις* **εἴδεσι** *προειλόμην χρῆσθαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς*, it seems to mean an entire course or line of argument, as distinguished from a single phrase.

c. *Εἶδος* was already used in common speech, with associations from the primary meaning, in a still more general sense, approaching to the abstract notion of 'mode,' 'sort,' 'kind.' Hippocrates *περὶ ἀρχαίης ἰατρικῆς*, § 15 *αὐτό τι ἐφ' ἑωυτοῦ θερμόν, ἢ ψυχρὸν . . . μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ* **εἴδεϊ** *κοινωνέον*.

Thuc. III. 82 *τοῖς* **εἴδεσι** *διηλλαγμένα*, 'differing in character.'

Isocr. 190 D, E (Evagoras, § 10) *τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ποιηταῖς πολλοὶ δέδονται κόσμοι . . . καὶ περὶ τούτων δηλῶσαι μὴ μόνον τοῖς τεταγμένοις ὀνόμασιν, . . . ἀλλὰ πᾶσι τοῖς* **εἴδεσι** *διαποικῖλαι τὴν ποίησιν*.

Isocr. 294 D (*κατὰ τῶν σοφιστῶν* § 20 Bekker) *δεῖν τὸν μὲν μαθητὴν πρὸς τῷ τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν οἵαν χρὴ τὰ μὲν* **εἴδη** *τῶν λόγων μαθεῖν, κ.τ.λ.*

These, the ordinary uses of the word, may all be readily exemplified out of Plato. **§ 25.**

a. (1) Rep. X. 618 A *ἐπὶ* **εἴδεσι** *καὶ κατὰ κάλλη*.

Charm. 154 D *τὸ* **εἶδος** *πάγκαλος*.

Symp. 189 E *τὸ* **εἶδος** *στρογγύλον*.

Prot. 352 A *ἄνθρωπον σκοπῶν ἐκ τοῦ* **εἴδους**.

(2) Rep. III. 402 D *ἔν τε τῇ ψυχῇ . . . ἐνόντα καὶ ἐν τῷ* **εἴδει**, 'in mind and body.'

Symp. 196 A *ὑγρὸς τὸ* **εἶδος**, 'of flexible make.'

b. (1) Rep. IX. 572 C *ὁρμήσας εἰς ὕβριν τε πᾶσαν καὶ τὸ ἐκείνων* **εἶδος**, 'their way of life' (where *ἦθος* has been needlessly conjectured).

(2) Rep. V. 449 C **εἶδος** *ὅλον οὐ τὸ ἐλάχιστον ἐκκλέπτειν τοῦ λόγου*, 'a whole chapter.'

III. 392 A *τί . . . ἡμῖν . . . ἔτι λοιπὸν* **εἶδος**; (cp. Laws VI. 751 A).

II. 363 E *ἄλλο αὖ* **εἶδος** *λόγων*.

See also Phaedr. 263 C *καλὸν γοῦν ἂν . . .* **εἶδος** *εἴη κατανενοηκώς*.

c. Rep. II. 357 C *τρίτον δὲ ὁρᾷς τι . . .* **εἶδος** *ἀγαθοῦ*, 'a third kind of good.'

Gorg. 473 E ἄλλο αὖ τοῦτο **εἶδος** ἐλέγχου ἐστίν;

Rep. III. 406 C οὐδὲ ἀπειρίᾳ τούτου τοῦ **εἴδους** τῆς ἰατρικῆς, 'this mode of practice.'

IV. 424 C **εἶδος** . . . καινὸν μουσικῆς μεταβάλλειν, 'a new style in music.'

And therefore in passages of more distinctly philosophical import the interpreter is by no means bound to drag in a ready-made 'doctrine of ideas' (εἰσαγαγεῖν τὰ εἴδη) wherever the word εἶδος happens to occur. This can hardly be done without violence, for example, in the following places:—

Rep. II. 380 D ἀλλάττοντα τὸ αὑτοῦ **εἶδος** εἰς πολλὰς μορφάς.

VI. 511 A τοῦτο τοίνυν νοητὸν μὲν τὸ **εἶδος** ἔλεγον.

VII. 530 C οὐ μὴν ἕν, ἀλλὰ πλείω . . . **εἴδη** παρέχεται ἡ φορά.

VII. 532 E (ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις) κατὰ ποῖα δὴ **εἴδη** διέστηκε.

VIII. 544 D ὅτι καὶ ἀνθρώπων **εἴδη** τοσαῦτα ἀνάγκη τρόπων εἶναι, ὅσαπερ καὶ πολιτειῶν.

And in the concluding passage in Book VI, where εἶδος is the cardinal term, it is applied to the visible forms as well as to the invisible (510 D **τοῖς ὁρωμένοις εἴδεσι** προσχρῶνται, compared with 511 B, C αἰσθητῷ παντάπασιν οὐδενὶ προσχρώμενος, ἀλλ' **εἴδεσιν αὐτοῖς** δι' αὐτῶν εἰς αὐτά, καὶ τελευτᾷ εἰς **εἴδη**).

Obs.—In Phaedr. 249 B where εἶδος has been used in the logical sense (infra p. 298, γ) it recurs in the same passage (1) for the imaginary form or nature of the soul, and (2) for the form and appearance of the noble steed.

§ 26. *Platonic uses.*

Εἶδος as employed by Plato is a word of extremely wide significance, and even where its use is avowedly technical (as in Phaedo 102 A) it receives not a new meaning but a new application. It is applied so variously that it can hardly be defined more closely, as a philosophical term in Plato, than by saying that it denotes *the objective reality of any and every abstract notion.* Nor is the word in this its philosophical sense by any means confined to

the Platonic 'ideas.' The crude idealists of Soph. 246 are no less than Plato himself believers in *εἴδη*. And in the passage of the Republic just referred to (VI. 510, 511) the connotation of *εἶδος* is not confined to the classification of natural objects, nor to mathematical principles, nor to moral truths. It includes also *ἐπιστήμη, ἀλήθεια, οὐσία, ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα* and all other philosophical conceptions to which the mind of Plato had attained when the book was written.

The application of the term in different passages, even within the limits of one dialogue, is by no means uniform.

a. Εἶδος is an ethical notion regarded as an object of thought. § **27.**

The chief instance of this use in the Republic is III. 402 B, C *οὐδὲ μουσικοὶ πρότερον ἐσόμεθα . . . πρὶν ἂν* **τὰ τῆς σωφροσύνης εἴδη καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφὰ** *καὶ τὰ τούτων αὖ ἐναντία πανταχοῦ περιφερόμενα γνωρίζωμεν καὶ ἐνόντα ἐν οἷς ἔνεστιν αἰσθανώμεθα καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ εἰκόνας αὐτῶν, καὶ μήτε ἐν σμικροῖς μήτε ἐν μεγάλοις ἀτιμάζωμεν, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς οἰώμεθα τέχνης εἶναι καὶ μελέτης*; where observe that two lines lower down the word is used in the vernacular meaning of 'bodily constitution' (*ἔν τε τῇ ψυχῇ . . . καὶ ἐν τῷ* **εἴδει**: supra p. 294, a (2)).

Cp. Parm. 130 B *δικαίου τι* **εἶδος** *αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πάντων . . . τῶν τοιούτων.*

Ib. 135 C *καλόν τε τί καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν* **εἰδῶν.**

β. This meaning is extended from ethical universals to all universals, implying at once the abstract notion and the essential nature of the thing.

Phaedo 100 B, C *εἶναί τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ* **μέγα** *καὶ τἆλλα πάντα*, resumed in ib. 102 B with *εἶναί τι* **ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν.**

Crat. 440 B *εἰ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ* **εἶδος** *μεταπίπτει τῆς γνώσεως, ἅμα τ' ἂν μεταπίπτοι εἰς ἄλλο* **εἶδος** *γνώσεως, κ.τ.λ.*

Rep. V. 476 A, X. 596 A **εἶδος** *γάρ πού τι ἓν ἕκαστον*

εἰώθαμεν τίθεσθαι περὶ ἕκαστα τὰ πολλά, οἷς ταὐτὸν ὄνομα ἐπιφέρομεν.

Parm. 135 D. (See also ib. 130 C, D where the doubt is raised whether there is any such essential nature attaching to dirt, mud, hair, and other insignificant things.)

γ. Εἶδος is the reality of a general concept.

Phaedr. 249 B *δεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον ξυνιέναι κατ'* **εἶδος** *λεγόμενον, κ.τ.λ.*

Ib. 277 C, Rep. VIII. 544 D *ἥτις καὶ ἐν* **εἴδει** . . . *κεῖται*; Men. 72 C.

(1) Εἶδος is thus a logical whole, containing the particulars under it. Rep. V. 475 B *παντὸς τοῦ* **εἴδους**, Theaet. 178 A, ib. 148 D.

(2) But it is also a part, i.e. a subordinate species: Phaedr. 265 E *κατ'* **εἴδη** *δύνασθαι τέμνειν*, Rep. V. 454 A *διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κατ'* **εἴδη** *διαιρούμενοι . . . ἐπισκοπεῖν*, Theaet. 181 C, 187 C.

Obs. 1.—Εἶδος when thus employed signifies a true and natural, as opposed to an arbitrary division. Cp. Polit. 262, 263.

Obs. 2.—In the passage of the Phaedrus p. 265 ff., the word is also used in the familiar idiomatic sense of a line of argument or mode of reasoning (see above, p. 295 b (2)) *τούτων δέ τινων ἐκ τύχης ῥηθέντων δυοῖν* **εἰδοῖν** . . . . *τὸ δ' ἕτερον δὴ* **εἶδος** *τί λέγεις*; See also ib. 263 B, C.

δ. Εἶδος is applied, not only to the species into which a genus is divided, but also to the parts of an organic whole. These two conceptions are, in fact, not clearly kept apart by Plato.

Thus the Soul in Rep. IV. 435 ff. is shown to have three forms or natures (*εἴδη*), which are her parts (*μέρη*, p. 442), but are also species, having varieties under them (VIII. 559 E, alib.), and are repeatedly spoken of as *γένη*.

ε. Εἶδος is the type of any natural kind, comprising its essential attributes.

Theaet. 157 B, C *ἄνθρωπόν τε τίθενται καὶ λίθον καὶ ἕκαστον ζῷόν τε καὶ* **εἶδος**.

Parm. 130 C *ἀνθρώπου* **εἶδος** *χωρὶς ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν οἷοι ἡμεῖς ἐσμὲν πάντων, αὐτό τι* **εἶδος** *ἀνθρώπου ἢ πυρὸς ἢ καὶ ὕδατος*.

Obs.—This is the *μονάς* of Phileb. 15 A *ἕνα ἄνθρωπον . . . καὶ βοῦν ἕνα, κ.τ.λ.*, about which there, as in Parm. 130 C, D, Socrates expresses himself doubtfully.

ζ. *Εἶδος* is also used of an abstract whole, conceived as separable from the parts, as in

Theaet. 204 A *ἢ καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν λέγεις γεγονὸς ἕν τι* **εἶδος** *ἕτερον τῶν πάντων μερῶν* ;

η. *Εἶδος* is used not only for the type of a natural kind § **28.** (man, horse, stone, &c.),—though on this point, as we have seen, there is in Plato's mind a lingering doubt,—not only for generic attributes (good, beautiful, wise, &c., Phileb. 15), but also to denote an idea of relation, as for example, the idea of similarity.

Parm. 128 E *αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ* **εἶδός** *τι ὁμοιότητος*.

In Rep. V. 454 B *τί* **εἶδος** *τὸ τῆς ἑτέρας τε καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως καὶ πρὸς τί τεῖνον ὡριζόμεθα*; the meaning of *εἶδος* is further explained by *πρὸς τί τεῖνον*. And in Phaedo 74, 75, although the term *εἶδος* is not expressly used of *αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον*, yet the whole course of reasoning implies that this, together with *μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον*, is included amongst the *εἴδη* spoken of in ib. 102 A.

θ. Lastly, *εἶδος* is applied to each of the primary forms or elements of thought. These come into question most in the dialectical dialogues (Theaet., Soph., Polit., Phileb.), but the use referred to is much the same with that which occurs already in Phaedr. 263 B *εἰληφέναι τινὰ χαρακτῆρα ἑκατέρου τοῦ* **εἴδους**. See especially Parm. 129 D, E, Theaet. 184, 185, 197 D, 202 A, Soph. 254 C, Phileb. 23 B, C, and again Soph. 258, where the *θατέρου φύσις* is described as an **εἶδος**, and also as *having* an **εἶδος** (i. e. a real nature corresponding to its definition).

The chief meanings or applications of εἶδος as a philosophical term in Plato may accordingly be thus tabulated :—

Εἶδος is

1. an ethical notion, Rep. III. 402 C, D, &c.

2. a universal nature, Phaedo 100 B, C.

3. a logical whole, Phaedr. 249 B. *α*. genus, Rep. V. 474; *β*. species, Phaedr. 265 E.

4. a part of an organic whole: an organ, Rep. IV. 435.

5. the type of a natural kind, Theaet. 157 B.

6. a pure abstraction, e. g. the whole as separable from the parts, Theaet. 204 A.

7. an idea of relation, Rep. V. 454 C.

8. any primary form or element of thought, Theaet. 184, 185, Parm. 129 C–E, Soph. 254 C, &c.

Γένος.

γένος often occurs in the Republic, Parmenides, and later dialogues, interchangeably with εἶδος, though suggesting rather the notion of *kind*, than of *form* or *nature*.

Rep. V. 477 B, C φήσομεν δυνάμεις εἶναι **γένος** τι τῶν ὄντων . . . εἰ ἄρα μανθάνεις ὃ βούλομαι λέγειν τὸ **εἶδος** . . . ib. D, E εἰς τί **γένος** . . . ἢ εἰς ἄλλο **εἶδος**;

Parmenides 129 C αὐτὰ τὰ **γένη** τε καὶ **εἴδη**.

See also Polit. 285 C, 286 D.

This use is especially frequent in the Sophistes.

γένος is combined with ἰδέα in Laws VIII. 836 D τὸ τῆς σώφρονος **ἰδέας γένος**.

Obs.—The use of γένος becomes more frequent in the later dialogues and at the same time the applications of εἶδος and ἰδέα become more varied. For confirmation of these assertions the student may consult the following passages :—

εἶδος Soph. 219–230 (where εἶδος occurs fifteen times), 236, 239, 246, 248, 252, 254, 255, 256, 258, 259, 260, 261, 264, 265, 267 : Polit. 258, 262, 263, 267, 278, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 291, 304, 306, 307 : Phil. 18, 19, 20, 23, 32, 33, 35, 48, 51 : Tim. 30, 37, 40, 42, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 62, 64, 66, 67, 68, 69, 75, 77, 81, 83, 87, 88, 89, 90 : Laws I. 630 E, VI. 751 A.

ἰδέα Soph. 235, 253, 254, 255 : Polit. 258, 289, 307, 308 : Phil,

16, 25, 60, 64 (twice), 67: Tim. 28, 35, 39, 40, 58, 60, 70, 71, 75, 77: Laws VIII. 836 D (τὸ τῆς σώφρονος ἰδέας γένος).

γένος Soph. 228 (three times), 229, 235, 253, 254, 256, 257, 259, 260, 261, 267, 268: Polit. 260, 262, 263, 266, 267, 279, 285, 287, 288, 289, 291, 305: Phil. 12, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 44, 52, 65: Tim. 41, 42, 43, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 67, 69, 73, 74, 77, 78, 81, 82, 83, 85, 86, 92: Laws VII. 797 A, VIII. 836 D, 897 B, XI. 916 D.

Ἰδέα. § 29.

ἰδέα is the feminine form of εἶδος. It is naturally the more picturesque word and is accordingly more frequent in the more imaginative and exalted passages. From this cause, and from its adoption as a term of Stoicism, the word has passed over into Latin and thence into modern literature and philosophy.

Ordinary meanings.

a. In the literal sense, = 'form,' 'appearance,' ἰδέα is used by Pindar, Theognis, Euripides, Aristophanes, Herodotus, and Thucydides (VI. 4 ὅτι δρεπανοειδὲς τὴν ἰδέαν τὸ χωρίον ἐστί).

b. In Herodotus it has the slightly more abstract meaning of Nature, description (I. 203 φύλλα τοιῆσδε **ἰδέης**, 'leaves of such a nature'; II. 71 φύσιν . . . παρέχονται **ἰδέης** τοιήνδε, 'their nature and description is as follows'; VI. 119), and even of a line of thought or policy, VI. 100 ἐφρόνεον δὲ διφασίας **ἰδέας**.

c. In Thucydides, where (acc. to Bétant) the word occurs fourteen times (see esp. III. 81, § 5 πᾶσά τε **ἰδέα** κατέστη θανάτου), it has acquired the further meaning of a plan, or mode of operation (see above, εἶδος, p. 294, b (1)).

II. 77, § 2 πᾶσαν **ἰδέαν** ἐπενόουν, 'they devised every plan.'

III. 62, § 2 τῇ . . . αὐτῇ **ἰδέᾳ** ὕστερον . . . ἀττικίσαι, 'on the same principle.'

d. In Isocrates ἰδέα already signifies a form (1) of life, (2) of speech, (3) of thought (see also Aristoph. Nub. 547 ἀλλ' ἀεὶ καινὰς ἰδέας εἰσφέρων σοφίζομαι, Ran. 384, Av. 993).

(1) Isocr. p. 21 D (Nicocl. § 46) *δεῖ δὲ χρῆσθαι μὲν ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς* **ἰδέαις** *ταύταις* (dignity and urbanity).

32 E *τὰς μὲν μὴ μετεχούσας τούτων τῶν* **ἰδεῶν** *(ἀρετὰς) μεγάλων κακῶν αἰτίας οὔσας*, 'those virtues that have no share of temperance and justice.'

The *ἰδέαι* referred to are *σωφροσύνη* and *δικαιοσύνη*.

36 A *ἐν ταῖς αὐταῖς* **ἰδέαις** (explained by *ἐν ταῖς ἀπορίαις, ἐν ταῖς δυναστείαις*, &c.).

259 E (Panathen. § 141) *τὰς . . .* **ἰδέας** *τῶν πολιτειῶν τρεῖς εἶναι.*

(2) 42 C (Panegyr. § 7) *εἰ μὲν μηδαμῶς ἄλλως οἷόν τ' ἦν δηλοῦν τὰς αὐτὰς πράξεις ἀλλ' ἢ διὰ μιᾶς* **ἰδέας**.

210 E (Helen. Encom. § 16) *ἔστι δ' οὐκ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν* **ἰδεῶν** *. . . ὁ λόγος*, 294 C (Sophist. § 18).

(3) 312 C (Antid. § 12) *τοσαύτας* **ἰδέας** *καὶ τοσοῦτον ἀλλήλων ἀφεστώσας συναρμόσαι καὶ συναγαγεῖν*, 'notions so important and so remote from one another.'

(4) A special use occurs in 216 E (Helen. Encom. § 62) *ὅσα ταύτης τῆς* **ἰδέας** *κεκοινώνηκε*, where *αὕτη ἡ* **ἰδέα** is the *attribute* of beauty.

(The word is hardly, if at all, used by Xenophon.)

§ 30. Thus it is evident that by the time of Plato the word *ἰδέα* was ready for his philosophical use. But before touching on this, it is important to observe, as in the case of *εἶδος*, (1) that he also employs it freely in all the senses (except perhaps that marked c) above-mentioned, and (2) that even in philosophical passages it is by no means always used with a scientific or technical intention. Such an intention is only to be assumed when the context places it beyond doubt.

a. Protag. 315 E *τὴν . . .* **ἰδέαν** *πάνυ καλός.*

Phaedr. 251 A *ἤ τινα σώματος* **ἰδέαν**.

Phaedo 108 D *τὴν . . .* **ἰδέαν** *τῆς γῆς.*

Polit. 291 B *ταχὺ δὲ μεταλλάττουσι τάς τε* **ἰδέας** *καὶ τὴν δύναμιν εἰς ἀλλήλους.*

b. Rep. II. 369 A *τὴν τοῦ μείζονος ὁμοιότητα ἐν τῇ τοῦ*

ἐλάττονος ἰδέᾳ ἐπισκοποῦντες, 'the resemblance of the greater in the form of the less.'

Rep. II. 380 D φαντάζεσθαι ἄλλοτε ἐν ἄλλαις **ἰδέαις**.

Tim. 58 D τὴν τοῦ σχήματος **ἰδέαν**, 'the shape of the figure.'

c. This meaning is possibly approached in Rep. VI. 507 E οὐ σμικρᾷ ἄρα **ἰδέᾳ**, κ.τ.λ., 'by a notable expedient' (?); Phaedr. 237 D, 238 A. But it is hard to find in Plato an exact parallel for the Thucydidean use.

• d. Phaedr. 253 B εἰς τὸ ἐκείνου ἐπιτήδευμα καὶ **ἰδέαν** ἄγουσιν, 'into conformity with his practices and way of life.' Cp. εἶδος, p. 294, b (1).

Even where the context is highly philosophical, ἰδέα often retains its usual, vernacular, meaning. Thus in Phaedr. 246 A it is used not of absolute Justice, Beauty, &c., but of the nature or conformation of the soul, as it is there figuratively described. And in Theaet. 184 C, D the word is similarly applied, not to Being, sameness, difference, and the other primary notions, but to the nature of the mind perceiving them—εἰς μίαν τινὰ **ἰδέαν**, εἴτε ψυχὴν εἴτε ὅ τι δεῖ καλεῖν, πάντα ταῦτα ξυντείνει.

Platonic uses. § 31.

The transition to the specially Platonic use is well marked in Parm. 131 E, 132 A οἶμαί σε ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦδε ἓν ἕκαστον **εἶδος** οἴεσθαι εἶναι. ὅταν πόλλ' ἄττα μεγάλα σοι δόξῃ εἶναι, μία τις ἴσως δοκεῖ **ἰδέα** ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι ἐπὶ πάντα ἰδόντι, ὅθεν ἓν τὸ μέγα ἡγεῖ εἶναι, 'when you look at them together, there appears to you one and the same form (or idea) in them all.'

a. Ἰδέα, as a philosophical term, signifies rather *form* than *kind*. The meaning of a *class*, which εἶδος often essentially connotes, attaches only accidentally to ἰδέα. The latter term immediately suggests the unity of a complex notion as present to the mind. It is thus used to describe the work of συναγωγή, where εἶδος denotes the result of διαίρεσις :—

Phaedr. 265 D, E εἰς μίαν τε **ἰδέαν** συνορῶντα ἄγειν τὰ

πολλαχῇ διεσπαρμένα, κ.τ.λ. . . . τὸ πάλιν κατ' **εἴδη** *δύνασθαι τέμνειν.*

Theaet. 205 D, E, Soph. 253 C, D, Phileb. 60 D.

Observe the frequent combination of **μία ἰδέα**.

See also Phaedo 103 D, E—where at first sight the terms may seem to be interchanged—*μὴ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ* **εἶδος** *ἀξιοῦσθαι τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ὀνόματος εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλο τι, ὃ ἔστι μὲν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο, ἔχει δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου* **μορφὴν** *ἀεὶ ὅτανπερ ᾖ . . .* 104 C *οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἔοικε δεχομένοις ἐκείνην τὴν* **ἰδέαν** *ἣ ἂν τῇ ἐν αὐτοῖς οὔσῃ ἐναντία ᾖ.* On a closer inspection it is seen that *ἰδέαν* corresponds not to **εἶδος** but to **μορφήν** in the preceding sentence.

§ 32. It follows that each *εἶδος*, or distinct and definite kind, has its own *ἰδέα*, or notional form.

Euthyphr. 5 D *τὸ ἀνόσιον . . . αὐτὸ δὴ αὑτῷ ὅμοιον καὶ ἔχον μίαν τινὰ* **ἰδέαν** *κατὰ τὴν ὁσιότητα.*

Phil. 25 B *τὸ μικτὸν* (*εἶδος*) *. . . τίνα* **ἰδέαν** *φήσομεν ἔχειν;*

β. In Rep. VI, where Plato dwells on the unity of knowledge and characterizes the philosopher as a spectator of all time and all existence, the term *ἰδέα*, in the more precise philosophical sense, occurs with special frequency.

VI. 486 D, E *ἣν* (*διάνοιαν*) *ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος* **ἰδέαν** *ἑκάστου τὸ αὐτοφυὲς εὐάγωγον παρέξει.*

VI. 507 B, C *τὰς . . .* **ἰδέας** *νοεῖσθαι μέν, ὁρᾶσθαι δ' οὔ.*

And the process so indicated naturally culminates in the contemplation of the **ἰδέα** *τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*. Closely akin to this last is the use in Phil. 67 B *οἰκειότερον . . . τῇ τοῦ νικῶντος* **ἰδέᾳ**.

And in the more imaginative description of the parts of the Soul towards the end of Book IX *ἰδέα* again takes the place of *εἶδος*:—

588 C, D *μίαν μὲν* **ἰδέαν** *θηρίου ποικίλου . . . μίαν δὴ τοίνυν ἄλλην* **ἰδέαν** *λέοντος, μίαν δὲ ἀνθρώπου* (he had just said in illustration *συχναὶ λέγονται ξυμπεφυκυῖαι* **ἰδέαι** *πολλαὶ εἰς ἓν γενέσθαι*) [1].

[1] To estimate Plato's freedom in the use of terms, words like *ὅρος, τύπος,*

γ. Ἰδέα is also preferred in speaking of an organic whole, in which the parts or elements are merged:—

Theaet. 204 A *μία ἰδέα ἐξ ἑκάστων τῶν συναρμοττόντων στοιχείων γιγνομένη.*

The word *ἰδέα* may be regarded as symbolizing the union of thought and imagination in Plato.

Αὐτός.

α. The emphatic use of *αὐτός* is the most constant and characteristic of the various modes in which Plato expresses his belief in the absolute reality of universals. The term *ἰδέα* in its technical sense is absent both from the myth in the Phaedrus and from the discourse of Diotima in the Symposium, where *εἶδος*, too, only comes in by the way. But the pronominal use now in question perpetually recurs. It is needless to quote passages at length: it is enough to refer to Lys. 220 B, Crat. 439 C, D, Phaedr. 247 D, Phaedo 74 B, 76 C, 100 B, C (*αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό*, cp. Rep. VI. 485 D, X. 604 A), Symp. 211 B (*αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ μεθ' αὑτοῦ*), ib. D (*θεωμένῳ αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν*), Rep. I. 342 A, II. 363 A, IV. 438 C, V. 472 C, 476 A–C, 479 A, VI. 493 E, 506 D, E, VII. 532 A, X. 612 A, Parm. 133 D, &c., Theaet. 175 B, C (**αὐτῆς** *δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας*). § 33.

β. Yet, while thus consecrated to special use, the pronoun is far from losing its proper idiomatic sense. Words like *αὐτοδικαιοσύνην* belong to later Platonism, although, through a not unnatural error, they have found their way into MSS. of Plato (E. on Text: above, p. 71). Such a form as *αὐτοάνθρωπος* nowhere occurs, and, though the neuter pronoun is often joined to a feminine abstract word, frequent changes of the order clearly prove that they do not adhere together as in a compound. See for example § 34.

μορφή, μονάς (Phileb.), *μοῖρα, φῦλον* (Polit.), *μέρος, μέλος, στοιχεῖον, μόριον, σχῆμα, ἑνάς*, should be considered. This is more noticeable in later dialogues. The expression is more varied, as the philosopher becomes more sure of his ground.

Rep. I. 331 C τοῦτο δ' αὐτό, τὴν δικαιοσύνην . . .

Theaet. 146 E ἐπιστήμην αὐτὸ ὅ τί ποτ' ἐστίν.

And consider the context of II. 363 A οὐκ **αὐτὸ** δικαιοσύνην ἐπαινοῦντες, ἀλλὰ **τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῆς εὐδοκιμήσεις**, where Par. A reads αὐτοδικαιοσύνην.

Once more, the Platonic student must often refrain from Platonizing. Even in passages where the 'doctrine of ideas' is immediately in question the emphatic αὐτός occurs in the ordinary vernacular sense. The context must decide. Thus in Rep. VI. 510 E **αὐτὰ** μὲν ταῦτα . . . 511 A **αὐτοῖς** τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπεικασθεῖσι, the pronoun refers to τοῖς ὁρωμένοις εἴδεσι supra, individual objects *themselves* as opposed to their shadows or reflexions, although in the words τοῦ τετραγώνου **αὐτοῦ** ἕνεκα . . . καὶ διαμέτρου **αὐτῆς**, what has here been called the special use of αὐτός has intervened. Compare Parm. 130 D χρὴ φάναι καὶ τούτων ἑκάστου **εἶδος** εἶναι χωρίς, ὂν ἄλλο **αὐτῶν** ὧν ἡμεῖς μεταχειριζόμεθα,—'the *actual* hair, mud, dirt, &c., of common life': Soph. 241 E (περὶ) εἰδώλων . . . εἴτε φαντασμάτων **αὐτῶν**, ἢ καὶ περὶ τεχνῶν τῶν, κ.τ.λ., 'illusions *themselves* or the arts concerned with them.'

γ. It follows that there is nothing specially Platonic in such uses as Crat. 432 D τὸ μὲν **αὐτό**, τὸ δὲ ὄνομα ('name and thing'), or Theaet. 202 A **αὐτὸ** ἐκεῖνο μόνον τις ἐρεῖ ('the term by itself apart from attributes').

§ 35. **Εἶναι, ὃ ἔστι, τὸ ὄν, τὰ ὄντα, τὸ ὂν ἕκαστον, ὄντως, οὐσία.**

(Theaet. 186 A τοῦτο γὰρ μάλιστα ἐπὶ πάντων παρέπεται.)

In all Greek philosophy, and not in Plato alone, metaphysical truths are expressed through εἶναι, its inflexions and derivatives. The cause of this is partly to be sought in Eleaticism, but largely also in the Socratic form of questioning, τί ἐστί;

The student who would learn of Plato in simplicity should clear his mind of Aristotelian distinctions, such as those in the third book of the Metaphysics, and, still more carefully of *Daseyn*, *Wesen*, *Ansich*, *Fürsich*,

Anundfürsichseyn, and other terms of modern German philosophy.

α. **Οὐσία** is the truth of predication, as sifted out by dialectical discussion (Prot. 349 B); in other words, it is the reality of definition: § 36.

Rep. X. 597 A *ὃ δή φαμεν* **εἶναι** *ὃ* **ἔστι** *κλίνη.*

Phaedo 75 D *περὶ ἁπάντων οἷς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τοῦτο,* **ὃ ἔστιν**: ib. 65 D.

Phaedo 78 C *αὐτὴ ἡ* **οὐσία** *ἧς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ* **εἶναι**: Polit. 285 B.

Phaedr. 245 E *ψυχῆς* **οὐσίαν** *τε καὶ* **λόγον** *τοῦτον αὐτόν τις λέγων οὐκ αἰσχυνεῖται.*

Being, so conceived, is called in Phaedo 76 C, D *ἡ τοιαύτη* **οὐσία.**

β. **τὰ ὄντα, τὸ ὂν ἕκαστον**, have nearly the same force.

Phaedr. 247 E *καὶ τἄλλα ὡσαύτως* **τὰ ὄντα** *ὄντως θεασαμένη*: ib. 262 B *ὁ μὴ ἐγνωρικὼς* **ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων.**

Theaet. 174 A **τῶν ὄντων ἑκάστου** *ὅλου.*

Rep. VI. 484 D *τοὺς ἐγνωκότας μὲν* **ἕκαστον τὸ ὄν.**

γ. But sometimes, in moments of exaltation, the whole of Being (like the sea of Beauty in the Symposium) is spoken of as one *continuum*, which, as the object of intellectual contemplation, exists in a region above the Visible:— § 37.

Phaedr. 247 C *ἡ γὰρ ἀχρώματός τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος καὶ ἀναφὴς* **οὐσία ὄντως** *ψυχῆς* **οὖσα** *κυβερνήτῃ μόνῳ θεατὴ νῷ*: ib. D, E *ἐπιστήμην, οὐχ ᾗ γένεσις πρόσεστιν, οὐδ' ἥ ἐστί που ἑτέρα ἐν ἑτέρῳ οὖσα ὧν ἡμεῖς νῦν ὄντων καλοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ* **ὃ ἔστιν ὂν ὄντως ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν.** (Cp. Tim. 29 C, 35 A.)

The white light of Being so conceived is parted into the primary colours, as it were, of Knowledge and Truth, as for example in Rep. VI. 508, 509, where, however, the *ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* dominates over *οὐσία* as well as over *ἐπιστήμη* and *ἀλήθεια*. See also for the totality of Being, VI. 486 A *θεωρία παντὸς μὲν χρόνου, πάσης δὲ οὐσίας*. And, for *οὐσία* as abstract truth, VII. 525 C *ἐπ' ἀλήθειάν τε καὶ οὐσίαν.*

§ 38. δ. In the dialectical dialogues *οὐσία* and *τὸ ὄν* have again the more logical meaning, 'Reality, answering to truth of conception:' or the essence of a thing as defined (Polit. 283 E, Phil. 32).

For example, in the strikingly modern passage of the Theaetetus quoted above, this sentence occurs, 186 B *τοῦ μὲν σκληροῦ τὴν σκληρότητα διὰ τῆς ἐπαφῆς αἰσθήσεται, καὶ τοῦ μαλακοῦ τὴν μαλακότητα ὡσαύτως . . . τὴν δέ γε* **οὐσίαν** *καὶ* **ὅ τι ἐστὸν** *καὶ τὴν ἐναντιότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλω καὶ τὴν* **οὐσίαν** *αὖ τῆς ἐναντιότητος αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐπανιοῦσα καὶ συμβάλλουσα πρὸς ἄλληλα κρίνειν πειρᾶται ἡμῖν.* And, just below, *τὰ δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀναλογίσματα πρός τε* **οὐσίαν καὶ ὠφέλειαν** ('what they are and what good they do') *μόγις καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων καὶ παιδείας παραγίγνεται οἷς ἂν καὶ παραγίγνηται.* And in the main argument of the Sophistes, *τὸ ὄν* is positive truth or reality, as opposed to negation. The verb of existence is attenuated to the copula, passing from the notion of essence to that of relation. Yet this dialectical procedure does not preclude a recurrence to the language of 'ontology':—

Soph. 254 A, B *ὁ δέ γε φιλόσοφος, τῇ* **τοῦ ὄντος ἀεὶ** *διὰ λογισμῶν προσκείμενος ἰδέᾳ, διὰ τὸ λαμπρὸν αὖ τῆς χώρας οὐδαμῶς εὐπετὴς ὀφθῆναι· τὰ γὰρ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν ψυχῆς ὄμματα καρτερεῖν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ἀφορῶντα ἀδύνατα.*

A different shade of meaning is observable according as *εἶναι* is opposed to *γίγνεσθαι* or *φαίνεσθαι* (Tim. 27 D, Parm. 165 A).

ε. A special meaning of *οὐσία* = *μικτὴ οὐσία*, 'concrete reality,' is formulated in Phil. 27 B, and applied in Tim. 35 A. But to examine this at present would be to travel too far beyond the stage of Platonism embodied in the Republic.

ζ. If the philosophical meanings of *εἶδος, ἰδέα, αὐτός*, are crossed by the vernacular meaning, this happens inevitably also in the case of *εἶναι* in both its meanings, (1) as the copula and (2) as the substantive verb.

(1) Rep. VI. 507 B *πολλὰ καλά . . . καὶ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἕκαστα οὕτως* **εἶναί** *φαμέν τε καὶ διορίζομεν τῷ λόγῳ.*

(2) Parm. 135 D, E *οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν . . . ὁτιοῦν τὰ* **ὄντα** *πάσχοντα ἀποφαίνειν.*

So *οὐσία* in the sense of 'property' occurs in Phaedr. 252 A *καὶ* **οὐσίας** *δι' ἀμέλειαν ἀπολλυμένης παρ' οὐδὲν τίθεται.* And there is a play on both uses of the word (property and truth) in Gorg. 472 B *ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐκβάλλειν με ἐκ τῆς* **οὐσίας** *καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.*

Μετέχειν, μέθεξις, μετάσχεσις, ἔχειν, μεταλαμβάνειν, προσχρῆσθαι, μετάληψις, κοινωνία, μετεῖναι, παρεῖναι, παρουσία, ἀγγεῖον (Lys. 219 D), **ἐνεῖναι, προσγίγνεσθαι, προσεῖναι, παραγίγνεσθαι, ἐγγίγνεσθαι, ὁμοίωσις, μίμησις, παράδειγμα, περιφέρεσθαι, περιτρέχειν, μετατίθεσθαι, πεπονθέναι, πάθος ἔχειν, συμπλοκή.** § 39.

(*εἴτε παρουσία, εἴτε κοινωνία, εἴτε ὅπῃ δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσαγορευομένη,*—**οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο διισχυρίζομαι** Phaedo 100 D, cp. Rep. V. 476 C, D.)

See Arist. Metaph. I. 6, § 4 *τὴν μέντοι γε μέθεξιν ἢ τὴν μίμησιν, ἥτις ἂν εἴη τῶν εἰδῶν, ἀφεῖσαν ἐν κοινῷ ζητεῖν.*

a. In his first discovery of the supreme reality of universals, Plato lightly assumes the correlation between them and the particulars of experience. He is more concerned in asserting this than in explaining it. And he expresses his conception in a variety of ways. When Socrates in the Phaedo substitutes a dialectical for a physical method, he implies a *causal* relation of idea to fact—*ἔρχομαι γὰρ δὴ ἐπιχειρῶν σοι ἐπιδείξασθαι τῆς* **αἰτίας** *τὸ εἶδος ὃ πεπραγμάτευμαι* (Phaedo 100 B), and he explains this by participation: ib. C *εἴ τί ἐστιν ἄλλο καλὸν πλὴν αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, οὐδὲ δι' ἓν ἄλλο καλὸν εἶναι ἢ* **διότι μετέχει** *ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ.* He does not, however, confine himself to the word *μετέχειν*, as if this were the chosen term of the school: *μεταλαμβάνειν* (102 B) is freely substituted, also *κοινωνία* (100 D). And it is observable that the abstract nouns, *μέθεξις, μετάληψις* (Parm. 131, 132, 151 E), do not seem to have been at this time in use.

§ 40. β. The participation of the particular in the universal is otherwise spoken of as the *presence* of the universal in the particular: Phaedo 100 D ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἴτε παρουσία, εἴτε κοινωνία. Cp. Lys. 217 D καὶ μὴν παρείη γ' ἂν αὐταῖς λευκότης: Charm. 158 E. Ἐνεῖναι—'to inhere' is similarly used in the Republic: III. 402 C τὰ τῆς σωφροσύνης εἴδη . . . ἐνόντα ἐν οἷς ἔνεστιν. In the same passage these moral attributes are spoken of as 'carried about' πανταχοῦ περιφερόμενα; and in Theaet. 202 A, though not in stating Plato's own theory, general predicates are said to *run round about*, περιτρέχειν, amongst particular subjects.

§ 41. γ. The relation of the universal to the particular is elsewhere regarded as the relation of the Perfect to the Imperfect, or of the Ideal to the Actual. Plato in the Phaedo does not feel this point of view to be inconsistent with the former. In that dialogue (p. 74) the reminiscence which is the germ of knowledge is accounted for by the *resemblance* of things transitory to eternal truths, known by us in a pre-existent state. The perception of equality and inequality, for example, is referred to the recollection of Ideal Equality (αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον). Sense-perceived equality recalls this by resemblance, but falls short of it. ὅταν γε ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἀναμιμνήσκηταί τίς τι, ἆρ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον . . . ἐννοεῖν, εἴτε τι ἐλλείπει τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα εἴτε μή, κ.τ.λ. In Phaedo 69 B the ordinary Virtue is called a σκιαγραφία, and in 76 D occurs the phrase, ταῦτα (τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων) ἐκείνῃ (τῇ οὐσίᾳ) ἀπεικάζομεν.

§ 42. This form of Plato's Idealism appears principally (1) in passages marked by strong ethical aspiration, or (2) where his speculation takes a cosmological turn. The image often employed is that of pattern and copy, borrowed from the 'imitative' arts, especially from the art of painting.

(1) Moral improvement is continually represented as a process of assimilation to the Divine (see esp. Theaet. 176 B). And in this connexion Plato treats the notions of participation and assimilation as interchangeable. For

instance in Phaedr. 253 A the words καθ' ὅσον δυνατὸν θεοῦ ἀνθρώπῳ μετασχεῖν are immediately followed up with ποιοῦσιν ὡς δυνατὸν ὁμοιότατον τῷ σφετέρῳ θεῷ. See Arist. Met. I. 6, § 3 τὴν δὲ μέθεξιν τοὔνομα μόνον μετέβαλεν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ Πυθαγόρειοι μιμήσει τὰ ὄντα φασὶν εἶναι τῶν ἀριθμῶν, Πλάτων δὲ μεθέξει, τοὔνομα μεταβαλών. τὴν μέντοι γε μέθεξιν ἢ τὴν μίμησιν, ἥτις ἂν εἴη τῶν εἰδῶν, ἀφεῖσαν ἐν κοινῷ ζητεῖν.

In the Republic, the perfect or ideal state is more than once described as a pattern of which the actual state is to be a copy:—V. 472 D, E παράδειγμα ἐποιοῦμεν λόγῳ ἀγαθῆς πόλεως, VI. 500 E οἱ τῷ θείῳ παραδείγματι χρώμενοι ζωγράφοι. And the same ideal is to be the pattern for the individual, whether the perfect state is realized or not,—IX. 592 B ἀλλ' . . . ἐν οὐρανῷ ἴσως παράδειγμα ἀνάκειται τῷ βουλομένῳ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὁρῶντι ἑαυτὸν κατοικίζειν. This comes near to the exalted tone of Theaet. 176 E παραδειγμάτων . . . ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἑστώτων, τοῦ μὲν θείου εὐδαιμονεστάτου, τοῦ δὲ ἀθέου ἀθλιωτάτου . . . λανθάνουσι τῷ μὲν ὁμοιούμενοι διὰ τὰς ἀδίκους πράξεις, τῷ δὲ ἀνομοιούμενοι, where the conjunction of opposites has a similar effect to that in Phaedo 74 D.

And in the Politicus (273 B, 293 E, 297 C) the true statesman is represented as imitating from afar the principles of Divine Government.

Similarly in Rep. VI. 500 C, Timaeus 47 C, the philosopher is described as imitating the universal order. See also Tim. 88 C κατὰ δὲ ταὐτὰ . . . τὸ τοῦ παντὸς ἀπομιμούμενον εἶδος.

(2) In the last-mentioned passages there is a union of § 43.
the ethical with the cosmological strain. The following may serve to illustrate the place which μίμησις holds from time to time in Plato's cosmogony. In the mythical description of the Earth in Phaedo 110 foll., the colours and the precious stones known in human experience are but meagre *samples* (δείγματα) of those on the upper surface of the globe as seen from above. In the vision of Judgement at the close of the Republic (not to dwell on the

βίων παραδείγματα) the orrery turning on Necessity's knees, although partly pictorial, is partly also an ideal pattern (and in some occult or inconsistent way an efficient cause) of the revolutions of the planets.

In the Phaedrus, 250 B, earthly realities are ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἐκεῖ; and each lover makes himself and his beloved like his god (ἄγαλμα).

And in the allegory of the Cave (Rep. VII) into which less of what is purely mythological enters, natural objects in their most essential forms are described as σκευαστὰ εἴδωλα, things manufactured after the supreme realities, and moved by hands unseen so as to cast their shadows on the wall. Elsewhere in the Republic, the figure of *substance versus shadow* repeatedly appears: II. 365 C, 382 D, III. 401 B, 402 B, C, IV. 443 C, V. 472 C, VI. 510, 511, VII. 516 A, 520 C, 534 C, IX. 587 D. Cp. Lysis 219 C, D, Phaedr. 250 A, B. And a similar strain of metaphor is carried further in the Timaeus, where the world is an εἰκών, or true image (not σκιά, an imperfect likeness) of the νοητὸν εἶδος, whose forms are stamped upon the chaotic receptacle of space 'in a strange and hardly explicable way.' (Tim. 50 C.)[1]

§ 44. Meanwhile the other metaphors of *participation* in the ideas, *real presence* of the ideas, *communion* with the ideas, are by no means discarded. For the Republic it is enough to quote V. 476 C, D, where indeed the two modes of expression (τὸ ὅμοιον . . . τὰ μετέχοντα) are conjoined,—as they are in Parm. 133 D. See also VI. 505 A ᾗ καὶ δίκαια καὶ τἄλλα προσχρησάμενα χρήσιμα καὶ ὠφέλιμα γίγνεται.

In the later dialogues (Soph., Polit., Phil., Tim., Laws) the relation of the individual to the universal is altogether less in question. See Excursus, Essay on Structure, p. 46 ff. But μέθεξις still takes place between subject and predicate, or between substance and attribute.

[1] Cp. Tim. 48 E, 49 A ἓν μὲν ὡς παραδείγματος εἶδος ὑποτεθέν, νοητὸν καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὄν, μίμημα δὲ παραδείγματος δεύτερον, γένεσιν ἔχον καὶ ὁρατόν.

Soph. 247 A δικαιοσύνης ἕξει καὶ **παρουσίᾳ** (L. C.'s conjecture δ. ἕ. κ. φρονήσεως has been approved by Schanz, but see the words which follow, τό γε δυνατόν τῳ **παραγίγνεσθαι** καὶ ἀπογίγνεσθαι πάντως εἶναί τι φήσουσιν[1]), which show that the correction is not absolutely necessary.

Ib. 248 C ὅταν τῳ **παρῇ** . . . δύναμις.

Ib. 256 A διὰ τὸ **μετέχειν** αὖ πάντ' αὐτοῦ.

Phil. 16 D μίαν ἰδέαν περὶ παντὸς . . . ζητεῖν· εὑρήσειν γὰρ **ἐνοῦσαν.**

Ib. 60 B, C τὴν τἀγαθοῦ διαφέρειν φύσιν τῷδε τῶν ἄλλων. τίνι; ᾧ **παρείη** τοῦτ' ἀεὶ τῶν ζῴων διὰ τέλους πάντως καὶ πάντῃ, μηδενὸς ἑτέρου ποτὲ ἔτι προσδεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἱκανὸν τελεώτατον **ἔχειν.**

Polit. 268 B μουσικῆς . . . **μετείληφεν.**

Ib. 269 D πολλῶν μὲν καὶ μακαρίων παρὰ τοῦ γεννήσαντος **μετείληφεν,** ἀτὰρ οὖν δὴ **κεκοινώνηκέ** γε καὶ σώματος, κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 273 B, 275 D οὐ **μετόν.**

Tim. 34 E **μετέχοντες** τοῦ . . . εἰκῇ, 36 E, 58 E **μετίσχει** μᾶλλον κινήσεως, 77 A, B **μετάσχῃ** . . . **μετέχει,** 90 C καθ' ὅσον . . . **μετασχεῖν** ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις ἀθανασίας ἐνδέχεται.

δ. The ἀπορήματα raised in the Parmenides, then (with § 45. which cp. Phil. 15), have not had the effect of banishing 'participation' (see esp. the examples just quoted from Polit., Phileb.). Yet it was there shown that particulars could not partake in the universal εἶδος, either (1) wholly, or (2) in part, nor (3) as individuals in a common form, nor (4) as objects of thought, nor (5) as copies of a pattern (καὶ ἡ μέθεξις αὕτη τοῖς ἄλλοις γίγνεσθαι τῶν εἰδῶν οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ εἰκασθῆναι αὐτοῖς). Nor are these difficulties solved in the latter portion of that dialogue. What is really shown there is the inadequacy of the Zenonian dialectic, since by subjecting to it the Eleatic hypothesis of One Being, this is proved (1) to have no predicates, (2) to have all predi-

[1] In Parm. 133 D there are two stages in the descent from the ideas to individuals, (1) ὁμοίωσις, subsisting between the idea and its ὁμοίωμα or concrete type, and (2) μέθεξις τοῦ ὁμοιώματος.

cates, and (3) to have neither all nor none, but to be in transition between them. Plato thus hints indirectly at the root-fallacy which he has ridiculed in the Euthydemus, and of which he finally disposes in the Sophistes—the blank absoluteness of affirmation and negation. By the series of inferences which Parmenides himself sums up in the concluding paragraph, Plato, it may be fairly said, ἐξημφοτέρικε τὸν τοῦ Ζήνωνος λόγον (cp. Euthyd. 360 D).

§ 46. ε. This is not done without a motive, and the motive may be gathered in the words of Socrates, Parm. 129 C–E εἰ . . . αὐτὰ τὰ γένη τε καὶ εἴδη ἐν αὑτοῖς ἀποφαίνοι τἀναντία ταῦτα πάθη πάσχοντα, ἄξιον θαυμάζειν . . . ἐὰν . . . πρῶτον μὲν διαιρῆται χωρὶς αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ τὰ εἴδη, οἷον ὁμοιότητά τε καὶ ἀνομοιότητα καὶ πλῆθος καὶ τὸ ἓν καὶ στάσιν καὶ κίνησιν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἶτα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ταῦτα δυνάμενα συγκεράννυσθαι καὶ διακρίνεσθαι ἀποφαίνῃ, ἀγαίμην ἂν ἔγωγ', ἔφη, θαυμαστῶς. Cp. Phileb. 14 D. The discussion of those ἀπορίαι has cleared the ground for truer modes of conception. Something like a theory of predication is at length formulated. But even in the Philebus the construction of ideas into a κόσμος τις ἀσώματος is carried only a little way, and after the relativity of ideas is proved, Plato still speaks of them as absolute, and still employs metaphorical language to indicate metaphysical relations. Yet the point of view is no longer quite the same as before.

As the conception of the nature of predication becomes more distinct, a new stage of inquiry is reached in the search for an order and connexion of ideas. A rational psychology begins to clear away the confusions of a crude ontology. And while in the untried effort to account for γένεσις, language is still affected with dualism and tinged with mythological imagery, a far less dubious light is already shining on the world of thought.

§ 47. In the Phaedo and elsewhere, moral and other 'ideas'—αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, ἀγαθόν, δίκαιον, ὅσιον, ἴσον, μέγα—were ranked together as coordinate, or summed up as ἡ ἀΐδιος οὐσία and

set over against the transitoriness of individual objects, τὰ τούτων (sc. τῶν εἰδῶν) μετέχοντα. But in the concluding passage of Book VI, and in what follows it, there is a revelation of the unity and organization of knowledge, implying (1) that there is an order in the intellectual world, and (2) that there is a way upward and downward[1] between intellect and sense: moreover that above knowledge, truth and being, there is the supreme domination of the good. But the statement is in general terms, and no account is taken of the difficulties which are raised, without being solved, in the Parmenides. In the Theaetetus (185 C) it is clearly seen that Being, Unity, Number, likeness, difference and goodness (even when relative) are notions of a higher order than other generalizations of experience—they are birds that fly everywhere about the cage[2]—and also that there are relations between them (Theaet. 186 B τὴν οὐσίαν ... τῆς ἐναντιότητος). The existence of such relations amongst the highest ideas (or primary forms of thought and being) is what the Stranger in the Sophistes undertakes to prove; and here the long-familiar words κοινωνία, μετέχειν, μεταλαμβάνειν, ἐνεῖναι (also ξύμμιξις, ἐνοικεῖν, συνοικεῖν, δέχεσθαι, προσάπτειν, περιτρέχειν, μετατίθεσθαι, μιχθῆναι, ἁρμόττειν, προσαρτᾶσθαι, συμφωνεῖν, σύμφυτον ἔχειν)[3] are again in frequent use. Even the dim form of Space in the Timaeus, the γενέσεως τιθήνη, is spoken of as εἶδός τι ... μεταλαμβάνον ... πῃ τοῦ νοητοῦ, and again as (εἰκόνα) οὐσίας ἁμῶς γέ πως ἀντεχομένην[4]. At the same time the other metaphor of Pattern and Copy comes once more into service, not now, however, merely to express the relation of particular to universal, but to throw light upon another difficulty, the possibility

[1] Cp. Heracl. Fr. 69 (Bywater) ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω μία καὶ ὡυτή.

[2] Theaet. 197 D: cp. Soph. 254 C.

[3] See Soph. 216, 223, 228 B, 235 A, 238, 248, 249 A, 250 E, 251, 252, 253, 255, 256, 259; Polit. 309; Phil. 15, 24, 37, 57, 60, 66.

[4] Tim. 45 D, 51 A, 52 C: cp. ib. 64 D λύπης δὲ καὶ ἡδονῆς οὐ μετέχον. The simple words ἔχειν, λαμβάνειν, κεκτῆσθαι are often similarly used. So too μὴ στέρεσθαι Phileb. 67.

of false opinion (ψευδὴς δόξα) and of falsity (ψευδὴς λόγος). And as the idea of predication becomes more distinct, other modes of expression of a more definite kind are introduced—πεπονθέναι Parm. 148 A, πάθος ἔχειν Soph. 245 A, πάθημα πάσχειν, συλλαβή Theaet. 202, συμπλοκή Theaet. 202 B, Soph. 262 C, 240 C, σύγκρασις Polit. 273 B, &c., Phil. 64 D, &c., κόσμος ἀσώματος Phil. 64 B.

§ 48. We are at present concerned not with Plato's philosophy, but with his use of Language. Else more might be said not only of his various modes of expression, but of the increasing clearness of his thoughts, and of an approach to system.

His expressions are various, because almost always figurative. Metaphorical language about philosophical notions is necessarily broken and inconsistent, and cannot without confusion be tested by a logical standard. Many phases of the Ideas occurred to Plato's mind. They are universals, realities, absolute, relative: they represent the most abstract and the most concrete notions: they are isolated, and also 'flying about' everywhere among objects: they are akin to numbers, though not the same with them. Plato does not attempt to harmonize all these different views; they are experimental conceptions of the Universal, which he gradually brings back more and more to what we term common sense,—to psychology and logic from a fanciful ontology. His language about them in the Phaedrus, Meno, Phaedo, is different from that which he uses in the Philebus and the Laws; or rather in the two latter dialogues the transcendental form of them has almost disappeared. If instead of dwelling on his use of terms we consider his thought and intention [1], we find that in the dialectical dialogues and those which go with them (Tim., Critias, Laws), through grappling with the difficulties which his own theories have raised in relation to

[1] τί . . . διανοούμενος εἶπε (Theaet. 184 A).

contemporary opinion, he is confronted more and more closely with the great central questions of all philosophy, the essence of thought, the meaning of the Universe, the conditions and possibilities of human improvement for the individual and for communities. The last word of Plato on the nature of Mind is hardly different from the language of Modern Philosophy. What can be more 'modern,' for example, than the definition of Thought in Soph. 265 D, E, or than several of the psychological distinctions in the Philebus?

Other terms having a metaphysical significance may be dismissed more briefly.

Φύσις. § 49.

The word *φύσις* (after appearing once in Hom. Od. X. 303, for the 'virtues' of a drug[1]) occurs in writers from Pindar to Aristophanes with various shades of meanings:—*birth, growth, stature, native character or disposition, inherent power or capacity*, as well as in the more general sense of *that which is natural, or in accordance with experience*, as opposed to what is artificial, acquired, conventional, or monstrous.

Herodotus II. 45 already has the idiomatic phrase *φύσιν ἔχει* (*ἕνα ἐόντα τὸν Ἡρακλέα . . . κῶς φύσιν ἔχει πολλὰς μυριάδας φονεῦσαι*). Thucydides repeatedly speaks of 'human nature' (*ἡ ἀνθρωπεία φύσις* I. 76, II. 50, III. 45, 84; see also III. 82, § 2 *ἕως ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις ἀνθρώπων ᾖ*): and in V. 105, § 2 *ὑπὸ φύσεως ἀναγκαίας*, he alludes to the inevitableness of 'natural law.'

Professor Burnet in his able work on *Early Greek Philosophy* argues with much force in favour of the thesis that 'the word which was used by the early cosmologists to express the idea of a permanent and primary *substance* was none other than *φύσις*, and that the title *περὶ φύσεως* so commonly given to philosophical works in the sixth and

[1] Also in the Batrachomyomachia, in the sense of natural endowments.

fifth centuries B.C. does not mean "on the nature of things," —a far later use of the word,—but simply "concerning the primary substance"'; and that 'in Greek philosophical language φύσις always means that which is primary, fundamental and persistent as opposed to that which is secondary, derivative and transient, what is given as opposed to what is made or becomes.'

The preciseness of this statement can hardly be borne out by quotations, but it may be accepted as an expression of the fact that the early philosophers in writing περὶ φύσεως had given to the word a new depth of meaning by choosing it as an expression for the uniformity of experience for which they sought to account. Hence κατὰ φύσιν, φύσει, παρὰ φύσιν, are phrases in common use. And the opposition of the natural to the conventional (φύσει to νόμῳ) was a common-place of sophistical disputation, Isocr. Panegyr. p. 62 d, § 121 (Bekker) φύσει πολίτας ὄντας νόμῳ τῆς πολιτείας ἀποστερεῖσθαι.

§ 50. In Plato the connotation of φύσις has not more fixity than that of other philosophical terms. The particular meaning is to be determined by the context in each case.

The following uses appear to be specially Platonic:—

1. Phaedo 103 C τότε μὲν γὰρ ἐλέγετο ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πράγματος τὸ ἐναντίον πρᾶγμα γίγνεσθαι, νῦν δὲ ὅτι αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίον οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο, οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὔτε **τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει**.

Here are three grades of reality[1], (1) the actual thing or object in which the idea is embodied (τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ μετέχον τοῦ εἴδους), (2) the idea as so embodied or 'immanent' (αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν), (3) the idea as self-existent, absolute, 'transcendent' (αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει). Φύσις, therefore, in this passage is the sum of self-existences, the immutable nature of things.

Compare Rep. X. 597 B μία μὲν ἡ ἐν τῇ **φύσει** οὖσα, ἣν

[1] As in Parm. 133 D, quoted above, p. 313, note.

φαῖμεν ἄν, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, θεὸν ἐργάσασθαι, ib. VI. 501 B *πρός τε τὸ* **φύσει** *δίκαιον . . . καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο αὖ* **τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.**

2. But elsewhere the supreme agency of Nature is regarded as an heretical doctrine, opposed to the sovereignty of Reason and of God. Soph. 265 C *τῷ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματι . . . τῷ τὴν* **φύσιν** *αὐτὰ γεννᾷν ἀπό τινος αἰτίας αὐτομάτης καὶ ἄνευ διανοίας* **φυούσης**. 'Nature' is here not Eternal Law, but mere blind, unconscious energy, as opposed to Mind. Cp. Laws X. 892 C *φύσιν βούλονται λέγειν γένεσιν τὴν περὶ τὰ πρῶτα, κ.τ.λ.*[1]

3. In Phaedr. 270 *φύσις* is an extremely comprehensive word, including both worlds, the inward and the outward. This appears from the allusions to Anaxagoras and Hippocrates. *Φύσις* in this sense differs from *οὐσία* chiefly in referring more distinctly to the parts which make up the whole.

4. According to another mode of expression, the subject of philosophy is not *all* nature but *every* nature, Theaet. 173 E, Polit. 272 C.

In so denoting single or particular natures, *φύσις* is sometimes (*a*) the nature of the thing described, and sometimes (*b*) the thing itself as characterized, and the word in this sense is applied equally to natural kinds and to abstract notions.

(*a*) Rep. II. 359 B *ἡ μὲν οὖν δὴ* **φύσις** *δικαιοσύνης . . . αὕτη*[2] (including both *γένεσις* and *οὐσία*, see context).

Phaedr. 245 E *ἀθανάτου δὲ πεφασμένου τοῦ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ κινουμένου, ψυχῆς οὐσίαν τε καὶ λόγον τοῦτον αὐτόν τις λέγων οὐκ αἰσχυνεῖται. πᾶν γὰρ σῶμα, ᾧ μὲν ἔξωθεν τὸ κινεῖσθαι, ἄψυχον, ᾧ δὲ ἔνδοθεν αὐτῷ ἐξ αὑτοῦ, ἔμψυχον, ὡς ταύτης οὔσης* **φύσεως** *ψυχῆς* (sc. *τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν*).

[1] Plato here claims that if the study of *nature* is the study of *primary* substances, it ought to begin with the study of mind, since mind is prior to the elements. He tries to wrest from the natural philosophers their chief catch-word—more openly and disputatiously than in the Phaedrus.

[2] The 'Naturalist' theory is in question, see **πεφυκέναι** Rep. II. 358 E.

Rep. VI. 493 C τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ **φύσιν**, κ.τ.λ.

Ib. VII. 525 C ἐπὶ θέαν τῆς τῶν ἀριθμῶν **φύσεως**.

Ib. X. 611 B μήτε γε αὖ τῇ ἀληθεστάτῃ **φύσει** τοιοῦτον εἶναι ψυχήν.

Soph. 245 C, 258 B, C; Phil. 25 A, 44 E.

(*b*) In the following places the nature is identified with the thing:—

Rep. II. 359 C ὃ **πᾶσα φύσις** ('every creature') διώκειν πέφυκεν ὡς ἀγαθόν.

Ib. IV. 429 D μίαν **φύσιν** τὴν τῶν λευκῶν.

Ib. VI. 491 A οἷαι οὖσαι **φύσεις** ψυχῶν.

Polit. 306 E.

§ 51. 5. There is a pleonastic use of *φύσις* with a genitive, in this latter sense, which, like other periphrases, occurs more frequently in the later dialogues. But the Phaedrus affords more than one example:—

Phaedr. 248 C ἡ . . . τοῦ πτεροῦ **φύσις**.

Ib. 254 B τὴν τοῦ κάλλους **φύσιν**.

Soph. 257 A ἡ τῶν γενῶν **φύσις**.

Ib. 257 C, D (bis) ἡ θατέρου **φύσις**.

Polit. 257 D τὴν τοῦ προσώπου **φύσιν**.

Phileb. 25 E τὴν ὑγιείας **φύσιν**.

Ib. 30 B τὴν τῶν καλλίστων καὶ τιμιωτάτων **φύσιν**.

Tim. 45 D τὴν τῶν βλεφάρων **φύσιν**.

Ib. 74 D τὴν τῶν νεύρων **φύσιν**. Ib. 75 A τὴν τῶν ἰσχίων **φύσιν**.

Ib. 84 C ἡ τοῦ μυελοῦ **φύσις**.

(Cp. for similar periphrases ib. 75 A τὸ τῆς γλώττης εἶδος, 70 C τὴν τοῦ πλεύμονος ἰδέαν.)

Laws VIII. 845 D τὴν ὕδατος **φύσιν**.

Ib. IX. 862 D τὴν τοῦ δικαίου **φύσιν**.

The same use recurs in Aristotle. See Bonitz' *Index Aristotelicus*, p. 837 b.

6. *Φύσις* is constantly used in the Republic in the ordinary sense of natural disposition or capability (esp. Apol. 22 B, C) as distinguished from the complete development of mind or character:—

III. 410 D *τὸ θυμοειδὲς . . . τῆς* **φύσεως**.

VI. 485 A *τὴν* **φύσιν** *αὐτῶν πρῶτον δεῖν καταμαθεῖν.*

The great frequency of the term *φύσις* in Plato's dialogues represents, what has too often been ignored, the experiential aspect of his philosophy.

(*b*) PSYCHOLOGICAL TERMS.

As Plato's philosophical language becomes (1) more subjective and (2) more accurate, his use of words to signify mental states, processes, or faculties, becomes at once more frequent and more precise. It would be an error, however, even in his latest dialogues to look for consistency or finality. When it is found that the definition of *δικαιοσύνη*, obtained with so much labour in the Republic, is tacitly set aside in the Laws, and that the disjunctive-hypothetical method so energetically put forth in the Parmenides nowhere distinctly recurs, it need not surprise us that the significance of *διάνοια* in Theaet. 189 E, Soph. 265 D, E differs essentially from that assigned to the same word in Rep. VI. 511, or that *αἴσθησις, δόξα, φαντασία, τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη, φιλοσοφία*, can only be said to have an approximate fixity of meaning. § **52.**

Αἴσθησις.

a. Any immediate perception, intuition or consciousness.

Charm. 158 E, 159 A *δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι, εἴ σοι πάρεστι σωφροσύνη, ἔχεις τι περὶ αὐτῆς δοξάζειν. ἀνάγκη γάρ που ἐνοῦσαν αὐτήν, εἴπερ ἔνεστιν,* **αἴσθησίν** *τινα παρέχειν, ἐξ ἧς* **δόξα** *ἄν τίς σοι περὶ αὐτῆς εἴη, ὅ τι ἐστὶ καὶ ὁποῖόν τι ἡ σωφροσύνη.*

This is the ordinary meaning as exemplified in Antiphon, Herod. p. 134, § 44; Thuc. II. 50, 61; Eur. El. 290; Xen. Hell. V. 1, § 8; Anab. IV. 6, § 13.

Obs.—Euripides (Iph. Aul. 1243) already has *αἴσθημα*, which, though frequent in Aristotle, does not seem to occur in Plato. A special meaning = 'scent' as a hunting term occurs in Xen. Cyn. 3, § 5; cp. Rep. II. 375 A.

β. Sense-perception in general, as opposed to *γνῶσις*, cognition, *νόησις*, intellection, *λογισμός*, reasoning: imperfectly distinguished from *δόξα* and *φαντασία*.

Without entering here on the discussion of Plato's philosophy of sensation, it may be observed that a comparison of Phaedo 79, Phaedr. 249, 250, Rep. VII. 524, with Phileb. 33, 38, 43 A, B, Tim. 43 C, shows that the reasonings attributed to the disciples of Protagoras in the Theaetetus, though rejected as a definition of knowledge, exercise a decided influence on the evolution of Plato's psychology.

γ. Special modes of sensation, including the five senses, with others not separately named.

Phaedo 65 D *ἤδη οὖν πώποτέ τι τῶν τοιούτων τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶδες; Οὐδαμῶς, ἦ δ' ὅς. Ἀλλ' ἄλλῃ τινὶ* **αἰσθήσει** *τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐφήψω αὐτῶν*; Rep. VI. 507 E *ἡ τοῦ ὁρᾶν* **αἴσθησις**.

δ. A single act of sense-perception,—an impression of sense. Theaet. 156 D *τὴν λευκότητά τε καὶ* **αἴσθησιν** *αὐτῇ ξύμφυτον*: ib. B *αἱ μὲν οὖν* **αἰσθήσεις** *τὰ τοιάδε ἡμῖν ἔχουσιν ὀνόματα, ὄψεις τε καὶ ἀκοαὶ καὶ ὀσφρήσεις, κ.τ.λ.*

Thus the *ἐναντία* **αἴσθησις** of Rep. VII. 523 B, Soph. 266 C is an opposite impression of *the same* sense.

Obs.—*Αἰσθητός* in Men. 76 D is said to be an expression in the manner of Gorgias: otherwise the word occurs first in Plato; and **αἰσθητής**, *ἅπαξ εἰρημένον* in Theaet. 160 D, appears to be invented on the spot. It is cited by Pollux as an unusual word.

§ 53. **Δόξα.**

The opposition of *δοκεῖν* at once to *εἶναι* and *ἐπίστασθαι* leads to the association of *δόξα* as the lower faculty with *αἴσθησις*. For example in Rep. VI. VII, where the clearness of a faculty is said to be proportioned to the nature of its object, *δόξα* seems to be concerned with the shadows, i. e. the visible world; in Phaedo 96 it is an involuntary judgement resulting from sense and memory, and in the Phaedrus the unlucky charioteer regales his steeds with *τροφὴ* **δοξαστή**, because of his poverty in the ideas. But in

Theaet., Soph., Phil., it becomes manifest that *δόξα* is simply a judgement, given by the mind in answer to herself, which may or may not be coincident with an impression of sense, and may be either true or false. This is in accordance with the advance in psychological clearness which marks the dialectical dialogues.

In the earlier part of the Theaetetus, *δόξα φαντασία αἴσθησις* are very closely associated, although in such an expression as in 179 C *τὸ παρὸν ἑκάστῳ πάθος, ἐξ ὧν αἱ αἰσθήσεις* **καὶ αἱ κατὰ ταύτας δόξαι** *γίγνονται*, the distinction between *αἴσθησις* and *δόξα* is accurately preserved (cp. Charm. 159 A quoted above). It is only after the discussion in pp. 184–190, however, that the definition of *δόξα* as *διανοίας ἀποτελεύτησις* (Soph. 264 A) becomes possible. For it has now been clearly brought out that *δόξα*, opinion or judgement, is an operation of the mind, silently predicating one thing of another. Such predication or judgement may refer to any subject matter, but it may be false as well as true, and this gives occasion for the question, How is false opinion possible? See esp. Phileb. 37 C, D.

Opinion, so understood, is still distinguished from Knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) which is always true, although this opposition is not sufficiently accounted for by the definition of *ἐπιστήμη* as *δόξα ἀληθὴς μετὰ λόγου*. *Δόξα ἀληθής* holds a higher place in subsequent dialogues, Sophist, Philebus, Timaeus, than in the Republic, where it is condemned as 'blind.' Rep. VI. 506 C: cp. IV. 430 B.

For the vernacular crossing the specific meaning, see esp. VI. 490 A *παρὰ δόξαν . . . δοξαζομένοις*.

Obs.—The naturalness of the association of *δόξα* with *αἴσθησις* appears from the passage of the Charmides (159 A) above quoted. On the other hand, the constant use of *δοκεῖ μοι* in expressing a judgement of the mind, suggested the other meaning in which *δόξα* is opposed to *ἐπιστήμη*. As the two meanings were not consciously distinguished, a confusion arose which helped to accentuate

Plato's view of the uncertainty and fallaciousness of sensation; to which, however, Philosophy had from the first been predisposed, as appears from well-known sayings of Heraclitus and Parmenides.

§ 54. **Φαντασία.**

Φαντασία is properly the noun of *φαντάζεσθαι* (Soph. 260 E, Rep. II. 382 E), but is treated in Theaet. 152 C, 161 E as the noun of *φαίνεσθαι*. In Soph. 264 A, B *τὸ φαίνεσθαι* is defined as *δόξα μετ' αἰσθήσεως* or *σύμμιξις αἰσθήσεως καὶ δόξης*. In Phileb. 39, however, there is a more elaborate description of imagination or presentation (Vorstellung). Opinion or judgement having been characterized under the figure of a scribe who writes down sentences in the mind, it is added that the scribe is corroborated by a painter, who illustrates what is written down. And the pictures of this artist may have reference to the past or future, and like the judgements which they accompany, they may be either false or true. The pleasures of Hope are thus accounted for. The word *φαντασία* does not occur in this passage. But it is obvious that the thing meant might be denoted by the term, and the mental images in question are spoken of as *ζωγραφήματα* (39 D) *τὰ* **φαντάσματα** *ἐζωγραφημένα* (40 A). In Rep. II. 382 E, where *φαντάζεσθαι* (380 D) has preceded, **φαντασίαι** are 'illusive apparitions.' The word carries a similar association in Soph. 260 E, &c.

The noun, although common (with its derivatives) in later writers, does not occur before the time of Plato.

§ 55. **Διάνοια.**

In the concluding passage of Rep. VI the word *διάνοια* acquires a specific meaning, to denote the faculty, or attitude of mind, *intermediate* between *δόξα* and *ἐπιστήμη*, or between *πίστις* and *νοῦς*. This definition stands in close reference to the context in which it occurs, and it is observable that *διάνοια* in this exact sense is hardly to be found elsewhere in Plato. The definition appears to rest on a false etymology, viz. *δια-νοια*, 'mediate intellection,'

'thinking *through* something,' as distinguished from pure intuition on the one hand and mere impressions on the other; because the abstract truths of mathematical science are studied *through* visible symbols (VI. 511 D ὡς μεταξύ τι δόξης τε καὶ νοῦ, cp. VII. 533 D, E). The psychology of the Theaetetus supplies a more accurate explanation of the term, as = 'mental discourse,' *passing between* subject and predicate, or predicate and subject. This view of διάνοια recurs in the Sophistes (263 D). *Διάνοια*, so understood, is not above and beyond δόξα, but is the necessary preliminary to it; since the mind puts her questions before she answers them, and opinion, however seemingly instantaneous, is the consequence of thought. Thus δόξα rises in the scale, and διάνοια, as a subjective fact, is correctly analysed.

In the great majority of instances **διάνοια** (with its verb διανοεῖσθαι) is used in the ordinary Greek acceptations of (1) mental activity, (2) mind in act, (3) a particular thought or conception, (4) meaning, (5) intention.

Ἕξις. § 56.

Ἕξις, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔχειν πως, is properly a state or condition whether bodily or mental. But the psychological use of this word also is affected in Plato by a false etymological association from the active use of ἔχω. The active use of ἕξις occurs in Rep. IV. 433 E ἡ τοῦ οἰκείου τε καὶ ἑαυτοῦ **ἕξις** τε καὶ πρᾶξις, Soph. 247 A δικαιοσύνης **ἕξει** καὶ παρουσίᾳ, Theaet. 197 A ἐπιστήμης . . . **ἕξιν**. And it seems probable that in such passages as Phaedr. 268 E τὸν τὴν σὴν **ἕξιν** ἔχοντα, Rep. VI. 509 A τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ **ἕξιν**, IX. 591 B ὅλη ἡ ψυχὴ . . . τιμιωτέραν **ἕξιν** λαμβάνει, although the ordinary meaning of 'condition' is present, Plato has the other association in his mind. For the more familiar meaning, see esp. Phileb. 11 D **ἕξιν** ψυχῆς καὶ διάθεσιν, κ.τ.λ.

Τέχνη—practical skill.

a. Skill as opposed to inexperience, Phaedo 89 E ἄνευ **τέχνης** τῆς περὶ τἀνθρώπεια.

β. Enlightened practice, as opposed to mere 'rule of thumb' (ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή), Phaedr. 260 E, 270 B, Gorg. 463 B (see Rep. VI. 493 B).

γ. Professional practice, opposed to that of an amateur, Prot. 315 A ἐπὶ τέχνῃ μανθάνει.

δ. Art as opposed (1) to nature, Rep. II. 381 B; (2) to divine inspiration, Ion 536 D.

ε. A system of rules (Phaedr. 261 B).

ζ. τέχνη as distinguished from ἐπιστήμη is (1) a lower grade of knowledge (see the contemptuous diminutive τεχνύδριον in Rep. V. 475 E); (2) (chiefly in the later dialogues) Knowledge applied to production (γένεσις), Laws X. 892 B, C.

Obs.—The *actual sciences* (as distinguished from the same studies when enlightened by philosophy) are called τέχναι in Rep. VI. 511 C τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν καλουμένων. The second (β) and sixth (ζ) of these definitions reappear in subsequent philosophy.

§ 57. **Ἐπιστήμη.**

As in other cases (above, p. 292 ff.) the philosophical is to be distinguished from the ordinary use.

α. (1) The proper note of ἐπιστήμη, as distinguished from δόξα, is *certainty* (Soph. Oed. Tyr. 1115):—

Rep. V. 477 B **ἐπιστήμη** . . . ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι πέφυκε, γνῶναι ὡς ἔστι τὸ ὄν.

(2) Hence in the specially Platonic sense, ἐπιστήμη is distinguished from τέχνη as speculative from practical knowledge.

Rep. IV. 438 C **ἐπιστήμη** . . . αὐτὴ μαθήματος αὐτοῦ **ἐπιστήμη** ἐστίν.

Parm. 134 A αὐτὴ μὲν ὃ ἔστιν **ἐπιστήμη**, τῆς ὃ ἔστιν ἀλήθεια, αὐτῆς ἂν ἐκείνης εἴη **ἐπιστήμη** . . . ἑκάστη δὲ αὖ τῶν **ἐπιστημῶν** ἣ ἔστιν, ἑκάστου τῶν ὄντων, ὃ ἔστιν, εἴη ἂν **ἐπιστήμη**.

It is in this ideal sense that vain attempts are made in the Theaetetus to define ἐπιστήμη. And this is the meaning of the word in Rep. VI. 508 E and similar places.

β. The more ordinary use of the word, in which it is nearly equivalent to τέχνη, is sometimes guarded by the addition of the specific object:—

Rep. IV. 438 D ἐπειδὴ οἰκίας ἐργασίας **ἐπιστήμη** ἐγένετο, διήνεγκε τῶν ἄλλων **ἐπιστημῶν**, ὥστε οἰκοδομικὴ κληθῆναι.

Or by some qualifying word such as λεγομένη. See Rep. VII. 533 D ἃς **ἐπιστήμας** μὲν πολλάκις προσείπομεν διὰ τὸ ἔθος, δέονται δὲ ὀνόματος ἄλλου, ἐναργεστέρου μὲν ἢ δόξης, ἀμυδροτέρου δὲ ἢ ἐπιστήμης.

But this meaning of ἐπιστήμη also occurs without any qualification, especially in the plural, and quite as often in the later as in the earlier dialogues.

Rep. VII. 522 C ᾧ πᾶσαι προσχρῶνται τέχναι τε καὶ διάνοιαι καὶ **ἐπιστῆμαι**.

Polit. 308 C τῶν συνθετικῶν **ἐπιστημῶν**: Phileb. 62 D.

The singular also appears in the sense of 'practical skill' (as in Thucydides, &c.).

Phaedr. 269 D προσλαβὼν **ἐπιστήμην** τε καὶ μελέτην.

Gorg. 511 C ἡ τοῦ νεῖν **ἐπιστήμη**.

Φιλοσοφία. § 58.

The abstract noun as well as the adjective φιλόσοφος occurs in Isocrates, but not elsewhere before Plato, although φιλοσοφεῖν was in ordinary use (Herod. I. 30, Thuc. II. 40).

a. Φιλοσοφία is defined in the Republic (V. 475 E ff.) as the love of the whole, (VI. 486 A) θεωρία παντὸς μὲν χρόνου, πάσης δὲ οὐσίας, and is elsewhere (Sophist. 253 E) identified with διαλεκτική.

β. But the word is also used in the more ordinary sense of 'mental culture,' 'scientific pursuit':—

Theaet. 143 D γεωμετρίαν ἤ τινα ἄλλην **φιλοσοφίαν**.

Tim. 88 C μουσικῇ καὶ πάσῃ **φιλοσοφίᾳ** προσχρώμενον.

In Theaet. 172 C οἱ ἐν ταῖς **φιλοσοφίαις** πολὺν χρόνον διατρίψαντες, the plural seems to include Theodorus as a man of *scientific culture*.

§ 59. **θυμός, τὸ θυμοειδές.**

A tripartite division of *ψυχή* appears in the Phaedrus-myth (Phaedr. 246 foll.), in Rep. IV. 435 foll., IX. 580 foll., and in Tim. 70. On the other hand in Rep. X. 612 A a doubt is expressed whether the Soul in her true nature be divisible at all, and in Phaedo 80 B, C pure Soul is akin to the *μονοειδές*. In the Timaeus *θυμός*, or resentment, is expressly said to belong to the lower and mortal part, or aspect, of the Soul. But the function assigned to it is much the same as in Rep. IV[1]. In Rep. IX, l. c., this part of the soul is more exactly described as *φιλότιμον*, and in the same passage the love of honour is resolved into the love of power. In the imagery which follows, the *θυμοειδές* is further analysed into the nobler and meaner forms of anger, the 'lion' being reinforced with a crawling serpent brood: IX. 590 B *τὸ λεοντῶδές τε καὶ ὀφεῶδες*.

The conception mythically expressed in the Phaedrus is less distinct, and though closely akin to the psychology of the Republic and Timaeus, is not precisely the same. The white horse yoked to the winged chariot is *altogether* of a noble strain (*καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων*), 'a lover of honour, with temperance and chastity[2], a comrade of right thinking, obedient to the voice of Reason.' He thus corresponds rather to the ideal in conformity with which the *θυμοειδές* is to be trained than to the *θυμοειδές* as such. Nor is the nobler steed entrusted with control over his

[1] Tim. 70 A *τὸ μετέχον οὖν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνδρίας καὶ θυμοῦ, φιλόνεικον ὄν, κατῴκισαν ἐγγυτέρω τῆς κεφαλῆς* . . . **ἵνα τοῦ λόγου κατήκοον ὂν κοινῇ μετ' ἐκείνου βίᾳ τὸ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν κατέχοι γένος,** *ὁπότ'* **ἐκ τῆς ἀκροπόλεως** *τῷ ἐπιτάγματι καὶ λόγῳ μηδαμῇ πείθεσθαι ἑκὸν ἐθέλοι. τὴν δὲ δὴ καρδίαν* . . . **εἰς τὴν δορυφορικὴν οἴκησιν** *κατέστησαν.*

[2] Shakespeare, *Macbeth* ii. 1:

Macbeth. 'When 'tis,
It shall make honour for you.'
Banquo. 'So I lose none
In seeking to augment it, but still keep
My bosom franchis'd and allegiance clear,
I shall be counsell'd.'

baser yoke-fellow. His work is done if he run his own course obediently.

It is probable that in the partition of the Soul in the Republic, Plato has not forgotten the Phaedrus. But he has also in mind the special requirements (practical as well as speculative) of the work in hand, and in particular the close analogy between individual and state, and the position of ἀνδρεία amongst the cardinal (civic) virtues.

Now θυμοειδής, 'spirited,' is applied by Xenophon to a high-bred horse, such as that which symbolized the nobler passions in the Phaedrus—the word does not occur in earlier Greek: and θυμός is the crude form of ἀνδρεία. Ἀνδρεία is the virtue of the guardians, who are φύλακες τῶν τε ἐκτὸς πολεμίων καὶ τῶν ἐντὸς φιλίων, and τὸ θυμοειδές is now formulated as the corresponding part of the individual Soul.

(*c*) DIALECTICAL TERMS. § 60.

No terms in Plato so nearly attain the fixity of technical use as those which bear on method, such for example as συνάγειν, 'generalize,' διαιρεῖσθαι, 'distinguish,' λαμβάνειν, 'apprehend,' διαλαμβάνειν, 'divide,' ἀπολαμβάνειν, 'specify,' μετιέναι, 'treat,' μέθοδος, 'treatment.' This is most apparent in dialogues which represent the conversation of Socrates with his disciples—as in the Phaedo, Republic and Philebus. See Rep. VII. 532 D where Glaucon says, οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι μόνον ἀκουστέα, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὖθις πολλάκις ἐπανιτέον.

Διαλεκτική—διαλέγεσθαι—διάλεκτος.

Διάλεκτος is *rational conversation*, with associations derived from the practice of Socrates, and is opposed to *barren disputation*:—Rep. V. 454 A **ἔριδι,** οὐ **διαλέκτῳ** πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρώμενοι. Hence ἡ **διαλεκτική** (sc. τέχνη, s. μέθοδος) is the Platonic ideal of method. But the connotation of the term inevitably varies with the shifting aspects of that ideal.

Meno 75 D εἰ μέν γε τῶν σοφῶν τις εἴη καὶ ἐριστικῶν τε καὶ ἀγωνιστικῶν ὁ ἐρόμενος, εἴποιμ' ἂν αὐτῷ . . . κ.τ.λ., εἰ δὲ ὥσπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ νυνὶ φίλοι ὄντες βούλοιντο ἀλλήλοις **διαλέγεσθαι**, δεῖ δὴ πραότερόν πως καὶ **διαλεκτικώτερον** ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

In the sequel it is explained that a dialectical answer is one having a true relation to the respondent's previous admissions.

The word therefore has no reference here to any assumption of supra-sensual εἴδη, but only to that living intercourse of mind with mind, which was the secret of Socrates[1]. In the Phaedrus διαλεκτική is again associated with the same vivid reciprocity of thoughts. But both the Socratic method and its intellectual aim are now viewed under the glow of Platonic idealism at its most fervent heat, and the διαλεκτικός is now the master of knowledge that is at once comprehensive and distinct, seeing as one what is a whole in Nature, as different, what Nature parts asunder; overtaking the subtleties of reality with the movement of mind—his thought adequately grasping and following the Nature of things, at once in their infinity and unity. Thus he realizes the privilege which belongs at birth to every soul which takes the form of man: δεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον ξυνιέναι κατ' εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὸν[2] αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἓν λογισμῷ ξυναιρούμενον. τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἀνάμνησις ἐκείνων, ἅ ποτε εἶδεν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ συμπορευθεῖσα θεῷ καὶ ὑπεριδοῦσα ἃ νῦν εἶναί φαμεν, καὶ ἀνακύψασα εἰς τὸ ὂν ὄντως. διὸ δὴ δικαίως μόνη πτεροῦται ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου διάνοια· πρὸς γὰρ ἐκείνοις ἀεί ἐστι μνήμῃ κατὰ δύναμιν, πρὸς οἷσπερ θεὸς ὢν θεῖός ἐστι. These latter words are of course taken from the myth (249 C), but in the later portion of the same dialogue (266 B, &c.) the method referred to, if not exactly formulated, is more precisely indicated. True eloquence, it is

[1] So in the Theaetetus Protagoras is made to claim fairness from a dialectical respondent. Theaet. 167 E χωρὶς μὲν ὡς ἀγωνιζόμενος . . . χωρὶς δὲ διαλεγόμενος. Cp. also Crat. 390 C for the simpler meaning.

[2] W. H. Thompson conjectured ἰόντ'.

there said, must be based on a scientific estimate of the human mind and of truth in all its aspects, and also of the mutual relations between these and various minds. This science is compared to that of Hippocrates, whose medical practice was based on profound study of the human body. Such an ideal, though vaguely sketched, is by no means severed from experience. Its unattainableness, indeed, lies rather in the infinity of nature than in the abstractedness of knowledge. In the Republic, on the other hand, the allegory of the cave and the ladder of the sciences carry off the mind into a region where actual experience seems of little account, and philosophic thought is imagined as moving among pure εἴδη,—εἴδεσιν αὐτοῖς δι' αὐτῶν εἰς αὐτά. Yet here also, while the dualism is more evident, it is hard to tell how much is allegorical. For Socrates maintains that the philosopher, who has been trained in dialectic, will be no whit behind his fellow-citizens in practical wisdom, but on the contrary will be infinitely more capable, with equal opportunities, of dealing with any actual emergency [1].

Συναγωγή—συλλογισμός. § 61.

The most pervading note of διαλεκτική, and this appears both in the Republic and the Phaedrus, is comprehensiveness accompanied with clearness.

VII. 537 C ὁ . . . γὰρ **συνοπτικὸς** διαλεκτικός, ὁ δὲ μὴ οὔ. Cp. Tim. 83 C where Socrates admires the man who gave the name of χολή to phenomena so diversified as those to which it is applied. This is again insisted on in Soph. 253 C, D—esp. in the words ὅ γε τοῦτο δυνατὸς δρᾶν **μίαν ἰδέαν** διὰ πολλῶν, . . . πάντη διατεταμένην ἱκανῶς διαισθάνεται—another *locus classicus* on the subject. By this time, however, the questions turning on predication have come to the front,

[1] In the Republic Socrates refuses to define διαλεκτική: but he describes it thus—ἦ καὶ διαλεκτικὸν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἑκάστου λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὐσίας; This follows a passage in praise of διαλεκτική in the light of the account of the mental faculties in Book VI.

and the method indicated is one of logical determination, according to the real participation of things in ideas, and of ideas or kinds in one another: *τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν, ᾗ τε κοινωνεῖν ἕκαστα δύναται καὶ ὅπῃ μή, διακρίνειν κατὰ γένος ἐπίστασθαι.* In the Politicus again, and also in the Philebus, the notion of method becomes still more concrete, involving not merely relation but proportion—*τὸ μέτριον, μικτὴ φύσις, μέτρον.* An increasing sense of the complexity of the world makes more apparent the hindrances to adequacy of method. At the same time dialectical improvement, the preparation and sharpening of the instrument, is prized apart from the immediate results. The notion of adapting logical weapons to the subject to be attacked is curiously expressed in Philebus 23 B *φαίνεται δεῖν ἄλλης* **μηχανῆς** *ἐπὶ τὰ δευτερεῖα ὑπὲρ νοῦ πορευόμενον οἷον* **βέλη** *ἔχειν ἕτερα τῶν ἔμπροσθεν λόγων· ἔστι δὲ ἴσως ἔνια καὶ ταὐτά.* And the conception of science, without losing the associations originally suggested by the conversations of Socrates, now includes not only the ascertainment of differences, but of finite differences, not only the one and many, but the 'how many,' Phil. 16 D.

Plato's 'dialectic,' then, is not merely an ideal method, but the ideal of a method, which at best is only approximately realized[1], and presents different aspects according to the scope and spirit of particular dialogues. It is a conception which grows with the growth of Plato's thoughts. In the Protagoras and Gorgias it is contrasted with popular rhetoric—the one exact and truthful, the other loose and careless of the truth; in other places to *ἐριστική* (*ἀντιλογική, ἀγωνιστική*). Its end is neither persuasion nor refutation, but the attainment and communication of truth, of which the tests are universality and certainty.

§ 62. **Ἐριστική.**

The marks of *ἀντιλογική* or *ἐριστική* also vary with the stages of Platonism[2]; but that which is most pervading,

[1] Theaet. 196 E, Rep. IV. 435 C.
[2] Phaedo 101 E, Rep. V. 454, Theaet. 197 A.

and which comes out most clearly where Plato's own philosophy is ripest, is the crudeness of affirmation and negation, the root fallacy of confounding *dictum simpliciter* with *dictum secundum quid*.

Διαίρεσις: διαιρεῖν, διαιρεῖσθαι, διαλαμβάνειν, διακρίνειν, τέμνειν, μέρος, μόριον, τμῆμα, τομή, διαφυή. § 63.

While διαιρεῖν or διαιρεῖσθαι is the term most commonly used for logical division, and μέρος for the result, it is observable that in the later dialogues, where classification becomes more frequent, the expression is varied, some other word from the list given above being used instead.

Obs. 1.—Ἁπλοῦν has two meanings, (1) admitting no further division, (2) true without qualification or distinction. (Gorg. 503 A, Phaedr. 244 A.)

Obs. 2.—Ἀπολαμβάνειν is to 'specify,' and for this ἀπονέμεσθαι is used in Polit. 276 D and elsewhere.

The aor. participle ἀπολαβών is used absolutely in Rep. IV. 420 C τὴν εὐδαίμονα πλάττομεν οὐκ **ἀπολαβόντες**.

Cp. ἀπομερίζω, ἀποχωρίζω.

Λαμβάνειν. § 64.

The simple λαμβάνειν has also a special use, nearly = ὑπολαμβάνειν, 'to conceive,' or 'formulate,' sometimes with the addition of λόγῳ.

Phaedr. 246 D τὴν . . . αἰτίαν . . . **λάβωμεν**.

Rep. VIII. 559 A ἵνα τύπῳ **λάβωμεν** αὐτάς.

Ion 532 E **λάβωμεν** γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ.

Rep. VI. 496 D ταῦτα πάντα λογισμῷ **λαβών**.

Rep. VII. 533 B οὐδεὶς ἡμῖν ἀμφισβητήσει λέγουσιν, ὡς αὐτοῦ γε ἑκάστου πέρι, ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον, ἄλλη τις ἐπιχειρεῖ μέθοδος ὁδῷ περὶ παντὸς **λαμβάνειν**.

Phileb. 50 D **λαβόντα** . . . τοῦτο παρὰ σαυτῷ.

Ὑπόθεσις, ὑποτίθεσθαι. § 65.

Ὑπόθεσις in Plato is 'an assumption,' adopted as a basis of reasoning, either (α) dogmatic, or (β) provisional. Cp. Xen. Mem. IV. 6, § 13.

a. Theaet. 183 B *ὡς νῦν γε πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν* **ὑπόθεσιν** *οὐκ ἔχουσι ῥήματα*, viz. the dogmatic assumption that all is motion: Soph. 244 C *τῷ ταύτην τὴν* **ὑπόθεσιν** *ὑποθεμένῳ*, the doctrine of *ἓν τὸ πᾶν*.

β. Meno 86 E *ἐξ* **ὑποθέσεως** . . . *σκοπεῖσθαι, εἴτε διδακτόν ἐστιν εἴτε ὁπωσοῦν*. Here the nature of such hypothetical reasoning is illustrated by a geometrical example: 'If the figure applied to the base of the triangle is similar to it, then one thing follows, but not otherwise'. In this sense the word is used with reference to the Zenonian dialectic, of the proposition which is subjected to the indirect proof that it is untenable.

Accordingly, in Socratic reasoning, which proceeds by testing successive assumptions with negative examples, each proposed definition, while it maintains its ground, is called the *ὑπόθεσις*.

Euthyphr. 11 C *νῦν δέ, σαὶ γὰρ αἱ* **ὑποθέσεις** *εἰσίν*.

Phaedo 107 B *οὐ μόνον γ', ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ ταῦτά τε εὖ λέγεις* (Simmias has just spoken of the greatness of the subject and the feebleness of man), *καὶ τὰς* **ὑποθέσεις** *τὰς πρώτας, καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ὑμῖν εἰσίν, ὅμως ἐπισκεπτέαι σαφέστερον· καὶ ἐὰν αὐτὰς ἱκανῶς διέλητε, . . . ἀκουλουθήσετε τῷ λόγῳ, καθ' ὅσον δυνατὸν μάλιστ' ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπακολουθῆσαι· κἂν τοῦτο αὐτὸ σαφὲς γένηται, οὐδὲν ζητήσετε περαιτέρω.*

We may remember that it is the same Simmias, who earlier in the dialogue (85 D) puts forth the touching image of a raft, to represent the provisional nature of every human theory, in the absence of a divine, or superhuman, principle.

Now of these primary hypotheses, or first premisses, one of the chief is clearly that notion of true causes insisted on in Phaedo 100 B, 101 D, as the outcome of the procedure of Socrates, viz. that each thing is what it is by participation (*μετάσχεσις*) in the idea. 'All other modes of causation you will leave, says Socrates, to those who are cleverer than you

are. Fearing, as the proverb says, your own shadow, you will hold on to that sure ground of the assumption (τῆς ὑποθέσεως). And if any one attacks you there, you will not answer him until you have tested all the consequences of the hypothesis itself. And if in the end you have to examine the grounds of your assumption, you will do so by a similar process, having framed a new and higher hypothesis, by the best lights you have, and so on until you reach a satisfactory result. But you will not, as the eristics do, confuse in argument the principle with its consequences; that is not the way to discover truth.'

Here the ἀρχή is the same with the ὑπόθεσις. It is therefore somewhat startling to find in Rep. VI. 511 C this very identification (αἷς αἱ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαί) made a ground of objection to the actual condition of the sciences. It will be said that this applies only to the mathematical sciences, and to them only in so far as they work through visible symbols, but this view is inconsistent with VII. 517 D; see the notes.

The apparent discrepancy arises out of what may be termed the overweening intellectualism of this part of the Republic, the same temper which prompts the notion of an astronomy without observations, and a science of harmony independent of sound. Plato is aware that he is setting forth an impossible ideal, but for the education of his 'airy burghers,' nothing short of the absolute will satisfy him. Allowing for this difference of spirit, the two passages just quoted from the Phaedo, for the very reason that they are less aspiring, throw light on the description of the true method in Rep. VII. 533 C ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος μόνη ταύτῃ πορεύεται, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναιροῦσα ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχήν, ἵνα βεβαιώσηται, and the corresponding passage in VI. 511. For example, though it is by no means clear that by the ἱκανόν τι of Phaedo 101 D, Plato means the same thing with the ἀνυπόθετον or the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, yet the description of the progress from the lower to the higher hypothesis is

parallel to the ladder of ideas in VI. 511 B τὰς ὑποθέσεις ποιούμενος οὐκ ἀρχάς, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ὑποθέσεις, οἷον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὁρμάς, ἵνα μέχρι τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν ἰών, κ.τ.λ. The contrast between arguing about principles and their consequences also corresponds to this upward and downward way. And the words in Phaedo 107 B ἐὰν αὐτὰς (τὰς ὑποθέσεις) ἱκανῶς διέλητε . . . ἀκολουθήσετε τῷ λόγῳ, καθ' ὅσον δυνατὸν μάλιστ' ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπακολουθῆσαι, further illustrate the notion of a 'higher analytic,' which in both dialogues is imperfectly shadowed forth: while the ultimate cause in the Phaedo 98 A, 99 C the 'reason of the best,' is a conception not far removed from the Idea of Good. It becomes apparent, when the whole tenour of these kindred passages is considered, that what Plato censures in the actual methods of 'Science' is not the use of assumptions, but the habit of regarding them as fixed and self-evident, VII. 533 C ἕως ἂν ὑποθέσεσι χρώμεναι ταύτας ἀκινήτους ἐῶσι, μὴ δυνάμεναι λόγον διδόναι αὐτῶν.

Obs.—The simple τιθέναι (sometimes τίθεσθαι)—in frequent use —is to 'posit' or 'assume,' not necessarily as the first step in an argument. Theaet. 190 A δόξαν ταύτην τίθεμεν αὐτῆς.

§ 66. ἓν καὶ πολλά—στοιχεῖον.

It is clear from the classical passage of the Philebus 16 ff., that 'one and many' had become a recognized formula in the Platonic school. But it is also clear from the passage itself, especially when other places are compared, that the formula had different meanings and applications. (*a*) Single objects have many attributes. (β) Many individuals 'partake' in common of one ἰδέα: the εἶδος is therefore one and many. (γ) Ideas themselves are complex, and variously correlated, yet many are bound in one under some higher notion, all partake of number and being, and Being is itself absorbed in the Good.

It is characteristic of Plato's later theory, that in the

Philebus he not only dwells on this last aspect of the truth, but also speaks of it as a *πάθος τῶν λόγων . . . παρ' ἡμῖν*, 'an affection or attribute of human discourse.' This point of view is all the more significant, when it is remembered that the discussions in the Parmenides, Theaetetus, and Sophist have intervened.

a. The first and simplest aspect of the 'one and many' § 67.
appears in Plato, (1) as a Zenonian or Heraclitean paradox, (2) as a proof of the necessity of the Idea.

(1) Phileb. 14 C *ὅταν τις ἐμὲ φῇ . . .* **ἕνα** *γεγονότα φύσει,* **πολλοὺς** *εἶναι πάλιν, τοὺς ἐμέ, κ.τ.λ., τιθέμενος.*

Parm. 129 C *εἰ δ' ἐμὲ ἕν τις ἀποδείξει ὄντα* **καὶ πολλά**, *κ.τ.λ.*

Theaet. 166 B **τὸν** *εἶναί τινα, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ* **τούς**, *καὶ τούτους γιγνομένους ἀπείρους, ἐάνπερ ἀνομοίωσις γίγνηται.*

In the Protagorean theory, as the mind is a bundle or succession of momentary impressions, each substance is a bundle or aggregate of transient attributes or presentations, Theaet. 157 B, C *ᾧ δὴ* **ἀθροίσματι** *ἄνθρωπόν τε τίθενται καὶ λίθον καὶ ἕκαστον ζῷόν τε καὶ εἶδος.*

(2) In Rep. VII. 523 it is shown by an example how the mind passes through the consciousness of diversity to the perception of unity. The finger is both rough and smooth; this awakens thought to the existence of roughness and smoothness, each as one several thing, and of their opposition as a reality. This is the psychological counterpart of many other passages where the diversities of sense are made the ground for assuming abstract unities.

β. One idea or form is shared by many objects. Beauty § 68.
is one, the beautiful are many, &c. This point of view, with the difficulties attending it has been already discussed (above, p. 309 ff.; *Μέθεξις*, &c.). It may be called the formula of crude realism.

γ. The problem of solving these difficulties emerges together with the third and highest aspect of the *ἓν καὶ πολλά* in the dialectical dialogues. It is now that, as we have seen, clearer views of predication, a more subjective

point of view, and a higher comprehension of the ideas as forms of thought, of their interrelation and sequence, lead the way towards a rational metaphysic and psychology. The result is a scheme of thought, or as Plato himself terms it, a *κόσμος τις ἀσώματος* (Philebus 64 B), which is indeed empty of content, but has no insignificant bearing on the after progress of the Sciences.

In Theaet. 202, Plato deals tentatively with this later phase of the question through the contrast of *στοιχεῖον* and *συλλαβή*. Here *συλλαβή* is the complex idea, which is itself resolved into a higher unity—e. g. the harmony of treble and bass notes, or the art of music as comprising various harmonies.

But in Polit. 278 B–D [1], as well as in Rep. III. 402 A–C, the *στοιχεῖον* is the idea, while the *συλλαβή* is the combination of ideas in fact. Thus justice is justice, whether in commerce, war, judicial pleadings, or any other of the varied circumstances of human society.

§ 69. **παράδειγμα.**

παράδειγμα has two very different meanings in Plato, one of which has been already discussed (above, p. 310 ff.). The artist copies from a *pattern* (1); the merchant, for convenience sake, carries about (2) *examples* of his wares (*δείγματα* Phaedo 110 B). The latter would seem to be the figure implied in the logical use of *παράδειγμα* for the illustration of one species by another of the same genus, the complex by the simple, the obscure by the familiar, the unknown by the known. A full account of this mode of argument is given by the Eleatic Stranger in Polit. 277 D ff. Cp. Prot. 330 A, Phaedr. 262 C, Theaet. 154 C, 202 E, Soph. 218 D.

For other 'dialectical' terms, expressing various aspects of predication, such as *προσαγορεύω*, *προσάπτω*, *προστίθημι*,

[1] This passage is a good example of the concrete mode of conception which belongs to Plato's later style.

προσαρμόττω, συμπλέκειν, ὄνομα, ῥῆμα, πρόσρημα, φάσις, ἀπόφασις, see the Lexica.

The wide gap which separates Plato's use of philosophical terms from Aristotle's may be briefly instanced in the case of (1) οὐσία, (2) διαλεκτική, and (3) συλλογισμός. § 70.

(1) The chapter of Aristotle's Metaphysics, IV. 8, in which various meanings of οὐσία both as *substance* and *essence* are distinguished, would hardly have been intelligible to Plato, although between the transcendent Being of Rep. VI, and the μικτὴ οὐσία of Phil. 27 B, a long step has been made towards the conception of concrete existence.

(2) Διαλεκτική in Aristotle is intermediate between philosophy and common sense, a sort of tentative philosophizing which falls short of certainty—Met. III. 2, § 20 ἡ διαλεκτικὴ πειραστικὴ περὶ ὧν ἡ φιλοσοφία γνωριστική. To Plato, as we know, the same term represented the highest reach of philosophic method.

(3) The word συλλογισμός occurs only once in Plato, Theaet. 186 D, where it is used quite simply, much as ἀναλογίσματα (ib. supr. C), to express the action of the mind in forming judgements from impressions of sense. The verb συλλογίζεσθαι, 'to reason,' 'collect,' 'infer,' is not infrequent, but is also used quite simply, as it might occur in ordinary discourse:—

Rep. VII. 531 D καὶ **ξυλλογισθῇ** ταῦτα ᾗ ἐστὶν ἀλλήλοις οἰκεῖα, 'and these things are reasoned of from that general point of view in which they are mutually akin.'

Ib. 516 B μετὰ ταῦτ' ἂν ἤδη **συλλογίζοιτο** περὶ αὐτοῦ, κ.τ.λ., 'in the next place he would proceed to infer that it is the Sun who,' &c.

How far such uses are removed from the Aristotelian doctrine of the Syllogism appears on comparing any one of numberless passages:

Rhetor. I. 2, § 8 *ἀνάγκη συλλογιζόμενον ἢ ἐπάγοντα δεικνύναι ὁτιοῦν.*

Analyt. Pr. I. 1, § 6 *συλλογισμὸς δέ ἐστι λόγος ἐν ᾧ τεθέντων τινῶν ἕτερόν τι τῶν κειμένων ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι.*

Met. IV. 3, § 3 *συλλογισμοὶ οἱ πρῶτοι ἐκ τῶν τριῶν δι' ἑνὸς μέσου.*

Analyt. Pr. I. 7, § 4 *ἔστιν ἀναγαγεῖν πάντας τοὺς συλλογισμοὺς εἰς τοὺς ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ σχήματι καθόλου συλλογισμούς.*

See also esp. Soph. Elench. c. 33 sub fin.

But it is observable that even in Aristotle both verb and noun occur elsewhere in the ordinary Greek sense. See Bonitz, *Index Aristotelicus*, s. vv.

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I. ENGLISH.

Contractions: *Str.* = *Structure*; *R.* = *Relation to other dialogues*; *Ess.* = *Essay*; *Exc.* = *Excursus to Essay on Structure*; *T.* = *Text*; *App.* = *Appendices to Essay on Text*; *St.* = *Style*; *Syn.* = *Syntax*; *D.* = *Diction*.

II. GREEK

Alexander Ziwet

PLATO'S REPUBLIC

THE GREEK TEXT

EDITED, WITH NOTES AND ESSAYS

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NOTES ON THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO

BOOK I.

ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ] The second title, περὶ δικαίου, found in Par. A and other MSS., is probably a later addition. The plural form, πολιτειῶν γ', δ', ε', &c., also occurs. *Republic I.*

The scene is laid in the house of Cephalus at the Peiraeus, and the whole discourse is supposed to be repeated by Socrates the day after it actually took place. To the Republic as to the Charmides, Lysis, Parmenides, and in a less degree to the Protagoras, Euthydemus, Symposium and Phaedo, Plato has given the form of a narrated dialogue. By this device he is enabled to combine description with dramatic effect.

The unfinished trilogy of the Timaeus, Critias, and Hermocrates professes to be a continuation of the Republic (cp. Tim. *ad init.*), but may have been added long afterwards (cp. the parallel relation of the Sophist and Statesman to the Theaetetus, which last would seem, from a comparison of the style, to have been written at an earlier time). The Republic contains no hint of the more comprehensive scheme. In the Timaeus Socrates is represented as having on the previous day set forth the principles of his ideal commonwealth to a select company, consisting of Timaeus, Critias, Hermocrates, and a fourth person, whose name is not mentioned.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ] Socrates is the principal speaker, the chief interlocutors being Glaucon and Adeimantus, the sons of Ariston and Perictionè, and brothers of Plato, who, like a painter, introduces the names and portraits of his family in several of his

Republic I. dialogues (himself and Adeimantus in the Apology; Charmides and Critias in the Charmides; Critias in the Timaeus and Critias; Adeimantus, Glaucon, and Antiphon in the Parmenides). There are present also Thrasymachus, the sophist, who is 'charmed' into silence at the end of the First Book (cp. ii. 358 B), Cephalus and his eldest son Polemarchus, who soon vanish from the scene, Lysias (the orator) and Euthydemus, also sons of Cephalus, Niceratus the son of Nicias (cp. the Laches), Charmantides and Cleitophon. The last five, if we except a few words from Cleitophon (i. 340 A, B), are mute auditors. The circumstances of the opening scene are quickly lost sight of. Polemarchus once again appears, v. 449 B. Thrasymachus interposes once in v. 450, and is made the subject of a good-humoured remark in vi. 498 C.

Critics have discussed at length not only the date at which the Republic was written, which can only be approximately guessed at, but the date which the author intended to be represented in it. The year assumed by Boeckh[1] for the imaginary scene is 411 or 410 B.C. Most of the characters in the Republic and also in the Timaeus and Critias agree with this date. Socrates himself was then about fifty-seven or fifty-eight years old, Lysias had just returned from Thurii to Athens in 411; the calamities of the year of the thirty had not yet fallen upon his house; Prodicus and possibly also Protagoras, both of whom are referred to as living persons in x. 600 C, may have been still alive (the date of Protagoras' death is quite uncertain: Prodicus is spoken of as a living person in the Apology). Hermocrates, if, as is probable, the Syracusan general of that name is intended in the Timaeus, may well have been at Athens at the time, after his banishment, and on his way to Pharnabazus. The minor discrepancy respecting the death of Cephalus, which is said by the pseudo-Plutarch (Vit. Or. iii. 3) to have occurred before the settlement of Lysias at Thurii (B.C. 443), is not worth noticing. Even if we accept this last statement on such authority,—and it is more or less contradicted by Lysias,—there is no reason to suppose that Plato would have cared about accuracy in such a minute detail. He is careless of such dramatic proprieties. His dialogues, like the plays of Shakespeare, are works of fiction, which have only a certain degree of historical truth. Many anachronisms occur in them, e.g. Ismenias the Theban, who did not become famous until some time after

[1] De tempore quo Plato Rempublicam peroratam finxerit, dissertationes III: *Kleine Schriften*, iv. 437 sqq.

Socrates' death, is mentioned by him in the Republic (i. 336 A) among great potentates; in the Menexenus, Aspasia, the mistress of Pericles, continues her survey of Greek history down to the peace of Antalcidas, B. C. 387; in the Symposium (193 A), Aristophanes, at the banquet of Agathon, which is supposed to have taken place in 416 B. C., uses an illustration taken from the dismemberment of Arcadia, or rather of Mantinea, by the Lacedaemonians (B. C. 385). It is doubtful whether Parmenides and Socrates can ever have met, as they are said to have done in the Theaetetus (183 E), Sophist (217 C), and Parmenides (127 B); and certainly the meeting is not to be taken as historical on the authority of Plato. These examples are enough to show that Plato is not to be appealed to as an authority for the dates of his *dramatis personae*, any more than Shakespeare or Sir Walter Scott. It is not known at what date the worship of Bendis was introduced in Attica, though it appears to be referred to in an inscription found at Salamis (Foucart, *Associations religieuses*, p. 209), but for the reason just stated this point is likewise unimportant. *Republic I.*

To defend uncertain, or try to reconcile inconsistent, statements in a work of imagination is out of place and alien to the true spirit of criticism.

Socrates and Glaucon are about to return from the Peiraeus after a festival, when they are detained by Polemarchus. He takes them home with him, and Socrates enters into conversation with Cephalus, the aged father of the household. *pp. 327 A –331 D.*

C. *Age is in itself a time of peace. The sorrows of old men are to be attributed to their own faults and tempers.*

S. *The world will say that you are happy in old age because you are rich.*

C. *Neither a bad rich man can be happy in age, nor a good poor man.*

S. *What is the chief advantage of riches?*

C. *Not to have deceived any one in word or deed, and to have paid one's debts to gods and men.*

S. *But is justice simply to speak the truth and pay your debts, or are there exceptions to this rule?*

C. *Yes, there are.*

'*And yet,*' *interrupts Polemarchus,* '*the definition which has been given has the authority of Simonides.*'

Cephalus retires to look after the sacrifices.

Republic I. 327 A **ΚΑΤΕ'ΒΗΝ χθές**] The old anecdote that the words with which the Republic opens were found after Plato's death with various transpositions in his tablets—which is narrated by Diogenes Laertius (fl. 200? A.D.) on the authority of Euphorion (fl. circa 241 B.C.) and Panaetius (185?–110? B.C.)—Diog. Laert. iii. 25. 37 Εὐφορίων δὲ καὶ Παναίτιος εἰρήκασι πολλάκις ἐστραμμένην εὑρῆσθαι τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς πολιτείας—and by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (fl. circa 30 B.C.) de comp. verb. v. p. 209 (Reiske) τὴν δέλτον ἣν τελευτήσαντος αὐτοῦ (sc. τοῦ Πλάτωνος) λέγουσιν εὑρεθῆναι, ποικίλως μετακειμένην τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς Πολιτείας ἔχουσαν τήνδε, κατέβην χθὲς εἰς Πειραιᾶ μετὰ Γλαύκωνος τοῦ Ἀρίστωνος,—may be true, but is more likely to have been invented.

τῇ θεῷ] Bendis, as is proved by the words of Thrasymachus, i. 354 A ταῦτα δή σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἱστιάσθω ἐν τοῖς Βενδιδείοις. The prominent part which the Thracians take in the procession seems to show that she is a Thracian goddess: Proclus (Theolog. 353) and others identify her with Artemis. Cp. Schol. in Rep. ἐπεὶ καὶ Βένδις παρ' αὐτοῖς (sc. τοῖς Θρᾳξὶν) ἡ Ἄρτεμις καλεῖται. It is not a little curious that the Platonic Socrates should care to be present at the inauguration of one of those 'strange divinities' who seem to have clustered about the Peiraeus in the fourth century, B.C. and even earlier (Foucart, op. cit. p. 57). See especially Laws x. 910 C.

καὶ ἡ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων] καί anticipates the mention of the Thracians, who are equal if not superior to the natives of Peiraeus. The second καί and a δέ corresponding to μέν, which might have been expected, pass into **οὐ μέντοι ἧττον . . . ἦν** = οὐχ ἧττον δὲ . . . καὶ ἦν.

B **θεωρήσαντες**] 'Having seen the spectacle,' corresponding to ἅμα τὴν ἑορτὴν βουλόμενος θεάσασθαι.

κατιδὼν οὖν πόρρωθεν ἡμᾶς οἴκαδε ὡρμημένους Πολέμαρχος ὁ Κεφάλου ἐκέλευσε δραμόντα τὸν παῖδα περιμεῖναί ἑ κελεῦσαι] 'Thereupon Polemarchus, the son of Cephalus, catching sight of us from afar, after we had set out on our way home, bade (ἐκέλευσε) his servant run and bid us (κελεῦσαι) wait for him.'

οὗτος, ἔφη, ὄπισθεν προσέρχεται]. 'There he is coming up behind.' Οὗτος is 'deictic.'

ἀλλὰ περιμένετε . . . ἀλλὰ περιμενοῦμεν] 'But, pray you, wait.' 'But we intend to wait': cp. infra 328 B ἀλλὰ μένετε. This expostulatory use of ἀλλά implies resistance and opposition, which is to be overcome in the mind of another. The second ἀλλά deprecates the assumption implied in the first, that they do not intend to wait.

ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς πομπῆς] 'As if from the procession,' i.e. it was natural to suppose they had been there. From the direction in which they were coming, Socrates infers that they had been at the spectacle, but does not know it. *Republic I.* 327 C

ὁρᾷς οὖν ἡμᾶς, ἔφη, ὅσοι ἐσμέν;] A similar playful threat occurs in the Philebus, 16 A *ἆρ', ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐχ ὁρᾷς ἡμῶν τὸ πλῆθος, ὅτι νέοι πάντες ἐσμέν; καὶ οὐ φοβεῖ μή σοι μετὰ Φιλήβου ξυνεπιθώμεθα*; in the Phaedrus, 236 C *ἐσμὲν δὲ μόνω μὲν ἐν ἐρημίᾳ, ἰσχυρότερος δὲ ἐγὼ καὶ νεώτερος*: in the Charmides, 176 C *ὡς βιασομένου, ἔφη, ἐπειδήπερ ὅδε γε ἐπιτάττει.* Cp. also Symposium 213 C, where Socrates claims the protection of Agathon against the apprehended violence of Alcibiades. Plato frequently repeats not only the same thought, but even small dramatic traits and terms of expression.

οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔτι ἓν λείπεται] *ἐλλείπεται* is the reading of A Π M and other MSS. 'Is there not still left out the supposition of our persuading you?' For the use of the passive cp. Philebus 18 D *τὸ δ' αὐτό μοι τοῦ λόγου νῦν τε καὶ σμικρὸν ἔμπροσθεν ἐλλείπεται.* See Goodwin, *M. and T.* 490, 2. The marginal reading of A *ἓν λείπεται*, 'Is there not still one alternative which remains?' is perhaps better and more emphatic and has been adopted in our text; but the other reading may still be defended. The emendation may be due to the fact that *ἔτι* is otiose; it does not introduce a second omission. There is a combination of two ideas: 'Is there not still the supposition?' and 'Have you not omitted the supposition?' Both = 'Have you not omitted the supposition which still remains?'

ὡς τοίνυν μὴ ἀκουσομένων] The genitive absolute is placed in a dependent relation to the main verb **διανοεῖσθε** by the addition of *ὡς*: cp. vii. 523 C *ὡς ἐγγύθεν . . . ὁρωμένους λέγοντός μου διανοοῦ*: Xen. Cyr. viii. 4. 27. Goodwin, *M. and T.* 864, 918. The expression of the antecedent in **οὕτω** adds a peremptory emphasis like 'even' in Shakespeare. See Schmidt's *Shakespeare Lexicon*, s.v. 'even,' § 8. 'You may even be assured we won't listen.'

ἆρά γε . . . οὐδ' ἴστε ὅτι λαμπὰς ἔσται] 'Are you really not aware that—?' Adeimantus is surprised at the ignorance of the torch-race which Socrates' early departure betrays. 328 A

τῇ θεῷ] For the torch-race see the article *λαμπαδηδρομία* in Smith's *Dictionary of Antiquities*. There is a difficulty in reconciling the form of the race described in Pausanias (Attica c. xxx. 2 *ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ δέ ἐστι Προμηθέως βωμός· καὶ θέουσιν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἔχοντες καιομένας λαμπάδας· τὸ δὲ ἀγώνισμα ὁμοῦ τῷ δρόμῳ*

Republic I. 328 A

φυλάξαι τὴν δᾷδα ἔτι καιομένην ἐστίν· ἀποσβεσθείσης δέ, οὐδὲν ἔτι τῆς νίκης τῷ πρώτῳ, δευτέρῳ δὲ ἀντ' αὐτοῦ μέτεστιν· εἰ δὲ μηδὲ τούτῳ καίοιτο, ὁ τρίτος ἐστὶν ὁ κρατῶν· εἰ δὲ καὶ πᾶσιν ἀποσβεσθείη, οὐδείς ἐστιν, ὅτῳ καταλείπεται ἡ νίκη), which is between single competitors who run the whole course and where there is no passing on of the torch, with the favourite use of the image in such passages as Laws vi. 776 B *γεννῶντάς τε καὶ ἐκφέροντας παῖδας, καθάπερ λαμπάδα τὸν βίον παραδιδόντας ἄλλοις ἐξ ἄλλων*: Lucretius ii. 79 'Et quasi cursores vitaï lampada tradunt': Persius vi. 61 'Cur me in decursu lampada poscis?' Compare also Aesch. Agam. 312, 313 *λαμπαδηφόρων νόμοι, ἄλλος παρ' ἄλλου διαδοχαῖς πληρούμενοι*, and the application of the image in Herod. viii. 98 to the Persian *ἄγγαροι* or royal post-runners. All these latter passages seem to imply a line of runners, each of whom carries the torch a certain distance and then hands it on to a successor. The form of the race which Plato has in mind in this passage was probably of this kind, the contest being between several competing lines running side by side.

διαδώσουσιν ἀλλήλοις ἁμιλλώμενοι τοῖς ἵπποις;] The relation between *ἁμιλλώμενοι* and *διαδώσουσιν* is not to be pressed: all that is necessarily implied is that the competitors were on horseback, and that they passed the torch from one to the other: not that the transmission took place while the riders were at full speed.

ἐξαναστησόμεθα γάρ] *Γάρ* does not merely refer to **ἄξιον θεάσασθαι,** but introduces reasons for the mention of the **παννυχίς.** ['I mention the night-festival,] for we will rise after supper,' &c. The supper, torch-race and night-festival are entirely forgotten in the sequel.

B **εἰς τοῦ Πολεμάρχου**] Cephalus, the rich Syracusan, had settled in Attica at the invitation of Pericles (Lys., c. Eratosth. § 4, p. 120) about 440 B.C. He was joined there by his three sons, Polemarchus, Lysias and Euthydemus, who are mentioned here, and are spoken of by their aged father as young men (328 D). Polemarchus, however, is represented as head of the household, although Cephalus, whom Plato has probably kept alive for the purpose of the dialogue, still acts as the family priest. And Lysias, who was born in 458 B.C., would at the imaginary date of the dialogue (if that is B.C. 411) be forty-seven years old. In the Phaedrus (257 B) Socrates suggests that Lysias should cease to busy himself with the composition of paradoxical orations, and, like his brother Polemarchus, turn to philosophy. Polemarchus was put to death by the order of the Thirty Tyrants in 404 B.C. Of Euthydemus,

who must not be confounded with the Sophist of that name, nothing more is known. *Republic I.* 328 B

καὶ δὴ καί] calls particular attention to the stranger Thrasymachus, a sophist or rhetorician who came to Athens about the year 430 B.C.: facetiously described by Plato in the Phaedrus (267 C) as a sort of rhetorical Titan (*τὸ τοῦ Χαλκηδονίου σθένος*). 'He was a great master of the pathetic—would put people into a rage and out again.' 'No one better at inventing or answering calumnies[1]'. In the Rhetoric of Aristotle (ii. 23) the same character appears: 'Herodicus was wont to say of Thrasymachus that he was ever Thrasymachus (bold in battle), as Conon said of Thrasybulus that he was truly Thrasybulus (bold in council)[2].' He is spoken of with more respect by other writers (Cic. de Orat. iii. 32[3]).

Cleitophon may be inferred to be a disciple of Thrasymachus from the part which he takes in the skirmish with Polemarchus (infra, 340 A). In the Cleitophon Cleitophon charges Socrates with exhorting people to virtue, but with not telling them what it is; and for this reason he resorts to Thrasymachus and other sophists. The dialogue recalls in many passages the First Book of the Republic: it is probably spurious and may have been suggested by the passage just cited.

διὰ χρόνου γὰρ καὶ ἑωράκη αὐτόν] 'For indeed it was a long time since I had seen him.' Καί adds emphasis to the sentence and refers to *μάλα πρεσβύτης μοι ἔδοξεν κ.τ.λ.* (not 'It was long since I had actually seen him'). The connexion of the sentences is: 'He appeared to me very aged. And no wonder, for . . . .' C

οὐ δὲ θαμίζεις] Compare Il. xviii. 385:

τίπτε, Θέτι τανύπεπλε, ἱκάνεις ἡμέτερον δῶ
αἰδοίη τε φίλη τε; πάρος γε μὲν οὔ τι θαμίζεις.

[1] Phaedrus 267 C, D *τῶν γε μὴν οἰκτρογόων ἐπὶ γῆρας καὶ πενίαν ἑλκομένων λόγων κεκρατηκέναι τέχνῃ μοι φαίνεται τὸ τοῦ Χαλκηδονίου σθένος· ὀργίσαι τ' αὖ πολλοὺς ἅμα δεινὸς ἀνὴρ γέγονε, καὶ πάλιν ὠργισμένοις ἐπᾴδων κηλεῖν ὥς ἔφη· διαβάλλειν τε καὶ ἀπολύσασθαι διαβολὰς ὁθενδὴ κράτιστος.* ib. 269 D *ὅσον δ' αὐτοῦ* (sc. *ῥητορικῆς*) *τέχνη, οὐχ ᾗ Λυσίας τε καὶ Θρασύμαχος πορεύεται, δοκεῖ μοι φαίνεσθαι ἡ μέθοδος.*

[2] Aristot. Rhet. ii. 23, 29 *καὶ ὡς Κόνων Θρασύβουλον θρασύβουλον ἐκάλει, καὶ Ἡρόδικος Θρασύμαχον "αἰεὶ θρασύμαχος εἶ."*

[3] 'Quid de Prodico Chio, quid de Thrasymacho Chalcedonio, de Protagora Abderita loquar? quorum unusquisque plurimum temporibus illis, etiam de natura rerum, et disseruit et scripsit.'

Republic I. 328 C

The latter words have suggested the emendation οὔτι in this passage. But this is unnecessary, and less expressive. The δέ in οὐ δέ may be explained as adversative to the idea contained in ἠσπάζετο: i. e. 'You are welcome, Socrates, but you do not come often enough.'

χρῆν μέντοι] The imperfect here, as in ἦν, ἔδει, ᾖμεν immediately following, is quite general, but there is a shade of difference between it and χρή infra. χρῆν, 'you ought to do what you have not been doing': χρή simply, 'you ought to do what you can do.'

οὐδὲν ἄν σε ἔδει] Goodwin, *M. and T.* 423, points out that in such cases 'the leading verb takes ἄν when the chief force falls on the necessity, propriety, or possibility of the act rather than on the act itself.'—'There would be no need (as there now is) of your coming hither.'

D **ἡμεῖς**] The familiar use of the plural for the singular.

νῦν δέ σε χρὴ πυκνότερον δεῦρο ἰέναι] 'But as things are (i.e. seeing that I am an old man) you should come here oftener.' In the Laches (181 c) the old man Lysimachus addresses Socrates in a similar strain: *χρῆν μὲν οὖν καὶ πρότερόν γε φοιτᾶν αὐτὸν παρ' ἡμᾶς καὶ οἰκείους ἡγεῖσθαι, ὥσπερ τὸ δίκαιον. νῦν δ' οὖν ἀπὸ τῆσδε τῆς ἡμέρας, ἐπειδὴ ἀνεγνωρίσαμεν ἀλλήλους, μὴ ἄλλως ποίει, ἀλλὰ σύνισθί τε καὶ γνώριζε καὶ ἡμᾶς καὶ τούσδε τοὺς νεωτέρους, ὅπως ἂν διασώζητε καὶ ὑμεῖς τὴν ἡμετέραν φιλίαν, κ.τ.λ.*, in which as in the speech of Cephalus there is an imitation of the garrulity of old age.

τοῖσδέ τε τοῖς νεανίαις] Cephalus thus speaks of his sons, although they are men of middle age. Some early interpreters and Boeckh make τοῖσδέ τε τοῖς νεανίαις refer only to Glaucon and Adeimantus, the Athenian youths, and Serranus renders 'et hos adolescentes tecum adducas velim.' This notion, which was probably strengthened by the v. r. νεανίσκοις, is really inadmissible.

καὶ μὴν . . . χαίρω γε] 'Believe me, Cephalus, that I have a real pleasure in talking to very old men:' γε is omitted in A and other MSS.

E **καὶ δὴ καὶ σοῦ ἡδέως ἂν πυθοίμην**] καὶ δὴ καί, as often, introduces a special instance: 'I take a pleasure in conversing with all old men . . . and of you in particular I should like to ask.'

τοῦτο . . . ἐξαγγέλλεις] The vague phrase ὅ τί σοι φαίνεται τοῦτο is made clearer by the explanatory clause πότερον . . . ἐξαγ-

γέλλεις. τοῦτο refers to ὁδὸν . . . ποία τίς ἐστι, κ.τ.λ., 'the nature *Republic I.*
of the path of life in old age;' but the meaning is defined by the
addition of ἐπειδὴ . . . ποιηταί, which gives the reason for asking 328 E
Cephalus to give his own experience in the matter. **τοῦ βίου** is a partitive genitive depending on χαλεπόν, 'a harsh part of life.' **χαλεπόν** sc. ἐστι: this is preferable to making it an accusative governed by ἐξαγγέλλεις, which might seem natural but for φαίνεται preceding. As in Iliad xxiv. 486:

> μνῆσαι πατρὸς σεῖο, θεοῖς ἐπιείκελ' Ἀχιλλεῦ,
> τηλίκου ὥσπερ ἐγὼν ὀλοῷ ἐπὶ **γήραος οὐδῷ**,

and Odyssey xv. 246:

> οὐδ' ἵκετο **γήραος οὐδόν**,

life is compared to a house, of which Cephalus is standing on the threshold—i. e. old age—preparatory to leaving it: (or old age or even death may be a house which he is entering). The meaning of the metaphor has been generalized by familiar use. It occurs also in Herodotus iii. 14, 12 ἐς πτωχηΐην ἀπῖκται ἐπὶ **γήραος οὐδῷ**.

διασῴζοντες τὴν παλαιὰν παροιμίαν] 'Keeping up the old 329 A
adage,'—ἧλιξ ἥλικα τέρπει.

ξυνιόντες] is the resumption of συνερχόμεθα. The present in both cases has a generalized meaning, not 'are coming' but 'come together.' Cp. vi. 493 C ἢ οὖν τι τούτου δοκεῖ διαφέρειν ὁ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν καὶ παντοδαπῶν **ξυνιόντων** ὀργὴν καὶ ἡδονὰς κατανενοηκέναι σοφίαν ἡγούμενος; **ξυνόντες**, the correction of Ast and Buttmann, is unnecessary.

ἀναμιμνησκόμενοι] 'calling to mind,' 'reminding one another.' The word more commonly governs the genitive: **περί** here gives indefiniteness.

καὶ ἄλλ' ἄττα ἃ τῶν τοιούτων ἔχεται] 'and other things connected therewith.' For this idiomatic use of ἔχεται cp. Theaet. 145 A ὅσα παιδείας ἔχεται.

τότε μὲν εὖ ζῶντες] The participle is in the imperfect tense.

ἐπὶ τούτῳ δὴ τὸ γῆρας ὑμνοῦσιν ὅσων κακῶν σφίσιν αἴτιον] 'and B
from this they take occasion' (τούτῳ referring to προπηλακίσεις τοῦ γήρως) 'to bewail old age as bringing upon them innumerable evils.' ὑμνεῖν is used in a depreciatory sense, as viii. 549 D οἷα φιλοῦσιν αἱ γυναῖκες περὶ τῶν τοιούτων **ὑμνεῖν**.

Republic I. 329 B **ἕνεκά γε γήρως**] is resumptive of *τοῦτο*: 'if old age were the cause, as an old man I am sure that I should have felt the same.' Cp. 337 D *ἀλλ' ἕνεκα ἀργυρίου λέγε* ('if money is the question').

καὶ ἄλλοις, καὶ δὴ καὶ Σοφοκλεῖ] The first *καί* prepares the way for the particular example of Sophocles.

C **ἔτι οἷός τε εἶ . . . συγγίγνεσθαι**] Hirschig, approved by Cobet, would delete these words. But they are required by the cry of shame, **εὐφήμει**, which follows.

ἀποφυγών] This passage is imitated by Cicero, De Senectute c. 14 'Quum ex eo quidam iam affecto aetate quaereret, utereturne rebus Venereis, "Dii meliora, (inquit,) libenter vero (*μέντοι*) istinc tanquam a domino agresti ac furioso profugi."' Cp. the description of Sophocles in Aristophanes, Ran. 82 *ὁ δ' εὔκολος μὲν ἐνθάδ', εὔκολος δ' ἐκεῖ*, which expresses the same character.

παντάπασι γὰρ . . . ἐπειδὰν αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι παύσωνται κατατείνουσαι καὶ χαλάσωσι . . . ἀπηλλάχθαι] It is best to omit *γάρ* after *ἐπειδάν* with Par. A: the clause *ἐπειδὰν αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι . . . χαλάσωσι* being taken as an explanation of *ἐν τῷ γήρᾳ*. This involves an asyndeton of *παντάπασι*, which introduces an emphatic resumption of the first clause of the sentence *παντάπασι . . . ἐλευθερία*. The asyndeton at *δεσποτῶν κ.τ.λ.* is the common asyndeton which is allowed in an explanatory statement. We note the absolute use of *κατατείνουσαι* and *χαλάσωσι*: the word *κατατείνουσαι* has the same general sense with *συντείνω*, *συντόνως*, and other compounds of *τείνω*.

D **ἔστι**] 'it is the case.' Arist. Ath. Pol. ch. 55 (Kenyon: Col. 28) *ἔστι δὲ ψηφίζεσθαι*, 'and the case is one of voting.'

τῷ τοιούτῳ] sc. *τῷ μὴ κοσμίῳ καὶ εὐκόλῳ, κ.τ.λ.*

ξυμβαίνει] These words are also imitated by Cicero, De Senect. cc. 2, 3, and the story of Themistocles and the Seriphian is repeated. Cicero, like Virgil (who *πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἐκέκαστο κλεπτοσύνῃ*), freely appropriates the turns of expression, as well as the subject matter, of his Greek master. But while the Latin poem is moulded by Virgil into a true work of Roman genius, the Latin dialogue is an inartistic imitation of the Greek model, being neither Greek in character nor Roman: a monologue rather than a dialogue, in which the grace of conversation, as well as much of the subtlety of philosophical thought, is lost.

ἐκίνουν] 'tried to draw him out.' Cp. Lysis 223 A *ἐν νῷ*

εἶχον ἄλλον ἤδη τινὰ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων κινεῖν: Xen. Mem. iv. 2. 2 *ὁ Σωκράτης βουλόμενος κινεῖν τὸν Εὐθύδημον.* Republic I.

τὸ τοῦ Θεμιστοκλέους] For a different version of the story, in which Timodemus of Belbina in the Saronic gulf (now the Island of St. George) called also the Aphidnean, takes the place of the Seriphian, see Herod. viii. 125. 329 E

εὖ ἔχει] 'is in point.' The abruptness of the expression is softened by the repetition of it with *ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος* (330 A), in the corresponding clause, where also the words *τοῖς πλουσίοις* are parallel with *τῷ Σεριφίῳ* in the preceding part of the sentence.

ὧν κέκτησαι] Socrates returns to the fact on which the conversation turns, *supra* 329 E *διὰ τὸ πολλὴν οὐσίαν κεκτῆσθαι.* 330 A

ποῖ' ἐπεκτησάμην] 'Acquired, do you say?' This use of *ποῖος* is not necessarily derisive or ironical, as in Gorg. 490 C *ποίων ἱματίων*; but only implies a humorous feeling of contrast between the suggestion and the fact. Cephalus may be supposed to speak with a gentle smile, remembering that his additions had been but small to the diminished fortune which he had received. Cp. infra *ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγαπῶ, κ.τ.λ.* B

τουτοισί] 'to my sons here'—an emendation of Bekker for *τούτοισιν*, the reading of the MSS. The 'Ionic' dative plural form in *σι(ν)* is rare in the Republic and occurs mostly in passages which have a poetical tinge, i. 345 E, iii. 388 D, 389 B, viii. 560 E, 564 C.

διπλῇ ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀσπάζονται αὐτά] The dative or adverbial termination in *διπλῇ* probably here expresses the manner and not the measure of excess: 'in a two-fold way' as compared with, rather than 'double as much as.' It is taken up in *ταύτῃ* and in *κατὰ τὴν χρείαν, ᾗπερ οἱ ἄλλοι.* The MS. emendation *καὶ οὐ κατὰ τὴν χρείαν* is clearly erroneous and makes havoc of the sense. With *διπλῇ ἤ* cp. vii. 539 D *ἔτη διπλάσια ἢ τότε.* C

χαλεποὶ . . . ξυγγενέσθαι] For the construction cp. Phaedr. 275 B *χαλεποὶ ξυνεῖναι.*

καταγελώμενοι] The participle is imperfect = *οἱ κατεγελῶντο.* D

καὶ αὐτὸς . . . ἠδίκηκεν] The sentence becomes anacoluthic at **καθορᾷ**, which would naturally have been *καθορῶν*: cp. vi. 495 D *οὗ δὴ ἐφιέμενοι πολλοί, κ.τ.λ.* where a main verb similarly takes the place of a participle. The resumptive **δ' οὖν**, 'however this may be,' make the irregularity less striking. Cp. Tim. 28 D *ὁ δὴ πᾶς οὐρανὸς ἢ κόσμος ἢ καὶ ἄλλο ὅ τί ποτε ὀνομαζόμενος . . . σκεπτέον δ' οὖν περὶ αὐτοῦ πρῶτον.* E

Republic I. 331 A **τῷ δὲ . . . γηροτρόφος**] 'but if a man is conscious of no injustice, hope is ever present to cheer him (**ἡδεῖα**), and to be his kindly nurse in age.' The order of the words is not *ἐλπὶς ἡδεῖα καὶ ἀγαθή*, but *ἡδεῖα πάρεστι καὶ πάρεστιν ἀγαθὴ γηροτρόφος.*

B **ἀλλά γε ἓν ἀνθ' ἑνὸς οὐκ ἐλάχιστον . . . εἶναι**]. *ἓν ἀνθ' ἑνός*, an adverbial idiom, like *ἓν πρὸς ἓν* Laws i. 647 B. The emphasis is on *οὐκ ἐλάχιστον.* 'But, comparing one thing with another, I should not reckon wealth as least useful for this object.' In *οὐκ ἐλάχιστον . . . χρησιμώτατον* there seems to be a confusion of two constructions: *οὐχ ἥκιστα χρήσιμον* and *χρησιμώτατον.* Stobaeus gives *ἀλλ' ἕν γε.*

C **τοῦτο δ' αὐτό . . . λάβῃ**] 'but as to this very thing, justice I mean, shall we say thus simply (as you imply), that it is truthfulness, and the restoration of what a man receives from another?' *τοῦτο δ' αὐτό* refers to *εἰς τοῦτο*, which itself goes back to *τὸ γὰρ μηδὲ ἄκοντα . . . ἀπιέναι δεδιότα.* The train of thought is as follows: 'You imply that a man may depart from life with a clear conscience if he has only told the truth and paid his debts, and that justice consists in this. But is it simply this—no more and no less? Are there not circumstances—e.g. if the man to whom we are speaking or to whom we are in debt is mad, in which to tell a lie or refuse to return a loan would be right; to speak the truth and return the loan wrong?'

For the indirect and natural way in which the subject of the dialogue is introduced, compare the Charmides; and for the familiar Socratic manner of commencing the argument with an external and superficial definition which is afterwards set aside or deepened by criticism and the consideration of instances, see the opening passages of the Charmides, Laches, Meno, Theaetetus.

Casuistry has a place in ancient as well as in modern thought, in Greek philosophy as well as in the theology of the Schoolmen and the Jesuits. It is not essentially the product of civilization or the consequence of deep pondering over moral problems. Amongst barbarous nations we already notice a tendency to casuistical distinctions: the letter, not the spirit of a contract, is observed by them; if the word of promise can be kept to the ear, the real or natural meaning of it is of no account (Thucyd. iii. 34). Early morality is legal and external, easily giving opportunity for such evasions; it is a morality of compulsion, not of willing obedience: the attitude of the savage towards a duty or obligation is to avoid fulfilling it so far as he can. In civilized

societies too a strong tendency to casuistry sets in when there is an abrupt transition from the old to the new, when the younger generation becomes dissatisfied with it and dares to criticize traditional morality and belief. It is this tendency which asserts itself in the transitional stage of Greek philosophy. Serious doubts arise when it is discovered that the old rule, which formerly claimed unquestioning obedience on all occasions, is found in the eye of reason and an enlightened conscience to admit of an exception. The course of such a revolution is well represented in the criticism and development of Cephalus' definition: but Plato artistically avoids the indignities which often arose out of such conflicts of the old and new by first requiring the retirement of Cephalus.

That simple rules, 'Thou shalt not lie,' 'Thou shalt not steal,' are modified by circumstances, was apparent enough to the contemporaries of Socrates. Aristotle, in the Nicomachean Ethics, is fond of turning aside into these by-paths of morals, which seem however to have rather an intellectual than a practical interest for him. Casuistical inquiry was carried still further in later writers, for example, in Panaetius, from whom Cicero partly borrowed his treatise 'De Officiis'; and the tendency was strengthened in later times by the parallel growth of law cases. Ancient casuistry is fresher than modern, and nearer to the first thoughts of mankind about right and wrong, growing up not so much out of the conflict of established principles, as in the effort to establish, widen, or purify them,—becoming in the hands of Socrates and Plato a sort of dialectic which undermines the maxims and aphorisms of the older times and prepares the way for higher and more universal conceptions of morality.

ἁπλῶς οὕτως] (1) 'thus absolutely:' *οὕτως*, i.e. 'as your words imply'; *ἁπλῶς*, 'absolutely,' i.e. making no allowance for circumstances. Cp. Laws i. 633 D *τὴν ἀνδρείαν δέ, φέρε, τί θῶμεν; πότερον ἁπλῶς οὕτως* (as implied in what precedes) *εἶναι πρὸς φόβους καὶ λύπας διαμάχην μόνον, ἢ καὶ πρὸς πόθους τε καὶ ἡδονὰς καί τινας δεινὰς θωπείας κολακικάς*; infra iii. 386 B *λοιδορεῖν ἁπλῶς οὕτως τὰ ἐν Ἅιδου*, referring to the opinion of the terrors of the other world which has been just alluded to. Or, (2) 'just absolutely,' *οὕτως* being used idiomatically as in *ῥᾳδίως οὕτω* (ii. 377 B, 378 A) without any special reference.

ὁ ἀποδιδούς] 'The restorer in the case mentioned'; hence the article, which is omitted with *ἐθέλων* in what follows (*οὐδ᾽ αὖ* . . .

Republic I. 331 C λέγειν), 'any more than if he were willing to tell the whole truth to a person in this condition.' The subject of ἀποδιδούς and ἐθέλων is one and the same person: 'neither the restorer . . . nor *the same person if he wished.*'

D **ὅρος ἐστὶ δικαιοσύνης**] 'The definition or determining principle of justice:' ὅρος is here used as in Aristotle but in a less technical sense. Like other Aristotelian terms in Plato it retains several other meanings. The logical sense of 'term' or 'proposition' which appears occasionally in Aristotle is as yet unknown.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν] 'Nay, but it is.' Μὲν οὖν is a corrective of the preceding sentence.

καὶ μέντοι . . . καί] like καὶ δὴ καί implies a sort of meditative transition, μέντοι calling attention to a new feature in the case. 'Well, said Cephalus (since you take up the argument), I hand it over to you.' The intervention of Polemarchus appears to Cephalus a fit opportunity for retiring: so he takes advantage of it to bequeath the argument to him. The second καί indicates that as Polemarchus has put in a word, the natural consequence of the interruption is that Cephalus should resign the argument.

331 D–336 A. *Polemarchus, who 'inherits' the argument, is now called upon to defend the thesis of Simonides.*

S. *What does the divine poet mean by 'debt' in his definition of justice? Not simply that which has been lent; e.g. to the madman?*

P. *Certainly not; for if the madman were our friend, we should be doing him harm; whereas Simonides thinks that harm should be done to enemies, as is fitting* (προσήκει), *not to friends.*

S. *So Simonides meant by 'debt' 'what is fitting'* (τὸ προσῆκον). *And Justice is the art of benefiting friends and harming enemies. But when does it benefit us, as piloting benefits us when we are at sea?*

P. *When we make war.*

S. *Then Justice is of no use in time of peace?*

P. *In partnerships.*

S. *Partnerships in what?*

P. *In money transactions.*

S. *Not in buying and selling: in buying or selling a horse a horse-dealer will be a better partner than a just man.*

P. *No, but in keeping money safe.*

S. *That is, while it is not put to any use? Justice, then, is only useful when the money is useless. But he who is strong in guarding is strong in attacking, as we see in medicine and in war, and so the just man, who is a good guardian of money, must also be an accomplished thief,—but always for the benefit of friends and harm of enemies.* *Republic I. 331 D–336 A*

Polemarchus, in desperation, repeats his definition—Justice benefits friends and harms enemies. Socrates proceeds to ask: Who are our friends? those who seem good to us, or those who are good?

P. *Those whom we think good.*

S. *Then, if they seem and are not, the just will do good to bad men, and harm the good, who to him seem bad.*

Polemarchus cries out against this conclusion and in order to avoid it, proposes to emend the definition. 'A friend must not only seem, but also be a good man.'

S. *Then Justice now means doing good to our friends who are good and harm to our enemies who are bad. But stay! Will the just do harm to any man? When harm is done to any creature, that creature loses something of his proper virtue. If harm therefore is done to any man, he loses something of justice. Our theory would make the just man the author of injustice, which is contrary to reason. That cannot have been the meaning of the wise Simonides, but must have been suggested by Periander, or Perdiccas, or Xerxes, or some other rich and seeming-powerful man.* (Cp. Gorg. 466.)

The first book of the Republic is a preface to the rest; Socrates pulls out the stuff which is hereafter to be spun and woven. The analogy of the arts is introduced, but fails to give any clear conception of the virtues.

ὁ Πολέμαρχος τῶν γε σῶν κληρονόμος;] 'Is not Polemarchus your heir?' That is, 'since the argument is yours' (γε adding emphasis to σῶν), 'does not Polemarchus inherit it?' 331 D

The character of Cephalus is distinguished by gentleness and goodness. There may also be traced in him the mannerism and garrulity of age: the love of anecdote and quotation, the matured experience of 'the evening of life.' Cicero (Ep. ad Att. iv. 16), who acknowledges himself to be what he truly is, an imitator of Plato in very minute particulars, remarks as follows on the retirement of Cephalus: 'Quum in iis libris quos laudavi

Republic I. desideras personam Scaevolae, non eum temere demovi, sed feci idem quod in Πολιτείᾳ Deus ille noster Plato. Quum in Piraeum

331 D Socrates venisset ad Cephalum locupletem et festivum senem, quoad primus ille sermo haberetur, adest in disputando senex; deinde quum ipse quoque commodissime locutus esset, ad rem divinam dicit se velle discedere, neque postea revertitur. Credo Platonem vix putasse satis consonum fore, si hominem id aetatis in tam longo sermone diutius retinuisset.' So in the Laches (189 B, C) the old man Lysimachus apologizes for the shortness of his memory: he 'cannot recollect the questions he would ask, or the answers to them.' Accordingly he subsides into a listener, who, though unable to take a part in the argument, is ready to act on the conclusions obtained. It may be noted also that the simpler conception of life and duty, the poetical and proverbial expression of it is better suited to the aged than to those who were deeply versed in the Sophistical and dialectical method of a later generation.

E ff. Sophistic cynicism, superficiality, and vehemence of assertion prove to be no match for the dialectic of Socrates. Many questions are raised, 'of which we have a taste only and not a full meal,'—among them the question whether the just or unjust man is the happier, which in the sequel (iv. 445 A) 'becomes ridiculous.' The second book proceeds to ask in a more earnest strain, 'What is justice stripped of its externals?' Socrates then considers justice in the State, to help him to find justice in the individual. The justice thus found exists somewhere in the relations of society (ii. 372 A).

E **λέγε δή, ... ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγνοῶ**] Observe the pretended awe for the authority of Simonides; the 'accustomed irony of Socrates' in professing his own ignorance, and assuming the knowledge of his companion. Simonides' definition, however, is not set aside, though certain explanations of it are, cp. esp. 335 E.

ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ... τοῦτο μέντοι] 'Ἀλλά opposes the words which follow to, *μέντοι* regards them as a limitation of, Socrates' rejection of Cephalus' definition. The second *μέντοι* limits the limitation introduced by the first. 'But (as opposed to what I have said) I said, it is true that it is not easy to disbelieve Simonides—for he was a wise and inspired man: still what he means by this . . . I fail to see.' It is true that the criticism of Cephalus' definition must be modified, if that definition has the authority of Simonides: but before we can appeal to his authority we must first understand his meaning. For *τοῦτο ὅ τι λέγει*, 'what he means by this,' cp. Symp. 178 D *λέγω δὲ δὴ τί τοῦτο*;

σοφός] With a light touch of irony, as in Theaet. 151 B πολλοὺς μὲν δὴ ἐξέδωκα Προδίκῳ, πολλοὺς δὲ ἄλλοις σοφοῖς τε καὶ θεσπεσίοις ἀνδράσι. *Republic I.*

μὴ σωφρόνως] i.e., 'when not in his right mind.' The adverb refers to the condition of the agent, not to the mode of action. It is probably used to avoid the awkward conjunction of two participles: μὴ σωφρονοῦντι ἀπαιτοῦντι. 331 E

ἀπαιτοῖ] i.e. 'at a time when you might suppose him to demand it.' Cp. Goodwin, *M. and T.* 555. He explains the optative as due to the fact that **ἀποδοτέον** = δέοι ἂν ἀποδιδόναι (resuming the previously expressed condition εἰ μανεὶς ἀπαιτοῖ). Cp. also ib. 521, for the forms of indefinite sentences. 332 A

ἢ τὸ τοιοῦτον] 'Than this sort of thing'—i.e. than the making restoration to a man who is out of his mind.

ἄλλο μέντοι . . . . κακὸν δὲ μηδέν] 'Something different, certainly, said he; for he thinks that the debt which friends owe to friends is a benefit, and no injury whatever.' Μέντοι as elsewhere in answers is used in confirmation of a previous suggestion: cp. v. 469 E Ἐατέον ἄρα τὰς νεκροσυλίας . . .; Ἐατέον μέντοι, ἔφη, νὴ Δία. Phaedo 73 D ἄλλα που μυρία τοιαῦτ' ἂν εἴη. Μυρία μέντοι νὴ Δία.

μανθάνω, ἦν δ' ἐγώ] A similar argument occurs in the Memorabilia of Xenophon (iv. 2. 16, 17) where Socrates says that deception may be just towards enemies, and in some cases even towards friends; e.g., a general may fairly deceive dispirited troops by falsely telling them of the approach of allies; or, again, you may steal a sword from a melancholy friend who is about to destroy himself.

ἐάνπερ] Emphatic; 'that is to say, if.' The defining περ limits the assumption to the case in point. Cp. Theaet. 166 C ἐάνπερ ἀνομοίωσις γίγνηται. B

ἠνίξατο ἄρα . . . ὀφειλόμενον] Compare similar expressions in Charm. 162 A ἠνίττετο ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὁ λέγων τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν σωφροσύνην εἶναι: and Theaet. 152 C τοῦτο ἡμῖν μὲν ἠνίξατο τῷ πολλῷ συρφετῷ.

ὠνόμασεν, 'he called,' is slightly opposed to **διενοεῖτο**, 'he meant.' C

ἀλλὰ τί οἴει; . . . Σιμωνίδῃ] This is the reading which gives the best sense and which is found in nearly every MS. Like τί δή, τί μήν in some of their uses, τί οἴει; = τί οἴει ἄλλο; 'But what else do you suppose him to have done?' Cp. Gorg. 480 B τί γὰρ δὴ φῶμεν; sc. ἄλλο. There is a touch of humour in making Polemarchus agree so heartily in the views suggested by Socrates, as if they had always been familiar to him. The same confidence is shown

Republic I. 332 C in his previous answers, into which he is led by the arguments of Socrates. The Zurich edition of 1881, adopting Madvig's punctuation, reads Ἔφη with a capital letter, making ἀλλὰ τί οἴει; a part of the previous sentence. But the use of Ἔφη in the sense of ξυνέφη is doubtful; and the use of ἀλλά in continuing the previous sentence is very abrupt.

Another expedient is to cancel ἔφη and the stops, and place a dash after καλεῖται: ἀλλὰ τί οἴει, ὦ πρὸς Διός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ (ἦν δ' ἐγώ being repeated, cp. infra 348 D ἔφη . . . ἦ δ' ὅς). This receives some support from τί ἂν οἴει below, but no change is really necessary.

ὦ πρὸς Διός] Socrates now fairly warms to the argument; he exults in the train of thought which occurs to him; he begins enthusiastically with a frequently recurring formula (v. 459 A, Lysis 214 E, &c.—'By Heaven, I said'—to construct the Sorites which follows.—'To invite Socrates to an argument is like inviting horsemen to a plain' (Theaet. 183 D).

D **ἡ οὖν δὴ τίσι τί, κ.τ.λ.**] 'And what then will that be which the art called Justice gives, and to whom?'

εἰ μὲν . . . εἰρημένοις] δεῖ, sc. (1) ἡμᾶς, 'If we are to be consistent with what we said before': or (2) τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον, 'If this case is to go along with the rest.'

E **τί δὲ ὁ δίκαιος;**] sc. δυνατός ἐστι ποιεῖν, gathered from δυνατώτατος . . . εὖ ποιεῖν above. An elliptical form of expression, in which we must supply some word to be gathered from the context: cp. infra 341 C τί δὲ κυβερνήτης; κ.τ.λ., and Gorgias 502 A τί δὲ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ Μέλης; κ.τ.λ.

ἐν τῷ προσπολεμεῖν] 'In going to war with others.' Thucyd. viii. 96. 5 ἐν τούτῳ μόνῳ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Ἀθηναίοις πάντων δὴ ξυμφορώτατοι προσπολεμῆσαι ἐγένοντο. The repetition of ἐν τῷ with ξυμμαχεῖν, though not necessary to the sense, is retained as having the greater MS. authority.

χρήσιμον ἄρα] ἄρα, 'Then I am to understand.' Socrates carries on the argument a little further by extracting the answer from the respondent in a more general or abstract form. An explanation or new mode of statement, especially in dialogue, often takes the form of an inference.

333 A **τί δὲ δή;**] marks the resumption of the main subject.

ξυμβόλαια . . . κοινωνήματα] 'By contracts do you mean partnerships?' The more general word is substituted for the sake of extending the analogy.

πεττῶν] *πεττοί* are 'draughts,' which were played in various ways. According to one mode of playing the game, you blocked up your antagonist so that he was unable to move. This process of 'shutting up' is used as an illustration of Socrates' method of arguing in vi. 487 B, C *ὥσπερ ὑπὸ τῶν πεττεύειν δεινῶν οἱ μὴ τελευτῶντες ἀποκλείονται, κ.τ.λ.* *Republic I.* 333 B

ἀλλ' εἰς πλίνθων] The new illustration is suggested by the word *θέσις*.

ὥσπερ ὁ κιθαριστικὸς τοῦ δικαίου] Plato in his lively manner passes unexpectedly from one illustration to another.

εἰς κρουμάτων] sc. *κοινωνίαν*: 'as a partner in playing the harp.'

ὅταν . . . σῶν εἶναι] 'When you want to deposit it and have it kept safely': *σῶν εἶναι* sc. *τὸ ἀργύριον*: the subject is changed, as below—*ὅταν μηδὲν δέῃ αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι ἀλλὰ κεῖσθαι* (sc. *αὐτό*). C

καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ is a transition from the word *κοινωνία*: 'whether the guardians of it are partners or not.' D

Socrates' 'incessant talk of cobblers, physicians, curriers, and cooks' (Gorg. 491 A) has left an impress on many passages in Plato. Both his political and his moral ideal are influenced by the analogy of the arts. But he repeatedly shows his sense of the inadequacy of the comparison of the 'art of living' to any particular art. And in the Statesman, 297 E, where the examples of the pilot, the physician, and the weaver are once more elaborately employed, he dwells expressly on the imperfect and provisional nature of the argument from example: ibid. 277 C.

οὐκ ἂν οὖν] Par. A reads *οὐκ οὖν* omitting *ἄν*, but *οὐκ ἂν οὖν* was clearly written in the margin, until a wormhole interfered with the *ν* of *ἄν*. The '?' in the critical note may therefore be cancelled. E

εἴτε πυκτικῇ is added to vary the notion of *μάχη* from *ὁπλιτική* above, which has suggested the new topic; and also to introduce **φυλάξασθαι**, 'to parry a blow.'

καὶ λαθεῖν . . . ἐμποιῆσαι;] The Zurich edition (1887) reads *ἐμποιήσας*, the conjecture of Schneider; but the emphasis falls on the wrong word, for the principal point is not that he who can guard against disease can be secret in producing it, but that he can produce it at all: that he does it secretly is merely a way in which Plato prepares for *κλέψαι* and *φὼρ δεινός* in the following lines. It is better to retain the reading of the MSS., placing the comma after *φυλάξασθαι*, although the construction **λαθεῖν ἐμποιῆσαι**

Republic I. =λάθρα ἐμποιῆσαι (‘best skilled to implant it by stealth’) is not free from suspicion. The second infinitive (sc. ὥστε ἐμπ.) may be excused
333 E by the emphasis and by the position of δεινότατος. Early editors, following the MSS., put the comma after λαθεῖν. But λαθεῖν νόσον, ‘to elude a disease,’ is hardly defensible; and in leading up to the parallelism of φύλαξ with κλέψαι and with φώρ in what follows, it is essential that φυλάξασθαι and λαθεῖν should be in separate clauses. Other emendations are (1) καὶ μὴ παθεῖν in *q* β′: but these MSS. are of questionable authority: (2) the omission of καὶ λαθεῖν—suggested by Muretus; in support of which it might be urged that the ‘accretion’ may have been due to a gloss on φυλάξασθαι having been μὴ παθεῖν. [L. C.]

To this it is right to add the following note by Professor Jowett:—

There is no MS. authority worth speaking of for any variation of the text in this passage. The principal emendation is that of Schneider, ἐμποιήσας for ἐμποιῆσαι, but to this it may be objected that the proper opposition is between φυλάξασθαι and ἐμποιῆσαι, not between φυλάξασθαι and λαθεῖν. The suggestion of Muretus that καὶ λαθεῖν should be omitted, as well as the MS. correction καὶ μὴ παθεῖν (*q* β′), is hardly worthy of notice. It is better to retain the old punctuation which places the comma after λαθεῖν and not after φυλάξασθαι. The chief reason why the passage has given trouble to interpreters is the impression that λαθεῖν can only be used with a personal object, and that therefore λαθεῖν νόσον, ‘to dodge a disease,’ is not good Greek. To this it may be replied that such personification involves a less flaw of language than the false opposition of φυλάξασθαι and λαθεῖν.

334 A **κλέψαι**] ‘To steal an enemy’s plans and proceedings.’ Κλέψαι = ‘by stealth’ (1) ‘to get possession of,’ or (2) ‘to obtain advantage over.’

ὡς γοῦν . . . σημαίνει] ‘That is certainly what the argument implies.’ The qualification with γοῦν indicates Polemarchus’ reluctance to admit the conclusion, although he cannot rebut the argument.

ἀναπέφανται] expressing an unexpected result, as infra, 350 C: Sophist. 233 C δοξαστικὴν ἄρα . . . ὁ σοφιστὴς . . . ἔχων ἀναπέφανται.

B **κατὰ σὲ . . . . Σιμωνίδην**] Compare Theaet. 160 D, where there is a similar ironical use of the poets: κατὰ μὲν Ὅμηρον καὶ Ἡράκλειτον καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον φῦλον . . . . . . κατὰ δὲ Θεαίτητον. For the humour

of attributing to the respondent what Socrates has drawn out of him, compare also Gorg. 470 B, 503 C; Theaet. 163 A; Euthyd. 290 E. Republic I.

334 B

ἐπ' ὠφελίᾳ . . . . . ἐχθρῶν] 'For the good, however, of friends, and the harm of enemies.' There is a humorous pretence of fairness in adding this limitation, which is also the link of connexion with what follows.

οὐκέτι . . . . ἔλεγον] Cp. the passage in Meno 80 A, B, in which the influence of Socrates on his adversary is compared to that of the torpedo (*νάρκῃ τῇ θαλαττίᾳ*): *ἀληθῶς γὰρ ἔγωγε καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ στόμα ναρκῶ*: and Euthyphro 15 B, where Socrates himself is compared to Daedalus, as he makes the arguments of his adversary 'walk away': Alcibiades I. 127 D, which has perhaps been imitated from this passage: *ἀλλὰ μὰ τοὺς θεούς, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδ' αὐτὸς οἶδ' ὅ τι λέγω, κ.τ.λ.*

ὠφελεῖν . . . ἡ δικαιοσύνη] Sc. *δοκεῖ* supplied from the previous words. Cp. vii. 517 B *τὰ δ' οὖν ἐμοὶ φαινόμενα οὕτω* **φαίνεται**, *ἐν τῷ γνωστῷ τελευταία* **ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα** *καὶ μόγις ὁρᾶσθαι, κ.τ.λ.*

καὶ ἐχθροὺς ὡσαύτως] Sc. *τοὺς δοκοῦντας εἶναι πονηρούς, ἢ τοὺς ὄντας, κἂν μὴ δοκῶσι.* C

τούτοις . . . φίλοι] 'These then have the good for their enemies and the bad for their friends.' *τούτοις*, sc. *τοῖς περὶ ταῦτα ἁμαρτάνουσιν.*

ἀλλ' ὅμως δίκαιον] *ὅμως*—i. e. notwithstanding their mistake, the principle which has been laid down is to be applied, and the result in this case is that the evil are to be benefited and the good harmed.

μηδαμῶς] Polemarchus, moved not by shame, like Gorgias or Polus (Gorg. 482 C, &c.), or Thrasymachus (infra 352 B), but by honest indignation, entreats Socrates to alter the course of the argument. 'Do not let us have that conclusion, Socrates.' Cp. infra 335 A *κελεύεις, κ.τ.λ.* For the ellipse of *οὕτω θῶμεν*, or some similar expression, cp. Gorg. 497 B *μηδαμῶς, ὦ Καλλίκλεις*: Euthyd. 294 C. D

ὅσοι διημαρτήκασι τῶν ἀνθρώπων] 'That is to say, those of mankind who are in error.' These words are added to explain *πολλοῖς*, and refer to *ἆρ' οὐχ ἁμαρτάνουσιν* (supra, C). For the compound verb (*δια* = diverging from the aim) cp. Theaet. 178 A *ἢ οὖν καὶ τυγχάνει ἀεί, ἢ πολλὰ καὶ διαμαρτάνει ἑκάστη;*

πονηροὶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰσίν] 'For they have bad ones.' E

τὸν δοκοῦντά τε . . . καὶ τὸν ὄντα] The article, though repeated

Republic I. 334 E for the sake of emphasis both with ὄντα and δοκοῦντα, refers to the same person. It may be expressed: 'He is our friend, who not only seems, but who also is a good man.'

335 A **ἡ αὐτὴ θέσις**] 'The same mode of statement': cp. μεταθώμεθα supra: viz., 'our enemy is he who not only seems, but is so.'

κελεύεις . . . ἐλέγομεν] 'You would have us add to our idea of justice more than we included in our first statement.' The particle ἢ depends on the notion of a difference or comparison which is contained in **προσθεῖναι**. Cp. Phaedr. 228 D οἷς ἔφη διαφέρειν τὰ τοῦ ἐρῶντος ἢ τὰ τοῦ μή: Gorg. 481 C ἀλλά τις ἡμῶν ἴδιόν τι ἔπασχε πάθος ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι. In what follows the words νῦν πρὸς τούτῳ ὧδε λέγειν are in apposition with προσθεῖναι and explanatory,—hence the asyndeton. **λέγειν** is governed by κελεύεις. By the terms of the argument the words ἀγαθὸν ὄντα, κακὸν ὄντα are added, not in limitation, but in definition of φίλον and ἐχθρόν: 'our friend who is good,' 'our enemy, who is bad.'

B **ἔστιν ἄρα . . . βλάπτειν**] Cp. Crito 49 B, C οὐδαμῶς ἄρα δεῖ ἀδικεῖν. Οὐ δῆτα. Οὐδὲ ἀδικούμενον ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται, ἐπειδή γε οὐδαμῶς δεῖ ἀδικεῖν. Οὐ φαίνεται. Τί δὲ δή; κακουργεῖν δεῖ, . . . ἢ οὔ;

That it is not right to harm even the evil is proved as follows:—When animals are harmed, they are made worse in that quality which is characteristic of them. That quality in man is justice: therefore, when man is harmed, he is rendered more unjust: whence follows the absurdity that justice is the cause of injustice. The argument is verbal, but hints at the truth more fully stated in ii. 379 C ff. (οὐδ' ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, . . . οἱ δὲ ὠνίναντο κολαζόμενοι).

C **μὴ οὕτω φῶμεν**] 'Shall we be told that we must not say in like manner . . . ?' Cp. 337 B μὴ ἀποκρίνωμαι ὧν προεῖπες μηδέν;

ἀλλὰ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ δή] δή emphasizes the real subject of inquiry; of which the previous cases are only illustrations. 'And by justice then can the just make men unjust?' So in οὐδὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ (infra, D).

E **τοῦτο δὲ δὴ νοεῖ αὐτῷ**] 'And this moreover means for him.' Cp. Euthyd. 287 D ὅ τί μοι νοοῖ τὸ ῥῆμα;

σοφῶν . . . μακαρίων] Both σοφῶν and μακαρίων are here ironical. μακάριος originally means 'blessed,' and is sometimes applied to the dead: also, as here, to persons who have any cleverness or excellence—'blest with understanding.' Cp. Meno 71 B κινδυνεύω σοι δοκεῖν μακάριός τις εἶναι, ἀρετὴν γοῦν εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε ὅτῳ τρόπῳ παραγίγνεται εἰδέναι.

ἔγωγ' οὖν . . . μάχης] 'for my part, anyway (*οὖν*) I am ready to share in the battle':—said in answer to the previous words of Socrates—'you and I will make war together.' The reading *ἔγωγ' οὖν* is better than the emphatic *ἐγὼ γοῦν*. After Socrates has declared that both are ready to take up arms, there would be no meaning in Polemarchus' asseveration—'I at all events am ready to do so,' as though there were a doubt of Socrates. *Republic I.* 335 E

τὸ ῥῆμα . . βλάπτειν] *τὸ φάναι* is in apposition with *τὸ ῥῆμα*: 'the saying which affirms that it is just to do good to friends and harm to enemies.' 336 A

Ἰσμηνίου τοῦ Θηβαίου] Cp. Meno 90 A, where Ismenias is said to have made himself a fortune in some sudden or irregular manner.—He was put to death by the Lacedaemonians in B.C. 382 after the seizure of the Cadmeia, on the ground that he had taken bribes from Persia.

μέγα οἰομένου δύνασθαι] 'who imagined that he had great power,' but had it not really, because Plato is not prepared to admit, as he here intimates by the word *οἰομένου*, that any man is really great or powerful who 'cannot do what he will.' (Gorg. 466 ff.)

οὐδὲ τοῦτο] Through the windings of dialectic we arrive at last in view of the Christian precept,—'Recompense to no man evil for evil.' After every caution and reservation something more is needed than the text of the old poet, which is only on a level with the old Hebrew saying, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour and hate thine enemy.'

Yet the definition of Simonides is really a very good one, nor can any objection be raised to the explanation of *ὀφειλόμενον* as *προσῆκον*. Socrates is unfair to it, in his attempt to elevate into a universal principle, that which is only a maxim or rule of conduct.

Thrasymachus breaks in with an impatient cry—'Instead of asking questions and criticizing answers, why not at once give your definition of the just? But don't treat us to such stale rubbish as 'the fitting' or 'the expedient.' *336 B–340 B*

Socrates deprecates the anger of the great Sophist and assures him that his own and his host's error is involuntary. They are only too ready to learn, if he will teach them.

Thrasymachus laughs sardonically at 'the accustomed irony' of Socrates,—who now alleges the further difficulty that the most obvious answers have been forbidden him. He ends by prevailing

Republic I. 336 B–340 B *on Thrasymachus (who is really eager to speak) to give his own definition, that justice is the interest of the Stronger. In States, for example, the government, whether despotic, democratic or oligarchical, makes all its laws with a view to its own maintenance and security. And it is just for the subject to obey the laws. 'But do governments never make mistakes in the laws which they pass?'*

T. '*Yes, sometimes.*'

S. '*Then it is sometimes just for the subject to do what is inexpedient for the ruler.*'

Polemarchus sees the point at once. But Cleitophon takes up the cudgels to defend his master's thesis. By 'what is expedient for the Stronger,' he says that Thrasymachus meant what the Stronger thought expedient for himself.

336 B **διαλεγομένων . . . μεταξύ**] 'In the midst of our discussion:' μεταξύ is to be taken with the participle: cp. Apol. 40 B, where Socrates says of the δαιμόνιον σημεῖον—πολλαχοῦ δή με ἐπέσχε λέγοντα μεταξύ.

ὥρμα . . . διεκωλύετο] 'had been attempting,' 'had been repeatedly prevented,'—the iterative force of the imperfect.

ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι] meaning originally 'to seize,' 'grasp'; has two secondary senses in Plato, (1) 'to lay hold of with the view of objecting':—so Soph. 239 D ἀντιλαμβανόμενος ἡμῶν: infra, vi. 497 D φόβῳ ὧν ὑμεῖς ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι δεδηλώκατε μακρὰν . . . καὶ χαλεπὴν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν; (2) 'to get possession of': so Parm. 130 E, where Parmenides says of Socrates—οὔπω σου ἀντείληπται φιλοσοφία, ὡς ἔτι ἀντιλήψεται. 'To get hold of,' i.e. 'to interpose in,' is the meaning here. Cp. Gorg. 506 A χρὴ ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ ἐλέγχειν.

The sketch of Thrasymachus may be compared with that of Polus in the Gorgias, or of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus in the dialogue which bears the name of the latter: or with the vanity of Hippias and Prodicus in the Protagoras. The greater masters of the Sophistic art, such as Gorgias and Protagoras, have a higher character attributed to them; they preserve a stately equanimity, and are treated with a certain degree of respect by Socrates.

ὡς δὲ διεπαυσάμεθα . . . εἶπον] 'when we had ceased, and I had thus spoken.' The two clauses refer to the same moment. The last words of Socrates coincided with the break in the discussion. The emendation of Cobet—ὡς δὴ ἐπαυσάμεθα,—which appears to arise from a supposed difficulty in explaining διεπαυσάμεθα, is

needless. Cp. Symp. 191 C ἵνα . . . διαπαύοιντο καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα τρέποιντο. The compound signifies 'intermission.' *Republic I.* 336

συστρέψας] i. e. 'gathering himself up,' i. e. for a spring. Cp. the Homeric ἐάλη τε χανών (Il. xx. 168), of the angry lion. **ἧκεν** is rather to be taken as the aorist of ἵημι than as the imperfect of ἥκω. Cp. Herod. ix. 49, § 2 ἐπῆκε τὴν ἵππον ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας. ἑαυτόν is easily supplied from what precedes: 'He gathered himself together and sprang upon us as if to tear us in pieces.' Cobet's conjecture (*Varr. Lectt.* ed. sec. p. 526), διασπασόμενος for **διαρπασόμενος**, is quite unnecessary. Cp. Il. xvi. 355 αἶψα διαρπάζουσιν (sc. οἱ λύκοι τὰς ἄρνας). B

διεπτοήθημεν] 'We were panic-stricken,' a metaphor taken from the scaring of birds. Cp. Od. xviii. 340 διεπτοίησε γυναῖκας, i. e. 'he scattered them in terror,' whereupon βὰν δ' ἴμεναι **διὰ** δῶμα.

εἰς τὸ μέσον φθεγξάμενος] 'He called out to the whole company.' Cp. Laws ii. 664 C τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰς τὸ μέσον ᾀδόμενος: Herod. vi. 130 ἔλεξε ἐς μέσον τάδε.

ὑποκατακλινόμενοι] The verb is used by Plutarch (1) of a wrestler allowing himself to be beaten, (2) of one who in a banquet takes the lower place. The latter seems to give the more natural metaphor here. See Liddell and Scott, s. v. The word here, taken in the sense of 'giving way to,' or 'giving place to,' may have a suggestion of either or both associations. C

οὐκ ἀποδέξομαι, ἐάν] 'I will not tolerate this sort of nonsense.' As elsewhere (infra, vii. 525 D οὐδαμῇ ἀποδεχόμενον, ἐάν τις, κ.τ.λ.), the object of the verb is resolved into a hypothetical or relative clause. D

καὶ ἐγὼ . . . γενέσθαι] Cp. Theocritus xiv. 22 οὐ φθεγξῇ; **λύκον** εἶδες; ἔπαιξέ τις: Virg. Ecl. ix. 53 'Vox quoque Moerim | Iam fugit ipsa; lupi Moerim videre priores.' It is suggested, rather than expressed, that Thrasymachus is a wolf.

εἰ γάρ] εἰ γάρ τι, the reading of Ven. Π, is perhaps better suited to the irony of the passage; cp. Gorg. 488 A ἐγὼ γὰρ εἴ τι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττω κατὰ τὸν βίον τὸν ἐμαυτοῦ, εὖ ἴσθι τοῦτο ὅτι οὐχ ἑκὼν ἐξαμαρτάνω, ἀλλ' ἀμαθίᾳ τῇ ἐμῇ. E

μὴ γὰρ δὴ . . . δυνάμεθα] 'If we were looking for a piece of gold, we should not, if we could help, allow ourselves to give place to one another and spoil our chance of finding it. Do not then imagine that in looking for justice, a thing more precious than many pieces of gold, we are weakly yielding to one another, and

Republic I. not doing our utmost to bring the hidden thing to light; believe me, friend, that we are doing our best; but the fact is that we cannot.'

336 E After **οὐ δυνάμεθα** some such word as 'find' or 'bring it to light' has to be supplied from **φανῆναι αὐτό**.

For this mode of expression, in which an antithetical compound sentence is treated as a simple one, and is contained within a single negative or interrogative, cp. ii. 374 B: Phaedo 68 A, B.

οἴου γε σύ] 'Believe it, friend, we are.' The reading of Ξ, and of the old editions—*οἷόν γε ἐστίν*, is feeble and without authority. The text may be said to have the support of the great majority of MSS., being the least possible correction of them. *οἴου* must be connected with *σπουδάζειν ὅ τι μάλιστα* (not with *οὐ σπουδάζειν*). Cp. the use of *οἴεσθαί γε χρή* in a very similar sentence (Phaedo 68 B), where it is in the same way disconnected from the negative—*οὐκ ἄσμενος εἶσιν αὐτόσε; οἴεσθαί γε χρή* (sc. *ἄσμενον ἰέναι αὐτόν*): also Crito 53 D *οὐκ οἴει ἄσχημον φανεῖσθαι τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πρᾶγμα; οἴεσθαί γε χρή.* Another reading, but of small authority, is *μὴ οἴου σύ.*

337 A **τῶν δεινῶν**] cp. infra E *ὑπ' ἀνδρὸς οὐ φαύλου*: *δεινός* has several transitions of meaning from the literal one of 'terrible' to 'strange,' 'admirable,' 'wonderful,' 'wise'; and so of pretended wisdom—'awful.' A favourite meaning of *δεινός*, always with a slight reproach, is that of 'one who is too much for another.'

χαλεπαίνεσθαι] 'Than to be the victims of your anger.' To form passives of verbs governing the dative, like *φθονέω, πιστεύω*, &c., was a growing tendency in the Greek of this period. See Essay on Platonic Syntax in vol. ii. p. 180, *β*.

σαρδάνιον] probably from *σαίρειν*, 'to grin.' The word occurs already in Homer (Od. xx. 302).

εἰρωνεία] cp. Symp. 216 E *ἡγεῖται δὲ πάντα ταῦτα τὰ κτήματα οὐδενὸς ἄξια, καὶ ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν εἶναι, λέγων μὲν οὔ, εἰρωνευόμενός τε καὶ παίζων πάντα τὸν βίον πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους διατελεῖ*: and Theaet. 150 C *ἄγονός εἰμι σοφίας, καὶ ὅπερ ἤδη πολλοί μοι ὠνείδισαν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἐρωτῶ, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐδὲν ἀποκρίνομαι περὶ οὐδενὸς διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν σοφόν, ἀληθὲς ὀνειδίζουσι.* For the meaning of the word cp. Ar. Eth. N. ii. 7, 12 *ἡ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον (προσποίησις) εἰρωνεία καὶ εἴρων*: and Theophr. Charact. *ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰρωνεία δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι . . . προσποίησις ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον πράξεων καὶ λόγων.* The word gains a new association from the application of it to Socrates, who not only pretended ignorance with the view of gaining an advantage in argument, but sincerely believed it to be the natural condition of man.

δῆλον . . . πυνθανομένῳ] 'To a questioner who puts the question in this form, I believe you clearly saw that no one would answer.' The words **δῆλον οἶμαί σοι ἦν** resume *εὖ οὖν ᾔδησθα*, the previous sentence being repeated in **οὕτω**. For the enclitic after *οἶμαι* in parenthesis cp. Theaet. 147 A *ἢ οἴει τίς τι συνίησί τινος ὄνομα, ὃ μὴ οἶδε τί ἐστιν;* *Republic* *I.* 337 B

μηδ' . . . ὄν] 'Not even if the answer to the question (sc. *τὸ ἐρωτώμενον*) happens to be one of these?' Others would render, 'Not if one of these chanced to be the truth?' Such an emphatic or predicative use of *ὄν* with *τυγχάνει* is doubtful, whereas the omission of a nominative, which is easily gathered from the rest of the sentence, is in the manner of Plato.

ὡς δὴ ὅμοιον τοῦτο ἐκείνῳ] 'Just as if the two cases were alike.' C
For this use of *ὡς δή* cp. Aesch. Agam. 1633 *ὡς δὴ σύ μοι τύραννος Ἀργείων ἔσει*: Soph. O. C. 809 *ὡς δὴ σὺ βραχέα, ταῦτα δ' ἐν καιρῷ λέγεις.*

οὐδέν γε . . . ἐγώ] 'There is nothing to prevent it.' This is said in the same spirit as *οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι*, a few lines below (cp. Charm. 164 A *καὶ οὐδέν γέ σε ἴσως κωλύει ἀληθῆ λέγειν*).

ἡμεῖς] is ironical. Socrates provokingly says: 'A man can't help thinking as he does, though you and I join in forbidding him.'

ἄλλο τι οὖν, . . . ποιήσεις;] *ἄλλο τι* is used by Plato chiefly in two ways: (1) *ἄλλο τι ἤ*—'Is it not the case that . . .?'—where the ellipsis of *ἐστί* or *γίγνεται* is lost sight of in the familiarity of the phrase; cp. Phaedo 70 C *ἄλλο τι ἢ εἶεν ἂν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν ἐκεῖ;* Theaet. 154 E *ἄλλο τι ἢ ἠρέμα, ὡς πάνυ πολλὴν σχολὴν ἄγοντες, πάλιν ἐπανασκεψόμεθα . . .;* 'Shall we not,' &c.: (2) *ἤ* is dropped and *ἄλλο τι* like *οἴει*, *δοκεῖς*, *βούλει*, and the like words, is taken adverbially: cp. Gorg. 495 C *ἄλλο τι οὖν . . . δύο ταῦτα ἔλεγες;* 'You spoke of them as two, did you not?' and infra i. 342 D *ἄλλο τι οὖν . . . οὐδὲ ἰατρὸς οὐδεὶς . . . τὸ τῷ ἰατρῷ ξυμφέρον σκοπεῖ . . .;* 'Then said I, neither does any physician consider what is for the interest of the physician: is not that true?' See Riddell's *Digest*, § 22. In the present passage Thrasymachus says: 'And that is what you are going to do, is it not?' i.e. 'I am to presume then that this is your intention,'—as if the absurdity were too glaring to be further expressed. Instead of saying sharply 'Do you mean to tell me . . .?' he says with assumed calmness 'I am to understand then that you intend . . .?'

Republic I. 337 D **ἡδὺς . . . ἀργύριον**] This is a jest at the expense of the sophists, which Socrates is always either repeating or insinuating, as infra, 345 A. He has not had the good fortune 'to hear the fifty drachma course of Prodicus' (Cratyl. 384 B). He is informed by Callias, 'who has spent more than all the rest of the world upon the Sophists,' that a complete course of education may be had of Evenus at a cost of five minae (Apol. 20 A): Hermogenes, the younger brother of Callias, who is poor, must get these expensive lessons at second hand (Cratyl. 391 C). And the trains of disciples who follow them in dutiful order (Protag. 315 B), and are ready almost to carry them about on their heads (infra x. 600 D), are constantly ridiculed. The gains of Protagoras (Meno 91 D), which are greater than those of Pheidias or ten other sculptors, are ironically assumed as a proof of the truth of his doctrines. Compare also the mention of Socrates' own circumstances in Apol. 23 B *ἐν πενίᾳ μυρίᾳ εἰμί.*

E **τίς**]. See above note on *δῆλον οἶμαί σοι* supra B.

ἔπειτα . . . εἴη] *εἴη*, though apparently redundant, is found in all the MSS. **ἀπειρημένον αὐτῷ εἴη** is written as if not a participle *μὴ εἰδώς* but *εἰ μὴ εἰδείη* had preceded.

οὐ φαύλου] 'who is not to be disregarded.' Ironicè: see above *ὑπὸ ὑμῶν τῶν δεινῶν* (337 A) and note.

338 A **προσεποιεῖτο . . . ἀποκρινόμενον**] 'He pretended to contend for my being respondent.' *φιλόνεικος*, 'loving contention': hence **φιλονεικεῖν**, 'to show a contentious spirit,' 'to be contentious.' But like other words in Greek, it passes readily from the *state* to the *act*, and the feeling of the etymology is lost through frequent use. Cp. Protag. 360 E *φιλονεικεῖν μοι δοκεῖς τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον*: Phil. 14 B *οὐ δήπου πρός γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο φιλονεικοῦμεν.* The Venetian MS. T. has *φιλονικεῖν.* C. F. Hermann and Cobet would restore *φιλόνικος*, *φιλονικέω*, *φιλονικία* in Plato throughout, relying on Plato's own remarks connecting the word with *νίκη* (ix. 581 A, 586 C), in which he is followed by Aristotle (Rhet. ii. 12, 6). But Plato's fanciful etymology is no sufficient ground for judging of the orthography of a word.

C **ἄκουε δή**]. The sham compliment which precedes is too much for Thrasymachus, who immediately begins like a crier (*oyez! oyez!*) to proclaim his idea of justice. For the definition cp. Laws iv. 714 C *οὔτε γὰρ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον οὔτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὅλην βλέπειν*

δεῖν φασὶ τοὺς νόμους, ἀλλ' ἥτις ἂν καθεστηκυῖα ᾖ πολιτεία, ταύτῃ δεῖν τὸ ξυμφέρον†, ὅπως ἄρξει τε ἀεὶ καὶ μὴ καταλυθήσεται, καὶ τὸν φύσει ὅρον τοῦ δικαίου λέγεσθαι κάλλισθ' οὕτως. Πῶς; Ὅτι τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον ἐστί. *Republic I.* 338 C

τὸ . . . ξυμφέρον] The participle with the article is used as a noun; hence *τοῦ κρείττονος*, not *τῷ κρείττονι*. The new philosophy is first of all damaged by a broad joke from Socrates. If Polydamas the Pancratiast, who is our superior, finds the expediency of eating beef, does not expediency, and therefore justice, require that we, who are his inferiors, should eat beef too? Thrasymachus replies angrily and pompously, endeavouring to re-invest the subject with the dignity that has been lost. A similar jest occurs in the Charmides (161, 162), where justice, having been defined, as in iv. 443, to be *τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν*, the question is raised whether this means 'making one's own coat.' Cp. also Gorg. 490 C, where a similar question is provokingly asked—whether, as the wisest is to have most, the wise physician is to have most food.

ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐθελήσεις] The future here appears to be used as a stronger present: a sense of predetermination being expressed in it: 'But you won't.' Cp. Charm. 166 A *ἔχεις οὖν μοι . . . δεῖξαι; ἀλλ' οὐχ ἕξεις*: Prot. 354 D *ἀλλ' οὐχ ἕξετε.*

καὶ τοῦτο . . . τί ποτε λέγεις;] 'And with what meaning do you say this?' *καί* indicates surprise, as in *καὶ πῶς;*

εἰ Πουλυδάμας ἡμῶν κρείττων] Polydamas is mentioned by many ancient writers as a Pancratiast of great strength and stature, who was at one time in the pay of Darius Ochus, and, amongst other wonderful feats, slew lions, and fought unarmed with armed men.

βδελυρὸς . . . λόγον] 'That is abominable of you, Socrates: you understand me in the sense in which you can do my argument most mischief.' **κακουργεῖν** implies malice. D

τίθεται . . . ἡ ἀρχή] 'The government in each case makes the laws.' The articles *τούς* and *ἡ* are correlative—**τίθεται ἡ** *ἀρχὴ* **τοὺς** *νόμους*. This removes Schneider's objection to *ἡ*. The interchange of the generic present and gnomic aorist (*τίθεται . . . θέμεναι . . . ἀπέφηναν . . . κολάζουσιν*) is noticeable. Par. A reads *ἑκάστῃ*—a manifest error. The thesis of Thrasymachus has a verbal and superficial truth. There are governments everywhere who have power in their hands and make laws for their own interest, and E

Republic I. obedience to government is right. The abstract notion of law is the same amid every variety of law and custom, and authority in
338 E the ruler is the correlative of justice in the subject. The statement is a paradox which partly gains force from the appearance of honesty in confessing what other men are trying to conceal. Cp. Callicles in the Gorgias 483 ff.

An opinion equivalent to this is cited by Aristotle, Pol. i. 3, 4 *τοῖς μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ ἐπιστήμη τέ τις εἶναι ἡ δεσποτεία . . . τοῖς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν τὸ δεσπόζειν.* Nor are modern parallels wanting. When Hobbes says that power is the source of right, this is really the enunciation of a principle which is carried out only in his own 'kingdom of darkness.' He seems to have confused the duty of obedience to authority in the abstract with the duty of obedience to a particular authority. That authority always exists and always claims obedience may be readily allowed: the dispute is whether the authority does or does not reside in a certain person. 'Mankind are rightly jealous of their principles being reduced to the level of their practice.' It must be allowed that the theory of the Sophist is realized in fact whenever power is preferred to justice, or conventionality perverts truth. But the elevation of this distortion of life and nature into a philosophical theory is deservedly hated.

339 B **αὐτόθι**] Sc. *ἐν τῇ σῇ ἀποκρίσει.* **δή** is emphatic and ironical: 'it is true.'

οὔπω . . . μεγάλη] Socrates, ignoring the irony of *σμικρά*, says gravely: 'It is not yet clear, even whether it is a great one,' i. e. 'it may be a great one for anything we yet know.'

ταῦτ' ἔσται, κ.τ.λ.] 'That is what I am going to do'—implying that the grumbling exhortation of Thrasymachus was rather unnecessary. The special use of **μέντοι** in interrogations with **οὐ** may be compared with the use of *δήπου* in claiming the recollection or agreement of the person addressed. But *μέντοι* further implies a transition of thought, or the renewal of an old thought, cp. infra vii. 521 D *οὐκ ἀθλητὰς μέντοι πολέμου ἔφαμεν τούτους ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι νέους ὄντας*; and 346 A *οὐχὶ ἑκάστην μέντοι φαμὲν ἑκάστοτε τῶν τεχνῶν τούτῳ ἑτέραν εἶναι, κ.τ.λ.*

Justice is the expediency of the superior, but the superior may err, and then inexpediency becomes justice. This 'reductio ad absurdum,' which Polemarchus receives with triumph, is rejected by Cleitophon, who argues that the word 'expedient' is to be taken as 'expedient in the thought or mind of the ruler.' The idea which

the ruler has of his interest, however inexpedient in fact, always remains the idea which the ruler has of his interest. Polemarchus truly retorts that this is an after-thought: Socrates, however, does not object to the change, but Thrasymachus prefers a different mode of shifting his ground. He argues not that the expedient is what seems to the ruler to be expedient, but that the ruler when he errs is not to be called a ruler. 339 B

τοὺς δέ τινας] For the qualifying use of the indefinite after the article, cp. Phileb. 13 C *τὰς δέ τινας ἑτέρας αὐτῶν κακάς*: Herod. i. 114 *τὸν δέ κού τινα αὐτῶν ὀφθαλμὸν βασιλέως εἶναι.* C

τί λέγεις σύ; ἔφη] The reading of Stephanus *τί λέγεις*; omitting *σύ*, is adopted by Schneider and inferred by him from Bekker's silence to rest on the authority of Par. A, where, however, *σύ* is read, but is marked as doubtful (.*σύ*·). For the text, which gives more point to *σύ* in the reply, cp. Aristoph. Nub. 1174 *τοῦτο τοὐπιχώριον ἀτεχνῶς ἐπανθεῖ, τὸ τί λέγεις σύ;* The question of Thrasymachus is rudely expressive of indignation and surprise. Socrates returns with a stroke of the hammer: 'I am saying what you say yourself.' There is the same form of the 'retort courteous,' infra in **οἶμαι** and **οἴου**—'I think so,' said he. 'Then,' said I, 'you must further think,' &c. Compare a similiar repetition in iv. 430 C *ἀποδέχομαι τοίνυν τοῦτο ἀνδρείαν εἶναι. Καὶ γὰρ ἀποδέχου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πολιτικήν γε, καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀποδέξει.* D

ὅταν οἱ μὲν ἄρχοντες, κ.τ.λ.] The sentence has a second apodosis: *ἆρα τότε κ.τ.λ.* resuming *οἴου . . . ὡμολογῆσθαι.* Cp. Theaet. 171 B *ἐξ ἁπάντων ἄρα . . . τότε . . . ξυγχωρήσεται.* E

ἆρα τότε . . . ἀποδεχώμεθα] The whole argument may be briefly summed up as follows: 'Justice is the interest of the superior.' 'But what if the superior is mistaken about his interest?' 'But,' says Cleitophon, 'he cannot mistake about what he thinks to be his interest; and that was what Thrasymachus meant.' 'But that,' retorts Polemarchus, 'was not the assertion actually made by Thrasymachus.' 'Never mind,' says Socrates; 'we will take this instead of the other.' Cleitophon tries to evade the 'reductio ad absurdum' of Thrasymachus' argument by substituting after the manner of the Sophists appearance for reality. Justice thus becomes not the stronger's interest, but what appears to the stronger to be his interest. This, however, is not what Thrasymachus actually said (338 C, E).

οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον . . . λέγεις;] 'Must it not then follow, that, in that

Republic I. 339 E case, it is just to do the very opposite of what you say?' According to Madvig's punctuation, which is here followed, **αὐτό** (emphatic) is joined to **τοὐναντίον**. (Madvig also, unnecessarily, reads *συμβαίνει*.) The older punctuation was *συμβαίνειν αὐτὸ οὑτωσί, δίκαιον εἶναι, κ.τ.λ.,—αὐτό* unemphatic and referring to the case put in the first part of the sentence; the antecedent, as in Polit. 263 B *μήποτε παρ' ἐμοῦ δόξῃς αὐτὸ ἐναργῶς διωρισμένον ἀκηκοέναι*, having inexact reference to what precedes. [L. C.]

***οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον . . . λέγεις**;] 'Is it not necessary for the matter to turn out thus, that it is just to do the opposite of what you say?' **αὐτό**, 'the matter,' has a vague antecedent in what precedes: cp. Polit. 263 B *μήποτε παρ' ἐμοῦ δόξῃς αὐτὸ ἐναργῶς διωρισμένον ἀκηκοέναι*. **οὑτωσί** is explained in the clause which follows. It is better to explain the passage thus—placing the comma after *οὑτωσί*, than with Madvig (who unnecessarily reads *συμβαίνει*) to delete the comma connecting *αὐτό* with *τοὐναντίον* and making *οὑτωσί* mean 'in that case.' 'Must it not then follow that, in that case, it is just to do the very opposite of what you say?' [B. J.]

340 A **τὸ γὰρ τὰ κελευόμενα, κ.τ.λ.**] The first *γάρ* introduces a justification, 'You are right,' says Cleitophon, and in that 'Thrasymachus was consistent, since he defined justice to be obedience to the command of the ruler.' The second *γάρ* with *καί* admits Cleitophon's assertion so far, but proceeds seriously to justify the argument by adding what had been suppressed. 'Yes, I was right: for he also defined justice to be the interest of the stronger. And these two general principles are rendered inconsistent by his admission that the ruler sometimes makes a mistake about his own interest.'

B **ἀλλ', ἔφη . . . ἐτίθετο**] 'But, said Cleitophon, he meant by the expediency of the superior, what the superior in his view thought expedient for him; this, he said, was to be done by the subject, and this he maintained to be justice.' The asyndeton is relieved by an emphasis on **τοῦτο**. For the optative see Goodwin *M. and T.* 694, 700.

τοῦτο ποιητέον εἶναι τῷ ἥττονι] **ἔλεγεν** has to be repeated with these words. Cleitophon's dialectic recalls the passage with Polemarchus, supra, 334 C ff. Thrasymachus passes by the interposition of Cleitophon and defends himself from another point of view. He maintains not that what the superior thinks for his interest is just, but that the superior, *qua* superior, can never err.

Socrates is ready to argue the question on the new ground proposed by Cleitophon. But Thrasymachus takes a different line. 'The ruler makes no mistake qua ruler; when he gives commands which are inexpedient for him, he loses his title to be called the ruler or stronger.' *Republic I. 340 C–342 E*

S. *Very well;—We will speak of the ruler in the strictest sense of the term. Turning to the analogy of the arts we note that the physician qua physician is a healer only; and he takes fees not as physician, but as money-maker. The pilot, qua pilot, considers not his own safety but that of the passengers in his ship. The art which rules each function is self-sufficing and perfect and in need of nothing, while that whereto it ministers has need of many things. In other words, a true form of government does not regard its own interest, but the interest of that which is governed by it. And in all cases, the ruler, who is truly such, rules not for himself but for his subjects.*

ἥκιστά γ', ἔφη, κ.τ.λ.] Thrasymachus raises a new objection: 'The superior is not the superior when he errs.' We say indeed that 'the ruler has erred,' as in the case of other arts we say that 'the physician, the calculator, has erred.' But this is an incorrectness of language; for in erring 'the physician is no longer physician,' 'the ruler is no longer ruler.' Yet the possibility of error in the ruler had been admitted by Thrasymachus in 339 C without this restriction. The question which is here introduced—viz. how far words are to be restricted to their good senses—is one which has occasioned considerable perplexity in the infancy of philosophy. Are *εὐβουλία, προαίρεσις, τέχνη, φρόνησις, σοφία*, and the other names of habits which occur in the Ethics of Aristotle, to be taken only in their better signification?—e. g. *εὐβουλία*, as implying a good end, *προαίρεσις*, as the deliberate choice always of good, *σοφία* and *φρόνησις* as concerned with truth only? How far, again, is the meaning of such terms to be extended by analogy? The answer seems to be that the use of language is determined by custom and association, and aims only at such a degree of precision as is necessary for the attainment of perspicuity. Words are not necessarily ambiguous because they are taken in good, bad, or neutral senses, if the sense in which they are taken is clearly indicated by the context. 340 C

The Sophist in Plato is apt to develop his argument into a speech—he 'goes running on in a long harangue, like brazen pots

Republic I. 340 C which, when they are struck, continue to sound unless some one puts his hand upon them' (Protag. 329 A). So Protagoras, in the dialogue which bears his name, objects to the short 'cut and thrust' method of Socrates, and prefers a stately display: and in the Gorgias, Socrates himself, when he can get no more answers out of his adversaries, is obliged to make 'one man do the work of two,' and embody a series of questions and answers in a single long speech.

D **συκοφάντης . . . ἐξαμαρτάνει**] 'You are a sharper, Socrates, in argument.'

For the argumentative use of **αὐτίκα** cp. Protag. 359 E *αὐτίκα εἰς τὸν πόλεμον οἱ μὲν ἐθέλουσιν ἰέναι, οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν.* The most general meaning of the word is 'immediately'—'to begin with'; when used as it is here, it may be conveniently translated 'for example.'

λογιστικόν] *λογιστικός* is used in Plato in both senses, (1) of calculating and (2) of reasoning. The latter sense, however, is chiefly confined to the neuter. For the first sense cp. vii. 526 B *οἵ τε φύσει λογιστικοὶ εἰς πάντα τὰ μαθήματα . . . ὀξεῖς φύονται*: for the second, iv. 439 D *τὸ μὲν . . . λογιστικὸν προσαγορεύοντες.* Cp. the converse transition of meaning in the use of the word *μαθήματα.*

λέγομεν τῷ ῥήματι] 'The expression which we use is.' Plato is fond of contrasting the expression with the thought: cp. Theaet. 166 D *τὸν δὲ λόγον αὖ μὴ τῷ ῥήματί μου δίωκε*: Gorg. 450 D *οὐχ ὅτι τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως εἶπες*: *ῥῆμα*, in the sense of 'expression,' is opposed to *ὄνομα*, 'a single word.' Cp. Cratyl. 399 A, B, where *Διῒ φίλος*, which is a *ῥῆμα*, when contracted into *Δίφιλος* becomes an *ὄνομα.*

τὸ δ', οἶμαι] 'Whereas in fact, as I conceive.' Cp. Laws i. 630 D *τὸ δὲ πῶς χρῆν ἡμᾶς λέγειν*; 'but how in fact ought we to say?' *τὸ δέ* is often thus used in Plato, and may be explained either as an accusative, 'as to this,' or as a nominative, 'the fact is.'

E **τοιοῦτον . . . ἀποκρίνεσθαι**] 'Understand, then, that my answer to you just now was of this nature.'

341 A **εἶεν**] Like 'So' in German, and 'Well!' or 'Good!' in English, implies assent with every degree of expression, grave or ironical—in this passage making rather light of the attack of Thrasymachus: 'Very well, Thrasymachus; you think me unfair?' Elsewhere *εἶεν* simply expresses agreement with a former proposition for the sake of getting on to a new one: cp. infra 349 D, Protag. 312 E *εἶεν· ὁ δὲ δὴ σοφιστὴς περὶ τίνος δεινὸν ποιεῖ λέγειν;*

οὐδέ γ' ἂν ἐπιχειρήσαιμι] Sc. *βιάσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ.* The boisterousness of Thrasymachus is contrasted with the provoking quietness of Socrates. Cp. infra 345 B *ἢ εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν φέρων ἐνθῶ τὸν λόγον;* where the rejoinder is *μὰ Δία, . . . μὴ σύ γε.* 341 B

τοιοῦτον] 'Any similar misunderstanding.'

ὃν νῦν] **ὃ** *νῦν*—(*ὃ* written over an erasure) is the reading of Par. A. Cp. *ὃν ἄρτι ἔλεγες* infra C: either *ὃ* or *ὃν* is quite admissible, but the masculine is more lively.

οὐδὲν ὢν καὶ ταῦτα] (1) 'Though here again you are nobody,' C
i. e. 'with as little effect as ever.' Thrasymachus has been prophesying that Socrates will try to cheat, but without success: Socrates replies that he is not such a madman as to try and cheat Thrasymachus. The latter rejoins that he has made the attempt, though in this case, as on former occasions, unsuccessfully; or (2) [B. J.] 'Although you made a fool of yourself at this too,' i. e. at cheating Thrasymachus, as you would also have done at shaving a lion if you had attempted it. For *οὐδὲν ὢν* cp. viii. 556 D *ἄνδρες ἡμέτεροί εἰσιν οὐδέν* (according to one reading), and for the idiomatic *καὶ ταῦτα,* Charm. 154 E *πάνυ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός ἐστι* **καὶ ταῦτα.**

Thrasymachus now argues that justice is the interest of the ruler regarded in his capacity of ruler, and therefore as unerring. Socrates accepts the position, and retorts that the ruler in his capacity of ruler has no concern with his own interests. To prove this, an appeal is made to the favourite analogy of the arts. The physician in his capacity of physician is not a taker of money, but a healer of the sick: the pilot is not to be thought of as a sailor, but as having a function of his own. And every man who has an art and function has in one sense an interest; but that interest is only the perfection of his art, and the art when perfect has no further need or interest.

οὐδὲν . . . ὑπολογιστέον] 'This must not be taken into the D
account:' i. e. as interfering with our conception of him. Cp. Laws iii. 702 C *μηδὲν ὑπολογιζομένους τὸ ξενικὸν αὐτῶν.*

ἆρ' οὖν . . . τελέαν εἶναι] There is a slight play upon the word *ξυμφέρον,* which is here used not of the artist but of the art. 'But has any of the arts an interest other than its own perfection?' In other words they are complete in themselves and self-contained. There is no reason to stumble at the words, or with MSS. *q β'* and some modern editors to alter the text by the insertion after *ἄλλο* of

Republic I. 341 D οὐ προσδεῖται, ἢ ἐξαρκεῖ ἑκάστη αὐτὴ αὑτῇ ὥστε (deleting ἤ). This is an interpolation rather than an emendation—a clumsy attempt to improve on the original text.

E **ὥσπερ, ἔφην ἐγώ]** Thrasymachus does not understand the meaning of this self-sufficiency of art. Socrates therefore adds an illustration. 'The body is not self-sufficing, because it requires the assistance of medicine: but the art of medicine (or any other art) is self-sufficing, because needing nothing external.'

νῦν] adds a slight emphasis which is sufficiently expressed in English by 'has been': but the word seems otiose, and may perhaps be a corruption of ἡμῖν.

ἐπὶ τούτῳ] 'For this purpose,' referring to the whole clause, viz. ἐπὶ τούτῳ ὅπως τούτῳ (sc. τῷ σώματι) ἐκπορίζῃ τὰ ξυμφέροντα. Cp. supra D ἐπὶ τούτῳ πέφυκεν, κ.τ.λ.

342 A **ἔσθ' ὅ τι προσδεῖταί τινος ἀρετῆς]** 'Does art at all require any excellence?' Socrates maintains a purely ideal conception of art or knowledge, because Thrasymachus had insisted on a purely ideal conception of the ruler. Thrasymachus might indeed have replied that this ideal of art is a mere fiction, or that the arts and sciences are dependent on one another. But such an answer, though familiar to modern thought, would have been strange to early Greek philosophy, perhaps even to Socrates, who has a clearer idea of art in the abstract than of the circumstances by which the arts are conditioned, or of their relation to one another.

σκεψομένης τε καὶ ἐκποριζούσης] Here as elsewhere the present and future are combined. Cp. x. 604 A μαχεῖσθαί τε καὶ ἀντιτείνειν.

δεῖ ἑκάστῃ τέχνῃ] Whether the reading of Par. A, δεῖ ἀεί, is the result of dittographia, or the omission of ἀεί in the other MSS. is due to the resemblance of ΔΕΙ–ΑΕΙ, is uncertain.

καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἀπέραντον] The argument from infinity is a *reductio ad absurdum* characteristic of Greek speculation. How could art and knowledge, like the good, be other than finite? Unless they were a law to themselves, what limit was there to them? So Plato argues in the dialogue which bears the name of Parmenides (132 E ff, 133 A), that behind an idea and the particulars corresponding to it there may arise another idea and again another idea of that idea and its particulars, and so on to infinity. Aristotle, in his criticism of Plato's Ideas (Met. i. 9. 3), repeats the same objection in a particular form, which he calls the argument of the

τρίτος ἄνθρωπος: i. e. behind the idea of humanity and individual men there arises another idea inclusive of both, and so on to infinity. *Republic I.*

τὸ ξυμφέρον σκοπεῖν] is a further explanation of *ἐπὶ τὴν αὑτῆς πονηρίαν*, 'for its own defect, to consider what is expedient.' 342 B

αὐτὴ δὲ ἀβλαβὴς . . . ὀρθὴ οὖσα, κ.τ.λ.] 'And it is itself whole and unimpaired while it remains true—that is, so long as each art in its entirety is exactly what it is.' The latter words are an expansion or explanation of *ὀρθὴ οὖσα*.

οὕτως, ἔφη, φαίνεται] Cp. infra C *φαίνεται, ἔφη, οὕτως. φαίνεται* is expressive of a careless indifference, 'so it seems'—which develops into reluctance (infra *συνεχώρησεν . . . μάλα μόγις*), as Thrasymachus becomes more alive to the impending consequences.

ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . τέχναι] 'But the arts have rule in their several spheres.' The missing link is now supplied, and Thrasymachus begins to be aware that he is caught in the toils of his adversary. For if the arts have no interest of their own, and yet are rulers or superiors, then in this case the ruler or superior does not seek his own interest. This idea that the only ruler is the scientific ruler, that government is an art, frequently recurs in Plato, and is the foundation of the famous notion of the 'philosopher-King.' Cp. viii. 552 B; Theaet. 170 A, B; Polit. 303 B. C

τῷ ἀρχομένῳ] like *ἐκείνῳ οὗ τέχνη ἐστίν* above, is neuter, including both things and persons: there is therefore no occasion to change the reading from *ἐκεῖνο* to *ἐκεῖνον* against the authority of the best MSS. Cp. infra 345 D *ἐφ' ᾧ τέτακται . . . ἐκείνῳ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ τε καὶ θεραπευομένῳ*: 346 D *ἐκεῖνο ἐφ' ᾧ τέτακται*. E

ᾧ ἂν αὐτὸς δημιουργῇ] 'And that (i. e. the person or thing) for which he himself executes the work.' For the dative after *δημιουργεῖν* cp. Laws viii. 846 E.

The impatience of Thrasymachus bursts forth again: 'As if the shepherd cared for the sheep and not for his own wages or profit! Justice is in reality another's good, that is to say the advantage of the ruler. The just man everywhere reaps harm and loss. But the unjust man who has power,—he is the happy man; above all when his power is supreme. For injustice, if practised on a sufficient scale, is stronger than justice, and much more worthy of a free and aspiring nature. *343 A–344 C*

ἐπειδὴ οὖν, κ.τ.λ.] Thrasymachus, foreseeing the inevitable 343 A

Republic I. 343 A conclusion, makes a bold diversion. He is indignant at the paradox of Socrates, that the ruler seeks only the interest of his subjects, and places the opposite point of view in the strongest light. 'Even a child might know that the idealism of Socrates is the very reverse of the truth.' This he expresses in a coarse Aristophanic manner. Cp. the part taken by Callicles in the Gorgias; see especially 449 B, 511 A, 521 C, where several retorts courteous are given. For τί and ὅτι cp. Hipp. Maj. 290 C καὶ ἐγώ· τί μάλιστα; φήσω. ὅτι, ἐρεῖ, τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς οὐ χρυσοῦς ἐποίησεν. τοι adds a slight emphasis: 'because, to say the truth.' Cp. supra 330 B οὔ τοι ἕνεκα ἠρόμην.

αὐτῇ] 'as far as she is concerned.' Cp. Lys. 208 D ἐκείνη σε ἐᾷ ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἂν βούλῃ, ἵν' αὐτῇ μακάριος ᾖς: Soph. 229 E ὅταν αὐτοῖς ἐξαμαρτάνωσιν.

οὐδὲ πρόβατα οὐδὲ ποιμένα] 'You do not know either sheep or shepherd,' i.e. you do not know which is which. For this disjunctive form of expression cp. x. 605 B οὔτε τὰ μείζω οὔτε τὰ ἐλάττω διαγιγνώσκοντι.

ὅτι δὴ τί μάλιστα;] 'Because of what?' i.e. what is that which makes you say it? a verbal notion = γίγνεται has to be supplied. The second ὅτι is a repetition of the first. Cp. Charm. 161 C ὅτι δὴ τί γε; ἔφη. Ὅτι κ.τ.λ. ὅτι . . . τί is a combination of a causal with an interrogative construction; or ὅτι which would properly introduce a causal sentence is converted into an interrogative by τί. There is no doubt about the meaning: the difficulty is to explain the syntactical relation. In an idiom the syntax may be lost or cannot certainly be traced. Compare ἵνα τί (sc. γένηται): Apol. 26 C ἵνα τί ταῦτα λέγεις;

B **ὅτι οἴει, κ.τ.λ.**] The state of Thrasymachus' temper is worthy of attention. His imagined superiority is not greater than the real interval between himself and Socrates. He may be compared to an angry child struggling in the hands of a giant, who for a moment lets him go. Immediately his spirits begin to rally, and his impudence revives, only to entitle him to a more thorough castigation. The instinct of self-defence leads him to avoid the short interrogatory method of Socrates; he makes an oration, and after having had the pleasure of hearing himself speak, is about to retreat with dignity. But Socrates, with the help of the rest of the company, practises a method of detaining him which is quite as effectual as physical force. He is at first reluctant to be cross-

examined, but afterwards in the skilful hands of the master, he shows real good-humour, and takes some interest in the subject of inquiry. *Republic I.* 343 B

διανοεῖσθαι πρός] Cp. Laws. i. 626 D *αὐτῷ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν πότερον ὡς πολεμίῳ πρὸς πολέμιον διανοητέον*; 628 D *ὡσαύτως . . . πρὸς πόλεως εὐδαιμονίαν . . . διανοούμενος.* Faesi, Badham, and Cobet would read *διακεῖσθαι*, a change not required by the sense and which has no authority.

οὕτω πόρρω εἶ] 'You are so far out of the way.' Cp. Lys. 212 A *οὕτω πόρρω εἰμὶ τοῦ κτήματος*: Theaet. 151 C *πόρρω ὄντες τοῦ εἰδέναι.* C

ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν . . . οἰκεία δὲ . . . βλάβη] Cp. Ar. Eth. N. v. 1, § 17; 6, § 6.

οἱ δ' ἀρχόμενοι] Either 'and the subjects—,' or 'and they, as subjects—.' For the latter cp. ii. 380 B *οἱ δὲ ὠνίναντο κολαζόμενοι*: Protag. 315 B *οὓς ἄγει . . . κηλῶν τῇ φωνῇ . . . οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν ἕπονται κεκηλημένοι.*

ὁ μὲν δίκαιος ἀπὸ τῶν ἴσων] 'the just man contributes a larger sum out of an equal fortune, the unjust a smaller.' D

ἀπέχθεσθαι] appears to be used (as the accent implies) for the present passive. Cp. *ὠφελεῖσθαι* supra. E

λέγω . . . πλεονεκτεῖν] **ὅνπερ**, not *ὅπερ*, which is found in some inferior MSS., is the true reading; the antecedent is inferred from 343 B *τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄρχοντας . . . ἄρχουσιν.*

ἢ τὸ δίκαιον] sc. *εἶναι.* 344 A

τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀδικίαν] cp. Euripides' description of tyranny (Phoen. 549) as *ἀδικίαν εὐδαίμονα*, and the preceding speech of Eteocles concluding with the lines:

εἴπερ γὰρ ἀδικεῖν χρή, τυραννίδος πέρι
κάλλιστον ἀδικεῖν, τἆλλα δ' εὐσεβεῖν χρεών.

ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τυραννίς] Villainy on a large scale is no longer villainy, just as successful treason is no longer treason. The picture of the tyrant, which is faintly given here, is further developed in the next book, and finally worked up in Books viii and ix.

οἱ . . . τῶν τοιούτων κακουργημάτων] 'For robbers of temples, man-stealers, burglars, swindlers, and thieves are the names which B

Republic I. 344 B are given to those who do wrong in the particular branches of this class of crimes.' The genitive depends on **κατὰ μέρη** (which is a resumption of *ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ μέρει*). The class implied is the class which comprises the various forms of robbery, *τοιούτων* referring back to *τἀλλότρια . . . δημόσια*. For this use of *τοιοῦτος* cp. iv. 430 B *τὴν δὴ τοιαύτην δύναμιν καὶ σωτηρίαν*: Crat. 405 B *ἀπολύων τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν*.

ἐπειδὰν δέ τις] The interchange of singular and plural varies the style. So above—*ὅταν τις ἀδικήσας μὴ λάθῃ*. And elsewhere—vi. 498 C *ὅταν δὲ λήγῃ μὲν ἡ ῥώμη, πολιτικῶν δὲ καὶ στρατειῶν ἐκτὸς* **γίγνηται**, *τότε ἤδη* **ἀφέτους** *νέμεσθαι*.

344 D–348 A *Socrates entreats Thrasymachus to stay and answer the momentous question. 'What way of life is best?' He will thereby confer an immense benefit on the whole company. Only let him be consistent and not shift his ground. If the physician is to be regarded as a healer of the sick, not as a receiver of fees, the shepherd is not to be described as a glutton, or a money-maker, but simply as a feeder of sheep. In so far as he is a shepherd, he tends his flock not for his own advantage, but for their good. All art is exercised for the good of its object—else why does the artist ask for pay? Every art has its proper function, beyond which it has no interest or requirement. And the earning of payment is the function of a separate art* (*μισθωτική*) *which is only accidentally associated with the other arts, such as medicine, shepherding, or the government of men. Hence the true rulers will not take office without reward, unless they are threatened with the penalty of being ruled by their inferiors. The last is the only motive by which a good man can be induced to govern.*

344 D **ὥσπερ βαλανεὺς ἡμῶν καταντλήσας . . . τὸν λόγον**] Compare the imitation of the expression by Lucian (Encom. Dem. § 16)—*ἢ πού γε, ἔφην, διανοῇ καταχεῖν μου τῶν ὤτων ὥσπερ βαλανεὺς καταντλήσας τὸν λοιπὸν λόγον*; **ἀθρόον**—'in a mass'—expresses the flood of words which the Sophist pours out upon them.

ἢ σμικρὸν . . . ζῴη] For the form of the sentence compare Laches 185 A *ἢ περὶ σμικροῦ οἴεσθε νυνὶ κινδυνεύειν καὶ σὺ καὶ Λυσίμαχος, ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ τούτου τοῦ κτήματος, ὃ τῶν ὑμετέρων μέγιστον ὂν τυγχάνει*; For the sentiment cp. Gorg. 500 C, where Socrates in like manner pleads with Callicles that he should be serious in speaking of a subject so important as the end of human life.

E **διαγόμενος**] sc. *τὸν βίον*. The middle voice marks the personal

interest which each man has in his own way of life. 'How his life may be passed by each one of us to the greatest advantage.' Republic I. 344 E

ἐγὼ γὰρ . . . ἔχειν] [There is no use in my remaining:] 'for I am of a different opinion about the matter' (i. e. about the nature and profitableness of justice). This is the most satisfactory way of taking the passage.

Some editors place a mark of interrogation after *ἔχειν*. Thrasymachus would then be understood to say, in answer to the question *ἢ σμικρὸν . . . ζῴη*; 'Do I think anything else?' i. e. about the importance of the question. But this is wanting in point. Schneider gives to the sentence a slightly different turn by placing a full stop after *ἔχειν*, and supposes the words to be ironical: 'Just as if I think otherwise!' But the irony is not sufficiently marked.

ἔοικας, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, . . . κήδεσθαι] *ἔοικας* sc. *οἴεσθαι τουτὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν*. 'So you seem; or rather you seem not to care a bit about us.' Socrates affects to understand Thrasymachus to mean that he thinks differently about the importance of the question.

οὔτοι κακῶς σοι κείσεται] 'It will not be a bad investment.' For the use of *κεῖσθαι* in the sense of 'being invested or laid up' so as to yield a return of profit or interest, cp. Soph. O. C. 1518 *ἅ σοι | γήρως ἄλυπα τῇδε κείσεται πόλει*, and above 333 C *ἀλλὰ κεῖσθαι* which is the explanation of *παρακαταθέσθαι καὶ σῶν εἶναι*, i. e. 'to be left on deposit.'

The Sophist is presented in a ludicrous point of view. He has been clamouring for a fee (337 D), and now the fee is offered to him as a bribe to prevent his running away.

ἐγὼ γὰρ . . . πείθομαι] 'For my part (**τό γ' ἐμόν**) I tell you that 345 A
I am not convinced.'

ἔστω μὲν ἄδικος] 'Let a man be unjust,'—not 'Let her (sc. injustice) be as unjust as she will,' which is poor and tautological.

ὅμως . . . κερδαλεώτερον] 'Still this does not convince me, for one, that injustice is more profitable than justice.' **οὐ πείθει**: sc. this supposed impunity of injustice. The nominative to *πείθει* is gathered from the previous sentence. 'Grant that the unjust man may be unpunished, still this does not convince me,' &c. The slight difficulty of this accounts for the reading of Ficinus (*mihi suades*).

Republic I. 345 B **ἢ εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν . . . μὴ σύ γε**] (Cp. vii. 518 c.) 'Must I take and put the argument bodily into your soul?' 'By Heaven,' I said, 'don't.' The impatience of Thrasymachus is met by Socrates with a cry of horror. 'God forbid!—not that, whatever you do.' The coarseness of the Sophistic method of imparting knowledge is compared to forcing food down another person's throat.

C **ἔτι γὰρ . . . φυλάξαι**] Socrates, as his manner is, resuming,—returning on the old track (*ἀναλαβών, ἴχνος μετελθών*), says to Thrasymachus: You see that 'having at first defined the physician as the true physician (341 c, 342 a) you did not think fit afterwards (343 b) to retain the same accuracy in speaking of the shepherd.' For *φυλάττειν*, 'to keep in mind,' cp. Theaet. 182 c *τοῦτο μόνον φυλάττωμεν.*

ποιμαίνειν] Par. A has *πιαίνειν* here in the text, which agrees with *μέλλοντα ἑστιάσεσθαι πρὸς τὴν εὐωχίαν* infra, and with *παχύνειν* supra 343 b. But the same MS. has *ποιμαίνειν* in the margin by the first or second hand,—which is clearly right and necessary to the sense.

D **τῇ δὲ ποιμενικῇ . . . εἶναι**] Cp. supra 342 b. Plato is speaking ideally. No art ever perfectly fulfils its function.

ἐπεὶ . . . ποιμενικὴ εἶναι] 'Since it has sufficiently provided what concerns itself with a view to its being perfect, so long as it lacks nothing of being the art of shepherding.' The subject of **ἐκπεπόρισται** (Perf. Mid.) is *ἡ ποιμενική*, as is shown by the nominative **βελτίστη**.

E **ἔν τε πολιτικῇ καὶ ἰδιωτικῇ ἀρχῇ**] 'In a public as in a private exercise of power': that is to say:—'And this applies not only to the shepherd and the physician, but also to the statesman.'

σὺ δὲ τοὺς ἄρχοντας . . . ἀλλ' εὖ οἶδα] The words **τοὺς ἀληθῶς ἄρχοντας** recall Thrasymachus' own assumption (343 b) that the term is used in the strictest sense. The fact that the artist will not work without pay, shows that as far as his art is concerned he studies not his own interest but the interest of his subject-matter. This is also the case with the true ruler: he too, for the same reason, will not rule without being rewarded.

οὐκ] sc. *οἴομαι.*

τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχάς] There is a slight inaccuracy in the expression,

which arises out of the somewhat forced analogy supposed to exist between the art of government and the other 'arts' or 'offices.' Cp. 342 c *ἄρχουσί γε αἱ τέχναι*, and infra 346 E. *Republic I.* 345 E

αὐτοῖσιν] The rare Ionic form is here adopted for emphasis and euphony. The other passages where it occurs in the Republic are iii. 388 D, 389 B; viii. 560 E, 564 C.

ἐπεὶ τοσόνδε εἰπέ] In assigning to each art a separate power or function, Socrates is preparing to distinguish the other arts from the art of pay. 346 A

ἀλλά] deprecates the imputation of perversity conveyed in Socrates' last words:—'But I admit that to be the difference.'

οὐκοῦν καὶ μισθωτικὴ μισθόν] 'The art of pay,' as the giving and receiving of money is quaintly termed, is distinct from the other arts: the art of the physician is no more *μισθωτική* because the physician takes fees, than the art of the pilot is the art of medicine, because a sea-voyage may accidentally improve the health of the sailor. 'The art of pay' has a curious sound to modern ears, because there is no such use of language among ourselves. But Plato might have defended the expression by saying that although applicable to all the arts, the art of pay had, like them, an end and a function, viz., that of providing maintenance for the practitioners of all of them. B

ὥσπερ ὑπέθου] 'as you proposed.' Cp. supra 341 B.

ἔστω, ἔφη] Thrasymachus becomes more reserved in his replies, as he begins to see the inevitable consequence. 'Let us suppose so.' Cp. Gorg. 504, 505. C

ἥντινα . . . ὠφελοῦνται] 'Whatever benefit all craftsmen have in common manifestly arises from their additional use (*προσχρώμενοι*) in common of some one and the same thing'—(*τινὶ τῷ αὐτῷ*)—since the arts are peculiar and the benefit common. **προσχρώμενοι**, i.e. using in addition to their peculiar arts. **ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνου**, 'from that' and not from their own art.

οὐ φαίνεται] 'Apparently not.' *οὐ φαίνεται*, like *φαίνεται* (cp. note on 342 c) has various shades of meaning which can only be determined by the context. As with *οὔ φημι, οὐκ ἐῶ*, the negative is attracted to the main verb: *οὐ φαίνεται* = *φαίνεται οὐκ* (*ὠφελεῖσθαι*). D

ἆρ᾽ οὖν . . . οἶμαι ἔγωγε] 'Does the art then confer no benefit,' when the artist works for nothing?' 'I should think it does.' E

Republic I. 346 E The point of Socrates is to show that the good which the art does is separable from the good of the artist. Now the artist is not benefited unless he is paid, but his art confers a benefit all the same.

καὶ ἐπιτάττει] The arts have already been spoken of in several places as exercising command: supra 342 C, E; 345 E.

διὰ δὴ ταῦτα . . . ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ] 'For which reason,' i.e. because the ruler considers the interest not of himself but of his subjects. **ταῦτα** refers to the preceding sentence. The clause which follows, **ὅτι ὁ μέλλων, κ.τ.λ.**, is a resumption and further explanation of it, and is itself again resumed in **ὧν δὴ ἕνεκα**.

347 A **κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἐπιτάττων**] Thrasymachus is again and again reminded, and in every form of speech (cp. *οἱ ἀληθῶς ἄρχοντες*: 346 B *ἐάνπερ βούλῃ ἀκριβῶς διορίζειν*, and D *εἰ δεῖ ἀκριβῶς σκοπεῖσθαι, κ.τ.λ.*), that at his own suggestion (346 E) they are speaking of the ruler *qua* ruler.

μισθὸν δεῖν ὑπάρχειν] *δεῖν*, sc. *ἐλέγομεν*, the construction being continued from the previous sentence; and this is assisted by the interposition of **ὡς ἔοικε.** Cp. Phileb. 20 D *τόδε γε μήν, ὡς οἶμαι, περὶ αὐτοῦ ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι λέγειν*: Soph. 263 D *παντάπασιν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ τοιαύτη σύνθεσις . . . γίγνεσθαι λόγος ψευδής*.

C **ὅθεν κινδυνεύει . . . αἰσχρὸν νενομίσθαι**] 'And this would seem to be the reason why the willingness to hold office, without waiting to be compelled, has been thought discreditable.' 'Nos autem versamur non in republica Platonis, sed in faece Romuli.' Compare the fable of Jotham (Judges ix. 8–15).

ἐὰν μὴ αὐτὸς ἐθέλῃ] referring to the indefinite *τινά* which is the subject of **ἄρχεσθαι.** For *αὐτός* referring to an indefinite word cp. Gorgias 520 C.

D **ἐπεὶ κινδυνεύει . . . τὸ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ**] Compare the derisive words of St. Paul (1 Cor. vi. 4): 'If then ye have judgements of things pertaining to this life, set them to judge who are least esteemed in the church': and of Christ (Matth. xx. 26, 27), in which there is a similar irony arising out of their intense contrast to the spirit of this world: 'Whosoever will be chief among you, let him be your servant.'

πᾶς . . . ὁ γιγνώσκων] 'every man of understanding.'

E **ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ καὶ εἰσαῦθις σκεψόμεθα**] Socrates, as elsewhere, availing himself of the facilities of conversation, breaks off

(Protag. 347 B, 357 B, 361 E, &c.), and defers a topic which is liable to become tedious. Instead of arguing out the question whether justice is the interest of the ruler, he takes up the subsequent statement of Thrasymachus, viz., that the unjust life is better than the just. *Republic I.* 347 E

ποτέρως] This reading, which has the support of the best MSS., is preferred to Ast's conjecture *πότερον*.

πότερον] *πότερον ὡς*, the reading of A Π, admits of explanation, the *ὡς* being used pleonastically, as in *ὡς ἀληθῶς*, *ὡς ἑτέρως* (Phaedr. 276 C, Soph. 221 C). But it may also be due to a variation of reading between *πότερον* and *ποτέρως*.

ἤκουσας, ἦν δ' ἐγώ] Plato thus prepares the way for the part to be taken by Glaucon in Book ii.

ἐξευρεῖν] sc. *ὅπῃ ἂν πείθωμεν*, to be supplied from **πείθωμεν**. 348 A

ἂν μὲν τοίνυν . . . ἐσόμεθα] With **ἀντικατατείναντες**, 'replying to each other in set speeches,' compare Protag. 329 A *δολιχὸν κατατείνουσι τοῦ λόγου*. For **ἀριθμεῖν δεήσει** compare Cratyl. 437 D *τί οὖν τοῦτο, ὦ Κρατύλε, ὥσπερ ψήφους διαριθμησόμεθα τὰ ὀνόματα, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἔσται ἡ ὀρθότης*; where Socrates, in a similar manner, repudiates the arithmetical method of determining the principles of language; also Gorgias 471 E, where Socrates refuses to permit the element of numbers to influence his judgement, and Theaet. 171 A, where the method of 'counting noses' is ironically retorted on Protagoras.

ὅσα . . . λέγομεν] *ὅσα* (sc. *ἀγαθὰ*) *ἑκάτεροι ἐν ἑκατέρῳ* (*ἐν τῷ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἄδικον εἶναι*) *λέγομεν*. B

ἀνομολογούμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους] 'by the method of mutual admissions.'

ὁποτέρως, κ.τ.λ.] gentler and less direct than *ποτέρως*. 'Would you tell me which of the two ways you prefer?' Cp. Euthyd. 271 B *ὁπότερον καὶ ἐρωτᾷς, ὦ Κρίτων*;

οὕτως, ἔφη] 'As you propose,' referring to the words *ἂν δὲ ὥσπερ . . . ῥήτορες ἐσόμεθα*.

'Perfect injustice,' says Thrasymachus, 'is more profitable than perfect justice.' 'Then will Thrasymachus maintain that the unjust are wise and good?' 'Undoubtedly, if only they have supreme power. In that case injustice is not only wise and good, but noble and strong.' And now Thrasymachus has told Socrates his whole mind, and they can argue on a satisfactory basis. *348 B–350 C*

Republic I. 348 B–350 C *Socrates begins by putting Thrasymachus to the question: 'Well:—but will the just man try to gain advantage over the just? or aim at more than what is just?' 'If he did, he would not be the diverting creature that he is.' 'Or would he claim to take advantage of the unjust?' 'He might claim to do so, but he would not be able.' But the unjust claims to take advantage both of his like and of his opposite, the just. Analogy shows this to be inconsistent with goodness and wisdom. No true musician aims at overstraining the lyre,—no artist seeks 'to do better than well.' And so the just man is like the good and wise artist, the unjust man like the bad artist. Now things which are alike have similar qualities, and therefore the just man is wise and good. To all this Thrasymachus is reluctantly forced to assent.*

348 B **ἐξ ἀρχῆς**] 'Beginning at the beginning,' as in Theaet. 179 E *μᾶλλον σκεπτέον· καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὥσπερ αὐτοὶ ὑποτείνονται.*

C **εἰκός γ', ἔφη . . . ἦ δ' ὅς**] 'That's a charming notion and a likely, seeing that I affirm injustice to be profitable and justice not.' 'Then what do you say?' 'The opposite,' said he. For **ἥδιστε**, as we might say in English, 'you funny man,' which expresses the affected amusement of Thrasymachus at being supposed to entertain such an opinion, see above 337 D *ἡδὺς γὰρ εἶ*: vii. 527 D *ἡδὺς εἶ, . . . ὅτι ἔοικας δεδιότι τοὺς πολλούς*: also Gorgias 491 E *ὡς ἡδὺς εἶ· τοὺς ἠλιθίους λέγεις τοὺς σώφρονας.* **ἀλλὰ τί μήν** in this and similiar places is equivalent to *ἀλλὰ τί μὴν ἄλλο*: as below 349 D *ἀλλὰ τί μέλλει*; for *ἀλλὰ τί μέλλει ἄλλο*; and *ἀλλὰ τί οἴει*; for *ἀλλὰ τί οἴει ἄλλο*; supra 332 C and elsewhere. Cp. also Sympos. 206 E *ἔστι γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ ὁ ἔρως, ὡς σὺ οἴει.* **Ἀλλὰ τί μήν**; *Τῆς γεννήσεως καὶ τοῦ τόκου ἐν τῷ καλῷ.*

ἦ τὴν δικαιοσύνην . . . γενναίαν εὐήθειαν] Thrasymachus is at first unwilling to hazard the assertion that injustice is virtue and justice vice. He says that justice is simplicity, injustice discretion. The statement is at length extracted from him that injustice is to be classed with wisdom and virtue, justice with their opposites. This proposition, which has been craftily drawn out of him, is the step in the argument which leads to his destruction. *ἦ* marks the astonishment of Socrates: 'And you mean to say?' Cp. infra iii. 396 B *ἦ μιμήσονται*;—**πάνυ γενναίαν εὐήθειαν**: 'sublime simplicity.' For the ironical use of *γενναῖος* cp. infra ii. 372 B *μάζας γενναίας*, v. 454 A *ἦ γενναία . . . ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης*: viii. 544 C *ἡ γενναία δὴ τυραννίς*: Soph. 231 B *ἡ γένει γενναία σοφιστική*: and for *εὐήθεια* iii. 400 E *οὐχ ἣν ἄνοιαν οὖσαν ὑποκοριζόμενοι καλοῦμεν ὡς εὐήθειαν.*

κακοήθειαν] a paronomasia: κακοήθεια is not the opposite of εὐήθεια in the sense in which Thrasymachus uses it. But Socrates snatches at the etymological meaning of εὐήθεια to make a point against Thrasymachus. *Republic I.* 348 D

σὺ δὲ . . . λέγειν] to transfer these words to Socrates, as is done on the authority of Par. A in the Zurich edition of 1887, interferes with the flow of the passage. The occurrence of ἦ δ' ὅς after ἔφη, though uncommon, is sufficiently accounted for by supposing a pause after ποιεῖσθαι. Cp. Xen. Oecon. c. xvii. 8 πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη· ἦν δέ γε ᾖ, ἔφη, κ.τ.λ. and infra 351 A νῦν δέ γ', ἔφην. The distinction of persons in Par. A, however, is clear.

λυσιτελεῖ . . . ἔλεγον] 'Even this sort of thing is advantageous, if undetected, but not worth mention: the real profit (ἀλλά sc. ἐστὶν ἄξια λόγου) is in what I was just now speaking of,' that is, in τελέα ἀδικία. νῦν δή refers chiefly to 344 B, C.

ἐθαύμασα] Aorist of the immediate past. E

τοῦτο . . . στερεώτερον] (1) 'This new position is firmer,'—'now you are on more substantial ground': or perhaps (2) 'this is harder to make an impression upon,' i. e. to deal with satisfactorily in argument. Par. A here reads ῥᾶιον for ῥᾴδιον, as ῥάιδιον for ῥᾷον in ii. 370 A.

ἀληθέστατα . . . μαντεύει] 'That guess of yours is wonderfully near the truth.' 349 A

ἀλλὰ τόδε μοι πειρῶ, κ.τ.λ.] A singular argument follows the admission that the unjust desires universal excess. The admission, which is rather unmeaning, seems to have arisen out of the desire of Thrasymachus to attribute to him every possible preeminence. In the argument the grasping nature of the unjust is contrasted with the moderation of the just, whose desires reach no higher than justice, and this, as Thrasymachus says, is the reason why he is such an amusing creature. The aim of the one is affirmed to be excess in all cases, the aim of the other, excess over deficiency, and attainment of the right measure. Immediately Socrates appeals to the analogy of the arts. No true artist desires excess in all cases, and the true artist is wise and good; therefore the just, not the unjust, is wise and good. But the conclusion thus arrived at contradicts the hasty assertion of Thrasymachus, that injustice is to be classed with wisdom and goodness, justice with their opposites. Compare the French proverb, 'Le mieux est l'ennemi du bien,' B

Republic I. 349 B and the words of Pembroke to King John (Shak., *King John*, iv. 2. 28)—

> 'When workmen strive to do better than well,
> They do confound their skill in covetousness.'

Also *Lear* i. 4. 369 'Striving to better, oft we mar what's well': and Sonnet 103. 9, 10:—

> 'Were it not sinful then, striving to mend,
> To mar the subject that before was well?'

Cp. also Gorgias 508 A σὺ δὲ πλεονεξίαν οἴει δεῖν ἀσκεῖν· γεωμετρίας γὰρ ἀμελεῖς: and the Kantian conception of freedom as obedience to law. The two kinds of measure in the Politicus (283), viz. (1) the comparative measure of more and less; and (2) the reference to a standard, belong to the same line of thought. Summed up in a word or two, the argument is that justice, if it be like the arts, aims not at excess, but at law and measure.

οὐδαμῶς . . . εὐήθης] 'Far otherwise, else he would not have been the amusing and simple-minded individual that he is.' **ἀστεῖος**, 'townbred,' as opposed to 'living far off in the fields.' Hence it acquires the meaning of 'witty,' 'clever,' which easily passes into that of 'amusing,' 'charming,' 'the cause of wit in others.' Cp. Lysis 204 ἀστεῖόν γε, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὅτι ἐρυθριᾷς. 'It's charming to see you blush.'

οὐδὲ τῆς δικαίας] sc. πράξεως, which is found in one MS.

εἰ . . . μή] Although εἰ is interrogative, μή and not οὐ is used, because Socrates asks whether this, in the opinion of Thrasymachus, is probable. The use of ἄν in the preceding sentences has given a hypothetical turn to the expression. Cp. Goodwin, *M. and T.* 667, 5.

C **τοῦ δὲ ἀδίκου**] Sc. ἀξιοῖ πλέον ἔχειν. 'But he does claim to have more than the unjust.' The context shows that this only applies where the unjust errs on the side of deficiency. For the use of δέ, when a negative has preceded in the first clause, compare i. 354 A ἄθλιόν γε εἶναι οὐ λυσιτελεῖ, εὐδαίμονα δέ: iv. 422 D ὑμῖν δέ: and for the use of πλεονεκτεῖν in this passage cp. Laws iii. 691 A πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν τεθέντων νόμων.

τί δὲ δὴ . . . πράξεως] 'What of the unjust? Does not he claim as his due more than the just man, more than the just action?'

ὧδε δὴ . . . τοῦ ἀνομοίου] 'Let us put the matter thus: the just does not desire more that his like, but more than his unlike;

but the unjust desires more than both his like and unlike.' With *Republic I.*
this statement Thrasymachus is remarkably well satisfied. Cp. 349
Philebus 27 E, where Philebus is similarly entrapped: *ἡδονὴ καὶ* C
λύπη . . . τῶν τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον δεχομένων ἐστόν; ΦΙ. Ναί, τῶν τὸ μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἡδονὴ πᾶν ἀγαθὸν ἦν, εἰ μὴ ἄπειρον ἐτύγχανε πεφυκὸς καὶ πλήθει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον.

ἄριστα, ἔφη, εἴρηκας . . . καὶ τοῦτ', ἔφη, εὖ] Thrasymachus D
accepts with ludicrous eagerness and want of foresight the restatement of his own opinion.

ὁ δὲ μὴ μὴ ἐοικέναι] Par. A (reading *ὁ δέ, μὴ ἐοικέναι*) omits the first *μή*, which, though not necessary, makes the meaning more distinct.

τοιοῦτος ἄρα . . . ἔοικεν] sc. *τοιοῦτος, οἷοί εἰσιν ἐκεῖνοι οἷσπερ ἔοικεν.*

ἀλλὰ τί μέλλει;] sc. *ἄλλο.*

οὐχ οὕτως] sc. *λέγεις;* E

ἁρμοττόμενος λύραν] 'In tuning his lyre.'

ἐν τῇ ἐδωδῇ ἢ πόσει] i.e. 'in the diet which he prescribes.' 350

ἀλλ' ἴσως . . . οὕτως ἔχειν] Thrasymachus makes a grudging A
admission: 'I suppose that this must be as you say.'

ἔγωγε, ἔφη] Thrasymachus still holds this fast. B

ἀναπέφανται] 'has turned out to be.' The word expresses the C
new light in which the subject is suddenly revealed to Thrasymachus and the company. Cp. i. 334 A *κλέπτης ἄρα τις ὁ δίκαιος . . . ἀναπέφανται.* The skilful management of refractory opponents in the hand of Socrates is one of the comic elements of the Platonic dialogue. Other striking examples are the treatment of Polus and Callicles in the Gorgias, of Anytus in the Meno, of Euthydemus and Euthyphro in the dialogues which are named after them. Perhaps the highest exhibition of this dramatic power is to be found in the Protagoras, in which Socrates adapts himself to numerous adversaries with the happiest versatility.

ὁ δὴ Θρασύμαχος] The reading *δή*, which is found in Ven. Π, but not in Par. A, is more emphatic and expressive than *δέ*, which however has the authority of A M r. *δή* marks the transition from a dramatic to a descriptive passage and may be translated: 'Now Thrasymachus assented to all this,' *δέ*, according to the English idiom, is better omitted, and the words may be translated simply: 'Thrasymachus assented,' &c. The latter reading has been retained by Hermann and Baiter.

Republic I. 350 D **τότε καί**] is probably a mock heroic form of expression (like the imitation of Homer in Protag. 315 D **καὶ μὲν** *δὴ καὶ* **Τάνταλόν** *γε* **εἰσεῖδον**): cp. esp. Il. v. 394 **τότε καί** *μιν ἀνήκεστον λάβεν ἄλγος. καί* adds emphasis to *τότε εἶδον*: 'Ay, and then I saw.' The unusual order has led to the erroneous punctuation of Par. A, which places the point after *τότε*.

Θρασύμαχον ἐρυθριῶντα] Compare Protag. 312 A, where the youthful Hippocrates is seen by the light of the opening dawn to have a blush upon his face, as he professes his intention of becoming a disciple of the Sophist.

350 D–352 B *The comparative strength of justice and injustice is tested by an independent argument. Suppose a city to have triumphed in complete injustice, and to have subjugated many other cities. Can this triumph be secured without the help of justice? Can a city or an army or a band of robbers do any unjust thing in common, if they do not keep faith with one another? And what is true of large bodies of men is true also of two or three. If they are absolutely unjust, they will quarrel and fight and hate each other and be paralysed in action. And it is true also of the individual. If he is completely penetrated by injustice, he will be divided against himself and cannot stand. And he is the enemy of just men, and also of the Gods whose justice even Thrasymachus will not venture to deny. Complete injustice, therefore, is complete powerlessness.*

350 D **ἔφαμεν**] Cp. supra 344 C. Socrates, with an apparent graciousness, but really with the object of drawing Thrasymachus into a fresh contradiction, reasserts a proposition formerly maintained by Thrasymachus (supra 344 C). Thrasymachus, who has learnt from experience to be cautious of Socrates, is in reply surly and reserved. For the plural, including the speaker as well as the respondent, cp. Theaet. 210 B *ἦ οὖν ἔτι* **κυοῦμεν** . . . *ὦ* **φίλε**;

οὐδὲ ἃ νῦν λέγεις ἀρέσκει . . . δημηγορεῖν ἄν με φαίης] 'I am not contented with your last conclusion any more than with the former ones, and I could answer you: but if I did, I well know that you would say I was haranguing.'

E **μηδαμῶς . . . παρά γε τὴν σαυτοῦ δόξαν**] Cp. Gorgias 500 B *καὶ πρὸς φιλίου, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, μήτε αὐτὸς οἴου δεῖν πρὸς ἐμὲ παίζειν, μηδ' ὅ τι ἂν τύχῃς παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀποκρίνου.*

τοῦτο . . . ὅπερ ἄρτι] Cp. supra D *ἔφαμεν . . . μέμνησαι*;

ἵνα καὶ ἑξῆς . . . ἀδικίαν] Cp. Politicus 281 D ποιητέον ὃ λέγομεν, ἵν' ἐφεξῆς ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ἴῃ. *Republic I.* 350 E

νῦν δέ γ', ἔφην] Par. A reads ἔφη. But ἔφην is obviously the right reading; ν has been dropped from the compendium ἔφη^. 351 A

ἀλλ' οὔ τι οὕτως ἁπλῶς . . . σκέψασθαι] 'I do not wish to consider the argument in this simple and abstract manner' (i. e. that injustice is folly and therefore weakness), but to show, by the example of states and individuals, how it actually works.

πόλιν φαίης ἂν . . . δουλωσαμένην] 'You would not deny that a state may be unjust and may be unjustly attempting to enslave, or may have utterly enslaved other states, while already holding many in subjection under her.' Three stages are supposed:—(1) states attacked with a view to subjection; (2) states utterly subdued in recent struggles (καταδεδουλῶσθαι); (3) states held in subjection (πολλὰς . . . ἔχειν δουλωσαμένην). As elsewhere, the complexity of the thing imagined makes the language harsh. B

εἰ μὲν . . . ἀδικίας] 'If the case is as you were saying, and justice is wisdom, then, with justice; but if as I was saying, with injustice.' The MS. authority is strongly in favour of ἔχει, the other reading, ἐστί, being an obvious correction which is meant to remedy the anacoluthon. The repetition of εἰ before ἡ δικαιοσύνη (a conjecture of Baiter's) is unnecessary, and also objectionable on the ground of the hiatus. The irregular construction may be defended by other passages of Plato, in which one of two clauses is an explanation of the other. Cp. Theaet. 203 E Ἐχέτω δή, ὡς νῦν φαμέν, μία ἰδέα . . . ἐξ ἑκάστων τῶν συναρμοττόντων στοιχείων γιγνομένη ἡ συλλαβή, where the reading has been questioned equally without reason. C

μετὰ δικαιοσύνης] sc. τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην ἀνάγκη ἔχειν.

πάνυ ἄγαμαι] Cp. a similar mode of practising on Meletus in the Apology 27 C ὡς ὤνησας, ὅτι μόγις ἀπεκρίνω ὑπὸ τουτωνὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος. See also Gorgias 449 C, D.

οὐκ ἐπινεύεις . . . ἀνανεύεις] Cp. supra 350 E.

σοὶ γάρ, ἔφη, χαρίζομαι] Thrasymachus wishes to intimate that the defeat which he sustains is to be attributed to his own good nature. The imperative moods which follow, ἔστω, ἐχέτω, ἔστωσαν, imply that he is ready to admit anything which Socrates likes: 'let

Republic I. us say so,' 'agreed,' 'if you will,' 'we won't quarrel about that.' And he is encouraged in his self-conceit by Socrates' words—Εὖ γε
351 C σὺ ποιῶν, ὦ ἄριστε, &c., of which he fails to see the irony. Callicles in the Gorgias (516 B) in the same temper says—Πάνυ γε, ἵνα σοι χαρίσωμαι. This is an ingenious device by which Plato is enabled to carry on the argument to the end, without requiring his adversary to undergo a process of sudden conversion.

D **ἦ γάρ ;**] This formula used interrogatively expects an affirmative answer. 'Surely that is so?'

ἐν ἐλευθέροις τε καὶ δούλοις] 'alike in freemen and in slaves.'

E **ἐὰν δὲ δή**] For the conflict with self cp. Laws i. 626 D αὐτῷ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν πότερον ὡς πολεμίῳ πρὸς πολέμιον διανοητέον, ἢ πῶς ἔτι λέγομεν; also viii. 560; Soph. 223 B.

ὦ θαυμάσιε] marks the intense interest of Socrates as the conclusion he has been preparing rises in full proportions before his mind (ἀναπέφανται supra 350 C).

μῶν μή] like other interrogative particles, used with some uncertainty of meaning, which has to be defined by the context; for instance, in this passage, it seems to require a negative answer, but in Phaedo 84 C it merely suggests a doubt (τὰ λεχθέντα μῶν μὴ δοκεῖ ἐνδεῶς λελέχθαι; πολλὰς γὰρ δὴ ἔτι ἔχει ὑποψίας). It is a pleonastic expression which intensifies the interrogation. Either μῶν or μή might be omitted without any perceptible difference, except a slight weakening of the sense. μῶν, having lost its etymological sense of μὴ οὖν, allows the μή to be repeated.

αὐτό] sc. πόλις, γένος or στρατόπεδον.

352 A **καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ παντὶ καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ**] 'with all that opposes, and therefore (inclusively) with the just.'

B **καὶ θεοῖς ἄρα**] θεοῖς ἐχθρός was a common form of abuse (and therefore a term to be deprecated beyond others). See Soph. Phil. 1031 πῶς, ὦ θεοῖς ἔχθιστε, κ.τ.λ.: Demosth. de Cor. p. 241 Bekk., § 46 νῦν κόλακες καὶ **θεοῖς ἐχθροὶ** καὶ τἄλλ' ἃ προσήκει πάντ' ἀκούουσιν.

Compare with this whole passage the description of the tyrannical man in Book ix. (577 ff).

εὐωχοῦ τοῦ λόγου . . . ἀπέχθωμαι] Socrates takes up the word εὐωχοῦ with ἑστίασις, which is again echoed by Thrasymachus at the end of the book, 354 A ταῦτα δή σοι . . . εἱστιάσθω ἐν τοῖς Βενδιδείοις.

Thrasymachus is seeking to cover his defeat by casting upon his

adversaries the reproach of intolerance. 'I shall make enemies here if I oppose you.' Compare the discomfiture of Gorgias and Polus through their fear of incurring odium: Gorgias 487 A, B τὼ δὲ ξένω τώδε, Γοργίας τε καὶ Πῶλος, σοφὼ μὲν καὶ φίλω ἐστὸν ἐμώ, ἐνδεεστέρω δὲ παρρησίας καὶ αἰσχυντηροτέρω μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος. *Republic I.* 352 B

Once more, are just men happier than the unjust, as well as wiser, better and stronger? *352 B–354 A*

Every creature has a work or function. And everything does its own work best, when it has its proper excellence. For example, the eye sees best when it is possessed of perfect vision, which is the opposite of blindness. Now life is the function of the soul, and justice (as we have seen) is the virtue or excellence of the soul. Therefore the soul lives best when it has justice. And to live well is to be happy.

Justice, then, is more profitable than injustice, if to be happy is profitable.

ὅτι μὲν γὰρ . . . τὸ πρῶτον ἐτίθεσο] After a somewhat long digression (οὐ γὰρ ἂν . . . πράττειν ἀδύνατοι) the sentence is resumed in the words—ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει μανθάνω. The first part, as far as λέγομεν, is governed by ὅτι, and τοῦτο οὐ παντάπασιν ἀληθὲς λέγομεν proceeds as if οὓς φαμεν had been ὅταν φῶμέν τινας. ἀλλ' οὐχ . . . ἐτίθεσο which is opposed to οὕτως ἔχει, repeats and emphasizes the antithesis. There is also a slight inexactness either of expression or of citation here, which is worth noticing as a point of style. The phrases ὡς σὺ τὸ πρῶτον ἐτίθεσο and ὅπερ τὸ ὕστερον προὐθέμεθα σκέψασθαι do not strictly agree. τὸ πρῶτον refers vaguely to the past discussion and suggests Socrates' subsequent criticism of the theory: 'which you maintained at first, but which I have since shown to be false.' The theory in question is that injustice is stronger than justice; and this, like the assertion next discussed —that injustice is happier than justice, is one aspect of Thrasymachus' *second* contention—that injustice is generally superior to justice. τὸ ὕστερον therefore contains a more exact reference than τὸ πρῶτον, alluding, not indefinitely to the past discussion, but to a definite point in it—the 'second contention,' as opposed to the first, that justice is the interest of the stronger (see above, 347 D, E). There is a slight inaccuracy in substituting a particular form of superiority—superior happiness—for superiority in general; and the introduction of τὸ ὕστερον obscures the fact that the second 352 B

Republic I. contention of Thrasymachus involves superior strength quite as much as superior happiness.

352 B **οἱ δὲ ἄδικοι οὐδὲ[ν] πράττειν]** The various reading *οὐδέ* (M), though inferior in manuscript authority, is not to be disregarded.

E **ἀκούσαις]** *ἄν* is to be continued from *ἴδοις*. The omission of *ἄν* in the following sentence, *μαχαίρᾳ . . . . ἀποτέμοις*, where however it is inserted in some MSS. of inferior note, may be defended on similar grounds.

ἂν . . . φαῖμεν] Schneider defended the manuscript reading *ἂν φαμέν* by comparing Laws iv. 712 E *ἐγὼ δὲ οὕτω νῦν ἐξαίφνης ἂν ἐρωτηθεὶς ὄντως, ὅπερ εἶπον, οὐκ ἔχω διορισάμενος εἰπεῖν τίς τούτων ἐστὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν*, and infra x. 610 A *ὀρθότατα ἄν, ἔφη, λέγεις* (so MSS.). But the latter passage is easily corrected,—see note in loco,—and in the former *ἔχω εἰπεῖν = ἂν εἴποιμι*. There is no sufficient ground for refusing to admit so slight an alteration as the addition of an iota here any more than in vi. 494 B *ἐν *παισὶν . . . ἐν ἅπασιν*, where Schneider vainly defends the manuscript reading *ἐν πᾶσιν*.

353 A **μαχαίρᾳ [ἂν] ἀμπέλου]** *ἄν* is omitted in Par. A, but may have dropped out between *αι* and *αμ*.

B **τί δέ; ὤτων ἦν τι ἔργον;]** 'Did we speak of any function of ears?' The imperfect refers to what has preceded, 352 E *τί δέ; ἀκούσαις ἄλλῳ ἢ ὠσίν; οὐδαμῶς*, as in Cratylus 410 C *τί οὖν ἡμῖν ἦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο*, referring to 408 D, and Soph. 263 C *ὅτι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἦν λόγον ὄντα μηδενὸς εἶναι λόγον*. *ἦν* = 'was admitted by us.'

οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετή;] Cp. Gorg. 468 B, 499 E, where the notion of an *end* appears in a still more rudimentary form. The conception of an *ἔργον* and an *ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον* is derived from the analogy of art, the province of which has not yet been thoroughly distinguished from the sphere of nature and of morals. The conception exercised a great influence on Logic and Ethics in the ancient world, leading to the *ἀγαθόν* of Aristotle, the opposition of means and ends, and the division of moral and intellectual virtue. Modern philosophy has moulded Ethics into another form. The favourite notion of a *τἀγαθόν* or 'summum bonum,' of which the conception of an *ἔργον* is the germ, has been replaced by modes of speech such as duty, law, the will of a superior being, or resolved into the more concrete abstractions of utility and pleasure.

ἔχε δή] 'Well then,' is used with various degrees of force for 'hold,' 'stay,' passing also into a mere invitation to attend or con-

sider. Cp. Laws i. 639 D ἔχε δή· τῶν πολλῶν κοινωνιῶν ξυμπότας καὶ ξυμπόσια θεῖμεν ἂν μίαν τινὰ ξυνουσίαν εἶναι; Republic I. 353 B

ἆρ' ἂν . . . καλῶς ἀπεργάσαιντο] Heindorf conj. ἀπεργάσαιτο, perhaps with reason. The use of the plural verb with the neuter plural nominative has been explained as a remnant of Epic usage, as a personification, or as due to the substitution in thought of a masculine plural substantive for a neuter plural having the same meaning, or to some other natural association. Cp. Thucyd. iv. 88 τὰ τέλη (the magistrates) . . . αὐτὸν ἐξέπεμψαν.

The construction in any of these cases follows the sense rather than the grammatical form. A doubt however is thrown on the passage by various readings, ἀπεργάσονται, ἀπεργάζωνται, ἀπεργάσασθαι, and by the use of ὦτα with the singular ἀπεργάσεται in the next sentence. The reading of the MSS. has however been retained in the text; because Greek usage is not absolutely uniform in requiring the neuter plural to be joined to a verb singular.

ἥτις . . . ἐρωτῶ] 'Say rather, whatever their virtue is, for I have not come to that question yet.' He means that he would rather affirm a general proposition (**εἰ τῇ οἰκείᾳ μὲν ἀρετῇ . . . εὖ ἐργάσεται τὰ ἐργαζόμενα**), and not anticipate the particular. Every step is to follow regularly in the dialectical process. C

τίθεμεν . . . λόγον;] 'Do we include all other things under the same statement?' D

τὸ . . . ἄρχειν, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Phaedo 94 B. The pronoun **αὐτά** resumes **τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι . . . πάντα**.

ἐκείνης] The gender follows **ψυχῇ**, and not **ὅτῳ ἄλλῳ**.

εὐδαίμονα δέ] Cp. supra 349 C, D τοῦ δὲ ἀδίκου, and note. 354 A

Thrasymachus is silenced, but Socrates is not satisfied. For he feels that he has passed on too quickly to consider certain attributes of justice, before he has defined what justice is. *354 A–354 C*

ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ λίχνοι, κ.τ.λ.] This is imitated by Polybius, B. P. iii. 57, 7 εἰ δέ τινες πάντως ἐπιζητοῦσι κατὰ τόπον καὶ κατὰ μέρος τῶν τοιούτων ἀκούειν, ἴσως ἀγνοοῦσι παραπλήσιόν τι πάσχοντες τοῖς λίχνοις τῶν δειπνητῶν. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι, πάντων ἀπογευόμενοι τῶν παρακειμένων, οὔτε κατὰ τὸ παρὸν οὐδενὸς ἀληθινῶς ἀπολαύουσι τῶν βρωμάτων, οὔτ' εἰς τὸ μέλλον ὠφέλιμον ἐξ αὐτῶν τὴν ἀνάδοσιν καὶ τροφὴν κομίζονται. The passage is a good example of the manner in which later writers amplified the ideas of Plato. See also Julian, Orat. ii. p. 69 C and Themist., Orat. xviii. p. 220 B. B

Republic I. 354 B A similar image occurs in the Sophist 251 B *ὅθεν γε, οἶμαι, τοῖς τε νέοις καὶ τῶν γερόντων τοῖς ὀψιμαθέσι θοίνην παρεσκευάκαμεν*: and in the Lysis 211 C, D *τί ὑμεῖς, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος, αὐτὼ μόνω ἑστιᾶσθον, ἡμῖν δὲ οὐ μεταδίδοτον τῶν λόγων*; Compare also the opening words of the Timaeus.

πρὶν δ τὸ πρῶτον, κ.τ.λ.] Plato is loose in recapitulating here. The question—'What is justice?' was immediately followed by the question which Thrasymachus raised, whether justice or injustice was the more expedient, and the question whether justice is wisdom or folly was subordinate to this. But in glancing backwards from the conclusion that the just man has the better life, Socrates recalls the argument about the wise and good (349), as if it had arisen independently. The order (1, 2, 3) is not that in which the questions were raised by Thrasymachus, but that in which they were discussed. Such slight inconsistencies are very natural to the freedom of discourse. See above, 352 B.

C **ὥστε μοι . . . εὐδαίμων**] Socrates ends the discussion with the truly Socratic thought, that the result of a long inquiry is ignorance. The First Book of the Republic, and the first half of the Second Book, though here and there (335 A–E, 352 A) containing true and deep thoughts, are in general destructive only. The controversy with the Sophists which has been carried on in the Protagoras, Meno, Gorgias, and other dialogues, is now concluded, or takes another direction (cp. Sophist and Politicus). In the Republic, as elsewhere in Plato, they are the representatives of the popular morality in a better or worse form; their theory accords with the practice of the world, which is the great Sophist (vi. 492 A): this is contrasted by Socrates with the deeper truths and higher aspirations of philosophy. The thought that he who is ignorant of the nature of anything cannot know its qualities or attributes is very characteristic of Plato, and is the germ of a distinction which has exercised a lasting influence on philosophy. Compare Laches 190 A, B *εἰ γὰρ μηδ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἰδείημεν ὅ τί ποτ' ἔστιν ὄψις ἢ ὅ τι ἔστιν ἀκοή, σχολῇ ἂν σύμβουλοί γε ἄξιοι λόγου γενοίμεθα καὶ ἰατροὶ ἢ περὶ ὀφθαλμῶν ἢ περὶ ὤτων, ὅντινα τρόπον ἀκοὴν ἢ ὄψιν κάλλιστ' ἂν κτήσαιτό τις*: Protag. 361 C: Meno 71 B *συμπένομαι τοῖς πολίταις τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, καὶ ἐμαυτὸν καταμέμφομαι ὡς οὐκ εἰδὼς περὶ ἀρετῆς τὸ παράπαν· ὃ δὲ μὴ οἶδα τί ἐστι, πῶς ἂν ὁποῖόν γέ τι εἰδείην*;

BOOK II.

Glaucon is determined to continue the argument. The theory which Thrasymachus has ineffectually maintained is one which passes current in various forms, and although it has no practical influence on ingenuous youths, yet their minds are confused by incessantly hearing it preached on every side. *Republic II. 357 A–358 D*

τὸ δ' ἦν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, προοίμιον] As a parallel of style we may compare Laws iv. 722 D *νόμους δὲ ἄρτι μοι δοκοῦμεν λέγειν ἄρχεσθαι, τὰ δ' ἔμπροσθεν ἦν πάντα ἡμῖν προοίμια νόμων.* *τό* in *τὸ δέ* resumes **ταῦτα εἰπών**: 'What I had said, I thought was the end, but it turned out to be (*ἄρα*) only the beginning.' 357 A

ὁ γὰρ Γλαύκων . . . πρὸς ἅπαντα] Another example of this 'intrepidity of talk' in Glaucon occurs in Xen. Mem. iii. 6, where he is described as dragged from the Bema, and with difficulty persuaded by Socrates that at twenty years of age he does not possess the qualifications of a statesman. In viii. 548 D he is compared to the representative of timocracy for his *φιλονεικία.* Glaucon is also the 'juvenis qui gaudet canibus avibusque' (v. 459 A), who breeds animals and birds; and the man of pleasure who is acquainted with the mysteries of love (v. 474 D). He is an interlocutor in the introduction to the Parmenides and Symposium. For **ἀνδρειότατος** cp. Polit. 263 D, where the young Socrates is called *ὦ πάντων ἀνδρειότατε* after a similar exhibition of boldness: also Theaet. 204 E *ἀνδρικῶς γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, μάχει.*

ἀεί τε before **ἀνδρειότατος** is closely connected with **καὶ δὴ καί**, which, as frequently, introduces an instance illustrating the general statement. The Greek expresses by a co-ordinate clause what in English would be introduced by a relative: 'For Glaucon, *who is always,*' &c.

τὴν ἀπόρρησιν] 'Renunciation of the argument' (cp. supra i. 350 D, E, 354 A). Cp. the use of *ἀπειπεῖν,* Phaedo 85 C: *ἀπαγορεύειν,* infra 368 C, viii. 568 C: Theaet. 200 D: *ἀπερεῖν,* ibid. See also Phileb. 11 C *Φίληβος γὰρ ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς ἀπείρηκεν.*

παντὶ τρόπῳ] 'in every way,' cp. infra 368 C *ὅ τε οὖν Γλαύκων καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐδέοντο παντὶ τρόπῳ βοηθῆσαι*—i. e. 'to do all that he could to assist.' The expression is passing into an adverb, and may be compared with *πάντως, παντάπασι, πανταχῇ, πάσῃ μηχανῇ, πάσῃ τέχνῃ.*

Republic II. 357 B

οὐ τοίνυν . . . (D) ἀπ' αὐτῶν] With the threefold division of goods which is given in the text may be compared the Aristotelian distinction (Eth. Nic. i. 6, 9) of goods which are pursued for their own sake, and goods which are means to other goods; also the statement (Eth. Nic. i. 7, 5) that the highest good (*εὐδαιμονία*) is the end of other goods, and not pursued for the sake of anything else: which implies a slightly different point of view from that of Plato in this passage. Yet afterwards (vi. 508) a higher good which gives reality even to virtue and knowledge and reaches beyond them, is also admitted. In the Philebus (65, 66) Good is measured by three tests—beauty, symmetry and truth,—and arranged in five degrees or stages: (1) measure; (2) symmetry; (3) reason and wisdom; (4) science, art, and true opinion; (5) unmixed pleasures.

οὐ τοίνυν . . . ὃ βούλει] Socrates in his refutation of Thrasymachus has been led to dwell on the superior profitableness of Justice. He seems to acknowledge himself that this is an unsatisfactory way of treating the subject. For (i. 354 C) he cannot know whether the just man is happy until he knows what justice is, any more than in the Meno (100 B) he can tell how virtue is acquired until he knows the nature of virtue. The question which Socrates had left unexamined is raised again by Glaucon, who, proceeding from another point of view, asks 'What is Justice stripped of its externals?'

καὶ μηδὲν . . . γίγνεται] The reading of the text is that of the best MSS. *καὶ μηδέν* has been altered by Stephanus and some of the later editors into *κἂν μηδέν*, and *γίγνεται* into *γίγνηται*, on slight external authority, from an objection to the use of *μηδέν* in an independent clause. But the indefinite force of the relative (**ὅσαι**) is continued, and therefore the use of *μηδέν* is justified: **διὰ ταύτας** is added because the subject is changed and the Greek idiom does not allow of the repetition of the relative (*δι' ὅσας*). **διὰ ταύτας γίγνεται** = *αἳ ποιοῦσιν*. Cp. i. 337 E *ἀπειρημένον αὐτῷ εἴη*, which is used as though *εἰ μὴ εἰδείη* or *ὃς μὴ εἰδείη* had preceded.—Glaucon's eager logic separates in idea what cannot be separated in fact. He forgets that harmless pleasures may be loved both for their own sake and for their effects.

ἢ χαίρειν ἔχοντα] (1) *ἔχοντα*, sc. *αὐτάς*, or (2) 'to go on rejoicing,' L. and S. s. v. *ἔχω* B iv. 2.

τὸ κάμνοντα ἰατρεύεσθαι] Corresponding to the mixed or contrasted pleasures of the Philebus (44 ff.). *Republic II.* 357 C

ἰάτρευσίς τε καὶ ὁ ἄλλος χρηματισμός] (1) 'The practice of healing and other modes of money-making,'—the practice of medicine being included under money-making. The thought of *ἰατρεύεσθαι* has suggested *ἰάτρευσις*, and hence this is given as the most obvious example of *χρηματισμός*. This is better than (2) understanding the words to mean—healing *and also* money-making,' according to the well-known idiom. Cf. infra 371 A *τῶν ἄλλων δημιουργῶν* and *τῶν ἄλλων διακόνων*. Gorgias 473 C *πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων*.

ἑαυτῶν] the reflexive pronoun here does not refer to the subject of the verb.

ἔστι γὰρ οὖν . . . τί δή;] 'There is, I said, certainly this third class also. But what then?' D

ἐν τῷ καλλίστῳ] This 'fairest' intermediate class may be compared with the 'mixed' or concrete essence of the Philebus. See especially Phileb. 26 C *οἷον μεθ' ὑγιείας κάλλος καὶ ἰσχύν, καὶ ἐν ψυχαῖς αὖ πάμπολλα ἕτερα καὶ πάγκαλα*: ibid. 27 D *νικῶντα μὲν ἔθεμέν που τὸν μικτὸν βίον ἡδονῆς τε καὶ φρονήσεως*. 358 A

ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐπιπόνου εἴδους] sc. *εἶναι*.

ἀδικία δ' ἐπαινεῖται] The omission of these words in Par. A may be due to the likeness of terminations (*ψέγεται, ἐπαινεῖται*). See Essay on Text, p. 103. The statement of the other side of an alternative where one only is in point is frequent in Plato.

ἀλλ' ἐγώ τις . . . δυσμαθής] 'But I, you see, am a slow sort of person.'

ἐάν σοι ταὐτὰ δοκῇ] A shortened or elliptical form of expression —'and then we shall see whether or no you and I agree.' *ἐάν* gives a softened and colloquial turn to the hypothesis. Cp. Theaet. 156 C *ἄθρει, ἐάν πως ἀποτελεσθῇ*, ib. 192 E: Xen. Cyr. ii. 4, 16 *ἄκουε τοίνυν . . . ἄν τί σοι δόξω λέγειν*. B

In order to elicit from Socrates a convincing argument in favour of absolute Justice, Glaucon restates the Sophistic theory in a more abstract and more developed form. *358 D, E*

διὸ . . . ἐπαινῶν] 'And so I will do my utmost to declare the praises of the unrighteous life.' For *κατατείνω* cp. 367 B *ὡς δύναμαι μάλιστα κατατείνας λέγω*. So *διατείνειν, συντείνειν, ἐντείνειν, ἔντονος* 358 D

Republic II. 358 D occur in a metaphorical sense, implying a high degree of effort or tension: v. 474 A θεῖν διατεταμένους: vii. 536 C μᾶλλον ἐντεινάμενος εἶπον: Soph. 239 B ὅ τι μάλιστα δύνασαι συντείνας πειράθητι.

εἴ σοι βουλομένῳ ἃ λέγω] The suppressed word is probably ἐστίν, or possibly λέγω, echoed from the relative clause.

E **οἷόν τε**] sc. ἐστίν. This reading, though not of much authority, seems probable, the reading of Ven. Π, τί οἷόν τε being perhaps an emendation of τί ὄν τε, the reading of Par. A MΞ, &c., which is also possible, notwithstanding the harshness of the construction ('being what, and whence, it arises'), and has far higher manuscript authority. τί οἴονται q β′ is derived from τί οἷόν τε. [τί ὄντε may be a corruption of τί ἐστί, L. C.] The nature of Justice is distinguished from its origin, although in the following argument the two are discussed together. Cp. infra 359 B αὕτη τε καὶ τοιαύτη, καὶ ἐξ ὧν πέφυκε τοιαῦτα.

358 E–359 B *In the nature of things to do wrong is a great good, but to suffer wrong is a still greater evil. Whence those who have not power to escape the evil and secure the good make an agreement with their fellows, by which they try to get rid of both. This is the origin of law and right, and the neutrality so brought about is Justice.*

358 E **πεφυκέναι . . . (359 B) ὡς ὁ λόγος**] Cp. the words of Thrasymachus in i. 344 C οὐ γὰρ τὸ ποιεῖν . . . τὴν ἀδικίαν. The same theory is otherwise stated in the Gorgias, where the favourite opposition of νόμος and φύσις also occurs: see especially Gorg. 483 B ἀλλ', οἶμαι, οἱ τιθέμενοι τοὺς νόμους οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ἄνθρωποί εἰσι καὶ οἱ πολλοί, κ.τ.λ. (Callicles is the speaker), 'The makers of laws are the many and the weak; so that legislation and praise and blame have all a view to them and to their interest. They terrify the mightier sort of men who are able to get the better of them, in order that they may not get the better of them; and they say that to take advantage of others is base and unjust and that injustice is the attempt to take advantage. Their reason is, as I believe, that being inferior they are well pleased to share alike.'

359 A **δοκεῖ**] Ast conj. δοκεῖν, in keeping with the *oratio obliqua* which precedes and follows. But the number of consecutive infinitives, which is supposed to have led the copyist to try his hand at emendation, may rather be said to account for the return to the indicative here, although the infinitive construction is resumed immediately afterwards.

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ξυνθήκας αὐτῶν] (1) 'Agreements with one another'—αὑτῶν for ἀλλήλων as elsewhere: Laws x. 889 E ὅπῃ ἕκαστοι ἑαυτοῖσι συνωμολόγησαν νομοθετούμενοι. Or (2), reading αὐτῶν: 'And this they say is the beginning of the imposition of laws and covenants among them.' αὑτῶν is best; the objective genitive is equivalent to πρὸς αὑτούς, sc. ἀλλήλους. So in Thucyd. i. 140 τὸ Μεγαρέων ψήφισμα = τὸ πρὸς Μεγαρέας ψηφισθέν: infra iii. 391 C ὑπερηφανίαν θεῶν, i. e. πρὸς θεούς. 359 A

ἀγαπᾶσθαι] implies acquiescence rather than decided preference. Cp. ἀγαπητός.

ἀρρωστίᾳ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν] 'through want of confidence in their power to do wrong.' B

If men had power to be unjust with impunity they would agree to no such compact. This is illustrated by the legend of Gyges' ring, which changed him from an innocent shepherd into a guilty usurper, simply by enabling him to become invisible. Let the just man and the unjust each have such a power, and they will both act alike. *359 B–360 D*

εἰ τοιόνδε . . . ἄξει] The clause **δόντες ἐξουσίαν . . . ἐπακολουθήσαιμεν** is an explanation of τοιόνδε. 359 C

ὃ πᾶσα . . . πέφυκεν] ὅ, sc. πλεονεξίαν, as elsewhere in Plato, the neuter referring to the feminine. Theaet. 146 E γνῶναι ἐπιστήμην αὐτὸ ὅ τί ποτ' ἐστίν: infra x. 612 B, where αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην (or αὐτοδικαιοσύνην) is the reading of most MSS.: Laws ii. 653 B τί ποτε λέγομεν ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν ὀρθὴν παιδείαν. τούτου γάρ, κ.τ.λ.

νόμῳ δὲ βίᾳ] Cp. the words of Hippias in Protag. 337 D ὁ δὲ νόμος, τύραννος ὢν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πολλὰ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν βιάζεται. For the adverbial βίᾳ with the other dative cp. viii. 552 E οὓς ἐπιμελείᾳ βίᾳ κατέχουσιν αἱ ἀρχαί. The active verbal use of **τιμήν**, as in the words which follow, is rare.

τοιάδε . . . φασι . . . γενέσθαι] τοιάδε is grammatically connected with **οἵαν**: the construction is hardly interrupted by the addition of **εἰ αὐτοῖς γένοιτο**, which adds liveliness to the expression. 'The liberty of which I speak would be realized by their obtaining such a power as this,' &c. The repetition of **δύναμιν** after ἐξουσίαν is occasioned by the additional words. This is the earliest mention, according to Mr. A. Lang, of the invisible-making ring.

τῷ [Γύγου] . . . προγόνῳ] It is Gyges himself, not the ancestor of Gyges, of whom Herodotus tells nearly the same story (without D

Republic II. the marvel), and Gyges himself, who is intended by Plato, as appears from x. 612 B *ἐάν τ' ἔχῃ τὸν Γύγου δακτύλιον, ἐάν τε μή.*
359 D Hence there is reason to suspect a miswriting of the text. Stallbaum reads, on slender manuscript authority, *τῷ Γύγῃ*, and, without authority, encloses *τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ* in brackets. But as Gyges was not the ancestor of Lydus, who is the eponym of the race, it is difficult to see how these words can have found their way into the text even as a gloss. A more satisfactory alteration would be the substitution of *Κροίσου* for *Γύγου*—*τῷ Κροίσου τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ γενέσθαι*, of which *Γύγῃ* may have been the explanation in the margin; or the original reading may have been *Γύγῃ τῷ Κροίσου, κ.τ.λ.*

ποιμένα θητεύοντα] 'Serving as a shepherd.' The phrase marks the contrast between his present and future condition. Cp. Eur. Alc., line 6.

ὄμβρου δέ, κ.τ.λ.] Translated by Cicero, de Off. iii. 9 *cum terra discessisset magnis quibusdam imbribus, in illum hiatum descendit aeneumque equum, ut ferunt fabulae, animadvertit, cuius in lateribus fores essent, &c.*

ἄλλα τε δὴ [ἃ] μυθολογοῦσι] *ἃ μυθολογοῦσι* is the reading of the greater number of MSS., but not of Par. A. If *ἃ* is omitted, *μυθολογοῦσι* is a repetition of *φασί*, 'they tell,' resumed by 'they say in the tale.'

E **τοῦτον δὲ ἄλλο μὲν [ἔχειν] οὐδέν**] The insertion of *ἔχειν* has not the authority of Par. A, but appears to be required in order to avoid a harsh ellipsis. Ξ omitting *ἔχειν* reads *δακτύλιον φέρειν.*

ἵν' ἐξαγγέλλοιεν] The present is the true reading (not *ἐξαγγέλοιεν* with some MSS., a second aorist which is rarely, if ever, found; or the future *ἐξαγγελοῖεν*, which is ungrammatical). The tense expresses the general habit of making the report and is suggested by **εἰωθότος**. It is further confirmed by **κατὰ μῆνα.**

τὴν σφενδόνην] the collet of the ring, in which the stone was placed as in a sling. **καὶ διαλέγεσθαι** changes the subject: 'he became invisible to the company, and they began to speak of him as though he were not there.'

360 **καὶ αὐτῷ οὕτω ξυμβαίνειν**] 'and he found this to be the case,'
A referring partly to **εἰ ταύτην ἔχοι τὴν δύναμιν**: also to the words which follow, **στρέφοντι μὲν εἴσω, κ.τ.λ.**, which are a further explanation of *ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν.*

ὡς δόξειεν] The optatives may be accounted for by assimilation (Goodwin, *M. and T.* 558, cp. 531). But Glaucon speaks throughout as putting the case for another who is the objector. See the Essay on Syntax, vol. ii. p. 175. *Republic II.* 360 B

οὕτω δὲ δρῶν . . . ἀμφότεροι] For a similar piece of sophistry at an earlier stage compare Hdt. iii. 72. 6, 7 *τοῦ γὰρ αὐτοῦ γλιχόμεθα, οἵ τε ψευδόμενοι καὶ οἱ τῇ ἀληθηΐῃ διαχρεώμενοι. οἳ μέν γε ψεύδονται τότε, ἐπεάν τι μέλλωσι τοῖσι ψεύδεσι πείσαντες κερδήσεσθαι· οἱ δ' ἀληθίζονται, ἵνα τι τῇ ἀληθηΐῃ ἐπισπάσωνται κέρδος, καί τι μᾶλλόν σφισι ἐπιτράπηται.* A more refined form of the same doubt occurs in Aristotle, Eth. Nic. v. 9, 9 *ἑτέρου γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ, εἰ ἔτυχεν, πλεονεκτεῖ, οἷον δόξης ἢ τοῦ ἁπλῶς καλοῦ.* C

ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδίᾳ ὄντος] gives the reason of **ἀναγκαζόμενος**: 'under compulsion, because justice is not a good to him individually'; **τοῦτο** refers to *ἐπὶ ταὐτὸν ἴοιεν* and is further explained in the clause **ἐπεὶ ὅπου γ' ἂν . . . ἀδικεῖν.**

ὁ περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου λέγων] Either (1) 'he who makes this argument his theme'; or (2) in the Homeric sense of *περί*, like *ἀμυνόμενος περὶ πάτρης*, 'who argues in defence of this thesis.' Cp. infra 362 D *ἱκανῶς εἰρῆσθαι περὶ τοῦ λόγου.* D

τοιαύτης ἐξουσίας ἐπιλαβόμενος] 'Having got such an opportunity into his hands,' a more graphic expression for *ἐξουσίαν λαβών*. Cp. *προφάσιος ἐπιλαβέσθαι* in Hdt. iii. 36. 5; vi. 13. 3; 49. 3.

Which is the happier, the just life or the unjust? *360 E–362 C*

Before we can answer this question, we must view them as they are in their perfection, the one entirely just, the other entirely unjust. The unjust man, seeming just, shall receive the rewards of justice in addition to the gains of injustice: the just man, seeming unjust, shall sacrifice his own advantage and also suffer the penalties of injustice.

τὴν δὲ κρίσιν αὐτήν] 'But the decision itself,' or 'the actual decision.' The judgement, as of supreme importance, is distinguished from the preliminary description. 360 E

πέρι] Either *πέρι* or *περί*: on such a point the authority of MSS. is of no value. It is best to read *πέρι* and make the genitive antecedent to **ὧν** depend on **κρίσιν**. 'The decision, in the case of the persons in question, as regards their life.' The accusative *κρίσιν* is first placed out of construction, and then resumed as a cognate accusative with *κρῖναι*.

τίς οὖν δὴ ἡ διάστασις;] For the sudden question compare infra 376 E *τίς οὖν ἡ παιδεία;*

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360 E Ideas of justice and injustice cannot really be isolated from their consequences. (Compare the attempt which is made in Phileb. 20 E to divide pleasure and knowledge: *μήτε ἐν τῷ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐνέστω φρόνησις, μήτε ἐν τῷ τῆς φρονήσεως ἡδονή.*) Truths which have any meaning or interest for man cannot be wholly withdrawn from the conditions of human life. Aristotle remarks on the absurdity of such paradoxes, Eth. Nic. vii. 13, 3 *οἱ δὲ τὸν τροχιζόμενον καὶ τὸν δυστυχίαις μεγάλαις περιπίπτοντα εὐδαίμονα φάσκοντες εἶναι, ἐὰν ᾖ ἀγαθός, ἢ ἑκόντες ἢ ἄκοντες οὐδὲν λέγουσιν.* And Socrates brings his hearers back to a more natural point of view when he requires that the meaning of justice should be sought for not in the individual, but in some relation of men to one another (infra 372 A).

The construction of the sentence is noticeable. First *οἷον, κ.τ.λ.* is added in explanation of *ὥσπερ οἱ δεινοὶ δημιουργοί*, then the whole clause, *ὥσπερ . . . ποιείτω*, is resumed in *οὕτω*.

361 A **τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀδικίαν**] Glaucon again recalls the phraseology of Thrasymachus, i. 344 A.

B **τῷ λόγῳ**] 'In our description.' So infra D *ἐπεξελθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ*. Cp. infra 363 C *εἰς Ἅιδου γὰρ ἀγαγόντες τῷ λόγῳ*, said of Musaeus and his son taking their heroes down to the world below in their descriptions: 369 A *εἰ γιγνομένην πόλιν θεασαίμεθα λόγῳ*: C *τῷ λόγῳ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ποιῶμεν πόλιν*—'let us create the state': vii. 534 D *οὓς τῷ λόγῳ τρέφεις . . . εἴ ποτε ἔργῳ τρέφοις*. So Tim. 27 A *ἀνθρώπους τῷ λόγῳ γεγονότας* might be translated 'the men whom we have created.' The word **ἱστῶμεν** suggests the image, *ὥσπερ ἀνδριάντα*, &c., in what follows, infra D.

οὐ δοκεῖν] Aesch., S. c. Th. 592 (said of Amphiaraus)

οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ἄριστος, ἀλλ' εἶναι θέλει,
βαθεῖαν ἄλοκα διὰ φρενὸς καρπούμενος,
ἐξ ἧς τὰ κεδνὰ βλαστάνει βουλεύματα.

C **ἄδηλον οὖν . . . τοιοῦτος εἴη**] *ἄδηλον*, sc. *ἂν εἴη*: 'In that case it would be uncertain whether he were such (i. e. just) for justice' sake, or for the sake of the gifts and rewards.' *εἴη* is the true reading, not *ἂν εἴη*, which has slight manuscript authority (Vind. E, Flor. x). The optative accords with the conditional nature of the case in an imagined future. See note on *ὡς δόξειεν* 360 B supra.

τέγγεσθαι] lit. to be 'softened by moisture,' like a stiff piece of leather. Cp. Aesch. Prom. 1008 *τέγγει γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδὲ μαλθάσσει κέαρ | λιταῖς*: Soph. O. T. 336 *ἀλλ' ὧδ' ἄτεγκτος κἀτελεύτητος φανεῖ;*

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τῶν ἀπ' αὐτῆς] ἀπό is not found in any of the MSS., which all read ὑπό. It is adopted from citations of the passage in Eusebius and Theodoret, and is better adapted to the context. The confusion of ὑπό and ἀπό is frequent in MSS. For ὑπό here, however, cp. Theaet. 200 E τὰ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ (sc. τοῦ δοξάζειν ἀληθῆ) γιγνόμενα. 361 C

ἀλλὰ ἴτω] The reading of the best MSS. ἤτω is a late form, which has probably crept in by mistake. Better ἴτω (cp. vii. 534 C διαπορεύηται). The η of ἤτω in Par. A appears to have been made from ι. ἔστω is probably a conjectural emendation for ἤτω.

βαβαί] is an exclamation of wonder, parallel in form to πόποι, παπαῖ. 'Wonderful, said I, dear Glaucon. In what a spirited manner you polish up your two heroes for the decision, as if each were a statue.' Cp. the reversal of the two portraits in the true state, in which the King and the Tyrant (ix. 577) and the just and the unjust (x. 613) receive their final reward. D

ἐκκαυθήσεται] (A Π), and not ἐκκοπήσεται (*q*) or ἐκκοφθήσεται (M), is the reading of the best MSS., and is confirmed by a further reference to this passage in x. 613 E καὶ ἃ ἄγροικα ἔφησθα σὺ εἶναι ἀληθῆ λέγων,—εἶτα στρεβλώσονται καὶ **ἐκκαυθήσονται**. The Gorgias contains a germ of the second book of the Republic; we find there (473 C) the parallel words, ἐὰν ἀδικῶν ἄνθρωπος ληφθῇ τυραννίδι ἐπιβουλεύων, καὶ ληφθεὶς στρεβλῶται καὶ ἐκτέμνηται καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς **ἐκκάηται**, which also confirms the reading in this passage. The corruption in M is due to the later pronunciation of αυ. E

Using a bold inversion, Glaucon says that the life of the unjust is more real than that of the just. For the reality of justice, when without the appearance of justice, is annihilated by suffering. But the hypocrisy of the unjust man is a part of his business, which is unmistakably real. The discourse of Adeimantus which follows is a further development of this paradox: cp. 362 E ἵν' ᾖ σαφέστερον ὅ μοι δοκεῖ βούλεσθαι Γλαύκων. Adeimantus however represents the worldly or prudential, rather than the sophistical point of view.

ἄρα] 'As may be inferred from this.'

ἀληθείας ἐχόμενον] 'which has to do with truth,' a favourite Platonic usage of ἔχομαι, e.g. Theaet. 145 A ὅσα παιδείας ἔχεται: ἀλήθεια was a favourite word, not only with Plato and Socrates, but with the Sophists, meaning with them, not reality, but appearance, which they asserted to be reality. Cp. Theaet. 167 A, C and the title of the book of Protagoras (ἡ Ἀλήθεια—Theaet. 161 C); also Sophist 246 B τὴν λεγομένην ὑπ' αὐτῶν **ἀλήθειαν**. 362 A

Republic *II.* 362 A **βαθεῖαν ἄλοκα . . . βουλεύματα**] Glaucon resumes the quotation, which he applies to the unjust man. In what follows the 'counsels' and their results are confused.

B **πρῶτον μὲν . . . δικαίῳ εἶναι**] The words *δοκοῦντι δικαίῳ εἶναι* are governed by **βλαστάνει**, with the subject of which **ἄρχειν** agrees. The accusative takes the place of the dative in *κερδαίνοντα*, and with the words *εἰς ἀγῶνας τοίνυν ἰόντα* the construction reverts to *φήσουσι*' (supra A). For the former change cp. iv. 422 B *οὐδ' εἰ ἐξείη . . .* **ὑποφεύγοντι** *τὸν πρότερον ἀεὶ προσφερόμενον* **ἀναστρέφοντα** *κρούειν . . .;*

ξυμβάλλειν] 'to have dealings with:' cp. iv. 425 C *ξυμβολαίων τε πέρι . . . ἃ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ξυμβάλλουσιν.* With the juxtaposition of **ξυμβάλλειν** and **κοινωνεῖν** cp. i. 333 A *ξυμβόλαια δὲ λέγεις κοινωνήματα, ἤ τι ἄλλο;*

παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα] 'in all this:' cp. iv. 424 B *ὅπως ἂν . . . παρὰ πάντα αὐτὸ φυλάττωσι.*

τούς τε φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν . . . βλάπτειν] A link of reminiscence connecting this with the previous discussion: supra i. 334 B.

C **θεραπεύειν . . . τοὺς θεούς**] This also contains an allusion to what precedes, supra i. 331 B, where Cephalus gave his simple definition.

θεοφιλέστερον . . . μᾶλλον προσήκειν] For the redundant comparative compare Laws vi. 781 A *λαθραιότερον μᾶλλον* and the redundant superlative in i. 331 B *οὐκ ἐλάχιστον . . . χρησιμώτατον.*

D **οὐκοῦν . . . ἐπάμυνε**] 'Well then, let brother help brother, as the proverb says.' The proverb is a natural one and appears to be remembered in the lines of Homer :—

Iliad xxi. 308:

φίλε κασίγνητε, σθένος ἀνέρος ἀμφότεροί περ
σχῶμεν.

Od. xvi. 97:

ἤ τι κασιγνήτοις ἐπιμέμφεαι, οἷσί περ ἀνὴρ
μαρναμένοισι πέποιθε, καὶ εἰ μέγα νεῖκος ὄρηται.

τὸ λεγόμενον, as elsewhere, is an accusative in apposition to the sentence. For the optative **παρείη**, expressive of a wish or gentle command, see Monro's *Homeric Grammar*, § 299 b.

E **οἵ**] sc. *λόγοι*, which, as elsewhere, are personified.

Glaucon had endeavoured to isolate justice and injustice from their consequences: 'let the just suffer and the unjust be rewarded.' 'But what are justice and injustice in their nature?' Adeimantus would wish also to make them independent of the opinion of men, who maintain, not that the just will suffer, but (1) that he will be rewarded (τοὺς ἐναντίους λόγους) in this world and also in another (these are the sort of motives that they inculcate): (2) that injustice is only condemned by opinion and custom, and may be readily expiated. Here then is another reason for having a clear account of the nature of justice and injustice. *Republic II.* 362 E

Adeimantus, whose character is contrasted with that of Glaucon throughout, as the more solid and practical is opposed to the eager and impulsive nature,—(two contraries, which, as Plato remarks in vi. 503 *C, are seldom to be found in the same person)—now urges on Socrates a different set of considerations. Glaucon has shown how the opponents of justice declare that seeming is better than reality, and that the praise of justice arises from the fear of injustice. According to Adeimantus, the world is always repeating that virtue is honourable, but toilsome and difficult, vice easy and profitable, although disreputable. The young are told to pursue justice, not for its own sake, but for the sake of reputation and reward, and to avoid injustice only from the fear of punishment. Poets and prose-writers alike tell of temporal prosperity attending on justice here, and sensual delights awaiting the just hereafter, and in speaking of the penalties of injustice they bury souls in mud or make them carry water in a sieve; their imagination reaches no further* (cp. Theaet. 177 *A*). *362 E–363 E*

λέγουσι] resumes λόγους supra. 362 E

αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην] For this apposition of neuter and feminine, which has led some of the copyists to write αὐτοδικαιοσύνην in one word on the supposed analogy of αὐτοαγαθόν, cp. infra v. 472 C ἐζητοῦμεν αὐτό τε δικαιοσύνην οἷόν ἐστι, καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τελέως δίκαιον: also x. 612 B. 363 A

γίγνηται] not γίγνωνται, is the true reading. The singular has a collective force which is assisted by the neuter **ὅσαπερ**. Cp. infra v. 463 A ἔστι . . . ἄρχοντές τε καὶ δῆμος: Euthyd. 302 C ἔστι . . . καὶ βωμοὶ καὶ ἱερά, κ.τ.λ.

τῷ ἀδίκῳ] is read in x *q v* and is probably right, though perhaps only a manuscript conjecture:—τῷ δικαίῳ, which is the reading of

Republic *II.* 363 A most MSS., including A Π M, may have arisen out of a logical confusion. Madvig would delete the words, which are omitted in one MS. (Par. K). It is hardly conceivable that Plato should have written *δικαίῳ = δοκοῦντι δικαίῳ*.

ἐπὶ πλέον . . . ἅ φασι θεοὺς διδόναι] 'Now these make still more of reputation; for throwing in the good opinion of Heaven, they have numberless benefits to relate, which the Gods, as they say, confer on the pious.' That is to say, they add the favour of Heaven to the good opinion of men.

ὥσπερ . . . (C) παρέχῃ ἰχθῦς] The first quotation is from Hesiod, Opera et Dies, 230:—

τοῖσι φέρει μὲν γαῖα πολὺν βίον, οὔρεσι δὲ δρῦς
ἄκρη μέν τε φέρει βαλάνους, μέσση δέ, κ.τ.λ.

as in the text. There is no reason to suppose any variation in this passage in the text of Hesiod. Plato has adapted the words to suit the construction of his own sentence. The second passage is quoted from the Odyssey, xix. 109–113, where *ὥστε τευ* is the beginning of the verse, *τευ* depending on *κλέος* in the previous line, and *ἤ* is correlative to another *ἤ*, which would have followed if the sentence had been completed.

C **Μουσαῖος δὲ . . . τοῖς δικαίοις**] 'And the blessings which Musaeus and his son (Eumolpus? cp. Suidas s.v.) represent the Gods as giving to the just are still more glorious.' In the lively language of Plato the poet is the maker of what he relates; he takes his heroes down into the world below, and lays them on couches, and puts them into a state of intoxication, while others extend the heavenly rewards yet further to their descendants (D *μακροτέρους ἀποτείνουσι μισθοὺς παρὰ θεῶν*). **μακροτέρους** is to be taken with **ἀποτείνουσι**. The jingle in *συμπόσιον τῶν ὁσίων* is perhaps intentional: cp. Symp. 185 C *Παυσανίου δὲ παυσαμένου, διδάσκουσι γάρ με ἴσα λέγειν οὑτωσὶ οἱ σοφοί.*

D **εἰς πηλόν τινα . . . ἀναγκάζουσι φέρειν**] Phaedo 69 C *κινδυνεύουσι καὶ οἱ τὰς τελετὰς ἡμῖν οὗτοι καταστήσαντες οὐ φαῦλοί τινες εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι πάλαι αἰνίττεσθαι, ὅτι ὃς ἂν ἀμύητος καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς Ἅιδου ἀφίκηται, ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσεται, κ.τ.λ.*: Gorg. 493 B *ὡς τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου . . . οὗτοι ἀθλιώτατοι ἂν εἶεν οἱ ἀμύητοι, καὶ φοροῖεν εἰς τὸν τετρημένον πίθον ὕδωρ ἑτέρῳ τοιούτῳ τετρημένῳ κοσκίνῳ.*

E **ἄλλα δὲ οὐκ ἔχουσιν**] sc. *λέγειν*. Plato has in his mind the only real punishment of injustice, which such reasoners cannot see. Cp.

Theaet. 176 D ἀγνοοῦσι γὰρ ζημίαν ἀδικίας, ὃ δεῖ ἥκιστα ἀγνοεῖν. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἣν δοκοῦσι, πληγαί τε καὶ θάνατοι, ὧν ἐνίοτε πάσχουσιν οὐδὲν ἀδικοῦντες, ἀλλὰ ἣν ἀδύνατον ἐκφυγεῖν, viz. that by their wicked acts they become like the pattern of evil. *Republic II.* 363 E

ἑκατέρων] i. e. τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν ἀδίκων.

Again, they tell us that the way of virtue, though honourable, is grievous and toilsome, whereas vice is easy and pleasant, although disreputable. And while dwelling on the rewards of virtue, they speak also in the same breath of the prosperity of the wicked, and of the misfortunes of the just, attributing both to the action of the Gods. There are prophets, too, and mendicant priests, who profess to have the means of reconciling the Gods to sinners, and these declarations of theirs are confirmed by poets, who represent the Gods as not inexorable. *363 E–366 B*

What conclusion will a youth of lively parts gather from all this? Will he not avoid the hard road which leads to possible disaster and follow the smooth pathway of appearances, holding up to the world a show of virtue, while in secret he pursues his own interest? If a doubt is suggested whether he can elude exposure, he is ready with an answer. Is there not rhetoric, the science of persuasion, and the power of combination into clubs for mutual security? May we not hope even to circumvent the Gods? And perhaps there are no Gods. But if there are, those who have told us of them tell us also that they may be propitiated by sacrifice. Then let us share our gains with them. You speak of the punishments of the world below. But are there not mighty deities who will give us absolution?

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις . . . καὶ ὑπὸ ποιητῶν] 'Further, Socrates, consider yet another way of speaking about justice and injustice to which utterance is given, not only by the poets, but also in prose writing.' Cp. infra 366 E αὐτὸ δ' ἑκάτερον . . . οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὔτ' ἐν ποιήσει οὔτ' ἐν ἰδίοις λόγοις ἐπεξῆλθεν ἱκανῶς τῷ λόγῳ. **ἰδίᾳ** is opposed to **ὑπὸ ποιητῶν** in the same way that ἰδιώτης is opposed to a skilled person. Cp. Phaedr. 258 D ἐν μέτρῳ ὡς ποιητής, ἢ ἄνευ μέτρου ὡς ἰδιώτης. 363 E

ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος] 'in general.' Cp. Phaedr. 275 B ἀγνώμονες ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος ὄντες. 364 A

καὶ πονηροὺς πλουσίους . . . ἔχοντας] 'wicked men who are rich or have any power besides riches.' **ἄλλας**, sc. ἢ πλοῦτον, understood from πλουσίους.

Republic II. 364 A **εὐχερῶς**] 'lightly,' is a word of blame here and in vii. 535 E ἀλλ' *εὐχερῶς ὥσπερ θηρίον ὕειον ἐν ἀμαθίᾳ μολύνηται.*

B **τούτων δὲ . . . ἐναντίαν μοῖραν**] Compare infra 379 D, where the Homeric sentiment of the two vessels of Zeus, the one full of good, the other of evil destinies, is condemned; also the words of Psalm xxxvii. 35 'I have seen the wicked in great power, and spreading himself like a green bay tree,' which are in like manner followed by a justification of the ways of God to man.

θαυμασιώτατοι λέγονται] *θαυμασιώτατοι* is the predicate of *λέγονται*, in which the notion of *λόγοι* is repeated. 'The tales which are told about the Gods and Virtue are the most wonderful of all.' The following words show the connexion implied in **τε καί**. 'How the Gods are disposed towards virtue.'

ἀγύρται] 'begging priests.' Cp. infra 381 D *Ἥραν ἠλλοιωμένην ὡς ἱέρειαν ἀγείρουσαν.*

C **βλάψει**] 'A man shall hurt,' sc. *πείθουσιν ὡς ὁ ἐθέλων βλάψει.* The passage may be taken in two different ways according as the prophet or the person who consults him is supposed to be the subject of **ἀκεῖσθαι** supra. In the latter case there is no difficulty in supplying the subject of *βλάψει*. The regularity of construction is interrupted by the sudden introduction of the direct form of speech, which adds vividness to the passage. And the main thread of the sentence is taken up again in **ἐπαγωγαῖς . . . ὑπηρετεῖν.** If the prophets are the subject throughout, the reading *βλάψειν* is more convenient though still not necessary. But the man who has recourse to the prophet or priest is clearly the nominative to **ἐθέλῃ**, and is referred to in **του** supra. Cp. 365 A *μὴ θύσαντας*. *βλάψει* is found in almost all the MSS. and is a reading which the scribes were unlikely to invent. *βλάψαι* is an emendation of Muretus.

οἱ μὲν . . . διδόντες] 'Those of them (i. e. of the persons mentioned in 364 A) who offer facilities for vice' (calling Hesiod to witness that, &c.). The conjecture of Muretus, approved by Cobet, *οἱ μὲν . . .* **ᾄδοντες**, 'Some of them singing about the facility of vice' was needlessly adopted in Baiter's edition of 1881. For διδόντες = δίδοσθαι **λέγοντες** cp. supra 363 C, D διδόασι, 'represent as being given,' *κατακλίναντες, κατορύττουσιν.*

D **λείη μὲν ὁδός**] The reading in the text of Hesiod (Opera et Dies, 286) is *ὀλίγη*, not *λείη*, which is found here and in Laws iv. 718 E,

where the quotation occurs again, and three other lines are added, the two last of which are quoted also in Prot. 340 D:— *Republic* II. 364 D

ἀθάνατοι, μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὄρθιος οἶμος ἐς αὐτήν,
καὶ τρηχὺς τὸ πρῶτον· ἐπὴν δ' εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηαι,
ῥηϊδίη δὴ ἔπειτα πέλει, χαλεπή περ ἐοῦσα.

The substitution of *λείη* for *ὀλίγη* in Plato and also in Xenophon (Mem. ii. 1, 20) and Plutarch (Mor. 77 D) is supposed to have been intended to avoid tautology of the two ideas, *ὀλίγη ὁδός* and *μάλα ἐγγύθι ναίει*, but such a tautology is frequent in Epic poetry: *ὀλίγη*, of which *μάλα δ' ἐγγύθι ναίει* is an explanation, is probably the true reading, and is opposed to *μακρός* following.

στρεπτοὶ δέ τε καὶ θεοὶ αὐτοί] The MSS. point to an early variety of reading between *λιστοί*, and *στρεπτοί* which is the reading of the original passage, Il. ix. 497. The word *λιστός* does not occur elsewhere, though *ἄλλιστος* is found in Empedocles (frag. 50), and *τρίλλιστος* in Homer (Iliad viii. 488).

βίβλων δὲ ὅμαδον παρέχονται Μουσαίου καὶ Ὀρφέως] For the 'host' of books cp. Eurip. Hippol. 953:— E

Ὀρφέα τ' ἄνακτ' ἔχων
βάκχευε, πολλῶν γραμμάτων τιμῶν καπνούς,

also Alcestis, 967:—

Θρῄσσαις ἐν σανίσιν, τὰς
Ὀρφεία κατέγραψεν
γῆρυς·

and for the general thought in what follows, Soph. Fragm. 719 Dindorf (753 Nauck):—

ὡς τρισόλβιοι
κεῖνοι βροτῶν, οἳ ταῦτα δερχθέντες τέλη
μόλωσ' ἐς Ἅιδου· τοῖσδε γὰρ μόνοις ἐκεῖ
ζῆν ἐστι, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοισι πάντ' ἐκεῖ κακά.

Homer, Hymn to Demeter, 480–482:—

ὄλβιος, ὃς τάδ' ὄπωπεν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων·
ὃς δ' ἀτελὴς ἱερῶν, ὅς τ' ἔμμορος, οὔποθ' ὁμοίην
αἶσαν ἔχει, φθίμενός περ, ὑπὸ ζόφῳ εὐρώεντι.

Suidas has given a list of twenty-one Orphic works, which he attributes to various authors; one class of them being called *τελεταί* and ascribed to Onomacritus. This and other passages (Phaedo

Republic II. 364 E 69 C; Orat. 402 B; Phileb. 66 C) show that a body of writings, older probably than any Orphica which have come down to us, existed under the name of Orpheus in the age of Plato.

καὶ παιδιᾶς ἡδονῶν] 'and sportive delights.' The pleonasm gives a scornful emphasis.

365 A **τελετάς**] Compare Laws x. 908, 909, where the enemies of religion are divided into two classes: (1) open unbelievers, who may be honest and good men; and (2) insidious priests and magicians, who practise upon the souls of the living and dead: 908 D *γίγνονται δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν* (sc. *μάντεων*) *ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ τύραννοι καὶ δημηγόροι καὶ στρατηγοί, καὶ τελεταῖς δὲ ἰδίαις ἐπιβεβουλευκότες σοφιστῶν τε ἐπικαλουμένων μηχαναί*: 909 B *ὅσοι δ' ἂν . . . καταφρονοῦντες δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ψυγαγωγῶσι μὲν πολλοὺς τῶν ζώντων, τοὺς δὲ τεθνεῶτας φάσκοντες ψυχαγωγεῖν καὶ θεοὺς ὑπισχνούμενοι πείθειν, κ.τ.λ.* Both the open unbeliever and the religious impostor are to be punished, the former with a view to reformation, the latter more severely: both capitally, if they persist after a five years' imprisonment.

ταῦτα . . . λεγόμενα] The *accusativus pendens* receives a construction from **ἀκουούσας**, as the sentence proceeds.

ὡς . . . τιμῆς] *τιμή* is here used in the active verbal sense—'regard'—cp. supra 359 C *ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἴσου τιμήν.*

τί . . . ποιεῖν] 'How will they behave' or 'be affected?' Essay on Diction, vol. ii. p. 282.

ὥσπερ ἐπιπτόμενοι συλλογίσασθαι] The words suggest the image of a wandering bee, gathering honey from each flower in passing. Cp. Ion 534 B *ἐκ Μουσῶν κήπων τινῶν καὶ ναπῶν δρεπόμενοι τὰ μέλη ἡμῖν φέρουσιν, ὥσπερ αἱ μέλιτται.*

B **λέγοι γὰρ ἂν . . . λέγεται**] *φασίν*, like *λέγεται*, at the end of the sentence, is a resumption of *τὰ μὲν . . . λεγόμενα*, which is out of construction or rather in suspense. For the anacoluthon cp. Polit. 295 D *ἢ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον . . . ξυμβαῖνον . . . γέλως ἂν ὁ μέγιστος γίγνοιτο τῶν τοιούτων νομοθετημάτων;*

πότερον δίκᾳ τεῖχος ὕψιον, κ.τ.λ.] The same passage is cited by Cicero ad Attic. xiii. 38, 41; Maxim. Tyr. xviii. init.; Atticus Platonic. apud Euseb. Praep. Ev. xv. 798 D; and Dionys. Halic. de Comp. verb. c. 21. From these sources Bergk gives the fragment thus:—*Πότερον δίκᾳ τεῖχος ὕψιον | ἢ σκολιαῖς ἀπάταις ἀναβαίνει | ἐπιχθόνιον γένος ἀνδρῶν, | δίχα μοι νόος ἀτρέκειαν εἰπεῖν.* Bergk observes

that *θεσπέσιος βίος* and *κύριον εὐδαιμονίας* in what follows have also a poetical ring. Republic II. 365

ἐὰν καὶ μὴ δοκῶ] 'If at the same time I have the opposite reputation.' This, and not *ἐὰν μὴ καὶ δοκῶ*, is the reading of a majority of MSS., and is more idiomatic. B

ἀδίκῳ δέ] sc. *ὄντι*.

τὸ δοκεῖν . . . καὶ τὰν ἀλάθειαν βιᾶται] The words of Simonides, quoted by the Scholiast on Eur. Or. 782. C

καὶ κύριον εὐδαιμονίας] sc. *ἐστί*.

πρόθυρα μὲν καὶ σχῆμα] 'As a vestibule and exterior.' *πρόθυρα*, *κ.τ.λ.*, are accusatives in apposition to **σκιαγραφίαν . . . περιγραπτέον**, and the whole sentence is explanatory of **ἐπὶ τοῦτο δὴ τρεπτέον ὅλως** and therefore in asyndeton.—*σκιαγραφία* in its simple meaning is painting in light and shade. In Plato the word is metaphorically used to imply illusion or unreality of any kind: cp. ix. 583 B *οὐδὲ παναληθής ἐστιν ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονὴ . . . ἀλλ' ἐσκιαγραφημένη*: Phaedo 69 B *μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ᾖ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετή, κ.τ.λ.* **ἀλώπεκα**, 'the fox,' is a more lively reading and better suited to the epithets **κερδαλέαν** and **ποικίλην**, 'cunning and versatile,' which are quoted from Archilochus, than *ἀλωπεκῆν*, the fox's skin, which is quoted in the Lexicon of Timaeus. The fox—as the emblem of cunning—is to be trailed behind. Cp. Themist. Orat. xxii. 279 A *ἀνθρωπία σμικρὰ καὶ ἀνελεύθερα τὰς ἀλώπεκας ὄπισθεν ἐφελκόμενα*: and Solon, Fr. 10. 7 *ἀλώπεκος ἴχνεσι βαίνει*.

οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἀεὶ λανθάνειν κακὸν ὄντα] For the failure of the wicked in later life cp. x. 613 B *οἱ μὲν δεινοί τε καὶ ἄδικοι δρῶσιν ὅπερ οἱ δρομῆς, ὅσοι ἂν θέωσιν εὖ ἀπὸ τῶν κάτω, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν ἄνω μή*.

ταύτῃ ἰτέον, ὡς . . . φέρει] *ταύτῃ*, 'in this path' (i. e. the path of dissimulation and appearance) 'we must proceed, following in the track of the argument.' D

ἐπὶ γὰρ τὸ λανθάνειν] 'For' (as to what you say of the difficulty of escaping detection) 'with a view of escaping it,' &c.—referring to the previous words *οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἀεὶ λανθάνειν κακὸν ὄντα*.

ἐξ ὧν] 'So drawing from these resources.' The antecedent to *ὧν* is the whole sentence from *ξυνωμοσίας* to *διδόντες*. The clubs supply force; the rhetors give the means of persuasion.

οὐδ' ἡμῖν μελητέον τοῦ λανθάνειν] *καὶ ἡμῖν μελητέον* is the reading of

Republic II. 365 D ΑΠΜ. But a wrong sense is thus given to the clause καὶ ἡμῖν μελητέον τοῦ λανθάνειν: 'We must take care to conceal our crimes.' Various ways of removing the difficulty have been suggested. (1) Stallbaum, in his later edition (1858), reads τί καὶ ἡμῖν . . .: and this is supported by slight manuscript authority (Flor. x); but the new interrogative beginning is too abrupt after οὐκοῦν. (2) For μελητέον the Zurich editions substitute ἀμελητέον, the conj. of Baiter. But the meaning is not 'We *ought not* to attend to concealment,' but 'we *need not* attend to concealment.' The difficulty in the passage is clearly the omission of the negative, which is a very common kind of corruption. It may be supplied either by reading with *q* οὐδ' instead of καί (as in the text), or with a still smaller alteration, adopted by Schneider, of inserting οὐ before μελητέον—καὶ ἡμῖν οὐ μελητέον: or by throwing back the accent on οὔκουν (*sic*), a suggestion of Hermann's, who thus obtains the required negative. But in that case the force of οὔκουν cannot be supposed to extend equally to both members of the sentence, which are distributed by μέν and δέ; in the second clause εἰ δέ, κ.τ.λ., it must be assumed that the negative is forgotten and the construction changed.

E **εὐχωλαῖς ἀγανῇσι**] The reading ἀγανῇσι here, as well as in 364 D, where some MSS. also read εὐχωλῇς, may possibly be a correction of ἀγαναῖσι taken from the ordinary text of Homer.

εἰ δ' οὖν] 'Now if we are to believe.' The alternative consequence which follows from the supposition 'if we believe neither' is too obvious to be expressed.

ἀπὸ τῶν ἀδικημάτων] 'From the results of wrong-doing.' For the sense compare Shakespeare, *Hamlet* iii. 3. 59 'And oft 'tis seen the wicked prize itself Buys out the law: but 'tis not so above.'

366 A **δίκαιοι . . . ἀζήμιοι *μέν, κ.τ.λ.**] The various reading μόνον, which is found in ΠΜ and several other MSS. but not in Par. A, after the first ἀζήμιοι, helps somewhat clumsily to point the sense: 'If we are just, all that we gain is,' &c. μέν, the conjecture of Muretus, gives a possible account of both the manuscript readings.

ἄδικοι δέ] sc. ὄντες.

λισσόμενοι . . . ἁμαρτάνοντες] The line of Homer already quoted — 364 E λισσόμενοι, ὅτε κέν τις ὑπερβήῃ καὶ ἁμάρτῃ — is ingeniously turned so as to suggest the notion of sinning and praying at once.

ἢ παῖδες παίδων] Cp. supra 363 D.

αὖ μέγα δύνανται] These words happen to be omitted in Par. A, showing that the best MSS. not unfrequently err. It is quite unnecessary with Hermann to spoil the effect of a very spirited passage by the introduction of a very tame emendation — *ἀλλ' ὠφελήσουσιν ἁγνιζομένους αἱ τελεταὶ καὶ οἱ λύσιοι θεοί*—in order to vindicate the accidental omission of *αὖ μέγα δύνανται* in Par. A. 366 A

αἱ μέγισται πόλεις] Meaning Athens, where the Eleusinian mysteries had become part of the state religion. B

καὶ οἱ θεῶν παῖδες ποιηταί] Either (1) 'and the poets, who are the children of the Gods': sc. *ὄντες*, absorbed in **γενόμενοι**, 'and have become their interpreters': or (2) 'the children of the Gods who have become poets and the interpreters of the Gods.' The authority of states is contrasted with the genius of individuals. Cp. infra *τῶν πολλῶν τε καὶ ἄκρων*.

τίς μηχανή] This phrase from the more precise — 'What contrivance is there?' has passed into the more general sense— 'What possibility is there?' Cp. Phaedo 72 D *τίς μηχανὴ μὴ οὐχὶ πάντα καταναλωθῆναι*; 'How can it be but that all things would be consumed?'

ὡς δή τοι . . . (D) αὐτὸ δρᾶν] For a like humanity of feeling cp. v. 476 E *ἐπικρυπτόμενοι ὅτι οὐχ ὑγιαίνει*: vi. 492 A foll., 499 E; Phaedr. 268 E; Laws x. 888, 903. The conviction that vice is at any rate in some degree involuntary leads men to regard it in a more tolerant spirit. C

πλὴν εἴ τις θείᾳ φύσει] Cp. again vi. 492 E *οὔτε γὰρ γίγνεται οὔτε γέγονεν οὐδὲ οὖν μὴ γένηται ἀλλοῖον ἦθος πρὸς ἀρετὴν παρὰ τὴν τούτων παιδείαν πεπαιδευμένον,—ἀνθρώπειον, ὦ ἑταῖρε·* **θεῖον** *μέντοι κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἐξαιρῶμεν λόγου.* See also the question raised in the Meno and in Aristot. Eth. Nic. i. 9, whether virtue is not a divine gift.

ψέγει] supply *ἕκαστος* from **οὐδείς**, as in Symp. 192 E *ταῦτα ἀκούσας . . . οὐδ' ἂν εἷς ἐξαρνηθείη . . . ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς οἴοιτ' ἂν ἀκηκοέναι.* D

ὡς δέ, δῆλον] 'And that this is so, is plain.' Cp. Dem. c. Tim. 730, 25 *ὡς δέ, ἐγὼ φράσω.*

τῶν τοιούτων] sc. *τῶν ψεγόντων τὴν ἀδικίαν.*

Republic II. 366 D–367 E *For these unworthy thoughts the friends of justice must be held responsible, if they continue to dwell mainly on the consequences of virtue and do not rather employ their eloquence to show that justice is in its own nature the highest good and injustice the greatest evil. Let Socrates apply himself to the task of showing this.*

366 D **ὥρμησε . . . εἰπεῖν**] 'And all this arises from one thing, which was the beginning of our whole argument with you. My brother here and I were impelled to say to you,' &c. *εἰπεῖν* is an explanation of **λόγος** and receives a subject from **τῷδε καὶ ἐμοί**—*ὥστε τόνδε καὶ ἐμὲ εἰπεῖν*. For the expression cp. Hdt. vi. 86, 16 *τοῦ δὲ εἵνεκα ὁ λόγος ὅδε, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡρμήθη λέγεσθαι ἐς ὑμέας, εἰρήσεται.*

ὦ θαυμάσιε] 'What surprises me in all of you who praise justice is that . . .' The mode of address, *ὦ θαυμάσιε*, identifies Socrates with the ordinary panegyrists of justice, with whom Adeimantus is expostulating. Cp. Phaedr. 260 D *τί ποτ', ὦ θαυμάσιοι, ληρεῖτε;*

E **ἀπὸ τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς . . . λελειμμένοι**] Plato is referring to well-known tales and maxims, which the poets and logographers had put into the mouths of ancient heroes, such as the choice of Heracles, or the advice of Erechtheus to his son in Euripides (Fragm. 364, ll. 11–17):—

ἀδίκως δὲ μὴ κτῶ χρήματ', ἢν βούλῃ πολὺν
χρόνον μελάθροις ἐμμένειν· τὰ γὰρ κακῶς
οἴκους ἐσελθόντ' οὐκ ἔχει σωτηρίαν.
ἔχειν δὲ πειρῶ· τοῦτο γὰρ τό τ' εὐγενὲς
καὶ τοὺς γάμους δίδωσι τοὺς πρώτους ἔχειν.
ἐν τῷ πένεσθαι δ' ἐστὶν ἥ τ' ἀδοξία,
κἂν ᾖ σοφός τις, ἥ τ' ἀτιμία βίου.

δόξας, κ.τ.λ.] sc. *ἐπαινῶν καὶ ψέγων.*

ἐν ἰδίοις λόγοις] 'in ordinary speech,' i.e. in prose. The poet is a professional person. Cp. *ἰδίᾳ* supra 363 E, Phaedrus 258 D.

367 A **αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ . . . φύλαξ**] After **ἕκαστος** some MSS. (Π *q*) introduce *ἄριστος*, which Bekker approved. The weight of authority seems to be against it.

ὑπέρ] 'Concerning.' Cp. Apol. 39 E *ἡδέως ἂν διαλεχθείην ὑπὲρ τοῦ γεγονότος τουτουὶ πράγματος.*

φορτικῶς] 'grossly,' 'unworthily.' The word has an associa-

tion of vulgarity or bad taste: infra vii. 528 E ὡς φορτικῶς ἐπαινοῦντι: Theaet. 183 E μὴ φορτικῶς σκοπῶμεν—'lest we consider the subject in an unworthy manner.' Republic II. 367 A

σοῦ ἐπιθυμῶν ἀκοῦσαι τἀναντία] is emphatic: 'it is because I wish to hear from you the opposite side, that I speak with so much earnestness, for I may as well be open with you.' B

ὡς δύναμαι μάλιστα] Cp. supra 358 D, where Glaucon says—διὸ κατατείνας ἐρῶ, κ.τ.λ.

εἰ γὰρ . . . ψέγειν ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν] 'For unless you subtract from both of them their true reputation, and unless you add on the false one (**μή** is to be repeated with **προσθήσεις**), we shall say that you do not praise justice, but the appearance of justice, nor blame the being unjust, but the seeming to be.'

While the essences of justice and injustice remain the same, their consequences are supposed to be interchanged. The second ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν is omitted in the text of A, but has been added in the margin by the second hand.

τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. i. 343 C. C

τὸ δὲ ἄδικον αὑτῷ μέν, κ.τ.λ.] The unjust is expedient to a man's self, as above i. 344 C τὸ δ' ἄδικον ἑαυτῷ λυσιτελοῦν τε καὶ ξυμφέρον.

ἐπειδὴ οὖν ὡμολόγησας . . . μᾶλλον αὐτὰ αὑτῶν] See above 357 B foll. Plato is fond of 'looping up' the argument by allusions to what has preceded. At the beginning of the Book, justice was placed in the second or 'fairest' class of goods, that is to say, goods desirable in themselves and for their consequences. Adeimantus in the words—**πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον αὐτὰ αὑτῶν**—has slightly altered this statement of Socrates, making justice belong to that class of goods which are desired much more for their own sakes than for their results.

We may observe **τε** followed by **δέ** as οὔτε by οὐδέ when a clause is emphasized, as below vi. 499 B οὔτε πόλις οὔτε πολιτεία οὐδέ γ' ἀνήρ.

καὶ ὑγιαίνειν δή] δή calls special attention to ὑγιαίνειν. Cp. Theaet. 156 B καὶ ἡδοναί γε δὴ καὶ λῦπαι: Meno 87 E ἰσχὺς καὶ κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος δή, infra vi. 503 E.

γόνιμα] 'genuine,' 'real.' Cp. γόνιμον ποιητήν in Aristophanes (Ran. 96). D

Republic II. 367 D **τοῦτ' οὖν αὐτὸ . . . βλάπτει**] **ὃ αὐτή, κ.τ.λ.** is an explanation of *τοῦτ' αὐτό*, which also refers to the previous context. 'She by herself'—setting aside the consequences which flow from her. **καὶ ἀδικία βλάπτει** is an instance of an unnecessary (and here ungrammatical) addition of a correlative clause.

ἀνασχοίμην ἄν] The MSS. vary between *ἀποσχοίμην*, *ἀποδεχοίμην*, and *ἀνασχοίμην*, the reading of Ξ, which has also the authority of the Scholiast and is represented in the version of Ficinus. The construction of the genitive with *ἀνέχομαι* occurs again in viii. 564 D *καὶ οὐκ ἀνέχεται τοῦ ἄλλα λέγοντος*, Protag. 323 A *εἰκότως ἅπαντος ἀνδρὸς ἀνέχονται.*

εἰ μὴ σὺ κελεύεις] *κελεύοις* is the reading of Par. A (with the iota over an erasure) and should perhaps be preferred to *κελεύεις*.

E **ἐάν τε λανθάνῃ, κ.τ.λ.**] These words are repeated almost *verbatim* in two other places, iv. 427 D, ix. 580 C,—where Socrates claims to have fulfilled the present demand. See note on 367 C *ἐπειδὴ οὖν ὡμολόγησας, κ.τ.λ.*

367 E–369 A *Socrates is greatly struck by the divine instinct which has kept in the paths of virtue two young men who are able to plead so eloquently for the opposite of virtue.—He is discouraged at not having satisfied them, but in the sacred cause of Justice he may not falter. He suggests an expedient by which the discussion may be facilitated. Justice is an attribute of States as well as of individuals, and in the state it must surely be present on a larger scale. Justice in the state may be compared to a writing in large letters, and in the individual to a writing in small letters. Having failed in our attempt to decipher the small characters, let us now begin with the larger, and afterwards return to the smaller letters.*

367 E **καὶ ἐγὼ . . . εἶπον**] For the form of the sentence cp. Protag. 335 E *ἀεὶ μὲν ἔγωγέ σου τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἄγαμαι, ἀτὰρ καὶ νῦν ἐπαινῶ καὶ φιλῶ.*

368 A **ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός**] Not Thrasymachus, as Stallbaum ridiculously supposes (quoting in proof of his opinion Phileb. 36 D, where Protarchus, who supports the doctrines of Philebus, is jestingly addressed as *ὦ παῖ 'κείνου τἀνδρός*), but Ariston, whose name immediately follows, and is connected with the phrase by the repetition of the word *παῖδες*. What the passage of the Philebus really proves is that this was a familiar mode of address amongst

intimate friends. As in other passages (Theaet. 207 D *αὐτά*: Sophist 263 E *αὐτό*), the demonstrative waits for the correlative word, which is supplied by the verse. The 'pronominal phrase' **ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός**, 'of that man,' prepares for the quotation from the Elegiac Poem and avoids the repetition of the name of Ariston. *Republic II.* 368 A

περὶ τὴν Μεγαροῖ μάχην] The battle of Megara here referred to may be one of those mentioned by Diodorus (xiii. 65, 72) as having taken place in 409 or 405. As the Athenians were constantly at war with the Megarians, it may also be some minor engagement which is unrecorded. It certainly could not have been the battle in 424, because Plato, who was the eldest of the family, was only born in 430 or 428. We may be certain of so much:—(1) that Glaucon and Adeimantus were Plato's brothers; (2) that they did distinguish themselves at a battle of Megara; (3) that this battle was not the famous one in 424. Cp. Böckh 439, 440.

εὖ δοκεῖ ἔχειν] 'seems to be very appropriate.' Cp. i. 329 E.

δοκεῖτε δή μοι . . . ἠπίστουν ἂν ὑμῖν] 'I do believe that you are really not convinced; and I gather this from your general character, for if I judged by your words only, I should not trust you.'

ἐκ τοῦ ἄλλου] *ἄλλος* here, as frequently in Plato, and occasionally in other writers, is used adverbially; not 'I judge from the rest of your character,' but 'I judge from something else [than your speech] which is your character.' Cp. supra 357 C. The antithesis is further pointed by **αὐτούς** in **αὐτοὺς τοὺς λόγους**. B

ὅ τι χρήσωμαι] used absolutely, as in Protag. 321 C *ἠπόρει ὅ τι χρήσαιτο*: Gorg. 465 E *ἐὰν . . . σοῦ ἀποκριναμένου μὴ ἔχω ὅ τι χρήσωμαι.*

μὴ βοηθεῖν] sc. *τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ.* C

ἐπειδὴ οὖν, κ.τ.λ.] For **οὐ δεινοί** cp. Theaet. 154 D *οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν δεινοὶ καὶ σοφοὶ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ ἦμεν, κ.τ.λ.*, and, for the favourite illustration from letters, Polit. 277 E foll., where the argument is from the simpler to the more complex, as here from the greater to the smaller. **οἷανπερ ἂν εἰ** may be compared with the elliptical formula *ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ.* The sentence is complicated. It would naturally have run thus: 'We should make such an enquiry as near-sighted people would make, if they were bidden to read small letters at a distance, and some one discovered that the same letters existed elsewhere larger and on a larger ground. It would be thought a gain to read the larger letters first, and then proceed to D

Republic *II.* 368 D the lesser.' These two sentences are compressed into one, the apodosis of the first (*ἐποιήσατό τις*), or some such words, being omitted, and **ἕρμαιον ἂν ἐφάνη**, strictly an epexegesis of it, taking its place. For a similar accusative out of construction, cp. especially iv. 434 D (where this passage is referred to) *νῦν δ' ἐκτελέσωμεν τὴν σκέψιν ἣν ᾠήθημεν, κ.τ.λ.* Compare the use of *ὥσπερ εἰ* with a sentence following: e.g. Theaet. 197 C *ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἴ τις . . . τρέφοι*, and elsewhere.

οὕτως] sc. *πρῶτον ἀναγνόντας.*

εἰ τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει] 'To discover if they are really the same.' See the transition from the state to the individual, which is made with a reference to this passage in iv. 434 D.

τί τοιοῦτον . . . καθορᾷς] 'What do you see like this in the inquiry respecting justice?' i.e. how is the inquiry facilitated by the simile of the large and small letters?

E **ἴσως τοίνυν . . . ἐνείη**] There is a touch of Socratic irony here.

369 A **τὴν τοῦ μείζονος . . . ἐπισκοποῦντες**] 'Looking for the likeness of the greater in the form of the less.'

γενομένου αὐτοῦ] 'When we have done as we propose.' Sc. *τοῦ γίγνεσθαι τὴν πόλιν λόγῳ.*

B **δοκεῖ οὖν χρῆναι, κ.τ.λ.**] The apparent backwardness of Socrates has the effect of stimulating his hearers. The crowning instance of this is in v. 472 A.

369 B–371 E *The state is the offspring of mutual need. No individual can supply a tithe of his own wants. Each therefore invites the co-operation of others, and the resulting association constitutes the state.*

Primary wants are those of food, shelter, raiment and shoes, and these are supplied by the husbandman, the builder, the weaver and the cobbler.

Their labours must be divided, and each must produce enough of his commodity, and that of the right quality, to supply the rest.

This division of labour is approved upon the following grounds:— 1. Natural aptitudes differ. 2. A man who has one calling only is more likely to excel in it. 3. Work must be done at the right time, and therefore there should be no risk of the workmen being otherwise engaged. A market must also be provided; and a medium of exchange.

And the principle must be carried further. The manufacture of

tools and implements must be committed to the carpenter and smith, and there must be a class of herdsmen and shepherds to rear the animals required for husbandry and for use in building, and for the supply of wool and leather to the weaver and the shoe-maker. *Republic II. 369 B–371 E*

Our city is growing in size and can hardly be self-supporting. This deficiency leads to importation, and this to the creation of a mercantile class, and then, as imports necessitate exports, there is an increase of the number of persons in the city who are engaged in production. There must also be ships and sailors, and as exchange within the city grows more complex, barter becomes purchase, a currency is established, and a class of retail merchants is created. Lastly, the bulk of the commodities now carried to and fro necessitates a class of hired porters, who complete our simple state.

γίγνεται τοίνυν . . . πόλις] The real origin of society is beyond the horizon of human history. We reconstruct the fabric on some modern basis of contract, divine right, division of labour, mutual necessity, or obligation, which is ascribed by us to the earliest ages. But the society which we put together is only that which we have previously taken to pieces. We mistake the scientific exposition of a subject for its historical growth and development. The principles which we suppose to have been known and recognized by all mankind from the beginning, are really working in them, but unconsciously. They grew like children according to certain laws, but they did not understand these laws. 369 B

ἢ τίν' οἴει . . . πόλιν οἰκίζειν] 'Or to what other origin would you attribute the foundation of the state?' (Literally, 'What other beginning, think you, founds the state?') Necessity is the *πρῶτος οἰκιστής*. For the liveliness of the expression, cp. infra C *ποιήσει δὲ αὐτὴν . . . ἡ ἡμετέρα χρεία*.

οὕτω δὴ ἄρα . . . ἐθέμεθα πόλιν ὄνομα] The plural is the main subject: this is subdivided by **παραλαμβάνων**, which is attracted by **ἄλλος** into the singular: cp. *ἡμῶν ἕκαστος* in the last sentence. C

ἄλλος ἄλλον . . . ἐπ' ἄλλου χρείᾳ] 'One taking to himself one person for one purpose, another taking another for a different purpose, and yet another for another purpose still.' The complex expression reflects the mutual interlacing of various needs.

μεταδίδωσι δὴ . . . ἄμεινον εἶναι] 'And so one gives to another

Republic *II.* or receives from another, because he believes it to be better for him' (to do so).

369 C **ἴθι δή . . . ἡμετέρα χρεία**] 'Well then, said I, let us in idea create a city from the beginning; although our need will be the real creator.'

D **καὶ τῶν τοιούτων**] preparing for *σκυτοτόμος* infra.

φέρε δή, κ.τ.λ.] Aristotle, misunderstanding the imaginative and artistic treatment of the subject, which he takes as matter of fact, makes a superficial criticism on this passage in Pol. iv. 4, § 12, which is as follows: 'Socrates says that a state is made up of four sorts of people who are absolutely necessary; these are a weaver, a husbandman, a shoemaker, and a builder; afterwards, finding that they are not enough, he adds a smith, and again a herdsman, to look after the necessary animals; then a merchant, and then a retail trader. All these together form the complement of the first state, as if a state were established merely to supply the necessaries of life, rather than for the sake of the good, or stood equally in need of shoemakers and husbandmen.' Stallbaum (note on 369 B) says: 'Aristoteles causam (die Veranlassung) et finem (den Zweck) non distinxit, licet alibi discrimen eorum non neglexerit.' It is quite true that Plato is not here speaking of the final cause of the state, but of the immediate cause of its origin. It is Aristotle who substitutes one for the other and thereby introduces confusion.

ἐπὶ τοσαύτην παρασκευήν] 'To provide all this.' Socrates playfully exaggerates the wants of his primitive state. Cp. the serious use in vii. 535 C *τοσαύτην μάθησιν*.

γεωργὸς μὲν εἷς] sc. *ἔσται*, implied in the previous verb.

σκυτοτόμον] This word, like 'cobbler' among ourselves, appears to have had ludicrous associations. Cp. infra 374 B; v. 466 B *κατὰ τὸν τῶν σκυτοτόμων . . . βίον*.

αὐτόσε] 'thereto,' i. e. to those already mentioned.

τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα] Either (1) neuter, or better (2) masculine: 'another of those who minister to the body.'

ἥ γε ἀναγκαιοτάτη πόλις] Either 'the barest idea of a state,' or 'a state which provides for the barest necessities.' Probably a slight play is intended on both senses of the word *ἀναγκαῖος*. There appears to be a similar double meaning in vii. 527 A *λέγουσι μέν που μάλα γελοίως τε καὶ ἀναγκαίως*, 'they speak very ludicrously and

meagrely,' i. e. with a view to mere necessities; but not without an allusion to geometrical necessity. Also in ix. 574 B ἕνεκα . . . οὐκ ἀναγκαίας ἑταίρας . . . τὴν . . . ἀναγκαίαν μητέρα. The geometrical meaning is also played upon in v. 458 D οὐ γεωμετρικαῖς γε, . . . ἀλλ' ἐρωτικαῖς ἀνάγκαις. Republic II. 369 D

ἀμελήσαντα] sc. τῶν ἄλλων. E

τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν] Compare Charm. 161 E, where this simple notion of doing one's own business, which has been suggested as a definition of σωφροσύνη, is humorously set aside: δοκεῖ ἄν σοι πόλις εὖ οἰκεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ νόμου τοῦ κελεύοντος τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἱμάτιον ἕκαστον ὑφαίνειν καὶ πλύνειν, καὶ ὑποδήματα σκυτοτομεῖν, καὶ λήκυθον καὶ στλεγγίδα καὶ τἆλλα πάντα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, τῶν μὲν ἀλλοτρίων μὴ ἅπτεσθαι, τὰ δὲ ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστον ἐργάζεσθαί τε καὶ πράττειν; Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἦ δ' ὅς. 370 A

ἀλλ' ἴσως . . . ῥᾷον ἢ 'κείνως] 'But surely, Socrates, the former way (**οὕτω**, sc. by co-operation) is easier than the second way' (**ἐκείνως**, by isolation). ῥᾴδιον, which is the reading of Par. A and of the great majority of MSS., is supported by Meno 94 E ῥᾴδιόν ἐστι κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους ἢ εὖ. The manuscript emendation, ῥᾷον, may be right (see v. rr. on i. 348 E), but is not absolutely necessary. The confusion, if so be, arises from *dittographia* and the similarity of Α to Δ (ραιον, ραιαιον, ραιδιον). **οὕτω** refers to the more familiar of the two alternatives, which is nearer in the speaker's mind.

ἐννοῶ γὰρ . . . εἰπόντος σοῦ] 'It comes into my mind now you speak.' Socrates has been leading Adeimantus to this result, which he now characteristically pretends to gather from him. The genitive absolute indicates the occasion rather than the cause: cp. infra 383 A οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ φαίνεται σοῦ λέγοντος.

φύεται] This word has the chief emphasis, and is resumed in **φύσιν**. The first point is that all have not the same natural aptitudes.

πρᾶξιν] The reading πράξει (M r) is not impossible. B

ὅταν μίαν εἷς] sc. ἐργάζηται.

οὐ γάρ, οἶμαι . . . ἐν παρέργου μέρει] 'For the business, I conceive, will not wait for the leisure of the doer of the business, but the doer must keep at the work, making it his first object.' For the metaphorical application of **ἐθέλειν** to things without life, cp. infra iv. 436 B ταὐτὸν τἀναντία ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν . . . οὐκ ἐθελήσει. So Hdt. i. 74 συμβάσιες ἰσχυραὶ οὐκ ἐθέλουσι συμμένειν.

Republic II. **ἐπακολουθεῖν**] Cp. iii. 406 B *παρακολουθῶν γὰρ τῷ νοσήματι.*

370 C **ἐκ δὴ τούτων . . . πράττῃ**] The order is inverted, **πλείω** referring to *καιρόν*, **κάλλιον** to *ὅταν μίαν εἷς*, **ῥᾷον** to *φύεται*, in what precedes.

D **τέκτονες δή**] *δή*, not *δέ*, is the true reading. 'And so,' &c.

ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄν πω] *οὔπω*, like *οὐκέτι* (373 A, 468 B), is used to imply stages in the argument. Cp. supra i. 353 C *οὐ γάρ πω τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ*— 'I have not yet come to that question.'

E **ἵνα οἵ τε γεωργοὶ . . . χρῆσθαι ὑποζυγίοις**] 'That the husbandmen may have oxen to plough with, and builders, as well as husbandmen, the use of cattle for draught.' **ἔχοιεν** is used in a double sense and construction—*ἔχοιεν* ('possess') *βοῦς* and *ἔχοιεν* ('be able') *χρῆσθαι*: *ἔχοιεν* follows the mood of *προσθεῖμεν*: 'if we were to give them shepherds and other herdsmen that the husbandmen might have oxen for the plough.' Every possible use of the animals is enumerated except that of eating them. This is reserved for the luxurious state. Cp. infra 373 C *δεήσει δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων βοσκημάτων παμπόλλων, εἴ τις αὐτὰ ἔδεται.* [*ὑποζυγίοις*, which should have been accusative after *ἔχοιεν*, is attracted into construction with *χρῆσθαι.*—L. C.]

αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν] 'To place the city itself' (not to speak further of the things contained in the city) 'where no imports are required, is well-nigh impossible.' *αὐτήν* opposes the state to the previously mentioned individuals who are included in it. Cp. especially Thuc. ii. 60, § 4 *ὁπότε οὖν πόλις μὲν τὰς ἰδίας ξυμφορὰς οἵα τε φέρειν, εἷς δ' ἕκαστος τὰς ἐκείνης ἀδύνατος, πῶς οὐ χρὴ πάντας ἀμύνειν αὐτῇ;*

κενὸς ἂν ἴῃ] *εἴη* is found in all the manuscripts with the exception of *q β'*. But the meaning of the words *κενὸς ἂν εἴη* is poor and feeble, and the asyndeton at **κενὸς ἄπεισιν** indefensible. The reading *κενὸς ἂν ἴῃ*, though probably a manuscript conjecture, is most likely to be the true one. 'But if the minister come empty-handed, and bring nothing which the other people want, whoever they may be from whom they obtain the supply of their needs, he will depart empty-handed.' The position of *κενός* before *ἂν ἴῃ* is emphatic, and prepares for the repetition of the word.

371 A **δεῖ δή**] 'And, therefore, what they produce at home must be not only enough for themselves, but also enough and of the right kind to accommodate (subaud. *ἱκανά ἐστιν*) those of whom (i.e. of whose commodities) they stand in need.' The slight difficulty of explaining the last words of this sentence has probably led to the insertion of

ἄξουσιν οἱ μεταδώσουσιν before **ὧν ἂν δέωνται** in *q*. Either (1) ὧν may be taken as masculine: in this case the construction is peculiar and different from ὧν ἐκεῖνοι δέονται in the preceding sentence: 'Those of whom they stand in need': i.e. of whose commodities they stand in need; or (2), placing a comma after **ἐκείνοις**, the clause ὧν ἂν δέωνται may be taken as epexegetic—οἷα καὶ ὅσα ἐκείνοις, sc. ἱκανά, 'but in quality and measure suited to them (viz. those of whom they buy, παρ' ὧν ἂν κομίζωνται)—whatever the things are which they require.' The former interpretation (1) is the more probable. *Republic II.* 371 A

τῶν ἄλλων διακόνων] 'And we shall also want the ministerial class of whom we spoke before, who will have to import and export the various products.' ἄλλων is adverbial. The article recalls the previous mention of them in 370 E. It is implied, but not expressed, that this class also must be increased.

ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει] 'In the city itself.' The pronoun here distinguishes the internal from the external commerce of the city. B

ὧν δὴ ἕνεκα] sc. τοῦ μεταδιδόναι, κ.τ.λ., supra 369 C.

ἀγορὰ . . . ἐκ τούτου] 'The next step will be to have a market-place, and a money-token for purposes of exchange.'

τὴν διακονίαν . . . ταύτην] 'this service'—of selling, as infra E τὴν τιμὴν ταύτην. The antecedent has to be collected from the previous words ἐν ἀγορᾷ καθῆσθαι. C

αὕτη . . . τῇ πόλει] 'This want, then (i.e. of ministers of exchange), calls retail-traders into existence in the state.' D

τοὺς δὲ πλάνητας ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις] He recalls the ἔμποροι mentioned in 371 A in order to distinguish them from the κάπηλοι.

τὴν τιμὴν ταύτην μισθὸν καλοῦντες] 'Who, selling the use of their strength, because they call the pay thereby obtained hire are called hirelings.' **ταύτην** refers to **πωλοῦντες**: cp. Theaet. 168 B ἀντὶ φιλοσόφων μισοῦντας τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα (=φιλοσοφίαν) and supra C τὴν διακονίαν . . . ταύτην. E

Plato is not a bad political economist; he saw the advantage of a division of labour (cp. Laws viii. 846 D, E) in saving the time and improving the skill of the labourers, and the accordance of such a division with the natural differences of mankind. The distinctions of manufacturers and dealers, and of soldiers and citizens, are based by him on the same principle, of which he also makes a fanciful

Republic II. 371 E application in his objections to the drama (iii. 395 A, B 'One man cannot in his life play many parts'). He further saw the necessity of foreign trade or 'territorial division of labour,' in speaking of which Plato almost uses the formula of modern economical writers.

πλήρωμα . . . μισθωτοί] 'Then hirelings also go to make up a state.'

372 A–373 C *Where in the state are Justice and Injustice and at what point in the growth of the state do they come in? Adeimantus thinks that Justice somehow springs out of the mutual intercourse of the different classes with each other. Socrates then proceeds to describe the way of living in the primitive state.*

But the rudeness of this Arcadian simplicity is distasteful to Glaucon, who, as a man of pleasure, demands that their citizens should have the comforts of civilized life.

And Socrates does not object. For the contrast between Justice and Injustice is likely to be more apparent when luxury has set in.

The first consequence is a further enlargement of the city by the addition of classes devoted to the supply of artificial wants; animals will be reared for food; more servants too, amongst others the class of swine-herds, as well as cooks and confectioners, will be required. The sphere of medicine also will be greatly extended.

372 A **χρείᾳ**] Here used in the sense of 'intercourse' or 'dealings with one another.' Cp. Aristot. Rhet. i. 15, 22.

B **θρέψονται . . . πόλεμον**] The main verb *θρέψονται* is forgotten in the accumulation of participles: and when the sentence is resumed with greater emphasis in the words **μάζας, κ.τ.λ.**, a word more suitable to the context (**εὐωχήσονται**) takes its place. Hence an asyndeton.

τῶν κριθῶν . . . τῶν πυρῶν] The article refers to *σῖτον* supra.

τὰ μέν] sc. *τὰ ἄλευρα.*

τὰ δέ] sc. *τὰ ἄλφιτα*—a simple chiasm. See vol. ii. p. 160, l. 48.

μάζας γενναίας] 'Noble bannocks,' see note on i. 348 C.

ἐπὶ στιβάδων ἐστρωμένων μίλακί τε καὶ μυρρίναις] 'On pallets spread of yew and myrtle boughs.'

τοῦ οἴνου] the article referring to *σῖτόν τε ποιοῦντες καὶ* **οἶνον**.

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οὐχ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν ποιούμενοι τοὺς παῖδας] cp. iv. 421 E–423 C, where the question of population recurs.

372 C

εὐλαβούμενοι . . . πόλεμον] cp. infra 373 D, where war is seen to be occasioned by the excess of population over territory.

ἄνευ ὄψου . . . ἑστιωμένους] *ἑστιωμένους* conveys a sarcastic allusion to *εὐωχήσονται*. 'You call it feasting when they have nothing but dry bread!'

καὶ βολβοὺς καὶ λάχανα . . . ἑψήσονται] 'And they will boil truffles and cabbages—such vegetables for boiling as, you know, are to be had in the country.' Xen. Cyr. i. 2, § 8 asserts that cress (*κάρδαμον*) was the only *ὄψον* allowed to the Persian youth when under training.

Socrates assumes a charming unconsciousness of Glaucon's meaning when he asks for *ὄψον*, and, like Grumio, 'feeds him with the name of meat.'

D

μετρίως ὑποπίνοντες] 'Drinking moderately the while.' *ὑπο-* implies that the wine was an accompaniment of the 'dessert.' Cp. Anacreon f. 63 (quoted by L. and S. s. v.) *καλοῖς ὑποπίνοντες ἐν ὕμνοις*.

εἰ δὲ ὑῶν πόλιν, κ.τ.λ.] This picture of paradisiacal simplicity and vegetable diet has no attractions for Glaucon, who abruptly exclaims: 'And if, Socrates, you were establishing a commonwealth of pigs, how else would you be feeding the beasts?' (**χορτάζειν** is used properly of animals). 'But what ought I to do, Glaucon? said I. Let them have the usages of civilized life: people who are to be comfortable should lie on sofas and dine off tables, and have dainties and dessert after the modern fashion.' In this easy, humorous style Plato makes the transition from the first simple notion of a state to the more complex. With **ἀλλὰ πῶς χρή** and **ἅπερ νομίζεται**, some general words like *ποιεῖν* and *διδόναι* have to be supplied from **ἐχόρταζες**.

ἐπί τε κλινῶν κατακεῖσθαι] in apposition with **ἅπερ νομίζεται**. *κλίνη*, 'a couch,' is opposed to *στιβάς*, 'a pallet,' supra B.

E

ὄψα] sc. *ἔχειν*, absorbed in **ἔχουσι**.

σκοποῦντες γὰρ . . . ἐμφύονται] Socrates ironically dissembles his real meaning, which is that without taking into account the evils attributable to luxury, and amongst other evils war, any real inquiry into the origin and growth of justice and injustice would be

Republic II. 372 E impossible. Plato does not seek for justice in the simple state, because his idea of it and his anxiety to elaborate a parallel between the virtues of the individual and the state requires a more complex and highly organized form of society. There must be three classes in the state (as there are three parts of the soul)—each having its appropriate virtue of temperance, wisdom, courage,—before there can be justice, which is the harmonious blending of three virtues or cooperation of the three classes in the state. These three virtues and classes have no sufficient *raison d' être* in the city of pigs.

ἡ μὲν οὖν . . . ὑγιής τις] The word *ὑγιής*, which is softened by **ὥσπερ**, prepares the way for the stronger metaphor of **φλεγμαίνουσαν πόλιν**, which follows. Cp. Laws iii. 691 E *φύσις τις . . . κατιδοῦσα ὑμῶν τὴν ἀρχὴν* **φλεγμαίνουσαν** *ἔτι.*

εἰ δ' αὖ βούλεσθε . . . θεωρήσωμεν] The subjunctive in phrases of this kind was originally interrogative, but the exact relation of the words was forgotten in the course of time. Goodwin, *M. and T.* §§ 287, 288.

ταῦτα γὰρ δή τισιν] Socrates thus playfully alludes to the displeasure which Glaucon expresses at the simple state.

373 A **κλῖναι, κ.τ.λ.**] *κλῖναι* are to supersede the yew and myrtle boughs, **τράπεζαι** to take the place of the clean leaves.

ἑταῖραι] are introduced *παρὰ προσδοκίαν* among cakes and ointments, as below *ἔτι δὲ καὶ συβωτῶν προσδεησόμεθα*, in contrast with the more refined ministers of luxury. A link of association is supplied by the mention of the rich perfumes and other sensual delights. A similar juxtaposition occurs in the Theaetetus, 175 E *μηδὲ ὄψον ἡδῦναι ἢ θῶπας λόγους.* So infra iii. 404 D *ψέγεις ἄρα καὶ Κορινθίαν κόρην φίλην εἶναι*, where the *Κορινθία κόρη* is mentioned along with the luxuries of the table.

καὶ ὄψα δή] the particle *δή* calls attention to the special demand of Glaucon for *ὄψον* in 372 C, which Socrates now satisfies.

ἕκαστα τούτων παντοδαπά] The asyndeton adds to the effect, as in iv. 434 A *πάντα τἆλλα μεταλλαττόμενα.*

καὶ δὴ καὶ . . . θετέον] The antecedent to *ἃ* is repeated with a limitation in **τὰ ἀναγκαῖα**. 'In providing what we first spoke of (shelter and covering) we must no longer ordain mere necessaries, as houses, garments, shoes, but set-a-going the arts of decoration.'

καὶ τὴν ποικιλίαν] These words are omitted in Par. A and

several other MSS., but their presence in Π shows the reading to be an early one, and as decoration is required for houses in the luxurious state, so embroidery is required for clothing. *Republic II.* 373 A

μείζονά τε αὖ] The correlative sentence is deferred; it is probably to be found in *καὶ ἡ χώρα που, κ.τ.λ.* (infra D). B

ὄγκου . . . καὶ πλήθους] 'It is to be increased in bulk and number.' The words have a depreciatory tone, and are suggestive of a huge unwieldy multitude.

οἷον . . . μιμηταί] (1) It is not certain whether in this passage **θηρευταί** simply means 'huntsmen,' who may be supposed to supply the wants of the luxurious citizens, or whether it includes the association of 'hunters of men,' 'birds of prey,' who live by their wits at the expense of others (observe the addition of **πάντες** suggesting a multifarious class). The love of fanciful language in Plato, and also the tendency to fanciful comparisons and generalizations, which is apt to prevail in the infancy of dialectic (see especially the Sophist and Politicus, in both of which *θηρευτική* and *μιμητική* occur together, as *θηρευταί* and *μιμηταί* in this passage,—Soph. 265 A, Polit. 299 D), makes it likely that this mischievous second intention of the word has not been forgotten by Plato. So the Sophist is termed *νέων καὶ πλουσίων ἔμμισθος θηρευτής* (Soph. 231 D), and the art of the Sophist (Euthyd. 290 B), *θηρευτική . . . τέχνη ἀνθρώπων*: in Laws vii. 823 B, the term *θήρα* is extended to men as well as to beasts and birds, so as to include thieves, pirates, &c.,—as also in the Sophist and Politicus, where the *θήρα τῶν ἡμέρων* has many subdivisions, including piracy, kidnapping, law, rhetoric, and sophistry (Soph. 222 B foll.)—and *στρατηγική* is included under *θηρευτική* (Polit. 299 D *στρατηγικῆς καὶ ξυμπάσης ἡστινοσοῦν θηρευτικῆς καὶ γραφικῆς ἢ ξυμπάσης μέρος ὁτιοῦν μιμητικῆς*). Cp. also Xen. Mem. ii. 6. 29. (2) On the other hand, although the metaphorical use of *θηρευτής* is common, it may seem that the word could hardly be applied in this way without some preparation or explanation.

οἱ περὶ τὰ σχήματά τε καὶ χρώματα] Simply 'forms and colours,' a general expression, including probably sculptors, painters, architects, as well as inferior decorative artists—not dancers, who are referred to under the next head (**χορευταί**).

ποιηταί] The poets are allowed to enter with other *μιμηταί*, but most of them in Book iii are afterwards driven out. And by this

Republic II. 373 B reform of *μουσική* Socrates professes to have done something to purge the fevered commonwealth: cp. infra iii. 399 E *καὶ νὴ τὸν κύνα, εἶπον, λελήθαμέν γε διακαθαίροντες πάλιν ἣν ἄρτι τρυφᾶν ἔφαμεν πόλιν.* The purgation is made more complete in Book x. **ῥαψῳδοί, ὑποκριταί, χορευταί, ἐργολάβοι** are the ministers of the poets.

C **παιδαγωγῶν**] Fathers will no longer look after their sons themselves. Mothers will not suckle their own children. All sorts of persons will be required to minister to the extravagances of fashion and the luxuries of the table.

ἔτι δὲ καὶ συβωτῶν] This is humorously added. Swine are fed only for eating; they were not wanted in a state that dispensed with animal food.

τοῦτο . . . τούτου]. The vagueness of the reference renders the transition easy to 'the other animals,' as if swine, and not their keepers, had been mentioned at first. In what follows the emphasis is on **παμπόλλων**. The other animals (that were included in the former state) will be needed in far greater numbers than before, i.e. not only enough for ploughing, draught, &c. (supra 370 E), but also for the table.

D **ἰατρῶν ἐν χρείαις**] The plural in *χρείαις* is occasioned by *ἰατρῶν*.

373 D–376 C *A further consequence of luxury is that we shall be no longer content with the boundaries of our original territory, nor our neighbours with theirs: each will covet a portion of the other's land. And so we shall go to war:—which to states is the source of so many evils. For self-protection we must now have a soldier-class, which, like the other classes, will devote itself exclusively to its own pursuits.*

In appointing the guardians, we must first of all select suitable natures. But what natures are suitable? The example of the watch-dog may instruct us here. For he, too, is a guardian. And we observe that courage and gentleness are united in him. Is such a combination possible in man? The difficulty seems at first sight insuperable; yet our illustration of the watch-dog shows a way out of it; for dogs are fierce to strangers, but gentle to those whom they know. May we not then infer that the love of knowledge in a spirited nature is the combination for which we are seeking.

373 D **ἀφῶσιν αὑτούς**] It is this prevalence of the lower nature (*σιδηροῦν, χρηματιστικόν*) which occasions the degeneracy of the state in Book

viii. (pp. 547, 550 ff.). Cp. also the downfall of Atlantis in the Critias (120 D ff.). *Republic II.*

πολεμήσομεν . . . ὅταν γίγνηται] Without enlarging on the precise effects of war, Socrates is content to argue that war arises from the same cause (i. e. luxury), as most of the other evils of mankind. 373 E

ἐξ ὧν] Either (1) referring to *πολέμου* (plural to singular, whence two MSS. read *ἐξ οὗ*), or (2) = *ἐξ ἐκείνων γιγνομένου ὧν*. For **ὅταν γίγνηται**, which is equivalent to *ἑκάστοτε*, cp. Euthyphr. 7 D *ἐχθροὶ ἀλλήλοις γιγνόμεθα, ὅταν γιγνώμεθα.*

ὅλῳ στρατοπέδῳ] follows the construction of **σμικρῷ** which is a dative of measure or excess.

ὑπὲρ ὧν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν] perhaps with an ironical reference to *τίτθαι κομμωτρίαι κουρεῖς*, &c. 374 A

αὐτοὶ οὐχ ἱκανοί] 'Are they not enough to take care of themselves without adding to them?' The answer is: 'Not enough; for if we are to carry out our principle of a division of labour, the soldier's must be a separate calling.'

Plato separates the profession of the soldier on much the same grounds as standing armies would be defended in our own day. Yet, as he himself allows afterwards, the soldier may also be a philosopher, nor is the utmost military training inconsistent with other employments in modern times. Large standing armies may be required by the exceptional circumstances of politics, and are not necessarily attended by political dangers. Yet the division between the calling of the citizen and the soldier is probably injurious to both, as tending to separate elements of character which should rather be united—in Plato's language, as dividing courage from gentleness, and also as superseding a patriotic by a merely professional feeling.

ἀλλ' ἄρα] applies, not only to the first, but also to the second member of the sentence (*τὰ δὲ δὴ . . . εὖ ἀπεργασθέντα*), which latter is the emphatic part of it: 'But are we to infer then that while we make one rule for the cobbler and for the husbandman with a view to their attaining a special excellence, the attainment of special excellence in the military art is not of the greatest importance?' B

ἐφ' ᾧ ἔμελλε . . . ἐργαζόμενος] (1) 'With a view to which keeping himself free from all other pursuits'—or better (2) 'attending

Republic *II.* 374 B to which,' 'in which,' i.e. 'leaving other things and doing this.' **ἐφ' ᾧ** belongs either (1) to **σχολὴν ἄγων**, or (2) to the whole sentence, being resumed emphatically in *διὰ βίου αὐτὸ ἐργαζόμενος*.—**ἔμελλε**, i.e. 'if he was to do his work well,' as supra 372 D *τοὺς μέλλοντας μὴ ταλαιπωρεῖσθαι*.

C **ἢ οὕτω ῥᾴδιον . . . (D) ἱκανὴν παρασχομένῳ**] For the complex form of sentence, where two clauses, which cannot be true together, are included in one interrogation or negation, cp. especially supra i. 336 E *μὴ γὰρ δὴ οἴου, εἰ μὲν χρυσίον ἐζητοῦμεν . . . δικαιοσύνην δὲ ζητοῦντας, κ.τ.λ.*, and note. The implied disjunctive argument, If war is to be left to citizen soldiers it is either less important or easier than other pursuits, is characteristic of Plato, as also is the introduction of fresh examples, *πεττεία καὶ κυβεία*, when those already adduced were sufficient.

αὐτὸ τοῦτο] sc. *πεττείαν ἢ κυβείαν*, understood from **πεττευτικὸς ἢ κυβευτικός**.

D **λαβὼν . . . ληφθέν**] The momentary tense is significant: 'the instant he takes it' or 'it is taken in hand.'

ὅπλων τε καὶ ὀργάνων] The addition of *ὀργάνων* points the analogy. The weapons of the warrior are his tools.

πολλοῦ γὰρ ἄν, κ.τ.λ.] sc. *εἰ οὕτω ταῦτα ἦν*.

τῶν ἄλλων] To be joined with **σχολῆς**: 'Leisure from other pursuits,' sc. *ἐπιτηδευμάτων*. Cp. supra 370 C *σχολὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄγων*, 374 B.

E **ἆρ' οὖν . . . ἐπιτήδευμα**] 'Will he not also require a natural aptitude for the particular occupation?' *ἐπιτήδευμα* (cp. *ἐπιτηδές, ἐπιτηδεύω*) has a wide range of meaning,—what a man practises, makes an object or profession: hence also the customs and institutions of a state.

ἡμέτερον μέντοι] *μέντοι* gives a deliberative assent to the new and somewhat disturbing suggestion.

ὅσον γ' ἂν δύναμις παρείκῃ] 'as far as our power allows.' Theaet. 150 D *οἷσπερ ἂν ὁ θεὸς παρείκῃ*: more often impersonal—Sympos. 187 E *καθ' ὅσον παρείκει, φυλακτέον*.

375 A **οἴει . . . διαμάχεσθαι**] Compare with what follows the conclusion of the Politicus 306–311, where courage and gentleness are to be

interwoven in a state. Also infra iv. 441 E: vi. 503 B, C: Laws vi. 773.

εἰς φυλακήν] is to be taken closely with **διαφέρειν**. **αἰσθανόμενον** is masculine: 'When he has the game in view.' **αἴσθησις** has a special use in hunting, cp. Xen. Cyn. 3. 5. 375 A

ὡς ἄμαχόν τε καὶ ἀνίκητον θυμός] Cp. the saying of Heracleitus (fr. cv Bywater) *θυμῷ μάχεσθαι χαλεπόν· ὅ τι γὰρ ἂν χρηίζῃ γίνεσθαι, ψυχῆς ὠνέεται.* B

ταῦτα δὲ ἀδυνάτοις ἔοικε] 'Now this seems an impossible requirement'—viz. that a nature should be found, having both these opposite qualities. For a similar affectation of despair on the part of Socrates cp. Theaet. 203 D *προγιγνώσκειν τὰ στοιχεῖα ἅπασα ἀνάγκη τῷ μέλλοντί ποτε γνώσεσθαι συλλαβήν, καὶ οὕτως ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς λόγος ἀποδεδρακὼς οἰχήσεται.* D

δικαίως . . . ἀπελείφθημεν] 'My friend, said I, we deserve to be in a puzzle, for we have lost sight of our own illustration.' Theaet. 189 C *δικαίως ἂν καλοῖτο ψευδῆ δοξάζων.* So *δίκαιος* vi. 504 A *μὴ γὰρ μνημονεύων . . . τὰ λοιπὰ ἂν εἴην δίκαιος μὴ ἀκούειν.*

οὐκ ἐνενοήσαμεν . . . ταῦτα] The greatest characters are those in which opposite qualities, instead of extinguishing one another, exist side by side, and are developed by the occasions which require them. Besides the strength or goodness, the range or play of a character has also to be considered. **ἄρα**, 'then,' as this example shows.

οἶσθα γάρ που . . . τοὐναντίον] **τῶν γενναίων κυνῶν** has a double construction: (1) after *οἶσθα*, as a poetical genitive, which may be defended by such passages as Laws i. 646 D *τῆς περὶ τὸν οἶνον ἄρα διατριβῆς ὡσαύτως διανοητέον.* (2) The use of the genitive is further supported by the resumption of *κυνῶν* in **αὐτῶν**, which is governed by **ἦθος**. Cp. infra iv. 439 B *τοῦ τοξότου οὐ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν, ὅτι αὐτοῦ, κ.τ.λ.* E

οἶδα μέντοι] 'Certainly.' *μέντοι* marks Glaucon's assent to the new point to which attention is called.

καὶ τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ . . . προπεπονθώς] Compare the fragment of Heracleitus (cxv Bywater) *κύνες καὶ βαΰζουσι ὃν ἂν μὴ γινώσκωσι.* This double character of friendliness to acquaintances and savageness to strangers—*τὸ φιλητικοὺς μὲν εἶναι τῶν γνωρίμων, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀγνῶτας ἀγρίους*—is attributed by Aristotle to *θυμός*, which he makes 376 A

Republic II. 376 A the principle of friendship, instancing in support of his statement the fact that we are more liable to be excited against friends when we are slighted by them than against enemies (Pol. vii. 7, § 5). **δή** after **οὐδέν** is well supported by manuscript authority, although Par. A has *δέ*, and the particle is omitted by Stobaeus. *δή* is more forcible than *δέ*. 'He has manifestly received no injury from one whom he has never seen.'

οὐ πάνυ . . . προσέσχον τὸν νοῦν] 'I never before gave any attention to the point.' *οὐ πάνυ*, 'not at all' or 'certainly not,' the absoluteness of the negative being used to intensify the statement, as also in *οὐ πάντως*, with which the expression may be compared.

ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . φιλόσοφον] 'But surely this instinct of canine nature is charming, and quite like a philosopher.' **κομψός** is one of the facetious words in Plato. Compare the following: viii. 558 A *ἡ πραότης ἐνίων τῶν δικασθέντων οὐ κομψή;* 'charming,' as in this passage: iii. 405 D *τοὺς κομψοὺς Ἀσκληπιάδας*, 'clever sons of Aesculapius': v. 460 A *κλῆροι κομψοί*, 'clever,' 'cunningly devised lots': vi. 489 C *ὁ τοῦτο κομψευσάμενος ἐψεύσατο*, 'the ingenious inventor of this told a fib:' Phaedr. 230 C *πάντων δὲ κομψότατον τὸ τῆς πόας*, 'most charming of all is the grass.' In all these passages there is an idea (1) of fineness or subtlety: (2) of amusement.

B **πῇ δή; . . . καὶ τὸ ἀλλότριον**] Socrates works the illustration with ironical gravity. 'Your dog,' as he would say, 'is a philosopher; for he loves those whom he knows, and what is the love of knowledge but philosophy?'

For the use of **πῇ** and **ᾗ**—'Interesting in what way? In this way'—cp. vi. 510 B *σκόπει δὴ αὖ καὶ τὴν τοῦ νοητοῦ τομὴν ᾗ τμητέον. Πῇ; Ἧι τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ τοῖς τότε τμηθεῖσιν ὡς εἰκόσι χρωμένη ψυχὴ ζητεῖν ἀναγκάζεται ἐξ ὑποθέσεων*: Theaet. 172 D, where *ᾗ* in like manner introduces a sentence: *πῇ δή; ᾗ τοῖς μὲν . . . ἀεὶ πάρεστι σχολή, κ.τ.λ.*

οὐκοῦν . . . δεῖν εἶναι] 'And may we not say confidently of man also that he who is to be gentle to his friends and acquaintances must by nature be a lover of wisdom and knowledge?' The following sentence shows that **φύσει** is construed with **φιλόσοφον** and not with **πρᾶος**.

C **οὗτος μὲν . . . οὗτοι**] The abrupt change of number is again noticeable. Cp. supra 373 E.

αὐτό] The antecedent is to be gathered from **παιδευθήσονται.** Republic II. 376 D

σκοποῦσι] = *ἐὰν σκοπῶμεν.*

ἵνα μὴ . . . διεξίωμεν] For the use of **ἱκανός** see Gorg. 512 C *ἱκανὸς γὰρ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος*: and for **συχνός**, implying tediousness, cp. Theaet. 185 E *μάλα συχνοῦ λόγου*: Soph. 217 D *ἐκτείναντα ἀπομηκύνειν λόγον συχνὸν κατ' ἐμαυτόν*: Phil. 23 B *βαβαί . . . συχνοῦ μὲν λόγου τοῦ λοιποῦ.* 'For we do not want to be tedious, and we do not want to leave unsaid what is required for completeness;' i. e. 'For we want enough, and not too much.' Cp. x. 601 C *μὴ τοίνυν ἡμίσεως αὐτὸ καταλίπωμεν ῥηθέν, ἀλλ' ἱκανῶς ἴδωμεν.* **ἱκανὸν λόγον**, like *πλήρωμα* supra 371 E, is a collective word used partitively. This clause is omitted in the text of Par. A, but has been added in the margin by an early hand.

καὶ ὁ τοῦ Γλαύκωνος ἀδελφός] Glaucon, who was provoked by 'the city of pigs,' has been the interlocutor in the lively discussion of the luxurious commonwealth and of the nature of the guardians. Adeimantus now interposes on the question of method and continues the serious discussion about education, till on the question of music Glaucon is again too much interested to keep silence.

How are these select natures to be reared? 376 E–383 C

In youth they are to be educated, according to the dictates of long experience, in gymnastic and the liberal arts (*μουσική*).

The liberal arts come first, beginning in the nursery with fables, in which truth is to be conveyed through fiction.

Considering the extreme importance of early impressions it is right to legislate even for these first beginnings of education.

The rules to be laid down may be exemplified by considering those great fables which the poets have embodied.

Their account of Gods and heroes is apt to insinuate wrong notions, which are injurious to the young and tender mind. Our poets must not tell of wrong done by Gods, nor of wars in heaven. Such tales are false and of bad example. Nor can they be defended as allegorical, for the child cannot distinguish allegory from fact.

God must be represented as He really is: (1) *good, and* (2) *true.*

τίς οὖν ἡ παιδεία;] Education in modern as well as in ancient times hangs to the past: the study of the poets who were committed to memory by the Athenian youth in the age of Plato (Protag. 325 E foll.: 'And when the boy has learned his letters, and 376 E

Republic II. 376 E is beginning to understand what is written, as before he understood only what was spoken, they put into his hands the works of great poets, which he reads sitting on a bench at school; in these are contained many admonitions, and many tales, and praises and encomia of famous men, which he is required to learn by heart, in order that he may imitate or emulate them and desire to become like them,'—Laws vii. 810 foll.) may be compared with the study of the classics in our own day.

ὑπὸ . . . χρόνου εὑρημένης] Cp. Aristot. Eth. Nic. i. 7, § 17 *καὶ ὁ χρόνος τῶν τοιούτων εὑρετὴς ἢ συνεργὸς ἀγαθὸς εἶναι.*

ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ σώμασι γυμναστική] This, the commonplace point of view (**που**), is stated here, but corrected afterwards (iii. 411 E).

μουσικῆς δ' εἰπὼν . . . ἢ οὔ;] 'In speaking thus, do you include literature under music, or not?' The genitive depends on **λόγους**. For *εἰπών* without an object (sc. *οὕτως* or *μουσικήν*) cp. supra 370 A *εἰπόντος σοῦ.*

The manuscript authority is divided between *εἰπών* and *εἶπον*: the latter reading would mean, 'And do you include literature,' I said, 'under music?' *εἰπών* is to be preferred as having better authority.

παιδευτέον δ' . . . ψευδέσιν] Truth of feeling rather than of fact or reasoning is the form of truth which the mind is most willing to receive during the first years of life. The child has to go through a stage which is not unlike that of the infancy of mankind, and is only partially corrected by the experience of older persons. That the pupil may have as little as possible to unlearn (*παρήσομεν . . . τοὺς παῖδας καὶ λαμβάνειν . . . ἐναντίας δόξας ἐκείναις, ἅς, ἐπειδὰν τελεωθῶσιν, ἔχειν οἰησόμεθα δεῖν αὐτούς*; infra 377 B: cp. also iii. 411 E, Laws ii. 653 B), whether in religion or in anything else, considering especially the shortness of life, is what Plato would have termed a 'point of first-rate importance' in education. Compare again Laws vii. 792 A *ἔστι δὲ ὁ χρόνος οὗτος τριῶν οὐκ ἐλάττων ἐτῶν, μόριον οὐ σμικρὸν τοῦ βίου διαγαγεῖν χεῖρον ἢ μὴ χεῖρον.* Nor has the power of the love of truth, regarded only as an instrument of enlarging and deepening the faculties, ever been sufficiently considered either in ancient or in modern education. For the falsehood of the poets cp. the familiar quotation from Hesiod—Theog. 27 *ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα.* Also Pindar, Olymp. i. 28 foll.:

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ἢ θαύματα πολλά, καί πού τι καὶ βροτῶν φάτιν ὑπὲρ τὸν ἀλαθῆ λόγον
δεδαιδαλμένοι ψεύδεσι ποικίλοις ἐξαπατῶντι μῦθοι. 376 E

and Arist. Met. i. 2, 13 κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἀοιδοί.

τοῦτο δέ που . . . ἀληθῆ] 'These, I conceive, speaking generally, are fictions, but they contain some elements of truth.' Mythology, taken as a whole, is false, but may contain elements of historical or moral truth. 377 A

τοῦτο δὴ ἔλεγον . . . γυμναστικῆς] 'That was my meaning in saying that (1) they (the young), or (2) that we (the teachers) must take in hand music before gymnastics.'

ἁπτέον] (1) sc. τοῖς νέοις (infra νέῳ καὶ ἁπαλῷ). Cp. infra iii. 389 B τό γε τοιοῦτον ἰατροῖς δοτέον, ἰδιώταις δὲ οὐχ ἁπτέον. Or (2) sc. τοῖς παιδεύουσιν ἡμῖν.

πλάττεται] sc. ὁ τρεφόμενος. The word occurs presently in a different connexion (μύθους πλασθέντας): but cp. infra C πλάττειν τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν. B

ἐνδύεται τύπος] 'A deep impression is made.' For ἐνδύεσθαι in the sense of 'penetrate,' 'sink in,' cp. Laws i. 642 B εὔνοια ἐκ νέων εὐθὺς ἐνδύεται ἕκαστον: also Theaet. 169 B οὕτω τις ἔρως δεινὸς ἐνδέδυκε τῆς περὶ ταῦτα γυμνασίας: infra iii. 401 D μάλιστα καταδύεται εἰς τὸ ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς ὅ τε ῥυθμὸς καὶ ἁρμονία. For the sense compare Timaeus 26 B ὡς δή τοι, τὸ λεγόμενον, τὰ παίδων μαθήματα θαυμαστὸν ἔχει τι μνημεῖον: Theaet. 194 C τὰ σημεῖα . . . ἱκανῶς τοῦ βάθους ἔχοντα πολυχρόνια . . . γίγνεται.

Compare the saying—ἀρχὴ ἥμισυ παντός—or, as Plato, altering the well-known line of Hesiod, says in the Laws vi. 753 E ἀρχὴ . . . πλέον ἢ τὸ ἥμισυ παντός: an adaptation which is repeated by Aristotle, Eth. Nic. i. 7, § 23. See also infra iii. 401 E τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἐπαινοῖ, . . . τὰ δ' αἰσχρὰ ψέγοι τ' ἂν ὀρθῶς καὶ μισοῖ ἔτι νέος ὤν, πρὶν λόγον δυνατὸς εἶναι λαβεῖν, ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου ἀσπάζοιτ' ἂν αὐτὸν γνωρίζων δι' οἰκειότητα μάλιστα ὁ οὕτω τραφείς; and Laws ii. 653 B.

ῥᾳδίως οὕτω] (1) 'Thus lightly,' i. e. as we should be doing if we went no further; like ἁπλῶς οὕτως i. 331 C and elsewhere, and νῦν οὕτως: or, rather (2) 'lightly, as is now commonly done' (with the customary indifference). Cp. infra iii. 403 E ἡ τῶνδε τῶν ἀσκητῶν ἕξις; viii. 544 C ἡ Κρητικὴ . . . αὕτη, sc. πολιτεία. The same difficulty arises infra 378 A.

Republic *II.* 377 C **ὃν μὲν ἂν καλὸν . . . ἀποκριτέον**] *καλόν*, sc. *μῦθον*, understood from **μυθοποιοῖς**, in the same way as infra iii. 399 D *τί δέ; αὐλοποιοὺς ἢ αὐλητὰς παραδέξει εἰς τὴν πόλιν; ἢ οὐ τοῦτο* (sc. *αὐλός*, understood from *αὐλοποιούς*) *πολυχορδότατον*; this 'word understood' is added in the text of Ven. Π.

καὶ πλάττειν . . . ταῖς χερσίν] A good commentary on these words is afforded by Plutarch, De Educatione Puerorum, ed. Reiske, 3. 26 *ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ μέλη τοῦ σώματος εὐθὺς ἀπὸ γενέσεως πλάττειν τῶν τέκνων ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν, ἵνα ταῦτα ὀρθὰ καὶ ἀστραβῆ φύηται, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ τῶν τέκνων ἤθη ῥυθμίζειν προσήκει.* A similar use of *πλάττειν* with reference to the adult body occurs in Plut., De Sanitate, ed. Reiske, 4. 93, where the editor vainly conjectures *παλασσόμενα*.

τὸν αὐτὸν τύπον εἶναι] sc. *τῶν μειζόνων καὶ ἐλαττόνων μύθων*, which is easily supplied either from the previous or the following clause.

D **καὶ ταὐτὸν δύνασθαι**] 'And should have the same effect,' i. e. embody the same principles.

καὶ λέγουσιν] This is said either (1) of Homer and Hesiod, whose poems still live and are recited, or (2) of contemporary poets, who are included in **οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταί**. Probably the latter.

ὅπερ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ . . . μέμφεσθαι] i. e. *τὸ ψεύδεσθαι περὶ θεῶν*. Plato means (1) that any falsehood about the Gods is blameworthy, but (2), above all, when it has an immoral tendency.

ἄλλως τε καὶ . . . ψεύδηται] 'Especially when the fiction is bad as well as false.' The meaning of **μὴ καλῶς** may be illustrated by the repetition of the expression (*οὐ καλῶς*) in describing what Socrates terms the 'immoral fable of Uranus and Cronus.'

E **ὅ τε αὖ Κρόνος ὡς**] *ὡς* here is not a mere resumption of the previous *ὡς*, but is emphatic and means 'in what way.'

378 A **ἄπορον**] The meaning is that the difficulty of procuring the victim was to make the representation nearly impossible.

καὶ γὰρ . . . χαλεποί] 'Why yes, he said, these stories are certainly indefensible.'

B **οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀληθῆ**] i. e. 'for they are false, as well as bad.'

C **εἴ γε δεῖ ἡμῖν, κ.τ.λ.**] 'if we are to have them think.' *ἡμῖν*, here

as elsewhere, is the dative of the person interested. See on i. 343 A ὅς γε αὐτῇ, κ.τ.λ. *Republic II. 378 C*

πολλοῦ δεῖ . . . καὶ ποικιλτέον] 'Far be it from us to tell them of the wars of the giants and (1) make them the subject of decorative work,' or (2) 'embroider them on garments.' To the same stories Euthyphro appeals in justification of his own conduct in bringing an action against his father. See Euthyphr. 6 B, C *καὶ πόλεμον ἄρα ἡγεῖ σὺ εἶναι τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ ἔχθρας γε δεινὰς καὶ μάχας καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά, οἷα λέγεταί τε ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν γραφέων τά τε ἄλλα ἱερὰ ἡμῖν καταπεποίκιλται, καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῖς μεγάλοις Παναθηναίοις ὁ πέπλος μεστὸς τῶν τοιούτων ποικιλμάτων ἀνάγεται εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν*: and the previous passage, 5 E, in which Euthyphro defends his impiety by the example of Zeus binding his father.

The sentence is an emphatic repetition of what has preceded: the emphasis justifies the asyndeton. *πολλοῦ δεῖ* has passed into an adverb = *ἥκιστα*.

τοιαῦτα λεκτέα . . . λογοποιεῖν] 'Such, rather, must be the stories told to them in earliest childhood by old men and old women alike, and as they grow up, we must compel the poets also to compose for them in a similar spirit' (cp. infra 380 B, C). This punctuation, with a comma after **γραυσί**, was first adopted in Baiter's edition of 1881. Previous editors, including K. F. Hermann, made the pause at **πρεσβυτέροις γιγνομένοις**. The passage, when so punctuated, was variously understood: (1) 'by old men and old women, and all elderly persons' (Davis and Vaughan): (2) 'this is what old men and old women should begin by telling children, and the same when they grow up' (Jowett's Plato, first edition). These ways are unsatisfactory, although the change from *πρὸς τὰ παιδία* to the dative in (2) may be defended by examples (Soph. 248 A). The omission of λεκτέα in Par. A may be accidental, or the insertion of the word in other MSS., although necessary, may be only conjectural.

υἱέος] is proved by the antithesis of **πατρός** to be the true reading; D
the old correction *Διός* (Ξ m), which is mentioned by Suidas and Photius, appears to have arisen from a reference to another story, which is told in Iliad xv. 18 ff. The legend of the golden throne containing hidden chains, which was presented by Hephaestus to his mother out of revenge for her rejection of him at his birth, is given by Pausanias i. 20. 3. It is to this legend that Plato refers.

Republic II. 378 D **ἐν ὑπονοίαις πεποιημένας**] 'Composed with a hidden meaning.' Cp. ἐν φαρμάκου εἴδει (iii. 389 B) and similar expressions. ὑπόνοια was looked upon as an old-fashioned word in Plutarch's day. Cp. Plut. de aud. Poet. ii. 19 E ταῖς πάλαι μὲν ὑπονοίαις ἀλληγορίαις δὲ νῦν λεγομέναις.

E **πρὸς ἀρετήν**] 'In regard to fitness for producing virtue.' Cp. Phaedo 69 A ἡ ὀρθὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγή, and see Riddell's Digest, p. 128.

ἔχει γὰρ . . . φαῖμεν] 'Yes, said he, there is reason in that; but suppose a person were to ask us with regard to this what these noblest kinds of fiction (sc. τὰ κάλλιστα μεμυθολογημένα πρὸς ἀρετήν) are and what the tales in which they are found, what answer should we give?' The first **ταῦτα** refers vaguely to what precedes, the second more precisely to κάλλιστα μεμυθολογημένα πρὸς ἀρετήν.

Compare Laws vii. 811, where the question is asked, what literary pattern the guardian of the law shall use in the education of youth, and is answered (not without a certain degree of egotism) that Plato's own book of the Laws affords the best pattern.

379 A **αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο**] in apposition with the sentence. 'But as to this very point—the forms of theology, what shall they be?'

οἷος . . . τραγῳδίᾳ] 'God should ever be rendered to us as he in truth is, whether the form of verse which the poet chooses for the description of him be Epic, Lyric, or Tragic.'

ἐάν τε ἐν μέλεσιν] though omitted in Par. A, is found in Eusebius (p. 376) and is probably genuine. The insertion seems to be required by the sense, and agrees with the divisions of poetry, infra iii. 392–394.

379 B–380 C 1. *God is good. He can never be the author of evil. He is not the cause of all things, but only of the good.*

How many poems will be cancelled by this simple rule!

If human calamities are referred to God, it must be added that they were inflicted for the good of those on whom they fell.

379 B **οὐκ ἄρα . . . ἀγαθόν**] Cp. x. 617 E αἰτία ἑλομένου· θεὸς ἀναίτιος: Tim. 42 D διαθεσμοθετήσας . . . ταῦτα, ἵνα τῆς ἔπειτα εἴη κακίας ἑκάστων ἀναίτιος. Some of the inferences in the preceding Sorites are verbal only. The unnecessary multiplication of the steps is a characteristic feature of the Platonic dialectic.

ὀλίγων μὲν . . . τῶν κακῶν ἡμῖν] Such pessimism seems more in harmony with the spirit of the Timaeus or the Laws than of the Republic. Cp. however infra v. 473 D. It is a strain of reflection always apt to recur in Greek literature: Iliad xvii. 446: Hdt. vii. 46, 3. *Republic II.* 379 C

ταύτην τὴν ἁμαρτίαν] sc. the error of making God the author of evil, as is further explained in what follows. D

κηρῶν] 'lots,' not Κηρῶν, 'fates.' Cp. Iliad xxii. 210:—

ἐν δ' ἐτίθει δύο κῆρε τανηλεγέος θανάτοιο.

The lines are not found in our text of Homer exactly as they are quoted; the passage referred to is Iliad xxiv. 527–532:—

δοιοὶ γάρ τε πίθοι κατακείαται ἐν Διὸς οὔδει,
δώρων, οἷα δίδωσι, κακῶν, ἕτερος δὲ ἑάων·
ᾧ μέν κ' ἀμμίξας δώῃ Ζεὺς τερπικέραυνος,
ἄλλοτε μέν τε κακῷ ὅ γε κύρεται, ἄλλοτε δ' ἐσθλῷ·
ᾧ δέ κε τῶν λυγρῶν δώῃ, λωβητὸν ἔθηκε,
καί ἑ κακὴ βούβρωστις ἐπὶ χθόνα δῖαν ἐλαύνει.

The quotations from Homer in Plato often show slight variations—which are sometimes intentional departures (see infra iii. 388 A) from the old manuscript text which has come down to us. The changes, however, are far from being sufficient to justify Wolf's assumption of the unsettled state of the Homeric text before the times of the Alexandrian Grammarians.

ὡς ταμίας] *ὡς* follows *λέγοντος*, in the same construction as *ὡς δοιοὶ πίθοι* supra. The words which follow are not found in Homer; they probably arise out of a confusion of the preceding quotation with Iliad iv. 84:— E

Ζεύς, ὅστ' ἀνθρώπων ταμίης πολέμοιο τέτυκται.

ἥν] cognate accusative.

θεῶν ἔριν . . . καὶ Διός] (1) The strife and combat in the *θεομαχία* in Iliad xx takes place after an assembly of the Gods, convened by Zeus, whose command is carried to them by Themis,—in Plato's view a most inappropriate person for such a message. **κρίσις** is here 'dispute,' 'altercation,' from *κρίνεσθαι*. (2) Others suppose an allusion to the *judgement* of Paris, and the *contention* which led to it: *θεῶν* is then from *θεά*. This explanation, however, rests on a con-

Republic *II.* 379 E jectural emendation of Proclus' abstract of the Cypria (viz. Θέμιτος for Θέτιδος—Heyne). See W. R. Hardie in the Classical Review, vol. iv. p. 182. And the strife of the goddesses is only the first of a chain of incidents leading to the events which the Cypria spoke of as planned between Zeus and Themis (or Thetis).

380 A **ἀλλ' ἐάν τις, κ.τ.λ.**] **τὰ τῆς Νιόβης πάθη** is used in two senses: (1) 'the sufferings of Niobe,' which is the object of **ποιῇ**, 'if any one shall make a poem on this theme:' (2) as the description of the play, which is the antecedent to **οἷς**. Plato is quoting from the Niobe of Aeschylus.

αὐτοῖς] probably refers to the poets, the singular being exchanged for the plural, as *ποιητήν* in the next sentence is followed by *λέγοιεν*. **θεός** in this passage is used in a generic sense, and **ὁ θεός** is relative to the *θεός* which has preceded. But the abstract term is already tending to pass into a proper name—a philological transition which in some degree assisted and also veiled the change in the Greek mind from many gods to one. Cp. infra 381 C **θεῷ** . . . *ἕκαστος* **αὐτῶν**, and note: x. 597 B, C. For the sentiment cp. Butler's Analogy, part I. c. ii On the government of God by rewards and punishments. 'Perhaps there may be some impossibilities in the nature of things, which we are unacquainted with (i. e. which prevent God from making men's happiness independent of their actions). Or less happiness, it may be, would upon the whole be produced by such a method of conduct, than is by the present.' Again c. vii 'Though the actual permission of evil may be beneficial (*οἱ δὲ ὠνίναντο κολαζόμενοι*) . . . yet notwithstanding it might have been much better for the world if this very evil had never been done.' The difficulty which Plato and Butler thus attempt to solve is, perhaps, reduced to the smallest proportions by regarding the whole of human existence as a course of education in which evil is ever lessening in the advance towards a higher good.

The amount of evil, rather than the permission of evil, seems to be the real difficulty. For what is called the permission of evil is only another way of describing the mixed nature of man. And no one can seriously complain that he does not belong to another order of beings, or that, having the power of doing right, he was not made incapable of doing wrong. And even in reference to the amount of evil there is no limit to the power which a man has of improving his own state and that of his fellow-creatures.

See on Book i. 352. In a solitary passage of the Laws (x. 897),

which is imitated in the Epinomis (988 E) Plato seems to explain the origin of evil as in the Zoroastrian system, by supposing a power of evil as well as of good. No trace of this double principle of good and evil is to be found in Plato except in these two passages. *Republic II.* 380 A

ὡς ἄθλιοι οἱ κακοί] Cp. infra ix. 591 A *πῇ δ' ἀδικοῦντα λανθάνειν καὶ μὴ διδόναι δίκην λυσιτελεῖν; ἢ οὐχὶ ὁ μὲν λανθάνων ἔτι πονηρότερος γίγνεται, κ.τ.λ.*, and Gorg. 472 foll. B

ἐατέον . . . διαμαχητέον] sc. *ἡμῖν*: cp. *ξύμφορα ἡμῖν* infra.

ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ πόλει] is added with solemnity; it does not imply that he might do so in another country.

μυθολογοῦντα] agrees with the subject of **λέγειν**, although **νεώτερον** is probably suggested by **μήτε τινὰ ἀκούειν** which is inserted *διὰ μέσου*. Cp. for the general meaning supra 378 C. C

ὡς οὔτε ὅσια ἂν λεγόμενα] Cp. Goodwin *M. and T.* §§ 214, 479.

οὗτος μὲν τοίνυν . . . μὴ πάντων] 'This then will be one of our laws and patterns relating to Theology, which will have to be observed in speaking and writing,—that God is not the author of all things, but of good only.' That morality in the highest and purest sense must be at the foundation of religion and especially of our conception of the nature of God, is a truth the repetition of which is rendered necessary by the corruption of the human intellect in Christian as well as in heathen times.

2. *God is true. He changes not, nor does he deceive.* *380 D–383 C*

(*a*). *He is not changed by another, for that other would be stronger than he; nor by himself, for that which is perfect can only change for the worse.*

(*b*). *He never deceives mankind. He is capable, neither of true falsehood, nor of falsehood in word;—neither of false-thinking (which all beings hate), nor of false-speaking, which men sometimes find necessary, when they want to elude an enemy, to humour an insane friend, or when they do not know the truth about ancient times, to make mythology as much like truth as they can. But God knows all things and is all powerful, and no madman is the friend of God. In this particular, as in the former, Homer and Aeschylus have committed grievous errors.*

τί δὲ δή, κ.τ.λ.] The connexion of these paragraphs is as follows: 380 D

Republic II. 380 D (1) God is good; (2) God is true, and this (*a*) in himself (i.e. unchangeable either from without or from within), and (*β*) in relation to us—i.e. he cannot lie or appear other than he is.

αὐτὸν γιγνόμενον] sc. *ἀλλοῖον τὴν ἰδέαν*, i.e. 'actually in his own person becoming different,' as opposed to 'merely appearing to become so.' The predicate is to be gathered from what precedes (**φαντάζεσθαι . . . ἰδέαις**), and any ambiguity which might have been felt is cleared up by the addition of the words **καὶ ἀλλάττοντα τὸ αὑτοῦ εἶδος, κ.τ.λ.** God is described, first as really taking some other form; in the second part of the sentence (**τότε δὲ . . . δοκεῖν**) the metamorphosis is only an illusion.

ἢ ἁπλοῦν τε εἶναι . . . τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἰδέας ἐκβαίνειν;] 'Or is he of a simple nature, and least of all going out of his own proper form?' What is this form? The true answer to this question can only be gathered from the context, viz. that God is good, and God is true. The highest idea of beauty is described in the Symposium (211) as 'that final cause of all our toils, which in the first place is everlasting, not growing or decaying, or waxing and waning; secondly, not fair in one point of view and foul in another, or at one time and in one relation, or at one place fair, at another time or in another relation or at another place foul, as if fair to some or foul to others, or in the likeness of a face or hands or any other part of the bodily frame, or in any form of speech or knowledge, or existing in any other being, as for example, in an animal, or in heaven, or in earth, or in any other place; but beauty only, simple, absolute, separate, and everlasting, which without diminution and without increase or any change, is imparted to the ever-growing and perishing beauties of all other things.' Cp. also infra vi. 508 E, in which is described what Plato there terms the idea of good: this is that nature 'which imparts truth to the known and the power of knowing to the knower, which is the author of science and truth, and yet surpasses them in beauty, and which is not only the author of knowledge, but of being and essence,—which is to the intellectual world what the sun is to the visible.' See also Tim. 29 E.

E **ὑπὸ μὲν ἄλλου**] *μέν* takes up one of the two cases which are supposed in the previous sentence. The second case is omitted, or rather deferred to infra 381 B *ἀλλ' ἄρα αὐτὸς αὑτόν, κ.τ.λ.*

σῶμα . . . καὶ πᾶν φυτόν] *φυτόν*, in the most general sense, would

be inclusive of the human body. Cp. vi. 491 D *παντὸς . . . φυτοῦ, εἴτε ἐγγείων, εἴτε τῶν ζῴων.* *Republic II.*

οὐ τήν] This is the reading of Par. A and several other MSS. Bekker read with Stephanus and some of the old editions *αὐτὴν οὐ τήν*. Aldus and Eusebius give *αὐτήν*. One MS. (*β*) has *αὖ τήν*. If *αὐτήν* is read it must mean 'the soul herself' as opposed to the body mentioned in the previous sentence. 381 A

καὶ μήν που . . . ἀλλοιοῦται] For the meaning of **σκεῦος** compare Soph. 219 A *τό τε αὖ περὶ τὸ ξύνθετον καὶ πλαστόν, ὃ δὴ σκεῦος ὠνομάκαμεν.* The words **καὶ ἀμφιέσματα** are omitted in Par. A.

ὁ θεός γε] *ὁ θεός τε*, Par. A, may perhaps be right. B

ἑκὼν αὑτόν, κ.τ.λ.] These words contain a fresh application of the Socratic principle of the involuntariness of Evil. C

ἕκαστος αὐτῶν] sc. *τῶν θεῶν*, referring to **θεῷ**. See note on 380 A.

μένει . . . μορφῇ] Cp. the impressive language of the Timaeus, 42 E *καὶ ὁ μὲν δὴ ἅπαντα ταῦτα διατάξας ἔμενεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ κατὰ τρόπον ἤθει.*

θεοὶ ξείνοισιν, κ.τ.λ.] Odyssey xvii. 485, 486. Plato has somewhat unfairly omitted the following line, which expresses a higher feeling, and is therefore unsuited to his purpose:— D

ἀνθρώπων ὕβριν τε καὶ εὐνομίην ἐφορῶντες.

In Soph. 216 C he alludes to the whole passage, and applies it to the philosophers, whom Socrates compares to unknown mysterious visitants, *καθορῶντες ὑψόθεν τὸν τῶν κάτω βίον.*

Θέτιδος] Thetis, according to Sophocles (Troilus fr. 556 Nauck; cp. Schol. in Pindar, Nem. iii. 60) and other writers, took various forms in order to escape from her nuptials with Peleus.

μηδ' ἐν τραγῳδίαις . . . βιοδώροις] 'Nor let any one, either in tragedy or in other poetry, introduce Herè disguised, in the form of a priestess, collecting alms for the life-giving sons of the Argive river Inachus.' For the significance of **ἀγείρουσαν** see the noun *ἀγύρτης* with the feminine *ἀγύρτρια* and the compound *μητραγύρτης*, 'a begging priest of Cybele.'

Ἰνάχου, κ.τ.λ.] It is uncertain from what poet this quotation is taken. The children of Inachus are the other rivers of Argolis on whose waters the fruitfulness of the plain depended.

Republic II. 381 E **λέγουσαι τοὺς μύθους κακῶς**] 'not telling their stories as they ought to be told.' Cp. *οὐ καλῶς* supra 377 E.

Such charges may be illustrated by the tales which are alluded to in the Laws, ii. 672, of Dionysus losing his reason through the devices of his step-mother Herè, and revenging himself by infusing madness into the rest of the world. Plato with a feeling like that of Herodotus is afraid to repeat the story (*ἐγὼ δὲ τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα τοῖς ἀσφαλὲς ἡγουμένοις εἶναι λέγειν περὶ θεῶν ἀφίημι λέγειν*): he appears, however, in the spirit of Pindar, to explain the madness innocently, as meaning the excess of youthful life.

ἰνδαλλόμενοι] The poetic word recalls the spirit of the mythology.

ἀλλ' ἆρα] 'But are we to suppose then . . . ?' *Ἆρα* (as above 381 B) expresses doubt or wonder about the alternative which remains. The emphasis is on the latter part of the sentence **ἡμῖν δὲ ποιοῦσι, κ.τ.λ.**

382 A **ἐθέλοι ἂν**] 'Can we imagine that God would lie or be willing to lie?' *ἐθέλω* here, as in 375 A, is nearly equivalent to *μέλλω*. 'Is God likely to do so?' 'Is it in His nature?'

ἢ ἔργῳ φάντασμα προτείνων] 'Or in act, by putting forth a false appearance.'

τό γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος] Plato is fond of this and similar oxymora. Cp. Theaet. 189 C *οὐκ ἄν, οἶμαι, σοὶ δοκῶ τοῦ ἀληθῶς ψεύδους ἀντιλαβέσθαι*: Soph. 263 D: Phil. 23 B *ἆρ' ὅτι τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶπον, λυπεῖν ἡδονήν;*

τῷ κυριωτάτῳ . . . ἑαυτῶν] For this as an expression for the soul, cp. Phaedo 94 B–E.

ἐκεῖ] sc. *ἐν τῷ κυριωτάτῳ*.

αὐτό] sc. *τὸ ψεῦδος*.

B **ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω**] Here, as often in antithesis, the pronoun, although not emphatic, partakes of the emphasis which belongs to the whole clause. 'What I really mean is this.'

ψεύδεσθαί τε καὶ ἐψεῦσθαι] 'To be and remain deceived.' *ἐψεῦσθαι* is added to explain or correct *ψεύδεσθαι*, 'the lie in the soul' being a thing infixed or permanent, and the whole phrase answers to **ἔχειν τε καὶ κεκτῆσθαι** in the following clause. Cp. supra i. 351 B *δουλοῦσθαι . . . καὶ καταδεδουλῶσθαι.*

ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ] 'in such a case'; when the lie is in the soul and about real being. Cp. Laws v. 731 C *τῶν γὰρ μεγίστων κακῶν οὐδεὶς οὐδαμοῦ οὐδὲν ἑκὼν κεκτῆτο ἄν ποτε· πολὺ δὲ ἥκιστα ἐν τοῖς τῶν ἑαυτοῦ τιμιωτάτοις.* Cp. for **ἐνταῦθα** (=*ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ*) vi. 505 D *ἀλλὰ τὰ ὄντα ζητοῦσι, τὴν δὴ δόξαν* **ἐνταῦθα** *ἤδη πᾶς ἀτιμάζει.* *Republic. II.* 382 B

ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . ἄκρατον ψεῦδος] The lie in the soul is unconscious falsehood respecting the highest matters. To regard God as false or immoral, or, according to Plato, as deluding men with appearances, or to deny the existence of God would be a lie of this hateful sort, which may be compared with Aristotle's *ἄγνοια καθόλου* (Eth. Nic. iii. 1, § 15), and is a contradiction of the essential nature of the soul, which, according to Plato, lives on truth, Soph. 228 C *ἀλλὰ μὴν ψυχήν γε ἴσμεν ἄκουσαν πᾶσαν πᾶν ἀγνοοῦσαν.* Plato considers this unconscious falsehood to be much more disastrous spiritually than the mere conscious or verbal falsehood.

ἐψευσμένου] is masculine, referring to a person (as supra *ἐψεῦσθαι*) 'on the part of him who is in error'; and the genitive depends on the whole phrase, **ἡ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἄγνοια**, resumed with **ἡ**.

τῶν καλουμένων φίλων] is a suspended genitive which finally gains construction from **ἀποτροπῆς ἕνεκα**. The emendation *οἳ ἄν* for **ὅταν** is unnecessary; **ὅταν** is correlative to **τότε**. This is perhaps said with a glance at the discussion in Book i, as to who are our friends (i. 334: cp. supra 362 B, C). C

διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι ὅπῃ τἀληθὲς ἔχει, κ.τ.λ.] Compare Timaeus 40 D *ἀδύνατον οὖν θεῶν παισὶν ἀπιστεῖν, καίπερ ἄνευ τε εἰκότων καὶ ἀναγκαίων ἀποδείξεων λέγουσιν,* sc. *περὶ δαιμόνων γενέσεως.* This notion of the functions of mythology may be illustrated from the Politicus, Timaeus, Critias, and Laws (Book iii), in which Plato gives the imaginary history of a 'world before the flood.' D

κατὰ τί δὴ . . . ἂν ψεύδοιτο;] 'Then on which of these grounds is lying useful to God? Will he lie in imitating the truth, because he is ignorant of the events of other days?'

ποιητὴς . . . οὐκ ἔνι] 'Then in God there is nothing of a lying poet.' For the personification of a quality compare Phaedo 77 E *ἀλλ' ἴσως ἔνι τις καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν παῖς, ὅστις τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβεῖται*: also Phil. 39 A, B, where the faculty of memory is personified as a scribe, *ὁ . . . παρ' ἡμῖν γραμματεύς,* and imagination as a painter, and some

Republic II. 382 D ludicrous lines of Diphilus, quoted by Harpocration, s. v. *δευσοποιός* :—

ἀγαθὸς βαφεὺς ἔνεστιν ἐν τῷ παιδίῳ·
ταυτὶ γὰρ ἡμῖν δευσοποιὰ παντελῶς
τὰ σπάργαν' ἀποδέδειχεν.

E **ἀλλὰ . . . ψεύδοιτο ;**] 'But shall we suppose him to speak falsely, for fear of his enemies?'—*Ἂν* is to be supplied from *ἀφομοιῶν ἂν ψεύδοιτο* above. Cp. supra i. 352 E *ἀκούσαις*, and note.

ὁ θεὸς ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἀληθές] The neuter is continued from the preceding sentence.

οὔτε κατὰ φαντασίας] These words are omitted in Par. A, probably from the repetition of *οὔτε*.

383 A **συγχωρεῖς . . . ἑαυτούς**] 'You agree then that here is a second principle, according to which the Gods are not enchanters who transform themselves?' **τοῦτον** refers to what has preceded, and is further explained by **ὡς μήτε, κ.τ.λ.**

παράγειν] The construction is changed from **ὡς . . . ὄντας**, probably in consequence of the clause **τῷ μεταβάλλειν, κ.τ.λ.**, coming between.

οὐδὲ Αἰσχύλου] sc. *τοῦτο ἐπαινεσόμεθα.* **ἑάς** is changed from *ἐμάς* to suit the former part of the sentence, and the less usual form is chosen to preserve the rhythm of the verse.

B **ξύμπαντά τ' εἰπών, κ.τ.λ.**] (1) 'And in saying all, he raised a note of triumph over the blessedness of my lot.' **τύχας** is governed by **παιῶν' ἐπευφήμησεν** in one phrase. Or (2) joining *εἰπὼν . . . τύχας*, 'Having spoken of my lot as in all things blest of heaven.'

C **ὅταν τις τοιαῦτα λέγῃ**] This sentence begins with a resumption from *ὅταν φῇ, κ.τ.λ.* supra: hence the asyndeton.

χαλεπανοῦμεν] 'We will frown,' says Socrates, speaking with the imaginary authority of the ruler and lawgiver.

οὐδὲ τοὺς διδασκάλους ἐάσομεν . . . εἰ μέλλουσιν, κ.τ.λ.] There is a confusion or combination of two constructions. 'We will not, because' and 'we must not, if.' For this condensation see Riddell's Digest, § 256: and cp. Thucyd. i. 40, 2 *ὅστις μὴ τοῖς δεξαμένοις, εἰ σωφρονοῦσι, πόλεμον ἀντὶ εἰρήνης ποιήσει.*

BOOK III.

Besides their false representations of the Divine nature, the poets and mythologers are guilty of other falsehoods, which must likewise be forbidden in the interests of morality. The tales about the world below are such as cannot fail to inspire cowardice in all that hear them. But our guardians must be brave and have no fear of death. And our poets must tell the truth concerning Death, and rob him of imaginary terrors. *Republic III. 386 A–392 A*

They will therefore be forbidden to represent their heroes as lamenting for the death of friends, since to die is not an evil, and the hero is sufficient for himself, and the loss of money and friends does not affect him greatly. Achilles must not mourn inordinately for Patroclus, nor Priam for Hector;—still less the chief of the Gods for his son Sarpedon.

Not only excessive grief, but excessive laughter must be discouraged. For every extreme brings on a reaction to the opposite extreme. The 'inextinguishable laughter' of the Gods must be erased from Homer.

Then our guardians must be taught veracity in their youth. For even 'the lie in word' has been reserved as a medicine for exceptional cases. And such a remedy must be solely entrusted to the physician, that is, to the ruler. No other in the state may ever dissemble what he knows.

In some things we may praise Homer—as where Diomed enforces obedience, or the good discipline of the Achaeans is described. But not the passage in which Achilles reviles his chief, nor where Odysseus rejoices over the banquet. For temperance, orderliness, and chastity are to be enforced, and such fortitude and self-control as Odysseus shows when he 'strikes upon his breast and chides his heart.'

Liberality is another virtue to be fostered by us. Our poets must not sing that gifts prevail with kings, or tell how Achilles took a ransom for the body of Hector.

Nor must we listen to those passages in which the same hero is represented on the other hand as proud and impious. To hear of one so born and so brought up as being possessed with the opposite vices of meanness and insolence cannot but be ruinous to the morals of the young. The preceding rules, then, must restrict the choice of subjects in mythologizing about Gods and Heroes and the world unseen.

Republic III. 386 A **τοιαῦτ' ἄττα**] viz. that God is good and true.

καὶ γονέας . . . ποιησομένοις] This is added in allusion to the stories of Zeus and Cronos, and of quarrelling among the Gods. The words form a transition to the human virtues and duties which follow. The effect of such stories on the conduct of children towards their parents is again referred to in Laws x. 886 C ff.

B **τοῖς ἐπιχειροῦσι λέγειν**] 'who essay to speak.' *ἐπιχειρεῖν* is often used in Plato as an amplification of the word which is attached to it. Cp. Phaedr. 265 E *τὸ πάλιν κατ' εἴδη δύνασθαι τέμνειν, κατ' ἄρθρα, ᾗ πέφυκε, καὶ μὴ* **ἐπιχειρεῖν** *καταγνύναι μέρος μηδέν, κακοῦ μαγείρου τρόπῳ χρώμενον*—'and not go about to break any part,' &c. Here the periphrasis is more significant. **περὶ τούτων τῶν μύθων** is (1) governed by **ἐπιστατεῖν**: (2) repeated with **λέγειν**: cp. ii. 360 D *ὁ περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου λέγων.*

δεῖσθαι] sc. *αὐτῶν.* The construction is again changed at **λέγοντας**, which refers back to **λοιδορεῖν**: 'since, in reviling the world below, they do not say what is either true or expedient.' In some MSS. (Ven. Ξ p. m., Vind. E, &c.) *ἂν* is inserted after *λέγοντες* which implies a suppressed condition: not 'since what they say is not true,' but (sc. *εἰ λοιδοροῖεν*), 'since if they did so they would not speak truly.' Compare ii. 380 C *ὡς οὔτε ὅσια ἂν λεγόμενα, εἰ λέγοιτο.*

C **ἀπὸ τοῦδε τοῦ ἔπους**] 'beginning with this verse' of the speech of Achilles to Odysseus: Od. xi. 489. For *ἔπος* in the sense of an Epic line cp. infra 393 A *οἶσθ' οὖν ὅτι μέχρι μὲν τούτων τῶν ἐπῶν, κ.τ.λ.*

[**ᾧ μὴ βίοτος πολὺς εἴη**]] These words are omitted in Par. A and may possibly have been inserted by some scribe from recollection of Homer.

D **οἰκία δὲ . . . θεοί περ**] Il. xx. 64, 65. The lines occur in the description of Poseidon striking the earth with his trident:—

> *δείσας δ' ἐκ θρόνου ἆλτο* (sc. Hades) *καὶ ἴαχε, μή οἱ ὕπερθεν*
> *γαῖαν ἀναρρήξειε Ποσειδάων ἐνοσίχθων,*
> *οἰκία δέ, κ.τ.λ.*

ὢ πόποι . . . οὐκ ἔνι πάμπαν] Il. xxiii. 103, 104: the words of Achilles on awaking from the dream in which the ghost of Patroclus appears to him.

καὶ τό, κ.τ.λ.] And the verse about Tiresias:—'To him alone [after death did the goddess Persephone grant] to have under-

standing, but other souls flit as shadows' (Odyss. x. 495). The feminine ταί is due to the attraction of σκιαί;—the verse is quoted also in the Meno (100 A) ὅτι οἶος πέπνυται τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου, αἱ δὲ σκιαὶ ἀΐσσουσι. Plato seems to presuppose the construction and context to be in the memory of his hearers. Though he sometimes quotes inaccurately, both he and they must have been intimately familiar with the Iliad and Odyssey. Republic III. 386 D

ψυχὴ δ' ἐκ ῥεθέων] Il. xvi. 856. On the form ἀνδροτῆτα see Monro and Leaf in loco.

ψυχὴ δὲ κατὰ χθονός] Il. xxiii. 100. 387 A

ὡς δ' ὅτε . . . ἅμ' ᾔεσαν] Odyss. xxiv. 6–9, 'As bats in hollow of a mysterious cave, whenever any of them falls off out of the string from the rock, fly squeaking and cling to one another, so did they move together with gibbering cry.'

τρίζω is here used of a shrill treble sound—the squeak of a bat. The thin treble cry of the bat (inaudible to some persons) has been the recognized similitude in many lands for the voice of a ghost.

διαγράφωμεν] διαγράφειν is here to 'cancel' or 'strike out,' as elsewhere (vi. 500 E) to 'describe' or 'draw a plan of.' B

ἀκουστέον] sc. ὄν, in construction with ὡς supra.

τὰ περὶ ταῦτα . . . φοβερά] The order is τὰ δεινά τε καὶ φοβερὰ ὀνόματα πάντα τὰ περὶ ταῦτα: 'We must cast aside all the terrible and dreadful names which are used in describing this subject, Cocytus, Styx,' &c.

ἀποβλητέα] though plural, takes the accusative after it, like ἀκουστέον supra.

καὶ ἄλλα . . . ὀνομαζόμενα] i.e. τἄλλα ὀνόματα τούτου τοῦ τύπου ὄντα, ἅ, κ.τ.λ. C

φρίττειν δὴ ποιεῖ, κ.τ.λ.] 'At the mention of which names a shudder passes through the soul of him that hears them.'

The words ὡς οἷόν τε are probably genuine, though resting on slender manuscript authority, which is chiefly that of *q*. The reading which is found in almost all the MSS. is ὡς οἴεται, i.e. 'as the poet thinks' or 'imagines, he produces a fine effect; whereas we fear that this effect of terror will spoil the courage of our soldiers.' This is forced; and the emendation of ὅσα ἔτη, which is supposed to be an allusion to annual recitations of the rhapsodists, is worse.

Republic III. 387 C Another conjectural reading is ὡς ἐτεά, 'believing them to be true.' The reading οἴεται may have easily sprung out of οἷόν τε through οἴονται: compare the converse confusion, i. 336 E οἷου γε σύ, ὦ φίλε, where for οἷου γε σύ Ven. Ξ reads οἷόν γε ἐστίν. The meaning of ὡς οἷόν τε may be supported by the frequent recurrence of ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα, μέγιστα, elsewhere in Plato. Protag. 349 E ὅλον που καλὸν ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα.

καὶ ἴσως . . . ἄλλο τι] (1) 'And this sort of thing (sc. ὅσα ἄλλα, κ.τ.λ.) may be well enough for some other object,' i.e. to excite interest, or to teach not courage but something else. Cp. supra B οὐχ ὡς οὐ ποιητικά, κ.τ.λ: infra 390 A εἰ δέ τινα ἄλλην ἡδονὴν παρέχεται, θαυμαστὸν οὐδέν. (2) Or does Plato mean—'this effect of fear may be well enough for another purpose,' viz., to discourage vice (cp. the judgement of the dead in x. sub fin.)? Cp. infra 394 D where, under a similar vague expression, a very important matter seems to be concealed, viz. the expulsion of Homer.

θερμότεροι] 'Too heated,' i.e. 'nervous,' or 'excitable,' not cool enough. θερμότεροι suggests **μαλακώτεροι**, 'softer,' the ordinary effect of heat being to soften. Plato is fond of the conjunction of θερμός, and similar words with μαλακός. The effect of heat on wax is probably present to his mind. Cp. infra 411 B; Cratyl. 432 B; Laws ii. 671 B τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν πινόντων διαπύρους γιγνομένας μαλθακωτέρας γίγνεσθαι: or 666 B μαλακώτερον ἐκ σκληροτέρου τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος, καθάπερ εἰς πῦρ σίδηρον ἐντεθέντα, γιγνόμενον.

Ast conjectured ἀθυμότεροι, and this reading was subsequently found by Bekker in MS. *v* (Angelicus).

D **καὶ τοὺς ὀδυρμοὺς . . . ἀνδρῶν;**] 'And shall we also get rid of the weepings and wailings of famous men?' The genitive **ἐλλογίμων ἀνδρῶν** is the subject, not the object, of **οἴκτους**; otherwise the argument from Ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . καταλάβῃ infra would be irrelevant. Cp. infra E τοὺς θρήνους τῶν ὀνομαστῶν ἀνδρῶν: also 390 D: Soph. O. C. 1636 ὁ δ', ὡς ἀνὴρ γενναῖος, οὐκ οἴκτου μέτα, κ.τ.λ.

διαφερόντως . . . προσδεῖται] 'He is distinguished above his fellows by standing least of all in need of another.'

E **ἥκιστα ἄρ' . . . καταλάβῃ**] 'And therefore will be least likely to lament, but will bear with the greatest equanimity any misfortune of this sort which may befall him.' The infinitive is dependent on λέγομεν (supra D), to which the construction returns.

388 A **ἄλλοτ' ἐπὶ πλευρᾶς . . . ἁλὸς ἀτρυγέτοιο**] Iliad xxiv. 10–12,

slightly altered. Plato has dropped the metre (in the words *τότε . . . ἀναστάντα*) to save the construction. It is probable that he has further altered *δινεύεσκε* (Il. xxiv. 12) into *πλωΐζοντα*, which does not occur in Homer, for the same reason, and also to increase the mock-heroic effect: the word *ἀτρυγέτοιο* does not occur in Homer, but is added to round off the line. *πλωΐζειν* is found in Hesiod (Op. et Dies 632), and seems to be introduced here in a humorous sense ('sailing along'), in order to throw ridicule on the description. Cp. vii. 529 C *κἂν ἐξ ὑπτίας νέων ἐν γῇ*. Heyne's conjecture, *πρωΐζοντα*, a word not found, but formed on the analogy of *ὀψίζοντα*, 'taking a morning walk,' is ingenious, cp. the words *οὐδέ μιν Ἠὼς | φαινομένη λήθεσκεν*, which follow in the text of Homer; but no change is necessary. *Republic III.* 388 A

ἐκεῖνος] sc. *ὁ Ὅμηρος*. B

κυλινδόμενον] The unmetrical *κυλινδούμενον* is read in MΞ, where the copyists have probably substituted the later prose form *κυλινδεῖν* for *κυλίνδειν*, which is the only form in Homer. The same may or may not be true of *ἀμφοτέραισι* (*ἀμφοτέρῃσι* Par. A).

ὤμοι ἐγώ, κ.τ.λ.] The words of Thetis in Iliad xviii. 54. C

ἀνομοίως] = 'in a manner unlike him,' recalls ii. 379 A *οἷος τυγχάνει ὁ θεὸς ὤν, ἀεὶ δήπου ἀποδοτέον*.

ὢ πόποι . . . δαμῆναι] Il. xxii. 168, 169; xvi. 433, 434.

ἀναξίως] sc. *τῶν θεῶν*. D

εἰ καὶ ἐπίοι αὐτῷ] 'Should it even come into his mind.' Compare Phaedr. 264 B *τὸ* **ἐπιόν**, 'what came into his head': infra viii. 563 C *οὐκοῦν κατ' Αἰσχύλον, ἔφη, ἐροῦμεν ὅ τι νῦν* **ἦλθ' ἐπὶ** *στόμα*; Eurip. Med. 1051, 1052 *ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐμῆς κάκης, | τὸ* **καὶ** *προέσθαι μαλθακοὺς λόγους φρενί*. The very inclination to such words and actions is to be rebuked and suppressed. So in the Theaet. 173 D *σπουδαὶ δέ, κ.τ.λ. . . οὐδὲ ὄναρ πράττειν* **προσίσταται** *αὐτοῖς*.

ἄλλῳ καλλίονι] 'Another and a fairer one:' sc. **λόγῳ**. For the term *καλός* applied to an argument cp. i. 334 D, where Polemarchus says—*οὗτος ἐκείνου καλλίων φαίνεται*: Theaet. 203 D, 209 E. E

ὅταν τις ἐφῇ ἰσχυρῷ γέλωτι] 'when a man gives way to violent laughter.' Cp. Tim. 59 D (Bekker's reading) *ταύτῃ δὴ* (sc. *τῇ ἡδονῇ*) *καὶ τὰ νῦν ἐφέντες* (*ἀφέντες*, Par. A), and Protagoras 338 A *οὐρίᾳ ἐφέντα*, 'running before the wind.'

The same thought occurs in viii. 563 E *τὸ ἄγαν τι ποιεῖν μεγάλην*

Republic *III.* 388 E *φιλεῖ εἰς τοὐναντίον μεταβολὴν ἀνταποδιδόναι.* For the personification of the neuter with **ζητεῖ** (‘requires,’ ‘demands’), compare ii. 370 B *οὐ γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐθέλει τὸ πραττόμενον τὴν τοῦ πράττοντος σχολὴν περιμένειν,* and note: Symp. 189 A *εἰ τὸ κόσμιον τοῦ σώματος ἐπιθυμεῖ τοιούτων ψόφων, κ.τ.λ.*: cp. x. 595 C *τί βούλεται* (sc. *ἡ μίμησις*) *εἶναι.*

389 A **πολὺ δὲ ἧττον, ἐὰν θεούς**] The particle *δέ* after *τε* (in *οὔτε*) is emphatic: ‘but surely much less so if they are Gods.’

οὐκ ἀποδεκτέον . . . οὐ γὰρ οὖν δὴ ἀποδεκτέον] ‘On your views we must not admit them.’ ‘On my views, if you like to call them mine: that we must not admit them is certain.’ For a similar piece of raillery compare v. 475 A *εἰ βούλει, ἔφη, ἐπ' ἐμοῦ λέγειν . . . συγχωρῶ τοῦ λόγου χάριν.*

B **ἀλλὰ μήν, κ.τ.λ.**] How far does Plato sanction falsehood? Only in the governors, who are allowed to use the ‘lie remedial’ in the management of their subjects; the subject is not allowed to have the privilege of lying in return. The higher sense of the inexpediency and immorality of all falsehood seems to be wanting here, as above in ii. 382 C. Yet falsehood is denied to the Gods, and only admitted as a necessary imperfection among men. Possibly some thread of irony is here interwoven (see especially *εἴπερ τισὶν ἄλλοις*). Plato seeing that falsehood plays a great part in the government of the world, is willing to sanction it for certain purposes: so for example in the marriage lots (v. 459 D), and in the noble lie—*Φοινικικόν τι*—about the origin of classes in society (infra 414 C).

εἰ γὰρ ὀρθῶς ἐλέγομεν ἄρτι] sc. at the end of Book ii. 382.

ὡς ἐν φαρμάκου εἴδει] Cp. v. 459 D *ἔφαμεν δέ που ἐν φαρμάκου εἴδει πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα χρήσιμα εἶναι.*

ἰδιώταις δὲ οὐχ ἁπτέον] sc. *τοῦ τοιούτου.*

τοῖς ἄρχουσι δὴ . . . ἢ πολιτῶν ἕνεκα] The disjunctive form of sentence is occasioned by the negative implied in **εἴπερ τισὶν ἄλλοις**. ‘None but the ruler is to do so, either for warlike or peaceful purposes.’ For the meaning of **πολεμίων ἕνεκα**, cp. ii. 382 C *τὸ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ψεῦδος . . . χρήσιμον . . . πρός τε τοὺς πολεμίους, κ.τ.λ.*

C **πρός γε δὴ τοὺς τοιούτους ἄρχοντας**] ‘To our rulers, being what they are.’ Plato does not acknowledge the same obligation towards unskilled rulers such as the demagogue or tyrant. Here, as supra i. 346 E Plato without distinctly anticipating the great

revolution of making philosopher-kings already hints at a better sort of government than any at present existing among mankind. *Republic III.* 389 C

In Par. A τοιούτους is written only in the margin, but by the first hand. It is omitted in Stobaeus and in *v*. It may therefore possibly be a repetition of τοιούτου.

λέγοντι] agrees with **ἰδιώτῃ** supra, the construction being slightly changed from λέγειν.

ἂν ἄρ' ἄλλον . . . ἐν τῇ πόλει] 'If then a ruler catches any one besides himself lying in the state.' ἄρχων is understood from τοῖς ἄρχουσι,—ἄρχοντας supra.

τῶν οἳ . . . τέκτονα δούρων] Od. xvii. 383, 384. D

ἐάν γε . . . ἔργα τελῆται] 'Yes, said he, that is, if our theory is carried out.' 'If over and above the word there should ever be the fact' (ἔργου τέλος). For the use of **ἐπί** cp. Odyss. xvii. 308 εἰ δὴ καὶ ταχὺς ἔσκε θέειν ἐπὶ εἴδεϊ τῷδε.

Plato has opposite ways of enlivening his language. The first creation of the state is confessedly theoretical (ii. 369 A, C), but it soon appears that 'we are the legislators or oekists' (ii. 379 A, v. 458 C), 'and do what we describe; or rather not we, but necessity is the founder of the state' (ii. 369 C). Then again we are reminded that this is a mere argument or similitude, and the fact quite another thing, which is to be added over and above (**ἐπὶ λόγῳ**), as in this passage. Elsewhere the two modes of speech alternate with one another.

ὡς πλήθει] 'for a body of men,' such as the army of guardians whom we are training. The qualifying phrase is probably added to prepare for the definition of σωφροσύνη in the individual in Book iv. For a similar qualifying addition, cp. iv. 430 C πολιτικήν γε. (The phrase is so understood by Van Heusde, *Spec. Crit. in Plat.* p. 52 and by Matthiae, *Greek Grammar*, § 388.)

τέττα . . . μύθῳ] Il. iv. 412. E

τὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα] either (1) 'other lines which are of the same order with these,' as expressing a similar feeling, or (2) 'which go along with these.' Plato, who is quoting from memory, supposes that all which he quotes occurs in the same passage.

ἴσαν . . . Ἀχαιοί,—σιγῇ δειδιότες σημάντορας] The first line is found in Iliad iii. 8: the second in Iliad iv. 431. It is improbable that we have a trace here of a Pre-Alexandrian Homer, nor is there

Republic III. 389 E any reason for supposing that the second verse is interpolated in the text. Some Homeric illustration of obedience to chiefs is needed, and Plato has taken the liberty of bringing together two half-lines out of different passages, perhaps by a slip of memory, perhaps not intending that they should be connected. Cp. supra 388 B.

οἰνοβαρές . . . ἐλάφοιο] Il. i. 225.

καὶ τὰ τούτων ἑξῆς] *ἑξῆς* is variously construed with a genitive or dative (infra vii. 528 A *τὸ ἑξῆς . . . τῇ γεωμετρίᾳ*).

390 A **νεανιεύματα**] 'impertinences.' So the verb, Phaedr. 235 A *ἐφαίνετο δή μοι νεανιεύεσθαι ἐνδεικνύμενος*: Gorg. 482 C: and the adjective *νεανικός*, Gorg. 508 D *τὸ νεανικὸν δὴ τοῦτο τοῦ σοῦ λόγου*. *νεανικεύματα* is the form in Par. A. In other MSS. there are traces of *νεανισκεύματα*. Xenophon, Cyr. I. 2. 15, appears to have used *νεανισκεύεσθαι*:—Pollux, 2. 20; see Stephanus' Thesaurus, ed. Dindorf.

εἰ δέ τινα ἄλλην ἡδονήν] 'If however, apart from this, it gives any pleasure,'—*ἄλλην* being 'adverbial.'

παραπλεῖαι ὦσι τράπεζαι, κ.τ.λ.] altered from Odyss. ix. 8 *παρὰ δὲ πλήθωσι τράπεζαι*. Plato has somewhat unfairly left out the minstrel, who, in the same passage, is placed foremost among the delights of the banquet.

B **λιμῷ δ' οἴκτιστον . . . ἐπισπεῖν**] Odyss. xii. 342.

ἢ Δία . . . ἐπιλανθανόμενον] 'Or to hear that Zeus, while the other Gods and mankind were sleeping, lightly forgot all that he had planned while he alone was awake.' The construction is *ἀκούειν Δία ὡς ἐπιλανθανόμενον* = *ὡς Ζεὺς ἐπελανθάνετο* (cp. ii. 383 A *ὡς . . . γόητας ὄντας*). The nominatives, *μόνος ἐγρηγορώς*, agree with the subject of *ἐβουλεύσατο*, the relative being transposed as supra ii. 363 A *τοῖς ὁσίοις ἅ φασι τοὺς θεοὺς διδόναι*. *καθευδόντων . . . ἃ ἐβουλεύσατο* is a paraphrase of Iliad ii. 1, 2 ff.

ἄλλοι μέν ῥα θεοί τε καὶ ἀνέρες ἱπποκορυσταὶ
εὗδον παννύχιοι· Δία δ' οὐκ ἔχε νήδυμος ὕπνος· κ.τ.λ.

And the chief allusion is to Iliad xiv. 294–351. The words *φίλους λήθοντε τοκῆας*, which occur in the poet's narrative (l. c. l. 296), are inaccurately ascribed by Plato to Zeus in person.

C **τὸ δωμάτιον**] The diminutive is comically substituted for the *θάλαμος* of Iliad xiv. 338, and is perhaps meant to burlesque the *αἰθέρα Διὸς δωμάτιον* which Aristophanes (Ranae 100) ascribes to Euripides.

Republic III. 390 C

δι' ἕτερα τοιαῦτα] 'for something else of the same kind,' 'for the same sort of thing.' These words are euphemistic and contemptuous. Plato does not care to give the second tale in full: Odyss. viii. 266 foll. The sentence passes out of the interrogative form. **οὐδέ**, sc. *ἐπιτήδειόν ἐστιν ἀκούειν.*

D

ἀλλ' εἴ πού τινες . . . ἀκουστέον] 'But any extreme deeds of endurance which are either performed by famous men or told concerning them, our youth should see (represented at the theatre) and hear.' **λέγονται**, sc. *περὶ ἐλλογίμων ἀνδρῶν*: **ὑπό**, κ.τ.λ., is in construction only with **πράττονται.** For **πρὸς ἅπαντα** cp. Thuc. iii. 82, 4 *τὸ* **πρὸς ἅπαν** *ξυνετόν.*

τοὺς ἄνδρας] is used pronominally,—'the men before us,' 'our pupils.' Compare infra 391 C *τοὺς ἡμετέρους.* This familiar way of speaking adds a touch of reality to the conversation. Cp. Theaet. 144 D, where Socrates says in reply to Theodorus' description of his pupil—*γεννικὸν λέγεις* **τὸν ἄνδρα.**

E

δῶρα . . . βασιλῆας] This verse is said by Suidas (i. p. 623) to be taken from Hesiod.

Φοίνικα, κ.τ.λ.] Il. ix. 432, 515 sqq.

τῆς μήνιος] The Epic word recalls the theme of the Iliad.

παρὰ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος δῶρα λαβεῖν] Il. xix. 278. Plato does injustice to the character of Achilles, who is indifferent to the gifts. It is a misconception of the Homeric idea to charge him with *ἀνελευθερία* or *φιλοχρηματία*, as infra 391 C. See especially Il. xix. 147, 148 *Δῶρα μέν, αἴ κ' ἐθέλῃσθα, παρασχέμεν, ὡς ἐπιεικές, | εἴτ' ἐχέμεν, πάρα σοί.*

391 A

δι' Ὅμηρον] Compare x. 595 B *καίτοι φιλία γέ τίς με καὶ αἰδὼς ἐκ παιδὸς ἔχουσα περὶ Ὁμήρου ἀποκωλύει λέγειν.*

ἔβλαψάς μ' ἑκάεργε . . . παρείη] Il. xxii. 15, 20.

καὶ ὡς πρὸς τὸν ποταμόν . . . ἀπειθῶς εἶχε] Il. xxi. 130 ff. B

καὶ αὖ . . . οὐ πειστέον] Il. xxiii. 151. 'Or that he said "Let me offer to Patroclus," who was a lifeless corpse, "to take with him the locks," which had been consecrated to the other river Spercheius, or that he did so, we should not believe.' **ὡς** is to be repeated with **ἔφη**. The accusative, **τὰς . . . τρίχας**, is in a loose construction, which becomes more precise when the phrase is resumed in **κόμην**. The genitive **τοῦ . . . Σπερχειοῦ** is to be taken closely with **ἱεράς** in the usual construction.

Republic III. 391 B **τάς τε αὖ Ἕκτορος . . . Πατρόκλου**] Il. xxiv. 14 ff.: cp. xxii. 395 ff.

τὰς τῶν ζωγρηθέντων σφαγὰς εἰς τὴν πυράν] Il. xxiii. 175, 176. The plurals **ἕλξεις** and **σφαγάς** refer to a succession of distinct acts. The body of Hector was dragged day after day, and twelve human victims, not one only, had been offered on the funeral pyre.

C **θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων**] For the genitive of the object after **ὑπερηφανίαν** cp. supra ii. 359 A *ξυνθήκας αὐτῶν*, and note.

μὴ τοίνυν . . . ἁρπαγάς] 'Then let us equally refuse to believe, or allow to be repeated the tale of Theseus, son of Poseidon, and Pirithous, son of Zeus, going forth to perpetrate such horrid acts of rape.' Pirithous aided Theseus in carrying off Helen, and Theseus joined Pirithous in his attempt to steal Persephone away from Pluto (Isocrates, *Ἑλένης ἐγκώμιον*, 20–22). The plural **ἁρπαγάς** includes both actions. **δεινάς** marks not the danger of the descent to Hades, but the heinousness of the offence. **ὥρμησαν** is read in Par. A after all, and not *ὥρμησεν*, as stated by all the Editors from Bekker downwards. This determines the balance in favour of the plural verb. **οὕτως** is to be joined with *δεινάς*. Cp. Symp. 192 C **οὕτως** *ἐπὶ* **μεγάλης** *σπουδῆς*.

D **μηδέ τιν' ἄλλον**] *ἄλλον* is clearly preferable to *ἄλλου*, although *ἄλλοὺ* (sic) is the reading of Par. A.

ὡς οἱ θεοὶ κακὰ γεννῶσι] 'That the Gods are progenitors of evil.' The doers of evil cannot be sons of God. Else evil would proceed from God. Cp. ii. 379 C.

E **ὡς ἄρα**] *ἄρα*, 'then'—if these stories are true.

οἱ θεῶν ἀγχίσποροι, κ.τ.λ.] These lines are taken, like the quotation in ii. 380 A, from the Niobe of Aeschylus. The lines are also quoted by Strabo (xii. 870), as they occur here, with the exception that *οἷς ἐν Ἰδαίῳ πάγῳ* is read for **ὧν κατ' Ἰδαῖον πάγον**. The reason of the resolution (**καὶ οὔ πω**), which occurs in all the MSS. but not in Strabo, may be either that Socrates is putting together lines from different places, as at pp. 386, 387, or that the copyists supposed him to have done so.

Aeschylus seems to imagine a sort of heavenly Ida, like Olympus in Homer, where the demigods sacrifice to their father in the sky.

It is the mountain whose top reaches to Heaven in the imagination of the poet. Cp. the similar consecration of Mount Oeta in Soph. Trach. 1191. *Republic III.* 391 E

What principles are to regulate the representation of human things? The point is reserved until after the decision of the main question, concerning the nature of Justice, and whether it is profitable or not to him who has it,—and this whether it be known or unknown to Gods and men. 392 A–C

[**ἡμῖν**] before ἦν δ' ἐγώ is omitted in Par. A, probably owing to ἦν following. 392 A

λοιπὸν εἶδος λόγων πέρι] 'What department still remains that has to do with the subjects of discourse.' The reading λόγων πέρι is confirmed by τὰ μὲν δὴ λόγων πέρι infra C, and by the expression εἶδος νόμων πέρι, infra iv. 427 A. The periphrasis is nearly equivalent to a simple genitive. The reading of Ξ, which was also the reading of the text before Bekker, is περιοριζομένοις, a word the existence of which could not be allowed on the authority of this passage only, even if the other reading had not the authority of Π M. The scribe who wrote περιορίζομεν οἷς as in A must have understood the relative clause to mean 'what is to be told to whom.' For the meaning of λόγοι cp. supra ii. 376 E μουσικῆς δ' εἰπὼν τίθης λόγους, ἢ οὔ; where the subject was first started.

ὡς ἄρα] 'to infer from what we admitted,' 'according to our view,' viz. in Book ii.

Plato remembers that the poets (as Adeimantus pointed out, ii. 364 A) err equally in their ideas about men, as about the Gods. But how can we determine the truth about human virtue till we define justice? This is an ironical or fanciful excuse for varying the order of the subject. Cp. iv. 430 D.

ἀλλότριον μὲν ἀγαθόν, κ.τ.λ.] i. 343 C, ii. 367 C. B

ἃ πάλαι * ζητοῦμεν] 'which we have been seeking all this while.' The manuscript reading is ἐζητοῦμεν, 'which we were seeking for long ago': sc. in the inquiry about justice, before we began to construct the state. But the conjectural reading ζητοῦμεν, which is confirmed by the version of Ficinus, is more probable. Cp. iv. 420 C κατιδόντες δὲ κρῖναι ἂν ὃ πάλαι ζητοῦμεν. For the use of such a pronominal phrase in recapitulating, to avoid tautology, cp. Phileb. 50 C τὰ νῦν πολλάκις λεγόμενα.

Republic III. 392 C–397 E

So much is said with regard to the substance of the new literature. Next, as to the form. Shall it be (1) *narrative, or* (2) *dramatic, or* (3) *a mixture of both?*

The speeches in Homer are dramatic, but they are linked together with bits of narration. Tragic poetry is dramatic throughout. Homer, again, would be entirely narrative, if the speeches were reported indirectly. And this is the mode actually adopted in the Dithyramb.

The purely dramatic form is to be excluded from our state. For we have long since decided that simplicity is to be our rule; and the imitation of various characters is fatal to simplicity. Our youth may be allowed to impersonate the virtuous and good, but nothing that is vicious or mean, nor a female in any condition, nor a slave; still less, as happens in comedy, a drunkard or a coward. They must indeed know such characters from without, but never for a moment must they be identified with them. Nor may they mimic menial arts, of which they are to know nothing, nor unmeaning noises, such as the neighing of horses or the sound of thunder.

In narrating the fortunes of some hero, if they are carried away into impersonating him when he is about some noble deed, well and good. Or if they scornfully throw in a dramatic touch in characterizing some bad man, there is no great harm, provided that such points in their discourse are few and momentary. But the main tenour of the recital will be pure narration, and the manner of the recitation in the pitch and cadence of the voice will be simple and uniform.

392 D **διήγησις οὖσα**] The participle is attracted to the noun instead of agreeing with **πάντα** supra.

ἆρ᾽ οὖν . . . περαίνουσιν] There are three kinds of poetry:—(1) the simple narrative, of which the dithyramb is given as an example (394 c): (2) the opposite kind, which has only action and no narrative, as is the case in tragedy and comedy: (3) the union of the two, as in Epic poetry, which, if you leave the speeches only, becomes a drama, or if you omit the speeches or report them in *oratio obliqua*, takes the form of simple narration.

Compare Aristotle's Poetics, c. iii. § 2 *καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μιμεῖσθαι ἔστιν ὁτὲ μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα ἢ ἕτερόν τι γιγνόμενον, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος ποιεῖ, ἢ ὡς τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλοντα, ἢ πάντας ὡς πράττοντας καὶ ἐνεργοῦντας τοὺς μιμουμένους.*—**λέξις**, as a separate element, is overlooked in Gorg. 502 c *φέρε δή, εἴ τις περιέλοιτο τῆς ποιήσεως πάσης τό*

τε μέλος καὶ τὸν ῥυθμὸν καὶ τὸ μέτρον, ἄλλο τι ἢ λόγοι γίγνονται τὸ λειπόμενον; *Republic III.*

Plato's test of the moral character of poetry, while including dithyrambics, would exclude the tragedies of Sophocles and Aeschylus. On the relation of Plato to the poets, see further notes in Book x. 392 D

περαίνουσιν] 'proceed.' For this absolute use cp. Laws iv. 715 E ὁ μὲν δὴ θεὸς . . . εὐθείᾳ περαίνει ('fulfils his course').

ἀπολαβὼν μέρος τι] 'breaking off a part,' i. e. making use of an example. Cp. Gorg. 495 E περὶ ὅτου βούλει τοῦ σώματος **ἀπολαβὼν** σκόπει, and Theaet. 182 A οὐ μανθάνεις ἀθρόον λεγόμενον· **κατὰ μέρη** οὖν ἄκουε. E

οὐκ ἐτύγχανε] The imperfect as in οὐκ ἔπειθε.

καὶ ἐλίσσετο . . . λαῶν] Il. i. 15, 16. 393 A

τῶν ἐν Ἰθάκῃ καὶ ὅλῃ Ὀδυσσείᾳ παθημάτων] 'the things which happened at Ithaca and in the Odyssey generally,' i. e. not only in Ithaca, but at Sparta, Phaeacia, and elsewhere. Observe that ἐν is not again repeated, but is implied in a somewhat different meaning with Ὀδυσσείᾳ. B

οὐκοῦν διήγησις . . . τῶν ῥήσεων] Epic poetry is *narrative* throughout; but the *simple narrative*, i. e. the descriptive part is to be distinguished from *narrative through imitation*, i. e. the speeches: ἁπλῆ διήγησις ἄνευ μιμήσεως from διήγησις διὰ μιμήσεως.

ᾧ ἄν τις ὁμοιοῖ] sc. ἑαυτόν, to be supplied from **ὁμοιοῦν ἑαυτόν** at the beginning of the sentence. C

ἵνα δὲ μὴ εἴπῃς, ὅτι οὐκ αὖ μανθάνεις] 'But that you may not say "Once more I do not understand you."' The order of the words appears to be euphonic. Cp. Theaet. 161 A ὡς οὐκ αὖ ἔχει οὕτω ταῦτα. D

αὐτούς] emphatic—'themselves,' opposed to **τὴν θυγατέρα οἱ.** E

λῦσαι] depends on the general notion of urging implied in **εὔχετο.**

μὴ . . . οὐκ ἐπαρκέσοι] This is the *oratio obliqua* of μὴ . . . οὐκ ἐπαρκέσει, Plato's prose version of μὴ . . . οὐ χραίσμῃ in Homer. The future indicative after a verb of fearing is rare, but occurs in Aesch., Soph., and Xen. See Goodwin, *M. and T.*, § 367. Cp. v. 451 A μὴ σφαλεὶς . . . κείσομαι, and for the optative Euthyphro,

Republic III. 15 D ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἂν ἔδεισας . . . μὴ οὐκ ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ ποιήσοις. The future indicative after μή in a final clause, although rare, is not
393 E unknown (Ar. Eccl. 495 εἰκὸς . . . μὴ βραδύνειν . . . μὴ καί τις ὄψεται), so that, as Goodwin remarks, *M. and T.*, § 132, there is no objection to μὴ . . . ἐπαρκέσοι being so taken here. In places of this kind the notions of purpose ('lest') and fearing ('for fear that') are nearly coincident.

ἀπιέναι δ' ἐκέλευε . . . οἴκαδε ἔλθοι] 'He told him to be off, and not to provoke him, if he wished to get home safely.' Plato omits the accusative case after **ἐρεθίζειν** (ἀλλ' ἴθι, μή μ' ἐρέθιζε), which has been unnecessarily restored by Valckenaer (μὴ **ἑ**) without manuscript authority.

394 A **ἀποχωρήσας δὲ ἐκ τοῦ στρατοπέδου**] This is prose for ἀπάνευθε κιὼν Il. i. 35.

τάς τε ἐπωνυμίας . . . ναῶν οἰκοδομήσεσιν] Il. i. 37–9:—

> κλῦθί μευ, ἀργυρότοξ', ὃς Χρύσην ἀμφιβέβηκας
> Κίλλαν τε ζαθέην, Τενέδοιό τε ἶφι ἀνάσσεις,
> Σμινθεῦ, εἴ ποτέ τοι χαρίεντ' ἐπὶ νηὸν ἔρεψα,

which last seems to have been understood by Plato, not of crowning shrines of the God with garlands, but of roofing them (ἐν ναῶν οἰκοδομήσεσιν), as Eustathius explains the word ἔρεψα by ὠρόφωσα, which is probably the true meaning. 'ἔρεψα seems to indicate the most primitive form of temple—a mere roof to protect the image of a God standing in a grove.' Leaf's note on Il. i. 39. Cp. Paus. x. 5, § 9.

τὰ ἃ δάκρυα] ἅ is an archaism or Homericism, into the use of which Plato is probably led by his subject. Cp. supra ii. 383 B τὰς ἑὰς εὐπαιδίας, and note. There is a similar use of a poetical form in the Phaedrus, where Socrates 'plays' at dithyrambics: 237 A **ξύμ μοι λάβεσθε** τοῦ μύθου.

B **ταύτης αὖ ἐναντία**] sc. διήγησις, i. e. ἡ διὰ μιμήσεως.

καὶ τοῦτο . . . τοιοῦτον] 'That again I understand; and I perceive that your remark applies to tragedy.'

ὀρθότατα . . . οὐχ οἷός τ' ἦ] 'You perfectly catch my meaning, and now I think I make you see what before I could not.'

ἔμπροσθεν . . . (c) τότε] supra 392 D καὶ τοῦτο (the first statement about διήγησις) . . . ἔτι δέομαι σαφέστερον μαθεῖν.

ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις] supra *μανθάνω . . . τοιοῦτον.* The respondent *Republic III.* 394 C
gets full credit for his contribution. The reference to this definition is repeated infra 395 A.

εἴ μοι μανθάνεις] 'If I make you understand.' The dative *μοι*, which is the reading of the MSS., has been altered into *μου* by Heindorf. This is unnecessary, although *εἴ μου μανθάνεις* occurs in Phileb. 51 C. Compare Laws i. 644 C *καί* **μοι** *δι' εἰκόνος ἀποδέξασθε.*

τὸ πρὸ τούτου] 392 C.

τοῦτο τοίνυν . . . ἔλεγον] 'That was just what I meant.' **τοῦτο** D
αὐτό refers to what follows, **ὅτι χρείη . . . μιμεῖσθαι**, as well as to the words **ὡς δὲ λεκτέον** in what precedes.

οὐδὲ μιμεῖσθαι] sc. *ἐάσομεν.*

ἴσως δὲ καὶ πλείω] 'And there may be more than this in question,'—an anticipation of the condemnation of epic poetry in Book x.

πολλῶν ἐφαπτόμενος] 'attempting many things, he will altogether E
fail to be eminent in any (**που**).' **ὥστε** depends on some positive idea, which is gathered from **ἀποτυγχάνοι**: 'he will not succeed (*οὐ τυγχάνοι ἄν*) in any so as to be eminent.' Cp. Protag. 314 B, where *ἔτι νέοι* **ὥστε** = *οὔπω ἡλικίαν ἔχομεν, ὥστε.*

οἷον κωμῳδίαν, κ.τ.λ.] Yet Socrates at the end of the Sympo- 395 A
sium (223 D) maintains that comedy and tragedy belong to the same artist: *τὸ μέντοι κεφάλαιον, ἔφη, προσαναγκάζειν τὸν Σωκράτη ὁμολογεῖν αὐτοὺς τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνδρὸς εἶναι κωμῳδίαν καὶ τραγῳδίαν ἐπίστασθαι ποιεῖν, καὶ τὸν τέχνῃ τραγῳδιοποιὸν ὄντα κωμῳδιοποιὸν εἶναι.*

For a judgement on tragedy compare Gorg. 502 B *τί δὲ δὴ ἡ σεμνὴ αὕτη καὶ θαυμαστὴ ἡ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποίησις, ἐφ' ᾧ ἐσπούδακε;* where he proceeds to say: 'Is the vocation of tragedy to please the spectators only? Or does she refuse to speak of pleasant vices and proclaim only what is wholesome but unpleasant? We must say Yes to the former; and if so, all the pretensions of tragedy will not hinder our classing her creations under the head of flattery.' The same test is applied to other kinds of poetry.

Plato's enmity to the drama seems to rest on grounds which are partly fanciful and partly real. The mimetic sympathetic power of the actor is unfavourable to strength and unity of purpose: the genius of imitation is certainly akin to weakness. But a man will not be induced to become a murderer by acting the

Republic III. 395 A part of a murderer; nor is the inference sound that the same individual cannot act many parts because he cannot succeed in many serious pursuits. The evil of the drama does not consist in the imitation of evil any more than of good, but in the effect of continued emotion and excitement on the character of the actor and spectators.

ἄρτι] 394 B, C.

ῥαψῳδοί γε] sc. *δύνανται εἶναι.*

οὐδέ τοι ὑποκριταὶ . . . οἱ αὐτοί] 'And you know that the same actors do not perform in tragedy and comedy.' Cp. *τραγῳδοῖς νικᾶν*, and similar expressions.

B **πάντα δὲ ταῦτα μιμήματα**] i.e. the rhapsode and the tragic or comic actor are 'imitators,' as well as the poets whose works they produce; or, in modern language, there is a sense in which the actor, too, 'creates' his part. Plato, however, fails to realize that true art is not mere imitation, but the embodiment of an ideal; although he comes near the expression of this truth in 401 B (infra).

ὥστε ἀδύνατος εἶναι . . . ἀφομοιώματα] (1) If ἢ is unemphatic, 'And becomes unable to imitate many things well or to do the things themselves well, if they are many'; (2) or taking ἤ emphatically—'Or else' (if able to imitate) 'is not able to do the things themselves.' For the latter (which resumes *σχολῇ ἄρα ἐπιτηδεύσει, κ.τ.λ.*) cp. vi. 503 A *ἢ τὸν ἀδυνατοῦντα ἀποκριτέον*: vii. 525 B *τῆς οὐσίας ἁπτέον εἶναι γενέσεως ἐξαναδύντι, ἢ μηδέποτε λογιστικῷ γενέσθαι.*

C **τὰ τούτοις προσήκοντα**] *τούτοις* is probably masculine = *φύλαξι καὶ δημιουργοῖς ἐλευθερίας τῆς πόλεως.* Cp. infra E *ὅσα δούλων*: 396 A *κελεύοντας* **τούτοις.**

ἵνα μὴ . . . ἀπολαύσωσιν] 'Lest by imitation they should become imbued with the reality of that which they imitate.' Cp. infra 401 B, C *ἵνα μὴ ἐν κακίας εἰκόσι τρεφόμενοι . . . ἔν τι ξυνιστάντες λανθάνωσι κακὸν μέγα ἐν τῇ αὐτῶν ψυχῇ.*

D **ἐὰν ἐκ νέων πόρρω διατελέσωσιν**] 'If, beginning in youth, they continue far into life.'

εἰς ἔθη τε καὶ φύσιν καθίστανται] 'Acquire the fixedness of habit and nature.'

ἀνδρὶ λοιδορουμένην] 'Reviling' (1) 'a man,' opposed to **πρὸς θεούς** following, or (2) 'her husband.' *Republic III.*

πολλοῦ καὶ δεήσομεν] *καί* adds to the emphasis: 'We shall be far indeed from that.' 395 E

μεθύοντας ἢ καὶ νήφοντας] These words qualify the preceding participles. 'Abusing and reviling one another whether drunk or sober.'

ἁμαρτάνουσιν εἰς αὐτούς τε καὶ εἰς ἄλλους] 'Sin against others and against themselves,' i. e. degrading themselves as well as injuring others. 396 A

γνωστέον μὲν γάρ, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. infra 409 D *ἀρετὴ δὲ φύσεως παιδευομένης χρόνῳ ἅμα αὐτῆς τε καὶ πονηρίας ἐπιστήμην λήψεται.*

κελεύοντας τούτοις] sc. *τοῖς ἐλαύνουσιν*: 'giving the time to the rowers,' i. e. doing the work of the *κελευστής* on board ship.

οὐδὲ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν τούτων οὐδενί] supra ii. 374 D, E. B

ἢ μιμήσονται] *ἤ*, which is emphasized by its position in the sentence, asks the question with a tone of indignation. Cp. v. 469 C *τί δέ; σκυλεύειν . . . τοὺς τελευτήσαντας πλὴν ὅπλων, ἐπειδὰν νικήσωσιν, ἢ καλῶς ἔχει;*

ἀπείρηται αὐτοῖς, κ.τ.λ.] supra A.

εἰ . . . μανθάνω ἃ σὺ λέγεις] Socrates again ascribes his own reflections to the respondent.

οὗ ἂν ἔχοιτο] 'In which he will persist.' Cp. Soph. 264 E *ἐχόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σοφιστοῦ κοινωνίας*: Thuc. i. 140 *τῆς μὲν γνώμης . . . τῆς αὐτῆς ἔχομαι.* C

ὁ μέν μοι . . . μέτριος ἀνήρ] *ὁ* is the definite article before *μέτριος ἀνήρ.* The words which intervene give an additional emphasis to *μέτριος.*

σπουδῇ] 'in earnest,' is opposed to *παιδιᾶς χάριν.* D

οὐκ ἐθελήσειν] like *ἐθελήσειν* supra, dependent on *δοκεῖ.*

αὑτὸν ἐκμάττειν τε καὶ ἐνιστάναι, κ.τ.λ.] 'To mould and adapt himself to the baser shapes,' like the clay of the statuary which would be said *ἐνίστασθαι τῷ τύπῳ*, 'to settle into the shape of the mould.' But in Tim. 50 D *ἐν ᾧ ἐκτυπούμενον ἐνίσταται*, the same word is used conversely of the form being impressed on the matter.

Republic III. 396 E **καὶ ἔσται . . . τῆς μιμήσεως**] 'And his style will partake of both kinds, of imitation and also of narrative' (*τῆς* **ἄλλης** *διηγήσεως*: see on ii. 357 C: it may be remembered however that *διήγησις* alone, when not distinguished by the epithet *ἁπλῇ*, may include the imitative, as well as other kinds, as in the beginning of this passage, supra 392 D): 'only there will be a few grains of the former in a long recital.' Bekker alters the text into *σμικρὸν δέ τι μέρος μιμήσεως ἐν πολλῷ λόγῳ τῆς διηγήσεως*, for which there is some faint manuscript authority; but the alteration is unnecessary; the text is neater and gives an equally good sense.

397 A **ὅσῳ ἂν φαυλότερος ᾖ . . . διηγήσεται**] It seems necessary to adopt Madvig's emendation here. Of the two manuscript readings, that of *q*, although probably conjectural, is the more plausible: 'The more vulgar he is, the more constantly will he employ imitation.' The reading of Par. A, &c., *πάντα τε μᾶλλον διηγήσεται*, could only mean: 'the more ready will he be to tell about anything and everything'—laying a strong emphasis on *πάντα*, and implying that there are some things which a good man will not even narrate. If Plato had meant this, he would have said it more clearly. And the form of the sentence (**τε . . . καὶ οὐδὲν . . . ὥστε, κ.τ.λ.**) is much better adapted to bring out the additional point—that not only does the bad man always prefer imitation, but there is nothing which he is ashamed to imitate. The expression *πάντα* **διηγήσεται** is also too obviously out of keeping with the concluding words, *σμικρόν τι διηγήσεως ἔχουσα*. [The avoidance of a mere awkwardness does not justify an emendation which has no real manuscript authority. B. J.]

τροχιλίων] 'pulleys.' Perhaps, as Ast suggested, *τροχιλιῶν* should be read, *τροχιλία*, not *τροχίλιον*, being the usual form.

B **σχήμασιν**] 'gestures': cp. Soph. 267 A *ὅταν . . . τὸ σὸν σχῆμά τις τῷ ἑαυτοῦ χρώμενος σώματι προσόμοιον ἢ φωνὴν φωνῇ φαίνεσθαι ποιῇ, μίμησις τοῦτο τῆς φανταστικῆς μάλιστα κέκληταί που*. The word is differently used supra ii. 373 B.

ὀλίγου πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν . . . καὶ ἐν μιᾷ ἁρμονίᾳ] (1) **πρὸς τὴν αὐτήν**, sc. *λέξιν* ('*ferme ad eandem orationis formam*,' Fic.). 'The result is that he speaks nearly in the same style and with a uniform cadence.' [(2) **ὀλίγου πρὸς τὴν αὐτήν**, sc. *χορδήν*. *πρὸς λέξιν τινὰ λέγειν* is hardly a natural expression, and the question here is not that of the style itself, but of the cadence and tone adapted to it. The cadence is uniform and approaches monotone. Cp. *πρόσχορδος*

(Laws vii. 812 D) and the ellipsis of χορδή with νεάτη, ὑπάτη, μέση (infra iv. 443 D): also Lucian, de Salt., c. 80 ἄλογα κινούμενοι καὶ μηδέν, ὥς φασι, πρὸς τὴν χορδήν. The narrative style, as it has less alteration of meaning or feeling (**σμικραὶ γὰρ αἱ μεταβολαί**), has fewer and slighter variations of tone than the dramatic.—As there is no authority, however, for this elliptical phrase, this interpretation, though suited to the context, is only conjectural. L. C.] For the use of **ὀρθῶς** compare 403 B οὐδὲ κοινωνητέον αὐτῆς ἐραστῇ τε καὶ παιδικοῖς ὀρθῶς ἐρῶσί τε καὶ ἐρωμένοις. The words **τῷ ὀρθῶς λέγοντι** ('when one recites properly') are balanced by εἰ μέλλει αὖ οἰκείως λέγεσθαι (infra C), i. e. 'when the enunciation is appropriate to the style.' It is clear that ἁρμονία here is not used in the strictly musical sense, but is applied to the changes of pitch and tone which occur in speaking and reciting. Cp. Ar. Rhet. iii. 1, where Aristotle says that the three elements of utterance are μέγεθος, ἁρμονία and ῥυθμός, and identifies ἁρμονία with τόνος.

τί δὲ τὸ τοῦ ἑτέρου εἶδος; . . . τῶν μεταβολῶν ἔχειν;] 'But what about the character of the other style? Will it not require the opposite? Will it not require all harmonies and all rhythms, if it is to be appropriately expressed, because it has every variety of change?' The μεταβολαί here referred to are changes in the style. C

ἆρ' οὖν, κ.τ.λ.] The words λόγος, λέξις, ἁρμονία, ῥυθμός, βάσις, may be distinguished as follows:—

λόγος, the subject, which is true or false, moral or immoral.

λέξις, the style, which is dramatic or narrative, or a composition of the two.

ἁρμονία is a musical term: it was applied (α) to the Enharmonic *genus* (this is the only sense it has in Aristoxenus), (β) to the *modes*, which according to some differed in the arrangement of the intervals, according to others in pitch. The word really means 'scale,' as defined in Laws ii. 664 E εἴπομεν . . . ὡς . . . τῇ δὴ τῆς κινήσεως τάξει ῥυθμὸς ὄνομα εἴη, τῇ δὲ αὖ τῆς φωνῆς, τοῦ τε ὀξέος ἅμα καὶ βαρέος συγκεραννυμένων, ἁρμονία ὄνομα προσαγορεύοιτο: (γ) Plato also applies the term in a still wider sense, as in the preceding sentence, to cadence or variation of tone in speaking and recitation—infra 398 D τοῦ μὴ ᾀδομένου λόγου.

ῥυθμός is a term which applies equally to the music and to the

Republic III. 397 C words: the division of time in metre (e.g. Paeonic, Dactylic, Trochaic, proceeding respectively in a ratio of $\frac{3}{2}$, $\frac{2}{2}$, $\frac{2}{1}$) and the corresponding accentuation of the music.

βάσις is the movement considered as a system of times or quantities, $\frac{3}{2}$, $\frac{2}{2}$, $\frac{2}{1}$. In 400 A *τρί' ἄττα ἐστὶν εἴδη ἐξ ὧν αἱ βάσεις πλέκονται* Plato implies that the term *βάσις* applies to the whole of each of the three systems of which the Paeon, Dactyl, or Trochee is the characteristic element.

ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τινὶ ξυγκεραννύντες] *τινὶ* sc. *τύπῳ*: i.e. *ἤ τινι ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων, ξυγκεραννύντες τι εἶδος ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων*. *ξυγκεκραμένῳ* would have been more natural. But the preference for the active is characteristic of Greek.

D **παισί τε καὶ παιδαγωγοῖς, κ.τ.λ.**] *καὶ παιδαγωγοῖς* is humorously added. He knows that his regulations will be unpopular, not with the children only, but with their attendants, who are 'children of a larger growth.' Cp. Gorg. 502 D (speaking of tragedy)—*νῦν ἄρα ἡμεῖς εὑρήκαμεν ῥητορικήν τινα πρὸς δῆμον τοιοῦτον, οἷον παίδων τε ὁμοῦ καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ ἀνδρῶν, καὶ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων*. The expression recurs in Laws iii. 700 C with reference to the earlier custom of the theatre: *παισὶ δὲ καὶ παιδαγωγοῖς καὶ τῷ πλείστῳ ὄχλῳ ῥάβδου κοσμούσης ἡ νουθέτησις ἐγίγνετο.*

E **καὶ οὐ χρηματιστήν**] See Thuc. vi. 31, § 5: vii. 13, § 2.

398 A, B *The genial versatile poet shall be sent into honourable exile: his severe didactic brother shall be alone retained.*

398 A **αὐτός τε καὶ τὰ ποιήματα, κ.τ.λ.**] (1) 'himself, and wanting to show his poems.' Cp. iv. 427 D *αὐτός τε καὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν παρακάλει*, and Phaedr. 253 B *μιμούμενοι αὐτοί τε καὶ τὰ παιδικὰ πείθοντες*: or perhaps (2), 'himself and his poems which he wishes to display'; **τὰ ποιήματα** being taken first as nominative to **ἀφίκοιτο** and then also as accusative after **ἐπιδείξασθαι**.

προσκυνοῖμεν ἄν, κ.τ.λ.] The words that follow are an ironical glorification of the dramatic poet: He is a holy and marvellous being—a delightful creature (cp. Ion 534 B *κοῦφον γὰρ χρῆμα ποιητής ἐστι καὶ πτηνὸν καὶ ἱερόν*). But as the like of him is not allowed among us, let us fall down before him and crown him with wool, and anoint his head with myrrh,—and show him the way out.

A similar, though more serious strain is addressed to the tragic poets in the Laws, vii. 817 A.D., where they are told that they will

not be allowed to perform their plays until they have been submitted to the censorship of the magistrates, and this severity is humorously attributed by Plato to professional jealousy. The law-giver who is a tragic poet in that 'his whole state is an imitation of the best and noblest life' cannot be expected to allow his rival and antagonist 'to erect his stage in the agora and introduce the fair voices of actors, speaking above his own,—very often in contradiction.' Cp. also Phileb. 50 B τῇ τοῦ βίου ξυμπάσῃ τραγῳδίᾳ καὶ κωμῳδίᾳ. *Republic III.* 398 A

ἐρίῳ στέψαντες] (1) 'Crowning him with wool': or (2) 'providing him with a woollen fillet' (στέμμα), which he is to carry on a wand in token of the sacredness of his person.

κατ' ἀρχάς] ii. 379 A ff. B

εἰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἴη] 'If we really had the power.' For a similar reference to the possibility of the Republic being realized in fact cp. supra 389 D ἐάν γε . . . ἐπί γε λόγῳ ἔργα τελῆται, and note.

So much for the subjects and the style of spoken discourse. And with regard to song the principles will be the same. *398 B–399 E*

The difference lies in the addition of tune and metre. As we have forbidden our poets to use lamentation, we shall forbid our musical composers to employ pathetic melodies, or any kind of music which tends to relax the moral fibre. No 'soft Lydian airs' for us, nor the 'linked sweetness' of Ionian strains! But only the manly Dorian and the martial Phrygian mood. Or, to speak more exactly, we must have one sort of music which expresses warlike resolution and patient fortitude, and one which breathes the serene temper of philosophic aspiration and wise counsel and calm rejoicing in the triumph of good.

For this we shall need no elaborate instrument, least of all the infinitely variable tones of the flute—nothing but the lyre and simple reed. We renounce Marsyas and hold to Apollo.

The passage which follows has been fully discussed by Westphal, *Griechische Harmonik*, ed. 1886, c. 5, §§ 25–31, pp. 187–240.

περὶ ᾠδῆς τρόπου καὶ μελῶν] 'About the character of songs and the tunes.' 398 C

ἐκτὸς τῶν πάντων] is a play upon the word πᾶς (ἆρ' οὖν οὐ πᾶς ἤδη ἂν εὕροι). Socrates argues that the application to song of the principles which have been already laid down will be evident to all. Glaucon answers with a smile: 'I do not seem to be included in the comprehensive word "all," and am therefore at a loss to con-

Republic III. 398 C jecture at present (though I have a suspicion) what sort of things we ought to say.' Cp. Soph. 233 E λέγω τοίνυν σὲ καὶ ἐμὲ **τῶν πάντων**: infra vii. 529 A παντὶ . . . δῆλον . . . ἴσως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, **παντὶ** δῆλον **πλὴν ἐμοί.**

D **λόγου . . . ῥυθμοῦ**] See note on supra 397 C.

καὶ ὡσαύτως] I. e. ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ λέξει, viz. τῇ ἁπλῇ διηγήσει.

καὶ μήν, κ.τ.λ.] This general truth has been admitted above, 397 B ἐάν τις ἀποδιδῷ πρέπουσαν ἁρμονίαν καὶ ῥυθμὸν τῇ λέξει, although this is there said of speaking and recitation only.

E **μιξολυδιστί**] 'That famous mode which Sappho invented, and which Aristoxenus declares to be perfectly adapted to tragedy' (Westphal, *Griechische Harmonik*, ed. 1886, p. 198). The authority for this is Plutarch, De Mus., c. 16 καὶ ἡ **μιξολύδιος** δὲ παθητική τις ἐστι, τραγῳδίαις ἁρμόζουσα. Ἀριστόξενος δέ φησι Σαπφὼ πρώτην εὕρασθαι τὴν **μιξολυδιστί**, παρ' ἧς τοὺς τραγῳδοποιοὺς μαθεῖν· λαβόντας γοῦν αὐτοὺς συζεῦξαι τῇ δωριστί, ἐπεὶ ἡ μὲν τὸ μεγαλοπρεπὲς καὶ ἀξιωματικὸν ἀποδίδωσιν, ἡ δὲ τὸ παθητικόν, μέμικται δὲ διὰ τούτων τραγῳδία. But Plutarch, in the same passage, attributes to Aristoxenus other statements at variance with this.

ἃς δεῖ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι] Cp. supra 387 E καὶ οὐδὲ ταύταις σπουδαίαις. The suggestion that some women are to aim high is one of the preparations for the surprise in Book v.

αἵτινες χαλαραὶ καλοῦνται] 'The sort of melodies called lax.' The indefinite relative suits with Plato's affected ignorance (cp. infra 400 C), and the antecedent is in apposition to **Ἰαστί** and **λυδιστί** taken together. The 'relaxed harmonies' include Ionian as well as a species of Lydian (ὑπολυδιστί), but there appears to be no distinction among Ionian melodies; although Westphal (§ 28, p. 200), assumes it. χαλαραί is probably a technical term of music, implying a lower pitch, and opposed to σύντονος, but is used by Plato with an ethical association, for which cp. ix. 590 B τρυφὴ δὲ καὶ μαλθακία οὐκ ἐπὶ τῇ αὐτοῦ τούτου (τοῦ θυμοῦ) **χαλάσει** τε καὶ ἀνέσει ψέγεται. Aristotle, Pol. viii. 5, § 22 says: 'Some of the modes make men sad and grave, like the so-called Mixolydian, others enfeeble the mind, like the relaxed harmonies, others again produce a moderate and settled temper, which appears to be the peculiar effect of the Dorian;—the Phrygian inspires enthusiasm.' Aristotle's word for 'relaxed' is ἀνειμέναι, and in this he is followed by Aristoxenus and later writers. It is generally assumed that χαλαραί in Plato means

the same thing. Aristotle in Pol. viii. 7, § 14, censures Plato for rejecting the 'relaxed' harmonies: he would keep them because less difficult for aged persons to sing. *Republic III.* 398 E

φρυγιστί] Why should Plato choose the Phrygian mode to suit the 'modest stillness and sobriety' becoming men in peace? Aristotle's criticism of this passage in Pol. viii. 7, §§ 9–11, seems only natural: 'The Socrates of the Republic is wrong in retaining only the Phrygian mode along with the Dorian, and the more so because he rejects the flute; for the Phrygian is to the modes what the flute is to musical instruments—both of them are exciting and emotional. Poetry proves this, for Bacchic frenzy, and all similar emotions are most suitably expressed by the flute, and are better set to the Phrygian than to any other harmony. The dithyramb, for example, is acknowledged to be Phrygian.' Either Phrygian melodies had other than orgiastic uses, or Plato is proceeding on some abstract ground, as that the Phrygian was in the mean between excess and defect in pitch. 399 A

ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις] is a resumption of *ἐν πολεμικῇ πράξει* and what follows: 'In all these cases repelling the attacks of fortune with a firm front.' B

ἑαυτὸν ἐπέχοντα] 'giving his attention to.' Cp. Laws xi. 926 B *ἐπὶ μείζοσι γάμοις τὴν διάνοιαν ἐπέχων.* After **δεομένου** the construction is changed and the accusatives **ἐπέχοντα . . . πράξαντα, κ.τ.λ.**, are governed directly by *μιμήσαιτο.* The correction **ὑπέχοντα**, 'resigning' or 'submitting himself,' which is found in a single manuscript (Ξ), is unnecessary.

ταύτας δύο ἁρμονίας, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Laws vii. 814 E, where it is said of dancing *τοῦ δὴ σπουδαίου [εἶναι κίνησιν] τὴν μὲν κατὰ πόλεμον καὶ ἐν βιαίοις ἐμπλακέντων πόνοις σωμάτων μὲν καλῶν, ψυχῆς δ' ἀνδρικῆς, τὴν δ' ἐν εὐπραγίαις τε οὔσης ψυχῆς σώφρονος ἐν ἡδοναῖς τε ἐμμέτροις· εἰρηνικὴν ἄν τις λέγων κατὰ φύσιν τὴν τοιαύτην ὄρχησιν λέγοι.* C

δυστυχούντων . . . ἀνδρείων] The genitives depend on **φθόγγους**. The second **ἁρμονίας**, here bracketed, should probably be omitted.

οὐκ ἄρα . . . φαίνεται] 'Then we shall certainly not want in our songs and tunes a multitude of strings or notes, or an instrument which has all the harmonies.' 'Clearly not.'

The Panharmonic instruments were those which were adapted for the performance of all the modes and musical genera; in other words, which admitted the greatest possible variety in the intervals and arrangement of the scale.

Republic III. 399 C **τριγώνων ἄρα καὶ πηκτίδων, κ.τ.λ.**] 'Then we shall not maintain the artificers of lyres with three corners and composite scales, nor of any of the many-stringed curiously harmonized instruments.' 'Manifestly not.' Cp. Arist. Pol. viii. 6, §§ 12, 13, who says that these and other elaborate instruments were gradually disused, as men learned to distinguish what conduced to virtue. The πηκτίς, like the μάγαδις, was of Lydian origin (Herod. i. 17), and was played with the fingers without a plectrum. See Susemihl's note on Arist., l. c.

D **τί δέ; . . . μίμημα;**] 'Next, will you admit makers and players of flutes into the state? Has not this' (**τοῦτο**, sc. αὐλός understood from αὐλητής and αὐλοποιός) 'more strings than all of them? And are not panharmonic instruments themselves an imitation of the flute?'

Plato says playfully that the flute, which has no strings, is 'the most many-stringed of instruments': that is to say, the flute has those qualities in the greatest degree which he has just been denouncing in stringed instruments. According to Proclus, in Alcib. p. 197, each aperture of the flute gave three or more sounds: this variety was obtained by the use of shifts and slides. It was natural that the panharmonic principle should be first applied to an instrument of which the notes could be easily modified. (Paus. ix. 12, § 5.)

In the Laws iii. 700 D, Plato describes the degenerate musicians as κεραννύντες δὲ θρήνους τε ὕμνοις καὶ παιῶνας διθυράμβοις, καὶ αὐλῳδίας δὴ ταῖς κιθαρῳδίαις μιμούμενοι. Cp. Pind. Ol. vii. 21 παμφώνοισί τ' ἐν ἔντεσιν αὐλῶν: Isthm. iv. 35 ἐν αὐλῶν τε παμφώνοις ὁμοκλαῖς.

κιθάρα] The Dorian mood includes the Ὑποδωριστί (otherwise called the Aeolian), of which Arist. Probl. xix. 48, § 1, says that it is κιθαρῳδικωτάτη τῶν ἁρμονιῶν.

E **νὴ τὸν κύνα**] may be regarded as a jest παρὰ προσδοκίαν (cp. Phaedr. 236 E ὄμνυμι . . . τὴν πλάτανον ταυτηνί). It occurs in a lengthened form, which perhaps explains the allusion, in the Gorgias 482 B μὰ τὸν κύνα, τὸν Αἰγυπτίων θεόν—'By the Dog, the God of Egypt.' It is observable that another oath of the same kind, μὰ τὸν χῆνα (which is likewise attributed to the followers of Socrates see Schol. on Ar. Birds 521), refers to an Egyptian deity.

399 E–400 E *By thus simplifying music we have purged our luxurious state.*

And we must also simplify rhythm and metre. Not to enter into technicalities of dactylic, spondaic, iambic, trochaic metre, and the

merits of the corresponding rhythms, we observe once for all that the rhythm must be noble and appropriate to the style, as the style is to the subject, and all must harmonize with the mental character which we desire to create. *Republic III. 399 E–400 E*

See Westphal's *Metrik* (1885), pp. 237–239.

τὰ λοιπὰ καθαίρωμεν] 'Let us finish the purgation.' In other words—'Let us do with the metres what we have done with the modes.' 399 E

μὴ ποικίλους . . . βάσεις] 'not to aim at having complex rhythms or varied systems of metre.'

ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί', ἔφη, κ.τ.λ.] 'But in good faith I cannot tell. That there are three kinds of feet out of which metrical systems of feet are formed, as in sounds there are four notes whence spring all the modes,—so much I have observed and can say: but of what sort of life they are severally the expressions, I am unable to affirm.' 400 A

(1) The elements of metrical systems are simple, like the elements of musical systems:—since all systems of metre are based on three proportions of time, $\frac{3}{2}$, $\frac{2}{2}$, $\frac{2}{1}$, and all the musical genera and modes, are produced by different intervals, or a different order of intervals, in the four sounds of the tetrachord. This is the simplest explanation of the words, **ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις τέτταρα,** sc. *εἴδη*. Cp. Theaet. 206 A *ἐν δὲ κιθαριστοῦ τελέως μεμαθηκέναι μῶν ἄλλο τι ἦν ἢ τὸ* **τῷ φθόγγῳ ἑκάστῳ** *δύνασθαι ἐπακολουθεῖν, ποίας χορδῆς εἴη, ἃ δὴ* **στοιχεῖα** *πᾶς ἂν ὁμολογήσειε μουσικῆς λέγεσθαι*; (2) Westphal, who interprets the words *ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις τέτταρα* as = *εἴδη ἁρμονιῶν τέτταρα* (*εἴδη* corresponding to the *γένη* of later writers), is compelled to assume that Plato here includes the Locrian mode, to which he has nowhere alluded: *Griechische Harmonik* (1886), § 31, p. 234. (3) Mr. Monro believes that *τὰ ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις τέτταρα* are the Pythagorean ratios $\frac{2}{1}$, $\frac{3}{2}$, $\frac{4}{3}$, .

καὶ μετὰ Δάμωνος] It is Damon in the Laches who is supposed to have imparted to Nicias his ideas about education (Laches 180 C, D: 200 A). Compare p. 200, where Laches ironically says to him: *πάνυ δὴ μεγάλην ἐλπίδα εἶχον ὡς τῇ παρὰ τοῦ Δάμωνος σοφίᾳ αὐτὴν* (sc. *ἀνδρείαν*) *ἀνευρήσεις*. Damon is said by Plutarch, de Mus. 16, to have invented 'the relaxed Lydian mode' (see above). *καί*, as in *καὶ εἰσαῦθις*. We are not limited to our own wisdom in this, but may confer with Damon too. B

Republic *III.* **τοῖς ἐναντίοις**] sc. τοῖς ἐλευθερίοις καὶ σώφροσιν, &c.

400 B **οἶμαι δέ με . . . προσῆπτε**] The masculine accusatives in this sentence belong not to the rhythms as such, but only to the feet, which have been spoken of above as the εἴδη ἐξ ὧν αἱ βάσεις πλέκονται. [B. J. questioned this, pointing to the words τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς αὐτούς below as well as to ῥυθμούς in the sentence itself. But can the words δάκτυλον, ἴαμβον, τροχαῖον be used for the corresponding rhythms (δακτυλικόν, &c.)? L. C.] The cretic (ἐνόπλιος) is composite (ξύνθετος), being made up of a trochee and a long syllable –⏑ | –, in fact a ditrochaeus catalecticus. ἡρῷος, which is elsewhere an epithet of the dactylic hexameter rhythm, seems here (sc. πούς) to stand for the spondee, and the following words are an obscure way of saying that the spondee is equivalent to the dactyl, which is only a resolved spondee: 'a dactylic and also an heroic foot, which he somehow arranged so that arsis and thesis were equal, and long syllables and short were inter-changeable.' By expressing himself in this awkward way, Socrates parades his affected ignorance of the subject. His use of the terms ἄνω, κάτω, however, is quite accurate. See Westphal's *Metrik* (1885), pp. 103, 104, and Aristoxenus, § 16, p. 20. (The inversion of the terms ἄρσις and θέσις need not detain us here.)

ἐνόπλιόν τέ τινα, κ.τ.λ.] That ἐνόπλιος is the Cretic we learn amid some variety of statement from the Scholiast on Arist. Nubes 651: οἱ δὲ ἐνόπλιον, τὸν ἀμφίμακρον, ὃς καὶ Κρητικὸς καλεῖται. The view in question is confirmed by this passage in which the mention of the Cretic or Paeon in illustrating the three kinds of metres (τρία ἄττα εἴδη) could hardly have been omitted. Plato takes no account of epitrite and Ionic metres. He probably discarded them as too composite and irregular. For Damon cp. Isocrates περὶ ἀντιδόσεως 251 where he is described as one of the wisest of the citizens and the teacher of Pericles.

C **καὶ τούτων . . . ξυναμφότερόν τι**] 'And in respect of some of these he appeared to praise and blame the movement of the foot quite as much as the rhythms themselves;—or perhaps the combined effect of both.' The meaning of **τὰς ἀγωγὰς τοῦ ποδός** is the comparative speed or slowness of singing or reciting (*tempo*). The foot has clearly different effects in different times.

This agrees with the definition of Aristides, quoted by Westphal, *Metrik* (1885), p. 336: Ἀγωγὴ δέ ἐστι ῥυθμικὴ χρόνων τάχος ἢ βραδυτής, οἷον ὅταν τῶν λόγων σῳζομένων οὓς αἱ θέσεις ποιοῦνται πρὸς τὰς ἄρσεις

διαφόρως ἑκάστου χρόνου τὰ μεγέθη προφερώμεθα. And it is confirmed *Republic III.* by Aristoxenus, quoted by Porphyr. ad Ptolem. p. 255 (Westphal, op. cit. p. 78) *εἴπερ εἰσὶν ἑκάστου τῶν ῥυθμῶν* **ἀγωγαὶ** *ἄπειροι, ἄπειροι* 400 C *ἕπονται καὶ οἱ πρῶτοι* (sc. *χρόνοι*) . . . *ὃς ἂν ληφθῇ τῶν ῥυθμῶν, ὅμοιον εἰπεῖν ὁ τροχαῖος, ἐπὶ τῆς δή τινος* **ἀγωγῆς** *τεθεὶς ἀπείρων ἐκείνων πρώτων ἕνα τινὰ λήψεται εἰς αὐτόν*: i.e. the time depends on the metrical unit ◡, and conversely the length of the metrical unit differs according to the time.

ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μέν, κ.τ.λ.] Is Plato serious or affected in his ignorance of music and metres? He probably knew all that was known of music and mathematics in his own day. The feigning of ignorance seems therefore to be an artistic excuse for touching lightly on a subject, of which the lengthened discussion would have been out of place.

ἢ σὺ οἴει;] sc. *σμικροῦ λόγου εἶναι.*

ταῦτά γε λόγῳ ἀκολουθητέον] = *δεῖ ταῦτα ἀκολουθεῖν.* D

εὐλογία ἄρα . . . διάνοιαν] Subject, style, metre, music, make up a fourfold harmony which in modern times has become dislocated and discordant, the style not being perfectly expressive of the subject, nor even lyric poetry always intended for song, and the time of the music being generally divorced from the metre of the words. Whether such an ideal as Plato imagines can be attained may be doubtful, as music can rarely express ideas, and the principles of articulate and inarticulate sound are necessarily different.

This musical harmony Plato partly confuses with a well-balanced life, and partly regards as the great instrument of attaining moral harmony. He is right in supposing that simplicity is a first principle both of art and life. Compare the defence of the ordinary education in *μουσική* which he puts in the mouth of Protagoras—Protag. 326 B *καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς τε καὶ τὰς ἁρμονίας ἀναγκάζουσιν οἰκειοῦσθαι ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν παίδων, ἵνα ἡμερώτεροί τε ὦσι, καὶ εὐρυθμότεροι καὶ εὐαρμοστότεροι γιγνόμενοι χρήσιμοι ὦσιν εἰς τὸ λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν· πᾶς γὰρ ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εὐρυθμίας τε καὶ εὐαρμοστίας δεῖται.*

τὸ αὑτῶν πράττειν] 'To do their duty as guardians.' E

αὐτῶν] sc. of the principles of rhythm and order implied in 401 A *ταῦτα* supra. For the expression cp. Phil. 56 A *μεστὴ μέν που μουσικὴ πρῶτον, κ.τ.λ.*

Republic III. 401 B–403 C *The rules which have been laid down for poetry and literature must now be extended to the other arts—building, painting, &c. For in these likewise there is the expression of mind and character. And when the true harmony and rhythm, inspired by nobleness of heart, is observed by all of them, our youth will be able to feast eye and ear on fair sights and sounds; they will dwell in a land of health where refreshing breezes blow and will gather good from all things.*

But of all the arts music, taken in the larger sense, is the most potent for good or for evil. And he who has been rightly trained in this will take less harm from outward things and will grow into natural conformity with reason, so that rational ideas when they are presented to him in due time will be recognized by him and find their way into his soul—just as one who has learnt the alphabet will attain to the power of reading the most complex writing, and will recognize the faintest trace of the familiar characters, even when reflected in water.

The fairest of all sights is the incarnation of these principles—as when a fair soul finds habitation in a body as fair, or even not so fair. The liberal education of our youth will culminate in having such a friend, not as the object of passionate longings, but of affectionate and well-attempered intercourse.

401 B **ἵνα μὴ ἐν κακίας εἰκόσι, κ.τ.λ.**] In what relation does good taste stand to morals, or beauty to truth, or character to virtue, or strength to right, or in general, what is external to what is within us? About these and similar questions there is in Plato a degree of ambiguity arising partly out of the Greek nature and education, partly out of the imperfect modes of conception which prevailed in the beginning of philosophy. To us the difference between art and morality is almost as permanent and settled as the distinction of intellect and will, and hardly less important. The dexterity or skill of hand of the mechanic is at once seen to be perfectly distinct from his moral character: though of course the hand is only the executor of the mind. In the fine arts, as we call them, here again making a distinction unknown to the ancients in the time of Plato, there is more danger of confusion, because a moral, or rather, perhaps, a sentimental, element enters into them. That is to say, the poet, painter, &c., must, at the time of executing his work, feel the thought to which he gives expression. But this temporary sentiment is really distinguished from the permanent basis of his

character. Ancient philosophy was little concerned with criticisms on art, and failed to make this analysis. Aristotle does indeed discuss the question whether the good citizen may be also a good man: but he never asks the parallel question, whether the good poet or good artist must be also a good man. In Plato, art has a large share in early education, but seems in later life to be superseded by speculative intelligence, which becomes the centre of truth and goodness. The discussion of such questions realizes to us the difficulty of reproducing a mental world which is different from our own. Compare the speech of Pericles in Thucydides (ii. 39–41). 401 B

ὁπόθεν . . . προσβάλῃ] 'From whatever source some influence of fair works stirs the sense of sight or hearing.' **πρὸς ὄψιν** not exactly = *πρὸς ὄμμα* but includes the notion of *πρὸς τὸ ὁρᾶν*. Cp. Theaet. 152 E—157 A. C

ὥσπερ αὔρα] 'like a breeze which wafts health from wholesome places.' *αὔρα*, not *λύρα*, as in the critical note, is the reading of Par. A.

φέροντα] For the neuter plural, referring to two words (**ῥυθμός** and **ἁρμονία**) which are not in the same gender, cp. Herod. iii. 57 *ἦν τότε ἡ ἀγορὴ καὶ τὸ πρυτανήϊον Παρίῳ λίθῳ ἠσκημένα.* D

καὶ ὅτι αὖ . . . ὁ οὕτω τραφείς] Education may be truly regarded as a process in which instincts, feelings, impressions, words, rules, are gradually ennobled and lighted up by reasoning and reflection. The results of reasoning and reflection may again become instincts and feelings; no conscious effort of thought is required to recall the first principles of morality. But this practical intuition of morals which is gained by use must not be confounded with that narrower and feebler perception of right and wrong which is given in childhood; or with the simple abstractions of right and wrong which are gained by later reflection. E

Plato is conscious of the importance of educating the sense of beauty in childhood. The standard of taste, as of manners and morals, may be indefinitely raised by the atmosphere of early life.

ἐκεῖ] sc. *ἐν μουσικῇ*: cp. infra 404 E *οὐκοῦν* **ἐκεῖ** *μὲν ἀκολασίαν ἡ ποικιλία ἐνέτικτεν.*

καὶ ὀρθῶς δὴ *χαίρων . . . καταδεχόμενος] Baiter, in the Zurich edition of 1881, adopted this very plausible conjecture of Maur.

Republic III. 401 E Vermehren. Cp. Arist., Eth. Nic. ii. 3, § 2 δεῖ ἦχθαί πως ἐκ νέων, ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησίν, ὥστε χαίρειν τε καὶ λυπεῖσθαι οἷς δεῖ. [B. J. would have retained the manuscript reading *χαίρων καὶ καταδεχόμενος* = 'rejoicing in them and receiving them into his soul.']

402 A **ὥσπερ ἄρα, κ.τ.λ.**] The image of letters, helped by the ambiguous use of the word *στοιχεῖον*, had a considerable influence on Plato's mind. At the end of the Theaetetus (201) an attempt is made to explain knowledge as a combination of elements, *στοιχεῖα*, which, like the letters of a word, have a meaning only in combination; and the same image occurs in the Sophist, 252 E. Cp. Polit. 278 D *ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ φύσει περὶ* **τὰ τῶν πάντων στοιχεῖα** *πεπονθυῖα, κ.τ.λ.*: Phil. 17 A: Tim. 48 B.

ὅτε τὰ στοιχεῖα . . . μὴ λανθάνοι] 'Whenever the letters, though few, were detected by us.'

οἷς] sc. *ἐν οἷς.*

B **ὡς οὐ δέοι**] *oratio obliqua*, depending on the thought implied in **ἠτιμάζομεν** = 'under the idea that we need not notice them.' So below, **πρὶν . . . ἔχοιμεν** is indirect in past time for *πρὶν ἂν . . . ἔχωμεν.*

ἀληθῆ] The sentence from *ὥσπερ ἄρα* is an anacoluthon; the thought is interrupted by the eager assent of Glaucon to the illustrative statement (*ἀληθῆ*), and after being expanded with *οὐκοῦν, κ.τ.λ.*, is resumed and completed in the words, *ἆρ' οὖν, ὃ λέγω, πρὸς θεῶν, οὕτως οὐδὲ μουσικοί, κ.τ.λ.* For a similar interruption of a comparison softened in the same way by a reference to what precedes, cp. Theaet. 197 C, D *ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἴ τις, κ.τ.λ.*

καὶ εἰκόνας γραμμάτων] Plato remembers that the highest forms of virtue to be found in human life are but shadows of the ideas, reflected on a fleeting stream.

αὐτά] the letters themselves—opposed to their shadows.

C **καὶ ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας**] Cp. vi. 486 A. The list of four 'cardinal' virtues is not here regarded as exhaustive. And in the present enumeration Justice is held in reserve.

πανταχοῦ περιφερόμενα γνωρίζωμεν] Cp. Theaet. 197 D *ἐνίας δὲ μόνας διὰ πασῶν,* **ὅπῃ ἂν τύχωσι, πετομένας**: Polit. 278 D **μετατιθέμενα δ'** *εἰς τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων μακρὰς καὶ μὴ ῥᾳδίους συλλαβὰς . . . ἀγνοεῖ;*.

ἀτιμάζωμεν] Compare Parmen. 130 E *οὔπω σου ἀντείληπται φιλοσοφία ὡς ἔτι ἀντιλήψεται κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὅτε οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἀτιμάσεις.*

ἐκείνοις] sc. τοῖς ἤθεσι.

τῶν δὴ ὅ τι μάλιστα . . . οὐκ ἂν ἐρῴη] 'The man who has the spirit of harmony will be enamoured, then, of those who have most of this character; but of one who is inharmonical he will not be enamoured.' 402 D

Compare Symp. 209 B *τά τε οὖν σώματα τὰ καλὰ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ αἰσχρὰ ἀσπάζεται ἅτε κυῶν, καὶ ἐὰν ἐντύχῃ ψυχῇ καλῇ καὶ γενναίᾳ καὶ εὐφυεῖ, πάνυ δὴ ἀσπάζεται τὸ ξυναμφότερον*: ibid. 210 B, C *μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τὸ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κάλλος τιμιώτερον ἡγήσασθαι τοῦ ἐν τῷ σώματι, ὥστε καὶ ἐὰν ἐπιεικὴς ὢν τὴν ψυχήν τις καὶ ἐὰν σμικρὸν ἄνθος ἔχῃ, ἐξαρκεῖν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐρᾶν καὶ κήδεσθαι, κ.τ.λ.*

μανθάνω . . . καὶ συγχωρῶ] A similar allusion to Glaucon's character occurs in v. 474 D *ἄλλῳ, εἶπον, ἔπρεπεν, ὦ Γλαύκων, λέγειν ἃ λέγεις· ἀνδρὶ δ' ἐρωτικῷ οὐ πρέπει ἀμνημονεῖν, κ.τ.λ.* The *σιμότης* of Theaetetus is a case in point (Theaet. 185 E). E

ἥ γε ἔκφρονα ποιεῖ] Cp. the description of the marvellous effects of pleasure in Phileb. 47 A.

τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀρετῇ] sc. *καὶ ἡδονῇ ὑπερβαλλούσῃ ἔστι τις κοινωνία;*

τὰ δ' ἄλλα . . . ὑφέξοντα] 'But for the rest he should so associate with him for whom he may care as never to be found to pass beyond this limit; and if he does, he is to be censured for coarseness and bad taste:' i. e. if he goes beyond what is implied in the words *φιλεῖν, ξυνεῖναι, ἅπτεσθαι ὥσπερ υἱέος*. **σπουδάζοι**—the optative (for *ἂν σπουδάζῃ*), because the legislation applies to an imagined future, or as Riddell would say, *Digest* § 74 *β*, is intended to belong to all time. **δόξει** is not to be taken emphatically; not 'even appear to' but simply 'be thought to.' A fact is spoken of, not as unreal or uncertain, but with reference to the impression which it creates. Cp. Thuc. iii. 10, § 1 *εἰ μὴ μετ' ἀρετῆς δοκούσης ἐς ἀλλήλους γίγνοιντο*: Soph. O. T. 402 *εἰ δὲ μὴ 'δόκεις γέρων | εἶναι.* 403 B

ὑφέξοντα] is dependent on *νομοθετήσεις*, the construction changing from the infinitive to the participle. Cp. supra 389 C *λέγοντι.*

Aristotle in the Politics (ii. 4, § 3) refers to this passage: *ἄτοπον δὲ κοινοὺς . . . διαφέρειν καὶ τὸ τὴν συνουσίαν ἀφελεῖν δι' ἄλλην μὲν αἰτίαν μηδεμίαν, ὡς λίαν δ' ἰσχυρᾶς τῆς ἡδονῆς γινομένης· ὅτι δ' ὁ μὲν πατὴρ ἢ υἱός, οἱ δ' ἀδελφοὶ ἀλλήλων, μηθὲν οἴεσθαι διαφέρειν.* There seems to be some misunderstanding here. Plato has said that love is not to go beyond the innocent sort of familiarity which

Republic III. 403 B subsists between members of a family. This is only an illustration of what is to be permitted. But Aristotle seems either to assume that Plato allows of improper intimacy between near relations, or to think that he ought to have distinguished different cases on some other ground than the mere violence of the pleasure. As he is evidently referring to this place, he has probably been misled by a confused recollection of the words, ἅπτεσθαι ὥσπερ υἱέος, or is drawing a strained inference by connecting this passage with the regulations in Bk. v.

403 C–405 D *Meanwhile their physical education will not have been neglected. We may observe that a good mind makes a good body, not a good body a good mind; and so if the mind be well trained, it will be enough for us to lay down general rules about gymnastics, leaving the more particular care of the body to the mind herself. The first rule will be that of temperance, and it must follow that our system of training must be different from that of the Hellenic athlete, which is both dangerous to health and inconsistent with mental activity. Our youth must be always on the alert, and their training must be suited to their warlike duties.*

In gymnastics as in music simplicity will be the guiding principle. And in this we shall follow Homer, whose warriors ate no fish nor stewed meats, but simple roast, and that without sauce. Far be from our youth the luxury of Sicily and the lasciviousness of Corinth, or even the niceties of Athenian confectionery.

Living in this simple fashion they will have no need of the law-courts and the doctor's shop.

403 D **ἐμοὶ μὲν γάρ, κ.τ.λ.**] The excellence of the mind is not dependent on the body, but the excellence of the body on the mind. Plato does not mean to say that greatness of soul will give the strength of Milo, or that an effort of the will is able to raise men above their bodily condition. But the mind has the initiative; it trains the body when duly trained itself; beginning in youth and considered with reference to the whole of life, the power of reason is really very great, if not supreme, over health and strength. 'Every man is either a fool or a physician' in some degree: he is his own best watchman, and has the power of observing and controlling his bodily habit.

Plato also regards the subject from another point of view: the mind is prior to the body as ideas are prior to sensible objects. There is something doubtful and ambiguous in such a notion, but

there is also the crude form of a truth which in modern times has been greatly neglected. Compare the fragment of Democritus, Frag. Mor. 128 (Mullach): *ἀνθρώποισι ἁρμόδιον ψυχῆς μᾶλλον ἢ σώματος ποιέεσθαι λόγον· ψυχὴ μὲν γὰρ τελεωτάτη σκήνεος μοχθηρίην ὀρθοῖ, σκήνεος δὲ ἰσχὺς ἄνευ λογισμοῦ ψυχὴν οὐδέν τι ἀμείνω τίθησι.* Also Charmides 156 E *πάντα γὰρ ἔφη ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς ὡρμῆσθαι καὶ τὰ κακὰ καὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ τῷ σώματι καὶ παντὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ἐκεῖθεν ἐπιρρεῖν ὥσπερ ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἐπὶ τὰ ὄμματα· δεῖν οὖν ἐκεῖνο καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα θεραπεύειν.* See also Laws x. 891 ff. for the priority of mind. That the object of Gymnastic is mental and not bodily training (*εἰ μὴ εἰ πάρεργον*) is a truth which is more fully brought out infra, 410 B, ff., 411 E. 403 D

μέθης . . . ἀφεκτέον αὐτοῖς] supra 390 A, B: 395 E. E

τί δὲ δὴ . . . ἀγῶνος] 'But next what shall we say of their food? For the men are in training for the greatest of contests.' Compare Laws viii. 829 E, where the legislator is supposed to ask himself: *φέρε, τίνας ποτὲ τρέφω τὴν πόλιν ὅλην παρασκευάσας; ἆρ' οὐκ ἀθλητὰς τῶν μεγίστων ἀγώνων, οἷς ἀνταγωνισταὶ μυρίοι ὑπάρχουσι;*

ἆρ' οὖν, κ.τ.λ.] Training is of use as the preliminary of any extraordinary bodily exertion, yet dangerous to health generally because inducing an artificial state, and increasing the muscular, while often impairing the constitutional powers.

ἡ τῶνδε τῶν ἀσκητῶν ἕξις] 'The condition of our ordinary athletes.' Cp. Symp. 211 C *ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ* **τῶνδε** *τῶν καλῶν.*

οὕς γε ὥσπερ κύνας . . . ὑγίειαν] Cp. ii. 375 A *ὀξύν τέ που δεῖ αὐτοῖν ἑκάτερον εἶναι πρὸς αἴσθησιν καὶ ἐλαφρὸν πρὸς τὸ αἰσθανόμενον διωκάθειν, καὶ ἰσχυρὸν αὖ, ἐὰν δέῃ ἑλόντα διαμάχεσθαι.* 404 A

καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σίτων] 'And of food also.' *ἄλλων* adverbial. B

ἀκροσφαλεῖς] 'Easily upset.' Cp. *ἀκρόχολος.*

ἁπλῆ που καὶ ἐπιεικὴς γυμναστική, καὶ μάλιστα ἡ τῶν περὶ τὸν πόλεμον] The subject of the first part of this sentence is *ἡ βελτίστη γυμναστική* and the predicate of the second part *μάλιστα ἁπλῆ καὶ ἐπιεικής.* The verb in both cases—*ἂν εἴη*—is supplied from the preceding words. The force of *τις* (**ἀδελφή τις**) must be continued with *ἁπλῆ καὶ ἐπιεικής.* The whole would be: *ἡ βελτίστη γυμναστικὴ ἁπλῆ που καὶ ἐπιεικής τις γυμναστικὴ ἂν εἴη, καὶ ἡ τῶν περὶ τὸν πόλεμον μάλιστα ἁπλῆ καὶ ἐπιεικὴς ἂν εἴη.*

καὶ παρ' Ὁμήρου . . . μάθοι ἄν τις] 'Even from Homer,' whom in other cases we blame, 'one may learn such simple matters as

Republic III. 404 this.' Cp. supra ii. 383 B: Crat. 391 C *ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ αὖ σε ταῦτα ἀρέσκει, παρ' Ὁμήρου χρὴ μανθάνειν καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ποιητῶν.*

B **ἐν Ἑλλησπόντῳ**] 'at the Hellespont.' The name is here given not to the straits merely, but to the country near them.

C **καὶ ὀρθῶς γε . . . ἀπέχονται**] *ὀρθῶς* applies mainly to *ἀπέχονται*. 'They know it, and rightly abstain.'

D **ψέγεις ἄρα . . . εὐπαθείας**] 'You would not have men keep a mistress, who mean to preserve their constitution?' 'Certainly not.' 'And you disapprove also of the delights, as they are termed, of Athenian confectionery?' For a similar association cp. ii. 373 A *ἑταῖραι καὶ πέμματα*. See also in the Laws, viii. 840 A, the account of Iccus of Tarentum and other athletes who *διὰ τὸν Ὀλυμπίασί τε ἀγῶνα καὶ τούς τε ἄλλους . . . οὔτε τινὸς πώποτε γυναικὸς ἥψατο, κ.τ.λ.*

ὅλην γὰρ . . . ἀπεικάζοιμεν] 'We should not be far from the truth in comparing generally this way of feeding and living to the composition of melody and song in the panharmonic style and in all the rhythms.'

παναρμόνιον here means 'panharmonic style,' the style in which all the modes were combined and there were frequent transitions from one to another: above, 399 C, it was used of the instrument adapted to this style.

E **ἐκεῖ**] *ἐν τῇ μελοποιίᾳ καὶ ᾠδῇ.*

405 A **δικανική**] Cobet would read *δικαστική* as in 409 E: unnecessarily and against the MSS.

ὅταν δὴ . . . σπουδάζωσιν] 'when even free-men concern themselves about such matters in great numbers and with much eagerness.' For **καὶ ἐλεύθεροι** cp. infra *μὴ μόνον τοὺς φαύλους, κ.τ.λ.*

B [**καὶ**] **ἀπορίᾳ οἰκείων**] *καί* is found in all the MSS., and, though somewhat difficult, is defensible. There is a double evidence of the want of education: (1) that like a slave you receive a justice that is imposed on you from without, and (2) because you have none of your own. The last clause not only adds emphasis but gives a new point.

ἢ δοκεῖ σοι . . . (C) **ἐκείνου ἔτι αἴσχιον**] The difficulty of this sentence arises chiefly from its length, and from the ambiguous use of **τούτου, τοῦτο** in the first clause. The mind has to be carried on

from πάντων μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, αἴσχιστον, to οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ', ἔφη, ἐκείνου ἔτι αἴσχιον. 'Is it not a most disgraceful thing to send out for justice because you have no supply at home' (ἀπορίᾳ οἰκείων)?—such is the general meaning of the previous sentence. To which the answer is that 'nothing can be more disgraceful.' The argument proceeds: 'Do you think this importation of justice (**τοῦτο**) is more disgraceful than the further stage (**τούτου**) of the same evil, in which a man takes a pride in litigation?' &c. 'No,' is the reply, 'that is more disgraceful still.' For the play on words in αἴσχιστον and ἔτι αἴσχιον cp. infra iv. 423 C καὶ φαῦλόν γ', ἔφη . . . φαυλότερον τόδε. *Republic III.* 405 B

ὡς δεινὸς ὤν . . . λυγιζόμενος] 'under the idea that he is a master of crime, who is able to wriggle into and out of every corner and hole, bending like a withy (**λυγιζόμενος**) and getting away.' The reading λογιζόμενος, which is that of the majority of MSS. (but not of Par. A or the Scholiast), is feeble: it affords an instance of the substitution common in MSS., of a well-known word for a less known one. Another various reading—αὖ (or αὐ) λογιζόμενος (Vind. F. Flor. X. Aug. *v*) is an indirect testimony to the reading of the text, as it has probably arisen from a confusion of the two, Λογιζόμενος (with ΑΥ written above) becoming Λογιζόμενος (with ΑΥ written above). For the imagery cp. Arist. Nub. 449, 450:— C

μάσθλης, εἴρων, γλοιός, ἀλαζών,
κέντρων, μιαρός, στρόφις, ἀργαλέος, κ.τ.λ.

νυστάζοντος δικαστοῦ] 'of a nodding justice.' The epithet is intended to cast a slur upon the law-courts.

τὸ δὲ ἰατρικῆς] The words **φύσας τε καὶ κατάρρους** correspond to **ῥευμάτων τε καὶ πνευμάτων** in the words immediately preceding. For **φῦσα** cp. especially Xen. Cyr. i. 2, 16 αἰσχρὸν . . . ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐστι Πέρσαις . . . τὸ **φύσης** μεστοὺς φαίνεσθαι.

ἀλλά] is adversative to the negative idea contained in **ὅ τι μή**.

δίαιταν οἵαν διήλθομεν] viz. in 403 D ff., although the errors in diet have been rather hinted at than described. But see especially 404 D. D

How simple were the prescriptions of the sons of Asclepius, for the wounded heroes who had lived as Homer describes! Very different is the practice nowadays, since Herodicus, himself a valetudinarian, has taught men to prolong their sickly lives by regimen. *405 D–408 C*

The common workman has no time to be ill. Neither has the

Republic III. 405 D–408 C

rich man, if, as Phocylides says, he ought to practise virtue. For to this or any other serious pursuit valetudinarianism is a great obstacle.

And Pindar and the tragic poets offended against principle when they said that Asclepius, who was a son of Zeus, was bribed to bring a man back to life, who in the course of Nature ought to have died.

405 E **Εὐρυπύλῳ**] It is Machaon (the Asclepiad), not Eurypylus, who receives the potion at the hands of Hecamede (Il. xi. 624). The name Eurypylus is repeated below, 408 A. It is observable that the same circumstance is rightly narrated of Machaon in the Ion (538 C). The mistake is natural (as the wound of Eurypylus occurs only a few lines earlier Il. xi. 575 ff.), and ought not to be adduced as a proof that the text of Homer was different in Plato's time.

406 A **ἃ δὴ δοκεῖ**] 'which, as you know, are considered to be rather inflammatory.'

τῇ παιδαγωγικῇ τῶν νοσημάτων] 'That watches over the course of a disease,'—as a tutor (*παιδαγωγός*) over a growing boy. Cp. infra *παρακολουθῶν . . . τῷ νοσήματι.* The word *παιδαγωγεῖν* recurs in the same sense in Tim. 89 D, but the passage in which it is found has a very different spirit, for Plato has changed his mind:—*διὸ* **παιδαγωγεῖν** *δεῖ διαίταις πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, καθ' ὅσον ἂν ᾖ τῳ σχολή, ἀλλ' οὐ φαρμακεύοντα κακὸν δύσκολον ἐρεθιστέον.*

Ἡρόδικος δὲ παιδοτρίβης ὤν, κ.τ.λ.] Little is known of Herodicus (*ὁ Σηλυμβριανός, τὸ δὲ ἀρχαῖον Μεγαρεύς* Protag. 316 E). From Plato's account we infer that he substituted regimen for medicine; in so doing he was probably in advance of his age. Two other notices of him in Plato agree with this passage: (1) Protag. 316 E, where he is called, with some degree of depreciation, 'a first-rate Sophist'—but this we may observe to be only said of him in the same sense in which Plato speaks of the poets as Sophists: (2) there is a pleasant mention of him at the commencement of the Phaedrus, where he is supposed to recommend walks in the open air, as far as the walls of Megara and back again (Phaedr. 227 D). According to Aristotle, Rhet. i. 5, § 10, Herodicus himself expressed an opinion not far removed from Plato's here: *πολλοὶ . . . ὑγιαίνουσιν ὥσπερ Ἡρόδικος λέγεται, οὓς οὐδεὶς ἂν εὐδαιμονίσειε τῆς ὑγιείας διὰ τὸ πάντων ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἢ τῶν πλείστων.*

νοσώδης γενόμενος] 'having fallen into bad health.' Cp. Plato's own opinion that the physician should not be in robust health—408 D, E. 406 A

δυσθανατῶν . . . ἀφίκετο] 'So struggling against death by his cleverness he reached old age.' His sickly life, prolonged by care, was in fact a lingering and painful death. Cp. Tim. 75 B *τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν γένεσιν δημιουργοῖς, ἀναλογιζομένοις πότερον πολυχρονιώτερον χεῖρον ἢ βραχυχρονιώτερον βέλτιον ἀπεργάσαιντο γένος, ξυνέδοξε τοῦ πλείονος βίου φαυλοτέρου δὲ τὸν ἐλάττονα ἀμείνονα ὄντα παντὶ πάντως αἱρετέον.* B

καλόν] For the ironical use of *καλόν* cp. Theaet. 183 A *καλὸν ἂν ἡμῖν συμβαίνοι τὸ ἐπανόρθωμα τῆς ἀποκρίσεως, κ.τ.λ.*

οὐκ ἀγνοίᾳ, κ.τ.λ.] It is assumed that Asclepius, as Apollo's son, must have had a Divine knowledge of the art of healing, and Plato implies that the innovation in question is not merely erroneous, but impious. C

πᾶσι τοῖς εὐνομουμένοις] is a dative of the persons interested: 'for the behoof of any well-governed community.'

ὃ ἡμεῖς . . . οὐκ αἰσθανόμεθα] 'This we observe in the case of the artisan, and ludicrously enough fail to make the application to people of the richer sort.' The adverb **γελοίως** has a predicative force (=*γελοῖα δρῶντες*). Cp. supra i. 332 A *ὁπότε τις μὴ σωφρόνως ἀπαιτοῖ*; Thuc. i. 21, § 1 *ἀπίστως ἐπὶ τὸ μυθῶδες ἐκνενικηκότα.* **δοκούντων** is used with a slight contempt.

μακράν] Some MSS. read *μικράν*, among them Par. A. But *μακράν* has sufficient manuscript authority and agrees better with the context, even if *μικρὰ δίαιτα* were a natural expression for 'low diet.' D

εἶπεν . . . ἀπηλλάγη] are gnomic aorists, used in general statements to give greater liveliness, as in the Homeric similes. **ἐμβάς** has an association of boldness, 'embarking on his accustomed mode of life.'

ἦν τι αὐτῷ ἔργον . . . ἐλυσιτέλει] The past tenses refer to the previous supposition, 406 C, D. E

ἀβίωτον] recalls *οὐκ ἐλυσιτέλει ζῆν.* 407 A

οὔκουν δὴ λέγεταί γε] sc. *ὁ πλούσιος ἔχειν τοιοῦτον ἔργον προκείμενον.*

μηδέν, εἶπον . . . (B) οὐδὲν ἐμποδίζει] 'Let us not quarrel with him on this head' (viz. at what time a man is to commence a life of

Republic III. 407 A virtue), 'our object is rather to inform ourselves whether the rich are bound to practise virtue; he who fails to do so having no true life; or whether valetudinarianism is an impediment to the application of the mind in carpentering and other arts, but is no impediment to that which Phocylides enjoins.' The disjunctive sentence, which is complicated by the expansion of the second clause with **μέν** and **δέ**, might be paraphrased as follows, 'if the rich man is allowed to be a valetudinarian, either he is not supposed to have any duties, or his duties must be of a kind with which the care of health does not interfere, as we found that it interfered with the work of the artisan.'

Plato is urging that the rich man, so far from having time to be an invalid, has the business of virtue always on hand, and that valetudinarianism is just as great a hindrance to the pursuit of this as it is to the occupation of the artisan. For the complex sentence cp. supra ii. 374 C and note: infra C, D.

B Two MSS., *q β'*, read *τῷ . . . παρακελεύματι* for **τὸ . . . παρακέλευμα**, but the accusative, which is found in all the other MSS., is preferable. Cp. Phaedo 66 C *ἐμποδίζουσιν . . . τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θήραν*: Xen. Mem. i. 2, 4 *ταύτην γὰρ τὴν ἕξιν ὑγιεινήν τε ἱκανῶς εἶναι καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιμέλειαν οὐκ ἐμποδίζειν ἔφη*: Aeschines 85, 35 *ἐμποδίζειν τοὺς τῆς πόλεως καιρούς*. 'But to the duty which Phocylides enjoins it (valetudinarianism) is no hindrance.' The datives, **τεκτονικῇ μὲν καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις**, depend in the first place on **ἐμπόδιον**, but also on **τῇ προσέξει τοῦ νοῦ**, which is added in further explanation.

ἑδραίους ἐν πόλει ἀρχάς] opposed to **στρατείας**.

τὸ δὲ δὴ μέγιστον] *τὸ μέγιστον* is a 'Noun-Phrase in apposition' (Riddell, Digest, § 13) to the notion of *ἐμποδίζει*, or *δύσκολος* (*ἐστίν*) which is continued in thought. *ἦν δ' ἐγώ* is omitted here, as above in *Ὁ δὲ δὴ πλούσιος, κ.τ.λ.*

C **μελέτας πρὸς ἑαυτόν**] i. e. *ὅταν μελετᾷ τίς τι πρὸς ἑαυτόν.*

κεφαλῆς . . . διατάσεις] 'tensions' or 'fulnesses of the head,' i. e. headaches. This reading has the authority of Galen and Stephanus. Par. A and most other MSS. read *διαστάσεις*, 'distractions'—as we say, 'a splitting headache'—a violent use of the word.

ὅπῃ ταύτῃ] **ταύτῃ** sc. *ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ*, including not only dialectic, but the preparatory studies of Bk. vii. For the two adverbs cp. Theaet. 194 A **πάντῃ ταύτῃ** *ψεύδεται ἡ διάνοια*: and for the general meaning Phaedo 66 B *μυρίας μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀσχολίας παρέχει τὸ σῶμα*

. . . ἔτι δέ, ἄν τινες νόσοι προσπέσωσιν, ἐμποδίζουσιν ἡμῶν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θήραν . . . ὥστε . . . οὐδὲ φρονῆσαι ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται οὐδέποτε οὐδέν. When Plato wrote the Timaeus he looked more seriously on the disorders occasioned by over-much study (87 E ff.) ταὐτὸν δὴ διανοητέον . . . αἰτιᾶσθαι ποιεῖ. *Republic III.* 407 C

τοὺς μὲν φύσει . . . τὰ δ' εἴσω, κ.τ.λ.] For the double form of the sentence (the two members of which may be joined by 'whereas') cp. supra B τεκτονικῇ μέν, κ.τ.λ.: iv. 445 A ἀλλ', ἔφη . . . βιωτὸν ἄρα ἔσται. The accusative in both parts of the sentence (**τοὺς μὲν . . . ἔχοντας . . . ἴσχοντας**) is a loose construction for which the dative **τούτοις** is afterwards substituted.

τὰ δ' εἴσω . . . λυσιτελῆ] (1) τὰ δ' εἴσω σώματα is accusative of reference. Both **οὐκ ἐπιχειρεῖν** and **μὴ οἴεσθαι** depend on φῶμεν in spite of the difference of negative, μή in indirect discourse being often used where we should expect οὐ. See Goodwin, *M. and T.*, § 685. **ἀπαντλοῦντα**, sc. αὐτῶν: **ἐπιχέοντα**, sc. εἰς αὐτά. 'But as for bodies diseased to the core, shall we not say (φῶμεν) that he (sc. Asclepius) would not have attempted by regimen, that is by gradual processes of evacuation and effusion, to make a man's life long and evil, and to make men beget children probably as good for nothing as themselves,—he did not think that he ought to prescribe for any one who did not live in the accustomed round of life, under the idea that such an one was useless alike to himself and to the state.' [B. J.] D

(2) **τὰ . . . σώματα** are in a pendent construction similar to τοὺς μέν, κ.τ.λ. above. Of the infinitives, **προστάττειν** and **ἐπιχειρεῖν** are in the construction with **καταδεῖξαι**: **ποιεῖν** is governed by ἐπιχειρεῖν, and **φυτεύειν** apparently by ποιεῖν: **μὴ οἴεσθαι**, however, would seem to depend on καταδεῖξαι ἰατρικήν supra, i. e. 'he taught his disciples so.' This seems required to justify the change from **οὐ** to **μή**, which helps to point the correspondence between **τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον . . . ζῆν** and what follows. [L. C.]

μὴ οἴεσθαι δεῖν θεραπεύειν] Cp. Laches 195 C ἢ οὐ πολλοῖς οἴει ἐκ τῆς νόσου ἄμεινον εἶναι μὴ ἀναστῆναι ἢ ἀναστῆναι; for the same thought. E

πολιτικόν, ἔφη, λέγεις Ἀσκληπιόν] 'You make out Asclepius to have been a statesman.' Some of the commentators defend Plato against the charge of cruelty. But it is not necessary to view this half-ironical passage in so serious a light. His main conclusion, that the art of medicine should be made simple, is justified by the uncertainty of the subject and confirmed by modern science.

Republic III. 407 E **δῆλον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· κ.τ.λ.**] The reading of the inferior MSS. *καὶ οἱ παῖδες αὐτοῦ* **δεικνύοιεν ἂν** *ὅτι τοιοῦτος ἦν· ἢ οὐχ, κ.τ.λ.* was due to a mistake as to the meaning of *ὅτι*. Sauppe would read *δῆλοι . . . καὶ οἱ παῖδες αὐτοῦ ὅτι τοιοῦτος ἦν,* comparing Crito 44 D *δῆλα τὰ παρόντα . . . ὅτι, κ.τ.λ.* But the text is right. 'That is manifest,' I said; 'and because of his statecraft, do you not see that his sons at Troy not only showed themselves brave in war, but practised medicine in the way I have described.'

408 A **αἷμ' ἐκμυζήσαντ' ἐπί τ' ἤπια φάρμακ' ἔπασσον**] Plato is quoting from memory, as is shown by the substitution of *τε* for *ἄρα*. *ἐκμυζήσαντ'* is dual. Asclepius had two sons, Podaleirius and Machaon. The words in Il. iv. 218 *αἷμ' ἐκμυζήσας ἐπ' ἄρ' ἤπια φάρμακα εἰδὼς | πάσσε* refer to Machaon only. Purves' rendering, 'He squeezed out the blood and sprinkled,' &c., is supported by the gloss in Suidas: *ἐκμυζήσας, ἐκπιέσας, ἐκθλίψας.* The notion seems to be that of pressing together the *lips* of the wound.

B **Μίδου**] Plato probably has in mind the verses of Tyrt. Eleg. iii. (12 in Bergk) 5, 6:—

> *οὐδ' εἰ Τιθωνοῖο φυὴν χαριέστερος εἴη*
> *πλουτοίη δὲ Μίδεω καὶ Κινύρεω μάλιον.*

The latter line is quoted with slight variation in the Laws ii. 660 E *ἐὰν δὲ ἄρα πλουτῇ μὲν Κινύρα τε καὶ Μίδα μᾶλλον.*

πάνυ κομψοὺς . . . παῖδας] 'From what you say, the sons of Asclepius must have been very clever' (perhaps referring to 405 D *τοὺς κομψοὺς Ἀσκληπιάδας*).

καὶ Πίνδαρος] Pindar, Pyth. iii. 55:—

> *ἔτραπεν καὶ κεῖνον ἀγάνορι μισθῷ χρυσὸς ἐν χερσὶν φανεὶς*
> *ἄνδρ' ἐκ θανάτου κομίσαι*
> *ἤδη ἁλωκότα, κ.τ.λ.*

Cp. Aesch. Agam. 1022, Eurip. Alc. 3, 4.

C **κατὰ τὰ προειρημένα**] sc. the principle laid down in 391 D—that no one can be at once a son of God and a bad man,—which is also alluded to in the words *ἀπειθοῦντές γε ἡμῖν* supra.

D **καὶ μάλα . . . τοιούτους**] 'Assuredly I mean good physicians, but do you know whom I consider to be such?' Socrates evades the point of Glaucon's question, viz. how the physician can see enough of disease in the 'healthy' commonwealth. Cp. supra 399 E, 405 E ff.

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ἂν εἴπῃς] sc. *εἰδείην ἄν.* 'I should, if you would tell me.'

ἀλλὰ πειράσομαι . . . ἤρου] ('It is difficult,) but I will try, 408 D
I said. Let me note, however, that in the same words you join two things which are dissimilar.'

ἰατροί, κ.τ.λ.] The most skilful doctors are those who combine experience of disease in their own persons as well as in those of others with the theoretical knowledge of their art. Plato is right in maintaining that the profession of a physician is one for which rude health is not in every respect a qualification. A delicate organization helps to give an intelligence of the bodily state of others.

αὐτά] sc. *τὰ σώματα αὐτῶν.* E

γενομένην τε καὶ οὖσαν] 'which has been and is.' The periphrasis gives dignity to the expression. The phrase repeats *κάμοιεν καὶ εἶεν . . . εἶναί ποτε καὶ γενέσθαι* supra. It is implied that past evil leaves its trace in the soul.

δικαστὴς δέ γε, κ.τ.λ.] The case of the judge is different: his knowledge of evil ought not to be derived from the conversation of early companions, or the experience of his own 'wild oats.' 'The princely heart of innocence' is the foundation of a sound judgement in questions of right and wrong. The knowledge of evil and of the world had better wait until a man is older, and be obtained, not by introspection, but by study and observation of others.

On the other hand, that there may be in the best of men a narrowness of virtue and ignorance of human nature, which degenerates rapidly into a moral fault is not to be denied. And the tendency to believe that all the world are rogues is almost as characteristic of good men as of bad. There may also be in good men as well as bad, even without experience, a natural insight into the wickedness of mankind: this is a reflection which Plato stops short of making.

παραδείγματα ὁμοιοπαθῆ τοῖς πονηροῖς] 'Samples of experience 409 B
shared in common with the wicked,' i. e. *παραδείγματα παθῶν ὁμοίων τοῖς τῶν πονηρῶν.*

καὶ ἀγαθός γε . . . σὺ ἠρώτας] 'Yes, and good too, which is C
what you were asking'—in the words above, 408 C *ἆρ' οὐκ ἀγαθοὺς δεῖ ἐν τῇ πόλει κεκτῆσθαι ἰατρούς; κ.τ.λ.* Socrates insists that the good judge must be a good man.

Republic III. **σοφὸς οἰόμενος εἶναι**] Cp. supra 395 D *οἰομένην εὐδαίμονα εἶναι.*

409 D **σοφώτερος . . . αὑτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλοις**] 'He is more apt to be held wise than foolish, both in the opinion of others and in his own.'

ἀρετὴ δὲ φύσεως, κ.τ.λ.] 'But virtue, in a nature which is educated by time, will attain to a knowledge of herself and of vice likewise.'

χρόνῳ reads better if taken with **παιδευομένης** than with **λήψεται.** In the latter case there is a want of point, as the fact has been already stated that the knowledge of evil is obtained by time, above 409 B *ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ διαισθάνεσθαι οἷον πέφυκε κακόν.* The principle that knowledge is of opposites is assumed.

E **ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ κακός**] sc. the rogue described above in the words— *ὁ δὲ δεινὸς ἐκεῖνος καὶ καχύποπτος, κ.τ.λ.*

410 A **αὐτοὶ ἀποκτενοῦσιν**] '*ultro occident.*' *αὐτοί* refers to *δικασταί* and *ἰατροί* understood in *δικαστικῆς* and *ἰατρικήν*, which are the antecedents to *οἵ*: although strictly speaking only *ἰατροί* goes with *ἐάσουσι* and only *δικασταί* with *ἀποκτενοῦσιν.*

B **ἆρ' οὖν . . . ἀνάγκη;**] 'And may not our student of music by following the same track—(i.e. aiming at simplicity) in his pursuit of gymnastic, gain an immunity from doctors, except in extreme cases?'

Simple training in music corrects the evil tendencies of law; simple gymnastic minimizes medicine. For the meaning of **αἱρεῖν**, 'to win' or 'gain,' cp. supra ii. 358 E *τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις τὸ μὲν ἐκφεύγειν τὸ δὲ αἱρεῖν.*

αὐτὰ μὴν . . . μεταχειριεῖται] The 'muscular' philosophy of Plato aims at steadying the nerves,—**πρὸς τὸ θυμοειδὲς . . . ἐκεῖνο**,— at courage and endurance rather than at strength.

οἱ καθιστάντες . . . παιδεύειν] i. e. those who institute an education in music and gymnastic.

For the optative which follows see Riddell's Digest, § 75. Either, (1) as is there suggested, 'the dependent verb is intended to belong to all time'—**καθιστᾶσιν** being a generic present, 'who at any time appoint' (cp. viii. 566 B *ἐξευρίσκουσιν*), or (2) the present tense may include a reference to the past as in Aristoph. Ran. 23:—

αὐτὸς βαδίζω καὶ πονῶ, τοῦτον δ' ὀχῶ,
ἵνα μὴ ταλαιπωροῖτο μηδ' ἄχθος φέροι—

i. e. 'I have been walking and toiling all this while.' Goodwin,

M. and T., § 323. The institutions of the legislator are present in their operation, but the grounds for them were considered in past time. So *οἱ καθιστάντες . . . παιδεύειν.* 'Those who are the authors of the system of education which now prevails.' 410 B

αὐτὴν τὴν διάνοιαν] 'Even in their minds'—though you might not expect the mind to be affected by their bodily training. C

ἔγωγε, ἔφη] sc. *ἐννοῶ*, from *οὐκ ἐννοεῖς* above. D

τὸ ἥμερον . . . φύσις] Cp. ii. 375 E. E

αὐτοῦ] sc. *τῆς φιλοσόφου φύσεως*: the neuter for the feminine, as elsewhere. That **ἀνεθέντος** here means 'relaxed' rather than 'indulged' or 'set free' is proved not only by *ἐπιταθέν* supra, but by the use of *ἀνιεῖσα* in iv. 442 A *τὸ δὲ ἀνιεῖσα παραμυθουμένη.*

ἀμφοτέρα . . . τούτω τὼ φύσει] *τήν τε θυμοειδῆ καὶ τὴν φιλόσοφον*: cp. ii. 375 E.

δειλὴ καὶ ἄγροικος] The verbal parallelism is maintained without considering that the two vices are not necessarily combined. Cowardice arises from excess of music and deficiency of gymnastic—rudeness from deficiency of music and excess of gymnastic. 411 A

οὐκοῦν ὅταν . . . ἐποίησεν] 'Accordingly, when a man allows music to play upon him and to pour over his soul through his ears, as through a funnel, those sweet and soft and melancholy strains of which we were just now speaking, and when his whole life is passed in warbling and under the glamour of song, at first whatsoever passion there is in him he tempers like iron, and makes useful instead of brittle and useless.'

For the use of **παρέχειν** with the infinitive cp. Charm. 176 B *ἢν ἐπᾴδειν παρέχῃς Σωκράτει*, and for the fanciful meaning of **καταυλεῖν** viii. 561 C *μεθύων καὶ καταυλούμενος*: Laws vii. 790 E *ἀτεχνῶς οἷον καταυλοῦσι τῶν παιδίων*: Eurip. H. F. 871 *τάχα σ' ἐγὼ μᾶλλον χορεύσω καὶ καταυλήσω φόβῳ.*

ἃς νῦν δὴ ἡμεῖς ἐλέγομεν] referring to supra 398 D, E.

τὸ μὲν πρῶτον . . . (B) μαλθακὸν αἰχμητήν] 'At first he attempers what spirit he had in him, as steel is tempered, and makes it serviceable instead of stiff and useless. But when he perseveres to fascination-point, thenceforward he begins to waste his spirit away, till he have melted the spirit out of him, and as it were cut out the sinews from his soul, and made thereof a feeble warrior.' **ἐμάλαξε, κηλῇ, τήκει, λείβει,**—sc. *τὸ θυμοειδές*: **ποιήσῃ**, sc. *τὴν ψυχήν* from **τῆς ψυχῆς**

Republic III. 411 B preceding. Also in what follows, *ψυχήν* is to be supplied with *ἄθυμον* and *θυμοειδῆ*. For **ἐπέχων μὴ ἀνίῃ**, of one who *keeps on* doing anything *unremittingly*, cp. Theaet. 165 D *ἤλεγχεν ἂν ἐπέχων καὶ οὐκ ἀνιείς*. For the Homericism **μαλθακὸν αἰχμητήν** see Il. xvii. 588, where Menelaus is so called.

καὶ ἐὰν μέν γε, κ.τ.λ.] 'And if he act upon a nature originally wanting in spirit, he quickly accomplishes this: but if upon a spirited nature, he makes the spirit in him weak, and therefore excitable, quickly flaming up on slight occasions and quickly extinguished.' The above interpretation (subaud. *ψυχήν*) affords a more natural construction than to supply *θυμόν*, with which **ἄθυμον** and **θυμοειδῆ** could hardly agree. For **ἐὰν λάβῃ** = 'if he have taken in hand,' i.e. to be submitted to the process in question, cp. Theaet. 159 C *ὅταν . . . λάβῃ ὑγιαίνοντα Σωκράτη*.

C **ἀντὶ θυμοειδοῦς**] The use of the singular here seems to imply that the adjective in this and similar expressions is neuter. Cp. Theaet. 185 E *καλὸς γὰρ εἶ, ὦ Θεαίτητε . . . πρὸς δὲ τῷ καλῷ εὖ ἐποίησάς με*: Symp. 195 C *νέος . . . ἐστί, πρὸς δὲ τῷ νέῳ ἁπαλός*.

καὶ εὐωχῆται εὖ μάλα] (1) 'and fare sumptuously'—with reference to the heavy feeding of Polydamas and his like (supra i. 338 C): or [rather, L. C.] (2) 'If he take his fill of it,' sc. *τῆς γυμναστικῆς*. Cp. i. 352 B *εὐωχοῦ τοῦ λόγου*: Gorg. 518 E *εὐωχοῦντες ὧν ἐπεθύμουν*.

D **οὔτε λόγου μετίσχον οὔτε τῆς ἄλλης μουσικῆς**] 'having no share in reason or in musical culture,' i.e. in those harmonies and rhythms, which are in accordance with reason. Cp. supra ii. 376 E, iii. 402 A.

αὐτοῦ] sc. *τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*, i.e. the indefinite subject of *πονῇ, εὐωχῆται, πράττῃ, κοινωνῇ*, &c.

E **βίᾳ δὲ καὶ ἀγριότητι . . . ζῇ**] 'And his only way of managing is by violence and fierceness, as if he were a wild beast, and he lives amid ignorance and perversity, with no sense of proportion or grace.'

πρὸς πάντα follows **διαπράττεται**, the genuineness of which there is no reason to doubt. For a similar use of *διαπράττεσθαι* as a neuter verb cp. Protag. 319 C *περὶ μὲν οὖν ὧν οἴονται ἐν τέχνῃ εἶναι, οὕτω διαπράττονται*.

ἐπὶ δὴ δύ' ὄντε τούτω, κ.τ.λ.] With Plato the effect of gymnastic on the body is of secondary importance compared with its effect

on the mind (cp. 1 Tim. iv. 8 ἡ γὰρ σωματικὴ γυμνασία πρὸς ὀλίγον ἐστὶν ὠφέλιμος). *Republic III.*

εἰ μὴ εἰ πάρεργον] The reading of the text, which is that of Ven. Π, is partly confirmed by the first hand of Par. A, which reads εἰ μὴ εἴπερ εργον (sic). The omission of the second εἰ, or the substitution of εἴη in some MSS., are probably emendations, arising from the comparative singularity of the expression εἰ μὴ εἰ. But cp. ix. 581 D εἰ μὴ εἴ τι αὐτῶν ἀργύριον ποιεῖ: Gorg. 480 C εἰ μὴ εἴ τις ὑπολάβοι ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον. 411 E

τελέως μουσικώτατον] Compare a fine passage in the Laches 188 D καὶ κομιδῇ μοι δοκεῖ μουσικὸς ὁ τοιοῦτος εἶναι, ἁρμονίαν καλλίστην ἡρμοσμένος, οὐ λύραν οὐδὲ παιδιᾶς ὄργανα, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ζῆν ἡρμοσμένος, and the definition of σωφροσύνη as a kind of harmony in iv. 430 E. Cp. also note on 400 D. 412 A

οὐκοῦν . . . σῴζεσθαι;] 'And in our city, if the form of government is to last, shall we not have need of some one to preside over it, who is of the character now described?' **τοῦ τοιούτου** refers to the class which is definite, **τινὸς** to the individual who is undefined. It is obvious that this minister of education will be one of the chief magistrates, but this point is for the present left undetermined.

Our guardians have now been chosen, and the main lines of their training have been laid down. But which of them are to be placed in command? At present we must be contented with providing that the officers or rulers shall be of ripe age and appointed on the principle of merit. And by merit is to be understood a steady loyalty, which neither forgetfulness nor sophistry nor pain nor fear nor even pleasure is able to shake or undermine. *412 B–414 B*

χορείας γὰρ . . . χαλεπὰ εὑρεῖν] As elsewhere, Plato avoids details: cp. his treatment of music (especially 399 A, 400 B), and his unwillingness to legislate about the smaller proprieties of life (iv. 425). 412 B

τούτοις] sc. τοῖς τύποις.

ὅτι μὲν πρεσβυτέρους, κ.τ.λ.] See Essay on Structure, vol. ii. pp. 8, 9. C

φρονίμους τε . . . δυνατούς] 'both wise and efficient for this object.' **εἰς τοῦτο**, sc. εἰς φυλακὴν πόλεως.

When he first selects his rulers Plato is contented that they should

Republic *III.* 412 C be wise, capable and patriotic: they are not supposed to be philosophers. In Books v-vii he places his requirements far higher. He refers to this passage in vi. 502 D, E *παραλιπόντι . . . τὴν τῶν ἀρχόντων κατάστασιν, κ.τ.λ.*, vii. 536 C.

D **καὶ [ὅταν μάλιστα]**] The MSS. read *ὅταν μάλιστα*, but *ὅτι μάλιστα* ('as far as is conceivable') is read in the quotation of Stobaeus. Hermann cancels both words, and Baiter (1881) plausibly suggests that they are due to the eye of the scribe having wandered back to *τοῦτ|ό γ' ἂν μάλιστα.* It is not probable that *ὅταν* is ever followed by the optative mood: either read *ὅτι μάλιστα* with Stobaeus, or follow Hermann and Baiter in the omission of the words. **ἐκείνου**, not *οὗ*, is written because the relative is not repeated in Greek: cp. ii. 357 B *αἱ ἡδοναὶ ὅσαι ἀβλαβεῖς καὶ μηδὲν . . . διὰ* **ταύτας** *γίγνεται.*

μὴ δέ] i. e. *μὴ εὖ δὲ πράττοντος ἐκείνου.* The other reading, *εἰ δὲ μή*, is probably conjectural.

E **φυλακικοὶ . . . τοῦ δόγματος**] Plato is playing, as elsewhere, on the word *φύλακες.* They are guardians of the city, and guardians of the patriotic principle which is implanted in them by the laws.

φαίνεταί μοι δόξα, κ.τ.λ.] Plato takes occasion, in the description of the true guardian, to remind us that ignorance is involuntary, because no one can be supposed voluntarily to part with a good; and knowledge is a good. Compare Arist. Eth. Nic. vii. 2: supra ii. 382 A.

413 B **τραγικῶς . . . κινδυνεύω λέγειν**] 'I seem, I said, to be speaking like a tragic poet,' i.e. obscurely: viii. 545 E *φῶμεν αὐτὰς* **τραγικῶς**, *ὡς πρὸς παῖδας ἡμᾶς παιζούσας καὶ ἐρεσχηλούσας.* In the latter passage, however, there is an association of mock solemnity which is hardly present here. For *κλέπτειν* used in tragedy with a similar reference to memory cp. Soph. Ant. 681 *εἰ μὴ τῷ χρόνῳ κεκλέμμεθα.*

νῦν γάρ που μανθάνεις] ['I say no more] for now, I suppose, you understand.'

C **ὑπὸ φόβου τι δείσαντες**] *τι* is a cognate accusative—not 'fearing something,' but 'having some fear.'

τοῦ παρ' αὐτοῖς δόγματος] *παρ' αὐτοῖς* is a little more emphatic than *αὐτῶν*—'which has been imparted to them.' Cp. Soph. O. T. 612 *τὸν παρ' αὐτῷ βίοτον.*

ὃ ἂν . . [αὐτοῖς ποιεῖν]] *αὐτοῖς* is in the dative, because the interest of the state is also their own. 'That which they conceive

it best for their state that they should perform.' But the two words are better omitted. 413 C

τηρητέον] sc. *ἡμῖν*.

καὶ ἀγῶνας αὐτοῖς θετέον] *θετέον* is used with immediate reference to *ἀγῶνας*. D

οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, . . . χρησιμώτατος εἴη] This passage is referred to in vi. 503 E, in the second education, where Socrates proceeds to speak of intellectual tests.

τρίτου εἴδους . . . ἅμιλλαν] 'A trial of a third sort, with regard to enchantments.' The genitive **γοητείας** adheres closely to *ἅμιλλαν* cp. *ἀγὼν εὐψυχίας* (Eur. Med. 402) and the like expressions.

Three dangers were mentioned above (A) in the words *κλαπέντες ἢ γοητευθέντες ἢ βιασθέντες*, and three tests are proposed of the capacity of the youths to meet them. Tasks are to be set them with a view to ascertain if they are proof against the two great thieves, Forgetfulness and Persuasion. They are to be subjected to hard toils and wearisome labours in order to show whether they can hold out against the violence of pain. A third and more subtle trial will test their powers to withstand the assaults of pleasure and fear. In the preceding sentence *ἐξαπατῷτο* has no reference to *ἀπατᾷ*, but recalls *κλαπέντας* and *μεταπεισθέντας* supra. The accidental use of the same word in different connexions is slightly confusing.

καὶ εἰς ἡδονὰς αὖ μεταβλητέον] 'And again pass them into pleasures,' just as metal is passed through different processes of heating and cooling. E

τάφων . . . λαγχάνοντα] 'having allotted to them the highest honours of sepulture and of the other memorials,' which the dead have, such as celebration on festival days, inscriptions on columns, sacrifices, and the *ἄγραφος μνήμη* spoken of by Pericles in Thucyd. ii. 43. **λαγχάνοντα** is made to agree with **ἄρχοντα**, the intervening clause **τιμὰς δοτέον . . . τελευτήσαντι** being neglected. 414 A

ὡς ἐν τύπῳ . . . εἰρῆσθαι] These words are inserted to prepare the way for Books v–vii.

ἆρ' οὖν ὡς ἀληθῶς . . . κακουργεῖν] **φύλακες** is used in two different senses with **πολεμίων** and **φιλίων**: 'to keep guard against the foe without and to watch over friends within.' **ὅπως** is dependent on *οἳ φυλάξουσιν* implied in **φύλακας**. The form **φίλιος** occurs here as elsewhere in Plato (Symp. 221 B) in connexion with *πολέμιος*, B

Republic III. as φίλος goes with ἐχθρός, perhaps from some affinity of rhythm. **οἱ μέν**, i. e. οἱ ἐντὸς φίλιοι: **οἱ δέ**, i. e. οἱ ἔξωθεν πολέμιοι.

414 B-415 D *Now is the time for the founders of the state to invent a myth respecting its origin. 'Like the warriors of Cadmus, our citizens'—so the tale will run—'have sprung in full armour from the bosom of the land, who is their mother, so that they are brethren all. The rulers have Gold in their composition: the auxiliaries Silver, the artificers and husbandmen Brass and Iron. But, as they all spring from a common stock, these class-differences will not be absolutely hereditary. It will therefore be a task of the chief rulers to test the metal of the children of the citizens, and assign them to their proper classes, so that brass and iron may never take the place of gold and silver in the government of the state.*

414 B **τίς ἂν . . . μηχανὴ . . . τῶν ψευδῶν . . . γενναῖόν τι ἓν ψευδομένους πεῖσαι, κ.τ.λ.**] The genitive τῶν ψευδῶν is to be taken partitively with γενναῖόν τι ἕν: 'Would that by telling one of those necessary falsehoods which we were mentioning,—just one noble lie—we might find a way of persuading,' &c.

ὧν δὴ νῦν ἐλέγομεν] supra 389 B.

C **μηδὲν καινόν**] An implied imperative. 'I don't want anything new. It is an old story.'

Φοινικικόν τι, κ.τ.λ.] The mythical origin of the Cadmeans is again alluded to in Laws ii. 663 E τὸ μὲν τοῦ Σιδωνίου μυθολόγημα ῥᾴδιον ἐγένετο πείθειν, οὕτως ἀπίθανον ὄν, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία. People have been readily persuaded of the tale of Cadmus. Why should not the legislator be able to persuade them of a similar tale?

γεγονὸς . . . γενόμενον ἄν] It is not clear whether γεγονός and γενόμενον ἄν refer to the acceptance of the story or to the occurrence of the facts mentioned in it. The ambiguity is perhaps intentional. Plato is half inclined for the moment 'to credit his own lie.' But cp. iv. 425 B οὔτε γάρ που γίγνεται, κ.τ.λ.

πεῖσαι δὲ συχνῆς πειθοῦς] sc. ὄν. 'But needing much persuasion to persuade men of it.'

ὡς ἔοικας, ἔφη, ὀκνοῦντι λέγειν] There is a similar hesitation on the part of Socrates in the Fifth Book, 450 D, 471 ff., where he is about to introduce his two great theses of communism and the philosopher-king. The fear is, of course, only pretended.

ὡς ἄρ' ἃ ἡμεῖς, κ.τ.λ.] *ἄρα*, 'according to our tale.' Republic III.

ἐδόκουν ταῦτα πάντα πάσχειν, κ.τ.λ.] *ἐδόκουν* is emphatic, opposed to *ἦσαν*—'they only thought.' *ταῦτα πάντα* is the object of *πάσχειν* and the subject of *γίγνεσθαι*—'they imagined that they suffered all these things and that they happened to them.' 414 D

καὶ ἡ γῆ αὐτούς, κ.τ.λ.] *καί* helps to mark the correspondence of the clauses. They were being fashioned in the Earth, and when they were ready, *even then* the Earth sent them forth. **ἀνιέναι** is rightly used of the offspring of the ground: cp. Soph. O. T. 270, 1405. For the creation of man in the bosom of the earth, compare Protag. 320 D *τυποῦσιν αὐτὰ θεοὶ γῆς ἔνδον, κ.τ.λ.* Plato has a special fondness for the fable of an earth-born race. Compare Symp. 190 B; Soph. 247 C, 248 B; Polit. 269 B; Tim. 23 E; Critias 109 C. E

καὶ νῦν δεῖ ὡς περὶ μητρός, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Eteocles' appeal to the Cadmeans in Aesch. S. c. Th. 16–20 (*πόλει τ' ἀρήγειν*) . . .

γῇ τε μητρί, φιλτάτῃ τροφῷ·
ἡ γὰρ νέους ἕρποντας εὐμενεῖ πέδῳ,
ἅπαντα πανδοκοῦσα παιδείας ὄτλον,
ἐθρέψατ' οἰκιστῆρας ἀσπιδηφόρους
πιστούς, ὅπως γένοισθε πρὸς χρέος τόδε.

See also the description of Melanippus in the same play, 412–416:

σπαρτῶν δ' ἀπ' ἀνδρῶν, ὧν Ἄρης ἐφείσατο,
ῥίζωμ' **ἀνεῖται**, *κάρτα δ' ἔστ' ἐγχώριος,*
Μελάνιππος· ἔργον δ' ἐν κύβοις Ἄρης κρινεῖ·
Δίκη δ' ὁμαίμων κάρτα νιν προστέλλεται
εἴργειν τεκούσῃ μητρὶ πολέμιον δόρυ.

οὐκ ἐτός . . . λέγειν] 'You had good reason to be ashamed of the lie which you were going to tell.'

ἱκανοὶ ἄρχειν . . . ἐπίκουροι] The distinction between the *ἄρχοντες* or *φύλακες* proper and the *ἐπίκουροι* has an important place in the analysis of the virtues (Book iv) and the development of philosophy in the state (Books vi and vii). 415 A

ἅτε οὖν ξυγγενεῖς ὄντες πάντες] These words refer to the second member of the sentence, **ἔστι δ' ὅτε**, κ.τ.λ., which has the chief emphasis. 'As you are all originally of one family,' specific differences will not always be maintained.

ὅ τι αὐτοῖς . . . παραμέμικται] (1) 'What they (the rulers) find to B

Republic III. 415 B be mingled in the souls of the young.' **αὐτοῖς**, sc. *τοῖς ἄρχουσιν*: cp. i. 343 A *ὅς γε αὐτῇ, κ.τ.λ.*, or (2) [B. J.] 'which of these metals is mingled in their souls.'

σφέτερος] 'belonging to their own (the rulers') class,' according to the familiar use of *σφεῖς*.

ὑπόχαλκος] 'having a proportion of brass.'

C **κατελεήσουσιν**] *κατα-* in composition here implies blame (as in *καταχαρίζομαι*), 'improperly pity them.'

τὴν . . . τιμὴν] *τιμὴν* has here rather the meaning of 'office or occupation' than of 'rank.' Cp. Phileb. 61 C *εἴθ' ὅστις θεῶν ταύτην τὴν τιμὴν εἴληχε τῆς συγκράσεως*: Hdt. vii. 36 *αὕτη ἡ ἄχαρις τιμή*.

ἐκ τούτων] sc. *τῶν δημιουργῶν ἢ γεωργῶν*. It is observable that in our own day the industrial class still tends to divide into these two sections—artisans and husbandmen.

τιμήσαντες] 'Having estimated their values.'

ὅταν . . . φυλάξῃ] The readings in this passage vary considerably. The principal variations are as follows: **σιδηροῦς φύλαξ** A *secunda manu* and M; *σίδηρος φύλαξ* A *prima manu* and Π; *σιδηροῦς* with the omission of *φύλαξ* Ξ. Either *ὁ σίδηρος ἢ ὁ χαλκός*, omitting *φύλαξ*, or **ὁ σιδηροῦς φύλαξ ἢ ὁ χαλκοῦς** give a good sense, the latter reading resting on the best authority.

D **οὐδαμῶς**] Plato means to intimate that almost any fable may be rendered credible by time. The new account of the origin of man is not more improbable than the old one was at first, or the old one more true than the new.

σχεδὸν γάρ τι μανθάνω ὃ λέγεις] 'I think that I understand what you mean:' viz. the difficulty of persuading the present generation. The first rulers must be taken into our confidence. Cp. supra 414 C *μάλιστα μέν, κ.τ.λ.*

415 D–417 B *Enough of the fiction, and now let the rulers lead them to their camping-ground. They will select a position commanding both friend and foe; and there they will build habitations for themselves, of a humble sort, such as are suitable for soldiers and will afford them no temptation to break the rules of their education. They will live together and call nothing absolutely their own; they will be fed on rations at the public expense, and share a common table. As for gold and silver, they will not tarnish the pure metal of Divine*

origin which is within them, by having anything to do with the corrupted coinage which passes current amongst men. *Republic III. 415 D–417 B*

Glaucon quite approves of this.

καὶ τοῦτο . . . ἀγάγῃ] 'And this will turn out as rumour directs it,' i. e. according to the success with which the fiction is rumoured abroad. 415 D

ὁπλίσαντες] Here, as elsewhere, the distinction between the guardians and the lower classes appears to be lost sight of.

θύσαντες οἷς χρή] The particulars of religious service are left undetermined: see iv. 427 B. E

ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ . . . χρηματιστικάς] 'Yes, said I, lodgings for soldiers, not for traders.' Compare supra 397 E *καὶ τὸν πολεμικὸν πολεμικὸν καὶ οὐ χρηματιστὴν πρὸς τῇ πολεμικῇ.*

ποιμέσι] The shepherds here are the lawgivers and the rulers who are to succeed them. The dative with **αἴσχιστον** takes the place of the accusative before the infinitive **τρέφειν.** Cp. Soph. O. C. 1201, 1202 *λιπαρεῖν γὰρ οὐ καλὸν | δίκαια προσχρῄζουσιν.* 416 A

ἐπιχειρῆσαι . . . κακουργεῖν] (1) is a confusion between *ἐπιχειρῆσαι κακουργεῖν τὰ πρόβατα* and *ἐπιχειρῆσαι τοῖς προβάτοις.* Cp. supra ii. 370 E *χρῆσθαι ὑποζυγίοις* and note; or (2) more simply 'so that they attack the sheep to do them harm': **κακουργεῖν**, epexegetic infinitive.

ἀφομοιωθῶσιν] As elsewhere, the asyndeton is allowed where the second clause is explanatory of the first. For a similar apposition compare Eurip. Heracl. 176:— B

μηδ', ὅπερ φιλεῖτε δρᾶν,
πάθῃς *σὺ τοῦτο, τοὺς ἀμείνονας παρὸν*
φίλους ἑλέσθαι, τοὺς κακίονας **λάβῃς.**

οὐκοῦν . . . εἰσίν;] 'Will they not, if they are really well educated, be provided with the best of safeguards?'

τὴν μεγίστην τῆς εὐλαβείας] With this phrase cp. *τῆς γῆς ἡ ἀρίστη, τὸν πλεῖστον τοῦ βίου, τὴν πλείστην τῆς στρατιᾶς* (Thuc. vii. 3). The adjective takes by attraction the gender of the noun following. The accusative is used adverbially after **παρεσκευασμένοι**: cp. Riddell's Digest, § 7.

τοῦτο μὲν . . . ἥτις ποτέ ἐστιν] We cannot be confident that they have the right education, but we may be confident that they

Republic III. ought to have. This touch of unlooked for modesty prepares for the higher education of Book vii.

416 C **καὶ ὀρθῶς γε**] sc. *ἐλέγομεν.*

πρὸς τοίνυν, κ.τ.λ.] The perfect harmony of a society is an idea only, which can never be realized in practice. Yet class-differences, though unavoidable, are still an evil. The antagonism of different sections deducts from the total strength of the whole of a community. The differences of interest create jealousy and party-spirit; the exclusive opinions of a class, whether of the highest or lowest rank, are always more or less untrue, and require to be adjusted by those of other classes. The happiest condition of society seems to be that in which different ranks insensibly fade into one another, or in which the transition is easy from one to the other, and personal merit, as in the Republic of Plato, readily acquires the privileges and estimation of rank. And although the individual is always in danger of sinking into his own class or imitating the one above him, yet he may lay aside the impress of any class in the sense of a higher freedom. Compare Aristotle, Pol. ii. 5, § 26, who in his matter-of-fact way objects that the confinement of office to a single class will be a cause of faction in a warlike state, and adds—*ὅτι δ' ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ ποιεῖν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄρχοντας, φανερόν· οὐ γὰρ ὁτὲ μὲν ἄλλοις ὁτὲ δὲ ἄλλοις μέμικται ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὁ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ χρυσός, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς.* But he does not seem to remember that Plato has already met this objection, in part at least, by allowing merit to rise in the social scale.

D **ἄνδρες ἀθληταὶ πολέμου**] 'Men in training for war:' cp. 403 E *ἀθληταὶ . . . οἱ ἄνδρες τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγῶνος.*

E **χρυσίον δὲ καὶ ἀργύριον, κ.τ.λ.**] 'But as for gold and silver coin, we must tell them that they have that (viz. gold and silver) of a divine quality in their souls.' That the words are used in the first instance of money appears from *νόμισμα* a few lines below.

τὴν ἐκείνου κτῆσιν] sc. *τοῦ θείου χρυσίου.*

417 A **ὑπὸ τὸν αὐτὸν ὄροφον ἰέναι**] The slight exaggeration and comic formality of the language keeps up the humour of the passage.

ἐξ ἀργύρου ἢ χρυσοῦ] The inverted repetition has the effect of a sort of legal phraseology.

B **θέοντες . . . ἐγγύτατα ὀλέθρου**] A metaphor from navigation.

πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς ὁ Γλαύκων] Glaucon, who began by protesting against the omission of the luxuries of life in the *ἀναγκαιοτάτη πόλις*, has by the art of Socrates been insensibly brought round to deny his own position. Cp. supra ii. 372 C, D. *Republic III.* 417 B

BOOK IV.

Adeimantus here points out the apparent incongruity of making the highest class in the state the poorest. They have the city in their power, and yet they are to get no enjoyment out of it. Socrates will not ask at present whether plain living is or is not consistent with true happiness ; he would rather insist that the law-giver is bound to consider the welfare of the whole community, and not of a part only, however important. Now the welfare of the community depends on the single-minded devotion of the guardians to their proper work, and the possession of private property would be subversive of this. *Republic IV.* *419–423 B*

Indeed one of the chief duties of the guardian will be to prevent excessive inequalities of fortune from arising at all in the city. For the city in which there is wealth and poverty is no longer one. Two nations are already struggling within her. And so long as our state avoids this evil condition and remains really one, she will have nothing to fear from her neighbours, although in bulk and outward semblance they may be many times more powerful than she is.

καὶ ὁ Ἀδείμαντος, κ.τ.λ.] Happiness is the result, not the aim, of our Utopia. We do not separate the advantage of our ruling citizens from the well-being of all. Their life is not exactly a life of enjoyment, yet in the end a happiness incomparably beyond the lot of other men will fall to their share : cp. x. 612, 613. 419

τί οὖν . . . ἀπολογήσει] Cp. Phaedo 63 B *Δίκαια, ἔφη, λέγετε. οἶμαι γὰρ ὑμᾶς λέγειν ὅτι χρή με πρὸς ταῦτα* **ἀπολογήσασθαι** *ὥσπερ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ*. For **δι' ἑαυτούς**, 'by their own act,' compare i. 354 A *οὐ μέντοι καλῶς γε εἱστίαμαι,* **δι' ἐμαυτόν**, *ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ σέ*: and for the meaning, Gorgias 492 B *οἷς ἐξὸν ἀπολαύειν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ μηδενὸς ἐμποδὼν ὄντος, αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς δεσπότην ἐπαγάγοιντο τὸν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων νόμον τε καὶ λόγον καὶ ψόγον.* There is a reference to this passage in v. 465 E *Μέμνησαι οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐκ οἶδα ὅτου λόγος ἡμῖν ἐπέπληξεν, ὅτι τοὺς φύλακας οὐκ εὐδαίμονας ποιοῖμεν, οἷς ἐξὸν πάντα ἔχειν τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδὲν ἔχοιεν;*

Republic IV. 419 **μὴ . . . μηδέν**] *μή* is used not unfrequently in oratio obliqua, especially when as here the main sentence is conditional, **ἐάν τίς σε φῇ, κ.τ.λ.**

νῦν δή] supra iii. 416 D.

ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς . . . φρουροῦντες] 'they simply appear, he would say, like mercenaries to be stationed in the city doing nothing but mounting guard.' The infinitive is used after **φαίνονται** to avoid a confusion of participles.—Badham would cancel **μισθωτοί**, but Socrates in saying **οὐδὲ μισθόν, κ.τ.λ.**, tacitly corrects the respondent.

φαίη ἄν] resumes *ἐάν τίς σε φῇ* in an independent construction.

420 A **ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, . . . ἀναλίσκουσι**] Socrates at first, instead of answering, reinforces the objection. Cp. vi. 487 E *ἀκούοις ἄν, ὅτι ἔμοιγε φαίνονται τἀληθῆ λέγειν.* **ἐπισίτιοι . . . λαμβάνοντες** is a correction of *ὥσπερ ἐπίκουροι μισθωτοί.* 'Yes, said I, and this for their food only, and not even receiving pay in addition.'

οἱ ἄλλοι] sc. *ἐπίκουροι.*

οἱ εὐδαίμονες δοκοῦντες εἶναι] **δοκοῦντες** with a slight contempt, as in iii. 406 C *τῶν πλουσίων τε καὶ εὐδαιμόνων* **δοκούντων** *εἶναι*: cp. x. 612 A *τῶν εὐδαιμόνων* **λεγομένων** *ἑστιάσεων.*

When Adeimantus is exhausted Socrates carries on the charges against himself, and as a final stroke he adds—'they will have no money to spend on courtesans, or other objects, which, as the world goes, make happiness.'

τί . . . ἀπολογησόμεθα] 'What, then, shall be our defence, you ask?' Socrates, in repeating the question from supra 419, would have Adeimantus make common cause with him.

B **τὸν αὐτὸν οἶμον, κ.τ.λ.**] refers to the division of labour, as appears from the words *ἐπιστάμεθα γάρ, κ.τ.λ.* infra E.

ἐροῦμεν . . . ὅλη ἡ πόλις] Aristotle (Pol. ii. 5, § 27) has the following remarks on this passage: 'Plato deprives the guardians of happiness, and says that the legislator ought to make the whole state happy. But the whole cannot be happy unless most, or all, or some of its parts enjoy happiness. In this respect happiness is not like the even principle in numbers, which may exist only in the whole, but in none of the parts; not so happiness. And if the guardians are not happy, who are? Surely not the artisans, or the common people.' It seems incredible that any one who has read

the beginning of Book iv should have so utterly misunderstood it. Plato, it is true, deprives the guardians of happiness, but only in the vulgar sense of the word: he believes that they will attain true happiness to the full in the performance of their proper function. So too of the other classes in the state. *Republic IV.* 420 B

ἐροῦμεν] The future implies: 'The spirit of our previous remarks will lead us to say.' Cp. iii. 392 A *οἶμαι ἡμᾶς* **ἐρεῖν**, *κ.τ.λ.*

καὶ αὖ . . . ἀδικίαν] This was not clearly said at first, although the presence of evil was acknowledged as a condition of the search (ii. 368 E, 372 E), but is added in anticipation of the bad states (infra 445 C, viii, ix). Compare infra C *αὐτίκα δὲ τὴν ἐναντίαν.*

ἀπολαβόντες] Compare iii. 392 E **ἀπολαβὼν** *μέρος τι πειράσομαί σοι ἐν τούτῳ δηλῶσαι*: Gorg. 495 E *οἷον περὶ ὅτου βούλει τοῦ σώματος* **ἀπολαβὼν** *σκόπει.* C

τιθέντες] is altered in some manuscripts (Π Ξ *q*) into *θέντες*, apparently for the sake of symmetry with *ἀπολαβόντες*: but the present agrees better with the present **πλάττομεν**.

ὥσπερ οὖν . . . (D) **τὸ ὅλον καλὸν ποιοῦμεν**] Why should the eyes of a statue be coloured black? The colouring of Greek statues was conventional, the design being, not to imitate life, but to bring out form. Perhaps the blackness of the eye was also conventional, or refers only to the pupil. Compare the Hippias Major 290 B *ὅτι, ἐρεῖ, τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς οὐ χρυσοῦς ἐποίησεν, οὐδὲ τὸ ἄλλο πρόσωπον, οὐδὲ τοὺς πόδας οὐδὲ τὰς χεῖρας, εἴπερ χρυσοῦν γε δὴ ὂν κάλλιστον ἔμελλε φαίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐλεφάντινον.*

All true art proceeds in the artist's mind from the whole to the parts—from composition and proportion to ornament and detail. The power of the whole, however simple, is the highest excellence of art, as the weakness of the whole, however finished in detail, is the greatest fault. The Greeks, though not much given to art criticism, were quite sensible of this first principle of art. Compare Soph. 235, 236, where symmetry of form and harmony of colour are declared to be the first principles of 'image-making,' with the single exception that in large works a slight deviation is necessary from the true and symmetrical line in the upper part of a statue to make up for distance.

ἐπιστάμεθα] 'We know how to,' i.e. we could do so, if we chose. E

Republic IV. 420 E **ἐπιδέξια**] This word may mean (1) 'from left to right,' cp. Homer, Odyss. xxi. 141, 142:

ὄρνυσθ' ἑξείης ἐπιδέξια πάντες ἑταῖροι,
ἀρξάμενοι τοῦ χώρου, ὅθεν τέ περ οἰνοχοεύει,

or (2) 'dexterously,' 'cleverly.' If the former sense is preferred, it must be taken with **διαπίνοντας**: if the latter, with **κατακλίναντες**: 'having cleverly stretched them by the fireside challenging each other to drink.' [Against the former view it may be urged that it introduces a particular which is too minute and adds nothing telling to the description. B. J.] The manuscripts do not agree here, some reading *ἐπιδέξια* (Par. A), others *ἐπὶ δεξιά* (M): if the sense 'dexterously' is preferred *ἐπιδέξια* alone can be read: if the sense 'from right to left,' either reading is possible.

κεραμεύειν] sc. *ἐπιστάμεθα κελεύειν.*

421 A **οὔτε ἄλλος οὐδεὶς . . . ἐξ ὧν πόλις γίγνεται**] (1) 'Neither will any one else have any of the characteristics which go to make up a city'—or (2) 'Neither will any of the persons who make up the city have any distinct character.' The antecedent to *ἐξ ὧν* may be either a plural *σχήματα* implied in **σχῆμα**, or a masculine *ἐκείνων* dependent on **ἄλλος οὐδείς**.

νευρορράφοι] Plato, as his manner is, in recapitulation adds a new touch to the picture. The word is chosen as humbler even than *σκυτοτόμος*.

For other references to the lowest class of citizens in Book iv see infra D, E, 423 D, 425 C, D, 428 B, C, E, 431 C—432 A, 434 A, B; cp. also v. 456 D *ἢ τοὺς σκυτοτόμους, τῇ σκυτικῇ παιδευθέντας.*

φύλακες δὲ . . . τὸν καιρὸν ἔχουσιν] The subject of **ἔχουσιν** is **φύλακες**, without the addition *μὴ* . . . **δοκοῦντες**. For **ἄρδην** cp. Laws iii. 677 C *θῶμεν δὴ τὰς . . . πόλεις . . . ἄρδην ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ διαφθείρεσθαι*; And for **οἰκεῖν**, used in a neuter sense, cp. viii. 543 A *τῇ μελλούσῃ ἄκρως* **οἰκεῖν** *πόλει*: also Thuc. ii. 37 *διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐς ὀλίγους ἀλλ' ἐς πλείονας* **οἰκεῖν**.

εἰ μὲν οὖν . . . (B) **ἄλλο ἄν τι ἢ πόλιν λέγοι**] 'Now if our way be to make guardians in the truest sense (**ὡς ἀληθῶς** opposed to *δοκοῦντες*), who are the reverse of harmers of the state (cp. *πᾶσαν ἄρδην πόλιν ἀπολλύασι*), but he who asserts the other view imagines (*ποιεῖ* understood from **ποιοῦμεν**, or *λέγει* from **λέγων**) a sort of ploughman, —a happy merry-maker, as we may fancy, at a high festival, not in a state,—he means something which is not a state.'

421 B

The sentence is a good deal involved, and is one of the few passages in the Republic which, like many in the Laws, seem to require the 'curae secundae' of the author. The perplexity in some degree arises from the antithesis to the previous sentence, which occasions the awkward apposition of **ἥκιστα . . . πόλεως**: also from the omission of the verb in the second clause (which is λέγει rather than ποιεῖ), and the tautology of **πόλιν** and **ἐν πόλει**. The difficulty is increased by the complex 'paratactic' structure. More simply expressed, the sense is as follows: 'If the idea of a state requires the citizens to be guardians, he who converts them into rustic holiday-makers will mean something that is not a state.' **πόλιν** (without the article) is used in the same general sense as πόλις in ii. 369 B. **ἐκεῖνο** refers to the objection of p. 419 as expanded in 420. Instead of finishing the sentence Socrates breaks off abruptly with a tone of impatience.

τοῦτο μέν] sc. ὅ, τι πλείστη εὐδαιμονία.

ἀναγκαστέον ποιεῖν] sc. ἡμῖν, 'you and I must compel.' Socrates persists in treating Adeimantus' imaginary objector as a real person who is certainly not Adeimantus. Cp. 420 A τί οὖν δὴ ἀπολογησόμεθα, φῄς; C

καὶ οὕτω . . . εὐδαιμονίας] **ἐατέον** anticipates the infinitive **μεταλαμβάνειν εὐδαιμονίας**, which, however, is drawn into construction with **ἀποδίδωσι**.

ἀδελφόν] For this metaphorical use of ἀδελφός cp. Soph. 224 B ἀδελφῷ τινὶ τῆς πράξεως ὀνόματι: Crito 54 C, where the laws of the world above speak of the laws of the world below as οἱ ἡμέτεροι ἀδελφοί. Compare the use in Soph. Ant. 192 καὶ νῦν ἀδελφὰ τῶνδε κηρύξας ἔχω. **μετρίως** is modestly substituted by Socrates for καλῶς in Adeimantus' reply.

τοὺς ἄλλους αὖ δημιουργούς] The φύλακες have been called δημιουργοί in a secondary sense, supra C; Socrates now speaks of the artificers properly so called. That this, and not the adverbial use of ἄλλος is intended here, is shown by the use of αὖ to point the antithesis. D

ὥστε καὶ κακοὺς γίγνεσθαι] (1) 'To the extent of rendering them worthless.' Cp. for the meaning infra κακίων χυτρεὺς γίγνεται, κ.τ.λ.: and for the expression Thuc. ii. 51, § 6 ὥστε καὶ κτείνειν, occurring in a negative sentence to which the interrogative (with εἰ) here corresponds; or (2) 'So that they become bad workmen.' **καί** is

Republic IV. 421 used idiomatically to give emphasis and is equivalent to an attenuated 'even.' [B. J.]

D **παρέχεσθαι**] 'To supply from his own resources.' It is not necessary to depart from this, the common use of παρέχομαι, though some here prefer the directly reflexive meaning, 'to provide for himself.'

E **διδάξεται**] (1) It is usually said that in Attic διδάσκω means 'to teach,' διδάσκομαι 'to get some one taught by another.' (2) Hence Dr. W. H. Thompson (*Journal of Philology*, vol. xii. p. 184) and Cobet, *Var. Lect.* 310, would read διδάξει here. (3) But it is doubtful whether this distinction can be strictly maintained. See Riddell's *Digest*, § 87. (4) The middle seems to be used for the sake of variety without any difference of meaning from the active: 'others whom he may teach, he will teach to be inferior workmen.' [B. J.] (5) The rare use of the middle is justified by the personal relation subsisting between the χυτρεύς and his sons or apprentices. The same observation applies to διδαξαίμην in Ar. Nub. 783 οὐκ ἂν διδαξαίμην σ' ἔτι, 'I won't have you any longer for my pupil.' [L. C.]

πλοῦτός τε, κ.τ.λ.] That riches are the bane of a state was a favourite notion with the ancient world; nearly the opposite view is current among thinkers on these subjects in modern times. How is this difference to be accounted for? (1) The first impressions of men about riches and poverty are derived from poetry rather than philosophy, and this has led to a sort of inconsistency in our ideas of them (παλαιὰ μέν τις διαφορὰ φιλοσοφίᾳ τε καὶ ποιητικῇ). (2) There is a real difference in the influence of wealth among the ancients and moderns. In the modern world, the possession of wealth is the cause and effect of industry and progress; accumulation implies distribution; and many moral qualities, justice, order, independence, energy, are the accompaniments of wealth. In the ancient world wealth was generally acquired by the labour of slaves, or by corruption and violence: in the early times of the Greek republics accumulation was really a disturbing agent in the relation of classes, and in the later days both of Greece and Rome implied an admixture with foreigners which sensibly impaired the force and intensity of the national character. (Compare the extreme opposition of rich and poor which Plato describes as prevailing in the last stage of oligarchy, Book viii. 551–556.) (3) It may be conceded that modern writers have erred in making wealth and security the

sole business of government, and that political economy, after every allowance for difference of circumstances, has something to learn from ancient philosophy on this subject. (4) Declamations against luxury in modern times have sometimes arisen insensibly from the application of the language of ancient writers, as in other instances, to an altered state of society. The same remark may be applied to the language of the New Testament about poverty, which presents an ideal only, not immediately applicable to other times and circumstances. 421 E

πλοῦτος] The noun agrees with the subject of **λήσει.**

ὡς οἷόν τε . . . παρεσκευασμένος] 'trained to perfection in the art of boxing.' **ἐπὶ τοῦτο**, i.e. *ἐπὶ τὸ πυκτεύειν*. For this use of *παρασκευάζω* cp. especially Gorg. 448 D *καλῶς . . . παρεσκευάσθαι εἰς λόγους*. 422 B

οὐδ' εἰ . . . πνίγει] (1) 'Not, said I, if he were able to run away and then turn and strike at the one who first came up, and supposing he were to do this repeatedly (**πολλάκις**) in the heat of a suffocating sun?' **πολλάκις**, 'several times,' adds a point to the description. Or (2) according to the other meaning of the word, 'perhaps,' 'it may be,' adding an accidental particular ('possibly in stifling heat') which would be much in favour of a trained boxer.—The change of case **ὑποφεύγοντι . . . ἀναστρέφοντα** is due to the affinity which the infinitive has for an active subject.

ἀμέλει . . . θαυμαστόν] 'Certainly, said he, there would be nothing wonderful in that.' **ἀμέλει** implies a full admission. C

εὐδαίμων εἶ . . . ὅτι οἴει] 'I envy you your simplicity in fancying.' The word *εὐδαίμων* has a similar ironical sense in other places: v. 450 C *οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ὦ* **εὔδαιμον** . . . *διελθεῖν*—as here implying a simplicity in the previous question. So *ὦ μακάριε* Phaedr. 241 E, al. E

ἀλλὰ τί μήν; ἔφη] 'But what would you have? said he.' **τί μήν**, sc. *ἄλλο*. Cp. i. 348 C and note.

μειζόνως, κ.τ.λ.] 'You must give a grander name to other cities.'

τὸ τῶν παιζόντων] may either mean, (1) 'as people jestingly say' (cp. ix. 573 D *τὸ τῶν παιζόντων, ἔφη, τοῦτο σὺ καὶ ἐμοὶ ἐρεῖς*: and Laws vi. 780 C) in allusion to some saying *οὐ πόλις ἀλλὰ πόλεις* (or *πολεῖς*, the Epic plural of *πολύς*—'not a city but a many'), the exact application of which has not been preserved to us: or (2) 'as in the game' where there is more than one city, in reference to the

Republic IV. 422 E expression *παίζειν πόλεις* which, according to Suidas and the Scholiast, had passed into a proverb. Cp. *Dict. of Ant.* vol. ii. p. 12. In this case there is an allusion to the game called *πόλεις*, for a description of which, see Pollux, iv. 98. It was a species of draughts, in which the pieces (*κύνες*) were ranged on opposite sides of the board (*πόλεις*), the game consisted in their taking one another.

δύο μέν . . . πλουσίων] **κἂν ὁτιοῦν ᾖ**, 'if it be anything at all': the *καί* is to be taken with **ὁτιοῦν**, according to a common use. For the meaning of **ὁτιοῦν** compare Polit. 308 C *εἴ τίς που τῶν συνθετικῶν ἐπιστημῶν πρᾶγμα* **ὁτιοῦν** *τῶν αὑτῆς ἔργων, κἂν εἰ τὸ φαυλότατον . . . ξυνίστησιν* : Apology 35 B *τοὺς δοκοῦντας καὶ* **ὁτιοῦν** *εἶναι.*

423 A **παντὸς ἂν ἁμάρτοις**] Cp. Phaedr. 235 E *ὡς Λυσίας τοῦ* **παντὸς** *ἡμάρτηκε.*

καὶ ἕως ἂν . . . τῶν προπολεμούντων] 'And as long as your city is governed wisely in the order just now prescribed, it will be the greatest of states, I do not mean in distinction or estimation, but in fact, though it number only a thousand fighting men.' **εὐδοκιμεῖν** has been altered into *δοκεῖν* in one manuscript (Par. K), which is followed by some editors.

B **δοκούσας δὲ . . . τῆς τηλικαύτης**] 'But many that appear even many times greater than one of such a size.'

423 B–427 A *The same rule must be applied to population and territory. In neither way must our city attain a size which is inconsistent with unity.*

Another 'trifling' rule they have to keep is that already laid down about maintaining the purity of the several classes: that so each individual may do one work and be truly one.

But indeed all else is really trifling in comparison with the great principles of Education as we have laid them down. If this all-important point be observed, all else is sure to go on rightly. Above all, the regulations respecting musical harmonies must be most jealously watched and preserved. No other innovation creeps in so insidiously, or is so destructive in its consequences, as the alteration of taste in music.

The minor details of conduct, including rules of behaviour, are matters which men educated as our citizens have been may be left to discover for themselves. But how if the greater principles are

not observed? They will tinker away at these minor matters of legislation, like men who will not give up a life of debauchery, but wish to avert its consequences: instead of getting rid of the cause of disease, they will strive by petty legislation to minimize its evils. What is this but trying to cut off the head of Hydra? *Republic IV. 423 B–427 A*

οἶμαι μέν, κ.τ.λ.] The limit of the state was a natural idea to the Greeks, who had no experience of any organization which could give unity to a great empire. Aristotle (Pol. vii. cc. 4, 5) agrees with Plato respecting the necessity of having a limit to the state, which is to be large enough to contain the elements of political well-being, and small enough to have a form of constitution (πολιτεία) and enforcement of the laws, within sight of the government (εὐσύνοπτος), and within the hearing of the herald. Much of his reasoning on the subject, however, turns on the abstract principle of measure in men, animals, and works and instruments in general. He approaches most nearly to Plato in the passage where he says that the greatness of the city depends, not on the numbers of the citizens, but on fulfilling the end for which political society exists (c. 4, § 5). 423 B

μήτε μεγάλη δοκοῦσα] 'Nor one that gives the idea of being large' (since none is really so). The qualifying word **δοκοῦσα** is added with reference to the preceding argument. Cp. supra B **δοκούσας** (sc. εἶναι μεγάλας) δὲ πολλάς. C

καὶ φαῦλόν γ', ἔφη . . . προστάξομεν] 'And surely,' said he, 'this is a light matter to impose upon them.' 'And this,' said I, 'a lighter still.' Adeimantus says ironically 'This, i.e. the preservation of the unity of the state, is a trivial matter,' meaning that it is grave and difficult. Socrates with a deeper irony says, 'And this (i. e. the assignment of the citizens to their several classes) is more trivial still.' Then, throwing off irony, he adds in sober earnest, 'All is light in comparison of the one great thing, i. e. education.' Cp. the ironical uses of γενναῖος, χαρίεις, καλός, εὐδαίμων, &c.

τοῦτο δ' ἐβούλετο . . . δεῖ κομίζειν] 'And this meant that in the case of the other citizens also (as well as of the guardians) we must put each individual man to that one particular work for which nature designed him.' D

He means that the transposition of ranks in individual cases is in accordance with our old principle of the division of labour, and

Republic IV. 423 D that this is to be carried out in detail, not only as between the guardians and the rest of the citizens, but as applied to the industrial classes amongst themselves.

ἀλλὰ εἷς γίγνηται, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. v. 462, where he insists that there must be unity in the state.

οὗτοι . . . ἱκανόν] The words **μᾶλλον δ' ἀντὶ μεγάλου ἱκανόν** are added with characteristic moderation, because adequacy is better even than greatness. In using the familiar (**τὸ λεγόμενον**) expression *ἓν μέγα φυλάττειν* (cp. Polit. 297 A *μέχριπερ ἂν ἓν μέγα φυλάττωσι*), Socrates reflects that the whole spirit of his previous remarks is against aiming at bigness in anything. Compare the curious passage in i. 349. The construction is slightly altered: **μέγα** is at first merely attributive to **ἕν**, but **ἱκανόν** is added as if **μέγα** were a supplementary predicate. 'So long as they observe one great thing, or rather, if they observe it, not to a great but to a sufficient extent.'

E **μέτριοι ἄνδρες**] 'Sensible men.' Cp. iii. 396 C.

γάμων καὶ παιδοποιίας] These genitives depend upon some word of more general meaning supplied from **κτῆσιν**. 'The matter of marriage,' &c.

424 A **κοινὰ τὰ φίλων**] Cp. Lys. 207 C *κοινὰ τά γε φίλων λέγεται*: Arist. Eth. Nic. viii. 9, § 1.

ὀρθότατα . . . γίγνοιτ' ἄν] Adeimantus is led on by the familiar *γνώμη*, **κοινὰ τὰ φίλων**, to assent easily to a proposition which he does not fully understand. Polemarchus calls his attention to this at the beginning of Book v, and brings into prominence the question which is here briefly indicated.

καὶ μήν . . . αὐξανομένη] 'The truth is, said I, that a state, if once started well, goes on with accumulating force like a wheel.'

The efforts of ancient philosophers were directed to the attainment of permanence; they sought to preserve the type, which the legislator had fixed, by education. Their want of historical experience prevented them from perceiving that the institutions of one age are not adapted to another, or that in politics, as in the action of organic bodies, true permanence is also a progress. Nor had they the modern feeling that education has higher objects than merely political ones, and is degraded by serving the purpose of a governing body.

ἔρχεται ὥσπερ κύκλος] The word **αὐξανομένη** is not to be pressed into the comparison. A hoop or wheel, when once started well, goes on smoothly. This is true also of the growth of the state. *Republic IV.* 424 A

τοιαύτης παιδείας] **τοιαύτης**, sc. *χρηστῆς*.

ἀντιλαμβανόμεναι] Lit. 'getting a firm hold of,' i.e. being thoroughly imbued with it.

παρὰ πάντα] 'On all occasions.' Cp. Parmen. 144 E *δύ' ὄντε ἀεὶ* **παρὰ πάντα**: Protag. 325 D **παρ' ἕκαστον** *καὶ ἔργον καὶ λόγον*. B

τὸ μὴ νεωτερίζειν, κ.τ.λ.] **τοῦ** *μὴ νεωτερίζειν*, in agreement with **τούτου ἀνθεκτέον**, would have been the natural construction, but the proximity of **αὐτό**, which refers to **τούτου**, in the epexegetic clause, determines the structure of the sentence against what would be its more grammatical and logical form. Strictly only the words *τὸ μὴ νεωτερίζειν . . . φυλάττειν* are epexegetic of *αὐτό*: hence *φοβούμενοι* agreeing with the subject of **φυλάττωσι** would have been more correct than the accusative. But the nominative *φοβούμενοι* is attracted into agreement with the subject of the dependent clause *τὸ μὴ νεωτερίζειν . . . φυλάττειν*, sc. *σφᾶς*. The notion of duty (*δεῖ* implied in *ἀνθεκτέον*) is also influential in favour of the accusative being used in place of the nominative in agreement with the subject of the main verb as required by the common rule.

For the use of **πολλάκις** (='perhaps') cp. ix. 584 B *ἵνα μὴ* **πολλάκις** *οἰηθῇς ἐν τῷ παρόντι οὕτω τοῦτο πεφυκέναι*. The quotation is from Homer, Od. i. 351, where, however, not *ἐπιφρονέουσ'*, but *ἐπικλείουσ'* is read.

δεῖ δ' οὔτ' ἐπαινεῖν . . . οὔτε ὑπολαμβάνειν] 'But this ought not to be praised or conceived to be the poet's meaning,' i.e. that he approves a new kind of song. C

εἶδος γὰρ . . . κινδυνεύοντα] 'For we must beware of a change to a new kind of music, as endangering the whole.' For the use of *μεταβάλλειν*=to take in exchange, cp. Theaet. 181 C *ὅταν τι χώραν ἐκ χώρας* **μεταβάλλῃ**: or perhaps the adjective **καινόν** is used proleptically. *μεταβάλλειν* would then mean 'to change,' 'to alter,' not 'to take in exchange.' For **ἐν** in this connexion cp. Laches 187 B *μὴ οὐκ* **ἐν** *τῷ Καρὶ ὑμῖν ὁ κίνδυνος κινδυνεύηται, ἀλλ'* **ἐν** *τοῖς υἱέσι, κ.τ.λ.*

οὐδαμοῦ . . . πείθομαι] Compare Laws vii. 800 B *παρὰ τὰ δημόσια μέλη τε καὶ ἱερὰ καὶ τὴν τῶν νέων ξύμπασαν χορείαν μηδεὶς μᾶλλον ἢ παρ' ὀντινοῦν ἄλλον τῶν νόμων φθεγγέσθω, μηδ' ἐν ὀρχήσει κινείσθω.* The

Republic IV. 424 C same fanciful importance is attributed to music in the saying, 'Let me make the ballads of a people, I care not who makes their laws.' For Damon, cp. iii. 400 B and note. Modern Damons have been equally ready to prognosticate the ruin that would follow from trifling changes in education.

D **ἡ γοῦν παρανομία . . . παραδυομένη**] 'Certainly, said he, this musical lawlessness easily creeps in unobserved.' **αὕτη**, sc. *ἡ ἐν μουσικῇ*, referring to *κινοῦνται μουσικῆς τρόποι* supra. **παρά** here and supra 421 E (*παραδύντα*) means 'sideways,' i. e. 'unawares.' Compare *παρεμπίπτειν* (Charm. 173 D).

οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐργάζεται, κ.τ.λ.] 'And it really does no harm, except that,' &c. The use of the negative is idiomatic, as in *οὐδέν γ' . . . εἰ μὴ ἀγαθά γε* Protag. 310 B.—'The only harm it does is this: it gradually ruins everything—that is all.'

E **ὡς . . . παίδων τοιούτων**] **τοιούτων**, sc. *παρανόμων*. Cp. supra A **τοιαύτης** *παιδείας* and note.

425 A **καλῶς ἀρξάμενοι παῖδες παίζειν**] The influence of the amusements of children upon their character is dwelt upon at length in the Laws vii. 797, 798.

πάλιν . . . αὔξει] sc. *ἡ μουσική*. 'Music does for them the opposite of what she did in the former case. She follows them into every part of life and makes them grow.' **ἢ 'κείνοις**, sc. *ἢ τοῖς τῇ παρανόμῳ μουσικῇ χρησαμένοις ἐποίει*.

ἔκειτο] Like 'jacere' in Latin.

B **κατακλίσεις**] Either (1) 'when to sit down, and when to give place'; or [rather L. C.] (2), as *κατακλίνειν* the verb has an active meaning, the substantive may be taken actively, of 'making another sit down,' or 'assisting elders to a seat.' This appears to be the right way of explaining the word in Arist. Eth. Nic. ix. 2, § 9 *παντὶ δὲ τῷ πρεσβυτέρῳ τιμὴν καθ' ἡλικίαν* [sc. *ἀποδοτέον*], *ὑπαναστάσει καὶ* **κατακλίσει**, when it is similarly combined with *ὑπανάστασις*. For the sense compare Hdt. ii. 80 *συμφέρονται δὲ καὶ τόδε ἄλλο Αἰγύπτιοι* **Ἑ**λλήνων *μούνοισι Λακεδαιμονίοισι. οἱ νεώτεροι αὐτῶν τοῖσι πρεσβυτέροισι συντυγχάνοντες εἴκουσι τῆς ὁδοῦ καὶ ἐκτράπονται καὶ ἐπιοῦσι ἐξ ἕδρης* **ὑπανιστέαται**.

οὔτε γάρ που γίγνεται οὔτ' ἂν μείνειεν] 'For express and written enactments on such points are ineffectual and could never endure.'

Cp. Polit. 294 B *αἱ γὰρ ἀνομοιότητες τῶν τε ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε μηδέν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων οὐδὲν ἐῶσιν ἁπλοῦν ἐν οὐδενὶ περὶ ἁπάντων καὶ ἐπὶ πάντα τὸν χρόνον ἀποφαίνεσθαι τέχνην οὐδ' ἡντινοῦν.* And for an attempt to meet the difficulty by 'exhortation' see Laws vii. 793, Soph. 230 A. For **γίγνεται** = 'take effect,' cp. supra iii. 414 C. *Republic IV.* 425 B

It is difficult in legislation to attain a mean between too great generality and too much detail. Particulars are endless and cannot all be included; yet the attempt to limit legislation to general principles gives rise to an undergrowth of precedents and legal maxims, which has no plan and is apt to become a wilderness. The good of one man is limited by the good of all; and the greatest freedom of the greatest number is attained by rules which fall very far short of universality. It might seem as if the legislator, having power, could easily mould the laws of a nation according to his will. But human nature is a stubborn thing—not a sheet of blank paper on which we can inscribe anything at will. Neither in England, nor in India, nor in any other country, can legislation be much in advance of public opinion. The laws of nations always stand in a near relation to their customs and history. Considering the influence of habit and idea and the growth of interests, the danger even in democracies is not of good institutions being too susceptible of change, but of bad ones becoming ineradicable. In social and commercial matters the difficulty of modern times is not how to preserve laws, but how to alter them, because great interests have grown up under their protection.

καὶ τελευτῶν . . . ἢ καὶ τοὐναντίον] 'And in the end it (i. e. the start which education gives him) terminates in some one complete and grand result either good or the reverse.' **αὐτό**, sc. *τὸ ὅποι ἂν τις ὁρμήσῃ ἐκ τῆς παιδείας.* **νεανικόν**, 'youthful: in the prime or pride of youth,' and so 'vehement.' The word is used in this sense by Hippocrates and the medical writers. C

οὐκ ἂν ἔτι] 'I would not go on and try to legislate in these matters.'

[τάδε] τὰ ἀγοραῖα] **τάδε** is omitted in Par. A. Though not necessary to the sense, it is idiomatic: 'Those familiar regulations.' Cp. supra iii. 403 E **τῶνδε** *τῶν ἀσκητῶν.*

δικῶν λήξεως] 'obtaining by lot the turn for bringing on a suit:' the last step in the *ἀνάκρισις*, i.e. the examination before the Archon of the parties to a suit prior to its being sent into the public courts. D

Republic IV. 425 D The reading λήξεως (M q K) is clearly right, though Par. A and Ven. Π Ξ agree in λήξεις. Throughout this and the following passage Plato has Athenian legislation in his mind. In the Laws the legislator makes minute provisions on many of the points here left to his successors to determine.

τελῶν . . . ἢ πράξεις ἢ θέσεις] 'Rules for collection or assessment.'

E **ὑπὸ ἀκολασίας**] These words are added to explain **οὐκ ἐθέλοντας**.

426 A **καὶ ἀεὶ ἐλπίζοντες**] The participle is resumed from **ἰατρευόμενοι**.

τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κ.τ.λ.] 'Well, said I, is not this charming in them?' &c. The irony in the word **χαρίεν** is seriously taken up in the next sentence: 'Not at all charming, he said: for there is no charm in going into a rage with a man who gives you good advice.' For the uses of the word *χαρίεν* first ironically and then seriously cp. the similar use of *φαῦλον* supra 423 C, D. For the change from plural to singular (**αὐτῶν . . . μεθύων**) cp. infra C *ἀποθανουμένους ὃς ἄν* and note.

The epigrammatic sentence of Tacitus, 'corruptissima civitate plurimae leges,' may be quoted as a Roman parallel of this passage of the Republic. The thought of both goes rather beyond the truth. For the complexity of law does not mainly arise from depravity of morals, or the ingenuity of legislators, or the love of novelty, but (1) from the complexity of the relations and dealings of mankind: (2) from the remnants of old laws and usages surviving side by side with new ones. Law, which must appeal to a written word, superseding the discretion of individuals, can never be perfectly simple. A popular system of law is impossible in a civilized country. Yet, on the other hand, the habit of mind which has been acquired in making necessary distinctions may go on to make unnecessary ones. The subtlety of law should fall short of the subtlety of the ordinary circumstances of mankind, instead of exceeding them. Compare the Politicus, 294 foll., in which the fixed character of law amid the variety of circumstances, and the necessity for this owing to the imperfection of human nature, are unfavourably contrasted with the living supervision of the perfect ruler.

C **ἀποθανουμένους**] agrees in number with **πολίταις**: in what follows, **ὃς ἄν, κ.τ.λ.**, is substituted for *οἳ ἂν τοῦτο δρῶσι*. A few manuscripts (Ξ Θ K) have *ἀποθανούμενος*, corrected in Ξ to *ἀποθανούμενον*, which is the reading of *q β'*.

ὃς δ' ἂν . . . τιμήσεται ὑπὸ σφῶν ;] Compare vi. 493 A, where the Sophist is compared to one who studies how to manage a great brute. *Republic IV.* 426 C

σοφὸς τὰ μεγάλα] 'Wise in great matters.'

ὑπ' αὐτῶν] sc. *τῶν πολιτῶν* supplied from *πόλεις* supra. D

πῶς λέγεις ; κ.τ.λ.] Socrates aggravates the satire by an ironical answer: 'What do you mean? Have you no mercy on the men? Do you think that one who does not know how to measure, when a number of others who are equally ignorant say that he is four cubits high, can help believing about himself what they say?' With a sort of half seriousness this impossibility is admitted in the words which follow.

οὐκ αὖ, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε] The manuscripts vary between *οὐκ ἂν* and **οὐκ αὖ**. For the first we might compare supra 422 B *οὐκ ἂν ἴσως, ἔφη, ἅμα γε,* where, however, there is *ἂν* also in the preceding sentence. In this passage *οὐκ ἂν* might possibly mean *οὐκ ἂν οἷόν τε εἴη μὴ τοῦτο ἡγεῖσθαι.* But *οὐκ αὖ* which has the support of A Π M is more in point (sc. *οἴομαι*). 'Though I do not admire the men who are so deceived, yet on the other hand I do not think that they could help believing in such a case.' The form of expression is not uncommon: cp. Ion 541 A *οὐκ αὖ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο*: Soph. El. 1034 *οὐδ' αὖ τοσοῦτον ἔχθος ἐχθαίρω σ' ἐγώ.* E

μὴ τοίνυν χαλέπαινε] 'Don't be angry, then.' Look at them not under a serious but under a comic aspect. Cp. Phaedr. 269 B *οὐ χρὴ χαλεπαίνειν, ἀλλὰ συγγιγνώσκειν, εἴ τινες μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι διαλέγεσθαι ἀδύνατοι ἐγένοντο ὁρίσασθαι, τί ποτ' ἔστι ῥητορική.* **χαριέστατοι** recalls *χαρίεν* supra A.

νομοθετοῦντές τε . . . ἐπανορθοῦντες . . . οἰόμενοι] (1) The first two participles may be dependent on the third: 'believing that by such legislation and reforms as we have just mentioned they will put an end to frauds in contracts.' Or (2) taken more simply the words may mean 'legislating and reforming as we have just described in the belief that they will put an end,' &c. Cp. supra 425 E.

τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδος νόμων πέρι] *νόμων πέρι* is an explanation of **τοιοῦτον**, which refers to legislation in matters of detail. Cp. vii. 539 C *τὸ ὅλον φιλοσοφίας πέρι.* 427 A

τὰ δὲ ὅτι] *ὅτι* is repeated pleonastically.

Republic IV. 427 B, C *It only now remains to legislate concerning Religion. Here again we shall insist on a single principle, that religious worship shall be national. All questions concerning it shall be referred to Apollo the God at Delphi, who is the hereditary authority on this subject for all Hellenes.*

427 B **τί οὖν, ἔφη, κ.τ.λ.**] Plato here, as in the Laws (vi. 759 c), is unwilling to depart from the traditionary ceremonial of Greece. For a discussion of religion in the higher sense cp. the tenth book of the Laws.

τελευτησάντων αὖ θῆκαι . . . ἵλεως αὐτοὺς ἔχειν] 'Likewise the graves of the dead, and the ministrations which are necessary to propitiate the inhabitants of the under-world.'

The manuscripts, with the exception of Ven. Ξ, omit *τε* after *τελευτησάντων*. The insertion is unnecessary, asyndeton being not uncommon in enumerations. Cp. iii. 399 c *βίαιον, ἑκούσιον, κ.τ.λ.*

C **τῷ πατρίῳ**] sc. *ἐξηγητῇ*: 'our ancestral interpreter.' There is slight manuscript authority (Par. K, Ven. Π, m *q*) for the reading *πατρῴῳ*, which would mean 'the father of our race,' Apollo being reputed the father of Ion (cp. Euthyd. 302 D) and worshipped under this title at Athens. The reading of the text, however, is favoured by the sense as well as by the manuscripts. For Plato is not speaking in the person of an Ionian, but of a Greek who will have no other teacher of religion than the god of his ancestors. And the Apollo of whom he is thinking is not *Ἀπόλλων πατρῷος*, but 'the God who sits in the centre of the earth, and is the interpreter of religion to all mankind.'

Plato's profession of reverence for the gods of Hellas is repeatedly expressed in a manner which makes it impossible to doubt his seriousness. The only passage which appears ironical is Tim. 40 D–41 A. He probably felt (1) that religion was indispensable, and (2) that a new religion could not be established in a day. (Cp. Laws x. 909 E *ἱερὰ καὶ θεοὺς οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἱδρύεσθαι, μεγάλης δὲ διανοίας τινὸς ὀρθῶς δρᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον.*)

427 D–428 A *The foundation of our state would seem to be complete, but we still need a strong light to discern in it the nature and essential value of Justice.*

Assuming, however, that the new city has the four cardinal virtues, if we can find three of them—wisdom, courage, and temperance—the remaining virtue will be the one which we seek.

αὐτός τε καὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν παρακάλει] Cp. iii. 398 A *αὐτός τε καὶ τὰ ποιήματα βουλόμενος ἐπιδείξασθαι*, and note: Phaedr. 253 B *αὐτοί τε καὶ τὰ παιδικὰ πείθοντες*: Xen. Anab. iii. 1, § 44: Thuc. viii. 55 *ὁ Πεδάριτος αὐτός τε καὶ τὸ περὶ αὐτὸν ἐπικουρικὸν ἔχων*. This passage is peculiar in that the verb is in the imperative mood and not a participle. 427 D

καὶ πότερον . . . καὶ ἀνθρώπους] Compare the closing words of Adeimantus' speech, ii. 367 E *ἐάν τε λανθάνῃ, κ.τ.λ.*, and note.

ὡς οὐχ ὅσιόν σοι ὄν] Another allusion to the words of Socrates in the passage just cited, ii. 368 B *δέδοικα γὰρ* **μὴ οὐδ' ὅσιον ᾖ** *παραγενόμενον δικαιοσύνῃ κακηγορουμένῃ ἀπαγορεύειν*. E

μὴ οὐ] **οὐ** is added in good manuscripts, and is in accordance with the usual idiom after such negative expressions as *ἄδικον, ἄλογον, οὐκ ὅσιον*. Compare, both for the meaning and the form of the sentence, Laws x. 891 A *διὰ ταῦτα λόγον οὐδαμῇ ἔχει οὐδὲ ὅσιον ἔμοιγε εἶναι φαίνεται τὸ* **μὴ οὐ** *βοηθεῖν τούτοις τοῖς λόγοις πάντα ἄνδρα κατὰ δύναμιν*. In what follows the popular classification of the virtues which, although first explicitly recognized by Plato, was latent in the common consciousness of Hellas, is assumed as the basis of inquiry.

οὐκοῦν . . . εὑρημένον] The use of this half-logical half-mathematical 'method of residues' marks the infancy of philosophy. Cp. Lys. 216 E. If we were sure that the subject of our inquiry was one of four terms, and could eliminate the other three, then, as Plato says, the remaining term would be the one for which we are seeking. Another condition must be remembered, viz. that the four terms have each a precise meaning. Otherwise the form will be illusory, and the disjunctive syllogism in which the error is expressed will only help the illusion. But no logical term has the precision of a mathematical quantity. For example, in the discussion which follows, the third term *σωφροσύνη* is not easily separated from the fourth, which seems also to comprehend the two previous ones. The formula of residues is true when applied to abstract quantity or to the laws of nature. But the further application of this or of any other abstract form to morals or metaphysics is interfered with by the imperfection, or rather by the nature of language, and the indefiniteness of the subject.

ὥσπερ τοίνυν, κ.τ.λ.] For the form of sentence (*ὥσπερ* with deferred apodosis) cp. iii. 402 A, B, and note. Plato intended to make **ἄλλων** 428 A

Republic IV. 428 A τινῶν τεττάρων dependent as a partitive genitive on ἕν τι: but the insertion of the resumptive αὐτῶν throws the words out of construction and they become a 'genitivus pendens.' Cp. infra 439 B ὥσπερ γε, οἶμαι, τοῦ τοξότου οὐ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν, ὅτι αὐτοῦ ἅμα αἱ χεῖρες τὸ τόξον ἀπωθοῦνταί τε καὶ προσέλκονται . . . ;

ἐν ὁτῳοῦν] 'In any subject-matter,' as we are now looking for justice in the state. ὁπότε, 'as soon as we had.'

οὐκ ἄλλο ἔτι ἦν] 'It could *now* be no other.' ἦν = 'was all along,' i.e. 'proves to be.' Cp. vi. 497 C δηλώσει ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν τῷ ὄντι θεῖον ἦν. ἔτι = 'after the other three were found.'

428 A–432 A *Wisdom is obviously present, but is possessed by one class only, and that the smallest, which gives this character to the whole. For statecraft is supreme wisdom, and this is vested in the rulers alone.*

Courage or fortitude also has her seat in one class principally, that is to say, in those guardians who are not rulers but defenders and preservers of the peace of the state. On their holding fast the patriotic principle with which they have been imbued, and thus having the courage of citizens, depends the security of the whole commonwealth.

Temperance is the mutual concord of the different classes rather than the proper excellence of one. In individuals this is spoken of as self-control, which means the obedience of the lower nature to the higher. And in our community it is the willing obedience of the industrial classes, which are lower and have a lower order of desires, to the two higher classes, which gives to the whole state the character of temperate.

428 A ἐν αὐτῷ] not ἐν αὐτῇ, is the true reading; the neuter, as in other places, referring to the masculine and feminine in abstract things, and here following the gender of ὁτῳοῦν.

B πολλαὶ δέ γε, κ.τ.λ.] Political science is similarly distinguished from the arts in the Euthydemus (291), and, with curious elaboration, in the Politicus, 258–268 and elsewhere.

C ὡς ἂν ἔχοι βέλτιστα] sc. τὰ ξύλινα σκεύη, 'how wooden implements may best be made.' It has been doubted whether βουλευομένη, which is the reading of all the manuscripts, should not be altered into βουλευομένην. But βουλευομένη, sc. ἡ πόλις ταύτῃ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, resumes διὰ . . . ἐπιστήμην. Cp. infra ᾗ . . . βουλεύεται and note.

Republic IV. 428 C

τί δέ; τὴν ὑπέρ, κ.τ.λ.] For the omission of διά compare Phaedo 64 D, where, however, as in this passage, the preposition is easily supplied: *φαίνεταί σοι φιλοσόφου ἀνδρὸς εἶναι ἐσπουδακέναι περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καλουμένας τὰς τοιάσδε; . . . τί δέ;* **τὰς** *τῶν ἀφροδισίων;* see Riddell's *Digest*, § 190.

ᾗ . . . βουλεύεται] *ᾗ* is Hermann's correction of *ἥ*, which was formerly read. It is confirmed by M a *t v*, and is supported by **ἑαυτῆς**, immediately below, which, though it proves not to be the reading of Par. A, is on the whole most probable. The accent on *ἥ* in Par. A is written over an erasure. It is the city, not the science, that is **εὔβουλος**, and is therefore rightly said *βουλεύεσθαι*: cp. supra *βουλευομένη*, and note.

D

ὁμιλοῖ] The MSS., with one exception (Flor. n) omit *ἄν*. The optative without *ἄν* in a relative clause expresses remote or ideal possibility, in a case that is perfectly general: 'what might be or may be conceived to be the best policy, internal or external.' Compare Phaedrus 239 B *ἀποβλέπων εἰς τὸν ἐραστήν, οἷος ὢν τῷ μὲν ἥδιστος, ἑαυτῷ δὲ βλαβερώτατος* **εἴη** [*ἂν εἴη* solus Φ].

οὓς νῦν δὴ . . . ὠνομάζομεν] iii. 414 B. The reading *τελέως* was erroneously attributed in Bekker's collation to Par. A, which reads **τελέους** with all the other MSS. except Ven. Ξ. **τελέους** has therefore been restored in the text.

πότερον οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ] *οὖν* after *πότερον* is omitted in the best MSS., perhaps rightly. Cp. Lys. 220 E *πότερον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κ.τ.λ.*

E

οὐκοῦν . . . γίγνεται γένος] Cp. Polit. 292 E—293 A, where Plato remarks that in a city of a thousand men there would not be 100 or even fifty good draught-players. How much smaller then would be the number of kings (i.e. scientific rulers)! The fewness of the wise is an often-recurring thought in Plato: cp. Theaet. 186 C, Polit. 297 C *ἀλλὰ περὶ* **σμικρόν τι καὶ ὀλίγον** *καὶ τὸ ἕν ἐστι ζητητέον τὴν μίαν ἐκείνην πολιτείαν τὴν ὀρθήν.*

429 B

οὐ γάρ . . . ἢ τοίαν αὐτὴν εἶναι ἢ τοίαν] 'For I do not imagine, said I, that the courage or the cowardice of the other citizens will have the power of giving such a city this or that character.' Infra 437 E *τοῦ δὲ* **τοίου ἢ τοίου** *τὰ προσγιγνόμενα.*

καὶ ἀνδρεία ἄρα, κ.τ.λ.] *καί* ('too') marks the correspondence between the courage and wisdom, both of which are virtues of a portion of the city and not of the whole.

Republic IV. 429 C **οὐ πάνυ . . . ἔμαθον**] 'I do not quite understand.' The other meaning, 'not at all,' is unsuitable here. It would be absurd for Glaucon to say that he does not at all understand the meaning of Socrates about courage.

σωτηρίαν . . . λέγω τινά] Socrates still answers enigmatically, as in Gorg. 463 D, where he defines rhetoric to Polus as *πολιτικῆς μορίου εἴδωλον.*

διὰ παντὸς δὲ ἔλεγον αὐτὴν σωτηρίαν] 'and in speaking of courage as a *never-failing* preservation, I meant that a man preserves this principle when he is tried,' &c. **διασώζεσθαι** is in the middle voice and has a general subject (*τινά, τὸν ἄνθρωπον*). **αὐτήν**, sc. *τὴν δόξαν.* Hermann would cancel the words **αὐτὴν σωτηρίαν.** Another reading is *τῷ ἔν τε λύπαις, κ.τ.λ.*, 'by reason of,' &c. For the right opinion concerning things terrible and not compare iii. 386 A, 387 B *οὓς δεῖ ἐλευθέρους εἶναι, δουλείαν θανάτου μᾶλλον πεφοβημένους.* See also Laches 190 ff., where the treatment of the subject is tentative, not dogmatic.

D **ἐκ τοσούτων χρωμάτων**] 'Out of so many.' The number of existing colours out of which the choice is made helps to show the amount of care that is required. The colour **ἁλουργόν** is described by Plato, Tim. 68 C, as *ἐρυθρὸν δὲ δὴ μέλανι λευκῷ τε κραθέν.*

E **καὶ ὃ μὲν ἂν . . . βαφέν**] 'And whatever is dyed in this manner, that which is dyed becomes of a fast colour.'

δευσοποιόν] 'fast-dyed.' Cp. some ludicrous lines of Diphilus quoted by Harpocration,

ταυτὶ γὰρ ἡμῖν δευσοποιὰ παντελῶς
τὰ σπάργαν' ἀποδέδειχεν,

where as here *δευσοποιόν* is used not of the colour, but of the coloured material.

ἄνθος] i. e. the perfect brightness of the colour, which is like the bloom of a flower.

ἐάν τε καὶ ταῦτα] **ταῦτα**, sc. *τὰ λευκά.* The choice of the wool answers to the selection of the guardians, the preparation of the wool to their education and training, and the dyeing of the wool to the imposition of the laws.

τοιοῦτον τοίνυν, κ.τ.λ.] The words **ἐξελεγόμεθα . . . ἐπαιδεύομεν** recall *ἐκλέγονται . . . προπαρασκευάζουσιν* supra.

Republic IV.

430 A

μηδὲν οἵου ἄλλο μηχανᾶσθαι, κ.τ.λ.] is a restatement of **τοιοῦτον . . . ἡμᾶς**. Hence the asyndeton.

ἐκπλύναι] the optative is the right reading, to be construed with **ἵνα μή**. The form is less common than *ἐκπλύνειε*, but occurs elsewhere in Attic Greek. Par. A reads *ἐκπλῦναι*, the infinitive, an obvious mistake, for **ῥύμματα**, as **ἡδονή** shows, is in the nominative case.

χαλεστραίου] 'pearl-ash' is said by the Scholiast to be derived from Chalastra, a town or lake in Macedonia (Hdt. vii. 123).

τὴν δὴ τοιαύτην δύναμιν καὶ σωτηρίαν] Cp. supra 429 B *δύναμιν τοιαύτην, ἣ διὰ παντὸς σώσει.* B

ἀλλ' οὐδέν . . . λέγω] sc. *ἄλλο*. 'But I do not say anything else,' 'I agree.' As here, so in Laches (196 D, E) Socrates refuses to admit that the brutes possess courage.

καὶ γὰρ ἀποδέχου . . . ἀποδέξει] 'Why, yes, said I, accept it, but as the courage of a citizen, and you will be right.' C

Plato is speaking of courage only as the virtue of citizens, not as based upon philosophical principle. Compare x. 619 C, where the unfortunate choice is made by one *ἐν τεταγμένῃ πολιτείᾳ ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ βίῳ βεβιωκότα, ἔθει ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετειληφότα*: also Phaedo 68 D, where the courage of the philosopher is contrasted with the courage of ordinary men, which is only a fear of greater evils. There is nowhere in the Republic a discussion such as appears to be intimated in the words **αὖθις δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ** (sc. *τῆς ἀνδρείας*) . . . **ἔτι κάλλιον δίιμεν**, but cp. vi. 486 A, B *οὐκοῦν καὶ θάνατον οὐ δεινόν τι ἡγήσεται ὁ τοιοῦτος*; Compare Aristotle (Eth. Nic. iii. 7, 8), where he distinguishes true courage, which is for the sake of *τὸ καλόν*, from the spurious forms of courage, and speaks of *political* courage as making the nearest approach to the true.

πῶς οὖν ἂν . . . περὶ σωφροσύνης] 'How then can we discover justice, that we may trouble ourselves no more about temperance?' i.e. that we may be relieved from further discussion. **πῶς ἂν** expresses a wish, which Socrates affects to believe to be that of his hearers. **εἴπερ** expresses 'I do not want justice to appear first, at least, if that is to prevent us from proceeding to examine temperance.' For this mode of creating variety by playing with the order of the subject, compare the correction of the order of the sciences, vii. 528 A, B, and the similar artifice in Sympos. 185 C, D. D

Republic IV. 430 D In the Charmides 160 ff., where σωφροσύνη is treated tentatively, as courage in the Laches, it is described (1) as ἡσυχία—but energy is excellence: (2) as αἰδώς—but Homer says αἰδὼς οὐκ ἀγαθή: (3) as τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν—but if every one makes his own coat, this is inconsistent with a division of labour: (4) as γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν—but that would make σωφροσύνη an ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης, and this is contrary to the analogy of other sciences and arts.

In accepting the recognized four virtues (supra 427 E) Plato has prepared for the threefold division of the soul into rational, irascible, concupiscent. To the rational and irascible elements correspond the first two virtues σοφία and ἀνδρεία. σωφροσύνη is not the virtue of a single part of the soul, but consists in the subjection of the lower elements to the higher. The remaining virtue δικαιοσύνη, which is the condition of all the rest, is the fulfilment by each part of its own proper function.

In Gorg. 507 A, B, Protag. 331 A, the virtue of ὁσιότης is also mentioned.

οὔτε οἶδα] sc. πῶς ἂν τὴν δικαιοσύνην εὕροιμεν.

E **ἀλλὰ μέντοι . . . εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ**] 'But that, said I, I do desire, or I am in the wrong.' There seems to be a slight ellipse: the full sense would be, 'I do desire, as I must, unless, &c.' The phrase occurs elsewhere, e.g. x. 608 D σὺ δὲ τοῦτ' ἔχεις λέγειν; **Εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ** γ', ἔφην: and Charm. 156 A καὶ τοὔνομά μου σὺ ἀκριβοῖς; **Εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ** γε, ἔφη.

ὥς γε ἐντεῦθεν ἰδεῖν] 'Looking from where I stand,' i.e. to judge from our present point of view. This graphic touch recalls the image of the search, supra 427 E, and prepares for the still more lively one of the hunt for justice, infra 432 B: cp. also 445 C **δεῦρο** . . . ἵνα καὶ ἴδῃς, κ.τ.λ.

ὥς φασι, κρείττω δὴ . . . λέγεται] The reading is doubtful. That in the text is confirmed by the margin of Par. A, and by Ma. also, according to Schneider, by two chief MSS. of Stobaeus. Schneider adopted this reading, but placed a full-stop at φασί, supposing in the latter part of the sentence the passive λέγεται to have taken the place of λέγουσιν, and comparing, amongst other passages, Apol. 21 C διασκοπῶν οὖν τοῦτον . . . καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, ἔδοξέ μοι οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι σοφός . . , εἶναι δ' οὔ. The reading of Α Π Ξ, &c., κρείττω δὴ αὐτοῦ **φαίνονται** οὐκ οἶδ' ὅντινα τρόπον καὶ ἄλλα ἄττα τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ ἴχνη αὐτῆς λέγεται, can only be construed by

supplying λέγοντες from λέγεται, cp. supra 421 B ὁ δ' ἐκεῖνο λέγων, κ.τ.λ. One MS., *q*, reads φαίνονται . . . καλοῦντες, which Bekker adopted. 430 E

οὐκοῦν . . . (431 A) προσαγορεύεται] In the Laws, i. 627 C, the same figure is applied to a family or state: cp. also 626 E *ἐπειδὴ γὰρ εἷς ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ὁ μὲν* **κρείττων αὑτοῦ**, *ὁ δὲ ἥττων ἐστί*: and Gorg. 491 D *ἕνα ἕκαστον λέγω αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχοντα.*

καὶ ὅταν μὲν . . . τὸ κρείττω αὑτοῦ] **φύσει** is to be joined with **βέλτιον**, 'that which is by nature better.' **τὸ κρείττω αὑτοῦ** = **ὁ λόγος** supra, is the subject of **λέγειν**, which depends on **φαίνεται** and not on **βούλεσθαι**. 431 A

ἐπαινεῖ γοῦν] 'it is certainly a term of praise.' Cp. Crat. 419 A *ὅπερ δὴ* **ἐπαινεῖ**, and the use of *νοεῖ* with a neuter subject: i. 335 E *τοῦτο δὲ δὴ νοεῖ αὐτῷ*: also supra 423 D *τοῦτο δ' ἐβούλετο δηλοῦν.* The more general subject (sc. *ὁ λόγος*) is continued with **ψέγειν**, **καλεῖν** infra.

καὶ γὰρ ἔοικεν] (That is evidently the meaning) 'for it seems a natural way of speaking.' B

οὗ] 'Seeing that a thing, the better part of which rules over the worse.' **οὗ** is governed by **τὸ ἄμεινον τοῦ χείρονος**.

***παισί**] This correction of the manuscript reading *πᾶσι* is necessary here, and in vi. 494 B. C

τῶν ἐλευθέρων λεγομένων] 'Those who are called freemen.' In this expression, as in *τῶν εὐδαιμόνων δοκούντων* (iii. 406 C) and the like, Plato implies that the philosopher alone is really free and happy.

τὰς δέ γε ἁπλᾶς] The accusative is unusual after **ἐπιτεύξει**, and therefore these words are best regarded as an anacoluthon, apparently occasioned by the parallel of the previous sentence, **τάς γε πολλὰς . . . εὕροι**. It may be rendered in English, 'But as to the simple and moderate pleasures, you will find them,' &c. **αἳ δή**, **κ.τ.λ.**, 'which of course follow reason,' i. e. as being *ἁπλαῖ* and *μέτριαι*.

ὅταν οὕτως ἔχωσιν] sc. *ὅταν ἡ αὐτὴ δόξα ᾖ τοῖς τε ἄρχουσι καὶ ἀρχομένοις περὶ τοῦ οἵτινας δεῖ ἄρχειν.* E

ὅτι οὐχ ὥσπερ . . . (A) ὁτῳοῦν τῶν τοιούτων] 'Because courage and wisdom reside each in a portion of the state, which the one makes wise and the other valiant, but that is not the way with temperance (**οὐχ οὕτω ποιεῖ αὕτη** is a resumption of **οὐχ ὥσπερ . . .**

Republic IV. 431 E **παρείχετο**) which literally extends through all the notes of the scale, and produces a supreme harmony of the weakest, the strongest and the intermediate class, whether in wisdom or in force, or, if you will, in number, wealth and the like.' **δι' ὅλης** (*λύρας*) and **διὰ πασῶν** (*χορδῶν*) are musical terms, carrying out the notion of **ἁρμονίᾳ** supra. The application of the figure is pointed with **ἀτεχνῶς**, 'literally through the whole,' i.e. the whole state as the whole lyre. A somewhat similar notion of the harmony of the various elements in a state occurs in Thuc. vi. 18 (the speech of Alcibiades) *ὁμοῦ δὲ τό τε φαῦλον καὶ τὸ μέσον καὶ τὸ πάνυ ἀκριβὲς ἂν ξυγκραθὲν μάλιστ' ἂν ἰσχύειν.*

432 A **ταὐτόν**] A cognate accusative emphasizing **ξυνᾴδοντας**: 'agreeing in unison.'

εἰ μὲν βούλει, κ.τ.λ.] This may be expressed in the following tabular scheme:—

	φρονήσει,	*ἰσχύϊ,*	*πλήθει,* &c.
ἰσχυρότατοι	rulers,	soldiers,	populace.
μέσοι	soldiers,	populace,	soldiers.
ἀσθενέστατοι	populace,	rulers,	rulers.

B **ὥς γε οὑτωσὶ δόξαι**] 'So far as for us to have formed the opinion we have expressed.' Each step in a Platonic argument is regarded as provisional, depending on the present consent of the interlocutors, who are free to modify their conclusions afterwards, should they see cause.

432 B–434 D *We are on the track of Justice but have not yet found her. Ah! we have been looking too far off. Here she lies, quite near to us,—the ground of the other virtues, the very life of the machine! Why is there harmony amongst the classes in the state? Why are the soldiers brave, the rulers wise? Simply because each is doing his own proper work, not interfering with his neighbour.*

That each should have his own and keep within his sphere is the popular notion of Justice. And by adhering to our first principle of the division of labour, we have secured that each of the three orders or classes shall perform its function well, and that our whole state shall be just, and escape from injustice which arises out of the interference of the three classes with one another.

432 B **οὐκοῦν, ὦ Γλαύκων . . . ἄδηλος γένηται**] 'So now then, Glaucon, like huntsmen we should encircle the cover, taking heed that

justice do not slip away and vanish out of sight.' For the metaphor compare Laches 194 B Οὐκοῦν, ὦ φίλε, τὸν ἀγαθὸν κυνηγέτην μεταθεῖν χρὴ καὶ μὴ ἀνιέναι; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Βούλει οὖν καὶ Νικίαν τόνδε παρακαλῶμεν ἐπὶ τὸ κυνηγέσιον . . . ; Justice is more general and abstract and has more of the nature of universal law, whereas temperance, courage and wisdom are particular applications of this law: it is the general idea underlying the other three; the virtue of the whole as contrasted with the virtues of the parts: it may also be viewed as the result of all the rest. The simplicity of this is the real difficulty in understanding the nature of Justice: we are looking into the distance for that which is tumbling out at our feet. Justice is neither more nor less than 'our old friend' the division of labour applied not merely to the artisan class but to all the classes in the state (cp. the anticipation of this, ii. 372 A ἐν αὐτῶν τούτων χρείᾳ τινὶ τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους). Further, justice is the foundation or condition of the three other virtues, the quality which makes them possible (ὃ πᾶσιν ἐκείνοις τὴν δύναμιν παρέσχεν ὥστε ἐγγενέσθαι 433 B). It is obvious (1) that the relation between the three first and fourth is at variance with the method of elimination or residues by which Plato has proceeded: the fourth is not separable from the other three, they are particularized forms of it: (2) that the four virtues, especially justice, do not hold the same place in the state as in the individual, because it is only in certain respects and to a very limited degree that the state and individual admit of comparison. *Republic IV.* 432 B

The four 'cardinal virtues' of Plato appear meagre when compared with the greater fulness and minuteness of the psychology of Aristotle. Aristotle seems to include other types of virtue, e. g. that of magnificence, which belong to particular characters and circumstances and are not parts of the common ideal of human nature. Yet this virtue as well as the kindred ἐλευθεριότης, although not entering into Plato's system, are mentioned by him along with σωφροσύνη and ἀνδρεία, iii. 402 C.

The definition of justice in this passage is one of the definitions of temperance in the Charmides (162 A). So far is Plato from using language with the technical strictness of Aristotle. In general an ethical conception appears to lie at the foundation of temperance, a political one at the foundation of justice.

The ironical self-depreciation of Socrates and the humility of Glaucon are worthy of observation.

ἐάν πως . . . ἴδῃς] For the form of expression cp. infra 434 A and Theaet. 156 C ἀλλ' ἄθρει, **ἐάν πως** ἀποτελεσθῇ. C

Republic IV. 432 C **ἐάν μοι ἑπομένῳ χρῇ . . . χρήσει]** The omission of *ὡς* is singular. **πάνυ μοι μετρίως χρήσει**, 'You will make a very fair use of me.' Compare a similar turn in the Sophist, 239 B, C *ὅ τι μάλιστα δύνασαι συντείνας πειράθητι . . . Πολλὴ μέντ' ἄν με καὶ ἄτοπος ἔχοι προθυμία τῆς ἐπιχειρήσεως, εἰ . . . ἐπιχειροίην*, and Cratyl. 398 E *πόθεν, ὦ 'γαθέ, ἔχω; οὐδ' εἴ τι οἷός τ' ἂν εἴην εὑρεῖν, οὐ συντείνω διὰ τὸ ἡγεῖσθαι σὲ μᾶλλον εὑρήσειν ἢ ἐμαυτόν.* Also infra v. 474 A, B.

ἔστι γοῦν σκοτεινός] Compare the hunt for the Sophist in the 'dark cave' of negation, Soph. 254 A *διὰ τὸ* **σκοτεινὸν** *τοῦ τόπου κατανοῆσαι χαλεπός.*

D **καὶ ἐγὼ κατιδὼν . . . εἶπον]** 'Here I got view, and cried Hurrah! hurrah!'

ἦμεν καταγελαστότατοι . . . ἀπεσκοποῦμεν] The words from **ὥσπερ** are added in explanation. Hence the asyndeton.

E **ἄκουε, εἴ τι ἄρα λέγω]** 'Listen and see whether there is anything in what I say.' Cp. infra 433 E *εἰ οὕτω δόξει.*

433 A **τοῦτό ἐστιν . . . ἡ δικαιοσύνη]** 'This, or rather some form of this, is justice.' For the use of **ἤτοι** compare iii. 400 C *τὰς ἀγωγὰς τοῦ ποδὸς αὐτὸν οὐχ ἧττον ψέγειν . . . ἢ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς αὐτούς,* **ἤτοι** *ξυναμφότερόν τι.* This (i.e. each doing his own proper work) as he says below, when done in a certain way or manner, may be suspected to be (*κινδυνεύει εἶναι*) justice.

τούτου τι εἶδος] It is the division of labour applied, not to the several industries, but to the three classes in the state and the three parts of the soul in the individual. The same thing is meant by *τρόπον τινά* supra 432 E and infra B. See 434 A.

B **τὸ ὑπόλοιπον . . . ὧν ἐσκέμμεθα]** 'That which is the remainder of those we have considered;' i.e. which remains now that we have considered the other three. So **τὸ ὑπολειφθὲν ἐκείνων** infra. Cp. note on 432 B.

παρέχειν] depends immediately on **δοκεῖ**.

C **ἀλλὰ μέντοι . . (D) καὶ οὐκ ἐπολυπραγμόνει]** The resumption **ἢ τοῦτο, κ.τ.λ.**, helps to emphasize the alternative which is immediately in question. **τοῦτο** is explained by **ὅτι τὸ αὑτοῦ, κ.τ.λ.**

D **ἐνάμιλλον . . . δύναμις]** 'Then competing with wisdom, temperance, and courage in the promotion of political virtue we find

this power, that each individual in the state is doing his own work.' The genitive is descriptive or explanatory, 'the power that consists in this, that each individual in the state does his own work.' *Republic IV.* 433 D

ἢ ἄλλου . . . τῶν αὑτῶν στέρωνται] The rule observed by courts of law in the administration of justice, that each shall have his own, is adduced in confirmation of the definition. Cp. infra 442 E. E

ἰδὲ δή . . . βλάψαι πόλιν;] 'Look now: perhaps you will agree with me. Suppose a carpenter to undertake the work of a cobbler, or a cobbler of a carpenter—either exchanging implements or duties, or the same person to be attempting to do both—any change you please but one, do you imagine that such changes will be any great harm to the state?' 434 A

πάντα τἆλλα μεταλλαττόμενα] are followed in *q* by *τά γε τοιαῦτα*, which gives a true explanation, but is unnecessary as a correction of the passage. The words are in apposition with **τέκτων . . . ἢ σκυτοτόμος, πάντα** summing up, and **τἆλλα**, as elsewhere in Plato, referring to what follows:—'anything but what I am about to speak of.' Compare Laws vii. 798 D **τὰ** *μὲν οὖν* **ἄλλα** *ἐλάττω μεταβαλλόμενα κακὰ διεξεργάζοιτ' ἄν, ὅσα περὶ σχήματα πάσχει τὸ τοιοῦτον· ὅσα δὲ περὶ τὰ τῶν ἠθῶν ἐπαίνου τε καὶ ψόγου πέρι πυκνὰ μεταπίπτει, πάντων, οἴομαι, μέγιστά τε καὶ πλείστης εὐλαβείας δεόμενα ἂν εἴη.* For the form of expression in summing up compare Polit. 299 E *περὶ ἅπαντα ταῦτα οὕτω πραττόμενα τί ποτ' ἂν φανείη, κ.τ.λ.* **ἢ . . . μεταλαμβάνοντες** and **ἢ καὶ . . . πράττειν** are opposed, **ἢ τιμάς** introducing a subordinate distinction between implements and industries.

εἰς τὸ τοῦ πολεμικοῦ εἶδος] *εἶδος* here = 'mode of life or action,' i.e. 'function' rather than 'class.' B

οὗτοι] The pronoun emphatically sums up the three classes in opposition to the minor sub-divisions of the industrial class enumerated in supra A.

ἡ τριῶν ἄρα . . . (C) **μάλιστα κακουργία**] **τριῶν γενῶν**, sc. guardians, soldiers, traders.

τῆς ἑαυτοῦ πόλεως] is added with the same solemn feeling as *ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ πόλει*, supra ii. 380 B. C

μηδέν . . . παγίως αὐτὸ λέγωμεν] 'We will not as yet say this quite positively.' For *παγίως* compare v. 479 C *οὔτ' εἶναι οὔτε μὴ εἶναι οὐδὲν αὐτῶν δυνατὸν* **παγίως** *νοῆσαι*: and Theaet. 157 A *ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν εἶναί τι καὶ τὸ πάσχον αὖ τι ἐπὶ ἑνὸς νοῆσαι, ὥς φασιν, οὐκ εἶναι* **παγίως**. D

Republic IV. 434 D **ἀλλ' ἐὰν . . . ξυγχωρησόμεθα ἤδη**] 'But if we apply this notion to the sphere of the individual, and it be admitted there also to be justice, we will concede the point without more ado.' Cp. infra 442 D. And for the liveliness of the expression compare Phaedr. 249 B *δεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον ξυνιέναι κατ' εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν* **ἰὸν** *αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἓν λογισμῷ ξυναιρούμενον.*

ἐκεῖ] sc. *ἐν ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ.*

τί γὰρ καὶ ἐροῦμεν;] sc. *ἄλλο.* 'For what else can we say?'

ἣν ᾠήθημεν, κ.τ.λ.] 'In regard to which we thought that we should more easily detect its nature in the case of the individual if,' &c. The accusative is in apposition to the sentence, and the difficulty of this construction is lessened by the attraction, which makes it unnecessary to ask for an account of the construction of **ἥν**. For similar accusatives cp. Hom. Il. xx. 83 *ποῦ τοι ἀπειλαί,* **ἃς** *Τρώων βασιλεῦσιν ὑπίσχεο . . . Ἀχιλῆος ἐναντίβιον πολεμίζειν;* Phaedr. 249 D *τῆς τετάρτης μανίας,* **ἣν** *. . . αἰτίαν ἔχει ὡς μανικῶς διακείμενος.* For the allusion see ii. 368 D ff.

ἐκεῖνο] sc. *δικαιοσύνην.*

τοῦτο εἶναι πόλις] sc. *τὸ μεῖζον . . . τῶν ἐχόντων δικαιοσύνην.*

E **ἔν γε τῇ ἀγαθῇ**] This was not distinctly said, but has become apparent since the development of the ideal state.

ἐκεῖ] sc. *ἐν τῇ πόλει.*

ἐπαναφέρωμεν] Compare the description of the argument from example in Polit. 278 A–C *Ἆρ' οὖν οὐχ ὧδε ῥᾷστον καὶ κάλλιστον ἐπάγειν αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τὰ μήπω γιγνωσκόμενα; Πῶς; Ἀνάγειν πρῶτον ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα ἐν οἷς ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ὀρθῶς ἐδόξαζον, ἀναγάγοντας δὲ τιθέναι παρὰ τὰ μήπω γιγνωσκόμενα, καὶ παραβάλλοντας ἐνδεικνύναι τὴν αὐτὴν ὁμοιότητα καὶ φύσιν ἐν ἀμφοτέραις οὖσαν ταῖς συμπλοκαῖς, μέχριπερ ἂν πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγνοουμένοις τὰ δοξαζόμενα ἀληθῶς παρατιθέμενα δειχθῇ, δειχθέντα δέ, παραδείγμαθ' οὕτω γιγνόμενα, ποιήσῃ τῶν στοιχείων πάντων ἕκαστον ἐν πάσαις ταῖς συλλαβαῖς, τὸ μὲν ἕτερον ὡς τῶν ἄλλων ἕτερον ὄν, τὸ δὲ ταὐτὸν ὡς ταὐτὸν ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἑαυτῷ προσαγορεύεσθαι. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο μὲν ἱκανῶς συνειλήφαμεν, ὅτι παραδείγματός γ' ἐστὶ τότε γένεσις, ὁπόταν ὂν ταὐτόν, ἐν ἑτέρῳ διεσπασμένῳ δοξαζόμενον ὀρθῶς καὶ συναχθέν, περὶ ἑκάτερον ὡς συνάμφω μίαν ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἀποτελῇ; Φαίνεται.*

κἂν μὲν ὁμολογῆται] sc. *τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ δικαιοσύνη εἶναι.*

ἐὰν δέ τι ἄλλο . . . ἐμφαίνηται] sc. *ὂν τὸ δίκαιον.* So also supra **ἐφάνη**: sc. *ὄν.*

βεβαιωσαίμεθ' ἄν, κ.τ.λ.] 'We will fix in our souls,' i.e. we will not only form a clear conception of justice, but will adopt it as our rule of life. There is here an anticipation of the tone assumed at the end of Book ix. *Republic IV.* 435 A

καθ' ὁδόν] In this expression, as in *πρὸς τρόπου*, &c., the notion of rightness is included in the noun. 'Your proposal is a right one.'

Let us turn now from the large letters to the small,—from the state to the individual,—and see whether this account of justice and of the other virtues is equally applicable in both cases. *435 A–D*

The same words of praise and blame are applied to communities and to individuals. Whence we conclude that the same moral attributes belong equally to both.

But if this be so, and our account of the virtues is right, the soul must have three parts corresponding to the three classes in the state. (We must be content for the present with crude methods of psychological inquiry, only bearing in mind that there is a longer and more certain way.)

The imperfect apprehension of logical distinction in the Socratic age of Greek philosophy is seen in the following discussion, which may be summarized as follows: 'Quantitative difference leaves a quality unchanged. The difference between the state and the individual is only a difference of quantity: therefore the quality of justice in the state and the individual is the same.' It is hardly necessary to point out in our own day that the spheres of law or politics and of morality are only partially co-extensive; or in the language of ancient philosophy, that justice in the state is not the same with justice in the individual. The criticism with which Aristotle commences the Politics, on the erroneous conception of the state as a large family, appears trite to us; in his own age such a criticism afforded a valuable landmark against error. It seems to be directed against Plato.

ἆρ' οὖν . . . ὅμοιον;] 'Is a nature which is called by the same name, whether it exists in a larger or smaller form, unlike or like in that respect in which it is called by the same name?' In other words, does quantity make any difference to quality? The translation in the English version is not strictly accurate: not two things, but two different forms of the same thing are spoken of. 435 A

πάθη τε καὶ ἕξεις] 'affections and qualities.' B

Republic IV. **καὶ τὸν ἕνα ἄρα . . . (c) τῇ πόλει**] **ἐκείνοις**, sc. *τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει εἴδεσιν.* **ἀξιοῦσθαι** is passive.

435 C **εἰς φαῦλόν γε . . . χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά**] The irony of Socrates in the use of the term **φαῦλον** is taken up seriously in what follows. Cp. supra 423 C *φαῦλον . . . φαυλότερον*: 426 A *τόδε αὐτῶν οὐ χαρίεν . . .*; which is seriously answered by the words *οὐ πάνυ χαρίεν.* *χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά* is a maxim which later on is put into Socrates' mouth, infra vi. 497 D. For **ἐμπεπτώκαμεν**, 'we have tumbled into,' cp. the image in v. 453 D *ἄν τέ τις εἰς κολυμβήθραν μικρὰν* **ἐμπέσῃ** *ἄν τε εἰς τὸ μέγιστον πέλαγος μέσον, κ.τ.λ.*

D **ἐκ τοιούτων μεθόδων, κ.τ.λ.**] Plato seems to intimate some 'dialectic of the future,' of which he has himself laid the foundation in the Sixth and Seventh Books, where he distinguishes the kinds of knowledge and the faculties corresponding to them: in the present discussion, which does not aim at philosophical accuracy, he will argue from the common use of language. The nature of such a dialectic can only be conjectured: probably Plato would have desired to proceed by some method of ideas in the investigation of the soul: e.g. 'what idea is that which contains or knows other ideas?' He might have gone on to speculate on the identity of the 'Ego' and the universal. Cp. Theaet. 184 D *δεινὸν γάρ που . . . εἰ πολλαί τινες ἐν ἡμῖν, ὥσπερ ἐν δουρείοις ἵπποις, αἰσθήσεις ἐγκάθηνται, ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰς μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν, εἴτε ψυχὴν εἴτε ὅ τι δεῖ καλεῖν, πάντα ταῦτα ξυντείνει.* In Book x. 611 B he hints that the soul is really one and not many.

In similar enigmatical language he appears in the Charmides (169 A) to describe dialectic: *μεγάλου δή τινος, ὦ φίλε, ἀνδρὸς δεῖ, ὅστις τοῦτο κατὰ πάντων ἱκανῶς διαιρήσεται, πότερον οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων τὴν αὑτοῦ δύναμιν αὐτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ πέφυκεν ἔχειν . . . ἢ τὰ μέν, τὰ δ' οὔ.* So Phaedrus, 246 A *περὶ δὲ τῆς ἰδέας αὐτῆς* (sc. *τῆς ψυχῆς*) *ὧδε λεκτέον· οἷον μέν ἐστι, πάντῃ πάντως θείας εἶναι καὶ μακρᾶς διηγήσεως, ᾧ δὲ ἔοικεν, ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ ἐλάττονος.* An application of the words **ἀλλὰ . . . ἄγουσα**, in a sense of which Socrates would doubtless have recognized the truth, may also be made to modern inductive philosophy.

οἵαις νῦν . . . χρώμεθα] So far as the expression is concerned, Plato might be referring generally to the methods in use in his own day: cp. vii. 516 A *τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἀληθῶν*: but that he is referring rather to the methods which he has employed in the previous discussion, is shown by the words **τῶν γε προειρημένων τε καὶ προεσκεμμένων ἀξίως**, and also by the reference to this place in vi. 504 B

ἐλέγομέν που ὅτι ὡς μὲν δυνατὸν ἦν κάλλιστα αὐτὰ κατιδεῖν ἄλλη μακροτέρα εἴη περίοδος, κ.τ.λ. Galen read ἄλλη for **ἀλλά** here. *Republic IV.* 435 D

ἀξίως] sc. λάβοιμεν ἄν. **τῶν γε προειρημένων τε καὶ προεσκεμμένων** refers not to the subjects of discussion but to the discussion itself: 'in a manner worthy of our previous statements and speculations.'

καὶ πάνυ ἐξαρκέσει] Socrates characteristically doubts the success even of their more modest attempt. Compare vi. 506 E πλέον γάρ μοι φαίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν παροῦσαν ὁρμὴν ἐφικέσθαι τοῦ γε δοκοῦντος ἐμοὶ τὰ νῦν.

It is clear that if a state has moral attributes, these can only come from the individuals of whom the state is composed. But what is not so clear is whether the three activities which we have identified with our three classes, are functions of three faculties or of one indivisible nature. In other words, is the distinction which we draw between thought, passion and desire, a real distinction? *435 E–441 C*

The soul is one. Is it also many? Let us make sure. We see a top revolve and yet stand still. But that implies that it has an axis and a circumference. For nothing can have opposite activities (or passivities) at the same time with the same part of itself and in the same respect.

Now assent and dissent, desire and repugnance, are opposites.

And thirst is desire of drink,—of that simply, without qualification,—unless the thirst is qualified. One may be thirsty, however, and yet not drink, because reason is opposed to the desire. This proves that reason excludes desire. It remains to distinguish anger from desire and reason. Some may be inclined to identify the two impulsive principles. But the case of Leontius is a refutation of them. For when he was led by a low craving to look at the dead bodies of criminals in the place of execution, a higher impulse struggled with his desire and he was angry with himself. Indeed anger commonly takes part with reason (just as our soldiers support the rulers), wherever injustice is perceived. Yet anger is clearly to be distinguished from reason. For children are irrationally angry—so are lions and wolves,—and when Odysseus rebuked his spirit, it was the reason in him which checked his passion.

ἆρ' οὖν ἡμῖν, κ.τ.λ.] The courageous temper (**τὸ θυμοειδές**) in the state is said to be derived from the individuals who compose the state. Cp. infra viii. 544 D, E οἶσθ' οὖν . . . πέντε ἂν εἶεν. But 435 E

Republic IV. 435 E Socrates again leaves out of sight the fact that the collective courage of a state or an army is in some degree different from the courage of individuals. And yet the conception of the state as an ideal unity different from the individuals who compose it belongs rather to ancient than to modern thought. See Thuc. ii. 60 *πόλιν πλείω ξύμπασαν ὀρθουμένην ὠφελεῖν τοὺς ἰδιώτας ἢ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν πολιτῶν εὐπραγοῦσαν, ἀθρόαν δὲ σφαλλομένην.*

γελοῖον γὰρ . . . ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν] 'For example, in the case of a people who have the character of being passionate, to imagine that this quality does not originate in the individuals, who compose the state, would be ridiculous.' For the use of *αἰτία* compare Laws i. 624 *θεὸς . . . εἴληφε τὴν* **αἰτίαν** *τῆς τῶν νόμων διαθέσεως*; and elsewhere *αἰτίαν ἔχειν.* **οἳ δή**: the relative refers to a masculine understood from **πόλεσιν**, rather than immediately to **ἰδιωτῶν**.

τὸν ἄνω τόπον] This can hardly mean 'the Highland country,' as L. and S. interpret: rather the parts of Europe which are remote from Hellas and the Aegean Sea.

436 A **Φοίνικας . . . Αἴγυπτον**] In Laws v. 747 C he passes a similar censure on the Phoenicians and Egyptians, whose institutions are charged with causing *πανουργία* instead of *σοφία*, though he is uncertain whether this is to be attributed to the hand of the legislator, to adverse fortune, or to climate. For Thrace and Scythia cp. Arist. Pol. vii. 7, § 2 *τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς τόποις ἔθνη καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην θυμοῦ μέν ἐστι πλήρη, διανοίας δὲ ἐνδεέστερα καὶ τέχνης, κ.τ.λ.*, which he goes on to contrast with the intellectual and indolent character of the Asiatics, and the union of intellect and passion in the Greek.

The fallacy about the sameness of the state and the individual easily escapes notice. A question of psychology receives more attention, and is imagined to involve a real difficulty:—Does the soul act as a whole or in three parts? Before this question can be resolved, the meaning of sameness and difference has to be ascertained. (1) Opposition in the same relation is to be distinguished from opposition in different relations; in the first case the two members of the opposition are necessarily exclusive or contradictory—they cannot co-exist; but not so in the second. (2) If one of the terms which are correlative (e.g. drink or thirst) is simple, the other should be simple: if one is compound the other must be compound.

τόδε δὲ . . . ἄλλο ἄλλῳ] 'But this is a real difficulty. Is there one principle here by which we perform our several actions, or three whereby our actions are severally performed?' *Republic IV.* 436 A

τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ] finds an imperfect antecedent in what precedes: 'this faculty' of which we spoke as *θυμοειδές, φιλομαθές, φιλοχρήματον.* **τούτων** *ἕκαστα*, the correction of *q*, would refer to the several *actions* of the mind.

δῆλον ὅτι . . . οὐκ ἐθελήσει ἅμα] 'It is clear that the same thing will not do or suffer opposites at the same time, in the same part and in the same relation.' B

Can two contradictories be true? Not in the statement of particular facts, when the terms are accurately used and the same relation is preserved. A wheel or top which moves upon a fixed axis or centre may be said to move and not to move, i. e. it may move at its circumference, while its axis (conceived as a vertical straight line) remains still. But the wheel or top cannot move and not move around its axis at the same time: it is ridiculous to maintain that 'the earth goes round the sun in the same sense and at the same time that the sun goes round the earth.' Where in any subject of theological or metaphysical speculation, such as necessity and free-will, or the divisibility of matter, contradictories are said to be equally true, the reason is that neither expression is more than half the truth, and both together are only approximations to the truth. Plato is perhaps arguing with the Heracliteans in this passage. If so, he has got beyond their point of view and reached the region of common sense. Cp. Symp. 187 A, B: Soph. 242 E *διαφερόμενον γὰρ ἀεὶ ξυμφέρεται, φασὶν αἱ συντονώτεραι τῶν μουσῶν, κ.τ.λ.*

οὐ ταὐτὸν ἦν] The imperfect of *εἰμί* is nowhere used simply for the present, but either (1) with some reference to the past as in ix. 580 D *τὸ μέν, φαμέν, ἦν*, referring to the discussion at iv. 439 D: or (2), as in this passage, supra 428 A, and x. 609 B, implying an assertion of existence confirmed by inquiry and therefore prior to it,—'was all along.' Compare the expression *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι*, in which the past tense refers to the essence as prior to our conception of it. C

οὐκοῦν . . . περιφέρωνται] 'And suppose such an objector were still further to display his wit by subtly arguing that tops at any D

Republic IV. rate, when they spin round with their pegs fixed on the same spot, stand and are moved in their entirety at the same time.'

436 D These are apparent exceptions to Plato's law of contradiction which have to be cleared away before we are in a condition to determine whether the parts of the soul are really opposed. There would be no distinction of *θυμός* and *ἐπιθυμία* unless the actions which flow from the one principle excluded those which flow from the other.

ὡς οὐ κατὰ ταὐτὰ . . . φερομένων] **τὰ τοιαῦτα** is to be taken as cognate accusative with the participles. 'Since things *which act in this way* are not at such moments in motion and at rest with the same parts of themselves.'

437 A **πάθοι . . . ποιήσειεν**] The words **εἴη ἢ καί** to which Stallbaum objects as unmeaning, and which he supposes to have crept in from the termination of **ποιήσειεν**, have the authority of the best MSS. They are more likely to have been omitted than inserted. Nor is there any objection to them on the ground of want of sense. Because the categories of *ποιεῖν* and *πάσχειν* are correlatives there is no reason why *εἶναι* should not be interposed between them, the three together answering to active, intransitive, passive.

ἵνα μὴ ἀναγκαζώμεθα . . . μηκύνειν] 'that we may not be compelled to be tedious by going right through all such objections, and satisfying ourselves that they are untrue.'

ὑποθέμενοι . . . ἔσεσθαι] He means to say that he will not guard every possible case: if any assumption on which the argument turns is found to be erroneous, the consequences which follow shall be withdrawn. Cp. supra 434 D *μηδέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πω πάνυ παγίως αὐτὸ λέγωμεν.*

B **προσάγεσθαι**] 'to draw to oneself,' i. e. to accept.

ἀπωθεῖσθαι] 'to reject.'

τῶν ἐναντίων *ἂν ἀλλήλοις] The insertion of **ἂν** seems necessary, and it may easily have dropped out between -*ων* and *ἀλ*-.

εἴτε ποιημάτων . . . παθημάτων] 'Activities or passivities as the case may be.'

οὐδὲν γὰρ ταύτῃ διοίσει] i. e. this relation of opposition is equally possible between activities and passivities.

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ἐπινεύειν τοῦτο . . . τῆς γενέσεως] (1) 'Nods assent to this within herself,' or (2) 'beckons this with a nod towards herself—as if some one were putting a question to her, longing for the attainment of it.' For **πρὸς αὑτήν** in the former case, cp. Phil. 38 E *πρὸς αὑτὸν διανοούμενος*. But the contrast favours (2). 437 C

εἰς τὸ ἀπωθεῖν . . . θήσομεν] Compare Soph. 235 A *εἰς γόητα . . . θετέον* (sc. *αὐτὸν*) *τινά*.

ἆρ' οὖν, καθ' ὅσον, κ.τ.λ.] He means to say that if one of two relative terms is qualified the other must also be qualified: e. g. simple thirst is relative to simple drink, but great thirst implies much drink, hot thirst cold drink, and so on. D

ἢ οὐ] The false reading *πον* seems originally to have had a place in Par. A (ἢ *οὐ* : *πον* mg). Hermann's inversion of **ψυχροῦ** and **θερμοῦ** for the sake of symmetry makes nonsense of the passage; see infra 438 E *καὶ οὔ τι λέγω, ὡς, οἵων ἂν ᾖ, τοιαῦτα καὶ ἔστιν*.

τοῦ δὲ τοίου . . . τὰ προσγιγνόμενα] 'But the accessories of the desire are relative to this or that quality in the object of desire.' E

μήτοι τις, κ.τ.λ.] The objection ends with the words **χρηστοῦ σίτου**. It is restated in a different and more general form by Socrates in the following sentence (**πάντες γὰρ . . . αἱ ἄλλαι οὕτω**). Plato leaves the objection for a time (until 439 A), and proceeds to show more clearly how the qualification of one term of a relation inevitably involves the qualification of the other. Then returning to the case of thirst in 439 A he states that thirst simple is neither of much nor of little, neither of good nor of bad drink, but simply of drink. He does not fully criticize the objection. Had he done so, he would probably have gone on to contest the fact that 'all desire is of good.' Obviously the desire of the drunkard is not of drink that is good for him—or to explain that the statement could only be accepted as true if 'desire' is used in an ideal sense and therefore implying the qualification of it by the word 'good.' 438 A

ἴσως γὰρ ἄν, κ.τ.λ.] **γάρ** means, 'You are right to call attention to this, for,' &c.

τοιαῦτα οἷα εἶναί του] For the technical use of the genitive to express relation, cp. Theaet. 160 A *Ἀνάγκη δέ γε ἐμέ τε* **τινὸς** *γίγνεσθαι, κ.τ.λ.*

οὐκ ἔμαθες, κ.τ.λ.] The example of comparatives is next taken, to which the same principle applies. 'Greater' is relative to B

Republic IV. 438 B 'smaller,' 'heavier' to 'lighter,' 'more' to 'fewer.' But if one of the terms in these several pairs is qualified, the other must also be qualified. Thus 'much greater' is relative to 'much smaller,' 'much heavier' to 'much lighter,' 'many more' to 'many fewer.'

A similar transition is made in the Charmides, from the relation between sense and knowledge, and the objects of sense and knowledge, to comparative terms: 168 B *καὶ γὰρ τὸ μεῖζόν φαμεν τοιαύτην τινὰ ἔχειν δύναμιν, ὥστε τινὸς εἶναι μεῖζον;* C *οὐκοῦν καὶ εἴ τι διπλάσιόν ἐστι τῶν τε ἄλλων διπλασίων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ, ἡμίσεος δήπου ὄντος ἑαυτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων διπλάσιον ἂν εἴη:* ibid. *πλεῖον δὲ αὑτοῦ ὂν οὐ καὶ ἔλαττον ἔσται, καὶ βαρύτερον ὄν, κουφότερον, καὶ πρεσβύτερον ὂν νεώτερον, καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ὡσαύτως;*

C **τὰ διπλάσια πρὸς τὰ ἡμίσεα**] The same rule applies to these terms as to 'greater' and 'smaller,' 'more' and 'fewer,' a 'larger double' is relative to a 'larger half.' The double of 6 (=12) is a larger double than the double of 4 (=8): and the larger half (6) is relative to the larger double (12): the smaller half (4) to the smaller double (8).

τί δὲ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας; κ.τ.λ.] So with regard to sciences: the object of science is knowledge, but the object of a particular science is a particular kind of knowledge. With **τί δέ**, *σοὶ δοκεῖ* may be supplied.

ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος] sc. *τούτων ἐστί.*

D **οἰκίας ἐργασίας ἐπιστήμη**] Cp. Theaet. 146 D *ὅταν λέγῃς σκυτικήν, μή τι ἄλλο φράζεις ἢ ἐπιστήμην ὑποδημάτων ἐργασίας; κ.τ.λ.*

αὐτά] 'themselves,' i. e. without their accidents. The simple correlatives are simply of each other, the qualified correlatives are of the qualified.

αὐτῶν μόνων] sc. *ὧν ἐστίν.*

E **καὶ οὔ τι λέγω, κ.τ.λ.**] The qualities of the two terms of a relation, though correlative, are not necessarily identical, e. g. as we have seen above, hot thirst is of cold drink; or to take the case of knowledge and its objects: there is a sub-division of things which are objects of knowledge into healthy things; and there is a subdivision of knowledge corresponding to these healthy things: but because the objects are healthy it does not follow that the knowledge which is concerned with them, although distinguished from other kinds of knowledge, is healthy too. As these objects are

distinguished from other objects by the possession of a particular quality (i. e. health), so the knowledge which is relative to them is distinguished from other kinds of knowledge by possessing a peculiar quality (i. e. having to do with health). *Republic IV.* 438 E

τὸ δὲ δὴ δίψος . . . (439 A) πώματός γε] 'Will you not say that thirst, said I, is in this class, the class of relations, as far as its essence is concerned. Thirst is, I imagine,— Yes, said he, thirst is of drink.' Two questions are asked; before the second is completed Glaucon breaks in with a reply to the first (**ἔγωγε**): and in **πώματός γε** he completes and answers the second. The order of words in the first question is *οὐ θήσεις τὸ δίψος εἶναι τούτων τῶν τινός* (sc. *ὄντων*) and in adding **τοῦτο ὅπερ ἐστίν**, sc. *εἶναι*, **τούτων** is neglected. For a brachylogy similar to that in **τῶν τινός** cp. Phil. 16 D *τῶν ἐν ἐκείνων*.

The bearing of this passage on the argument appears to be as follows. The object of Socrates is to establish a difference between *θυμός*, *ἐπιθυμία* and *λόγος*, and to show that these are primary elements of the soul. In order to meet the possible objection— that these are not distinct elements, as is shown by such phrases as a 'reasonable' or a 'passionate desire,' or 'a reasonable anger,' he insists that 'desire' or 'anger' are in themselves simple, and that they become qualified by the addition of something apart from them and different from them.

οὐ γὰρ δή . . . πράττοι] 'For surely as we maintain, the same thing cannot do opposite things with the same part of itself in reference to the same thing at the same time.' *ἂν* is to be supplied from the previous sentence: cp. for parallels i. 352 E, ii. 382 E, and notes. 439 B

τοῦ τοξότου] cp. supra 428 A and note.

πότερον, κ.τ.λ.] A man may be thirsty and not choose to drink: but this is because there is present in him another principle (usually reason) besides thirst, which masters his thirst. C

τὰ τοιαῦτα] i. e. the indulgence of appetite generally.

ὅταν *ἐγγίγνηται] Plato never loses an opportunity of saying that 'all men have not' right reason. Cp. Theaet. 186 C *τὰ δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀναλογίσματα πρός τε οὐσίαν καὶ ὠφέλειαν μόγις καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων καὶ παιδείας παραγίγνεται* **οἷς ἂν καὶ παραγίγνηται**. D

διὰ . . . νοσημάτων] 'through the incidence of morbid conditions.'

Republic IV. 439 D Cp. especially Tim. 86 B, C *ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας ὑπερβαλλούσας τῶν νόσων μεγίστας θετέον τῇ ψυχῇ· περιχαρὴς γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ὢν ἢ καὶ τἀναντία ὑπὸ λύπης πάσχων, σπεύδων τὸ μὲν ἑλεῖν ἀκαίρως, τὸ δὲ φυγεῖν, οὔθ' ὁρᾶν οὔτε ἀκούειν ὀρθὸν οὐδὲν δύναται, λυττᾷ δὲ καὶ λογισμοῦ μετασχεῖν ἥκιστα τότε δὴ δυνατός ἐστι.*

οὐ δὴ . . . ἑταῖρον] From the rule that the same principle when rightly defined cannot have two contradictory effects is inferred that the desire to drink and the power to abstain from drinking proceed from different elements in the soul.

ἐπτόηται] The perfect signifies a perpetual or constantly recurring state, 'is in a continual flutter.' Cp. vii. 521 E *τετεύτακε.*

οὔκ] in the answer refers back to *οὐ δὴ ἀλόγως.*

E **ταῦτα μὲν . . . τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ**] The opposition of desire and reason is admitted. Are desire and anger equally opposed? At first sight the impression is that they are nearly related.

τούτων ποτέρῳ] 'To one or other of these.' The indefinite *πότερος* (L. and S. s. v.) occurs several times in Plato. It is hardly found in other Greek writers of the classical period.

ἀλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κ.τ.λ.] An anecdote is introduced to prove that a similar opposition may exist between anger and desire as between reason and desire. The interpretation of **ποτὲ ἀκούσας τι πιστεύω τούτῳ** is difficult; the best explanation of the words as they stand is as follows: 'I once heard a story in which I put faith,' and which implies that anger is not akin to desire. [Possibly, however, a negative *οὐ* has been dropped before **πιστεύω.** 'I once heard a tale which makes me doubt that suggestion of yours.' L. C.]

τὸ βόρειον τεῖχος] I.e. the outer wall on the north running from Athens to the Peiraeus. The middle wall (*τὸ διὰ μέσου τεῖχος*), which was parallel to the north wall, is mentioned in the Gorgias (455 E): it also extended from Athens to Peiraeus, and was so called because it lay between the north wall and another wall which ran to Phalerum. Thus a fortified open space communicating between Athens and the Peiraeus, and not merely a wall, was still preserved as a means of communication between Athens and the Peiraeus, even if the north wall were captured.

παρὰ τῷ δημίῳ] The story is that Leontius, son of Aglaion, going up from the Peiraeus underneath the north wall on the out-

side observing dead bodies lying by the executioner' [or 'at the executioner's,' L. C.], &c. There is no reason to read *δημείῳ* for **δημίῳ**. The spot is sufficiently described as outside the north wall on the road from Peiraeus to Athens, being also the spot where the executioner would naturally be found. *Republic IV.* 439 E

ἰδοὺ ὑμῖν . . . ὦ κακοδαίμονες] 'There's for you, wretches!' 440 A

οὗτος μέντοι . . . ὁ λόγος] 'This tale, however.' **μέντοι** contrasts the inference suggested by Leontius' words with Glaucon's first impression.

οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλοθι . . . (B) τοῦ τοιούτου] The subject is at first the man himself, but changes to **τὸν θυμόν** as the sentence proceeds. Cp. supra 411 B.

αὐτὸν κοινωνήσαντα] sc. *τὸν θυμόν*. B

αἱροῦντος λόγου μὴ δεῖν ἀντιπράττειν] 'When reason decides that she is not to be opposed.' The omission of *ἑαυτῷ* (sc. *τῷ λόγῳ*) after **ἀντιπράττειν** is sufficiently supported by instances (L. and S., s.v. *ἀντιπράσσω* 2). The reading of the principal MSS. has therefore been retained, and may be construed as above. There is no distinct subject of *ἀντιπράττειν*, with which either *θυμόν* or *ἐπιθυμίαν* or *τὸν ἄνθρωπον*, or all together may be supplied. The other reading, *ἄν τι πράττειν*, accepted by Bekker, is obviously an emendation, which gives a poor sense. Stallbaum places a comma after *δεῖν*, and construes as follows:—'But that the spirit, making common cause with the desires when reason insists that its making common cause is wrong (*μὴ δεῖν*, sc. *κοινωνῆσαι*), should oppose reason,' &c.,—a method of taking the words which is harsher than the other.

The sentence is an anacoluthon, the structure of **κοινωνήσαντα** being broken by **τοῦ τοιούτου αἰσθέσθαι**, which is substituted for *ἰδεῖν*.

ὅταν ἀδικεῖσθαί τις ἡγῆται . . . (D) πραϋνθῇ] The subject of **ζεῖ**, **κ.τ.λ.**, is **ὁ θυμός** from the previous sentence, as appears from *ὥσπερ* **κύων ὑπὸ νομέως**. But the **θυμός** is closely identified with the person in whom it forms the active principle. Hence **παρ' αὐτῷ**, 'with the man's self.' C

διὰ *τοῦ πεινῆν, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. infra 442 C *διά τε λυπῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν*: vi. 494 D *διὰ τοσούτων κακῶν*. The reading is conjectural. The manuscript reading *διὰ τό* can only be defended in one of two ways. Either (1) connecting *διὰ τὸ . . . πάσχειν* directly with **οὐ λήγει τῶν γενναίων** = 'he does not on that account desist from noble efforts,'

Republic IV. 440 C the words **καὶ νικᾷ καί** being introduced *διὰ μέσου*: or (2) [B. J.] 'and because it (sc. passion) endures hunger and cold and other such sufferings patiently,' &c. (**πεινῆν ὑπομένων** being equivalent to *ὑπομένειν πεινῶν*). The words **καὶ νικᾷ καὶ οὐ λήγει, κ.τ.λ.**, present considerable difficulty, and involve a contradiction if **νικᾷ** and **οὐ λήγει** are supposed to refer to the same struggle, because they put together conjunctively (*καὶ . . . καί*) what should be joined disjunctively (*ἤ . . . ἤ*). The difficulty is somewhat obviated if **νικᾷ** and **οὐ λήγει, κ.τ.λ.**, are taken to refer to different struggles,—the former to the struggle between *θυμός* and *ἐπιθυμία* within the injured man himself, as exemplified in his endurance of hunger and cold in the attempt to satisfy his anger, the latter to the struggle in which the injured man strives to avenge himself on his injurer.

D **καίτοι γ'**] 'And indeed'—a common use in Homer, rare in Attic.

ἀλλ' *ἦ . . . ἐνθυμεῖ;] 'But do you bear this also in mind, I wonder?' ***ἦ**, the conjecture of Ast, is more expressive than *εἰ*, the manuscript reading. **Εἰ** in Hellenistic Greek (Matt. xii. 10), as in Homer (Od. i. 158) is used with directly interrogative force. But this only helps to account for the corruption.

E **'όμεθα**] refers to the suggestion hesitatingly put forward by Glaucon, supra 439 E *Ἴσως, ἔφη, (τὸ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἂν εἴη ὁμοφυές) . . . τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ*. Socrates, as in other passages, courteously assumes a share of the responsibility of a suggestion which has proved erroneous.

τίθεσθαι τὰ ὅπλα πρὸς τοῦ λογιστικοῦ] 'Arrays itself on the side of the rational part.'

441 A **φύσει, ἐὰν μὴ . . . διαφθαρῇ**] These words seem to imply an admission that the statement in 440 B goes beyond the actual fact, and represents what Plato regards as the normal condition. It is only in the uncorrupted soul that passion always obeys reason. It may, in perverted natures, become subject to the many-headed monster, i.e. the desires, cp. ix. 590 B, where the depravation of *θυμός* is described, especially in the words *κολακεία δὲ καὶ ἀνελευθερία οὐχ ὅταν τις τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, τὸ θυμοειδές, ὑπὸ τῷ ὀχλώδει θηρίῳ ποιῇ καὶ ἕνεκα χρημάτων καὶ τῆς ἐκείνου ἀπληστίας προπηλακιζόμενον ἐθίζῃ ἐκ νέου ἀντὶ λέοντος πίθηκον γίγνεσθαι;*

ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, τρίτον] sc. *τοῦτο εἶναι.*

ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κ.τ.λ.] That passion or spirit is the ally of reason against appetite has been already shown. But is there any difference between passion and reason? Yes, for passion exists in children who have not attained to reason, and in irrational animals. A further proof of their opposition is given by Homer, who makes the reasoning principle rebuke senseless wrath. *Republic IV.* 441 A

λογισμοῦ δ' ἔνιοι . . . ὀψέ ποτε] Cp. Theaet. 186 C *τὰ δὲ περὶ τούτων . . . παραγίγνηται.*

ἄνω που ἐκεῖ] 'Somewhere above (you know where).' The reference is to iii. 390 D. B

Since, then, it is proved that the state and the individual are alike resolvable into three elements, it may be assumed that wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice are severally referable to corresponding parts and relations in either. Justice in the individual as in the state exists when reason, passion, and desire perform severally their proper functions. And this end is secured by the united influence of music and gymnastic applied to the two higher elements, which together will rule and keep guard over the third. Courage in the individual as in the state is the virtue of the spirited element, and consists in tenacity of patriotic resolve; temperance is the harmony between higher and lower; wisdom is the supremacy of the rational element. The 'small letters' are now as legible as the large. And our theory will stand the test of common instances. For the actions of the just man, as we have defined him, are in accordance with popular notions of justice. Our presentiment that justice would be found in the interaction of the various classes of the community has been more than confirmed. But the principle of the division of labour which we then asserted was but a shadow of the deeper truth, that there are these three elements in the soul of man, whose right and consentaneous working constitutes him just. Such is justice, then, in states and individuals. *441 C–444 A*

διανενεύκαμεν] Compare Parmen. 137 A *πῶς χρὴ τηλικόνδε ὄντα* **διανεῦσαι** *τοιοῦτόν τε καὶ τοσοῦτον πλῆθος λόγων.* 441 C

ἐπιεικῶς] like *μετρίως*, is an expression of moderation, which is not, however, to be taken very strictly—'we are fairly agreed.'

Socrates determines that we reason with one part of the soul, and desire with another, and are angry with another. This is an important beginning in the science of psychology. For though

Republic IV. 441 C a thinker of the Megarian school may argue that the soul is without parts (and Plato himself hints as much—Book x. p. 611), the thing intended is nevertheless true, that there are different and opposite effects which may be ascribed in a figure to parts of the soul. The division does not interfere with the higher unity in which they meet. A limb is dead when cut off from the source of life; a faculty is unmeaning which is independent of the mind and of other faculties. But the body or mind which had no limbs or faculties would be incapable of being made the subject of inquiry or of description.

Psychology seems to rest (1) on language, which expresses in a crude and general manner, subject to the conditions of language, the collective reflections of the human mind about itself; the common use of terms which has come down from former ages is partially modified (α) by the efforts of great thinkers, who stamp words anew, and (β) by the experience of mankind, which insensibly changes their meaning: names which have originally referred to material objects insensibly pass into the sphere of mind: (2) on consciousness, which suggests rather than proves, and the facts or results of which are generally lost in the attempt to define them: (3) on external observation (α) of the physical antecedents of mental states or habits, which, however, fall very far short of the whole secret of the mind: (β) of outward acts either seen by the eye or verified by the independent testimony of several observers,—and admitting sometimes of being tabulated in the form of statistics: these form the principal scientific ground of psychological inquiry: (4) on history, which traces the continuity of the human mind in all ages and countries, though with many breaks and chasms: which shows the impossibility of explaining mental phenomena within the limits of the individual: which helps to separate the abstract from the concrete, the ideas of the understanding or reason from the colours of mythology or imagination: which subjects the mental world to our use by showing us our place in the whole. There is no science in which we are more likely to be imposed upon by words: in none is greater care required that the parts should not be separated from the whole; in none is more left to the subtlety of individual apprehension. The greatest use of such a science is not to supply positive information about the mind or the faculties of the mind, but to quicken the habit of observation of ourselves and others.

Republic IV.

τὰ αὐτὰ μὲν . . . τὰ αὐτὰ δ'] For this idiomatic pleonasm cp. Soph. Trach. 263, 264, Philoct. 1370, 1371 *διπλῆν μὲν . . . διπλῆν δέ, κ.τ.λ.*

441 D **ἀμφότερα**] The individual and the state.

τῷ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ . . . γενῶν] The order is *τῷ ἕκαστον τριῶν ὄντων ἐν αὐτῇ γενῶν πράττειν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ.*

E **τὸ μέν**] sc. *τὸ λογιστικόν.* **τὸ δέ**, sc. *τὸ θυμοειδές.*

442 A **ἡμεροῦσα ἁρμονίᾳ τε καὶ ῥυθμῷ**] Cp. iii. 401 D, 412 A.

καὶ τούτω . . . *προστατήσετον] The MSS. give *προστήσετον*, which would mean,—'And so music and gymnastic' (the subject is supplied from **μουσικῆς καὶ γυμναστικῆς κρᾶσις** above), 'will place these two' (reason and anger), 'which have been thus nurtured and have learned their parts and been educated, in authority over the concupiscent element.' There is a harshness in this change from the singular to the dual with a dual object, and in the further change of subject in **τηρήσετον** to which the subject appears to be *τὸ λογιστικὸν καὶ τὸ θυμοειδές.* To avoid this Bekker has, without manuscript authority, altered *προστήσετον* into **προστατήσετον**,—'these two' (reason and anger) 'will preside,' &c. But the correction is not absolutely necessary, and therefore, like all emendations which are not absolutely necessary, should not be admitted into the text. [B. J.]

ὃ τηρήσετον . . . (B) **ἀνατρέψῃ**] 'Over this part of the soul they (reason and passion) will keep guard, lest waxing great with fulness of bodily pleasures, as they are termed, and no longer confined to her own sphere, the concupiscent soul should attempt to enslave and rule those who are not her natural born subjects, and overturn the common life of all.' For the use of **οὐκ αὖ**, referring to *τὰ αὑτῶν μαθόντε* (supra), cp. iii. 393 D, and note: vi. 499 D *τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι* **οὐκ αὖ** *δοκεῖ, ἐρεῖς;* Bekker reads *γενῶν* for **γένει** with *q β'*, these MSS. also give *προσῆκεν* for **προσῆκον** with Stobaeus—probably the right reading.

καλουμένων] implies the unreality of the grosser bodily pleasures. Cp. Phileb. 45, supra 420 A, &c.

πάντων] sc. *τῶν μερῶν*, which, in Plato's figurative language, are spoken of as a community: cp. infra *ἑκάστῳ τε καὶ* **ὅλῳ τῷ κοινῷ** *σφῶν αὐτῶν τριῶν ὄντων.* B

σοφὸν δέ γε ἐκείνῳ τῷ σμικρῷ μέρει, τῷ ὃ ἦρχέ τ' ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ταῦτα παρήγγελλεν] The reference in the first words, **ἐκείνῳ τῷ σμικρῷ . . .** C

Republic IV. 442 C **ἦρχέ τ' ἐν αὐτῷ**, is to supra 428 E τῷ **σμικροτάτῳ** ἄρα ἔθνει καὶ μέρει ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῇ ἐν τούτῳ ἐπιστήμῃ, τῷ προεστῶτι καὶ **ἄρχοντι**, ὅλη σοφὴ ἂν εἴη κατὰ φύσιν οἰκισθεῖσα πόλις.

ταῦτα παρήγγελλεν] referring to τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου παραγγελθέν supra, and both containing a reference to supra 429 C, where the instruction is given not by reason to the individual, but by the lawgiver to the state. The imperfect refers to the time of education.

ἔχον αὖ κἀκεῖνο, κ.τ.λ.] 'that again too having in itself a knowledge, the knowledge of what is advantageous to each and to the whole community which is composed of them, being three in number.' Reason has in itself a knowledge (i. e. of the expedient for each and all), as it was implied in the previous sentence that θυμός had received a knowledge (i. e. of what is or is not fearful).

D **τό τε ἄρχον καὶ τὼ ἀρχομένω**] the one ruling principle of reason, and the two subject ones of passion and desire.

στασιάζωσιν αὐτῷ] sc. τὼ ἀρχομένω τῷ ἄρχοντι.

ᾧ πολλάκις λέγομεν] Cp. ii. 368 A for a similar 'pronominal' phrase.

τί οὖν; . . . ἐφάνη;] 'Is justice in any way more dim to our eyes, so as to appear other than she appeared in the state?' Justice, as now seen in the individual, has the same form under which she appeared in the state, and the outlines are as sharp in every way. In ii. 368 C the form of justice in the individual was said to require a keen vision. And a visual image, if seen more dimly in one position than in another, might be said ἀπαμβλύνεσθαι. As elsewhere, the attribute of perception is transferred to the thing perceived.

E **ὧδε γάρ . . . προσφέροντες**] 'Because if there be any doubt lingering in our minds we may thoroughly convince ourselves in this way;—by applying to it (i. e. to justice as we define it) the test of common-place notions.' **αὐτῷ** refers to δικαιοσύνη, as elsewhere, a neuter taking up a feminine. προσφέρειν is used as in Phileb. 23 A τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην **αὐτῇ προσφέροντα** βάσανον. Plato uses common opinion, not without disdain, as a confirmation of his philosophical definition. The common notions about justice, which when adduced by Polus and Cephalus are rejected as superficial and external, are now used 'as witnesses' to the soundness of the deeper conception. Cp. supra 433 E, where the definition of

justice in the state is illustrated by the legal notion of justice, viz. that every man should have his own. *Republic IV.*

τέλεον ἄρα . . . τὸ ἐνύπνιον . . . ὃ ἔφαμεν ὑποπτεῦσαι] 'Our dream, then, is fulfilled, I mean the suspicion which we expressed.' The antecedent to **ὃ** is in apposition to **τὸ ἐνύπνιον**, and **ὃ** is a cognate accusative, governed by **ὑποπτεῦσαι**. In what follows, the reference is to supra 432 D **κινδυνεύομέν** *τι ἔχειν ἴχνος*, and 433 A *ὃ γὰρ* **ἐξ ἀρχῆς** *ἐθέμεθα . . . ὅτε τὴν πόλιν* **κατῳκίζομεν.** That again refers back to ii. 370 B ff. And an anticipation of the dream occurs at ib. 371 E, 372 A *ποῦ οὖν ἄν ποτε ἐν αὐτῇ εἴη ἥ τε δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀδικία; . . . ἐν αὐτῶν τούτων χρείᾳ τινί.* There is also some reference to supra 432 D. It follows that **ἀρχόμενοι** in the present passage is in the imperfect tense, and **ἐμβεβηκέναι** pluperfect:—'how that in the very commencement of our foundation of the state we had lighted (it would seem) upon a certain beginning and impress of justice.' 443 B

ἀρχόμενοι τῆς πόλεως οἰκίζειν] lit. 'making a beginning of the city to found it.' So v. 450 B *μέτρον . . . τοιούτων λόγων* **ἀκούειν.**

κινδυνεύομεν] In recalling the language of supra 432 D **κινδυνεύομέν** *τι ἔχειν ἴχνος*, Plato retains the direct form, although *κινδυνεύοιμεν* would have been more regular. C

τὸ δέ γε ἦν ἄρα . . . δι' ὃ καὶ ὠφελεῖ, εἴδωλόν τι τῆς δικαιοσύνης] 'And this (the division of labour) was really a sort of shadow of justice. Hence the advantage of it,' i. e. because it partakes of the nature of justice. **τό** refers to *ἀρχήν τε καὶ τύπον τινὰ τῆς δικαιοσύνης* and is further explained by **τὸ τὸν μέν, κ.τ.λ.**

τὸ δέ γε ἀληθές] 'Whereas in reality.' The words oppose what, after inquiry, has been found out to be the case, to what at one time they suspected to be the case. The construction of this sentence is as follows: **τοιοῦτο** is first explained in the clause *ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ τὴν ἔξω πρᾶξιν . . . περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ*, and what follows (*μὴ ἐάσαντα . . . περὶ τὰ ἴδια ξυμβόλαια*) is again an explanation of the second part of this explanatory clause (*περὶ τὴν ἐντὸς ὡς ἀληθῶς περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ*). **οὕτω δὴ πράττειν** resumes the participial clauses from *μὴ ἐάσαντα . . . σώφρονα καὶ ἡρμοσμένον.* Plato passes from explanation to a more general characterization of justice in the words *ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ἡγούμενον, κ.τ.λ.*

τοιοῦτο μέν τι] 'Something of this kind': i. e. a sort of doing one's own business.

Republic IV. 443 C **ἀλλ᾽ οὐ περὶ τὴν ἔξω πρᾶξιν**] 'but not concerned with the performance of any external action of his own, but with internal actions which are in very truth concerned with himself and are his own.'

D **ἕκαστον ἐν αὑτῷ**] The omission of the article *τῶν* is supplemented by the addition of **τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γένη** below.

τῷ ὄντι τὰ οἰκεῖα εὖ θέμενον] 'Having in very truth arranged his proper home business well.' For what is more *οἰκεῖον* than a man's soul, and what arrangements more perfect than what is here described?

καὶ ξυναρμόσαντα . . . ὅρους τρεῖς . . . καὶ μέσης] 'and having harmonized the three elements, just as if they were three notes of a scale of a higher, middle and lower string.' The scale contemplated seems to be the octave: **νεάτης, ὑπάτης, μέσης**, sc. *χορδῆς*. The Greek 'highest' note (*ὑπάτη*) corresponds to our 'lowest,' the 'lowest' (*νεάτη*) to our 'highest.'

The words **εἰ ἄλλα ἄττα μεταξύ** (suggested by the intermediate notes of the lyre) are observable, as seeming to imply that Plato did not wish his threefold division of the soul to be taken as strictly exhaustive.

σοφίαν δὲ . . . δόξαν] The distinction between *ἐπιστήμη* and *δόξα* is here assumed.

444 A **ἐν αὐτοῖς**] sc. *ἐν ἀνδρὶ καὶ πόλει.*

444 A–445 E *Injustice is the strife of the three elements with one another, the insurrection of a part against the whole, the rebellion of the lower nature against that which has natural authority.*

Having determined so much we have no difficulty in distinguishing what actions are just and what are unjust. And we perceive that virtue is health and vice disease in the soul.

Let us ask once more, Is it expedient to be just or unjust, apart from opinion, human or divine? It is no longer possible to ask the question seriously. For if incurable bodily disease makes life not worth living, how utterly unprofitable must it be, if the soul which is the principle of life is diseased? However, we must complete our survey, and describe the forms of unrighteousness. They are innumerable, but four may be selected as sufficiently distinct for our examination. These four severally correspond to four forms of

political constitution. The just life, which is the fifth, answers to Kingship or Aristocracy. *Republic IV.*

οὐκοῦν στάσιν τινά, κ.τ.λ.] Evil, unrighteousness, injustice are regarded by Plato here and in other passages (e.g. Soph. 228 A) as a sort of distraction or dissolution. They can only exist to a certain degree, because they would be destructive to that in which they are contained. As he says in i. 352 D, there is no such thing as perfect injustice, for that would be suicidal: enough justice must remain to keep injustice together. 444 B

No single aspect includes all the forms of evil, which varies infinitely with the characters and circumstances of mankind. (i) Evil may be represented as weakness: the higher nature, though not absolutely extinct, habitually and without resistance giving way to the lower: *ἀκρασία, δειλία.* Or (ii) as mere negation or privation of good: the diverse, transient, irrational principle, which has been imagined to stand in the same relation to God that physical impurity does to ourselves. (iii) Evil may be conceived as strength; the merely animal passing into a diabolical nature, the reason giving a malignant intensity to the passions, doing and suffering without end in this world and another,—*τὸν δ' ἔχοντα καὶ μάλα ζωτικὸν παρέχουσαν* (x. 610 E: cp. vi. 491 E). (iv) Evil may be summed up under the two commonest forms of evil: (*a*) untruth—*ψεῦδος*: (*β*) sensuality—*ἀκολασία.* (v) Evil, according to some theological writers, is the preference of self to God or other men. Lastly (vi) evil is strife, or *ἐπανάστασις μέρους τινὸς τῷ ὅλῳ τῆς ψυχῆς*, as in this passage; or, as in the Epistles of St. Paul, the consciousness of sin. To Plato evil appears more under the aspect of deformity and untruth than to modern writers, and less under that of sensuality; also more as political and social, and less as spiritual and moral. Yet in the picture of the tyrant and the tyrannical man in the Republic (Book ix), and in the discussion of the Gorgias respecting the chastisement of evil, the effect of evil in the individual is also strongly felt and expressed.

οὐκοῦν . . . τῷ τοῦ ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὄντι] 'Must not it (i.e. injustice) on the other hand be a kind of quarrel between these three, a meddlesomeness and interference and rising up of a part of the soul against the whole in order that it may rule over her when it has no right, but is of such a nature as to be properly the slave to that which is of the royal race.'

The majority of MSS., including Par. A, read *τοιούτου . . . δου-*

Republic IV. 444 B λεύειν, τοῦ δ' αὖ δουλεύειν ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὄντι (ὄντος M: ὄντε *q*). Vind. E has τῷ δ' αὖ μὴ δουλεύειν, ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὄντι. This last is approved by Madvig, but is much too feeble. The variation of the MSS. is difficult to account for, and throws some doubt upon the text.

ἀλλά opposes **τοιούτου . . . ὄντι** to **οὐ προσῆκον** (sc. *αὐτῷ ἄρχειν*). In **τῷ τοῦ ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὄντι** he describes a part of the soul in language appropriate for describing a member of a class in the state 'to that which is of the ruling class' instead of 'to the ruling part.' This use of language is rendered easier by the expression *τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γένη* supra. And again the highest class is figuratively compared to a dynasty or royal family. Cp. Polit. 310 B *μᾶλλον δέ γε δίκαιον τῶν περὶ τὰ* **γένη** *ποιουμένων ἐπιμέλειαν, τούτων πέρι λέγειν, εἴ τι μὴ κατὰ τρόπον πράττουσιν.*

D **τὸ δὲ** *νόσον* **παρὰ φύσιν, κ.τ.λ.**] sc. *τὸ δὲ νόσον ποιεῖν ἐστι τὰ ἐν τῷ σώματι παρὰ φύσιν καθιστάναι ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἄλλο ὑπ' ἄλλου.*

Justice is the health of the soul, is beauty, is harmony, is fitness, is division of labour, is nature, is happiness: of all which injustice is the contrary. Already at this stage of the argument our old question about their comparative expediency 'has become ridiculous,' and can no longer be seriously entertained.

445 A **ἐάν τε λανθάνῃ**] sc. *τις.*

μηδὲ βελτίων γίγνηται κολαζόμενος] Cp. supra ii. 380 B *οἱ δὲ ὠνίναντο κολαζόμενοι.*

τῆς δὲ αὐτοῦ τούτου . . . ἀρετὴν κτήσεται] 'And when the very principle of our life is thrown into confusion and is going to pieces, shall we be told that it is worth a man's while to live, whatever course he choose to follow, unless he finds some means of escaping from vice and injustice, and of acquiring justice and virtue?' **δέ** marks the transition from the trivial to the more important case. The general drift of the sentence is, that nothing can make life bearable to the unjust, except the prospect of escape from injustice. For a similar mode of expressing an 'a fortiori' argument cp. i. 336 E *μὴ γὰρ δὴ οἴου . . . φανῆναι αὐτό* and note. **οὐ**, not *μή*, is used because the clause depends on **δοκεῖ** and not on the conditional particle **εἰ**, which introduces the whole sentence. The negative belonging to the direct form is retained in the indirect. The fresh protasis, **ἐάνπερ, κ.τ.λ.**, is added in the development of the thought independently of the preceding participial clause, so that the sen-

tence has a twofold protasis, or in other words, ἐάνπερ, κ.τ.λ., modifies the apodosis. *Republic IV.*

445 B

***ἀποκμητέον**] This is Bekker's conjecture for ἀποκνητέον, the MS. reading. The change is very slight, and is justified by the general exactness of the replies in the Platonic dialogue. It is obvious that Glaucon is intended to emphasize (with characteristic ardour) what Socrates has just said. He is much less likely to have used a different expression than the copyists are to have written the commoner for the rarer word. And the form ἀποκμητέον, though not occurring elsewhere, is perfectly legitimate.

C

ἅ γε δὴ καὶ ἄξια θέας] Plato will not assert that his division is exhaustive. Cp. viii. 544 D *ἤ τινα ἄλλην ἔχεις ἰδέαν πολιτείας,* **ἥτις καὶ** *ἐν εἴδει διαφανεῖ τινὶ κεῖται;* Similarly in Theaet. 156 B it is said that modes of sensation are infinite, though only a few of them have distinct names.

ὥσπερ ἀπὸ σκοπιᾶς] The course of the argument which had once kept Socrates and his companions watching a thicket, has now taken them up to a mountain top, from which they have a wide and clear survey of human things,—of the one form of virtue and the countless forms of vice. The graphic use of **δεῦρο** has prepared for this.

D

ἐγγενομένου . . . ἀριστοκρατία] Cp. Polit. 297 C *περὶ σμικρόν τι καὶ ὀλίγον καὶ τὸ ἕν ἐστι ζητητέον τὴν μίαν ἐκείνην πολιτείαν τὴν ὀρθήν.*

οὔτε γὰρ ἂν πλείους οὔτε εἷς ἐγγενόμενος] 'For the accident of there being one, or more than one of them will not lead them to disturb any fundamental law of the state so long as they observe the nurture and education which we have described.'

E

τῶν ἀξίων λόγου νόμων τῆς πόλεως] For the partitive genitive = 'any of them,' cp. Gorgias 514 A *δημοσίᾳ πράξαντες* **τῶν πολιτικῶν** *πραγμάτων.*

BOOK V.

Republic V.

449 A–451 B

At this point Socrates is interrupted by a whispered conversation between Adeimantus and Polemarchus, who has not failed to notice the application of the proverb 'Friends have all things in common' to the question of marriage (iv. 423 E). *He and Adeimantus are agreed that Socrates must be challenged to explain himself on a matter of such paramount importance as the relation of the sexes.*

Republic V. 449 A–451 B *Socrates admits that the subject is one on which it would be calamitous to miss the truth, but for that very reason he is reluctant to speak. In the end, however, he yields to their request.*

449 A **περὶ ἰδιωτῶν ψυχῆς τρόπου κατασκευήν]** περὶ κατασκευὴν τρόπου ψυχῆς ἰδιωτῶν is the order of the words. Each form of constitution has a form of the individual life corresponding to it.

ἐν τέτταρσι, κ.τ.λ.] The subject of the four perverted forms of the state is resumed again in Book viii.

B **σμικρὸν γὰρ ἀπωτέρω τοῦ Ἀδειμάντου καθῆστο]** That is, Polemarchus sat a little further away from Socrates than Adeimantus did. He is supposed to draw the latter away from Socrates and to whisper in his ear. This explains how a conversation could be carried on of which Socrates heard only the last words.

λαβόμενος . . . παρὰ τὸν ὦμον] 'having taken hold of him (**αὐτοῦ**) by his garment, high up, close to the shoulder.'

τί μάλιστα, ἔφην . . . ἡμῖν δοκεῖς, ἔφη] **τί μάλιστα** is taken in two senses: in the first case as meaning 'what in particular?' and in the second case 'why in particular?' This play of words cannot be maintained in English.

ἔτι ἐγὼ εἶπον] is the reading of all the MSS. but Ven. Ξ, in which ὅτι ἐ. ε. is found. (A trace of the same reading appears in M, which reads ἔτι, according to Signor Rostagno. Schneider asserts that ἔτι is the reading of *q*, notwithstanding the silence of Bekker.) The alteration to ὅτι . . . τί ('because of what?') is no improvement in the meaning: and where this combination occurs, as in i. 343 A **Ὅτι** δὴ **τί μάλιστα**; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. **Ὅτι** οἴει, κ.τ.λ.: Charm. 161 C **Ὅτι** δὴ **τί** γε; ἔφη. **Ὅτι** οὐ δήπου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ᾗ τὰ ῥήματα ἐφθέγξατο, ταύτῃ καὶ ἐνόει: ὅτι is resumed in the reply and the words are not separated, as they are here, by ἐγὼ εἶπον. For the use of ἔτι with an aorist, cp. vi. 508 C Πῶς; ἔφη· ἔτι δίελθέ μοι: Prot. 310 C ἔτι μὲν ἐνεχείρησα.

C **εἶδος ὅλον]** 'a whole division' or 'subject.' See Essay on Diction, vol. ii. p. 295, and cp. iii. 392 A Τί οὖν . . . ἔτι λοιπὸν **εἶδος** λόγων πέρι, κ.τ.λ., and iv. 427 A τὸ τοιοῦτον **εἶδος** νόμων πέρι.

καὶ λήσειν οἰηθῆναι . . . κοινὰ τὰ φίλων ἔσται] 'And you seem to have thought (**δοκεῖς . . . οἰηθῆναι**) that you would escape detection in throwing out the slight remark that forsooth in the

matter of women and children everybody must know that friends will have all things in common.' The passage referred to is iv. 423 E *ταῦτα ῥᾳδίως διόψονται, καὶ ἄλλα γε ὅσα νῦν ἡμεῖς παραλείπομεν, τήν τε τῶν γυναικῶν κτῆσιν καὶ γάμων καὶ παιδοποιίας, ὅτι δεῖ ταῦτα κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν πάντα ὅ τι μάλιστα* **κοινὰ τὰ φίλων** *ποιεῖσθαι.* *Republic V.* 449 C

ὀρθῶς] sc. *εἶπον* to be supplied from *εἰπών* supra.

τὸ ὀρθῶς τοῦτο . . . λόγου δεῖται, τίς ὁ τρόπος τῆς κοινωνίας] 'but your word "rightly," like the rest, requires explanation, as to the manner of the community.' **τἆλλα**, the other particulars of legislation which have not been lightly passed over but fully explained.

γενομένους] sc. *τοὺς παῖδας* understood from **παιδοποιήσονται.** D

ὅλην ταύτην ἣν λέγεις κοινωνίαν] 'and [speak about] the whole subject of the community of women and children which you mean.' Some verb governing the accusative must be supplied with **ὅλην** in place of *μνησθήσεσθαι*, or the construction goes back to **μὴ οὖν παρῇς.**

μέγα γάρ τι οἰόμεθα φέρειν καὶ ὅλον, κ.τ.λ.] 'For we think that whether it takes place rightly or not rightly will make a great, nay all the difference to the state.' Cp. Phaedo 79 E *ὅλῳ καὶ παντί*: Laws xii. 944 C *διαφέρει δὲ ὅλον που καὶ τὸ πᾶν.*

φέρειν . . . γιγνόμενον] sc. *τὸ τῆς περὶ ταῦτα κοινωνίας.*

ἐπειδὴ . . . πολιτείας] 'But now as you are taking in hand another form of government.' For *ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι* in this sense cp. Soph. 217 B *λόγων* **ἐπελάβου** *παραπλησίων, κ.τ.λ.*

ἀμέλει] 'Never mind!'—'without more ado,' setting aside a remark or question either as unimportant or not requiring further discussion. Cp. iv. 422 C and note **Ἀμέλει,** *ἔφη, οὐδὲν ἂν γένοιτο θαυμαστόν*: and vii. 539 E **Ἀμέλει,** *εἶπον, πέντε θές.* 450 A

ἐπιλαβόμενοί μου] 'In laying hands upon me.' The word is repeated in a different sense, for which cp. especially Prot. 329 A *μακρὸν ἠχεῖ καὶ ἀποτείνει, ἐὰν μὴ* **ἐπιλάβηταί** *τις*, 'unless someone lays hold of it.'

ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς] 'As if we were just beginning,' cp. i. 348 B.

ὡς τότε ἐρρήθη] iv. 423 E.

ἃ . . . παρακαλοῦντες] Either (1) 'and in now calling in this fresh argument,' or (2) 'and in now urging me to this.' In the latter case the antecedent is to be gathered from the general sense

Republic V. of the preceding words (sc. *ταῦτα πάλιν διελθεῖν*) and **ἃ** is cognate accusative.

450 B **ὅσον ἑσμὸν λόγων**] For the image cp. Cratylus 401 E *ἐννενόηκά τι σμῆνος σοφίας.*

τί δέ; ἦ δ' ὅς . . . ἀκουσομένους] *χρυσοχοεῖν*, literally, 'to smelt ore for gold.' The word had also acquired the sense of 'to go on a fool's errand,' 'to be imposed upon,' the origin of which Suidas and Harpocration explain in the following manner: A report was once spread about at Athens that there was on Hymettus a great quantity of gold dust guarded by warrior ants. The Athenians went armed out to seize the treasure but were worsted and returned home without accomplishing their purpose. Cp. the parallel expression in English—'to seek for the philosopher's stone.'

μέτρον δέ γ'] In book vi. (498 D) such discussions are not merely limited to this life, but are supposed to be continued in another, when the soul is reborn to the world: *πείρας γὰρ οὐδὲν ἀνήσομεν, ἕως ἂν ἢ πείσωμεν καὶ τοῦτον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἢ προὔργου τι ποιήσωμεν εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν βίον, ὅταν αὖθις γενόμενοι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐντύχωσι λόγοις*: Theaet. 173 C: Polit. 283. **ἀκούειν** is an epexegetic infinitive.

ἀλλὰ . . . ἔα] 'but never mind us,' i.e. never mind inflicting on us a discourse of immoderate length, referring to **μετρίων γε.**

C **ἣ δὴ ἐπιπονωτάτη δοκεῖ εἶναι**] 'Which is generally thought to be the most troublesome part of education.' **ἐπιπονωτάτη**, sc. *τῆς τροφῆς.* Plato dwells on the importance of the very earliest training in Laws vii. 792 A. See especially the words *ἔστι δὲ ὁ χρόνος οὗτος τριῶν οὐκ ἐλάττων ἐτῶν* (i.e. the three first years of life), *μόριον οὐ σμικρὸν τοῦ βίου διαγαγεῖν χεῖρον ἢ μὴ χεῖρον.*

πειρῶ* δή] The choice lies between this correction of *πειρῶ ἄν*, the reading of Par. A, and *πειρῶ οὖν*, the reading of ΠM. Cp. iv. 431 B: Symp. 221 E.

οὐ ῥᾴδιον . . . ἀπιστήσεται] **καὶ ταύτῃ** refers to **ὡς ἄριστ' ἂν εἴη ταῦτα.** For *εὐδαίμων* in the sense of 'blissfully ignorant,' cp. iv. 422 E *εὐδαίμων εἶ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι οἴει, κ.τ.λ.* and note.

Great preparations are made for the introduction of the new social system. First, Socrates is disposed to pass over the entire subject. After he has been detected in this little trick he will only proceed at the earnest request of the company, who are willing to take upon themselves the entire responsibility. He anticipates all

the ridicule which the common sense of mankind has agreed to heap on the attempt to overthrow the first and simplest of human institutions. At each fall of the wave the sound of laughter is resounding in our ears, until the greatest wave swallows up all, and the Republic, which was originally a Dorian state, reappears as a kingdom of philosophy. *Republic V.* 450 C

μὴ εὐχὴ δοκῇ εἶναι ὁ λόγος] Cp. infra 456 C *οὐκ ἄρα ἀδύνατά γε οὐδὲ* **εὐχαῖς ὅμοια** *ἐνομοθετοῦμεν.* D

ἐμοί] not *ἐμαυτῷ*, because the object is to be distinguished from the subject of belief. The repetition of the same word adds point. Cp. Soph. O. T. 379 *Κρέων δέ σοι πῆμ' οὐδέν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς* **σὺ σοί.**

καλῶς εἶχεν] The omission of *ἄν* gives emphasis to the apodosis, cp. Goodwin, *M. and T.*, § 431.

περὶ τῶν μεγίστων τε καὶ φίλων] 'About matters dear to us, and of the highest importance' (such as family life). E

ἀσφαλὲς καὶ θαρραλέον] 'A thing safe and giving confidence,' i. e. a thing which may be done with safety and confidence. The epithet *θαρραλέος*, commonly used of a person who possesses confidence, is here applied to a thing which inspires confidence in the doer. Cp. Prot. 359 C: Soph. Philoct. 106: Pind. Nem. vii. 50.

οὔ τι γέλωτα ὀφλεῖν is an explanatory infinitive after **φοβερόν τε καὶ σφαλερόν**—'not at all as to incurring ridicule.' The phrase *γέλωτα ὀφλεῖν* recurs in vi. 506 D *ἀλλ' ὅπως μὴ οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσομαι, προθυμούμενος δὲ ἀσχημονῶν* **γέλωτα ὀφλήσω.**

κείσομαι] 'I shall be overthrown.' Cp. Euthyd. 303 A *ὥσπερ πληγεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου* **ἐκείμην** *ἄφωνος*: Ar. Nub. 126 *ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐγὼ μέντοι πεσών γε* **κείσομαι.** The future indicative follows **μή** by a slight anacoluthon arising from the common tendency to revert to the more direct form of expression. 451 A

προσκυνῶ δὲ . . . οὗ μέλλω λέγειν] 'And I bow to Adrasteia touching what I am about to say.' The involuntary homicide prays Adrasteia to bear witness that he could not help his act, and Socrates is in a like evil case. Cp. Aesch. Prom. 936 *οἱ προσκυνοῦντες τὴν* **Ἀδράστειαν** *σοφοί.* The slightly archaic form *ἀπατεὼν* (cp. *λυμεών*) adds to the mock solemnity here and infra B.

ἐλπίζω γὰρ . . . νομίμων πέρι] 'For I do indeed believe that to be an involuntary homicide is a less crime than to be a deceiver about the beautiful, the good, and the just, in the matter of laws.'

Republic *V.* 451 A Schneider joins the words **καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ δικαίων** with **νομίμων**, but is inclined to cancel *δικαίων*. Several MSS., with Ven. Ξ, read *δικαίων καὶ νομίμων πέρι.*

ὥστε εὖ με παραμυθεῖ] (1) 'So that you console me well.' This at first sight appears to be a contradiction of the words *καλῶς εἶχεν ἡ παραμυθία*, at 450 E. The apparent difficulty has led the scribe of *q* to insert *οὐκ* after *ὥστε*. Socrates had rejected the consolation when first offered, and now, without much point, he is supposed to repeat his refusal. The reading of the text, in which the other MSS. agree, gives also a better sense. Socrates ironically accepts the consolation which he had previously rejected. The ironical emphasis is more pointed than the simple negative would have been. Cp. the ironical use of *καλόν* in iii. 406 B *καλὸν ἄρα τὸ γέρας, κ.τ.λ.* 'You are indeed happy in your attempt to console me!' This is better than (2) making the words equivalent to *εὖ ποιεῖς ὅτι με παραμυθεῖ* ('You do well in endeavouring to console me') which loses the reference to the point of Glaucon's remark, *οὔτε ἄπιστοι οὔτε δύσνοι οἱ ἀκουσόμενοι.*

B **ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη . . . εἴπερ ἐκεῖ, κἀνθάδε**] The first *ἀλλά* is adversative to the remark of Socrates about the risk which he is running, the second *ἀλλά* is a repetition of the first with the addition of a request. Both are resumed in the third *ἀλλά*, which implies that Socrates adopts Glaucon's point of view in opposition to his own.

ἀφίεμεν . . . καθαρὸν εἶναι] 'We acquit you both as guiltless of our blood, so to say, and as not our deceiver.'

ἀλλὰ μέντοι, κ.τ.λ.] 'Well, it is true that in that case, said I, the man who is acquitted is clear as the law says, and if in that case' (i. e. in the case of the homicide) 'it is likely that he will be so in this' (i. e. the case of involuntary deception).

C **δρᾶμα**] 'business,' or 'part.' Cp. Theaet. 150 A *τὸ μὲν τοίνυν τῶν μαιῶν τοσοῦτον, ἔλαττον δὲ τοῦ ἐμοῦ δράματος.*

451 C–452 E *Our guardians have been compared to watch-dogs. Now in training these, we make no difference between male and female, except that we do not expect the female to be quite equal to the male in strength.*

In applying this general principle we must be prepared for ridicule, especially when we insist that the women, like the men,

must strip for gymnastic exercises. But we may remember that when this custom was first introduced among the men, the wits of that day had their opportunity, and no doubt made use of it. Yet experience and common sense have proved too much for them. *Republic V. 451 C–452 E*

ἰοῦσιν] sc. *ἡμῖν*. For the idiomatic dative cp. infra 452 C *πορευτέον . . . δεηθεῖσι, κ.τ.λ.* 451 C

ἀκολουθῶμεν . . . ἀποδιδόντες] 'Let us follow out that hint in the matter of the birth and training which we assign to our women, making it similar (to that of the watch-dogs) and then consider whether we deem it suitable or not.' The subject of **πρέπει** is *τὸ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τροφὴν παραπλησίαν ἀποδιδόναι* gathered from the previous words. D

εἰ ἡμῖν πρέπει] 'If we find it suitable.' Cp. especially infra 462 A *ἆρα . . . εἰς μὲν τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἴχνος* **ἡμῖν** *ἁρμόττει.*

ἅπερ ἂν . . . φυλάττωσι] **ἅπερ** is cognate accusative: 'In those duties of guardianship which are performed by the males.'

κοινῇ, ἔφη, πάντα] sc. *οἰόμεθα δεῖν αὐτὰς πράττειν.* E

ὡς ἀσθενεστέραις] The subject, *ταῖς θηλείαις τῶν φυλάκων κυνῶν*, is sufficiently indicated by the previous sentence.

παρὰ τὸ ἔθος] sc. *πραττόμενα*, which is absorbed in **λεγόμενα.** 452 A

εἰ πράξεται ᾗ λέγεται] Cp. iii. 389 D *Ἐάν γε, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐπί γε λόγῳ ἔργα τελῆται*, where see note.

οὐ μόνον τὰς νέας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἤδη τὰς πρεσβυτέρας] Said with a slight hyperbaton (which adds emphasis) for *τὰς ἤδη πρεσβυτέρας.* B

ῥυσοί] sc. *ὄντες.*

οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κ.τ.λ.] The uncompromising tone of this passage may be contrasted with the greater respect for public opinion which is shown in Laws viii. 834 D *θηλείας δὲ περὶ τούτων νόμοις μὲν καὶ ἐπιτάξεσιν οὐκ ἄξια βιάζεσθαι τῆς κοινωνίας· ἐὰν δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔμπροσθεν παιδευμάτων εἰς ἔθος ἰόντων ἡ φύσις ἐνδέχηται, κ.τ.λ.*

περὶ τὴν τῶν ὅπλων σχέσιν] 'as to their bearing of heavy arms.' C

πορευτέον, κ.τ.λ.] Plato's theory of female education, though at variance with modern ideas, has points which are worthy of attention. (1) He considers the subject independently of existing practice, and with reference to the difference of sex only. He implies (2) that

Republic V. 452 C bodily health and strength, and the training which gives them, are equally necessary for both sexes. (3) Also that men and women have the same interests and duties, and are capable of the same occupations in a greater degree than the customs of society allow. (4) That false delicacy is not a good foundation either for manners or morals. The error of Plato seems to arise from not considering the other differences to which the difference of sex gives rise in mind and feeling. He has forgotten that 'women's best education is the training of their children.' He has lost sight also of the fact that education is relative to character, and the character of women is necessarily formed by the universal opinion of mankind. The merit of seeking to give them position in an age in which they were comparatively degraded must certainly be conceded to him. Modern philosophy would ascribe to them equal powers of different qualities:

> 'For woman is not undeveloped man,
> But diverse.'

Plato has made a considerable step in advance of the ancient world by assigning to them unequal powers of the same quality: as the poet elsewhere sings:

> 'Woman is the lesser man.'

τὸ τραχὺ τοῦ νόμου] For an analogous phrase cp. viii. 568 C *πρὸς τὸ ἄναντες τῶν πολιτειῶν.*

δεηθεῖσί τε τούτων] sc. *ἡμῖν.*

οὐ πολὺς χρόνος ἐξ οὗ, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Hdt. i. 10: Thuc. i. 6, § 5.

D **πάντα ταῦτα** and **πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα** refer partly to the ludicrous image called up supra *ὅταν ῥυσοί, κ.τ.λ.*

καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς . . . ἐνεδείξατο, κ.τ.λ.] 'Then the ludicrous effect to the outward eye vanished before the arguments which showed what was best, and this (i.e. the disappearance of ridicule) showed that he is a fool who thinks anything else ridiculous,' &c. The first *καί* is intensive, marking the correspondence between men's experience and the change in their opinions. This was an instance of the folly of ridicule not grounded in reason.

μάταιος ὃς γελοῖον, κ.τ.λ.] Ridicule is not 'the test of truth' or goodness, but the test of strength, the detector of some flaw or inconsistency or pretension or deviation from custom in

character or action. 'Man is a laughing animal,' and reason uses this power no less than that of speech as the expression of herself, finding in the pleasure of laughter a ready opening at which wisdom or wit may enter in. But the alliance, though capable of a serious purpose, is partly fanciful and humorous, and cannot always be constrained, as Plato seems to imply, for the sake of some political or moral end. Ridicule has more influence on manners than on morals;—is more concerned with the outward surface of life and society than with the inner nature of man, having a free touch and passing lightly from one topic to another. Ridicule is the enemy of superstition and sentimental feeling; and the employment of such an instrument on serious subjects is not always to be deprecated as hurtful; there is nothing of which hypocrisy is so much afraid, nothing which better sifts the weaknesses of human nature. Successful ridicule (1) depends on a certain force of character or ready tact in the person who makes another ridiculous: (2) it requires either an object of attack which is sensitive to ridicule, or (3) public opinion which supports the assailant. A rude justice is the result, in which perhaps a certain degree of injustice may be concealed by the excellence of the jest. On the other hand, the greatest minds, one of whose proper works is to help and free others from scorn, are perhaps incapable of using the weapon of ridicule as they are also incapable of being made ridiculous. Compare Arist. Eth. Nic. iv. 8, 9. *Republic V.* 452 D

καὶ καλοῦ αὖ σπουδάζει] is the reading of the majority of the MSS., which yields a tolerable sense—'and who again aims seriously at any standard of nobility which he sets up for himself, except the good.' Schneider reads *ᾗ σπουδάζει*, omitting *καὶ καλοῦ*. Others make **πρὸς . . . σκοπόν** depend on **στησάμενος**, 'having set himself to some other aim.' (Jebb on Soph. Ant. 299.) E

But the first aorist middle of *ἵστημι*, unlike *ἵστασθαι*, requires an object. This may be supplied in one of two ways, (1) supposing the expression to be metaphorical, sc. *τὸ τόξον*: cp. the absolute use of *ἐπιστῆσαι*, sc. *τὸ ἅρμα*; or (2) as above, *σπουδάζει πρὸς . . . σκοπόν, στησάμενος* (*αὐτόν*), 'with any other aim which he proposes to himself.' The word *ἵστημι* is used of setting up a mark, although *θέμενος* would be more usual. Cp. Hom. Od. xix. 573, 574:

τοὺς πελέκεας, τοὺς κεῖνος ἐνὶ μεγάροισιν ἑοῖσιν
ἵστασχ' ἑξείης, δρυόχους ὥς, δώδεκα πάντας.

The conjectural omission of *πρός* (W. H. Thompson on Gorg. 474 D)

Republic V. is plausible, but not necessary. For the epexegetic participle cp. iii. 397 C ξυγκεραννύντες.

452 E–457 B *The only question of any real moment is whether the female sex in man is capable of sharing in the duties which we assign to them. For our first principle is that our citizens, all and each, shall do the work which is suited to their several natures. A controversialist will say that men and women differ, and therefore that the pursuits assigned to them must differ. But in the spirit of controversy such a one omits to ask whether the difference of nature has anything to do with the particular work in question. One cobbler may have a shock of hair and yet another who is bald is not disqualified from cobbling. Now the difference of sex is limited to the function of procreation, and this lies quite apart from government and war. In point of fact women can do all that men do, though as a rule they cannot do it so well, and men can do all that women do (even to weaving and the baking of cakes), and as a rule, when they do it, they do it better. And there are the same differences amongst women as amongst men. One has a taste for medicine, another for music. And we may presume that some of them, though not all, have capabilities for war and government. These ought to be selected as companions and helpmates for the highest class of men, and to share in the same occupations. In giving them also the same education in music and gymnastic we have been legislating according to nature.*

This is contrary to present custom: but is it possible? Is it the best course? We have shown that it is possible. And if the men whom we have chosen and educated are better than the other men, will not the chosen women, similarly educated, be better than other women? And is it not best to provide for the existence of the best possible men and women in a community? Our women, then, shall not shrink from physical exercises nor from war, although we shall assign to them the lighter duties in both pursuits, because of the comparative weakness of their natures. Our standard of excellence and grace, in this and all respects, shall not be Custom, but the highest Utility.

452 E **φύσις ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη ἡ θήλεια**] 'Female human nature.' The words **ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη**, to which Cobet objected, keep up the analogy between man and the other animals which runs through the passage. Cp. supra 451 D, E.

453 A **καὶ τοῦτο δὴ . . . ποτέρων ἐστίν;**] 'And to which of the two

classes (the class of things they can or cannot share with the men) is this duty of warfare to be assigned?' *Republic V.*

453 A

ἵνα μὴ ἔρημα . . . πολιορκῆται] 'That the other side may not be besieged without having defenders.' Cp. Soph. 246 D: Theaet. 164 E.

τῆς κατοικίσεως] sc. *τῆς πόλεως*, for which **πόλιν** is substituted by attraction. Cp. iv. 443 C and note. The reference is to ii. 369 A ff. B

ὦ θαυμάσιε] 'O rare, O admirable sir,' as elsewhere, marks the wondering eagerness of Socrates at the new turn in the argument. C

σοῦ δεήσομαί τε καὶ δέομαι] 'I shall have to ask you, as I now do.' For the future cp. Theaet. 164 E *κινδυνεύσομεν . . . αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν.*

καὶ τὸν . . . ἑρμηνεῦσαι] Socrates has explained the views of an imaginary critic of the argument (supra A *ἵνα μὴ ἔρημα, κ.τ.λ.*). He is now asked to explain 'our own' meaning, which is not yet clear. For the word compare Soph. 246 E *Κέλευε δὴ τοὺς βελτίους γεγονότας ἀποκρίνασθαί σοι, καὶ τὸ λεχθὲν παρ' αὐτῶν* **ἀφερμήνευε.**

οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία . . . ἔοικεν] 'I don't wonder at your hesitation, for by Zeus it is no easy task,' &c. The strong negation is put forward as a reason for the fear which Socrates expresses in the previous sentence:—'No indeed, that does not look easy' (which is a reason for hesitation). 'Why, no; but the truth is that whether a man tumbles into a swimming-bath or into a mighty ocean, he swims all the same.' The real order is, *οὐ γὰρ εὐκόλῳ ἔοικεν, οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία.* But the eagerness of the speaker brings the oath to the front. Cp. Parm. 131 E *Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, φάναι, οὔ μοι δοκεῖ εὔκολον εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον οὐδαμῶς διορίσασθαι.* **οὐκ εὐκόλῳ**=*χαλεπῷ.* Cp. i. 348 E. D

ἄν τέ τις . . . νεῖ οὐδὲν ἧττον] is perhaps the first suggestion of the image of the wave which is distinctly mentioned infra 457 B ff. The word *διανενεύκαμεν* iv. 441 C. has prepared the way for it. A similar figure occurs in the Laches, 194 C *Ἴθι δή, ὦ Νικία, ἀνδράσι φίλοις χειμαζομένοις ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἀποροῦσι βοήθησον.* Cp. Eurip. Hipp. 469, 470 *ἐς δὲ τὴν τύχην | πεσοῦσ' ὅσην σὺ πῶς ἂν ἐκνεῦσαι δοκεῖς;*

ἄπορον] lit. 'hard to come by': cp. ii. 378 A *ἀλλά τι μέγα καὶ ἄπορον θῦμα,* 'some unprocurable victim.' **σωτηρίαν** is the subject of some more general word than **ὑπολαβεῖν**, e.g. *φανῆναι.*

Republic V. 453 E **ὡμολογοῦμεν**] The imperfect tense seems preferable, as the reference to the former argument is so pointed here, although *ὁμολογοῦμεν*, the reading of Par. A, is also possible. The present might convey a general statement. Cp. supra B *ὁμολογεῖτε . . . Ὡμολογήσαμεν.*

τὰς δὲ ἄλλας φύσεις] 'The aforesaid different natures.' **τὰς δὲ ἄλλας** is to be explained with reference to **ἄλλην φύσιν** in the preceding line. The verbal ambiguity is obviated by the clearness of the context. So in Soph. O. T. 845 *τοῖς πολλοῖς* is not 'the many' or 'the greater number,' but 'the plurality of persons which the previous description implied.'

ἢ γενναία . . . (454 A) **πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρώμενοι**] That is to say, People make oppositions of words, because they do not understand the differences of things. Our argument hinged upon the opposition of 'some' and 'other'; but we never considered in what sense each of these terms applied to the difference of sex. There are various species of difference —*εἴδη τῆς ἀλλοιώσεως* (454 C) each appertaining to some particular quality or capacity (*πρός τι τείνοντα*), e. g. height, strength, &c.; and because people differ as participating in some particular species of difference, we must not conclude that they differ *in toto*, depriving 'different' as applied to them of all real significance.

Compare Soph. 218 C *δεῖ δὲ ἀεὶ παντὸς πέρι τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ μᾶλλον διὰ λόγων ἢ τοὔνομα μόνον συνομολογήσασθαι χωρὶς λόγου*: Theaet. 164 C *ἀντιλογικῶς ἐοίκαμεν πρὸς τὰς τῶν ὀνομάτων ὁμολογίας ἀνομολογησάμενοι καὶ τοιούτῳ τινὶ περιγενόμενοι τοῦ λόγου ἀγαπᾶν, καὶ οὐ φάσκοντες ἀγωνισταὶ ἀλλὰ φιλόσοφοι εἶναι λανθάνομεν ταὐτὰ ἐκείνοις τοῖς δεινοῖς ἀνδράσι ποιοῦντες*: Polit. 285 A, B: Soph. 259 D *τὸ δὲ ταὐτὸν ἕτερον ἀποφαίνειν ἀμῇ γέ πῃ καὶ τὸ θάτερον ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸ μέγα σμικρὸν καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον ἀνόμοιον, καὶ χαίρειν οὕτω τἀναντία ἀεὶ προφέροντα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, οὔτε τις ἔλεγχος οὗτος ἀληθινὸς ἄρτι τε τῶν ὄντων τινὸς ἐφαπτομένου δῆλος νεογενὴς ὤν.*

454 A **κατ' εἴδη διαιρούμενοι**] Cp. Phaedr. 265 E *τὸ πάλιν κατ' εἴδη δύνασθαι τέμνειν, κατ' ἄρθρα ᾗ πέφυκε, κ.τ.λ.*

κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα διώκειν] Either (1) as in the translation 'pursuing a merely verbal opposition,' or (2) (as suggested by Mr. J. Solomon) 'assailing,' or 'holding in chase, what is a mere verbal contradiction.' For the latter cp. Theaet. 166 D *τὸν δὲ λόγον αὖ μὴ τῷ ῥήματί μου* **δίωκε.**

B **τὸ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν**] **μή** is the reading of Ven. Ξ and the old

editions, and is probably right. 'We might valiantly and contentiously insist upon the verbal truth that the nature which is not the same (i. e. the female nature) ought not to have the same pursuits (i. e. as the male nature), but we never considered at all what was the nature of the sameness and difference which we were then distinguishing and whereto it was related.' The reading of the other MSS. A Π M &c. τὸ τὴν αὐτήν, κ.τ.λ., can only mean, 'the nature which was in fact the same we argued in our contentious manner to be incapable of the same pursuits.' But the words **τὸ . . . τυγχάνειν** are simply a restatement of the objection in 453 B, C that men and women having different natures should have different pursuits, while the assertion that men and women share the same human nature would be out of place. And the opposition of μὴ τὴν αὐτήν, οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν, is more like Plato than the conjectural reading τὴν ἄλλην (Baiter). *Republic V.* 454 B

ἐπεσκεψάμεθα δὲ . . . (C) **μὴ τοὺς ἑτέρους**] We spoke of the same and other, but we did not define the meaning or object of the difference. Bald and hairy men are different; but no conclusion can be drawn from this that because the bald man is a cobbler the hairy man is not to be a cobbler. Plato is well aware of the value of a ludicrous illustration. Cp. infra 474 E: vi. 495 E: Theaet. 149 A.

μὴ ἐὰν κομήτας] sc. σκυτοτομεῖν. C

τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ τὴν ἑτέραν] ὁ αὐτός and ὁ ἕτερος are here generalized. Cp. Theaet. 190 C.

ἰατρικὸν μὲν καὶ ἰατρικὸν τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντα] This reading has weak manuscript authority (*q* β'), but is probably right, the older MSS. having been misled by the apparent *dittographia*. Par. A has ἰατρικῶν μὲν καὶ ἰατρικὴν τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντα: others (Vat. Θ) give ἰατρικὸν μὲν καὶ ἰατρικὴν τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχοντα by a further corruption. K. F. Hermann approved of ἰατρικὸν μὲν καὶ ἰατρικὴν τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντας, 'a man and woman gifted with medical talent' (cp. infra 455 E), but Plato could not be guilty of the clumsiness of assuming at the very beginning incidentally the general proposition which he has to prove, viz. the aptitude of women for all pursuits. Others have proposed ἰατρὸν μὲν καὶ ἰατρικὸν τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντα, which is adopted by Bekker, and may be supported by comparing Xen. Mem. iii. 1, 4 ὁ μαθὼν ἰᾶσθαι κἂν μὴ ἰατρεύῃ ὅμως ἰατρός ἐστιν: Polit. 259 A εἴ τῳ τις τῶν δημοσιευόντων ἰατρῶν ἱκανὸς ξυμβουλεύειν ἰδιωτεύων αὐτός, κ.τ.λ. But D

Republic V. 454 D the slight alteration ἰατρόν is unnecessary, and it is better not to depart further from the MSS. than is absolutely required. Schneider obtained nearly the same meaning by reading as in the text and joining τὴν ψυχὴν with the second ἰατρικόν exclusively. But the repetition simply emphasizes identity in order to prepare for the contrast between identity and difference. 'If two men have each the soul of a physician, we meant to say for example that they have the same nature' (however different they may be in other respects); 'if one have the soul of a physician, and the other have the soul of a carpenter, we meant to say that they have different natures' (however else they may resemble one another). The singular **ὄντα** is accounted for by attraction to the nearest word.

πρὸς τέχνην τινά] 'in regard of fitness for some art.' Riddell, *Digest*, § 128.

E **ὡς πρὸς ὃ ἡμεῖς λέγομεν, κ.τ.λ.**] 'that a woman differs from a man with reference to the point of which we are speaking,' i. e. common training and participation in the same duties. Cp. Theaet. 177 D *τοῦτο δέ που σκῶμμ' ἂν εἴη* **πρὸς ὃ λέγομεν.**

455 A **ὅπερ σὺ ὀλίγον πρότερον ἔλεγες**] supra 453 C *Ὡς μὲν ἐξαίφνης, ἔφη, οὐ πάνυ ῥᾴδιον.*

B **καὶ τῷ μὲν . . .** (c) **τῷ δὲ ἐναντιοῖτο**;] Strength of body is needed for strength of mind. Cp. vi. 498 B *τῶν τε σωμάτων, ἐν ᾧ βλαστάνει τε καὶ ἀνδροῦται, εὖ μάλα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι,* **ὑπηρεσίαν** *φιλοσοφίᾳ κτωμένους*: Protag. 326 B *ἔτι τοίνυν πρὸς τούτοις εἰς παιδοτρίβου πέμπουσιν, ἵνα τὰ σώματα βελτίω ἔχοντες* **ὑπηρετῶσι** *τῇ διανοίᾳ χρηστῇ οὔσῃ.*

C **οἷς . . . ὡρίζου**] For the dative cp. ii. 376 B *συνέσει τε καὶ ἀγνοίᾳ ὁριζόμενον τό τε οἰκεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀλλότριον.* The imperfect tense alludes to what was implied in the objection, 'you meant to define,' supra 453 B.

D **ἐν οἷς δή τι δοκεῖ . . . εἶναι**] Cp. Symp. 219 C *καίπερ ἐκεῖνό γε ᾤμην* **τι εἶναι.**

κρατεῖται] *κρατεῖσθαι* is passive, and as in a few other instances (with the meaning of *ἡττᾶσθαι*) takes the genitive (**πολλῶν ἀνδρῶν**) without the preposition (e. g. *κρατεῖσθαι ἡδονῶν* Aeschin. de Fals. Leg. § 152).

Compare Cratyl. 392 C *πότερον οὖν αἱ γυναῖκες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι φρονιμώτεραί σοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι ἢ οἱ ἄνδρες,* **ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν γένος**;

ἀλλ' ὁμοίως . . . ἀμφοῖν τοῖν ζῴοιν] 'But natural aptitudes are equally diffused in both.' **αἱ φύσεις** are the qualities suited for the different occupations of life. For the generic use of ζῷον cp. Theaet. 157 C *ᾧ δὴ ἀθροίσματι ἄνθρωπόν τε τίθενται καὶ λίθον καὶ ἕκαστον ζῷόν τε καὶ εἶδος.* *Republic V.* 455 D

ἐπὶ πᾶσι δέ, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. supra 451 E *πλὴν ὡς ἀσθενεστέραις χρώμεθα, τοῖς δὲ ὡς ἰσχυροτέροις.* E

ἀλλ' ἔστι γάρ] It has been agreed that women must have some occupation. 'But then (*ἀλλὰ γάρ*) as we shall say, women's capabilities differ, just as men's do, and their occupations therefore must be similarly distributed.'

καὶ γυνή] sc. *ἡ μὲν ἰατρική, ἡ δ' οὔ.*

γυμναστικὴ δ' ἄρα οὔ . . . (456 A) **ἔγωγε**] 'But is not one woman a lover of gymnastics and of war, another unwarlike and no lover of gymnastics?' 'I should think so.'

The reading **γυμναστικὴ δ' ἄρα οὔ, οὐδέ** is adopted by Schneider and Hermann and the Zurich editors, and is supported by the preponderance of MS. authority. The form of question is not the ordinary use of *οὐ* expecting an affirmative answer, but rather an ironical negation with an interrogative tone. Cp. infra 468 B (where however the humour is more apparent): *'Αλλὰ τόδ', οἶμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,* **οὐκέτι** *σοι δοκεῖ. Τὸ ποῖον; Τὸ φιλῆσαί τε καὶ φιληθῆναι ὑπὸ ἑκάστου.* The other readings, *καὶ γυμναστική, ἡ δ' ἄρα οὔ·* and that of *q*, which Bekker adopted, *καὶ γυμναστικὴ ἄρα καὶ πολεμική*, look like clumsy attempts at emendation.

ἄθυμος] 'Passionless.' For this use of the word cp. iii. 411 B, Laws x. 888 A. 456 A

ἢ οὐ τοιαύτην] sc. *φιλόσοφον καὶ θυμοειδῆ.* The instances from *μουσική* onwards have led the way to this.

ἐπείπερ εἰσὶν ἱκαναὶ καὶ ξυγγενεῖς] 'Seeing that they are qualified and of a kindred nature,' i. e. one which is at once *φιλόσοφος* and *θυμοειδής*. In the Politicus and Laws, on the other hand, the aim of the legislator is rather to unite in marriage opposite natures that they may supplement each other.—Polit. 309, 310: Laws vi. 773 ff. B

ἥκομεν ἄρα . . . ἀποδιδόναι] 'And so we are come round to what we were before saying, and allow that there is nothing

Republic V. 456 B unnatural in assigning the pursuit of music and gymnastic to the wives of the guardians.' Cp. Laws ii. 659 C *Δοκεῖ μοι τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον ὁ λόγος εἰς ταὐτὸν* **περιφερόμενος ἥκειν**: Gorg. 521 E *ὁ αὐτὸς δέ μοι* **ἥκει** *λόγος, ὅνπερ πρὸς Πῶλον ἔλεγον*: ibid. 517 C *οὐδὲν παυόμεθα εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ* **περιφερόμενοι.**

C **εὐχαῖς ὅμοια**] Cp. supra 450 D *μὴ* **εὐχὴ** *δοκῇ εἶναι ὁ λόγος.*

ἡ ἐπίσκεψις] supra 452 E.

ὅτι δὲ δὴ βέλτιστα, κ.τ.λ.] The *possibility* of our proposals has received an elaborate proof. Men and women have been shown to have a common nature and therefore it is natural to assign to them a common education and common pursuits. Whether our proposals are *desirable* remains to be considered.

Aristotle (Pol. i. 13, § 9), perhaps referring to Meno 71 E, will not hear of the ascription of the same qualities to men and women: *οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ σωφροσύνη γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρός, οὐδ' ἀνδρία καὶ δικαιοσύνη, καθάπερ ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ἀρχικὴ ἀνδρία, ἡ δὲ ὑπηρετική.*

οὐκ ἄλλη μὲν . . . (D) **παραλαβοῦσα;**] 'Then surely with a view to a woman's becoming fitted to be a guardian, there will not be one education which will make men and another which will make women guardians, especially when it has received the same nature to work upon.' The whole sentence is negatived, and the paratactic expansion breaks from the construction with **πρός. ποιήσει,** sc. *φυλακικούς.*

D **ἐν οὖν τῇ πόλει . . . τῇ σκυτικῇ παιδευθέντας;**] This is the most distinct allusion which is made in any part of the Republic to the education or want of education of the lowest class in the state. Cp. however viii. 547 C, where the condition of the ordinary citizens is alluded to in general terms, and iv. 421 E, where apprenticeship is incidentally referred to. The lower classes have no real place in the Republic; they fade away into the distance.

τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν . . . ἄριστοι] i. e. (1) 'better than the other citizens,' as they are better than the cobblers, or (2) 'than the citizens besides themselves.' [B. J.]

457 A **καὶ οὐκ ἄλλα πρακτέον**] Their devotion to public duty forbids their absorption in the nursery. This remark contains a hint of the next-coming 'wave.'

B **ἀτελῆ τοῦ γελοίου σοφίας δρέπων καρπόν**] *σοφίας* is the genitive

after **καρπόν**, which is governed by **δρέπων**, 'the man who laughs at naked women, plucks from his laughter an unripe fruit of wisdom,' i. e. foolishness, 'not knowing at what he is laughing.' According to Stobaeus (ed. Gaisford, Tit. 304), the quotation is from Pindar, who applies the words *ἀτελῆ σοφίας καρπὸν δρέπων* to the physiologists, the addition *τοῦ γελοίου* is Plato's own. See also Phaedr. 260 C, D *ποῖόν τινα οἴει . . . τὴν ῥητορικὴν* **καρπὸν** *ὧν ἔσπειρε* **θερίζειν**; Jests about the gymnastics of the Spartan women such as Plato describes are found in the Lysistrata of Aristophanes (80–83). *Republic V.* 457 B

κάλλιστα γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο καὶ λέγεται καὶ λελέξεται] i.e. 'this which is commonly said will ever be the noblest saying: "That the useful is noble and the hurtful is base."' See especially Theaet. 172 A, B, 177 D, E. The sentiment recurs infra 458 E *εἶεν δ' ἂν ἱεροὶ οἱ* **ὠφελιμώτατοι**. The future-perfect expresses permanence and absoluteness in future time.

We have escaped one wave of the sea of ridicule which was ready to swallow us up alive. But the next is still more formidable. For on the community of education and employment there follows the community of marriage. And here also the scepticism to be encountered is two-fold:—(1) *Is the change possible, and* (2) *is it for the best? Socrates is confident upon the latter point, and proposes to take it first, leaving what is more doubtful and difficult to be disposed of afterwards. Let us build our 'Castle in the air,' and then consider whether we may hope one day to find a place fit for it on the solid ground.* *457 B–461 E*

The women shall be first selected, then educated, and, lastly, have their duties assigned to them. Then—having their work, their quarters, and their meals in common—the two sexes cannot but be drawn together, by a more than mathematical necessity. Now order is inseparable from our first principle: licentiousness, in a city of the blessed, is a thing not to be permitted: and so the question rises, What order is to be observed about marriage-rites? Once more we may appeal to the analogy of the lower animals. In breeding hawk or hound, Glaucon is careful in the matter of selection, pairing the best-bred individuals with the best, while both are in their prime. And the same conditions ought to be applied to the breeding of other animals and of men amongst them, if the quality of the race is to be preserved. Here, then, is a point in which the wisdom of our rulers will be put to the test. For they must have recourse to the 'medicine' of deception, so that, without apparent constraint,

Republic V. 457 B–461 E *the highest privileges in the way of marriage may be reserved for the noblest. There must be festivals and hymeneal songs proclaiming how 'the brave deserve the fair.' And exceptional advantages in affairs of this kind must be provided for those who distinguish themselves in war. There will be lotteries cunningly devised, which, unknown to the people, will effect our purpose. And there will be magistrates, male and female, appointed to take care of the children who are born of these marriages. The perfect offspring of noble parents they will carry to the common nurseries and place them under appropriate care. But the children of inferior parents, and accidental misbirths, will be carried off by them none shall know whither,—never to reappear. The mothers shall be allowed to suckle their own and one another's children (not knowing the difference), as much as is desirable for their health. But there will be wet nurses who will relieve them of any duties that might break their rest.*

It remains to define the age for marriage. In women this lasts from twenty to forty, and in men from about twenty-five to fifty-five. Beyond these limits either way none shall be permitted to bring forth children for the state. Nor shall any one within the prescribed age cohabit without permission of the magistrates. But a general dispensation shall be given to those who are past the age, provided that they abstain from incestuous intercourse and provided also that if a child is born, it shall be understood that no one shall be responsible for rearing it.

Now under these new laws what connexions are incestuous? Children are not to know their real parents. But all who are born from seven to nine months after each marriage festival will be brothers and sisters to each other, and sons and daughters to all who were married at that festival. These will be the prohibited degrees.

457 C **ἀλλά πῃ . . . ὁμολογεῖσθαι**] 'But that the argument somehow comes to an agreement with itself.' For the reciprocal middle voice, cp. Phaedr. 265 D *τὸ αὐτὸ αὑτῷ ὁμολογούμενον*: Tim. 29 C: Laws v. 746 C.

The image of the wave, the way for which has been already prepared (453 D), is one of those continuous images in Plato which also form links in the arrangement of the subject.

D **μεῖζον πρὸς ἀπιστίαν**] 'more formidable, as more provocative of incredulity.'

ἀλλ' οἶμαι . . . γενέσθαι] The aorist is sometimes used without ἂν in confident prediction. Cp. Protag. 316 C *τοῦτο δὲ οἴεταί οἱ μάλιστα* **γενέσθαι**, *εἰ σοὶ συγγένοιτο*: Goodwin, *M. and T.*, § 127. But the similarity of ἄν, ἀμ, may easily have led to the loss of the particle here. 457 D

λέγεις] 'Your words imply.' Cp. iv. 425 E **Λέγεις**, *ἔφην ἐγώ, βιώσεσθαι τοὺς τοιούτους, κ.τ.λ.* E

λόγων σύστασιν] 'A combination' (or 'coalition') 'of arguments': i.e. *λόγον λόγῳ συνιστάμενον.* Socrates had hoped to escape from one of his enemies, he now finds that he has to meet both of them. Cp. Eurip. Androm. 1088 *εἰς δὲ* **συστάσεις** | *κύκλους τ' ἐχώρει λαὸς οἰκήτωρ θεοῦ*: Dem. *κατὰ Στεφάνου* A, 1122, l. 5 *τὰς αὐτῶν* **συστάσεις** *κυριωτέρας τῶν νόμων ἀξιοῦν εἶναι.*

ἔκ γε τοῦ ἑτέρου] The language is still coloured by the image of the 'sea of arguments.'

λοιπὸν δὲ δὴ . . . περὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ καὶ μή] sc. *διαλέγεσθαι*, or *λόγον διδόναι*, which is supplied in the next sentence (cp. infra).

ἔασόν με ἑορτάσαι] 'suffer me to keep holiday.'

καὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοί που, κ.τ.λ.] *καί* in **καὶ γάρ** anticipates *καί* in *ἤδη οὖν* **καὶ** *αὐτός, κ.τ.λ.*, to which it is correlative. 458 A

γενομένου] sc. *ἐκείνου ὃ βούλονται.* Cp. ii. 369 A *Οὐκοῦν* **γενομένου αὐτοῦ** *ἐλπὶς εὐπετέστερον ἰδεῖν ὃ ζητοῦμεν;*

καὶ ὕστερον] **καί** implies 'there will be an opportunity of doing so hereafter as well as now.' Cp. iii. 400 B **καὶ** *μετὰ Δάμωνος* and note: Soph. 254 B *περὶ μὲν τούτου* **καὶ** *τάχα ἐπισκεψόμεθα σαφέστερον.* [**καί** simply = 'and.' B. J.] B

γιγνόμενα] 'When they do take place.' Cp. supra *γενομένου.*

τὰ δὲ καὶ μιμουμένους] sc. *τοὺς νόμους*, i.e. 'following their spirit.' Cp. Polit. 300 ff., where the actual rulers are advised to 'imitate,' i.e. act in the spirit of, the ideal ruler. C

σὺ μὲν τοίνυν, κ.τ.λ.] **αὐτοῖς** depends on **παραδώσεις**, sc. *τοῖς ἄρχουσι καὶ τοῖς ἐπικούροις.*

ὁμοῦ δὲ ἀναμεμιγμένων . . . ἄξονται] The subject of **ἀναμεμιγμένων** is also the subject of **ἄξονται. ἄξονται** is passive in sense. D

οὐ γεωμετρικαῖς γε . . . ἀνάγκαις] The dative *ἀνάγκαις* is to be

Republic V. 458 D construed with ἀναγκαῖα, 'necessary in virtue of': cp. Soph. 252 D ταῖς μεγίσταις ἀνάγκαις ἀδύνατον. For the play on ἀνάγκη, cp. vii. 527 A, ix. 581 E.

ἀλλὰ μετὰ δὴ ταῦτα, ὦ Γλαύκων, κ.τ.λ.] Is Plato serious in his scheme of communism? Modern readers would like to explain this part of the ideal commonwealth in a figure only (ἐν ὑπονοίᾳ); they might imagine themselves not far off a kingdom of heaven, 'in which they neither marry, nor are given in marriage.' But the particularity of the details forbids this: we seem rather to be entering on a 'new moral world.' It may be urged on behalf of Plato: (1) that he himself acknowledges the community of women and children to be 'the second of the three great waves' or paradoxes: (2) that in the Laws the theory is not put into practice, though regarded as affording the true and absolutely perfect rule of the state, Laws v. 739 D ἡ μὲν δὴ τοιαύτη πόλις, εἴτε που θεοὶ ἢ παῖδες θεῶν αὐτὴν οἰκοῦσι πλείους ἑνός, οὕτω διαζῶντες εὐφραινόμενοι κατοικοῦσι: (3) that the Greek sentiment about the relations of the sexes is unlike that of modern times: (4) that the family is not destroyed but merged in the state; public interests are supposed to take the place of private ones: (5) the equalization of the sexes was a great thought in that age and country, not entirely realized by any modern nation: (6) the communism of Plato has other aims than the indulgence of the passions; licentiousness is to be deemed 'an unholy thing': (7) although the physical considerations to which Plato draws our attention can hardly be dwelt upon, neither can they be safely overlooked: (8) lastly, there is a speculative interest in considering social institutions with a reference to first principles which lie beyond the range of custom and experience.

459 A **ἆρ' οὐκ εἰσί τινες καὶ γίγνονται ἄριστοι;]** 'Are there not some who are and who prove themselves to be the best?' The same creatures form the subject of both verbs.

ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων] sc. γεννᾶν.

B **γεννᾶται]** sc. (1) τὸ γεννώμενον, or (2) τὸ γένος infra.

τί δὲ ἵππων οἴει] ἵππων may be taken as a genitive of reference (with περί omitted), as in Hom. Od. xi. 174 εἰπὲ δέ μοι **πατρός** τε καὶ **υἱέος**, ὃν κατέλειπον: Soph. O. C. 354, 355 μαντεῖ' ἄγουσα πάντα, . . . ἃ **τοῦδ'** ἐχρήσθη **σώματος**: this is eased by assimilation to the genitives in

the previous sentence (**ὀρνίθων . . . κυνῶν**). Cp. Phaedo 78 D Τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν . . .; ἆρα κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχει . . .; *Republic V.* 459 B

ὡς ἄρα . . . δεῖ ἄκρων εἶναι τῶν ἀρχόντων] is a fusion of two constructions of **δεῖ**: *ὡς σφόδρα δεῖ ἄκρων ἀρχόντων* and *ὡς σφόδρα δεῖ ἄκρους εἶναι τοὺς ἄρχοντας.*

ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς, κ.τ.λ.] For deception as a political medicine, cp. ii. 382 C. The order is *ἡγούμεθα ἐξαρκεῖν ἰατρὸν εἶναι καὶ φαυλότερον.* C

μὴ δεομένοις μὲν . . . ἐθελόντων ὑπακούειν] **ἐθελόντων** (1) sc. *τῶν σωμάτων* (the genitive absolute is changed in one MS., r, to the dative *ἐθέλουσιν*), 'when the constitution is amenable to diet:' cp. ii. 370 B and note; or (2) the subject of **ἐθελόντων** is personal: 'when the patients are willing to submit to regimen' [B. J.].

ἀνδρειοτέρου] 'more courageous': the task of prescribing medicine is more difficult than of prescribing a diet, and therefore requires more courage in the physician.

τὸ ὀρθὸν τοῦτο] sc. *τὸ ὀρθὸν εἶναι τῷ ψεύδει χρῆσθαι, ὡς ἐν φαρμάκου εἴδει.* Socrates echoes the expression of Glaucon. Cp. supra 449 C *τὸ ὀρθῶς τοῦτο . . . λόγου δεῖται.* D

εἰ μέλλει . . . ἀκρότατον εἶναι] 'If the flock is to be of the highest quality': as above *σφόδρα ἄκρων.* E

ποίμνιον . . . ἀγέλη] The words are meant to recall the analogy of the lower animals (cp. Polit. 261).

τοῖς ἡμετέροις ποιηταῖς] For the sort of poetry and poets to be received in our state cp. iii. 398 A, B.

τοῖς γιγνομένοις γάμοις] 'The unions which result' from brides and bridegrooms being brought together. The expression prepares for the restriction following. 460 A

τὸ δὲ πλῆθος, κ.τ.λ.] 'But the number of the marriages we shall place under the control of the magistrates.' For **πλῆθος** of a limited number or quantity, cp. Gorg. 451 C *πῶς ἔχει* **πλήθους** (*τό τε ἄρτιον καὶ τὸ περιττόν*): Phaedr. 279 C *τὸ . . . χρυσοῦ* **πλῆθος** *εἴη μοι ὅσον, κ.τ.λ.*

On the question of population, cp. viii. 546 A, B, D. We may observe that these two passages have an apparent likeness but are not really similar in their drift. In the first, Plato supposes

Republic V. 460 A a limitation to be placed upon population by the rulers to avoid excess and defect of numbers: in the second, he fears the deterioration and confusion of classes which may arise by ignorance in the rulers of the so-called number of the state or cycle of human births.

Aristotle and Plato are agreed, the latter both in the Laws and the Republic, in limiting the state by unity, *μέχρις οὗ ἂν ἐθέλῃ εἶναι μία.* No definite number is given in the Republic: in the Laws it is said that the number is to be regulated by the size of neighbouring states. The number finally fixed upon is 5040, which Plato praises in respect of convenience, because it was capable of such numerous subdivisions. At this number, in a passage which it is hardly possible to explain, Aristotle carps. It would require, he says, a territory as great as Babylonia to support such a vast population in idleness, to say nothing of their attendants.

πρὸς πολέμους . . . ἀποσκοποῦντες] Cp. ii. 372 C *εὐλαβούμενοι πενίαν ἢ πόλεμον* (but in the present passage the notion is rather that of making allowance for losses sustained through war or pestilence): and for **μήτε . . . γίγνηται** cp. iv. 423 C *ὅπως μήτε σμικρὰ ἡ πόλις ἔσται μήτε μεγάλη δοκοῦσα.*

κλῆροι δή τινες . . . τοὺς ἄρχοντας] 'Then, I suppose, we must contrive some ingenious kind of lot, that the less worthy person, on each occasion of uniting them, may lay the blame on chance, and not on the ruler.'

For **σύνερξις**, cp. Tim. 18 D *εἰς τὴν τῶν γάμων* **σύνερξιν**, where Plato, referring to this passage, repeats the expression, and infra 461 B *μὴ* **ξυνέρξαντος** *ἄρχοντος.* Cp. also the Homeric use of *συνέργω* in Od. ix. 425–427 *Ἄρσενες ὄϊες ἦσαν . . . | Τοὺς ἀκέων* **συνέεργον** *ἐϋστρεφέεσσι λύγοισιν.* Plato thinks that the principles which are observed in breeding animals should also be observed in breeding human beings. Hence he applies the terminology of the former to the latter. **Σύνερξις**, properly used of the penning of animals, is here applied to the union of men and women. Cp. the use of the words *ἀγέλη* and *ποίμνιον* supra 459 E, and of *σηκός* infra C.

τὸν φαῦλον ἐκεῖνον] The reference is to supra 459 D *τοὺς δὲ φαυλοτάτους ταῖς φαυλοτάταις τοὐναντίον.*

B **ἵνα καὶ . . . σπείρωνται**] 'That there may be moreover a colourable excuse for such fathers having as many children as possible.

καὶ ἅμα] 'and at the same time,' i.e. while we honour bravery we also reap an advantage. 460 B

εἴτε ἀμφότερα] For this adverbial accusative cp. Laches 187 A *ἢ δώροις ἢ χάρισιν ἢ* **ἀμφότερα.**

κοιναὶ . . . καὶ ἀρχαί, κ.τ.λ.] 'Offices also' (as well as education and the general duties of guardians, supra 456 ff.) 'are I suppose to be common to both women and men.' The inference on p. 456 supra only extended to the duties of guardians generally. The further consequence that the rulers will be taken from both sexes is here assumed by the way. Plato seems, however, to betray a certain consciousness that the office immediately in question might be specially suitable for women. Cp. Laws vi. 784, vii. 794, where it is actually entrusted to women.

εἰς τὸν σηκόν] Cp. Homer, Od. ix. 219, 220, where the lambs and kids await their mothers in the pens: *στείνοντο δὲ* **σηκοὶ** | *Ἀρνῶν ἠδ' ἐρίφων.* C

τὰ δὲ τῶν χειρόνων . . . κατακρύψουσιν ὡς πρέπει] Cp. infra 461 C *ὡς οὐκ οὔσης τροφῆς τῷ τοιούτῳ.* Is Plato a maintainer of infanticide? It must be admitted that the words in which he touches on this subject are not perfectly clear. First let us consider the passage supra 459 D *δεῖ . . . τοὺς ἀρίστους ταῖς ἀρίσταις συγγίγνεσθαι ὡς πλειστάκις, τοὺς δὲ φαυλοτάτους ταῖς φαυλοτάταις τοὐναντίον, καὶ τῶν μὲν τὰ ἔκγονα τρέφειν,* **τῶν δὲ μή,** *εἰ μέλλει τὸ ποίμνιον ὅ τι ἀκρότατον εἶναι,* 'The best of either sex should be united with the best as often, and the inferior with the inferior, as seldom as possible; and they should rear the offspring of the one sort of union, *but not of the other*, if the flock is to be maintained in first-rate condition.' Here Plato is speaking of keeping up the breed of the guardians in perfection: but it does not necessarily follow that the weaklings or imperfect individuals must be put out of the way to accomplish this: he could have obtained his object by degradation of them to an inferior class. Nevertheless the words *τῶν δὲ μή* (sc. *τρέφειν*) have an ominous sound, unaccompanied as they are by any explanation of what is to become of them. Still more ominous are the words in the present passage **τὰ δὲ τῶν χειρόνων, καὶ ἐάν τι τῶν ἑτέρων ἀνάπηρον γίγνηται, ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τε καὶ ἀδήλῳ κατακρύψουσιν ὡς πρέπει,** 'But the offspring of inferior parents, or of the better, when they chance to be deformed, will be put away in some mysterious un-

Republic *V.* 460 C known place, as they should be.' These words are meant to suggest something different from rearing the children in a pen or asylum, which Plato does not like or think it good taste more distinctly to describe. It is further stated in 461 C that the children born of irregular unions between parents who have passed the prescribed limit of age, if abortion has not been already practised, shall not be reared, *μάλιστα μὲν μηδ' εἰς φῶς ἐκφέρειν κύημα μηδέ γ' ἕν, ἐὰν γένηται, ἐὰν δέ τι βιάσηται, οὕτω τιθέναι, ὡς οὐκ οὔσης τροφῆς τῷ τοιούτῳ.* It may be remarked that whatever doubt may be entertained respecting the meaning of the word *τρέφειν* in the first of these passages, there can be no doubt as to the sense which is to be assigned to *τροφῆς* in the last.

All three passages occur within two pages of each other: there is therefore a strong presumption that they must be explained in the same way. It may also be fairly argued that they must be taken in the worst sense that they will bear, because Plato would naturally wish to cast a veil over an unpleasant subject. Nor can the milder view be defended by Timaeus 19 A *τὰ δὲ τῶν κακῶν εἰς τὴν ἄλλην λάθρα διαδοτέον πόλιν*: for it is not necessary that Plato should be perfectly consistent: he may have altered his mind or may have forgotten.

The Greek feeling is sufficiently expressed in a well-known passage of Aristotle (Pol. vii. 16, § 15): 'As to the exposure and rearing of children, let there be a law that no deformed child shall live, but where there are too many (for in our state population has a limit), when couples have children in excess, and the state of feeling is averse to the exposure of offspring, let abortion be procured before sense and life have begun; what may or may not be lawfully done in these cases depends on the question of life and sensation.' The occurrence of such a passage in Aristotle is a strong reason for believing that similar passages have a similar meaning in Plato. It shows that they are not in any degree at variance with Greek feeling.

On the whole we must conclude that the only reason for denying Plato to be a maintainer of infanticide is the wish to acquit him of allowing a practice so repugnant to modern Christian notions.

There are similar questions in antiquity; e.g. whether human sacrifices were practised by the Greeks and Romans, about which there is the same doubt, due to the same reticence or ambiguity, and which should probably be answered in the same way.

τὰ εἴκοσι ἔτη] 'a period of twenty years.' The article, which is added according to Greek idiom with the word of number, defines the time in reference to the rest of life. *Republic V.* 460 E

τὰ ποῖα αὐτῶν;] sc. *τῶν ἐτῶν.* 'Which years of life do you mean?' i.e. within what limits do you define the twenty or thirty years?

γυναικὶ μέν . . . πεντεκαιπεντηκονταέτους] 'For a woman, said I, the proper time (*μέτριος χρόνος*) is to begin at twenty years of age and to continue to bear children to the state until forty; for a man the proper time is to begin when he has passed "the swiftest prime of running,"' i.e. when his powers of running are at their highest, 'and to beget children to the state until fifty-five.' The words **τὴν ὀξυτάτην δρόμου ἀκμήν** have also been referred to the course of life. But it is difficult to make *δρόμος* refer to the race of life where there is nothing in the context to suggest this metaphorical application of the phrase. In Laws (vi. 785) a man must marry, if at all, between thirty and thirty-five, a woman between sixteen and twenty.

τῶν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν γεννήσεων] This qualification is added to leave room for the licence given infra c. 461 A

ἂν λάθῃ] sc. *φύς.* Cp. infra c *ἐὰν δέ τι βιάσηται.* It is assumed that, if such a birth came to the knowledge of the rulers, the child would be at once destroyed.

ὑπὸ σκότου] Cp. the use of *σκότιος* in Hom. Il. vi. 24, Eurip. Troad. 44, &c. B

ἀνέγγυον] 'unwarranted.'

καὶ ταῦτά γ' ἤδη . . . προθυμεῖσθαι] **ταῦτά γε**, sc. *ἀφήσομεν.* 'Before granting this permission, however, we must instruct them to use all diligence,' &c. C

ἐὰν γένηται] sc. *κύημα*, not *παιδίον.*

βιάσηται] sc. *εἰς τὸ φῶς.*

οὕτω τιθέναι] sc. *τὸ γιγνόμενον*, 'to dispose of it on the clear understanding that such an offspring is not to be reared.'

πῶς διαγνώσονται . . . οὐδαμῶς] sc. *διαγνώσονται.* 'How will they distinguish their fathers and daughters and the other relatives of each other whom you mentioned?' (1) 'Not at all,' i.e. they D

Republic *V.* 461 D will not know their own fathers and daughters, &c. in the literal sense. Or (2), as sometimes elsewhere, the negation with ἀλλά is only a stronger way of saying 'simply as follows.' Cp. iv. 424 D and note: also infra 472 B ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτό γ'; ἔφη. Οὐδέν· ἀλλ' ἐάν, κ.τ.λ. [L. C.]

Plato's 'table of prohibited degrees' appears to be the following. Brothers and sisters (except in the reserved case of a 'dispensation' from the Oracle), parents and children, grandparents and grandchildren. These terms are all relative to the common marriage of the hymeneal festival. Brothers and sisters are those born from seven to ten months afterwards; they cannot marry those who took part in the festival, who are all their parents, any more than one another; nor any one who took part in the festivals from seven to ten months before the birth of their parents.

There is no difficulty in this passage if we bear in mind that Plato uses the words parents and children, brothers and sisters in a new sense which he consistently observes. Some of the results of his arrangements he hardly saw or does not care to notice. The infrequency of the opportunity of nuptial intercourse is singular: but this is not unreasonable if it is considered that the nuptial scheme has absolutely no other object but the procreation of children: also the circumstance is to be remarked that those who were united in any hymeneal festival would rarely be born in the same year owing to the difference in the marriageable age prescribed for men and women.

μετ' ἐκείνην δεκάτῳ μηνὶ καὶ ἑβδόμῳ δή] 'After an interval of ten or indeed of seven months': an inexact way of saying, 'From seven to ten months after.' **δή** draws attention to the more exceptional case.

καὶ οὕτω δὴ τὰ τούτων ἔκγονα] 'Their offspring defined in the same way.' Cp. Theaet. 156 C τὰ δὲ γεννώμενα **οὕτω δή**.

E **ἐὰν ὁ κλῆρος ταύτῃ ξυμπίπτῃ**] It is not forgotten that the lottery has been cunningly devised by the rulers: supra 460 A.

461 E–466 D *The great merit of the new arrangement is that it secures the unity of feeling in the state: so that if one member suffer, the whole body shall suffer with it, and the gladness of one shall be the gladness of all.*

In other states one family sorrows, another rejoices at the same

event; the rulers, though fellow-citizens, are masters, the people slaves, and even the ruling class are bound together by no tie but that of office. Whereas in our community the people regard the rulers as their protectors and are regarded by them in turn as bread-winners, and the rulers will be all one family, not only in name, but in reality. Republic V. 461 E–466 D

This new institution is in keeping with the community of property which was previously ordained. And both together, by securing unanimity, will render quarrels and crimes of violence impossible in our state. Nor shall we have poor men flattering the rich, nor fathers of families harassed by petty cares, but the life of our guardians will be more enviable than that of Olympian victors. So little need we fear the objection that in forbidding them to have property we have made them less happy than the other citizens. Should any of them be moved by a low ambition and seek to appropriate the state to himself, he will learn to his cost how truly Hesiod said, 'Half is better than the whole.'

ὡς δὲ . . . παρὰ τοῦ λόγου] **βεβαιώσασθαι παρὰ τοῦ λόγου** is literally 'to obtain confirmation from the argument,' which, as elsewhere, is personified. Cp. Gorg. 489 A *μή φθόνει μοι ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῦτο, Καλλίκλεις, ἵν', ἐάν μοι ὁμολογήσῃς,* **βεβαιώσωμαι ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ,** *ἅτε ἱκανοῦ ἀνδρὸς διαγνῶναι ὡμολογηκότος.* 461 E

In what follows Plato appears to confuse the absolute unity of the state with the harmony or balance of the various elements which are contained in the state. He has no idea of a unity of opposites or differences—*τὸ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον.* May we not imagine some Athenian statesman or man of the world saying: 'O Socrates, did you ever see one individual who was by nature the same as another? and is not a state made up of differences of character as well as of different employments? And if you could destroy these differences by education, would you not reduce men to a powerless unity in which their best qualities are lost?' Such has certainly been the fate of religious orders, who, in a spirit not unlike that of Plato's Republic, have attempted to extinguish individual character or genius in a common interest. Cp. Arist. Pol. ii. 2, § 3 *οὐ μόνον δ' ἐκ πλειόνων ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ εἴδει διαφερόντων.* Cp. also ibid. c. 2, § 2; c. 5, §§ 13–17. This truth begins to find acknowledgement in Plato's regulations concerning marriage in the Politicus and Laws (Polit. 309, 310: Laws vi. 773).

Republic V. 462 A **τῆς ὁμολογίας**] 'Of the mutual understanding or agreement,' implied in the words *ὡς δὲ ἑπομένη τε τῇ ἄλλῃ πολιτείᾳ . . . δεῖ . . . βεβαιώσασθαι παρὰ τοῦ λόγου.*

ἆρα . . . ἡμῖν ἁρμόττει] 'If we find that it fits the impress of the good.' For **ἡμῖν** cp. supra 451 D *εἰ* **ἡμῖν** *πρέπει* and note. **ἃ νῦν δὴ διήλθομεν**: sc. the community of women and children.

B **ἡ δέ γε τῶν τοιούτων ἰδίωσις . . . τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει;**] The clause *ὅταν οἱ μὲν . . . ἐν τῇ πόλει;* is the explanation of **ἰδίωσις**, as in the next sentence the clause *ὅταν . . . οὐκ ἐμόν;* is the explanation of *ἐκ τοῦδε.*

C **ἐν ᾗτινι δὴ . . . διοικεῖται;**] This is that barren unity which Aristotle condemns (Pol. ii. cc. 3, 4: also c. 5, § 14 *ὥσπερ κἂν εἴ τις τὴν συμφωνίαν ποιήσειεν ὁμοφωνίαν ἢ τὸν ῥυθμὸν βάσιν μίαν*). **τοῦτο** refers to *τό τε ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἐμόν* in the previous sentence.

καὶ ἥτις δὴ . . . ἔχει] *αὕτη ἄριστα διοικεῖται* is to be supplied from the previous sentence. The illustration then proceeds until Glaucon gives his assent and returns to the original question of Socrates (*τοῦτο ὃ ἐρωτᾷς*). For the expression **ἡ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα . . . τεταμένη** cp. ix. 584 C *αἵ γε διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνουσαι . . . ἡδοναί*: Theaet. 186 C *ὅσα διὰ τοῦ σώματος παθήματα ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνει*: Phil. 34 C, D: Tim. 64. The redundancy of **ὅλη** after **πᾶσα** is occasioned by the antithesis of **μέρους.**

D **ὁ αὐτὸς γὰρ . . . πόλις οἰκεῖ**] For *οἰκεῖν* as a neuter cp. iv. 421 A *καὶ αὖ τοῦ εὖ* **οἰκεῖν** *καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν μόνοι τὸν καιρὸν ἔχουσιν*: viii. 543 A *τῇ μελλούσῃ ἄκρως* **οἰκεῖν** *πόλει.*

E **ὥρα ἂν εἴη . . . ἐπανιέναι ἡμῖν**] For the familiar idiom cp. Theaet. 145 C **ὥρα** . . . *σοὶ μὲν ἐπιδεικνύναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ σκοπεῖσθαι.*

τὰ τοῦ λόγου ὁμολογήματα] 'The things agreed to.' Cp. ii. 362 B *βουλεύματα* and note.

ἔστι μέν που . . . ἄρχοντές τε καὶ δῆμος] For the use of the singular verb with a plural substantive, cp. ii. 363 A *ἵνα . . .* **γίγνηται** . . . *ἀρχαί τε καὶ γάμοι, κ.τ.λ.* and note.

463 A **πρὸς τῷ πολίτας**] sc. *προσαγορεύειν.*

B **τῶν ἀρχόντων**] 'with regard to the rulers.' The genitive is at first vague, as supra 459 B *Τί δὲ ἵππων οἴει . . .;* and is then brought into government with **εἴ τις.**

τὸν μὲν οἰκεῖον . . . (C) οὐχ ἑαυτοῦ;] 'The friend he thinks and speaks of as belonging to him; the stranger as not belonging to him.' *Republic V.* 463 B

πότερον αὐτοῖς . . . κατὰ τὰ ὀνόματα πράττειν;] 'Will you merely assign to them by law the name of friends?' It is hardly necessary to observe that **νομοθετεῖν** has two constructions in the successive clauses: (1) with **τὰ ὀνόματα**: (2) with **πράττειν**. C

περί τε τοὺς πατέρας] The correlative phrase (*καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ξυγγενεῖς*) is deferred through the expansion of the sentence, and the lost thread is resumed in the words *καὶ περὶ πατέρων . . . καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυγγενῶν*, in construction with *ὑμνήσουσιν*. D

αὗταί σοι ἢ ἄλλαι φῆμαι . . . (E) φθέγγοιντο] This resumption only regards the latter part of the preceding sentence (*ἢ μήτε πρὸς θεῶν . . . ἢ ταῦτα*), in which not the law itself, but the sanction of the law is spoken of.

ὑμνήσουσιν] is used intransitively like *οἰκεῖν* in the expression *ἡ ἄριστα πολιτευομένη πόλις οἰκεῖ* (supra 462 D).

ἔφαμεν] supra 462 B, C. 464 A

κοινῇ] sc. *γιγνομένας*.

οὐκοῦν μάλιστα . . . ἕξουσιν;] As Aristotle truly remarks (Pol. ii. 1), 'mine and thine,' as well as 'father and mother,' have received a new meaning; Plato seems to forget that the legislator cannot create by new use of names the feeling of family relationship where no such relationship exists. The sweetness of the 'wine,' which is the affection of a family, has been dissolved in water (Ar. Pol. ii. 4, 7, 8).

πρὸς τῇ ἄλλῃ καταστάσει] 'besides the general arrangement of the state,' i.e. the other arrangements not including the community of wives and children. Cp. supra 463 A, B.

σώματι . . . ὡς ἔχει] The slight harshness of adding **πρὸς μέρος αὐτοῦ** to **σώματι** (cp. infra 466 D *παρὰ φύσιν τὴν τοῦ θήλεος πρὸς τὸ ἄρρεν*) is softened by the further addition of **ὡς ἔχει λύπης**, *κ.τ.λ.* B

τοῖς πρόσθεν γε] The reference is to iii. 415 E ff.

κοινῇ πάντας ἀναλίσκειν] This was implied in the institution of *συσσίτια*, which were a *κοινὴ ἀνάλωσις τῆς διδομένης τροφῆς* (iii. 416 E). C

Republic V. 464 D **καὶ γυναῖκά τε καὶ παῖδας ἑτέρους**] sc. *ὀνομάζοντας 'ἐμούς.'* 'Calling a different wife and different children his own.'

ἰδίων ὄντων] sc. *τῶν τε παίδων καὶ τῆς γυναικός.*

E **ὅσα γε . . . στασιάζουσιν;**] 'They are blest with peace from all those factious dispositions which,' &c. **ὅσα** is cognate accusative. See Riddell's *Digest*, § 2.

καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ βιαίων γε, κ.τ.λ.] The mention of offences against the person is suggested by the exception of **πλὴν τὸ σῶμα** in the preceding sentences. (Cp. the classification of criminal offences in the Laws, Book ix, especially pp. 879, 880.)

δικαίως ἂν εἶεν] 'Can have any right to exist,' i.e. may be expected. This use is idiomatic:—cp. *εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ* (iv. 430 E, &c.).

ἥλιξι μὲν γὰρ . . . δίκαιόν που φήσομεν] 'First, I believe we shall declare it to be chivalrous and right for equals to defend themselves against equals.' The order is *φήσομέν που καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον ἥλιξιν ἀμύνεσθαι ἥλικας.* The dative depends on *καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον.* Cp. Laws ix. 879 E **ἧλιξ δὲ ἥλικα . . . ἀμυνέσθω** *κατὰ φύσιν ἄνευ βέλους ψιλαῖς ταῖς χερσίν.* The correlative to **μέν** ('in the first place') is supplied by **μήν** infra.

ἀνάγκην . . . τιθέντες] 'In this way we shall oblige them to keep themselves in condition': literally, 'setting compulsion on the care of their persons.' The reading **ἀνάγκην . . . ἐπιμελείᾳ** has the greater manuscript authority. Several variations occur: *ἀνάγκη* (Ξ), *ἐπιμελείας* (*q* supported by Stobaeus), *ἐπιμέλειαν* (Π Ξ): the two last appear to be corrections.

καὶ γὰρ τόδε ὀρθὸν . . . ὁ νόμος] **ὀρθόν** echoes and expands *ὀρθῶς* supra. Cp. 459 D and note.

465 A **ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ**] *ἐν τῷ αὐτίκα ἀμύνεσθαι.* For **πληρῶν τὸν θυμόν** cp. Soph. Phil. 324 *θυμὸν γένοιτο χειρὶ πληρῶσαί ποτε.*

πρεσβυτέρῳ μὴν νεωτέρων πάντων ἄρχειν] Cp. iii. 412 C.

καὶ μὴν . . . ὡς τὸ εἰκός] **ὅτι γε, κ.τ.λ.**, sc. *δῆλον.* Cp. iii. 407 E. **ὡς τὸ εἰκός** = 'as is likely,' is added to supplement the defective construction. For the sense cp. iv. 425 B.

B **δέος δὲ . . . βοηθεῖν**] Although *τό*, the MS. reading, may be construed—'the fear, namely, that succour will be brought,'

Madvig's simple change of *τό* to **τοῦ** seems justifiable. Cp. iv. 440 C. 465 B

ξυμβαίνει γὰρ οὕτως] 'That is clearly the result' (viz. of our institutions—*ἐκ τῶν νόμων* infra).

τούτων μὴν . . . διχοστατήσῃ] Plato, as Aristotle remarks (Pol. ii. 5, 18 ff.), seems hardly to think of the lower orders of the state. The question which is raised in the Politics has no answer: 'Did he mean the communism of the higher orders to extend to the lower?' There is certainly no proof that he did.

δι' ἀπρέπειαν] Cp. iv. 425 B–E, 442 E *τὰ* **φορτικὰ** *αὐτῷ προσφέροντες, κ.τ.λ.* C

κολακείας τε πλουσίων πένητες] (1) 'Flatteries of the rich, in the case of the poor': **κολακείας**, like **ἀπορίας** and **ἀλγηδόνας**, is the accusative after **λέγειν**, while **πένητες** is in apposition (part with whole) with the nominative of **ἀπηλλαγμένοι ἂν εἶεν**: the full expression is *κολακείας τε πλουσίων ὧν πένητες ἀπηλλαγμένοι ἂν εἶεν.* Or (2) **κολακείας** gen. sing. in the same case with **ὧν.**

ταμιεύειν παραδόντες] Cp. iii. 416 D *οἴκησιν καὶ ταμιεῖον μηδενὶ εἶναι*: viii. 550 D *τὸ ταμιεῖον . . . ἐκεῖνο ἑκάστῳ χρυσίου πληρούμενον ἀπόλλυσι τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν.*

ἀπαλλάξονται] Cobet's conjecture, *ἀπηλλάξονται* (future perfect), though in strict accordance with *ἀπηλλαγμένοι ἂν εἶεν* supra, is quite needless, and the form does not occur elsewhere. D

γέρα δέχονται . . . μετέχουσιν] Plato seems at first to have intended to end the sentence at **τελευτήσαντες**, but by an afterthought expands the word into an independent clause. Cp. Phaedr. 258 C *ἰσόθεον ἡγεῖται αὐτός τε αὑτὸν ἔτι ζῶν, καὶ οἱ ἔπειτα γιγνόμενοι ταὐτὰ ταῦτα περὶ αὐτοῦ νομίζουσι.* E

οὐκ οἶδα ὅτου] viz. Adeimantus' imaginary objector, iv. 419 ff.

ποιοῖμεν . . . σκεψοίμεθα . . . ποιοῖμεν] The optative has sufficient manuscript authority, and is therefore preferred, although the readings of A, *ποιοῦμεν* (bis), *σκεψόμεθα*, are not impossible. 466 A

εἴ που παραπίπτοι] 'If so be that the topic should fall in our way.' Cp. viii. 561 B.

μή πῃ κατὰ . . . τὸν τῶν γεωργῶν;] 'Can it from any point of view be regarded as on a level with that of the husbandman,' &c. Cp. Gorg. 512 B *μή σοι δοκεῖ* **κατὰ** *τὸν δικανικὸν εἶναι;* B

Republic V. **ἐκεῖ**] iv. 420 D.

466 C **μενεῖ . . . βίῳ**] either (1) 'he will continue in, or remain true to, this life.' Cp. vi. 496 B *πάνσμικρον . . . κατὰ φύσιν μεῖναν ἐπ' αὐτῇ*: or (2) taking **μενεῖ** in a more general and absolute sense, 'he will remain where he is (i. e. he will be content) when such a life is offered to him.' (**ἐπί** = on condition of.)

συγχωρεῖς] here is followed by two constructions: first by the accusative of the noun (**κοινωνίαν**), then by the infinitive (**δεῖν**, **πράξειν**). 'You agree to the community . . ., viz. that the women should (**δεῖν**) . . . and that if they do so they will do (**πράξειν**) what is best . . . .'

D **ᾗ πεφύκατον . . . κοινωνεῖν**] These words are added in limitation and further explanation of **παρὰ φύσιν**.

466 D–471 C *Here Glaucon would have reminded Socrates of the question which had been left to the last,—whether such a revolution of established custom is possible. Socrates anticipates him by subtly interposing a point of detail, which still detains them for some time. What are to be the laws and usages of war? The women will go campaigning with the men, and they will take their children with them* (*except those of tender age*), *mounted on swift and well-trained horses, under proper guidance and protection, to see the battle and to perform such services as they are fitted for. Thus, while their safety is provided for, they will learn their future occupation, and their presence will heighten the valour of their parents.*

As to military discipline, the appropriate punishment for cowardice in action will be the degradation of the offender to the rank of an artisan, and if he is taken prisoner, we may make a present of him to the enemy. As rewards for eminent service in the field, there will be crowns, ovations and favours from the young and beautiful (*as before said*), *not to mention feasts for which we have the example in Homer. Those who die bravely for their country shall be declared to be of the golden* (*or royal*) *race, and shall have divine honours paid to them, as the God at Delphi shall direct. And a similar tribute shall be assigned to those who die at home after doing eminent service.*

But how will our soldiers treat their enemies? They will distinguish between Hellenes and barbarians. No Hellenic city shall be enslaved; no Hellene held in bondage. And it shall be forbidden

to despoil the dead, both on grounds of humanity and discipline. Hellenic armour (unless by Divine command) shall not be hung as a trophy in the temples of Greek Gods. Nor shall Hellenic territory be ravaged, or Hellenic villages burnt. For the quarrel of Hellene with Hellene is not war, but sedition, an untoward variance between kinsmen; and it should be kept within strict bounds, not suffered to degenerate into unnatural violence. Nor should men act as if such contention were irreconcileable. In warring with barbarians, which alone is truly war, the usages heretofore practised by the Hellenes in fighting amongst themselves are quite barbarous enough. *Republic V. 466 D–471 C*

οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, . . . (E) πολεμήσουσιν] 'The only question that remains, is as to the possibility of the scheme.' 'That is what I was going to suggest.' 'We need not speak about war, for it is obvious what will be the manner of their wars.' 466 D

ἔφθης . . . ὑπολήψεσθαι] 'You have forestalled an interruption which I was meditating.' ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι has the meaning of interrupting, taking up a conversation, cp. Prot. 318 A ὑπολαβὼν . . . εἶπεν.

περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ, κ.τ.λ.] **γάρ** introduces the reason why the possibility of the scheme is the *only* remaining topic (λοιπόν supra). The real motive of the digression is an artistic one. The great *peripeteia*, the on-rushing of the 'third wave,' is made more impressive by being delayed. E

ὅτι κοινῇ . . . (467 A) καὶ μητέρας] The words **διακονεῖν, κ.τ.λ.**, follow the general notion of what is fitting. They may be construed with **ἄξουσι**, but the change is occasioned by **δεήσει** intervening. For **ἁδροί** cp. Hdt. iv. 180 ἐπεὰν δὲ γυναικὶ τὸ παιδίον ἁδρὸν γένηται.

οἷα δὴ ἐν πολέμῳ φιλεῖ] sc. γίγνεσθαι. Cp. viii. 565 E ἀδίκως ἐπαιτιώμενος, οἷα δὴ **φιλοῦσιν** (sc. ποιεῖν). 467 B

ἀναλαβεῖν] here as often in later writers is intransitive in meaning = 'to recover.'

καὶ οὐκ ἄξιον κινδύνου] (1) **οὐκ ἄξιον** is co-ordinate with **σμικρόν**. 'Do you think the difference unimportant and not worth some risk?' Or (2) the words **οὐκ ἄξιον κινδύνου** are parenthetical and are to be joined with **θεωρεῖν**, neglecting **ἢ μή**. [B. J.] C

Republic V. **παῖδας . . . ἐσομένους**] 'Boys who are to be men of war.'

467 C **τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα ὑπαρκτέον**] 'This then we must begin with.' *ὑπάρχειν*, 'to begin with,' being used with the accusative as well as the genitive, is legitimately formed into a passive verbal with **τοῦτο** in the accusative. **προσμηχανᾶσθαι** depends on the general notion of duty implied in *ὑπαρκτέον*.

ὅσα ἄνθρωποι] sc. *γνῶναι πεφύκασι*. Cp. Crit. 46 E **ὅσα** *γε τἀνθρώπεια*.

D **εὐλαβήσονται**] sc. *ἄγειν*.

ἀλλὰ γάρ] introduces an objection. 'But this is not enough. For many accidents defy calculation.' This is said in the same spirit as supra B *σφαλεῖσιν, οἷα δὴ ἐν πολέμῳ φιλεῖ*. He is careful to enumerate all the risks with the view of providing against them.

E **καὶ διδαξαμένους ἱππεύειν**] 'And when we have had them taught to ride.' **διδαξαμένους** is a correction of *q*. Cp. Meno 93 D *Θεμιστοκλῆς Κλεόφαντον τὸν υἱὸν ἱππέα μὲν ἐδιδάξατο ἀγαθόν*. The construction of the accusative with the gerundive (**διδαξαμένους . . . ἀκτέον** = *ἡμᾶς διδαξαμένους αὐτοὺς* (sc. *τοὺς παῖδας*) *δεῖ ἄγειν*) is quite legitimate; although *διδαξαμένοις* would be more unequivocal here. The reading of A Π M, *διδαξομένους*, could only mean 'that they may teach themselves to ride.' But it would surely be more reasonable for them to learn to ride before they were taken on such expeditions. And the rare reflexive use in Aristoph. Clouds 127: Soph. Ant. 356 will not justify such an interpretation either of the future or of the aorist here. Another reading, *διδαχθέντας*, is probably conjectural. The passage is referred to in vii. 537 A.

τὸ αὑτῶν ἔργον] sc. *ἐσόμενον*.

468 A **πῶς ἑκτέον σοι τοὺς στρατιώτας**] **πῶς ἑκτέον**; = *πῶς ἔχειν δεῖ*; **σοι** is an ethic dative: 'How should you have your soldiers disposed to one another and to their enemies?'

ποῖ' ἄν] sc. *εἴη τὰ σοὶ καταφαινόμενα*. [H. Richards cj. *ποῖα δή*;]

τοῖς θέλουσι] sc. *ἔχειν*.

B **δεξιωθῆναι**] *δεξιοῦσθαι* often means 'to extend the right hand towards a person in token of admiration.' See especially Soph. El. 975, 976: Xen. Hellen. v. 1, 3 *οὐδεὶς ἐκεῖνον τῶν στρατιωτῶν ὃς οὐκ* **ἐδεξιώσατο**, *καὶ ὁ μὲν ἐστεφάνωσεν, κ.τ.λ.*

καὶ μηδενὶ ἐξεῖναι] **καί**, which is omitted in some MSS., including A, may indicate the addition of a further clause to the law. 'Be it furthermore enacted,' &c. Cp. iii. 417 A and note. *Republic V.* 468 C

αἱρέσεις τῶν τοιούτων] Either (1) 'there will be more frequent selections of such men' (**τοιούτων** referring to **ἀγαθῷ ὄντι**) 'than of others by the rulers to take part in the marriage festivals,' cp. supra 460 A, B; or (2) 'success in winning such prizes.'

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ καθ' Ὅμηρον . . . (D) **τὴν ἰσχὺν αὐξήσει**] Il. vii. 321, 322

νώτοισιν δ' Αἴαντα διηνεκέεσσι γέραιρεν
ἥρως Ἀτρεΐδης, εὐρυκρείων Ἀγαμέμνων.

As in iii. 408 B and elsewhere, Socrates takes a humorous delight in supporting his opinions by the authority of Homer.

ὡς ταύτην οἰκείαν οὖσαν τιμήν] 'implying that this was a proper way of honouring.' D

ταῦτά γε] 'in *this*,' although we refuse to follow him in other things (ii. 383 A, &c.).

νῦν δή] supra B, C.

καὶ κρέασιν . . . δεπάεσσιν] Il. viii. 162: xii. 311. This may seem a curious form of training and hardly consistent with iii. 390 A, B, &c.; but compare Laws i. 649. Plato cannot be held up as an advocate of total abstinence, but rather of moderation in the use of wine. E

τοῦ χρυσοῦ γένους] iii. 415 A–C.

ἀλλ' οὐ πεισόμεθα Ἡσιόδῳ] The lines which follow are altered from Hesiod, Op. et Dies, 121 ff.:

τοὶ μὲν δαίμονές εἰσι Διὸς μεγάλου διὰ βουλάς,
ἐσθλοί, ἐπιχθόνιοι, φύλακες θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων.

They occur also in Crat. 398 A, where it is inferred that Hesiod meant by *δαίμονες* the wise and good. Ib. C *ὃς ἂν ἀγαθὸς ᾖ δαιμόνιον εἶναι, καὶ ζῶντα καὶ τελευτήσαντα καὶ ὀρθῶς* **δαίμονα** *καλεῖσθαι.*

τοῦ τοιούτου] *τοῦ χρυσοῦ.* Cp. iv. 424 A.

πῶς χρὴ . . . τιθέναι] 'how to order the sepulture of heroic and divine persons': *τιθέναι* used absolutely for *ἐς ταφὰς τιθέναι* (cp. *τὰς θήκας* infra B). 469 A

τί δέ; πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους, κ.τ.λ.] Plato would make a distinction B

Republic *V.* 469 B between Greek meeting Greek and the wars of Greeks with barbarians, not unlike that which has been observed in modern times between the wars of civilized nations with one another and with Orientals or savages.

What are to be the usages of war is a question which has not received a complete solution. This is due to the comparative infrequency of wars and the variety of their circumstances. The precedents are few and there are no courts to sanction or register them. Still some shadow or reflection of law seems to watch over a state of man which in one sense is the negation of law. As in other cases in which the law of nations fails, the law of nature tends to appear. 1. In ancient times there was a faith that 'God would defend the right'; and in our own day justice has not so entirely vanished from the world, but that some plea or appearance of right also gives might. 2. As there must be a degree of justice in the commencement, there must also be some regard to the common rights of humanity in the conduct of a war: (*a*) so much truth and sincerity in the dealings of the two adversaries as may enable them to fight collectively; an army would cease to be an army which had no word of honour with their opponents; (*b*) so much humanity as is consistent with the object of war; everyone would agree that a destruction of life or property, say of an unfortified town or of helpless persons, which had no military result, was barbarous and inhuman; (*c*) but the question when the destruction of life and property is justified by the military result is always a matter of opinion; (*d*) the first thoughts of mankind regard war as a great evil, which is to be humanized as far as possible; their second thoughts lead them to doubt the 'greatest humanity principle,' as likely to multiply and protract the evil: on the other hand, cruelty or severity, which may perhaps tend to shorten wars, tends also to deprive them of their chivalry, and to demoralize those who are engaged in them; (*e*) neutral nations insist that the two belligerents shall not be allowed so to injure one another, as permanently to injure the world: also that they shall settle their quarrel within as narrow limits and with as little injury to others as possible. 3. An element of feeling and courtesy happily enters into the usages of war; the friendly relation of individuals is not wholly absorbed in the collective antagonism; the condition of prisoners is ameliorated, and the communications between the two parties are couched in friendly language, and are not interpreted by legal technicalities.

4. No Christian or civilized nation would willingly overstep the limits of custom. The soldier may be trained to give the most fatal wound; the engineer may invent deadly machines: but the suggestion of any new kind of death by poisoning and suffocation is revolting to the military as well as to the common feeling. With a like inconsistency, the Greek, who slew his prisoners, nevertheless restored the bodies of the slain. 5. Speculative politicians have sometimes imagined that war, which has been in some degree regulated, might be further conventionalized into a duel between armies and fleets. But the elements of war are never so completely under our control, or the situation so equal, as to admit of such a convention. International law, whether about neutral ships or goods, rights of blockade, privateering, can only be altered by common consent; and the alterations commonly affect the relative positions of different nations in the event of war. 6. That one usage of war should be maintained towards Greeks, one towards barbarians—one towards Europeans, another towards Indians or New Zealanders, may be palliated by necessity or previous wrong, but cannot be defended in theory. 'A great nation's little wars' are commonly the least creditable part of her history. *Republic* V. 469 B

δοκεῖ δίκαιον . . . τοῦτο ἐθίζειν] ἄλλῃ sc. *πόλει* (*ἄλλῳ* Ξ). For the form of sentence cp. Theaet. 154 A *ἔχεις τοῦτο ἰσχυρῶς, ἢ πολὺ μᾶλλον, κ.τ.λ.* For the influence of this feeling on actual Greek usages of war cp. Xen. Hellen. i. 6, § 14 *κελευόντων τῶν συμμάχων ἀποδόσθαι καὶ τοὺς Μηθυμναίους οὐκ ἔφη (ὁ Καλλικρατίδας) ἑαυτοῦ γε ἄρχοντος οὐδένα Ἑλλήνων εἰς τὸ ἐκείνου δυνατὸν ἀνδραποδισθῆναι.*

καὶ τοῦτο ἐθίζειν] sc. *τοὺς Ἕλληνας*. Our state is a Greek state (cp. 470 E) and will therefore habitually spare their own kinsmen.

τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων δουλείαν] 'Their enslavement by the barbarians.'

ὅλῳ καὶ παντί] 'altogether,' *ganz und gar*. The expression is varied in different places, *τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ παντί* (Rep. vii. 527 C): *τῷ παντὶ καὶ ὅλῳ* (Laws v. 734 E). C

μηδὲ . . . ξυμβουλεύειν;] 'Is it just that they should not even possess a Greek as a slave and that they should advise the other Hellenes not to do so either?' The sentence is divided by **μήτε . . . τε**, the latter particle introducing a variation of *μήτε τοὺς ἄλλους*. The infinitives depend on the general notion of *δοκεῖ δίκαιον*, understood from the previous question.

Republic V. 469 C **σκυλεύειν . . . πλὴν ὅπλων, κ.τ.λ.**] Xenophon tells us (Hell. ii. 4, § 19) that Thrasybulus and his friends, after their victory over the thirty tyrants, *τὰ μὲν ὅπλα ἔλαβον, τοὺς δὲ χιτῶνας οὐδενὸς τῶν πολιτῶν ἐσκύλευσαν.*

ἢ οὐ πρόφασιν . . . τοῖς δειλοῖς ἔχει] For the use of *ἔχω* cp. Thuc. ii. 41 *οὔτε τῷ πολεμίῳ ἐπελθόντι ἀγανάκτησιν ἔχει.*

E **τοῦ βαλόντος**] 'of him who hit them,' is the reading of Par. A. Other MSS. have *βάλλοντος*, 'of the thrower' in general, or 'of him who is throwing at them.' This passage is quoted by Aristotle, Rhet. iii. 4, § 3, as a specimen of an *εἰκών*: *καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος, ὅτι οἱ τοὺς τεθνεῶτας σκυλεύοντες ἐοίκασι τοῖς κυνιδίοις, ἃ τοὺς λίθους δάκνει τῶν βαλλόντων οὐχ ἁπτόμενα.*

ἐατέον . . . τὰς τῶν ἀναιρέσεων διακωλύσεις] 'We must let alone spoliation of the dead, or prevention of the removal of corpses.' See Thuc. iv. 97–101 (the affair of Delium).

ἐατέον μέντοι] **μέντοι** here implies strong assent to a proposition which alters what had previously been thought.

470 A **ἐὰν μή τι δή, κ.τ.λ.**] Plato thus avoids clashing directly with religious tradition. He will not lay down the law too rigidly, but allows an appeal against himself to the oracle of Delphi (iv. 427 B, C). See Paus. x. 10, § 3.

γῆς τε τμήσεως] For the omission of *περί* cp. supra 459 B *τί δὲ ἵππων οἴει . . .;* vii. 515 B *τί δὲ τῶν παραφερομένων; οὐ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο;* and Gorg. 500 D. The correction *τιμήσεως*, formerly adopted by the Zurich editors ('assessment of the territory'?), is not in keeping with the corresponding clause, and is unsupported by manuscript authority. What is expressed in *γῆν τέμνειν*, which is forbidden, is clearly more than the removal of the year's produce, which he allows (infra D), and would include the cutting down of fruit-trees, the destruction of farm buildings and the like.

τί σοι δράσουσιν] For **σοι** cp. supra 468 A *πῶς ἑκτέον* **σοι** *τοὺς στρατιώτας;*

B **δύο ταῦτα, κ.τ.λ.**] The article *τά*, which is added after *ταῦτα* in some MSS. (M Ξ), throws a stronger emphasis on the verb, but makes no real difference in the sense: 'It appears to me that wars and sedition, as they are two in name, are two in reality.'

ὄντα ἐπὶ δυοῖν . . . τῇ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου πόλεμος] 'being applied to

differences arising in two things. And the two things I speak of are what is domestic or kindred and what is alien or foreign. Accordingly sedition is the name for the enmity of what is domestic: war, for the enmity of what is alien.' The quarrel or enmity of what is domestic and kindred = the quarrel of one state with itself: the quarrel or enmity of what is alien and foreign = the quarrel of two states with one another. For καλεῖν ὄνομα ἐπί τινι cp. Parmen. 147 D, Soph. 218 C: and for the use of the passive, Eurip. Hec. 1271 τύμβῳ δ' ὄνομα σῷ **κεκλήσεται**. The particle **οὖν** (**ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν**), which is omitted in a few MSS., is probably genuine. It is hardly worth while, therefore, to discuss whether the asyndeton which is occasioned by the omission of οὖν is justified by examples. The genitives are possessive or descriptive: 'where the relation is that of kindred,' 'where it is that of aliens.' For the definition of **στάσις** cp. Soph. 228 A τὴν τοῦ φύσει ξυγγενοῦς ἔκ τινος διαφθορᾶς **διαφοράν**. Republic V. 470 B

καὶ οὐδέν γε . . . ἄπο τρόπου λέγεις] 'That is a very just mode of speaking.' **ἄπο** in the sense of 'away from' is accented by the grammarians as a paroxytone, a distinction however which is often neglected in the MSS.

ὅρα δὴ καὶ εἰ τόδε . . . λέγω] **καί** belongs in sense to **τόδε**. C

Ἕλληνας μὲν ἄρα . . . τὴν ἔχθραν ταύτην κλητέον] A slight variation in the order of the text occurs here: instead of **πολεμεῖν μαχομένους τε . . . εἶναι**, some MSS. (including A mg.) read μαχομένους πολεμεῖν τε in order to give **τε** its proper position after the main verb. But τε may follow πολεμεῖν μαχομένους as a single word.

ξυγχωρῶ οὕτω νομίζειν] 'I agree to hold this language.' D

ἐν τῇ νῦν ὁμολογουμένῃ στάσει] 'In what people now agree in calling sedition,' i.e. in sedition as ordinarily understood, as opposed to the new meaning which Socrates has given to it, viz. the war of Greeks with Greeks. For the use of **νῦν** in such a connexion cp. ii. 372 E ὄψα ἅπερ καὶ οἱ νῦν ἔχουσι: vii. 529 A ὡς μὲν νῦν αὐτὴν μεταχειρίζονται οἱ εἰς φιλοσοφίαν ἀνάγοντες.

ὡς ἀλιτηριώδης τε, κ.τ.λ.] **ὡς** is substituted for ὅτι at the beginning of the sentence. It is to be taken with **ἀλιτηριώδης** in the sense of 'how.' 'How wicked does the strife appear! and neither of the two parties seem lovers of their country.' Cp. vi. 496 C.

τὴν τροφόν τε καὶ μητέρα κείρειν] See note on iii. 414 E.

Republic V. **μέτριον εἶναι**] The force of δοκεῖ is continued from above.

470 E **ὡς διαλλαγησομένων**] For the construction of **διανοεῖσθαι ὡς** cp. i. 327 C **ὡς** . . . *μὴ* **ἀκουσομένων** . . . **διανοεῖσθε**: vii. 523 C **ὡς** *ἐγγύθεν τοίνυν* **ὁρωμένους** *λέγοντός μου* **διανοοῦ**.

αὕτη ἡ διάνοια ἐκείνης] **αὕτη** refers to the words immediately preceding, *τοὺς καρποὺς ἀφαιρεῖσθαι . . . πολεμησόντων*: **ἐκείνης** to *ἐὰν ἑκάτεροι, κ.τ.λ.*

ἣν σὺ πόλιν οἰκίζεις] *σύ* is emphatic. The new city shares the nationality of Glaucon, who is playfully called the founder of it.

ἀλλ' οὐ . . . ὧνπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἱερῶν;] For **οὐδέ** in interrogations cp. supra 455 E **οὐδὲ** *πολεμική*;

471 A **σωφρονιοῦσιν**] For the significance of this term cp. Xen. Hell. iii. 2, § 23 *ἔδοξε τοῖς ἐφόροις καὶ τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ* **σωφρονίσαι** *αὐτούς* (sc. *τοὺς* Ἠλείους), and the context there.

B **ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναιτίων ἀλγούντων**] The innocent, who are in the majority (cp. *ὡς φίλων τῶν πολλῶν*), compel the minority (cp. *ὀλίγους ἀεὶ ἐχθρούς, κ.τ.λ.*), for whose guilt they are made to smart, to submit.

πρὸς δὲ τοὺς βαρβάρους, ὡς . . . πρὸς ἀλλήλους] 'And they should deal with barbarians as the Greeks now deal with one another.' The irony is transparent.

In the previous clause the ingenuity of the transcriber of *q* has unnecessarily altered *ἐναντίους* into *Ἕλληνας*. That Greeks only are intended is clear from the context.

C **θῶμεν, ἔφη . . . καὶ τὰ πρόσθεν**] The infinitive **ἔχειν** is governed by **θῶμεν**, which is used in two constructions: 'We will lay down this law, and we will assume that this and the former enactments are excellent.' For the infinitive after *τίθημι* cp. i. 331 A *ἔγωγε* **τίθημι** *τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτῆσιν πλείστου ἀξίαν εἶναι.*

471 C–473 C *Glaucon grows impatient of the digression and Socrates can no longer elude the advance of the 'third and greatest wave.' The new institution involves innumerable benefits, but is it possible? Can this ideal ever become real?*

Socrates first pleads that such a demand goes beyond the aim proposed (ii. 368), *which is to find the nature of Justice in the abstract. If we have made that discovery, our success will not be*

discredited, though we should be unable to show an actual embodiment of Justice answering to the ideal conception of it. It is enough to have obtained a pattern by which to judge of approximate resemblances, without seeking for absolute agreement. And if asked in what way the nearest approximation can be made, we must premise that in the nature of things all practical realization must fall short of the ideal as conceived in thought and expressed in language. *Republic V. 471 C–473 C*

What then is the simplest and least difficult change within the range of human possibility, by which the present hindrances to the attainment of perfection may be removed? One change there is that would effect this object, and it is not impossible, though neither slight nor easy.

ὅτι γε, εἰ γένοιτο . . . ᾗ γένοιτο, κ.τ.λ.] The point to be chiefly dwelt on is put forward, leaving the construction in suspense, and the words **καὶ ἃ σὺ παραλείπεις ἐγὼ λέγω** supply the apodosis: 'For as to the advantages of this form of government, if possible, to the state in which it might be possible, I add particulars not mentioned by you.' For a similar turn of expression cp. iv. 420 A *ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ταῦτά γε ἐπισίτιοι . . . κατηγορημένα*, and for **παρωσάμενος** cp. Soph. Trach. 358 *ὃν νῦν* **παρώσας** *οὗτος ἔμπαλιν λέγει*. 471 C

ὅτι καὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις, κ.τ.λ.] As in vii. 528 E, 537 D, the lively imagination of Glaucon seizes on the incidental results and circumstances of the institution which is in question. **γιγνώσκοντες** is to be taken closely with what follows, 'acknowledging each other as brothers,' &c. Compare supra 461 C.

στραγγευομένῳ] instead of the unmeaning *στρατευομένῳ*, is the ingenious emendation of Orelli; and is also found as a correction in the Viennese MS. F: 'You have no mercy on my hesitation.' The metaphor in the word **στραγγεύομαι** is taken from the falling of drops of water extracted by pressure: cp. *στρεύγομαι*, and for the use of the word Aristoph. Nubes 131 *τί ταῦτ' ἔχων στραγγεύομαι*; Acharn. 126 *κᾆπειτ' ἐγὼ δῆτ' ἐνθαδὶ* **στραγγεύομαι**; This reading is confirmed by the resumption of the same idea in **ὤκνουν τε καὶ** *ἐδεδοίκη* infra. *στρατευομένῳ* may have been suggested to a scribe by the association of **καταδρομὴν ἐποιήσω**: or possibly by the notion which Stallbaum seems to entertain that warfare is the subject in hand. 472 A

Republic *V.* 472 A **τῆς τρικυμίας**] The same metaphor occurs in the Euthydemus 293 A *σῶσαι ἡμᾶς . . . ἐκ* **τῆς τρικυμίας** *τοῦ λόγου.* It is continued infra 473 C *ἐπ' αὐτὸ δὴ . . . εἶμι ὃ τῷ μεγίστῳ προσεικάζομεν κύματι.*

ὃ ἐπειδὰν . . . ἐπιχειρεῖν διασκοπεῖν] **ἀκούσῃς** still preserves the metaphor of the wave, referring to its roar. The expression **ὅτι εἰκότως ἄρα** expands the idea of **συγγνώμην,** 'you will make allowance for me and feel that my hesitation was natural.'

λόγον λέγειν τε] This is the reading of ΜΞ. The reading of Par. A, Ven. Π, *λέγειν λόγον τε,* might be preferred as the *durior lectio,* but on no other ground. It is probably an accidental mis-writing. The reading of the text is also supported by *q* corr., the first hand having written *λέγειν λέγειν* according to Schneider, who examined the MS. after Bekker.

ἧττον] sc. *τοσούτῳ ἧττον.*

B **οὐκοῦν, κ.τ.λ.**] As a preparation for the third and last wave, which is still impending, Socrates returns to the main object of the work, which, as he again reminds us, is the search after justice and injustice, first in the state, and secondly in the individual. The ideal of justice is not the less ideal because incapable of realization, any more than the perfection of human beauty in a picture is less perfect because there is no ideal man like the man in the picture. Therefore Socrates regards the task required of him, to prove the possibility of his state in fact, as a work of supererogation, the failure of which in no way interferes with the truth of his speculations, and in which only a contingent and imperfect success is to be expected. The spirit of this passage may be compared with vi. 501 ff., where the relation of the ideal to the actual is again in question. In both these passages Plato talks of painters as copyists of the Idea. In Book x he speaks of them along with poets as mere copyists of the copy. The former view comes nearer to the modern notion of art as the idealization of nature than the ordinary Greek conception of *μιμητική.*

ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτό γ';] sc. *εἶπες,* 'why that?'

οὐδέν· ἀλλ' ἐάν] 'Only that if.' Cp. supra 461 D *οὐδαμῶς* and note.

ἆρα καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν δίκαιον . . . διαφέρειν] Plato here implies that it is the nature of the actual to fall short of the ideal, and of the concrete to fall short of the abstract.

οὕτως] 'The latter,' answering the last question.

εἰ γένοιτο] These words may be explained to mean 'whether he could be produced'; but they are then inconsistent with *οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα* infra D. Madvig would obviate the difficulty by omitting **καί**. But the tautology of **εἰ γένοιτο . . . γενόμενος** is then very weak, and it is better to cancel *εἰ γένοιτο* as a gloss on *γενόμενος*. Another expedient is to read *ᾗ* (*ἄν*?) *γένοιτο* with Bekker. **τελέως** is omitted in Ven. II. [There is no inconsistency between *εἰ γένοιτο . . . γενόμενος* and *ἀλλ' οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα* infra D: to inquire whether perfect justice or a perfectly just man are possible is a different thing from trying to demonstrate their possibility. B. J.] 472 C

τὴν ἐκείνοις μοῖραν ὁμοιοτάτην ἕξειν] *τὴν ἐκείνης*, the reading of Par. A and most MSS., 'The lot that is most like justice,' is not ungrammatical, but extremely improbable, as answering to **ἐκείνοις . . . ὁμοιότατος** preceding. It is much more likely that *ἐκείνης* is due to itacism or to an echo of the phrase *μηδὲν δεῖν αὐτῆς* **ἐκείνης** *διαφέρειν* in what precedes.

ἵν' ἀποδείξωμεν] is the explanation of **τούτου ἕνεκα**: cp. infra *τούτου ἕνεκα, ἐὰν μὴ ἔχωμεν*. D

τὰ αὐτὰ διομολόγησαι] Socrates in 472 D had extracted from Glaucon the admission that an artist who cannot demonstrate the possibility of the existence of a man so beautiful as he has painted is not to be considered inferior for that reason. Here, before he attempts to show the possibility of his communistic scheme, he asks Glaucon to make the same admission, in a different, it is true, and more universal form: 'That action can never come up to description.' E

ἦ φύσιν ἔχει, κ.τ.λ.] 'All experience is against this, but that is no reason for doubting the truth of it,' says Euler (quoted by Coleridge) of the properties of the arch. He means that the mathematical ideal of the arch is imperfectly realized in matter. The relation of mathematics to physics is a good because a definite type of the relation of the abstract to the concrete. The ideal of the state is much farther removed from actual fact; or in Plato's words, 'action falls short of conception or expression, though some may deem otherwise.' What is true or perfect is one thing: what is possible, another. And great evils may arise from an attempt to enforce political ideals on a state of the world unsuited to them,— 473 A

Republic V. the 'respublica Platonis' or 'the primitive church,' 'in faece Romuli' or 'the dregs of the Gothic empire.'

473 A For the expression **φύσιν ἔχει** cp. vi. 489 B *οὐ γὰρ* **ἔχει φύσιν** *κυβερνήτην ναυτῶν δεῖσθαι ἄρχεσθαι.*

κἂν εἰ μή τῳ δοκεῖ;] i. e. though it may seem an inversion of the recognized opposition between *λόγος* and *ἔργον.* **ἀλλὰ σύ** is an appeal from common opinion to the judgement of Glaucon.

καὶ τῷ ἔργῳ δεῖν] **δεῖν** is pleonastic, expanding **ἀνάγκαζε.**

φάναι] is the common use of the infinitive for the second person of the imperative (like *φάσκειν* in poetry). Cp. vi. 508 B *τοῦτον τοίνυν* . . . **φάναι** *με λέγειν,* and 509 B *καὶ τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις τοίνυν μὴ μόνον τὸ γιγνώσκεσθαι* **φάναι, κ.τ.λ.**

B **ἃ σὺ ἐπιτάττεις**] sc. *ἐξευρεῖν ὡς δυνατὰ ὄντα γίγνεσθαι,* 'which you bid us find to be capable of coming into existence.'

ὡς ἔοικε, πειρώμεθα] *πειρώμεθα* is probably subjunctive: cp. Theaet. 173 C *λέγωμεν δή, ὡς ἔοικε.*

473 C–474 D *The change required is nothing short of this. Either kings and rulers must be philosophers or philosophers kings. Until that is effected, there can be no happiness for individual or state.*

This is a hard saying, and to escape from the consequences of having uttered it we must distinguish whom we mean by 'philosophers.'

473 C **ἐπ' αὐτὸ δὴ . . . κατακλύσειν**] For **ἐπ' αὐτὸ . . . εἶμι** cp. infra 476 B **ἐπ' αὐτὸ** *τὸ καλὸν* . . . **ἰέναι.** The pronoun is used as in Soph. O. T. 1169 *πρὸς* **αὐτῷ** *γ' εἰμὶ τῷ δεινῷ λέγειν.* The metaphor of the laughing wave is perhaps the most audacious in Plato; the wave which has been following us throughout the book, since our first plunge, supra 453 D, is at last turned into a roaring sea of ridicule.

εἰρήσεται δ' οὖν] 'But the word shall be spoken, come what may.'

ἐὰν μὴ . . . (E) διεληλύθαμεν] (Cp. Laws iv. 710, 711, where a wise and virtuous despotism is affirmed to be the best basis of legislation: *εἰ τύραννος γένοιτο . . . νέος, σώφρων, εὐμαθής, μνήμων, ἀνδρεῖος, μεγαλοπρεπής*).

In this celebrated sentence Plato expresses the real unity of

practical and speculative life. Everywhere they seem to diverge—in politics, in religion, in the characters of men; but the principle which unites them lies deeper than the divergences. One is subject to the idols of the tribe, the other, of the den; the one is of this world, the other not of this world: the one is strong within a limited range, the other has a feeble intelligence of all things. The philosopher, in the description of the Theaetetus (173 ff.), may hardly recognize the existence of his fellow-creatures: the lawyer or politician in the companion picture (ib. 175) often knows only a narrow and debased section of human nature, and is as much out of his element in extraordinary circumstances as the philosopher is in common life. And there are false ways in which the two elements may be reconciled—in the doctrinaire (Euthyd. 305), in the pseudo-philanthropist, in the political idealist, or in any premature and superficial attempts to rest society on a liberal and philosophical basis. There is a real reconcilement of them when the king is also a seer, or the statesman in the highest sense is a philosopher, equal to the immediate present, rising also into the more distant future. The words of the text may also be regarded as a sort of Greek prophecy of a millennium: 'I heard a voice crying, The kingdoms of the world are become the kingdoms of wisdom and truth.' *Republic V.* 473 C

The passage is the keystone of the Republic. In other writings of Plato the speculative is divorced from the practical: in the Republic there is an attempt to unite them. The philosopher is no longer an isolated being who lives in contemplation; he descends from his 'mountain heights' to dwell among his own people, and in 'his father's house,' 'if there is such a home upon the earth' (ix. 592 B).

οἱ βασιλῆς . . . λεγόμενοι] It is implied that the actual rulers of the world are not true kings. D

καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ταὐτὸν συμπέσῃ] 'And unless these two, political power and philosophy, meet together in the same.' Two things are here spoken of which coalesce in one. In the form of the sentence their coalition is anticipated. Cp. iv. 435 A and note.

εἰς τὸ δυνατόν] 'so far as is possible,' in the nature of things. Such touches of moderation (in accordance with supra 472 ff.) occur in the most ideal passages of Plato. Cp. especially Symp. 212 A *καὶ εἴπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπων, ἀθανάτῳ κἀκείνῳ*: Phaedr. 253 A *καθ' ὅσον δυνατὸν θεοῦ ἀνθρώπῳ μετασχεῖν.* E

Republic V. 473 E It may be asked whether there has ever been a period in which this dream of the Republic has received a fulfilment: in the course of ages, as Plato pathetically asks, may there not have been a king who was also a philosopher? Some would add a further condition, not only that the king should be a philosopher, but that he should rule over a people fitted to receive his institutions. The names of the philosophical Roman emperors naturally occur to us; as has been truly said, one of the greatest blessings to the world would have been the adoption of Christianity by Marcus Antoninus instead of by Constantine. Still nearer approaches to a philosopher-king may be found in the legislators and princes of the East: Zoroaster, Sakya Muni, in the Mahometan emperor Akbar Khan, in our own Alfred the Great or the Mexican Montezuma.

Nor have there been wanting in our own day one or two who have shown a remarkable union of philosophical genius with military and political insight. Compare the ideal of the Puritans and the French Protestants.

χαλεπὸν γὰρ ἰδεῖν] 'It is given to few to perceive.' Cp. Phaedo 62 B *ὁ . . . λόγος . . . μέγας τέ τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ* **οὐ ῥᾴδιος** *διϊδεῖν*. **χαλεπόν** is used of an excellence rarely attained: cp. Theaet. 144 A *ὡς ἄλλῳ* **χαλεπόν**.

καὶ ὅς, Ὦ Σώκρατες, κ.τ.λ.] We are reminded of the manner in which the upholders of paradoxical or revolutionary ideas are threatened with popular hostility in Aristophanes, e. g. Birds 310 ff., Wasps 400 ff., and Acharnians 280 ff.

The famous words are introduced with great circumstance and preparation. The expectation has been raised by the image of the wave; at last the time has arrived for the revelation of the overwhelming truth. The real solemnity of the revelation is instantly broken by the ludicrous outburst which follows. Socrates admits all the consequences which are urged, and gravely charges them upon his companion. The companion promises to help with good wishes and encouragement, which are all that he has to offer; and Socrates, having such a champion to support him, takes heart, and, still relieving the discourse by ludicrous imagery, proceeds to the description of philosophy.

474 B **διαδήλων**] 'distinguished,' i. e. from those whom we do not mean.

The philosopher loves wisdom in its entirety. His desires are fixed on universal truth: not as seen in the concrete, but as known in the abstract. For between knowledge and ignorance there is an intermediate faculty of sense or opinion (δόξα), *and between being and nonentity there is an intermediate region of 'contingent-matter.' Now, as being corresponds to knowledge, and not-being to ignorance, so the contingent, which now is and now is not, must be the object of the blinking, twilight faculty of opinion. That is the sphere of sense and ordinary thinking, and has no share in philosophy.* *Republic V. 474 C–480*

οὐ γὰρ πάνυ γε] 'Not perfectly.' Cp. iv. 429 C and note. 474 D

δάκνουσι] Compare the image in the Symposium of those who are 'bitten' with philosophy 218 A *τὴν καρδίαν . . . πληγείς τε καὶ* **δηχθεὶς** *ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λόγων*: Eurip. Hippol. 1301–1303 *τῆς γὰρ ἐχθίστης θεῶν | ἡμῖν ὅσαισι παρθένειος ἡδονὴ |* **δηχθεῖσα** *κέντροις παιδὸς ἠράσθη σέθεν*. So with comic exaggeration, *δαρδάπτει πόθος* in Aristoph. Ran. 66. *κνίζω* is the common word.

ἢ οὐχ οὕτω ποιεῖτε;] 'Is not this your way?' Cp. ii. 365 A *τί οἰόμεθα . . . ψυχὰς* **ποιεῖν**; and note.

ὁ μέν, ὅτι σιμός, κ.τ.λ.] A parallel to the thought is furnished by Hor. Sat. book I. iii. 38 'Illuc praevertamur amatorem quod amicae | Turpia decipiunt caecum vitia . . . Strabonem | Appellat Paetum pater:' Lucret. iv. 1160–1164 'Nigra melichrus est, immunda et fetida acosmos, | Caesia Palladium, nervosa et lignea dorcas | Parvula pumilio, chariton mia, tota merum sal, | Magna atque immanis cataplexis plenaque honoris.' In Charmides 154 B *ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ λευκὴ στάθμη εἰμὶ πρὸς τοὺς καλούς*, Socrates ironically represents himself as thus universally susceptible. Cp. Herrick, 'What I fancy, I approve, | No dislike there is in love.' For the colour of **μελίχλωρος** cp. Theocritus x. 26

> *βομβύκα* (silkworm) *χαρίεσσα, Σύραν καλέοντί τυ πάντες,*
> *ἰσχνάν, ἁλιόκαυστον· ἐγὼ δὲ μόνος μελίχλωρον*:

and for the expression **πάσας φωνὰς ἀφίετε**, Laws x. 890 D *ἀλλὰ* **πᾶσαν**, *τὸ λεγόμενον*, **φωνὴν ἱέντα** . . . *ἐπίκουρον γίγνεσθαι*.

The meaning is that the lover, by the excuses he makes for the defects of his favourites, proves that his love is not partial, but universal: in this he is the figure of the lover of knowledge. The idea of a 'whole' in this passage is less abstract than elsewhere in Plato, e.g. Theaet. 173 E, where philosophy is again the love of

Republic V. the whole, *πᾶσαν πάντῃ φύσιν ἐρευνωμένῃ τῶν ὄντων ἑκάστου* **ὅλου**. This is intentional, however, and prepares for the correction of Glaucon's view, infra 475 D, E.

475 A **εἰ βούλει . . . τοῦ λόγου χάριν**] 'If you wish to say, taking me as your example, that lovers act thus, I agree, for the argument's sake.' For this use of **ἐπί** cp. x. 597 B **ἐπ'** *αὐτῶν τούτων ζητήσωμεν τὸν μιμητὴν τοῦτον*, and Charm. 155 D *ὅς εἶπεν* **ἐπὶ** *καλοῦ λέγων παιδός*, κ.τ.λ.

καὶ μὴν φιλοτίμους γε] 'And further you see that lovers of honour,' &c., cp. **τοὺς φιλοίνους** supra. The article appears to be omitted for the sake of variety; the difference of meaning is hardly distinguishable in English.

τριττυαρχοῦσι] 'If they cannot be *στρατηγοί*, they are glad to be in command of the third of a tribe.' See Photius, p. 288: Pollux viii. 109.

C **τὸν . . . εὐχερῶς ἐθέλοντα, κ.τ.λ.**] The real lover of knowledge has a taste for every kind of knowledge.

E **ἀλλ' ὁμοίους μὲν φιλοσόφοις**] Aristotle says more seriously that the love of knowledge is apparent even in the delights of sensible perception: Metaph. i. 1 *Πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει. Σημεῖον δ' ἡ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἀγάπησις· καὶ γὰρ χωρὶς τῆς χρείας ἀγαπῶνται δι' αὑτάς, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἄλλων ἡ διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων . . . Αἴτιον δ' ὅτι μάλιστα ποιεῖ γνωρίζειν τι ἡμᾶς αὕτη τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ πολλὰς δηλοῖ διαφοράς.* For the use of *μέν* cp. Theaet. 201 B *οὐδαμῶς ἔγωγε οἶμαι, ἀλλὰ πεῖσαι μέν.*

οὐδαμῶς . . . τὸ τοιόνδε] (1) Socrates appeals to Glaucon's confession of discipleship, supra 474 A, B. Cp. vi. 504 E, 505 A: Phaedo 100 B, C. This agrees better with the context and with the tone of the passage than to suppose (2) that Socrates is continuing the raillery with which he attacked Glaucon, supra 474 D, E, 'A man of pleasure like you will readily perceive that beauty and ugliness are not the same.'

476 A **τῇ δὲ τῶν πράξεων . . . καὶ ἀλλήλων κοινωνίᾳ**] Plato here supposes, first of all, an admixture of the ideas with human actions, and with sensible objects; secondly, with one another. For the intercommunion of ideas, cp. Soph. 250 ff. It may also be illustrated from infra 478 E, where *τὸ δοξαστόν* is shown to be *τὸ ἀμφοτέρων μετέχον, τοῦ εἶναί τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι*: there is therefore no

reason for suspecting or emending the word ἀλλήλων. Cp. also Polit. 278 D μετατιθέμενα δ' εἰς τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων μακρὰς καὶ μὴ ῥᾳδίους συλλαβάς, κ.τ.λ. *Republic V.* 476 A

ἐπ' αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν δυνατοὶ ἰέναι] Cp. Sympos. 210 E πρὸς τέλος ἤδη ἰὼν . . . ἐξαίφνης κατόψεταί τι θαυμαστὸν τὴν φύσιν καλόν, κ.τ.λ. B

ἡγούμενός τέ τι αὐτὸ καλόν] For ἡγεῖσθαι (= νομίζειν) with a simple accusative and without εἶναι cp. Laws x. 899 D ὅτι μὲν ἡγεῖ θεούς, κ.τ.λ.: Soph. 222 B εἴτε . . . ἀνθρώπων . . . μηδεμίαν ἡγεῖ θήραν. D

καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου μετέχοντα] The language of μέθεξις is here used, although the ideal of justice has just before (472 C) been spoken of as παράδειγμα. The two notions, which are figures, are not here, as in Arist. Met. i. 6, §§ 3 and 4, opposed.

ἐπικρυπτόμενοι ὅτι οὐχ ὑγιαίνει] 'Drawing a veil over the fact that he is not in his right mind.' Cp. Phaedr. 268 E οὐκ ἀγρίως εἴποι ἄν, Ὦ μοχθηρέ, μελαγχολᾷς, ἀλλ' ἅτε μουσικὸς ὢν πρᾳότερον, ὅτι, Ὦ ἄριστε, κ.τ.λ. for a similar humanity of feeling. E

ἀλλ' ἡμῖν εἰπὲ τόδε] The sentence returns to the direct form, addressing the imaginary respondent.

ἱκανῶς οὖν . . . πάντῃ ἄγνωστον] Being, according to Plato in this passage, is the absolute object of knowledge; not-being, of ignorance; and the intermediate which partakes of both, matter of opinion. This last, as here expressed, is probably the earliest conception of contingent matter. That Plato should not have perceived that degrees of certainty are in the subject only, and have no corresponding object, considering the great difficulty which the ancient world experienced in disengaging subject and object, is not perhaps surprising: the wonder is rather that such a figment as a 'contingent or probable matter' should have survived in the traditions of modern logic. The other two conceptions of being and not-being also present a different aspect to the ancient philosopher and to the student of modern metaphysics. Being, according to Plato, is true existence, the essence of things human and divine, the correlative of absolute knowledge, almost the Supreme Being. To the modern metaphysician, on the other hand, being, as Hegel says, is a word only, the poorest and most void of all abstractions, which only by negation or combination with not-being attains to positive or definite meaning. The necessity of passing from being to the determinations of being or to 477 A

Republic V. 477 A actual phenomena was never seen distinctly in the Platonic philosophy (although approximately realized in the Sophist, Politicus, and Philebus). Not-being has in Plato, at least in the present passage, a positive or substantial existence, and is not perceived to be abstract or negative only.

ἱκανῶς . . . κἂν εἰ πλεοναχῇ σκοποῖμεν] The supposition refers to the negative notion implied in **ἱκανῶς**. 'We could not be more assured of this, even if we were to look at it in several more points of view.' For the implied admission that an important truth may be proved in more ways than one cp. x. 611 B: Theaet. 206 C *ἀλλὰ δὴ τούτου μὲν ἔτι κἂν ἄλλαι φανεῖεν ἀποδείξεις.*

τοῦ εἰλικρινῶς ὄντος] 'the pure light of being'; cp. Phaedo 67 B *γνωσόμεθα δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πᾶν* **τὸ εἰλικρινές**.

οὐκοῦν ***ἐπεὶ ἐπὶ** *μέν*, **κ.τ.λ.**] Most of the MSS. omit *δέ* after **μεταξύ**. Two of them (*q β'*) complete the sentence by adding *εἰ* after **οὐκοῦν**. Hermann and Baiter further amend *εἰ* by **ἐπεί**, for the omission of which the alliteration may afford a reason. This is adopted in the text. The true reading is uncertain. A further step is being taken in the argument: 'Since knowledge corresponded (**ἦν**) to being, and ignorance to not-being, for this intermediate must we not look for a corresponding intermediate between ignorance and knowledge, if such there be?'

B **κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν ἑκατέρα τὴν αὑτῆς**] For *αὐτήν* in the reading of Par. A, &c. (*κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν*), Hermann and the Zurich editors conjecture *ἄλλην* (cp. infra 478 B *ἄλλη δὲ ἑκατέρα, ὡς φαμέν*). But a safer correction is (with Schneider and the Viennese MS. F) to omit *αὐτήν*, which may be due to a repetition of the preceding letters | *ὰ τήν*. The addition of *ἢ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν* in Vind. E, &c. indicates an early variation of reading. The words from **κατά** to **αὑτῆς** are omitted in Ven. Ξ. Π M really agree with Par. A.

οὐκοῦν ἐπιστήμη μὲν . . . διελέσθαι] The words **γνῶναι ὡς ἔστι τὸ ὄν** are a resumption or epexegesis of the words which precede. Socrates returns to the same question below (478 A), where he repeats it in nearly the same words—*ἐπιστήμη μέν γέ που ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι, κ.τ.λ.* But first he will explain and illustrate by examples the meaning of the term 'faculties' or 'powers,' which he is employing. Compare the preliminary psychological discussion in iv. 435 ff.

D **δυνάμεως δ' εἰς ἐκεῖνο . . . ἀπεργαζομένην ἄλλην**] He means that faculties have no sensible qualities, but are known by their effects

only. This is a first principle of psychology. Cp. Ion 537 D ὅταν ἡ μὲν ἑτέρων πραγμάτων ᾖ ἐπιστήμη, ἡ δ' ἑτέρων, οὕτω καλῶ τὴν μὲν ἄλλην, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην τέχνην. And for the words οὔτε τινὰ χρόαν ὁρῶ οὔτε σχῆμα, κ.τ.λ. cp. Soph. 247 C, D and Theaet. 155 E (of the crude materialists) πράξεις δὲ καὶ γενέσεις καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἀόρατον οὐκ ἀποδεχόμενοι ὡς ἐν οὐσίας μέρει, whereas the disciples of Protagoras are said to uphold the existence of things (or processes) not visible. *Republic V.* 477 D

ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ τεταγμένην] Cp. i. 345 D ἐφ' ᾧ τέτακται: ib. 346 A.

ἐπιστήμην πότερον . . . φῂς εἶναι αὐτήν] The pronoun is unemphatic, being simply a resumption of the noun, which is placed at the beginning for the sake of emphasis.

εἰς τοῦτο . . . ἐρρωμενεστάτην] For the two-fold answer to one question in the same sentence cp. iv. 439 A ἔγωγε, ἦ δ' ὅς· πώματός γε.

εἰς δύναμιν] Cp. Soph. 235 A εἰς γόητα . . . θετέον. E

οἴσομεν] θήσομεν M *corr.* Θ Vind. D; and so Cobet. The use in the text is certainly singular. But φέρω is elsewhere used (with ἐπί) of referring a predicate to a subject (Soph. 237 C, Tim. 37 E), or a thought to its object (infra 478 B).

πῶς γὰρ ἄν . . . τιθείη] Δόξα is the faculty of opinion and is also nearly allied to sensible perception or sense. But what has opinion to do with perception? To us opinion is fallible and probable; sense is generally infallible. Opinion to us is for the most part concerned with the same matter as knowledge; sense with external objects only. The truth seems to be that here and in some other passages of Plato δόξα is a union or rather confusion of two operations of the mind which are really distinct. The origin of this confusion is to be sought for in the history of early Greek philosophy which opposed sense and opinion alike to the certainty of pure intellect. Both are opposed to the universal and neither of them affords a standard of measurement. Αἴσθησις and δόξα are however distinguished in Theaet. 187 A, where it is suggested that knowledge may be the same with true opinion.

ἐπιστήμη μέν γέ που ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι] sc. πέφυκεν. Cp. supra 477 B. 478 A

δόξα δέ, φαμέν, δοξάζειν] sc. πέφυκεν.

ἦ ταὐτὸν ὅπερ ἐπιστήμη γιγνώσκει] ἦ ταὐτόν sc. δόξα δοξάζει; 'Is it the nature of opinion to opine the same which knowledge knows?'

S 2

Republic V. 478 B **ἆρ' οὖν τὸ μὴ ὂν δοξάζει**] sc. *ὁ δοξάζων*: cp. i. 345 A *ἔστω μὲν ἄδικος, κ.τ.λ.* So infra C *οὐκ ἄρα . . . δοξάζει.* For the form of argument cp. Theaet. 188 D *δυνατὸν δὲ ὁτῳοῦν ὃ λέγετε, καί τις ἀνθρώπων τὸ μὴ ὂν δοξάσει; . . . ὁ ἄρα ἕν γέ τι ὁρῶν ὄν τι ὁρᾷ*: Soph. 237 D *τὸ τὶ τοῦτο ῥῆμα ἐπ' ὄντι λέγομεν ἑκάστοτε . . . ἀνάγκη τόν τι λέγοντα ἕν γέ τι λέγειν.*

μὴ ὄν γε] (1) sc. *τὸ μὴ ὄν*, which is resumed as the subject of **προσαγορεύοιτο** from supra *τὸ μὴ ὂν δοξάζει*. To this *μὴ ὄν γε* is attached as a ground or reason. 'Not-being, since non-existent, would not rightly be called one-thing, but, strictly, no-thing' (*μὴ ὄν γε* i. q. *εἰ μὴ εἴη γε*, Stallbaum).

[(2) It is better to take *μὴ ὄν* more simply for 'what is not' or ('not-being') the sense in which *μὴ ὄν τι* occurs just below. B. J.]

C **ἆρ' οὖν ἐκτὸς τούτων . . . ἀσαφείᾳ**] 'Does opinion then lie in a region beyond these, surpassing either knowledge in clearness, or ignorance in dimness?'—But if not 'without,' the argument proceeds to show that opinion is within these limits.

σκοτωδέστερον . . . φανότερον] Cp. Soph. 254 A *ὁ μὲν ἀποδιδράσκων εἰς τὴν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος* **σκοτεινότητα** *. . . κατανοῆσαι χαλεπός . . . ὁ δὲ . . . τῇ τοῦ ὄντος . . . προσκείμενος ἰδέᾳ, διὰ τὸ* **λαμπρὸν** *αὖ τῆς χώρας οὐδαμῶς εὐπετὴς ὀφθῆναι.*

D **οὐκοῦν ἔφαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν**] supra 477 A, B.

οἷον ἅμα ὄν τε καὶ μὴ ὄν] There is probably a confusion of the two constructions *οἷον εἶναι* and *φανείη ὄν.*

E **ἀποκρινέσθω ὁ χρηστός . . . (479 A) φιλοθεάμων**] *ἐκεῖνος ὁ φιλοθεάμων* is a resumption of *ὁ χρηστός*, referring to supra 475 D—476 B, C. For the vague reference cp. supra 460 A *τὸν φαῦλον* **ἐκεῖνον.** Socrates proceeds to show that sensible objects are and are not what they are:—They have no fixed character of their own; they are different in different relations.

479 A **ἡγεῖται . . . νομίζει**] supra 476 C, D.

καὶ τἄλλα οὕτω] Some of these 'other things' are enumerated infra B.

B **τί δέ; τὰ πολλὰ διπλάσια . . . φαίνεται;**] That is to say, although, in the abstract, a double and half differ, in the concrete they may coincide; e.g. two chairs are the half of four and the double of one.

Republic V. 479 B

The same view of the relativeness of sense occurs often elsewhere: e.g. Theaet. 152 D *ἐὰν ὡς μέγα προσαγορεύῃς, καὶ σμικρὸν φανεῖται, καὶ ἐὰν βαρύ, κοῦφον, ξύμπαντά τε οὕτως*: Phil. 14 D *καὶ βαρὺν καὶ κοῦφον τὸν αὐτόν*: Phaedo 74 B ff., 102.

τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ἑστιάσεσιν, ἔφη, . . . αἰνίγματι] (1) 'They are like the *double-entendres* at feasts, and like the children's riddle about the eunuch throwing at the bat.' **ἐπαμφοτερίζουσιν** is thus explained by Timaeus in his lexicon to Plato: cp. the active use of *ἐξημφοτέρικε* in Euthyd. 300 D. [(2) But the verb occurs immediately below, **ἐπαμφοτερίζειν** sc. *ἔοικεν*, in the ordinary intransitive sense, and it is unlike Plato to repeat the same example in illustration —(Riddles at feasts and the children's riddle). The phrase *τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ἑστιάσεσιν ἐπαμφοτερίζουσιν* may contain an allusion to some incident of Greek festivity familiar to Plato's readers, but to us unknown. L. C.]

καὶ τῷ τῶν παίδων αἰνίγματι] The riddle referred to is given by the Scholiast:— C

Αἶνός τίς ἐστιν ὡς ἀνήρ τε κοὐκ ἀνὴρ
ὄρνιθα κοὐκ ὄρνιθ' ἰδών τε κοὐκ ἰδὼν
ἐπὶ ξύλου τε κοὐ ξύλου καθημένην
λίθῳ τε κοὐ λίθῳ βάλοι τε κοὐ βάλοι:

i.e. a eunuch aimed at a bat which he saw imperfectly sitting upon a reed with a pumice-stone and missed him.

ᾧ] 'wherewith,' viz. with a pumice-stone. This proves to be the reading of Par. A, and is therefore to be adopted without question in preference to *ὡς*.

ἐφ' οὗ] sc. *καθημένην*.

παγίως νοῆσαι] Cp. Theaet. 157 A *ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν εἶναί τι καὶ τὸ πάσχον αὐτῶν ἐπὶ ἑνὸς* **νοῆσαι**, *ὥς φασιν, οὐκ εἶναι* **παγίως**.

μεταξύ που κυλινδεῖται] 'range somewhere between.' The word *κυλινδεῖσθαι* has often a depreciatory association, as of 'knocking about, a prey to chance or circumstance,' &c. Cp. Phaedr. 275 E, Phaedo 81 C, 82 E. D

προωμολογήσαμεν δέ γε . . . πλανητὸν ἁλισκόμενον] 'But we agreed beforehand, that anything of this kind which might come to light was to be described as the object of opinion, not of

Republic V. knowledge, being the class which oscillates between and is apprehended by the intermediate faculty.

480 **ἢ οὐ μνημονεύομεν**] supra 476 B, C: 479 A.

ἕκαστον τὸ ὄν] 'Each kind in its essential nature,'—i. e. *αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, δίκαιον, ἀγαθόν, . . . καὶ τἄλλα οὕτω.*

BOOK VI.

Republic VI. 484 A–487 A

If the philosopher can lay hold of universal and unchanging truth, and those who cannot rise above opinion are not philosophers, to which of the two shall we commit the government of the state? In a word, ought the true guardian to be clear-sighted or blind? There can be but one answer to this question, unless the philosopher is deficient in some other way. But the philosophic nature contains all the elements of virtue. He who is to be trained in philosophy must be quick-witted and have a good memory; he must be a lover of all truth, a hater of falsehood, courageous, temperate, just, gentle, large-minded, gracious in his thoughts and ways. Not even Momus can have any fault to find with such a character.

484 A **διὰ μακροῦ . . . λόγου**] λόγος, as elsewhere, is personified: cp. infra 503 A *παρεξιόντος καὶ παρακαλυπτομένου τοῦ λόγου, πεφοβημένου κινεῖν τὸ νῦν παρόν.* **διεξελθόντος** may be explained (1) as intransitive (cp. Soph. 237 B *τὸν δὲ λόγον, ᾗ βέλτιστα διέξεισι*: Sophocl. Oed. Col. 574 *χὠ λόγος διέρχεται*: Dem. 541, 22 *πάντα δ' ἤδη διεξεληλύθει τὰκ τῶν νόμων*)—the participle being added afterwards to complete the expression—'In the course of a long discussion which has come to its conclusion.' Or (2) *αὐτούς*, sc. *τοὺς φιλοσόφους*, may be supplied as the object of **διεξελθόντος**—'after a long argument which has discussed their nature.' Cp. Laws v. 743 E *ἣν διεξερχόμεθα πολιτείαν.*

μακροῦ] a slight exaggeration, as the argument about the true nature of philosophers does not extend to more than six pages, 474–480. But if such a matter-of-fact objection needs an answer, it may be replied that six pages seem a considerable space to devote to the definition of a single term: and the steps through which Glaucon has been led to the conclusion were elaborate and

minute. The reading of Ξ, *διὰ μ. τ. δ. τοῦ λόγου*, is due to a false interpretation, i.e. *τοῦ λόγου διεξελθόντος διὰ μακροῦ τινός*. *διεξελθόντες* (x v) is another manuscript conjecture. According to this reading the philosophers are supposed to run the gauntlet of the argument through which their nature is revealed. *Republic VI.* 484 A

οὐ ῥᾳδιον] sc. *ἀναφανῆναι αὐτούς*.

οὐ φαίνεται] is, 'it appears to be not easy': not 'it does not appear easy.'

ἔμοιγ' οὖν] 'To me at least it appears that it might have been set forth in a still better manner, if we had had only to speak of this one point.' The subject of **φανῆναι** is *τὸ πρᾶγμα* rather than *τοὺς φιλοσόφους*, as appears from **τούτου μόνου** following.

μέλλοντι] agreeing with *τινί* understood, not with *ἔμοιγε* supra: 'if one were not required'; not 'if I were not required.'

οἱ δὲ μή] sc. *οἱ δὲ μὴ τοῦ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος δυνάμενοι ἐφάπτεσθαι*. B

πλανώμενοι] 'Wandering up and down'—referring to the uncertainties of opinion: cp. v. 479 A ff., especially D *τὸ μεταξὺ πλανητόν*: also infra 485 B. For the word cp. especially Lysis 213 E *οὐκ ἄν ποτε οὕτως* **ἐπλανώμεθα.**

μετρίως] 'fairly,' 'duly,' 'fittingly.' Cp. x. 597 E *τοῦτο . . . ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ μετριώτατ' ἂν προσαγορεύεσθαι, μιμητής*.

καθιστάναι] sc. *λέγοντες δεῖν*. C

τόδε δέ . . . τηρεῖν ὁτιοῦν;] 'But can there be any question whether a blind or sharp-seeing watchman should guard a thing?'—In Plato's language, he who is ignorant of the universal is blind, 'not seeing the sun': he has no mental image or 'pattern in the mount' (cp. ix. 592), no idea of true being or principle of order, to which he may refer objects of sense or the particulars of human action: he is still in the den, having his back turned toward the light (cp. vii ad init.).

ὥσπερ γραφῆς] Cp. infra 500 E *οἱ τῷ θείῳ παραδείγματι χρώμενοι ζωγράφοι*, 501 A, B, where Plato repeats and expands the image suggested here.

κἀκεῖσε] sc. *εἰς τὸ ἀληθέστατον*. But the opposition of **ἐκεῖσε—ἐνθάδε** implies that the truth is not here but yonder,—*ἐν οὐρανῷ που ἀνακείμενον* (ix. 592 B: cp. also x. 610 B).

Republic VI. 484 D **ἐὰν δέῃ τίθεσθαι**] 'If there should be need of such enactments.' The regulation of minutiae was to be left to each generation of rulers, the great principles having been once for all laid down: cp. iii. 412 B, iv. 425, 426, 427 A: and Laws vi. 769, 770, 772, 779 D, vii. 816, viii. 846 E, xii. 956 E.

τούτους] sc. 'the blind leaders of the blind,' who have just been described.

ἕκαστον τὸ ὄν] i. e. who know the essential reality of each thing: who are capable, in modern language, of abstraction and generalization:—The power of abstraction seemed to Plato in his own age to constitute the great difference between one man's mental condition and another's (Phaedr. 265 E, Rep. vii. 534).

εἴ γε τἆλλα μὴ ἐλλείποιντο] 'If they did not fall behind in other ways.'

τούτῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ . . . ἂν προέχοιεν] 'For this very thing in which they will have the superiority is about the most important point of all.' **σχεδόν τι τῷ μεγίστῳ**: the emphasis is on *τῷ μεγίστῳ*, 'the greatest point of all' is the knowledge of ideas and universals. **τι** which follows **σχεδόν** does not weaken its force but calls attention to it: as 'pretty' is employed in some uses of the phrase 'pretty nearly' in English.

485 A **κἀκεῖνα καὶ ταῦτα**] 'The other qualities (= *τἆλλα* supra E—i. e. experience and general excellence) and these (the special attributes of the philosopher). Both are comprised in **ταῦτα** infra (*ταῦτα ἔχειν οἱ αὐτοί*).

The question how this combination of the practical and speculative may be attained, is answered by an inquiry into the nature of the philosopher. For the necessity of the philosopher's knowing also the particular, 'if he is to find his way home,' cp. Phileb. 62 B.

ὃ τοίνυν, κ.τ.λ.] v. 474 B. If with the best MSS. we read *δεῖν*, we must supply *τοῦτο ποιεῖν δεῖ* from **πρῶτον δεῖν καταμαθεῖν** to complete the sentence. Or if this explanation is deemed unsatisfactory we must adopt the reading *δεῖ* of the inferior MSS.

B **ὃ ἂν αὐτοῖς δηλοῖ . . . καὶ φθορᾶς**] The genitive **οὐσίας** is partitive and follows **δηλοῖ**: cp. iv. 445 E *οὔτε εἷς ἐγγενόμενος κινήσειεν ἂν τῶν ἀξίων λόγου νόμων τῆς πόλεως*. **ἐκείνης** refers to the discussion in v. 475 F foll.

Republic VI. 485 B

The words are found in Themistius, Orat. xxi. 250, with some verbal differences: *τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ὁμολογείσθω τῆς φιλοσόφου φύσεως πέρι, ὅτι μαθήματος δέοι οὔτοι παντὸς ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν ἐκείνην δηλοῖ τὴν οὐσίαν τὴν ἀεὶ οὖσαν καὶ μὴ πλανωμένην ὑπὸ φθορᾶς καὶ γενέσεως.* The agreement is not sufficiently exact to justify the substitution of *οὐσίαν* for *οὐσίας* in the text; Themistius appears to have simplified the construction.

πάσης αὐτῆς] sc. *τῆς οὐσίας*, governed by **ἐρῶσιν**.

οὔτε τιμιωτέρου οὔτε ἀτιμοτέρου μέρους] Cp. Soph. 227 A, Parmen. 130 E, for this favourite thought.

ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν . . . διήλθομεν] v. 474 C ff.

ἑκόντας εἶναι] 'so far as their being willing is concerned.' C *ἑκὼν εἶναι* is a parenthetic phrase—generally used in negative sentences—in which the word *ἑκών* gains force from the addition of *εἶναι*.

μηδαμῇ προσδέχεσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος] Cp. Theaet. 151 D *ἀλλά μοι ψεῦδός τε ξυγχωρῆσαι καὶ ἀληθὲς ἀφανίσαι οὐδαμῶς θέμις.*

ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . ἀπωχετευμένον] For **ἀπωχετευμένον** in strict accuracy *ἀπωχετευμέναι* might be expected. But the attraction which confuses the simile and the thing compared is common in Greek (e. g. Soph. Trach. 33), and occurs elsewhere in Plato: cp. iii. 401 C, D *ὁπόθεν ἂν αὐτοῖς . . . πρὸς ἀκοήν τι προσβάλῃ, ὥσπερ αὔρα φέρουσα ἀπὸ χρηστῶν τόπων ὑγίειαν, καὶ . . .* **ἄγουσα. ἐκεῖσε** refers to **εἰς ἕν τι.** D

τὰς δὲ διὰ τοῦ σώματος] **τάς** is an accusative of reference—'in respect of': or *περί* may be supplied from the previous clause. The former is the more natural way of taking the words. The image of the stream is continued in **ἐρρυήκασι** and **ἐκλείποιεν.**

It is common to draw a line between talent and character: the powers of a man are distinguished from his interests and affections. Such lines of demarcation are convenient, but they are also partly misleading. For the love of knowledge is knowledge: moral qualities interpenetrate with mental: how much a man feels is quite as important as how much he thinks, or rather he must feel what he thinks. There is no surer criterion of progress in education than an interest in study: nor anything more fatal to intellectual excellence than envy and meanness.

ὅ γε τοιοῦτος] 'such an one, at any rate'—i. e. one who takes E no delight in the pleasures of the body—'must be temperate.'

Republic VI. 485 E **μετὰ πολλῆς δαπάνης σπουδάζεται**] 'For the reasons why wealth is eagerly pursued with lavish expenditure.' For the use of **μετά** cp. viii. 560 D *μετριότητα . . . ὑπερορίζουσι μετὰ πολλῶν καὶ ἀνωφελῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν*: ix. 575 C *οἱ τὸν τύραννον γεννῶντες μετὰ δήμου ἀνοίας*. And, for the thought, cp. Ar. Eth. Nic. iv. 1, § 33 *οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀσώτων . . . καὶ λαμβάνουσιν ὅθεν μὴ δεῖ.*

486 A **τοῦ ὅλου καὶ παντός**] Compare Theaet. 173 E, where the soul of the philosopher is described as *πᾶσαν πάντῃ φύσιν ἐρευνωμένη τῶν ὄντων ἑκάστου ὅλου, εἰς τῶν ἐγγὺς οὐδὲν αὑτὴν συγκαθιεῖσα.*

ᾗ οὖν ὑπάρχει διανοίᾳ . . . οἷόν τε οἴει τούτῳ, κ.τ.λ.] The common transition from the mind or soul to the person. Cp. x. 620 D. Ast and Stallbaum, following a quotation of the passage in Marcus Aurelius (vii. § 35), read *ᾧ . . . διανοίας* for *ᾗ . . . διανοίᾳ*, but this is unnecessary.

B **μηδ' ἀλαζών**] This refers to the love of truth, supra 485 C.

ἔσθ' ὅπῃ ἂν δυσξύμβολος . . . γένοιτο] For **δυσξύμβολος** with **δυσκοινώνητος** following, compare the juxtaposition of *ξυμβάλλειν* and *κοινωνεῖν* in ii. 362 B.

καὶ τοῦτο δὴ . . . καὶ ἀγρία] Cp. Theaet. 144 D. The qualities here enumerated are nearly the same that are found to be actually embodied in the 'wise' Theaetetus. The words **εἰ . . . ἀγρία** are the explanation of **τοῦτο**, the whole question being suggested by the words of the previous sentence, **δυσξύμβολος ἢ ἄδικος**.

C **εὐμαθὴς ἢ δυσμαθής**] sc. *εἰ ἄρα*. The construction is to be supplied from the previous sentence.

λήθης ὢν πλέως] Cp. Theaet. 144 B *νωθροὶ . . . πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις καὶ λήθης γέμοντες.*

D **ἀλλὰ μνημονικὴν . . . δεῖν εἶναι**] A seeming combination of two constructions, *μνημονικὴν αὐτὴν δεῖ εἶναι* and *μνημονικὴν αὐτὴν ζητῶμεν εἶναι*. Cp. infra 503 B *ἣν γὰρ διήλθομεν φύσιν δεῖν ὑπάρχειν αὐτοῖς.*

ἕλκειν] Cp. viii. 568 C *εἰς τυραννίδας . . .* **ἕλκουσι** *τὰς πολιτείας.* The word conveys an idea of distortion and perversion.

εἰς ἀμετρίαν] Cp. Soph. 228 A *τὸ τῆς ἀμετρίας πανταχοῦ δυσειδὲς ὂν γένος.*

ἣν ἐπὶ . . . (E) εὐάγωγον παρέξει] 'which its own nature will make easy to lead towards the idea of each form of being.'

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μή πῃ δοκοῦμέν σοι, κ.τ.λ.] πῃ = 'at any point.' The dative τῇ . . . ψυχῇ depends chiefly on **ἀναγκαῖα.**

φίλος τε καὶ ξυγγενής] The latter word implies a reference to 485 C ἦ οὖν οἰκειότερον σοφίᾳ τι ἀληθείας ἂν εὕροις; 487 A

ἀλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, . . . τὴν πόλιν ἐπιτρέποις] Compare the virtues of the philosopher-tyrant in Laws iv. 709, where despotism is thought to afford the most favourable opportunity for organizing a state: εἰ τύραννος γένοιτο, φῄς, νέος, σώφρων, εὐμαθής, μνήμων, ἀνδρεῖος, μεγαλοπρεπής.

τελειωθεῖσι . . . παιδείᾳ τε καὶ ἡλικίᾳ] is introductory to the discussion about the education and age of the rulers, from 502 onwards.

The conclusion appears inevitable that the philosophic nature, when matured by time and training, ought to be entrusted with the supreme power. But Adeimantus meets all these theoretical assumptions by an appeal to facts. Experience shows that those who continue in the pursuit of philosophy after their first youth turn out to be either strange creatures, not to say rascals, or at all events, even when they are thoroughly respectable, their philosophy makes them useless. Socrates admits the force of the objection, yet maintains his paradox. To explain his position he has recourse to an allegory. *487 B–E*

παρ' ἕκαστον τὸ ἐρώτημα] 'at every question.' Cp. Laws iv. 705 A παρ' ἑκάστην ἡμέραν. 487 B

παραγόμενοι . . . μέγα τὸ σφάλμα . . . ἀναφαίνεσθαι] i.e. μεγάλως σφάλλεσθαι καὶ τοῖς πρῶτον ὡμολογημένοις ἐναντιοῦσθαι: cp. vii. 534 C ἀπτῶτι τῷ λόγῳ. The subject is changed from the persons to that which they experience: 'the overthrow which is revealed is great and contradictory of their first impressions.' At **σφεῖς**, κ.τ.λ., the original construction is resumed.

Compare the description of the Elenchus in the Sophist, 230 B διερωτῶσιν ὧν ἂν οἴηταί τίς τι πέρι λέγειν λέγων μηδέν· εἶθ' ἅτε πλανωμένων τὰς δόξας ῥᾳδίως ἐξετάζουσι, καὶ συνάγοντες δὴ τοῖς λόγοις εἰς ταὐτὸν τιθέασι παρ' ἀλλήλας, τιθέντες δὲ ἐπιδεικνύουσιν αὐτὰς αὑταῖς ἅμα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐναντίας. And for the effect of Socrates on his hearers see the image of the torpedo in Meno 80.

ὑπὸ τῶν πεττεύειν δεινῶν] The game of draughts here spoken

Republic VI. 487 B of is plainly one in which the victory was won by hemming in the adversary. The metaphor of *πεττοί* occurs again in Laws v. 739 A, where legislation is compared to a game of draughts.

D **τοῦ πεπαιδεῦσθαι ἕνεκα**] Cp. infra 497 E (where *ἅπτεσθαι* occurs in the same idiomatic sense).

πάνυ ἀλλοκότους . . . παμπονήρους] 'very strange beings, not to say utter rogues.'

τοὺς δ' ἐπιεικεστάτους . . . ἀχρήστους ταῖς πόλεσι γιγνομένους] See the description of the philosopher in the Theaetetus, who has not a word to say for himself in the courts or the assembly (173 C, D): or the view of Callicles in the Gorgias, 485 A *φιλοσοφίας μέν, ὅσον παιδείας χάριν, καλὸν μετέχειν, καὶ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν μειρακίῳ ὄντι φιλοσοφεῖν.* The man of the world admires philosophy in youth: such interests, at that time of life, are indications of a free and generous spirit: but if a person has not 'passed his metaphysics' when he is old, why, he should go to school again and be beaten. The feeling which Plato here expresses is a feeling of modern quite as much as of ancient times. The study of metaphysics is regarded as at once dangerous and puerile. They have been thought to belong only to a particular stage of life: 'poetry for boys,' 'metaphysics for young men,' 'facts for those who are of full age.' The true conception of metaphysics is the combination of the parts of knowledge by an effort of the mind into an ideal whole. They are always extending their domain, as the prospect is opening of new fields of science and of the past history of man. The narrower view is lost in a wider one: the previous elements of knowledge, whether in the world or in the individual, are taken up into the mind, and adjusted in new proportions. Also the knowledge of facts would be narrow and partial unless the imagination enabled us to allow for the unknown part of man and nature, raising us above our own particular study or aspect of things to the other elements of truth and knowledge. On the other hand it may be argued that metaphysics may easily outrun facts, and interfere with our capacity of observing and acquiring them.

E **ἀκούοις ἂν . . . λέγειν**] The popular opinion of philosophy has been seriously urged against Socrates. Instead of the expected refutation, 'Quite true' is the only reply.

ἐρωτᾷς . . . δι' εἰκόνων λέγειν] 'You ask a question, I said,

requiring to be answered through a similitude.' 'And you, methinks, are not accustomed to speak through similitudes.' *Republic VI.* 487 E

The last words are of course ironical: Socrates carries on the irony in what follows (ἵν' ἔτι μᾶλλον ἴδῃς, κ.τ.λ.).

ἔτι μᾶλλον] 'that (having this contempt for my similitudes) you may see still better what a poor hand I am at them.' For **γλίσχρως** cp. Crat. 414 C, where Hermogenes, speaking of one of the etymologies offered by Socrates, says: καὶ μάλα γε γλίσχρως, ὦ Σώκρατες. He who would judge of Socrates' powers in inventing similitudes may, after reading this passage, compare ix. 588 C, D. 488 A

There is a ship of which the captain is a simple-minded giant, short-sighted, dull of hearing, and but slightly skilled in navigation. The crew are always contending among themselves for the possession of the helm, but have never learnt, and even deny the possibility of learning, the art of steering. He only is the skilled navigator who is a partisan of theirs. If they cannot succeed by persuasion, they resort to force, throwing their rivals overboard and drugging the captain. Thus beginning they proceed to make free with the stores, and their voyage is such as might be expected of men like them. What chance of a hearing has the skilled pilot among such as they are? They only call him prater, star-gazer, and good-for-nothing. This image sufficiently indicates the position of those philosophers whom Adeimantus has acknowledged to be honest men. They are useless, because their states, as at present governed, make no use of them. *487 E–489 C*

At a later date Plato returns to the comparison of the ruler to the steersman as a familiar image: Polit. 297 E Εἰς δὴ τὰς εἰκόνας ἐπανίωμεν πάλιν, αἷς ἀναγκαῖον ἀπεικάζειν ἀεὶ τοὺς βασιλικοὺς ἄρχοντας.

Ποίας; Τὸν γενναῖον **κυβερνήτην** καὶ τὸν ἑτέρων πολλῶν ἀντάξιον ἰατρόν. κατίδωμεν γὰρ δή τι σχῆμα ἐν τούτοις αὐτοῖς πλασάμενοι.

αὐτό] sc. τὸ πάθος τῶν ἐπιεικεστάτων. 488 A

οἷον . . . γράφουσι] **οἷον** may be taken either as an adverb, 'just as'; or as an adjective governed by γράφουσι—'to form by combining from many sources an idea of it like what' &c. The former is right.

νόησον . . . (B) **ἕτερα τοιαῦτα**] **τοιουτονί**, i. e. the kind of thing which I have now before my mind.

ναύκληρον] The asyndeton, as usual, in an explanatory clause.

Republic VI. 488 B **βραχύ τι**] is cogn. accus. 'having but a narrow range of vision,'—and **ἕτερα τοιαῦτα** is in the same construction,—'and whose intelligence in nautical matters is much on the same level.'

περὶ τῆς κυβερνήσεως] 'quarrelling about the steering, each thinking that he ought to steer.'

μήτε μαθόντα, κ.τ.λ.] This recalls Socrates' well-known accusation against the statesmen of Greece, that there are among them no teachers of political virtue. Cp. Protag. 319 D *τούτοις οὐδεὶς τοῦτο ἐπιπλήττει ὥσπερ τοῖς πρότερον, ὅτι οὐδαμόθεν μαθών, οὐδὲ ὄντος διδασκάλου οὐδενὸς αὐτῷ, ἔπειτα συμβουλεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖ· δῆλον γάρ, ὅτι οὐχ ἡγοῦνται διδακτὸν εἶναι.* Cp. also Xen. Mem. iii. 6.

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις . . . κατατέμνειν] Yet Plato himself seems to maintain this paradox in the Protagoras and Meno. In those dialogues the postulate that there must be a science of politics was ironically held in reserve, while the hollowness of the actual politicians was disclosed. But Plato is now ready to assert, not only that there is such a science, but that he has the key of it.

C **περικεχύσθαι . . . τῆς νεὼς ἄρχειν . . . πλεῖν**] These infinitives, which follow **νόησον** at the beginning of the sentence, avoid the confusion which would otherwise be occasioned by the multiplication of participles. In **πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, κ.τ.λ.**, a return is made to the participial construction.

ξυμποδίσαντας is metaphorical: 'having enchained the noble captain,' i. e. rendered him incapable, 'by some narcotic drug, or by drink or some other means.' Cp. Gorg. 482 E *ἐκ ταύτης γὰρ αὖ τῆς ὁμολογίας αὐτὸς ὑπὸ σοῦ* **συμποδισθεὶς** *ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπεστομίσθη*: Theaet. 165 E *ἤλεγχεν ἂν . . . οὐκ ἀνιεὶς πρὶν . . .* **ξυνεποδίσθης** *ὑπ' αὐτοῦ.*

πλεῖν ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς τοὺς τοιούτους] 'make just such a voyage as might be expected of men like them.' Cp. Polit. 302 A *πολλαὶ μὴν ἐνίοτε καὶ καθάπερ πλοῖα καταδυόμεναι διόλλυνται καὶ διολώλασι καὶ ἔτι διολοῦνται διὰ τὴν τῶν κυβερνητῶν καὶ ναυτῶν μοχθηρίαν τῶν περὶ τὰ μέγιστα μεγίστην ἄγνοιαν εἰληφότων, κ.τ.λ.*: Laws x. 906 D.

D **ὅπως δὲ κυβερνήσει . . . (E) καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικήν**] (1) 'But to get the helm into one's hand, with or without consent, is an art and study which they imagine to be irreconcileable with the acquisition of the science of navigation.' The mutinous sailors think that the struggle to get the helm into one's power, which, in their opinion, is the all-important thing, leaves no time for the study of navigation, and so

they neglect it. Transferring the image into the language of politics we have—*ὅπως δὲ ἄρξει (τις) κ.τ.λ., μήτε τέχνην τούτου . . . δυνατὸν εἶναι λαβεῖν ἅμα καὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν.* They are absorbed in the struggle for power, and have no time to think how power should be used. Therefore they reject philosophy and the philosopher. **ὅπως . . . κυβερνήσει . . . ἐάν τε μή** is a resumption of *ὅπως ἄρξουσιν ἢ πείθοντες ἢ βιαζόμενοι τὸν ναύκληρον*, and **τὴν κυβερνητικήν** refers to the science of the true pilot, *τοῦ . . . ἀληθινοῦ κυβερνήτου* supra. **τούτου** takes up **ὅπως, κ.τ.λ.** Socrates reiterates his main point, that power, not knowledge, is the object of the actual politicians. (2) According to Ast and others the true pilot is the subject of **κυβερνήσει**, and this part of the sentence gives the impression which the behaviour of the true pilot makes on the world in general. The phrase **ἐάν τέ τινες βούλωνται ἐάν τε μή** is supposed to contrast the scientific pilot, who keeps the ship in her course, without consulting the passengers, with the conduct of the sailors in the allegory, whose one thought is to cajole or intoxicate the captain (i. e. to flatter and humour the people) so that they may get the helm into their power. The sense then would be: 'imagining that to know how to steer, whether he has the leave of those on board or no,'—as, in their opinion, the true pilot does,—'is an art and study quite incompatible with the business of a steersman'—as they conceive of it. They consider that the arbitrary rule as it appears to them of the true pilot is inconsistent with steering, as they understand it (i. e. as the art of cajoling the captain). They think it is no part of pilotage to know how to manage the helm (no part of politics to know how to govern). This explanation appears plausible on comparing infra 489 B *οὐ γὰρ ἔχει φύσιν κυβερνήτην ναυτῶν δεῖσθαι . . . ὑφ' αὐτοῦ*: and Polit. 293 A *ἐάν τε ἑκόντων ἐάν τε ἀκόντων ἄρχωσιν, . . . νομιστέον . . . κατὰ τέχνην . . . ἄρχοντας.* But the exactness of the parallel in the immediate context between *ὅπως ἄρξουσιν* and *ὅπως κυβερνήσει*, and between *πείθοντες ἢ βιαζόμενοι* and *ἐάν τέ τινες βούλωνται ἐάν τε μή*, is decisive in favour of the first (1) interpretation. And the true king in the Republic is imagined as the ruler of a *willing* people: infra 502 B *πόλιν ἔχων πειθομένην*, 499 B *καὶ τῇ πόλει *κατηκόῳ γενέσθαι.* *Republic VI.* 488 D

οἰόμενοι] The MSS. vary between *ἐπαΐοντες, οἰόμενοι*, and *ἐπαΐοντας, οἰομένους.* That the copyists should have changed the accusative into the nominative is unlikely; the analogy of *ψέγοντας* was almost certain to lead some of them to change the nominative into the accusative. The transition to the nominative may be occasioned by E

Republic VI. the neighbourhood of *ἄρξουσιν*, and in so long a sentence the original construction is apt to be lost sight of.

489 A **ταῖς πόλεσι . . . τὴν διάθεσιν ἔοικεν**] 'resembles cities in their attitude towards true philosophers.'

The 'parable' hardly needs an interpretation. The ship is the state: the star-gazing pilot is the philosopher: the noble captain, 'not very quick in his perceptions,' the people honest and stupid: the mutineers, the sophists and adventurers by whom the noble captain is 'drugged and disabled,'—who make their last appearance in the Politicus (291).

Aristotle refers to this passage in Rhet. iii. 43 as an example of an *εἰκών—ἡ εἰς τὸν δῆμον ὅτι ὅμοιος ναυκλήρῳ, ἰσχυρῷ μέν, ὑποκώφῳ δέ.* The passage should be compared with Politicus 298, 299, where it is supposed that if certain rules were prescribed by the state about navigation and the true *κυβερνήτης*, who steered from knowledge of the stars and winds, were to transgress them, he would be liable to be called *μετεωρολόγος, ἀδολέσχης τις σοφιστής.*

ἐκεῖνον] supra 487 D.

ὅτι . . . οὐ τιμῶνται] Socrates softens the language of Adeimantus.

B **καὶ ὅτι . . . λέγεις, κ.τ.λ.**] **ὅτι** depends on **δίδασκε** and is parallel with **ὅτι** in the previous sentence. The MSS. are divided between *λέγεις* and *λέγειν* (for Par. D, which reads *λέγει*, has no independent value): the greater weight of authority is in favour of *λέγεις*. 'And that you are not wrong in saying that the best of the votaries of philosophy are of no use to the world:—for their uselessness, however, bid him blame those who make no use of them and not the good philosophers themselves.'

In using the second person (**λέγεις**), Socrates attributes to Adeimantus what he had only represented to be the opinion of others, though with an evident inclination to assent (cp. infra D *οὓς δὴ σὺ φῄς . . . ἀληθῆ σε λέγειν*). The other reading, *λέγειν*, could only be explained, if at all, as a harsh confusion of two constructions—*δίδασκε λέγειν* and *δίδασκε ὅτι λέγεις.*

οὐ γὰρ ἔχει φύσιν] *φύσιν ἔχει*, 'it is natural,' like *λόγον ἔχει*, 'it is reasonable.' The phrase occurs in Herodotus, ii. 45.

C **ἀλλ' ὁ τοῦτο κομψευσάμενος . . . πέφυκεν, κ.τ.λ.**] The saying is attributed by Aristotle to Simonides: Rhet. ii. 16 *τοὺς σοφοὺς γὰρ ἔφη ὁρᾶν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν πλουσίων θύραις διατρίβοντας.* Cp. for the general

sentiment, Theaet. 170 A, B καὶ ἔν γε τοῖς μεγίστοις κινδύνοις, ὅταν ἐν στρατείαις ἢ νόσοις ἢ ἐν θαλάττῃ χειμάζωνται, ὥσπερ πρὸς θεοὺς ἔχειν τοὺς ἐν ἑκάστοις ἄρχοντας, σωτῆρας σφῶν προσδοκῶντας, οὐκ ἄλλῳ τῳ διαφέροντας ἢ τῷ εἰδέναι. καὶ πάντα που μεστὰ τἀνθρώπινα ζητούντων διδασκάλους τε καὶ ἄρχοντας ἑαυτῶν τε, κ.τ.λ. Republic VI. 489 C

δεῖσθαι] (1) is governed by some word (such as πρέπειν) suggested by **ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι** preceding. Or (2) **ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι** is neglected, and the infinitive continued directly with **πέφυκεν**.

μετεωρολέσχας] 'Meteorologizers' combines the μετεωροσκόπον τε καὶ ἀδολέσχην of supra 488 E.

ἔκ τε τοίνυν . . . ἐπιτηδευόντων] 'As a result of this and (1) in these circumstances'—or (2) 'among men like these'—'the noblest pursuit can hardly be held in esteem by those who have opposite pursuits.'

ἐν τούτοις may be either masculine or neuter (infra 494 C ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις: Symp. 220 B: Phaedo 101 C), but for the masculine cp. supra ὑπὸ τούτων. The words **οἱ δὲ ἐπιεικέστατοι ἄχρηστοι** are added to recall both sides of the statement, although only one is in point.

τὰ τοιαῦτα] sc. τὰ τῆς φιλοσοφίας. D

τὸν ἐγκαλοῦντα . . . ἀληθῆ σε λέγειν] Supra 487 D, E. As before in supra B Socrates chooses to identify Adeimantus with the objectors whose opinions he quotes.

οὐκοῦν τῆς μὲν . . . ἀχρηστίας, κ.τ.λ.] The reason why one class of philosophers are useless is that the world will not use them: the reason why another class are corrupted is that the finest natures are most susceptible of adverse influences.

τῆς δὲ τῶν πολλῶν πονηρίας τὴν ἀνάγκην] 'The cause which inevitably produces the wickedness of the greater number.'

The philosophic nature combines qualities that are rarely found in the same person. It is also exceptionally liable to corruption. Rare plants are more than others sensitive to surrounding influences. And the very graces which have been enumerated, above all when combined with gifts of fortune, become, through their perversion, sources of evil. The world is the great sophist that spoils the highly endowed youth, and moulds him with popular applause and clamour to mundane purposes. How can such an one, except through some divine providence, give ear to the teachings of philosophy? The professional, fee-earning sophist is like the attendant of a great beast, 489 E–496 E

Republic VI. 489 E–496 E *whom he knows when to approach, and who indicates by grunts his likes and dislikes. He never distinguishes between what is inevitable and what is best. Hence, of those who are at their birth endowed with a philosophic nature, all save the few 'useless' ones (whom pride or sickness or some internal oracle have retained) desert philosophy for 'politics' and leave a vacant room, which is filled by those whom Adeimantus designates as nondescripts and rascals. The maiden of high estate, left poor and desolate, is married to a tinker just let out of prison. Meanwhile the child of light, who is faithful to his trust, sees the hopelessness of effort, and stands in shelter until the storm has passed, contented if he may preserve his own integrity.*

489 E **ἀκούωμεν δὴ . . . κἀγαθὸν ἐσόμενον**] **ὅθεν** is put for οὗ by attraction with **ἐκεῖθεν**, which is to be construed with **ἀναμνησθέντες**.

490 A **αὐτῷ**] is not the usual dative after ἡγεῖσθαι, but an ethical dative: sc. ἡγεῖτο τοῦ χοροῦ αὐτῷ—'was the leader of his band,' infra c.

εἰ νῷ ἔχεις] 'if you remember.' Cp. Euthyphro 2 B εἴ τινα νῷ **ἔχεις** Πιτθέα Μέλητον.

ἢ ἀλαζόνι ὄντι, κ.τ.λ.] For the use of **ἢ** in the sense of 'or else' cp. v. 463 D ἢ μήτε πρὸς θεῶν μήτε πρὸς ἀνθρώπων αὐτῷ ἄμεινον ἔσεσθαι.

οὐκοῦν . . . περὶ αὐτοῦ;] 'Is not this one point, to say no more (**οὕτω**), very inconsistent with our present ideas about him?' **οὕτω** is idiomatic, as in νῦν οὕτως, ἁπλῶς οὕτως.

παρὰ δόξαν τοῖς νῦν δοκουμένοις] i. e. πρὸς τὰ νῦν δοκούμενα, the whole expression being an amplified equivalent of παρὰ τὰ νῦν δοκούμενα = παρὰ τὰς τῶν νῦν δόξας. **τοῖς νῦν δοκουμένοις** = 'received opinions,' is a noticeable phrase.

ἀπολογησόμεθα . . . ἁμιλλᾶσθαι] 'We shall defend ourselves' (when accused of being paradoxical) 'by saying' (as we have said) 'that it was his nature to press onward towards true being.' The optative after the future indicative in an indirect sentence may be explained as implying a reference to some former expression of the thought quoted. See Goodwin, *M. and T.*, §§ 159, 676.

καὶ οὐκ ἐπιμένοι] Cp. Laches 194 A καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ τῇ ζητήσει ἐπιμείνωμεν.

B **ἀλλ' ἴοι . . . ὠδῖνος, πρὶν δ' οὔ**] In such glowing language does Plato describe what are termed by us mere abstractions, to which metaphysical enthusiasm has, nevertheless, given a permanent

place in the mind, and which in a secondary logical stage have been the regulators and instruments of human knowledge. In one point of view the language may be compared with that of Eastern Pantheism (**μιγεὶς τῷ ὄντι ὄντως**), in another (**ἐπὶ τοῖς . . . πολλοῖς ἑκάστοις**), with that of the Organon of Aristotle. 490 B

ᾧ προσήκει ψυχῆς ἐφάπτεσθαι τοῦ τοιούτου] i.e. *τούτῳ τῆς ψυχῆς ᾧ*. *τούτῳ*, the suppressed antecedent, is a dative of the instrument, ᾧ, the relative, a dative of reference with **προσήκει**: 'with that part of the soul to which it belongs.'

ζῴη καὶ τρέφοιτο] Cp. Phaedr. 248 B *οὗ δ' ἕνεχ' ἡ πολλὴ σπουδή, τὸ ἀληθείας ἰδεῖν πεδίον οὗ ἐστίν, ἥ τε δὴ προσήκουσα ψυχῆς τῷ ἀρίστῳ νομὴ ἐκ τοῦ ἐκεῖ λειμῶνος τυγχάνει οὖσα.*

λήγοι ὠδῖνος] Cp. Theaet. 148 E *ὠδίνεις γάρ, ὦ φίλε Θεαίτητε*: Symp. 206 E *τῷ κυοῦντι . . . πολλὴ ἡ πτοίησις γέγονε περὶ τὸ καλὸν διὰ τὸ μεγάλης* **ὠδῖνος** *ἀπολύειν τὸν ἔχοντα.*

τούτῳ τι μετέσται . . . μισεῖν;] 'Will he have any part in loving falsehood, or, on the contrary, will he not hate it?'

ἀλλ' ὑγιές τε καὶ δίκαιον ἦθος] sc. *φαῖμεν ἂν αὐτῇ* (sc. *ἀληθείᾳ*) *ἀκολουθῆσαι.* C

καὶ δὴ τὸν ἄλλον . . . ἀναγκάζοντα τάττειν;] 'Why should I again set in array from the very beginning the rest of the band of qualities which make up the philosophic nature, at each step compelling your assent?' **ἀναγκάζοντα** is taken up in **ξυνέβη**: 'Why force you again to admit what you have already admitted?'

ἀναγκάζοντα is the reading of the best MSS.: *ἀναλαμβάνοντα* (= 'recapitulating'), the reading of Stephanus and of Ven. Ξ, is probably a correction: cp. infra D *τὴν τῶν ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφων φύσιν . . .* **ἐξ ἀνάγκης** *ὡρισάμεθα.*

For the favourite image of the chorus (continued from **χορὸν κακῶν** supra), cp. especially Euthydemus 279 C *τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ποῦ* **χοροῦ** *τάξομεν; ἐν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ἢ πῶς λέγεις;* Rep. viii. 560 E *ὕβριν καὶ ἀναρχίαν . . . λαμπρὰς μετὰ πολλοῦ* **χοροῦ** *κατάγουσιν ἐστεφανωμένας*: ix. 580 B *ἔγωγε ὥσπερ* **χοροὺς** *κρίνω, κ.τ.λ.*: also Theaet. 173 B–D *τοὺς δὲ τοῦ ἡμετέρου* **χοροῦ** *. . . περὶ τῶν κορυφαίων.*

καὶ σοῦ ἐπιλαβομένου] 'And when you interposed and said.' Cp. Symp. 214 E *ἐάν τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγω, μεταξὺ* **ἐπιλαβοῦ.**

τῆς διαβολῆς] *διαβολή* is a malicious 'misrepresentation.' Cp. supra 489 D: infra 500 D *διαβολὴ δ' ἐν πᾶσι πολλή.* D

Republic VI. 490 E **σμικρὸν δέ τι . . . καλοῦσι**] 'A small number, whom, as you say, they call,' &c. The antecedent of **οὕς** is implied in the collective neuter *σμικρόν τι = ὀλίγοι τινες.*

491 A **καὶ εἰς τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα καθισταμένας αὐτῆς**] 'and settling down to her pursuit.'

ἀνάξιον . . . ἑαυτῶν] 'of which they are themselves unworthy.' For this use of *ἀνάξιος* = 'too good for,' cp. Soph. Phil. 1009 *ἀνάξιον μὲν σοῦ, κατάξιον δ' ἐμοῦ*: i.e. 'of which you are unworthy and I am worthy.'

καὶ μεῖζον] For **μεῖζον** = 'too great' or 'high,' cp. Soph. 231 A *μὴ* **μεῖζον** *αὐτοῖς προσάπτωμεν γέρας.*

καὶ ἐπὶ πάντας] sc. *τείνουσαν*: 'and extending to all who bear the name.' This phrase is added by an afterthought and is not strictly in construction.

B **καὶ ὀλίγας**] sc. *τοιαύτας φύσεις.*

ὃ μὲν πάντων . . . ἀποσπᾷ φιλοσοφίας] 'In the first place what is strangest of all to hear, viz. that each of the qualities which we praised as belonging to the philosophic nature destroys the soul which possesses them and draws it away from philosophy.' These words are the answer to **τίνες δή**;—giving one of the ways in which these rare natures are corrupted. **ὧν** = *ἐκείνων ἅ.*

C **τὰ λεγόμενα ἀγαθά**] This is Plato's way of quoting a common opinion which is not acknowledged by philosophy. Cp. iv. 431 C *τῶν ἐλευθέρων* **λεγομένων** *ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τε καὶ φαύλοις.*

λαβοῦ τοίνυν . . . περὶ αὐτῶν] **αὐτοῦ** = 'the subject in hand': **αὐτῶν** = 'the philosophic natures;' last mentioned supra B in *τούτων δὴ τῶν ὀλίγων, κ.τ.λ.*

κελεύεις] sc. *λαβέσθαι αὐτοῦ.*

D **παντός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, . . . ἴσμεν**] 'Of every seed or growing thing, whether vegetable or animal, we know.' **φυτόν** is here taken in its widest sense.

It is not, however, the stronger or better nature of which the remark in the text is psychologically true. The poetical and sensitive temperament is the one which suffers most from alien conditions. Weakness, especially when accompanied by intellectual gifts, may indeed, by the help of accidents, be matured into strength. And strength, which was wanting in the original

character, has been sometimes developed in a life-long struggle against the passions or against circumstances. But, in general, the finer qualities of mind, which are capable also of coming to the greatest good, are most injured by corrupting influences: the gentler nature, which meets with no response at school or in the world, is coated over with an impenetrable rind: the soil is receptive, and the imagination is frequently haunted by impressions of evil, when they have ceased to affect the will. Genius, in the spring of youth, is hardly ever aware of the deteriorating effects of the surrounding atmosphere or soil. Stronger, rougher characters are not in the same way the creatures of circumstances. But weakness has no limit of evil, when the barriers of education and of public opinion have been once passed. This is commonly the stuff out of which great criminals are made. *Republic VI.* 491 D

κάκιον ἀπαλλάττειν] Stallbaum reads *κακίων*, with a slight variation of writing and of meaning, but see L. and S. s. v. *ἀπαλλάσσειν*, A. ii.

νεανικῆς] 'vigorous,' 'high-spirited.' Cp. infra 503 C *νεανικοί τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τὰς διανοίας.* E

ἀσθενῆ δὲ φύσιν, κ.τ.λ.] This clause depends on the general force of the words **ἢ οἴει . . . ἀλλ' οὐκ**, which emphasize the second alternative mentioned:—'Surely you must think that great crimes spring from a high-spirited (not from an inferior) nature, but that a weak nature,' &c. For **ἢ οἴει . . . ἀλλ' οὐκ** cp. i. 344 E *ἢ σμικρὸν* **οἴει** *ἐπιχειρεῖν πρᾶγμα διορίζεσθαι,* **ἀλλ' οὐ** *βίου διαγωγήν;* **αἰτίαν** here is the adjective.

οὔκ, ἀλλά . . . οὕτως] **οὔκ**, sc. *ἐκ φαύλης*: **οὕτως**, sc. *ἐκ νεανικῆς.*

ἦν τοίνυν ἔθεμεν] sc. *εἶναι.*

ἢ καὶ σὺ ἡγεῖ . . . (B) ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας;] 'Or do you, like the many, really think that there are, in any degree worth speaking of, young men corrupted by Sophists, or Sophists in a private capacity who corrupt them?' &c. Plato exhibits the Sophist in different lights,—here in a more favourable one. The point of this passage is to show that whether the Sophists are good or bad, their influence is unimportant compared with that of the great Sophist, public opinion, which they merely echo. 492 A

ἰδιωτικούς] 'in a private capacity,' is opposed to the sophistry

Republic VI. of the assembly or of public opinion. Cp. infra C *παιδείαν ἰδιωτικήν*: E *ἰδιωτικοὺς λόγους*.

492 B **μεγίστους . . . σοφιστάς**] Cp. Polit. 303 C, where Plato says of false statesmen — *μεγίστους δὲ ὄντας μιμητὰς καὶ γόητας* **μεγίστους** *γίγνεσθαι τῶν σοφιστῶν* **σοφιστάς**.

ξυγκαθεζόμενοι ἀθρόοι *οἱ πολλοί] 'sitting down together assembled in great force.' Hermann's correction ***οἱ πολλοί** adopted in the text is not quite certain. *ἀθρόοι πολλοί* seems to have been a not uncommon phrase: cp. Gorgias 490 B *ἐὰν ἐν ταὐτῷ ὦμεν, ὥσπερ νῦν, πολλοὶ ἀθρόοι ἄνθρωποι*: Xen. Anab. vii. 3, § 9 *οἶδα κώμας πολλὰς ἀθρόας*. The subject of **ψέγωσι** is to be supplied from **αὐτοὺς τοὺς ταῦτα λέγοντας** supra.

C **ὑπερβαλλόντως ἑκάτερα**] sc. *ποιοῦντες*—'doing either in excess' (referring to **ἐπαινῶσιν** and **ψέγωσι**).

ἢ *ποίαν αὐτῷ . . . ἀνθέξειν] *ποίαν ἂν* MSS. (1) *ἂν* with future indicative and future infinitive is a well-authenticated construction, that is, in many cases it has the support of the best MSS.: the omission of it is unjustifiable when it has sufficient manuscript authority in its favour. Here it is read in all the MSS. The particle, without weakening it, gives an ironical force to the future: 'will be likely to.' Cp. x. 615 D *Οὐχ ἥκει, φάναι, οὐδ' ἂν ἥξει δεῦρο*. Cp. Goodwin, *M. and T.*, §§ 197, 208. [B. J.]

(2) The repetition of the same syllable in *ποίαν ἂν* makes it easier to question the authority of the MSS. The 'colloquial style' of which Goodwin speaks in referring to x. 615 D, is not present here. [L. C.]

οὗτος] *ὁ τοιοῦτος ψόγος ἢ ἔπαινος*, under the image of a torrent suggested by **κατὰ ῥοῦν** and by **κατακλυσθεῖσαν** supra.

φήσειν . . . τοιοῦτον] **φήσειν** is dependent on *οὐκ οἴει* to be gathered from *ποίαν αὐτῷ παιδείαν ἰδιωτικὴν ἀνθέξειν* (sc. *οἴει*, supplied from *τίνα οἴει καρδίαν ἴσχειν*;) *ἣν οὐ . . . οἰχήσεσθαι* which is equivalent to *οὐκ οἴει καὶ ἥντιναοῦν παιδείαν ἰδιωτικὴν . . . οἰχήσεσθαι*. Cp. note on 491 E *ἀσθενῆ δὲ φύσιν, κ.τ.λ.*

D **τὸ[ν] μὴ πειθόμενον**] *τόν* is the reading of Ven. Π Ξ and a majority of the MSS. and seems more expressive here than *τό* (collective neuter), the reading of A M, for which cp. infra E *ὅ τί περ, κ.τ.λ.* *τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον* is Bekker's reading.

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492 E **οὐ γὰρ . . . ἐξαιρῶμεν λόγου**] For **ἐξαιρῶμεν λόγου** cp. Symp. 176 c *Σωκράτη δ' ἐξαιρῶ λόγου.*

'That which is impossible with men is possible with God' is one way in which Plato expresses the Socratic feeling that the ideal of philosophy is a divine reality, which is nowhere fully manifested. Cp. the *θεῖος λόγος* of the Phaedo (85 D), and the 'epiphany' of the philosopher in the Sophist (216 c): ii. 368 A: ix. 592 A *ἐὰν μὴ θεία τις ξυμβῇ τύχη.* See also the words which have prepared for this, supra 492 A *ἐὰν μή τις αὐτῇ βοηθήσας θεῶν τύχῃ.*

ἀλλοῖον ἦθος . . . πεπαιδευμένον] (1) 'A different type of character, which has been trained to virtue in opposition to the education which they (sc. *οἱ πολλοί*) supply.' It is better to adopt this interpretation, giving to **παρά** its common signification, and taking **πρὸς ἀρετήν** with **πεπαιδευμένον** (cp. Protag. 342 D *Λακεδαιμόνιοι* **πρὸς** *φιλοσοφίαν καὶ λόγους ἄριστα πεπαίδευνται*: Gorg. 471 D), than (2), with Stallbaum, to take **παρά** in the unparalleled sense of 'in accordance with,' translating the whole passage: 'a type of character differently disposed towards virtue, if it has been trained in accordance with the education which they supply.' The participle, **πεπαιδευμένον,** according to the first interpretation, is equivalent to a relative clause, *ὃ πεπαίδευται*: according to the second, to a conditional, *ἢν πεπαιδευμένον ᾖ.*

493 A **ἕκαστος . . . μὴ ἄλλα παιδεύειν**] sc. *δοξάτω σοι.* For what follows cp. Phaedrus 260 c, D, especially the words *δόξας δὲ πλήθους μεμελετηκώς, κ.τ.λ.*

οὓς δὴ . . . ἡγοῦνται] 'whom they regard as their professional rivals.'

οὗτοι] the people, who are themselves the Sophist: cp. *τούτων*, supra 492 E. The dislike of the Sophists on the part of men like Anytus (Meno, sub fin.) is humorously attributed to professional jealousy.

μεγάλου καὶ ἰσχυροῦ τρεφομένου] 'a great and mighty beast which is fed by him,'—'of which he is the keeper.'

B **ἐφ' οἷς *ἑκάστας**] The reading of nearly all the MSS. is *ἕκαστος*, which cannot be explained satisfactorily. Corrections are *ἑκάστοτε* (Vind. E), *ἑκάστοις, ἃς ἐφ' ἑκάστοις* (*q*), and *ἑκάστας* (cj. van Prinsterer). **ἑκάστας** is preferred because it gives a slight increase of distinctness

Republic VI. 493 B to the meaning: 'upon what occasions he utters his different cries.' Cp. Laws vii. 792 A *οὗ μὲν γὰρ ἂν προσφερομένου σιγᾷ, καλῶς οἴονται προσφέρειν, οὗ δ' ἂν κλαίῃ καὶ βοᾷ, οὐ καλῶς.*

καὶ χρόνου τριβῇ] *τριβή* is opposed to *ἐπιστήμη*, Phaedr. 260 E &c.: Gorg. 463 B: Soph. 254 A.

καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν] Opinion and desire are hardly distinguishable in the great beast.

C **ὀνομάζοι δὲ πάντα ταῦτα, κ.τ.λ.**] 'should employ all these terms (*καλόν, αἰσχρόν*, &c.) according to the opinions of the great beast.'

τἀναγκαῖα δίκαια καλοῖ] His only principle of justice would be the physical necessities and exigencies of the great beast's nature.

οὐκ ἄτοπος ἂν . . . παιδευτής] *ἂν* is to be joined with **εἶναι.**

D **ξυνιόντων**] marks the fact that the Sophist represents the collective opinion of mankind in their assemblies: **παντοδαπῶν**, that this opinion is a mixture of very incongruous elements, cp. Protag. 319 D *ὁμοίως μὲν τέκτων, ὁμοίως δὲ χαλκεύς, κ.τ.λ.*

εἴτ' ἐν γραφικῇ, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Polit. 297 E ff., where the absurdities of actual politics are ridiculed by imagining the result of similar proceedings in other sciences.

ὅτι μὲν γάρ . . . ἐπαινῶσιν] The construction is incomplete: *δῆλον* or some such word has to be supplied with **ὅτι.** Cp. v. 471 C, D *ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε, κ.τ.λ.*, and note: Soph. 248 D *τὸ δὲ ὡς τὸ γιγνώσκειν εἴπερ ἔσται ποιεῖν τι, τὸ γιγνωσκόμενον ἀναγκαῖον αὖ ξυμβαίνει πάσχειν.*

ἐπιδεικνύμενος] supra iii. 398 A.

πέρα τῶν ἀναγκαίων] is to be joined with **κυρίους αὑτοῦ ποιῶν τοὺς πολλούς**: 'The man who makes the many his arbiters of taste, except in so far as is necessary, will experience the fatal necessity of doing whatever they approve.' The true artist will not fall under the dominion of the many: but he must respect the opinion of the world up to a certain point, if 'he is to get leave to live in it.'

The aim of the Sophist, in Plato's view, is not to undermine public opinion or morals, but to reproduce them. His wisdom is to think like other men: cp. Shaks. 2 *Henry IV. ii.* 2, 62 'Never a man's thought in the world keeps the roadway better than thine.' He is

the representative man, who utters the average mind,—in religion, in politics, in arts, in society. He gathers up in his words the power of the many, which he directs against the wisdom of the few. He systematizes received opinions, which are thus rendered capable of being taught (compare the Protagoras). And sometimes philosophy may enable him to invest a popular belief with the dignity of a great truth, or to embody in a general formula the maxims of a party or sect. 493 D

ἡ Διομηδεία λεγομένη ἀνάγκη] The proverb is said by the Scholiast to refer to the following story :—*Διομήδης καὶ Ὀδυσσεὺς τὸ Παλλάδιον κλέψαντες ἐξ Ἰλίου νυκτὸς ἐπανῄεσαν ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς σελήνης ὑποφαινούσης, φιλοτιμούμενος δ' Ὀδυσσεὺς αὐτοῦ μόνον δόξαι γενέσθαι τὴν πρᾶξιν, ἐπεχείρησε τὸν Διομήδεα μετὰ τοῦ Παλλαδίου προηγούμενον ἀνελεῖν. ὁ δὲ κατὰ τὸ τῆς σελήνης φῶς τὴν καθ' αὐτοῦ θεασάμενος τοῦ ἐπιφερομένου ξίφους σκιάν, συλλαμβάνει τε τὸν Ὀδυσσέα, καὶ τὰς χεῖρας τοῦδε συνδεῖ, προάγειν τε κελεύει, καὶ τύπτων αὐτοῦ πλατεῖ τῷ ξίφει τὸ μετάφρενον ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας παραγίνεται.* The Scholiast on Aristoph. Eccles. 1029 has a different explanation :—*ὅτι Διομήδης ὁ Θρᾷξ, πόρνας ἔχων θυγατέρας, τοὺς παριόντας ξένους ἐβιάζετο αὐταῖς συνεῖναι.* Whatever the story may be to which the phrase refers, it is quite clear that the general meaning of it is ‘ inevitable necessity.’

ταῦτα τοίνυν . . . (494 A) **ὑπ' αὐτῶν**] The opposition of the few and the many is almost as great in the reading age of the nineteenth century as in the hearing age of Socrates and Plato. In politics, in society, in the realms of thought and imagination, there are two classes not marked in the vocabulary of party and found in all parties—the inferior minds and the superior: those who are under the influence of the hour, and those who have characters and principles. The difference is exaggerated when a single mind is at variance with the rest of the world. The great man who may be borne on the deeper tide of ages has, nevertheless, to struggle with the eddies and currents which react upon the surface. Yet the opposition is not so entire and absolute as Plato seems to assume. For different classes of minds, like different ranks in society, fade into one another: and also the simple elements of moral and religious truth afford a wide ground of common interest. No link from the highest to the lowest can be spared in the order of things. And through the progress of commerce and the arts, in the movements of history, by the gradual spread of education, the discoveries of great thinkers at length find a place in the world, E

Republic VI. and the speculative ideas of one generation become the received opinions of the next.

493 E **ταῦτα τοίνυν . . . ἀναμνήσθητι**] 'Bearing all these things in mind, remember further that point which we mentioned before'—i.e. in 491 A, where it is said that the truly philosophic nature is rarely found among men.

αὐτό τι ἕκαστον] Cp. v. 479 E: supra 484 D, 490 B.

494 A **ἀνέξεται**] sc. *λεγόμενα*.

φιλόσοφον μὲν ἄρα . . . πλῆθος ἀδύνατον εἶναι] Cp. especially Polit. 292 E *μῶν οὖν δοκεῖ πλῆθός γε ἐν πόλει ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην δυνατὸν εἶναι κτήσασθαι; Καὶ πῶς;*

καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων δὴ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν] supra 493 A.

ἐκ δὴ τούτων] 'As a consequence of this,'—i.e. the fact of their being blamed by the people and by their flatterers. Cp. supra 489 C.

ὡμολόγηται] 485 A, 487 C.

B **οὐκοῦν εὐθὺς ἐν *παισὶν . . . ἐν ἅπασιν**] The MSS. have *εὐθὺς ἐν πᾶσιν*. But the conjecture **ἐν παισίν** is clearly right. For (1) it makes explicit the contrast to **πρεσβύτερος** infra: (2) the same correction (*παισί* for *πᾶσι*) is required in iv. 431 C, where there can be no reasonable doubt: (3) it agrees better with **εὐθύς**: cp. iii. 401 D *εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων*.

C **ὑποκείσονται ἄρα**] 'Then they will lie at his feet.' *ὑποκεῖσθαι* is here used like *ὑποπίπτειν* (infra ix. 576 A) or *ὑποτρέχειν* (iv. 426 C). Cp. Gorg. 510 C *ταὐτὰ ψέγων καὶ ἐπαινῶν ἐθέλῃ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ* **ὑποκεῖσθαι** *τῷ ἄρχοντι*.

τί οὖν οἴει . . . ποιήσειν] 'How then do you suppose that he will behave?' For **ποιήσειν** cp. supra ii. 365 A and note: Thuc. v. 71 *τὰ στρατόπεδα* **ποιεῖ** *μὲν καὶ ἅπαντα τοῦτο*.

ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις] 'under such circumstances': cp. supra 489 C *ἔκ τε . . . τούτων καὶ ἐν τούτοις* according to one interpretation.

ἡγούμενον] The lives of Pausanias, Themistocles, Alcibiades (the latter especially in the words **καὶ ἔτι εὐειδὴς καὶ μέγας**), perhaps of Lysander, may have been in the writer's mind. Cp. I Alcibiades 105, where Socrates charges the young Alcibiades with an ambition extending beyond Athens to Greece, beyond Greece to Asia and the world.

Republic VI. 494 D

τὸ δὲ οὐ κτητόν] sc. ὁ νοῦς, as elsewhere the neuter referring to a masculine word.

διὰ τοσούτων κακῶν] 'through' (i. e. notwithstanding) 'such manifold hindrance.' For a somewhat similar use cp. Soph. Trach. 1131 τέρας τοι **διὰ κακῶν** ἐθέσπισας. Cp. also Keble, *Christian Year*, Whit-Sunday:

'To other strains our Souls are set;
A giddy whirl of sin
Fills ear and brain and will not let
Heaven's harmonies come in.'

διὰ τὸ . . . ξυγγενὲς τῶν λόγων] (1) 'Because such reasoning is congenial to him': or (2) 'Because of that in him which is kindred to dialectic.' Cp. iii. 402 A ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου ἀσπάζοιτ' ἂν αὐτὸν γνωρίζων δι' οἰκειότητα μάλιστα ὁ οὕτω τραφείς.

εἷς] 'One person': more than 'one' cannot be expected. E

τοὺς ἡγουμένους ἀπολλύναι] 'who think that they are losing.'

οὐ πᾶν μὲν ἔργον . . . εἰς ἀγῶνας καθιστάντας] With the participles we must supply οἰόμεθα καὶ ὁτιοῦν δράσειν αὐτούς from **τί οἰόμεθα δράσειν . . .**; immediately preceding. 'Do we not suppose that they will do anything, performing any action and speaking any word . . .?' The words **καὶ** ('both') **ἰδίᾳ . . . καθιστάντας** are added in explanation of **πράττοντας . . . περὶ τὸν πείθοντα.**

ἐλέγομεν] 491 B ff. 495 A

πλοῦτοι] The plural has the effect of scorn.

οὐ γάρ] 'Yes, I see that all this is true: for it was not a bad, but a true observation.' κακῶς has to be understood from the beginning of the preceding sentence—**οὐ κακῶς ἐλέγομεν.**

ὀλίγης καὶ ἄλλως γιγνομένης] 'which even otherwise' (i. e. setting aside the cause of destruction just mentioned) 'is a rare growth.' B

ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμέν] v. 476 B: supra 491 A, B.

καὶ ἐκ τούτων δὴ τῶν ἀνδρῶν . . . οὔτε ἰδιώτην οὔτε πόλιν δρᾷ] Plato thinks that it is only great natures which do great evil. Yet it is almost a condition of men's greatness that they should also in spite of themselves do some good.

The largeness and force and originality of a man's character are

Republic VI. 495 B the qualities which give him power over his fellows. The narrow nature, which is incapable of attracting others and has no intelligence either of things or persons, is necessarily unable to act upon them.

καὶ οἱ τὰ μέγιστα] **καί** = 'also,' anticipating **καὶ οἱ τἀγαθά**. The latter clause introduces the reverse statement, though not immediately in point.

καὶ οἱ τἀγαθά, οἳ ἂν ταύτῃ τύχωσι ῥυέντες] 'and' [from these men, i. e. the philosophers, come those who do] 'the' [greatest] 'goods, being such of them as are drawn in this direction.' The element of chance is never wholly eliminated in Plato.

οἷς μάλιστα προσήκει] sc. *ἡ φιλοσοφία*—'to whom she is nearest of kin.' There is a reference to the Athenian law which compelled the nearest kinsman to marry an orphan maiden. Cp. Laws xi. 924.

C **τὴν δέ, κ.τ.λ.**] The bad philosophers are not the philosophic natures spoilt, but the unphilosophic pretenders to philosophy. **δέ** answers both to **μέν** (**οὗτοι μέν**) and **τε** (**αὐτοί τε**).

D **ὅμως γὰρ δὴ . . .** (E) **τυγχάνουσιν**] The sentence is really unfinished, the finite verb **τυγχάνουσιν**, substituted for the participle by attraction from **λελώβηνται**, giving it a fallacious appearance of completeness. The sense is completed figuratively in the words **τοῦ δεσπότου τὴν θυγατέρα μέλλοντος γαμεῖν, κ.τ.λ.**, of the next sentence, and literally in 496 A *ὅταν αὐτῇ πλησιάζοντες ὁμιλῶσι κ.τ.λ.*

The personification which follows is suggested in the words **ὥσπερ ὀρφανὴν συγγενῶν** (C), and continued by the help of **οἱ ξυνόντες αὐτῇ** (ibid.), until the idea is complete and philosophy is transformed into a gentle maiden who is compelled by poverty to marry a tinker and has offspring **νόθα καὶ φαῦλα**. In the words **τί δαί; . . . ἀληθινῆς ἐχόμενον;** the simile is blended with that which it is intended to illustrate.

E **δοκεῖς . . . διαφέρειν αὐτοὺς ἰδεῖν**] **ἰδεῖν** is epexegetic := 'to look at.'

φαλακροῦ] is only added to make a more contemptible image, while **σμικροῦ** is in keeping with the diminutives **ἀνθρωπίσκοι, τεχνίον**, and **νεωστὶ . . . λελυμένου** continues the figure **οἱ ἐκ τῶν εἱργμῶν . . . ἀποδιδράσκοντες. τοῦ δεσπότου** is in construction with **θυγατέρα.**

496 A **προσήκοντα ἀκοῦσαι σοφίσματα**] 'fit to be called sophisms.' Cp. Lysis 207 A *οὐ τὸ καλὸς εἶναι μόνον ἄξιος* **ἀκοῦσαι**, and see L. and S.,

496 A

s. v. *ἀκούω*, iii. 2. The use of this idiom here implies the familiar personification of *λόγος*, in the shape of the **διανοήματά τε καὶ δόξας**, which are the offspring of the unworthy marriage. **προσήκοντα** = *οἷς προσήκει*,—a 'personal' construction.

καὶ οὐδὲν . . . ἐχόμενον;] 'And nothing genuine or worthy of true wisdom or having to do with it.' There is no sufficient reason for cancelling **ἄξιον**, which may be either taken absolutely, or as governing the genitive as well as **ἐχόμενον**, which in this case is pleonastic, like *φανείς*, *ἔχων*, *μολών*, &c. But the reading of Ven. Π, *ἄξιων ὡς*, suggests the possibility of **ἀξίως*.

πάνσμικρον δή τι] For the collective neuter cp. supra 490 E *σμικρὸν δέ τι ἐκφεύγει*: 492 E *ὅ τί περ ἂν σωθῇ*.

καταληφθέν, 'detained by exile,' sc. from deserting philosophy. B

βραχὺ δέ πού τι . . . ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἂν ἔλθοι] **εὐφυές** gives the reason of **δικαίως ἀτιμάσαν**: its force may be rendered thus:—'rightly scorning it by reason of its own natural excellence.'

κατασχεῖν . . . (C) **κατέχει**] sc. *πρὸς τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ*.

τὸ δαιμόνιον σημεῖον] On this subject see Apology 31 D: Theaet. 151 A: Theages 128 E: Xen. Mem. i. 4. What we gather respecting this 'familiar' of Socrates is (1) that he had experienced these intimations from childhood (Apol. 31): (2) they prohibited but never instigated a course of action; they would stop him when going out of his house or forbid him to proceed in the middle of a speech (ibid. D), or prevent his taking back truant pupils (Theaet. 151), or hinder his departure till he had expiated some trifling impiety (Phaedr. 242 B): (3) the *δαιμόνιον* is always described by him in the neuter gender,—once in a doubtful dialogue as having a voice (Theages 128 E); also as a special monitor which is peculiar to himself, as in the text and Xen. Mem. i. 4. Xenophon is very anxious that we should believe his master's account of this strange experience; the simplicity of Socrates' own statement is a strong reason for doing so. It is not to be confounded with the general consciousness of a divine mission received by Socrates from the Oracle, or with special intimations such as that given by the dream in the Phaedo (60 E). There is nothing wonderful or mysterious beyond the fact itself: no intimations are given by the *δαιμόνιον* of future events or divine truths. Nor can we easily set bounds to the latent forms of instinct which reason may assume, C

Republic VI. 496 C or deny the possibility of mental phenomena, which are without parallel in ordinary experience.

ἢ . . . τινι ἄλλῳ ἢ οὐδενί] A slight extension of a common idiom, for which cp. Apology 17 B *ἤ τι ἢ οὐδέν.*

τούτων δὴ τῶν ὀλίγων οἱ γενόμενοι] Cp. Thuc. iii. 56, § 7 *ὧν ἡμεῖς γενόμενοι.*

If a perfectly wise and just man were to appear, how would the world receive him? Would he make his voice heard in opposition to the opinions and practices of the day? Would any party range themselves on his side? Or would he be an outcast and an exile, 'wandering about in sheepskins and goatskins?' Would he have been burnt at the Reformation, or would he be tolerated in our own day?

ἐπὶ τὴν τῷ δικαίῳ βοήθειαν] The manuscript authority is nearly divided between **τῷ δικαίῳ** (Par. A: Vind. F) and *τῶν δικαίων* (Π M). The former was adopted by Schneider and is idiomatic: but *τῶν δικαίων* (the objective genitive) is not ungrammatical. Both readings have the same meaning: 'to the assistance of what is just.'

D **ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἰς θηρία . . . ἵλεώς τε καὶ εὐμενὴς ἀπαλλάξεται**] Cp. Gorg. 521, 522, where Socrates gives the reason why he takes no part in politics, viz. because he would have been long ago put to death.

εἷς πᾶσιν ἀγρίοις ἀντέχειν] **ἀγρίοις** is emphatic and a part of the predicate: = *ἀγρίοις οὖσι* or *ἀγριαίνουσι*, 'singly to oppose the fury of them all.' The collocation of **εἷς πᾶσιν** aids the antithesis.

λογισμῷ λαβών] The change from the plural to the singular (**ἰδόντες** *τὴν μανίαν . . . ταῦτα πάντα* **λογισμῷ λαβών**) is due to the singular in the image (*ὥσπερ εἰς θηρία ἄνθρωπος* **ἐμπεσών**).

E **τὴν ἀπαλλαγήν, κ.τ.λ.**] 'He will take his departure from it with a fair hope, in peace and good-will.' **αὐτοῦ**, sc. *τοῦ βίου.*

497 A **οὐδέ γε . . . τὰ κοινὰ σώσει**] Shall a man acquiesce in the state of life, politics, education, which he finds around him, retiring 'behind a wall' in stormy times, or shall he 'take arms against a sea of troubles' and strive to set men right? That is a question which admits of a general answer so far as this: That he who from cowardice or self-interest or over-refinement or indolence or irresolution fails in resisting the prejudice or injustice or falsehood of his

age, is wanting in the fulfilment of the highest duty of a citizen and a man. Yet, in the ordinary state of society, the antagonism between the individual and the world, whether of politics or of public opinion, is not so great as is implied in the Platonic contrast. The spirit which replies to divine goodness with the words, 'We have a law and by our law he ought to die,' is, in Plato's language (supra 496 c), hardly worth mentioning, having only occurred once perhaps in the history of mankind. Most societies have better, as well as worse impulses; if they are not so good as the best individuals, of whom they are partly composed, neither are they so bad as the worst. Of their nobler impulses the philosopher may avail himself: he is the Master of those that think; his gentle qualities may readily be appreciated by all. Nor does he really stand alone: many intermediate minds are the conductors between himself and the multitude, with whom he may sometimes also make a direct alliance, like the King and the Commons in the Roman State, against the prejudices or interests of the few. His duty is to struggle rather than to win, in the faith, which is the meeting-point of philosophy and religion, that truth will finally prevail. His place is not in the congenial state which Plato offers him—this would only limit him; but in the world at large, in which he makes himself felt as a power. *Republic VI.* 497 A

Philosophy must continue thus degraded and defamed, until the true philosopher obtain a state and constitution suited to him. Thus, having a true environment, Philosophy will prove in action that she is alone divine. Such a perfect constitution has now been described in outline. But the education of the philosophic rulers has yet to be determined. And first, the method of their training in philosophy must be the opposite of that now in vogue. Instead of getting a smattering of dialectic in the brief interim between school and business, after which, as things now are, the student hardly meddles with philosophy again, they shall be content in youth with elementary mental discipline and attend seriously to the strengthening of the physical frame; until the age arrives when the mind approaches her maturity. Then they shall increase the gymnastics of the mind. And when declining strength exempts them from public services, they shall be permitted to devote themselves entirely to the pursuit which they love, and so prepare themselves for blessedness to come. *497 A–498 C*

τὴν προσήκουσαν αὐτῇ τίνα . . . λέγεις] For the form of expression cp. v. 475 E τοὺς δὲ ἀληθινούς, ἔφη, **τίνας λέγεις**; 497 A

Republic VI. **ἐπαιτιῶμαι**] *τὰς νῦν πολιτείας* is easily supplied, but is unnecessary.

497 B **διὸ καὶ στρέφεσθαι . . . κρατούμενον ἰέναι**] 'And so it (i. e. the philosophic nature) is warped and changed, just as a foreign seed, sown in an alien soil, fades away (**ἐξίτηλον**) and tends to be subdued and pass (**κρατούμενον ἰέναι**) into the native stock.' For *ἰέναι εἰς* cp. Laws viii. 834 D *παιδευμάτων εἰς ἔθος ἰόντων*.

The words which follow, **οὕτω καὶ τοῦτο . . . ἐκπίπτειν**, are added as if **ὥσπερ ξενικὸν σπέρμα, κ.τ.λ.**, had been quite independent of **διὸ καὶ στρέφεσθαι . . . αὐτήν**. The construction would have been more correct if the sentence had terminated at **ἰέναι**, or if *καί* had been inserted before **ὥσπερ ξενικὸν σπέρμα**. As the sentence stands there is an asyndeton either before **ὥσπερ** or **οὕτω**.

C **δηλώσει**] is impersonal : = *δῆλον ἔσται* : cp. Gorg. 483 D *δηλοῖ δὲ ταῦτα πολλαχοῦ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει*.

ἦν] 'was always,' even when rejected of men.

τὰ μὲν ἄλλα, κ.τ.λ.] 'In other respects this one (sc. *ἣν ἡμεῖς διεληλύθαμεν*) is the best constitution': but there was one defect in it. We did indeed say at the time that the spirit of the legislator was to be preserved, but we did not show sufficiently how this was to be effected. **τοῦτο δὲ αὐτό**, 'this very point' (which is excluded and excepted by **τὰ ἄλλα**) was mentioned, but not adequately discussed.

ἐρρήθη μὲν . . . (D) **ἀλλ' οὐχ ἱκανῶς . . . ἐδηλώθη**] The construction is broken by the answer, **ἐρρήθη γάρ, ἔφη**: and **ἀλλ' οὐχ ἱκανῶς . . . ἐδηλώθη** takes the place of *οὐχ ἱκανῶς δ' ἐδηλώθη*.

Socrates had said (**ἐρρήθη** : cp. iii. 412–414) that it was necessary to have an authority in the state that should preserve the spirit of the legislator. The question as to how this was to be effected had only been partly answered in Book iii (*οὐχ ἱκανῶς ἐδηλώθη*), owing to the objection of Adeimantus (**φόβῳ ὧν ὑμεῖς**, *κ.τ.λ.*) at the beginning of Book iv (419 ff.), and the more serious interruption at the beginning of v (450 ff.), which led to the discussion of communism. Socrates now proceeds to complete (**τὸ λοιπόν**) his answer by stating how the study of philosophy is to be pursued.

D **λόγον**] 'idea,' 'conception,' 'reasoned notion.'

ὧν ὑμεῖς ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι] **ὧν**, sc. *ἐκείνων ἅ* (cognate accus.).

αὐτοῦ] 'of it,' i. e. of the question which we were discussing in Book iii.

οὐ *πάντων ῥᾷστον] πάντως MSS.—'not by any means the easiest.' Bekker's correction, οὐ *πάντων ῥᾷστον, is unnecessary [B. J.]. But the change is slight and the phrase more idiomatic [L. C.]. *Republic VI.* 497 D

καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον . . . χαλεπά] τῷ ὄντι is an addition of Socrates', 'we may indeed say in the words of the proverb.'

ἀλλ' ὅμως . . . φανεροῦ γενομένου] 'Still, he said, let us clear up this point, and so complete the demonstration.' E

νῦν μέν . . . (498 A) περὶ τοὺς λόγους] 'At present those who do engage in philosophy are mere striplings, just past their boyhood: they approach—that is, those of them who are most thought of as philosophers—the most difficult part of the subject; and I mean by the most difficult part, dialectic; in the interval before keeping house and going into business, and then betake themselves off.' That is to say, the study of philosophy, as at present pursued, begins too early, at the wrong end, and ends too soon. The opposite advice is given by Callicles in the Gorgias (485).

(1) Only the extreme limit (οἰκονομίας καὶ χρηματισμοῦ) of the interval (τὸ μεταξύ) is mentioned; the other is to be gathered from ἐκ παίδων: 'between boyhood and business.' Or (2) we may take τὸ μεταξὺ . . . χρηματισμοῦ, with Stallbaum, as meaning 'in the spare moments of housekeeping and business.'

οἱ φιλοσοφώτατοι ποιούμενοι] On comparing vii. 538 C *τῶν ἄλλων ποιουμένων οἰκείων*, it appears that ποιούμενοι is a qualifying word like *δοκοῦντες*, &c., and is to be understood passively: 'who are thought to be most accomplished in philosophy.' 498 A

πρὸς δὲ τὸ γῆρας . . . αὖθις οὐκ ἐξάπτονται] Cp. Aristot. Meteor. ii. 2, § 9 *περὶ δὲ τὸν ἥλιον, ἀδύνατον τοῦτο συμβαίνειν· ἐπεὶ στρεφομένου γε τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνοί φασι, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ὁ ἥλιος οὐ μόνον καθάπερ ὁ Ἡράκλειτός φησι, νέος ἐφ' ἡμέρῃ ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ νέος συνεχῶς.*

δεῖ δὲ πῶς;] sc. *πράττειν.* B

πᾶν τοὐναντίον] sc. *δεῖ πράττειν.*

ὑπηρεσίαν φιλοσοφίᾳ κτωμένους] In the Protagoras Plato represents this principle as recognized in the ordinary education of the Greek: Protag. 326 B *ἵνα τὰ σώματα βελτίω ἔχοντες ὑπηρετῶσι τῇ διανοίᾳ χρηστῇ οὔσῃ.*

προϊούσης δὲ τῆς ἡλικίας, ἐν ᾗ] 'as the period of life advances in which.' Two notions are combined: 'As the time of life goes forwards,' and 'as the particular age arrives.'

Republic VI. 498 C ὅταν δὲ λήγῃ . . . μοῖραν ἐπιστήσειν πρέπουσαν] 'But when the strength fails, and a man is past political and military duties, they should range at will and devote themselves to no other pursuit, except as a secondary matter, those, that is, who are to live happily and after death to crown the life they have lived with a fitting destiny in the world below.' The subject of γίγνηται is τις, for which the Indef. Plur. is substituted in ἀφέτους, κ.τ.λ.

For a similar use of the term ἄφετοι, applied to the sons of Pericles, who are left to get their political education where they can, cp. Protag. 320 A αὐτοὶ περιϊόντες νέμονται ὥσπερ ἄφετοι, ἐάν που αὐτόματοι περιτύχωσι τῇ ἀρετῇ.

498 C–502 C *Adeimantus thinks that the zeal of Socrates will be met with equal zeal on the part of his opponents, beginning with Thrasymachus. 'Do not try to cause ill-feeling between Thrasymachus and me, who are now friends, although we were never enemies. For I shall never relax my efforts to do good to him and to all men, and my work may bear fruit in another life, if not in this.' He adds that it is no blame to ordinary men that they do not believe, since they have had sophistry palmed upon them for truth, and an artificial combination of words for the spontaneous unity of nature. Nor have they ever seen a perfect man ruling in a perfect state. Socrates therefore once more reiterates his main position, that there is no hope for mankind unless either the few who are now 'useless' should have supreme power, or the actual potentates should be inspired with a genuine love of true philosophy. Then, and not till then, the ideal state will come into being. And when the vulgar see the philosopher as he really is, they will be of another mind. The majority of men cannot be angry with one who loves them, or be jealous of one who is free from all jealousy and personality. For his mind dwells, not among the contentions of earth, but in the divine order. He will take the state in hand and make a 'tabula rasa,' whereon he will plan out the ideal of human society, looking at the abstract principles of virtue, and at the actual traces of it existing among men, framing out of both together the image of a divine humanity. He—or they, if there be more than one—is alone qualified for this work. Nor is it inconceivable that in the whole course of time one such may arise, and may legislate for a willing people, or that he may make his laws according to the spirit of our doctrines. In that case our ideal ('though hard and rare') will be actually realized.*

μὴ διάβαλλε, κ.τ.λ.] See note on i. 336 B. The words **οὐδὲ πρὸ τοῦ, κ.τ.λ.**, are in keeping with the good humour which, after the storm, Socrates has contrived to restore at the end of Book i. and which remains unbroken at the beginning of Book v. For the use of *διαβάλλειν* cp. Symp. 222 D *ὅπως ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ μηδεὶς διαβάλῃ.* *Republic VI.* 498 C

ὅταν . . . ἐντύχωσι λόγοις] For this notion of discourses taking place in another life cp. Apol. 41, Phaedo 68 A, B, in which Socrates anticipates his meeting with great souls in Hades. In the present passage, however, the reference is to a future life on earth after the interval of a thousand years. It is curious after this allusion to find Glaucon in x. 608 D expressing surprise when Socrates announces the immortality of the Soul. D

εἰς οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν . . . τὸν ἅπαντα] Cp. x. 608 C *τί δ' ἄν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔν γε ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ μέγα γένοιτο; πᾶς γὰρ οὗτός γε ὁ ἐκ παιδὸς μέχρι πρεσβύτου χρόνος πρὸς πάντα ὀλίγος πού τις ἂν εἴη.* **Οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν,** *ἔφη. Τί οὖν; οἴει ἀθανάτῳ πράγματι ὑπὲρ τοσούτου δεῖν χρόνου ἐσπουδακέναι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός;*

ἐξεπίτηδες ἀλλήλοις ὡμοιωμένα] 'artificially made to agree with one another.' E

ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου, ὥσπερ νῦν] This allusion to the 'spontaneous harmony' of the dialogue is partly a mode of praising his own work (cp. Shakespeare, *Jul. Caes.* iii. 1, 111 'How many ages hence | Shall this our lofty scene be acted over | In states unborn and accents yet unknown!' and Laws vii. 811, where Plato eulogizes his own compositions with the freedom and garrulity of old age), and partly expresses his real conviction that the harmony of his dialogues (as of a living creature—Phaedr. 264 C) was not merely a work of art, but had a real correspondence with the truth of the ideas. Cp. Theaet. 200 E, Phil. 20 C.

λόγων . . . ἐλευθέρων] 'discourses noble and free.' 499 A

οἵων ζητεῖν] 'whose nature is to seek.' **οἵων** = *τοιούτων ὥστε.* The arguments are again personified.

πρὸς δόξαν] 'to producing an impression.'

πόρρωθεν ἀσπαζομένων] 'giving a distant welcome.' Cp. Psalm cxxxviii. 6 'The proud he knoweth afar off.' The phrase occurs in Eurip. Hippol. 102 **πρόσωθεν** *αὐτὴν ἁγνὸς ὢν* **ἀσπάζομαι.**

τότε] v. 473 D. B

Republic VI. **καὶ δεδιότες ὅμως**] 'although with trembling.' **καί** as in *καίπερ*.

499 B **οὐδέ γ' ἀνὴρ ὁμοίως**] 'No, nor can an individual become equally perfect,' sc. as he would in a kingdom of philosophers. See above 497 A *οὐδέ γε, εἶπον, τὰ μέγιστα, κ.τ.λ.*

περιβάλῃ] which is found in the best MSS., is probably correct: 'until necessity (1) encompasses them' (L. and S. s. v. *περιβάλλω*, ii) to take charge of the city and the city to obey them, or (2) 'constrains them' (lit. 'invests them with it'), the infinitives taking the place of an accusative. The inferior reading, *παραβάλῃ*, must be taken intransitively, like *παραβάλλω* in viii. 556 C *ὅταν παραβάλλωσιν ἀλλήλοις οἵ τε ἄρχοντες καὶ οἱ ἀρχόμενοι.*

καὶ τῇ πόλει *κατηκόῳ γενέσθαι] The MSS. have *κατήκοοι* (*κατήκοι* Π), which is harsh in grammar and irrelevant in meaning. **κατηκόῳ**, a correction of Schleiermacher's, involves the least possible change (from *οι* to *ῳ*), and makes the sentence smooth: 'Until either philosophers are invested with power, or kings, who have power, become philosophers.' Cp. v. 473 D *ἐὰν μὴ . . . ἢ οἱ φιλόσοφοι βασιλεύσωσιν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἢ οἱ βασιλῆς τε νῦν λεγόμενοι καὶ δυνάσται φιλοσοφήσωσι γνησίως τε καὶ ἱκανῶς* for the same two alternatives. *κατήκοοι* has been explained as attracted to the subject of **βούλονται** from *κατηκόοις* which Stallbaum conjectured: but apart from the grammar, the notion of the city entreating the philosophers to govern her, goes beyond anything which has been suggested by Plato.

C **τούτων δὲ πότερα . . . ἔχειν λόγον**] 'To suppose that either or both of these alternatives is impossible, I maintain to be quite unreasonable.' *πότερος* is the indefinite, 'either of the two,' as in Theaet. 145 A *τί δ', εἰ* **ποτέρου** *τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπαινοῖ πρὸς ἀρετήν, κ.τ.λ.*, and elsewhere. This is one of Plato's subtleties of language which appear to be lost in later writers. The pronoun **οὐδένα** is more emphatic than the simple negative *οὐκ ἔχειν λόγον.*

εἰ τοίνυν . . . (D) **ἐγκρατὴς γένηται**] **ἕτοιμοι**, sc. *ἐσμέν.* **αὕτη ἡ Μοῦσα**, sc. *ἡ φιλοσοφία*, **αὕτη** referring to **ἄκροις εἰς φιλοσοφίαν** at the beginning of the sentence.

ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ τῷ παρεληλυθότι χρόνῳ] The fancy of ancient writers led them to speculate on the boundless past more than on the future. Herodotus has no difficulty in imagining that the Delta might have been accumulated in 10,000 years. Socrates in the Theaetetus (174 E) imagines infinite time, in which every man's

pedigree has contained princes, as well as peasants, many times over. In the Laws infinite time, in which a series of destructions is supposed to have occurred, is said to be the origin of states (iii. 677). Similar speculations occur in the Politicus and Timaeus. In this respect, as in several others, Greek thought seems to occupy an intermediate space between the dreamy infinity of the Oriental and the narrower notions of the West. *Republic VI.* 499 C

ἢ †καὶ ἐὰν οὕτω . . . ἀποκρινεῖσθαι] (1) The difficulty of this passage is removed by reading ἦ for ἤ, placing a full stop after **ἀποκρινεῖσθαι**, and joining **καὶ . . . οὕτω**: 'You will surely say that, if they look at the philosophers in this light too' (and not in the former only), 'they will change their mind and answer in another strain.' Cp. Thuc. v. 45 *τὸν 'Αλκιβιάδην ἐφόβουν μὴ* **καὶ** *ἢν ἐς τὸν δῆμον ταῦτα λέγωσιν, ἐπαγάγωνται τὸ πλῆθος*, where *καί* marks the antithesis of *ἐς τὸν δῆμον* to *ἐν τῇ βουλῇ*. This avoids the harshness of taking **ἀλλοίαν δόξαν** in two opposite senses (i. e. (*a*) 'different from their earlier opinion': and (*b*) 'the same with their earlier opinion but different from yours') within a few lines. (2) But the reading *q ἢ οὐκ ἐάν* suggests a clearer sense which can be obtained by Stallbaum's simple expedient of changing *τοι* to *τε*: 'or supposing them to look at the question in this light, will you not say that they will adopt a different opinion and make another reply?' The repetition of **ἀλλοίαν** has then a natural emphasis. For the omission of a negative see note on iv. 439 E. Cp. for the spirit of the passage Phaedr. 268 D *ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν ἀγροίκως γε, οἶμαι, λοιδορήσειαν, κ.τ.λ.* 500 A

ἄφθονόν τε καὶ πρᾶον ὄντα] with this use of *ἄφθονος* cp. *ἄθυμος* in iii. 411 B, Laws x. 888 A. It is remarkable that Plato should be found asserting the goodness of ordinary human nature when treated with gentleness and consideration.

ἀμέλει] See note on iv. 422 C.

ἐκείνους] Supra 495 C, D. B

λοιδορουμένους . . . αὐτοῖς] **αὑτοῖς** is better than *αὐτοῖς*, being more in keeping with the spirit of the passage: cp. supra 499 E *μὴ φιλονεικῶν ἀλλὰ παραμυθούμενος*, and infra C *μαχόμενον αὐτοῖς*. It was by no means an uncommon practice of the old philosophers to abuse the people. For an illustration of *ἐπεισκωμάζεσθαι* compare the amusing description of Alcibiades in Symp. 213 ff. A still

Republic VI. 500 B more fanciful use of the metaphor occurs in Theaet. 184 A *ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπεισκωμαζόντων λόγων.*

B It may be often doubted whether the persecution of religious and philosophical teachers is to be laid to the door of their virtues or of their faults: in the nineteenth century and under ordinary circumstances, rather to the latter. No man is now persecuted for his goodness: there is far more danger that the rewards which he receives may injure the bloom of his disinterestedness. He is more likely to be persecuted for the love of truth, when the truth happens to be opposed to the prevailing sentiments of his age and country. Yet here, again, much will depend upon himself. The philosopher who has no kindness for the many and is too fastidious to sympathize with them, easily becomes the object of enmity to those who are unacquainted with him. This does not show that mankind deliberately prefer falsehood to truth, any more than evil to good.

ἥκιστα . . . ποιοῦντας] Names and authorities in the place of reasons and proofs, personalities instead of facts, in ancient as well as modern times, mark a superficial and unphilosophic character. So the *μεγαλόψυχος* in Aristotle is *οὐκ ἀνθρωπολόγος* (N. E. iv. 3, § 31). Yet those who are guilty of these faults are almost always unconscious of them.

πολύ γ'] sc. *ἥκιστα.*

C **ἀλλ' εἰς τεταγμένα ἄττα, κ.τ.λ.**] In a similar spirit it is said in the Timaeus (47 A–C) that men should in their lives imitate the unchanging motions of the heavens. Compare also the philosopher in the Theaetetus 174 ff., and, for the loftiness of **κάτω βλέπειν**, Sophist 216 **καθορῶντες** *ὑψόθεν τὸν τῶν κάτω βίον.*

ταῦτα μιμεῖσθαί τε . . . ἀφομοιοῦσθαι] sc. *δεῖ*, elicited from **οὐδὲ . . . σχολή**, the positive from the negative.

ἀφομοιοῦσθαι] sc. *τούτοις.*

D **διαβολὴ δ' ἐν πᾶσι πολλή**] **ἐν πᾶσι** may mean either (1) 'among all men': or (2) 'in all things,' i. e. attending every form of human life. 'The philosopher attains to divinity as far as man can: but there is always detraction going on.' The divine life is not complete until its excellence is acknowledged by mankind.

δημοτικῆς ἀρετῆς] Cp. iv. 430 C *πολιτικήν γε* and note: Phaedo 82 B *οἱ τὴν* **δημοτικήν** *τε καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτετηδευκότες.*

Republic VI.

οὐ χαλεπανοῦσιν . . . (501 A) ὃ οὐ πάνυ ῥᾴδιον] 'They will not be angry if they understand. But tell me, what is their manner of drawing it?' 'I mean, I replied, they will take for their tablet a state and human nature, and will begin by making a clean surface, which is not at all an easy thing to do.' 500 E

The modern philosopher will rather say: *ὅπερ οὐ πάνυ δυνατόν*. Neither individuals nor states can wholly break with their antecedents. The power of habit or tradition, in institutions as well as characters brings back the former things.

ἀλλ' οὖν . . . ἢ αὐτοὶ ποιῆσαι] 'However, you know that this is the point which will at once distinguish them from the others: they will have nothing to do with individual or state, and will draft no laws, until they have either (*ἤ*) received or (*ἤ*) themselves made a clear surface.' In other words they will begin with the abstraction of a state. A method of effecting such a 'clean sweep' is suggested at the end of Book vii, where all persons of ten years old and upwards are to be sent out of the city. 501 A

οὐκοῦν . . . τῆς πολιτείας] 'Do you not suppose that the next step will be to make an outline of the form of the constitution?' For the meaning of *ὑπογράφειν* cp. the opposition of *ὑπογραφή* and *τελεωτάτη ἀπεργασία* infra 504 D. In Protag. 326 D the word is used of the writing-master setting a copy.

ἀπεργαζόμενοι] 'In filling up the outline.' B

τὸ φύσει δίκαιον . . . τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις] i.e. to natural justice and to that justice which exists among men. Cp. Phaedo 103 B *οὔτε* **τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν** *οὔτε* **τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει**: ibid. 102 D. The absolute ideal or the ideal in nature, is opposed to the actual in man. The pronoun is resumed in **ἀπ' ἐκείνου.**

ἐμποιοῖεν . . . θεοείκελον] 'they would put into the picture what is manlike, mingling and mixing it from the modes of human action, forming their conception of it from that ideal, which Homer, when existing among men, called divine and godlike.' There is possibly an allusion to the secondary meaning of **ἀνδρείκελον** = a pigment of the colour of human flesh.

ἀπ' ἐκείνου τεκμαιρόμενοι, κ.τ.λ.] Does an artist paint from an ideal in the mind's eye, or from observation of nature and life? Is moral and political philosophy to be gathered deductively from ideas, or inductively from experience? The same answer may be

Republic VI. 501 B given to both questions: (1) that different minds work in different ways: one with eye and thought simultaneously, the other with a conception that always seems to outrun the power of execution. One fills up a previously existing outline, the other creates piecemeal: the ideal is first in one mind, the real in another. And one man is a philosopher from running about in life, another from reading and study. (2) The opposition of fact and idea, though often made and occasionally justified by the differences of human character or genius, is not, speaking generally, a true one; ideas and ideals are only more universal and distant facts, in which the particularity and confusedness of sense is lost.

C **οὓς διατεταμένους ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ἔφησθα ἰέναι**] Viz. v. 474 A *θεῖν διατεταμένους, κ.τ.λ.*

D **ἣν ἡμεῖς διήλθομεν**] Referring once more to supra 485 ff.

τί δέ; τὴν τοιαύτην . . . ἀφωρίσαμεν] The change from *μή* to *οὐ* shows that *ἀμφισβητῆσαι* has been forgotten, some general notion such as *λέγειν* having taken its place; and in what follows **φήσειν** can only be explained by a recurrence to *οἴει* or some similar word implied in the preceding question, the infinitive being suggested by **ἔσεσθαι** preceding.

E **ἣν μυθολογοῦμεν λόγῳ**] Cp. once more iii. 389 D *ἐάν γε . . . ἐπί γε λόγῳ ἔργα τελῆται.*

ἧττον] sc. *ἀγριανοῦσιν.*

βούλει . . . (502 A) ὁμολογήσωσιν] 'Do you wish that we should say, not that they are less angry, but that they have become altogether gentle.' So the unregenerate materialists in the Sophist are imagined to be better than they are, for the sake of the argument (Soph. 246 D, 247 E). Cp. also i. 354 A *ὑπὸ σοῦ γε, . . . ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἐπειδή μοι πρᾶος ἐγένου καὶ χαλεπαίνων ἐπαύσω.*

ἧττον φῶμεν] sc. *ἀγριαίνειν.*

502 A **αἰσχυνθέντες**] 'from shame' at our magnanimity in saying they are quite gentle.

τις] *τίς;* which proves to be the reading of Par. A, agrees equally well with the answer **οὐδ' ἂν εἷς**, but cp. **ἔχει τις . . ., ἔσθ' ὅστις . . .**, infra.

ὡς μὲν γὰρ . . . ξυγχωροῦμεν] Supra 491 ff., 499 D.

B **γενόμενος**] = *εἰ γένοιτο,* 'were he to arise.'

ἀλλὰ δή . . . ἀδύνατον] Plato is arguing about the probability of his perfect state coming into being, and he assumes this to be possible if only one philosophic nature in the course of ages remains uncorrupted, and finds a city willing to obey him—that is the first step. The ruler lays down his laws and the people execute them—that is the second step. But why should not that which approves itself to us approve itself to him? Or, in other words, 'Why should not the laws which he lays down be the same with ours?' *Republic VI. 502 B*

We may now return to the education of the ruling class, which, as was said above, must be arranged with due regard to the age best fitted for each branch of study. And first, the tests which we now demand for them will be more severe than those previously required. Their patriotism must indeed be proof against all assaults, but they must also be unwearied in learning. Now this implies the combination, rarely found, of quickness with steadiness, of eagerness with persistence. If this higher nature is to be tested, the course of studies must not only include such provisional views of justice, temperance and other virtues, as have been given above: but the pupil must be taken round by what was then briefly indicated as the 'longer way.' In other words, he must not stop short of the highest of all studies, that of the idea of good,—a thing of which all men have a presentiment, but which none have grasped, yet without which all pursuits are vain. This the true guardian must not fail to know if our state is to be perfectly ordered. Yet for the present this supreme idea, transcending not pleasure only, but wisdom, knowledge, truth, and even Being, cannot be defined, but only shadowed forth. As the sun is the source not only of light and vision, but also of the generation and growth of visible things, so the Idea of Good is the supreme cause, not of truth and knowledge only, but of Being. The analogy may be carried further. As in the visible world there are shadows and (so-called) substances, so in the intelligible there is a lower sphere in which ideas are symbolized by sensible things, and a higher one, where the ideas are contemplated absolutely in subordination to the idea of good. Thus:— *502 C–511 E*

The visible world presided over by the sun has

a. Shadows perceived by (α) *Conjecture:*

b. Realities perceived by (β) *Faith.*

The intellectual world presided over by the Idea of Good has

c. Mathematical truth perceived by (γ) *Scientific thought:*

d. Ideal truth perceived by (δ) *Reason.*

Republic VI. 502 D **οὐδέν . . . τὸ σοφόν μοι ἐγένετο**] 'I gained nothing by the trick.' Cp. Symp. 214 A *πρὸς μὲν Σωκράτη, ὦ ἄνδρες, τὸ σόφισμά μοι* **οὐδέν.** The allusion is to v. 449 C and the passage there referred to—iv. 423 E.

τὴν . . . δυσχέρειαν] 'the troublesomeness,' i. e. both the inherent difficulty of this, and the dislike which the statement of it was sure to occasion.

ἡ παντελῶς ἀληθής] The absolutely right arrangement being that the rulers must be philosophers. He proceeds to take up the subject at the point where in Book iii he had digressed. The *φύλακες* had been supposed to go through a novitiate, with a view of testing their temperance and courage: 413 E *καὶ τὸν ἀεὶ ἔν τε παισὶ καὶ νεανίσκοις καὶ ἐν ἀνδράσι βασανιζόμενον καὶ ἀκήρατον ἐκβαίνοντα καταστατέον ἄρχοντα τῆς πόλεως . . . τὸν δὲ μὴ τοιοῦτον ἀποκριτέον.*

E **ἐλέγομεν**] iii. 412 C ff.

503 A **τὸ δόγμα τοῦτο**] as appears from iii. 412 E, is that which is implied in **φιλοπόλιδας**, viz. the determination *ὃ μὲν ἂν τῇ πόλει ἡγήσωνται ξυμφέρειν, πάσῃ προθυμίᾳ ποιεῖν, ὃ δ' ἂν μή, μηδενὶ τρόπῳ πρᾶξαι ἂν ἐθέλειν.*

ἢ τὸν ἀδυνατοῦντα ἀποκριτέον] 'else, he who failed was to be rejected.'

παρακαλυπτομένου] proves to be the reading of A, as well as of Π M. The reading *παρακαλύπτεσθαι* appears in no manuscript.

B **ἣν γὰρ διήλθομεν φύσιν δεῖν ὑπάρχειν αὐτοῖς**] 'for the nature which we described as needing to be present in them.' *διέρχεσθαι* here takes the construction of *λέγειν*: *ὡς δέον* would be more regular than the infinitive **δεῖν.**

διεσπασμένη] *διεσπασμένα* was wrongly read by Cobet (*Var. Lectt.*, ed. sec., p. 531, quoted by Baiter) in Par. A. It is really found only in *a' v*, and was adopted by Stephanus from the Latin version of Ficinus. **διεσπασμένη** is now restored.

C **εὐμαθεῖς καὶ μνήμονες . . . ἐθέλειν ζῆν**] There are two ways of construing this passage:—(1) 'You know that people who have a quick apprehension and memory, shrewdness and acuteness, and such like qualities, are not wont to be at the same time of a generous and noble spirit, so as to be such as to wish (*ὥστε τοιοῦτοι εἶναι οἷοι*) to live an orderly life, quietly and steadily.' (2) 'People who have

a quick apprehension and memory, and shrewdness and acuteness, and other such qualities, as you know (and we must add the impetuous and noble), are not wont to be at the same time such as to wish to live orderly.' *Republic VI.* 503 C

The former interpretation (1) gives the more obvious and natural construction. But it is objected, not without a show of reason, that the combination of high-spirit with quickness of intellect does not necessarily produce quietness of conduct (**μετὰ ἡσυχίας . . . ζῆν**). To which it may be replied that **νεανικοί**, as well as **μεγαλοπρεπεῖς**, is here used in a good sense, implying, not youthful impetuosity, but a robust and high-toned character. For this use of *νεανικός* cp. supra 491 E *ἢ οἴει τὰ μεγάλα ἀδικήματα . . . ἐκ φαύλης, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ* **νεανικῆς** *φύσεως τροφῇ διωλομένης γίγνεσθαι . . .;* For the connexion of *μεγαλοπρέπεια* with *σωφροσύνη* and *κοσμιότης* cp. supra 500 C, D.

τὰ βέβαια . . . ἤθη] The *ἐμβριθέστεροι* of Theaet. 144 B.

αὐτῷ] sc. *τῷ παιδευομένῳ.* D

αὐτό] sc. *ἣν διήλθομεν φύσιν* (supra B).

οἷς τότε ἐλέγομεν] iii. 413 C ff. E

δυνατή] is the reading of the majority of MSS. It may be defended by supplying *φύσις* (or *ψυχή* cp. vii. 535 B) from the general sense of the preceding passage.

οἱ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις] 'In other kinds of effort,' i. e. other than intellectual. Orelli's conjecture, *ἄθλοις*, is plausible but unnecessary. It is also noticeable that the word *ἆθλος* is absent from most of Plato's dialogues, occurring only in the Timaeus and Laws. 504 A

διαστησάμενοι ξυνεβιβάζομεν] It is better (1) to take **ξυνεβιβάζομεν** transitively—' we gathered concerning justice, temperance, courage and wisdom, what their several natures were,' than (2) intransitively, as Timaeus does, 'we came to an agreement.' The meaning here approaches that of proof or inference which is common in Aristotle. L. and S. s. v. *συμβιβάζω*, iii.

μὴ γὰρ . . . ἀκούειν] 'Why, if I did not remember, I should deserve not to hear the rest.' **μὴ μνημονεύων** = *εἰ μὴ μνημονεύοιμι.*

ἦ καὶ τὸ προρρηθὲν αὐτῶν] sc. *μνημονεύεις.* **αὐτῶν**, sc. our discussion of the three parts of the soul.

ἐλέγομέν που . . . προσάψαι] Cp. iv. 435 D *μακροτέρα καὶ πλείων ὁδὸς ἡ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἄγουσα.* That is to say, the account of the ideas of B

Republic VI. 504 B justice, temperance, courage, wisdom, which was given in Book iv, was inexact and popular. Their true nature would only be revealed by dialectical deduction in their relation with the good. For ἑπομένας with the genitive cp. Polit. 271 E ὅσα τῆς τοιαύτης ἐστὶ κατα- ἑπομένας ἑπόμενα.

ὡς μὲν δυνατὸν ἦν] The use of the indicative here amongst so many optatives belongs to the idiomatic use of ἦν in speaking of an ultimate fact.

C **ἀτελὲς γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς μέτρον**] 'Nothing imperfect is the measure of anything.' The very notion of measure involves completeness or definite quantity. For another play on the word **μέτρον** cp. v. 450 B μέτρον . . . τοιούτων λόγων ἀκούειν ὅλος ὁ βίος νοῦν ἔχουσιν. A somewhat different test is proposed in Polit. 286 D, E οὔτε γὰρ πρὸς τὴν ἡδονὴν μήκους ἁρμόττοντος, κ.τ.λ., where it is said that discourses are not to be measured by the pleasure they give, nor by the ease or quickness with which they dispose of a subject, but as they tend to sharpen the dialectical powers.

δοκεῖ δ' ἐνίοτέ τισιν] Cp. ii. 372 E, where **τισιν** conveys a similar innuendo.

D **καὶ μεῖζον, κ.τ.λ.**] Not only is there a knowledge higher than virtue, but the virtues themselves should be exhibited in their most perfect form.

E **καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, ἄξιον τὸ διανόημα**] 'Your sentiment, said he, is a right noble one': i. e. that the highest perfection is required on the highest subjects. **καὶ μάλα** is to be connected with **ἄξιον**: cp. i. 334 E καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, οὕτω ξυμβαίνει. Cp. the αὐτὸ τἀκριβές of the Politicus (284 D), which will require a standard of measure.

Yet in modern, as well as in ancient times, the highest subjects have been treated in the loosest manner. The reason is that they are partly matters of faith and feeling, as well as of reason: all have something to say upon them, and all are eager to hear about them. Not only philosophy, but theology, has often fallen into ignoble hands—οὐ προσῆκον ἐπεισκεκωμακότας.

οὐ πάνυ] 'Certainly not.'

πάντως] as elsewhere, has the force of a connecting particle; cp. Theaet. 143 A πάντως ἔγωγε καὶ ἀναπαύσασθαι δέομαι: Polit. 268 E πάντως οὐ πολλὰ ἐκφεύγεις παιδιὰς ἔτη. The sentence is not therefore to be regarded as an asyndeton.

ἢ αὖ διανοεῖ . . . ἀντιλαμβανόμενος] 'Or you again intend to interrupt and give trouble,' as Adeimantus had previously done by recurring to the subject of women and children (v. 450 B *ὅσον ἑσμὸν λόγων ἐπεγείρετε, κ.τ.λ.*). *Republic VI.* 504 E

εἰ δὲ μὴ ἴσμεν . . . ἄνευ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ] The double **εἰ** in the former part of the sentence helps to distinguish the indicative clause from the optative,—the former mood being correctly used to repeat a previous statement, the latter indicating the further supposition. For the same reason Bekker rightly changed *κεκτήμεθα* to **κεκτῄμεθα**. 505 A

ἢ οἴει . . . ἀγαθήν] Compare the passage (iv. 438 A) in which drink or any desirable object is said to include the good. But are all the meanings of 'good' the same?—would have been the question of Aristotle (N. E. i. 6). Words seem to play the same part with the *ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* as with the Eleatic *ὄν* or with the abstract *θεός*. Language readily provides an expression for the unity which the human mind is vainly seeking. B

τοῖς δὲ κομψοτέροις] Cp. Aristotle's *οἱ χαριέντες* (N. E. i. 4, § 2, &c.): also Theaet. 156 A.

καὶ ὅτι γε, ὦ φίλε, κ.τ.λ.] (*a*) Those who maintain that intelligence is the good, on being asked what they mean by intelligence, reply—'Intelligence of the good'—thus re-introducing the word and still begging the question 'What is the nature of the good?' (*b*) Those who maintain that pleasure is the good have to admit that there are bad as well as good pleasures, and therefore that bad and good are identical. In the first sentence Plato appears to be speaking of the Cynics, or perhaps of the Megarians: in the second of the Cyrenaics and of people in general. Cp. Phileb. 67 B *οἱ πολλοὶ κρίνουσι τὰς ἡδονὰς εἰς τὸ ζῆν ἡμῖν εὖ κρατίστας εἶναι.* For the contradiction **ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ ταὐτά** (infra D), cp. Phil. 13 B, C: and, for **ὡς . . . ξυνιέντων**, Theaet. 147 A, B *οἰόμενοι συνιέναι ἐκ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀποκρίσεως, κ.τ.λ.*

τί δέ; τόδε οὐ φανερόν, κ.τ.λ.] However men may differ in their idea of the good, they all alike insist on having what they think the reality and will not put up with a sham. D

The argument is in some degree like that of Anselm and Descartes, that the highest perfection involves existence. The reality of pleasure might be maintained on similar grounds. For nobody desires 'sham pleasure.' Plato in this passage (but cp.

Republic VI. 505 D Parm. 132 B, where he has begun to suspect that abstractions may be a creation of the mind) does not appear to be aware of the answer to this sort of argument—that good, like being, may be an abstraction only, though one of the three greatest or highest of our abstractions: 'verum, unum, bonum.' Compare Theaet. 172 A, where the real nature of the good or expedient is contrasted with the conventionality of law and justice.

The tautology in **δοκοῦντα . . . δοκεῖν** affords no valid objection to the reading.

E **ὃ δὴ διώκει μὲν ἅπασα ψυχή, κ.τ.λ.**] Cp. Aristot. N. E. i. 1, § 1 *διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο τἀγαθόν, οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται.*

εἴ τι ὄφελος ἦν] sc. *αὐτῶν.*

506 A **ἐσκοτῶσθαι**] Cp. Theaet. 209 E *τὸ γάρ, ἃ ἔχομεν, ταῦτα προσλαβεῖν κελεύειν . . . πάνυ γενναίως ἔοικεν* **ἐσκοτωμένῳ.**

πρότερον] (1) sc. *τοῦ φύλακος.* The guardians are *φύλακες τῶν δικαίων καὶ καλῶν*, sc. *τῶν νομίμων.* Cp. supra 504 C *φύλακι πόλεώς τε καὶ νόμων.* Or (2) 'before he sees how they (justice and beauty) are good (**ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἀγαθά** *ἐστιν*).' [B. J.]

B **ἀνάγκη . . . παρὰ ταῦτα**] A slight discontent is betrayed in these words. Adeimantus, here, as elsewhere, is not easily satisfied: he wants to know Socrates' own opinion. Socrates before giving his answer, exclaims against the persistent vein of expostulation adopted by Adeimantus already in several passages: ii. 367 D, v. 449 C, vi. 487 B. The impatience of Glaucon (infra D: cp. ii. 357 A) comes to the aid of his elder brother.

οὗτος . . . ἀνήρ] *οὗτος ἀνήρ* expresses a sort of humorous indignation. The MSS. vary between *καλός* and **καλῶς.** If *καλός* is read, it must be taken ironically with **οὗτος ἀνήρ**: 'A fine gentleman like you.' For **καλῶς** (which is idiomatic) cp. Soph. Oed. Tyr. 1008 *ὦ παῖ,* **καλῶς** *εἶ δῆλος οὐκ εἰδὼς τί δρᾷς*: Oed. Col. 269 *τοῦτ' ἐγὼ* **καλῶς** *ἔξοιδα.* The point is determined in favour of **καλῶς** by observing that the vernacular phrase **Οὗτος ἀνήρ** (for which cp. especially Gorg. 467 B, 489 B, 505 C) does not elsewhere occur with the addition of an epithet. The text agrees with the first hand of Par. A.

A similar trait of character is attributed to Cebes in the Phaedo 63 A *ἀεί τοι, ἔφη, ὁ Κέβης λόγους τινὰς ἀνερευνᾷ, καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐθέως ἐθέλει πείθεσθαι ὅ τι ἄν τις εἴπῃ*: and 77 A *καίτοι καρτερώτατος ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ* (sc. *ὁ Κέβης*) *πρὸς τὸ ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις.*

Republic VI. 506

ἢ δοκοῦσί τί σοι . . . δοξάζοντες] For the blindness of right opinion without knowledge cp. Theaet. 201 C.

μὴ πρὸς Διός, κ.τ.λ.] As in the search after justice (iv. 432 B, C), C
the increasing dramatic life indicates the interest and importance of the discovery. D

ἀρκέσει γὰρ ἡμῖν] Glaucon seizes on the admission of Socrates (504 D), that an approximate method might be sometimes employed. Socrates replies that in the present case even the approximation may be unattainable.

πλέον γάρ . . . ἢ κατὰ τὴν παροῦσαν ὁρμήν] 'To reach what E
is now in my mind is too much for our present attempt.' We have set out in search of Justice (v. 472 B), and in the attempt to discover it we are called upon to define the Good. But that is only to be attained by metaphysical disquisitions for which the readers of the Republic are not yet expected to be sufficiently prepared. Cp. Theaet. 177 C, where Theodorus prefers moral discourses to dialectic. The present remark throws some light on the scope and aim of the Republic.

ὃς δὲ ἔκγονός τε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ . . . καὶ ὁμοιότατος ἐκείνῳ] Cp. Laws x. 897 D *μὴ τοίνυν ἐξ ἐναντίας οἷον εἰς ἥλιον ἀποβλέποντες, νύκτα ἐν μεσημβρίᾳ ἐπαγόμενοι, ποιησώμεθα τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ὡς νοῦν ποτὲ θνητοῖς ὄμμασιν ὀψόμενοί τε καὶ γνωσόμενοι ἱκανῶς· πρὸς δὲ* **εἰκόνα** *τοῦ ἐρωτωμένου βλέποντας ἀσφαλέστερον ὁρᾶν.*

τοὺς τόκους μόνον] The untranslateable pun (*τόκος*, 'offspring,' 507
and *τόκος*, 'interest'), for which the way has been prepared in the A
word **ἀποτίσεις**, is carried further in what follows: 'Take care that I do not unintentionally deceive you and render a false account of the offspring or interest.'

For the same figure cp. Polit. 267 A *καλῶς καὶ καθαπερεὶ χρέος ἀπέδωκάς μοι τὸν λόγον, προσθεὶς τὴν ἐκτροπὴν οἷον τόκον καὶ ἀναπληρώσας αὐτόν*: and for a different simile viii. 555 E *τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκγόνους* **τόκους** *πολλαπλασίους κομιζόμενοι.*

διομολογησάμενός γ᾽, ἔφην ἐγώ . . . εἰρημένα] For the use of the aorist participle with *γε* = 'not until,' cp. Phaedr. 228 D *τὴν μέντοι διάνοιαν . . . δίειμι, ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου.* **Δείξας γε** *πρῶτον, ὦ φιλότης, τί ἄρα ἐν τῇ ἀριστερᾷ ἔχεις ὑπὸ τῷ ἱματίῳ.* The reference in **ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν** is to v. 476 A: cp. supra 493 E.

πολλὰ καλά . . . τῷ λόγῳ] This passage has been thought B

Republic VI. 507 B inconsistent with v. 478, 9, where it was shown that the 'many beautiful,' &c. cannot be said either to be or not to be. But **εἶναι** is not here used in the sense of 'to have real existence,' but simply = 'to be.'

ἕκαστα οὕτως] **οὕτως**, sc. *πολλά*, 'many individuals of each class.'

καὶ αὐτὸ δὴ καλὸν . . . προσαγορεύομεν] 'And we say that there is a beauty in itself and a good in itself: and in the same way with reference to all the classes which we previously regarded as consisting of many individuals, reversing the process and placing the individuals under one idea corresponding to each of these classes, as forming a unity, we call each class by what it really is.' Cp. Phil. 16 C, D *δεῖν . . . ἀεὶ μίαν ἰδέαν περὶ παντὸς ἑκάστοτε θεμένους ζητεῖν· εὑρήσειν γὰρ ἐνοῦσαν.*

C **ἆρ' οὖν . . . ἐδημιούργησεν**] Cp. Heracleitus, fragm. 21 *ὀφθαλμοὶ ὤτων μάρτυρες ἀκριβέστεροι.*

ἔστιν ὅ τι . . . (D) ἀκουσθήσεται] The ancient physical philosopher did not observe that air was as necessary for the transmission of sound as light for the medium of vision.

D **ἢ σύ τινα ἔχεις εἰπεῖν;**] sc. *αἴσθησιν ᾗτινι τοιούτου τινος προσδεῖ.*

παρούσης δὲ χρόας ἐν αὐτοῖς] sc. *ἐν τοῖς ὁρατοῖς* from **τοῦ ὁρατοῦ** supra. The analysis of vision here is less minute than in the Theaetetus and Timaeus. Colour is imagined as being present in the objects, although neither colour nor vision can be realized without light. Cp. infra 508 C *ὧν ἂν τὰς χρόας . . . ἐπέχῃ . . . νυκτερινὰ φέγγη.*

E **τίνος δὴ λέγεις**] (1) sc. *γένους παραγενομένου τήν τε ὄψιν ὁρᾶν τά τε χρώματα ὁρατὰ εἶναι.* The genitive is used as if *ἐὰν μὴ παραγένηται* had been *οὗ μὴ παραγενομένου.* (2) For the genitive cp. v. 459 B *τί δὲ ἵππων οἴει;* [B. J.].

οὐ σμικρᾷ ἄρα ἰδέᾳ . . . (508 A) τὸ φῶς] 'Then the sense of sight and the quality of visibility are joined together by a bond nobler by the measure of no small nature than the bond which unites other correlatives, if light be no ignoble thing.' 'Nay, said he, it is far from being ignoble.' **οὐ σμικρᾷ ἰδέᾳ** is the dative of measure or comparison, and is said in the same way as *μείζονος τῆς πόλεως δεῖ* **οὔτι σμικρῷ**, *ἀλλ' ὅλῳ στρατοπέδῳ* (ii. 373 E). Cp. especially Hdt. vi. 106, § 3 *πόλι λογίμῳ ἡ Ἑλλὰς γέγονεν ἀσθενεστέρη.* For the use of *ἰδέα* in this sense, cp. Phileb. 64 E *οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ μιᾷ δυνάμεθα*

ἰδέᾳ τὸ ἀγαθὸν θηρεῦσαι, κ.τ.λ. Light is necessary to the correlation between the eye and visible things, and the preciousness of light is the measure of the superiority of that correlation to those existing between the other organs of sense and their several objects. *Republic VI.* 507 E

τίνα οὖν ἔχεις . . . τούτου κύριον] For the use of *αἰτιῶμαι* in the sense of 'allege to be the cause' cp. x. 599 E *σὲ δὲ τίς* **αἰτιᾶται** *πόλις νομοθέτην ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι καὶ σφᾶς ὠφεληκέναι*; 508 A

οὐκοῦν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν . . . κέκτηται;] 'Is not the power which it (the eye) has, dispensed from the Sun and possessed by it as something derived from without?' B

τοῦτον τοίνυν . . . (c) **τὰ ὁρώμενα**] This may be appropriately termed Plato's 'solar myth.' Even at the present day, when the power which the sun's force exerts over all nature is so much more truly recognized than formerly, the influence which the idea of the sun continues to exercise over the mind and imagination is hardly less remarkable. The ordinary religious feeling about the sun was shared by Socrates: Apol. 26 c, Symp. 220 D.

For **φάναι** cp. v. 473 A **φάναι** *ἡμᾶς ἐξευρηκέναι ὡς δυνατὰ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι ἃ σὺ ἐπιτάττεις.* **ὅ τί περ, κ.τ.λ.**, is added in explanation of **ἀνάλογον ἑαυτῷ.**

ὃν τἀγαθὸν . . . (c) **τὰ ὁρώμενα**] 'whom the good begot to be its own counterpart, to be in the visible world in relation to sight and the things of sight what itself is in the intelligible world in relation to mind and the things of mind.' **τοῦτον**, emphatically resuming the preceding **τοῦτον**, is in the same construction with **ὅν**, while **τοῦτο** is the emphatic antecedent to **ὅ τί περ.** For the construction of **λέγειν** with all that follows it cp. 511 A, B.

ὧν . . . ἐπέχῃ] 'upon the colours of which the light of day falls.' C

ἀλλὰ ὧν νυκτερινὰ φέγγη] sc. *ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα ὧν ἂν τὰς χρόας νυκτερινὰ φέγγη ἐπέχῃ.*

καταλάμπῃ] The *ἄν*, which is not absolutely required in this and similar expressions, may be supplied from what has preceded, **ὧν ἂν . . . ἐπέχῃ**, and would be felt as superfluous after **ὅταν.** D

ἐνοῦσα φαίνεται] sc. *ἡ καθαρὰ ὄψις.*

οὕτω τοίνυν . . . νοῦν ἔχειν φαίνεται] 'In like manner (**οὕτω**) conceive too of the soul in this way (**ὧδε**): when she is fixed steadily on that on which truth and being shine, she knows and understands this and appears to have intelligence.'

Republic VI. **εἰς τὸ τῷ σκότῳ κεκραμένον**] The expression recalls v. 479 c.

508 E **τοῦτο τοίνυν . . . ὀρθῶς ἡγήσει**] 'This, then, which imparts truth to the things that are known, and gives to the knower the power of knowing, is what I would have you call the idea of good: and this you will deem to be the cause of knowledge and of truth so far as the latter is known: but fair as are both these, knowledge and truth, you will be right in thinking that it is something fairer than these.' **μέν** strictly belongs to **αἰτίαν** and is opposed to the following **δέ**: the idea of good 'is indeed (**μέν**) the cause of knowledge and truth, but (**δέ**) it is other and fairer than they.' The reading **διανοοῦ** instead of the formerly received *διὰ νοῦ* (Ven. Ξ, &c.) has superior manuscript authority, including Par. A, and gives a clear sense. The other is feeble and the expedient of cancelling the clause **ὡς γιγνωσκομένης . . . ἡγήσει** indefensible.

The good is the sun, truth is light, the ideas are the objects of sight, and knowledge is vision. The strain of 'heavenly beauty' in which the mind is to be absorbed is in a region far away from modern thoughts. The intense reality of all beauty and all truth when seen according to the divine idea is perhaps as near an approach as we can make to the meaning of Plato. The want of personality in the *ἀγαθόν* prevents our minds from resting in that which to Plato is the most real of thoughts, comprehending in one the idea of order and design, of a cause in nature and of intelligence in man, not without an association of goodness in the sense of benevolence and good-will. Cp. Tim. 29 E.

Preparations for the *ἀγαθόν* may be traced in the Symposium, 211 D, E *τί δῆτα, ἔφη, οἰόμεθα, εἴ τῳ γένοιτο αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ἰδεῖν εἰλικρινές, καθαρόν, ἄμικτον, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀνάπλεων σαρκῶν τε ἀνθρωπίνων καὶ χρωμάτων καὶ ἄλλης πολλῆς φλυαρίας θνητῆς, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ θεῖον καλὸν δύναιτο μονοειδὲς κατιδεῖν*; where the idea of *ἀγαθόν* is not yet evolved out of the *καλόν*: in the Phaedrus 250 D *ὄψις γὰρ ἡμῖν ὀξυτάτη τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔρχεται αἰσθήσεων, ᾗ φρόνησις οὐχ ὁρᾶται—δεινοὺς γὰρ ἂν παρεῖχεν ἔρωτας, εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἑαυτῆς ἐναργὲς εἴδωλον παρείχετο εἰς ὄψιν ἰόν—καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα ἐραστά· νῦν δὲ κάλλος μόνον ταύτην ἔσχε μοῖραν, ὥστ' ἐκφανέστατον εἶναι καὶ ἐρασμιώτατον.* And in the Philebus, which is probably later than the Republic, we find an attempt to give a further definition to the idea. The eternal nature or highest good is found to consist in measure, above the *σύμμετρον* and *τέλεον*, which are second, and *νοῦς* and *φρόνησις*, which are third in the scale (Phil. 66 A, B).

Republic VI. 509 A

ἡλιοειδῆ] Neuter plural rather than feminine singular.

τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕξιν] = *τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὡς ἔχει*, 'the state or nature of the good.'

ἀμήχανον κάλλος] sc. *τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*.

φάναι] cp. supra 508 B. B

οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος . . . ὑπερέχοντος] Referring to the history of philosophy we may translate this:—'The idea of good reaches a step beyond the Eleatic being.'

Ἄπολλον . . . δαιμονίας ὑπερβολῆς] 'Good heavens, what a marvellous superiority!' The way for this exclamation has been already prepared in the words **ἀμήχανον κάλλος**, supra. Glaucon speaks with a feeling of admiration and yet of incredulity. Cp. Euthyd. 303 A *ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ἔφη, καλοῦ λόγου!* and for the rejoinder of Socrates cp. Phaedr. 238 D *οὐκέτι πόρρω διθυράμβων φθέγγομαι . . . τούτων μέντοι σὺ αἴτιος.* C

εἰ μή τι] sc. *ἄλλο*: 'at all events complete the simile of the sun.' Cp. 501 E *ἵνα, εἰ μή τι ἄλλο, αἰσχυνθέντες ὁμολογήσωσιν*: Meno 86 E *εἰ μή τι οὖν, ἀλλὰ σμικρόν γέ μοι τῆς ἀρχῆς χάλασον.*

ἵνα μὴ οὐρανὸν . . . περὶ τὸ ὄνομα] In allusion to the fanciful derivation of *οὐρανός* from *ὁρᾶν*. Cp. Crat. 396 B *οὐρανία, ὁρῶσα τὰ ἄνω.* The v. r. *οὐρανοῦ*, though of inferior manuscript authority, may possibly be right. D

ὥσπερ τοίνυν γραμμὴν . . . τὸ μὲν ἕτερον τμῆμα εἰκόνες] Cp. Sophist 265 E ff., where *ποιητική* is first divided *κατὰ πλάτος* into *θεία* and *ἀνθρωπίνη*, and then sub-divided *κατὰ μῆκος* into shadows and realities. **ἄνισα τμήματα** is the reading of Proclus, p. 431. 10; of the Pseudo-Plutarch, 1001; and of the great majority of MSS., including Par. A. The emendations *ἴσα, ἀν' ἴσα*, have been proposed: the variations *εἰς ἴσα* (*v*), perhaps equally an emendation, and *ἄν, ἴσα* (Vind. E, &c.), are also found in MSS. The reading *ἀν' ἴσα* is poor Greek, as well as poor sense; and the other correction, *εἰς ἴσα*, although not open to the first charge, equally enfeebles the meaning of **ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον**:—'Divide the line equally and then sub-divide in the same proportion.' The text, as found in the best authorities, is probably genuine: the difficulty is to discover a reason for the inequality in the divisions. The whole line may be regarded as representing a progress upwards from the

Republic VI. 509 D infinite multiplicity of sense and the reflections of sense at the lower end, to the unity of good at the higher; the reflections of sense are more numerous than the objects of sense, as the mathematical figures and other phenomena of nature are more numerous than the ideas; and also downwards from the infinite value of the idea of good to the insignificance of sensible objects and their shadows (cp. infra 511). Still, although this explanation is in harmony with Plato's ideas and with the general context, as a matter of style further explanation is needed. Cp. however Theaet. 197 D, where in the same manner he describes the different kinds of knowledge under the image of birds, some in larger and smaller groups, others singly flying through all, without adding any explanation of the reason of this.

τὸ μὲν ἕτερον τμῆμα] i. e. the lower segment.

510 A **ὅσα πυκνά τε καὶ λεῖα καὶ φανὰ ξυνέστηκε**] For **ξυνέστηκε** of a compact solid, cp. Tim. 61 A, 83 A. And for an account of the phenomena of reflection, ibid. 46 A, B.

ἦ καὶ ἐθέλοις ἂν . . . ᾧ ὡμοιώθη] **αὐτό**, sc. *τὸ ὁρώμενον*, which has now been divided.

B **ᾗ τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ . . . τὴν μέθοδον ποιουμένη**] 'As thus:—There are two subdivisions of the intellectual sphere: a lower one, wherein the mind uses the objects given by the former segments as symbols; the inquiry can only be hypothetical, and instead of going upwards to a principle, works downward to a result. In the higher subdivision, the soul passes out of hypotheses and ascends to a first principle, which is above hypotheses, making no use of symbols, as in the former case, but proceeding by ideas alone.'

τοῖς τότε τμηθεῖσιν] = *τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένοις τμήμασιν*, referring to supra 509 D, E, 510 A. The reading of A and of the MSS. of Proclus, *μιμηθεῖσιν*, though it may be due to the ingenuity of some early corrector, has the advantage of giving clearness to the logical connexion:—i. e. the visible realities, of which the *εἰκόνες* in the lower segment of the visible were imitations. These now become *εἰκόνες* in their turn. Cp. infra E *ὧν καὶ σκιαί, κ.τ.λ.*: vii. 515 D *ἐκεῖνα ὧν τότε τὰς σκιὰς ἑώρα.* The testimony of Ven. Π is not available here, two leaves of the MS. having been lost; but its congeners D K agree with other MSS. in giving **τμηθεῖσιν.**

τὸ δ' αὖ ἕτερον τό, κ.τ.λ.] The genuineness of **τό** after **ἕτερον** is open

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to question. For no mention has occurred of the upper division leading to an ἀρχὴ ἀνυπόθετος. It may be answered that this is sufficiently implied in the preceding words, which describe the soul in the other division as **ἐξ ὑποθέσεων οὐκ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν πορευομένη.** But the construction is also much simpler and more intelligible without the article, the only word to be supplied being ζητεῖ, which governs both **τὸ ἕτερον** and **ἐκεῖνο.** The conjecture ὅ for **τό** is ingenious but unnecessary.

Of the three manuscript readings, ὧνπερ ἐκεῖνο εἰκόνων (A M), τῶν περὶ ἐκεῖνο εἰκόνων (DK Vind. F *corr.*), ὧν περὶ ἐκεῖνο εἰκόνων (Vind. F *p. m.*), the first, which is that of Par. A is probably the true one: i.e. ἄνευ τῶν εἰκόνων αἷσπερ χρωμένη ἐζήτει ἐκεῖνο.

ἀλλ' αὖθις] sc. λεγόμενον μαθήσει.

τούτων] sc. what I am now about to say, as well as what has been said. C

καὶ ἄλλα . . . καθ' ἑκάστην μέθοδον] This is added, like **καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα** supra, **καὶ τἄλλα οὕτως** infra, to show that διάνοια is not confined to Arithmetic and Geometry, but prevails also in the other sciences.

ποιησάμενοι ὑποθέσεις αὐτά] That is to say, they presuppose mathematical quantities and figures without any inquiry into the grounds of their suppositions, and end in the construction of their problem **ὁμολογουμένως,**—i. e. consistently, without any contradiction within the sphere of mathematics.

οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι, κ.τ.λ.] sc. οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε οἶσθα ὅτι. D

καὶ τἄλλα οὕτως] sc. πραγματεύονται.

ἃ πλάττουσι] e. g. the sphere, pyramid, cube, and other solid figures. E

ὧν καὶ σκιαί, κ.τ.λ.] These words allude to the fourth or lowest section. Plato means to say that the mathematicians use as images of abstract ideas those things of which shadows and reflections are the natural images, that is, the forms of superficial and solid geometry, such as the square, circle, sphere, pyramid, cube, &c., and the other objects of vision.

Cp. vii. 534 A, where further inquiry into the relation of the subdivisions is declined. The lowest of the four segments consists of shadows and reflections of objects: and each of the three

Republic VI. 510 E lower is the reflection of the segment above it. The two main divisions rest on the fundamental antithesis of Greek philosophy, *αἰσθητά* and *νοητά*: the first and third subdivisions appear to be suggested by the Heraclitean and Pythagorean doctrines.

511 A **τοῦτο τοίνυν νοητόν, κ.τ.λ.**] The mind, beginning with number and figure, in the longest trains of reasoning always remains within the sphere of mathematics—a truth which was not perceived by the Pythagoreans when they identified numbers with moral ideas, and is forgotten by Plato in the next book where he supposes the higher astronomy to consist only of mathematical problems.

εἰκόσι δὲ χρωμένην . . . τετιμημένοις] 'using, however, as images those very things of which there are reflections in the sphere below them, and which, in relation to those reflections, are habitually esteemed and honoured as real and clear.'

There are two respects in which *διάνοια* or scientific reasoning is inferior to true dialectic (*νοῦς*):—

(1) In deducing its results from certain abstract assumptions. Thus arithmetic assumes the notions of 'odd' and 'even,' geometry those of the circle, square, &c., and of acute, right and obtuse angles; solid geometry, the notions of the sphere, pyramid, cube, octahedron, &c.: astronomy, certain relations of matter in motion: harmony, certain proportionate vibrations, and the like. None of these sciences ask the reason of their primary definitions, or can prove them to be otherwise than arbitrary.

(2) The other point in which these sciences are inferior is that their processes are not pure from matter. For although both their assumptions and their deductions have for their object certain pure abstractions, they are unable to study these apart from visible things. Even the arithmetician has a difficulty in separating his abstract unit from the units which he is engaged in counting, or from the geometrical figures through which he studies the relations of numbers. In the *ἐπίπεδον σχῆμα*, which stands visibly for 9, each side is of a certain length. The geometer cannot reason without diagrams, much less can the astronomer without the outward configuration of the heavens (*τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ποικίλματα* vii. 529 C) or some copy of this, or the harmonist without audible sounds.

The first of these defects is meant by **ὑποθέσεσι δ' ἀναγκαζομένην ψυχὴν χρῆσθαι**: the second by **εἰκόσι δὲ χρωμένην, κ.τ.λ.** Cp. vii. 529 D *τῇ περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ποικιλίᾳ παραδείγμασι χρηστέον τῆς πρὸς ἐκεῖνα μαθήσεως ἕνεκα* (sc. *τῶν ἀληθινῶν ἐν σχήμασι φορῶν*).

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But in speaking of sensible objects as the symbols or images through which science works, Plato remembers that what are images or shadows in relation to scientific conception, are the realities of common language and experience, and he recalls the distinction which he made at first between the shadow and the substance (supra 509 E), which were to one another as opinion or fancy to knowledge (*τὸ μὲν ἕτερον τμῆμα εἰκόνες . . . τὸ . . . ἕτερον . . . ᾧ τοῦτο ἔοικε . . . διῃρῆσθαι ἀληθείᾳ τε καὶ μή, ὡς τὸ δοξαστὸν πρὸς τὸ γνωστόν, οὕτω τὸ ὁμοιωθὲν πρὸς τὸ ᾧ ὡμοιώθη*).

The *εἰκόνες* of the present passage are taken from the same class, which in the former place (and in common life) hold the higher and more honourable position of Realities—*τὸ ᾧ ἡ εἰκὼν ὡμοιώθη*, and are so esteemed in relation to the *εἰκόνες* of that place (509 E), viz. the shadows and reflections which occupy the fourth or lowest grade. To avoid the confusion that might arise from this, he here resumes what he had hinted just before, supra 510 E *ὧν καὶ σκιαὶ καὶ ἐν ὕδασιν εἰκόνες εἰσί*, and uses emphatic pronouns to make the distinction felt, **αὐτοῖς, ἐκείνοις, πρὸς ἐκεῖνα.** The things which science uses as her symbols are sensible objects, *τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπεικασθέντα*,—**αὐτοῖς**, the things themselves, as distinguished from their shadows, &c.—of which the class below them are again the symbols or likenesses: and in relation to those likenesses (their shadows and reflections) those sensible objects (both are **ἐκεῖνα** because remote from the true objects of knowledge) have had awarded to them an honourable estimation for clearness and reality.

The words **ἐκείνοις πρὸς ἐκεῖνα** (sc. *τοῖς ὁρωμένοις πρὸς τὰς σκιάς*) are added in apposition to **τοῖς . . . ἀπεικασθεῖσι**, so as to show that the 'distinctness' (*ἐνάργεια*) here spoken of is entirely relative, within the lower world of sense: and **αὐτοῖς** is not used with the specially Platonic meaning, but simply to distinguish objects from their shadows. Cp. Soph. 266 C, and for **ἀπεικασθεῖσι**, Phaedr. 250 B *ὀλίγοι ἐπὶ τὰς εἰκόνας ἰόντες θεῶνται τὸ τοῦ εἰκασθέντος γένος.* The use of *ἐκεῖνος* here distinguishes the *visible*, which has been dismissed, from the intellectual, which is the immediate subject of thought.

For **τετιμημένοις** several MSS., including the first hand of Par. A, read *τετμημένοις*, which may be variously regarded either as supported or suggested by **τοῖς τότε τμηθεῖσιν** above. The word *τετμημένοις* is not, however, in harmony with **δεδοξασμένοις.** The correction of Par. A is by the first or second hand, and both Ven. Π and M are defective here.

Republic VI. 511 A In the highest of the four divisions we are concerned with ideas only. The spheres of Mathematics and Metaphysics, as they may be termed in modern phraseology, are alike limited, the one to hypotheses, the other to ideas.

B **τὸ ὑπὸ ταῖς γεωμετρίαις, κ.τ.λ.**] Mathematical studies are regarded by Plato as affording the most distinct example of scientific method. Indeed, from the position which they occupy in the next book, it might appear that they are understood by him to constitute the whole of the division intermediate between *πίστις* and *νόησις*, the field that is occupied by *διάνοια*. But from an incidental remark, vii. 517 D *τῶν τοῦ δικαίου σκιῶν ἢ ἀγαλμάτων ὧν αἱ σκιαί*, it is evident that he does not clearly distinguish between those hypotheses which are abstractions of sense and those which are abstractions of mind, between the hypothetical conception of a circle or a square, and that of Justice, so far as method is concerned. See also Meno 86 E ff. *ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι, κ.τ.λ.*, where ethical reasoning is illustrated from mathematical. All science is imperfect so long as assumptions are taken for first principles, and symbols for realities. When the hypothesis is referred to a first principle, and the symbol explained by the thing signified, the science is complete (*νοητῶν ὄντων μετὰ ἀρχῆς* infra D).

Of the attempt to rise upwards from **ὑποθέσεις** towards first principles, we have many examples in Plato: for instance in the Phaedo, where from the consideration of equality we rise to the conception of a perfect ideal, and in the Symposium, where Diotima leads Socrates upwards from the definition *τόκος ἐν καλῷ* to the contemplation of absolute Beauty. We may doubt if Plato himself would have asserted that in any part of his works he had realized the other aspect of his ideal method, that of descending by due steps from the Idea of Good to particular things. There is a sense in which his method is far more inductive than deductive. But, in the early part of the Timaeus, where from the notion of the Uncreated, the Eternal and the Good, he passes gradually to the necessary constitution of the Universe, there is an approximation to the intellectual movement which is here indicated.

It would be vain to formulate the precise relation in which Plato's view of Mathematics in the Republic stands to the statement of Aristotle, Metaph. i. 6, § 4 *ἔτι δὲ παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ τὰ εἴδη τὰ μαθηματικὰ τῶν πραγμάτων εἶναί φησι μεταξύ, διαφέροντα τῶν μὲν αἰσθητῶν τῷ ἀΐδια καὶ ἀκίνητα εἶναι, τῶν δ' εἰδῶν τῷ τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἄττα ὅμοια εἶναι, τὸ δὲ εἶδος αὐτὸ ἓν ἕκαστον μόνον.*

τὰς ὑποθέσεις] The assumptions here meant are clearly not those of Mathematics only, but of every subject which can be brought under definition. *Republic VI.* 511 B

οἷον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὁρμάς] For a similar ladder by which we may ascend through the lower stages of beauty, *ὥσπερ ἐπαναβαθμοῖς χρώμενοι*, to the contemplation of a divine perfection see Symp. 211 B, C.

τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν καλουμένων] Meaning geometry and the sister arts, cp. supra B. That the term is not quite accurately used Plato himself seems to intimate in **καλουμένων**, and also in vii. 533 C, D especially the words *ἃς ἐπιστήμας μὲν πολλάκις προσείπομεν διὰ τὸ ἔθος, δέονται δὲ ὀνόματος ἄλλου, ἐναργεστέρου μὲν ἢ δόξης, ἀμυδροτέρου δὲ ἢ ἐπιστήμης.* C

αἷς αἱ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαί, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Meno 87 A, Aristot. Metaph. iii. 2, § 24 *διὰ τοῦτο οὐ τοῦ γεωμέτρου θεωρῆσαι τί τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ τέλειον ἢ ὂν ἢ ἓν ἢ ταὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερον, ἀλλ' ἢ ἐξ* **ὑποθέσεως**.

αὐτά] sc. *τὰ ὑπὸ τούτων (τῶν τεχνῶν) θεωρούμενα.*

ὡς μεταξύ τι . . . τὴν διάνοιαν οὖσαν] 'meaning to say that *διάνοια* is intermediate between opinion and reason.' Cp. the phrases *διὰ μέσου, διὰ χρόνου*, &c., for the meaning of *διά*. And for a reference to this place cp. vii. 533 D. D

καὶ τάξον αὐτὰ . . . ἡγησάμενος μετέχειν] 'And arrange the terms in proportion, attributing to them such a degree of clearness as their objects have of truth.' For **πίστιν** cp. the use of the words *πιστεύειν* and *πίστις* applied to right impression as distinct from knowledge in x. 601 E, and Tim. 29 C *ὅ τί περ πρὸς γένεσιν οὐσία, τοῦτο πρὸς πίστιν ἀλήθεια.* The word expresses the 'natural realism' of ordinary thought. E



BOOK VII.

Republic VII. 514 A–516 A *Now if the idea of good in relation to the other ideas be represented by the sun, who gives light and warmth and growth to the natural world, the condition of men without philosophy may be compared to that of persons in a subterranean cave, bound fast in a position where they can only see the shadows of manufactured images cast by the light of an artificial fire. Education in the higher sense might then be represented as the process of unbinding such prisoners and turning them round and making them look upwards and then dragging them from their cavernous habitation into the light of day.*

514 A **μετὰ ταῦτα, κ.τ.λ.**] The metaphor by which the sun represents the idea of Good as supreme over the intellectual world is now developed into an allegory, in which the shadows cast from images by the light of an artificial fire are contrasted with the true objects seen by the light of the sun.

τοιούτῳ πάθει] 'To a condition which I may thus describe.' For the use of *πάθος* cp. vi. 488 A *οὕτω γὰρ χαλεπὸν τὸ πάθος τῶν ἐπιεικεστάτων.*

ἀναπεπταμένην πρὸς τὸ φῶς . . . παρ' ἅπαν τὸ σπήλαιον] 'The entrance extending all along the den,' i. e. the cave is shallow in proportion to the width of its mouth. This helps verisimilitude, because a multitude of human beings can be thus imagined as similarly placed with respect to the ascent towards the opening. The light of heaven does not penetrate into the cavern, which is 'open to the light' only in the sense that it is possible to clamber out of it into the light.

B **κύκλῳ δὲ . . . ἀδυνάτους περιάγειν**] The construction with **ἰδέ** is continued. The illusion of the shadows could not have been preserved if the prisoners had been able to turn their heads and see the fire and the images from which the shadows fell.

φῶς δὲ αὐτοῖς πυρὸς ἄνωθεν . . . ἐπάνω ὁδόν] The way along which the figures are moving is raised and the light at a distance is raised still higher: otherwise the shadows of the figures and vessels could not have been visible to the prisoners in the den. *Republic VII.* 514 B

ὥσπερ τοῖς θαυματοποιοῖς . . . δεικνύασιν] 'As exhibitors of puppets have a screen before the persons who exhibit them, over which they show the puppets.' The image of puppets is a favourite one with Plato. In the Laws i. 645 B, vii. 804 B, he compares human life to a puppet-show. The difficulty in **τῶν ἀνθρώπων**, which seems at first sight needless, is best met by supposing the **θαυματοποιός** to be not the actual exhibitor or puller of the strings but the master of the show. This agrees better with what follows—**῞Ορα τοίνυν, κ.τ.λ.**, than to suppose **τῶν ἀνθρώπων** to refer to the spectators.

σκεύη, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. vi. 510 A. These represent the natural and artificial objects (*τά τε περὶ ἡμᾶς ζῷα καὶ πᾶν τὸ φυτευτὸν καὶ τὸ σκευαστὸν ὅλον γένος* of vi. 510 A) which have their patterns in the upper world and in relation to them are mere toy-work (cp. x. 596, where Plato speaks of the ideal bed, the real bed, which is the copy of it, and the picture of the bed: also Tim. 28, 29, where the visible patterns are made in the likeness of the invisible and fashioned by the younger gods; ibid. 42 D, E): yet even of these only the shadows are perceptible by sense. The intention of this expression is best seen by comparing the following passages:—

515 C *τὰς* **τῶν σκευαστῶν** *σκιάς*·

ib. D *καθορᾶν ἐκεῖνα ὧν τότε τὰς σκιὰς ἑώρα*·

ib. *πρὸς μᾶλλον ὄντα τετραμμένος*·

ib. *ἕκαστον τῶν παριόντων . . . τὰ νῦν δεικνύμενα*·

517 B *τὸ . . τοῦ πυρὸς . . . φῶς τῇ τοῦ ἡλίου δυνάμει* (*ἀφομοιοῦν*)·

ib. D **ἢ ἀγαλμάτων** *ὧν αἱ σκιαί*·

520 C *γνώσεσθε ἕκαστα τὰ* **εἴδωλα** *ἅττα ἐστὶ καὶ ὧν*·

532 B *μεταστροφὴ ἀπὸ τῶν σκιῶν ἐπὶ τὰ* **εἴδωλα** *καὶ τὸ φῶς*·

ib. C *τὰ ἐν ὕδασι φαντάσματα θεῖα καὶ σκιὰς τῶν ὄντων, ἀλλ'* **οὐκ εἰδώλων** *σκιὰς δι' ἑτέρου τοιούτου φωτὸς . . . ἀποσκιαζομένας*·

534 C *εἴ πῃ* **εἰδώλου** *τινὸς ἐφάπτεται, δόξῃ, οὐκ ἐπιστήμῃ ἐφάπτεσθαι.*

Republic VII. 514 B Without wishing to press the allegory, it is natural to assume that a point of which so much is made has a distinct intention. Now in page 532 A it is stated that the man who in the allegory begins to see the real objects in the daylight represents the soul beginning dialectic, and that the scientific education preceding this was represented by the turning round to the εἴδωλα, the ascent, and the first glimpse of the reflections of the real objects in the light of day.

The stages in this preliminary process represent not different spheres but different degrees of scientific enlightenment. The meaning of εἴδωλα receives further illustration from the following passages:—

530 A *νομιεῖν μέν, ὡς οἷόν τε κάλλιστα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔργα συστήσασθαι, οὕτω ξυνεστάναι τῷ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ δημιουργῷ αὐτόν τε καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ· τὴν δὲ νυκτὸς πρὸς ἡμέραν ξυμμετρίαν, . . . οὐκ ἄτοπον . . . ἡγήσεται τὸν νομίζοντα γίγνεσθαί τε ταῦτα ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως . . . σῶμά τε ἔχοντα καὶ ὁρώμενα, καὶ ζητεῖν παντὶ τρόπῳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν αὐτῶν λαβεῖν;*

533 D *συνερίθοις καὶ συμπεριαγωγοῖς χρωμένη αἷς διήλθομεν τέχναις· ἃς ἐπιστήμας μὲν πολλάκις προσείπομεν διὰ τὸ ἔθος, δέονται δὲ ὀνόματος ἄλλου, ἐναργέστερου μὲν ἢ δόξης, ἀμυδροτέρου δὲ ἢ ἐπιστήμης. διάνοιαν δὲ αὐτὴν ἔν γε τῷ πρόσθεν που ὡρισάμεθα.* See also ibid. B, C.

The εἴδωλα are (1) out of sight of the ἰδέα of good, (2) made and shown by somebody, (3) lighted by the fire which represents the sun. They are the figures of real outward objects: but as all outward objects can be comprehended under number and figure, Plato seems also to include in them the figures and numbers of arithmetic and geometry. He passes from the world as we see it to the world as conceived of by the mathematician, in which he expects to find the way up to the ἰδέα of good.

The notion of the σκευαστὰ εἴδωλα has been prepared for by the mention of the solid figures of geometers ἃ πλάττουσιν (vi. 510 E) and the use of the word σκευαστά for inanimate objects (ib. 510 A).

515 A **λίθινά τε . . . εἰργασμένα**] The σκευαστά are wrought in various materials, as the visible world is compounded of the four elements.

οἷον εἰκός] To be joined with what follows: 'naturally, some of the carriers are speaking, others not.' The first impression of these words is that they have no point, but we see below (515 B εἰ καὶ ἠχώ, κ.τ.λ.) the reason why they are introduced. Plato has hitherto spoken of the sensible as the *visible* world. But he here also

includes the world of hearing. This prepares for the science of harmonics infra 530 D ff. *Republic VII.*

τί δὲ τῶν παραφερομένων] sc. *οἴει ἂν ἑωρακέναι αὐτούς;* 515 B

οὐ ταῦτα ἡγεῖ . . . ἅπερ ὁρῷεν;] 'Do you not suppose that they would believe that they were naming those things that they saw actually before them?' i. e. that the terms they used in their conversations applied to the shadows and not to the realities of which they are ignorant? **ταῦτα** the reading of Ξ K, the simple antecedent, is better than *ταὐτά*, the reading of A. Π and M are wanting in this place. *Παριόντα* the reading of Flor. x is rather confusing as it might signify either the shadows or the realities. The pleonastic expression 'those present things which they actually saw' is emphatic and in the manner of Plato.

παντάπασι . . . σκιάς] *σκευαστά* are not ordinary artificial objects (as in vi. 510 A *καὶ τὸ σκευαστὸν ὅλον γένος*) but diminutive *images* of ordinary artificial objects, being the *σκεύη* which are carried along the wall. For the purpose of the present allegory the *ζῷα* and *φυτευτά* also are *σκευαστά*, 'manufactured articles.' C

τὸ ἀληθές] *ἀλήθεια*, 'reality,' was the favourite term of Protagoras, who denied all truth beyond momentary impressions, Theaet. 162 A; Soph. 246 B; Crat. 391 C.

The stages of the educational process may be roughly sketched in terms of the preceding allegory. The man is first loosed from his bonds and turned towards the light. Then by questions his attention is fixed upon the realities of which he has hitherto seen the shadows, and heard the echoes only:—then upon the central power which gives light to these. After this he is dragged up the rough and steep ascent into the daylight; where again he first sees the shadows, then real objects, then the heavenly luminaries, first the moon and stars by night, and last of all the sun by day. And when he has seen the sun, he will recognize the truth about him, that he is in a manner the cause of all things. He who has so far attained will not wish himself back in the den nor covet the honours there adjudged to those who make the best guesses about the shadows. And if he were restored to his old place while his eyes were still unaccustomed to the darkness, his fellow-prisoners would laugh him to scorn, and say that Philosophy was the ruin of a man. *515 C–517 A*

σκόπει δή, κ.τ.λ.] join **λύσιν τῶν δεσμῶν, ἴασιν τῆς ἀφροσύνης.** 515 C
The latter phrase refers to the state of ignorance described as the

Republic VII. 515 C consequence of their position. Ἀφροσύνη here is unconsciousness rather than folly.

εἰ φύσει τοιάδε ξυμβαίνοι αὐτοῖς] Supposing that the following were the manner of it (their release and cure as it happened to them): 'in the course of nature.' For the conception of philosophy as the freeing of the soul from sense cp. Phaedo 83.

D **τί ἂν οἴει . . . βλέποι**] This is the apodosis of the new sentence which begins with **ὁπότε** and is grammatically in apposition to that which precedes, although gradually developed into an independent statement. Cp. supra ii. 359 B *εἰ τοιόνδε ποιήσαιμεν, κ.τ.λ.*

φλυαρίας] Cp. Phaedo 66 C *εἰδώλων παντοδαπῶν καὶ* **φλυαρίας** *ἐμπίπλησιν ἡμᾶς πολλῆς.* **βλέποι** is the reading of all the better MSS. which grammarians are disposed to correct into *βλέπει* in accordance with the more common usage. The optative may be due to the attraction of the preceding optative **λέγοι**.

καὶ δὴ . . . δεικνύμενα;] Plato here seems to be thinking of the practice of Socrates, who by interrogation about the facts of experience in the light of common sense reduced men to perplexity.

E **διὰ τραχείας τῆς ἀναβάσεως καὶ ἀνάντους**] Cp. Theaet. 175 B *ὅταν δέ γέ τινα αὐτός . . . ἑλκύσῃ ἄνω, κ.τ.λ.*

ὀδυνᾶσθαι . . . ἀγανακτεῖν . . . (516 A) **δύνασθαι**] These infinitives depend like the preceding (*ἀπορεῖν*, &c.) on **οὐκ οἴει** (supra D).

516 A **τῶν νῦν λεγομένων**] 'Of the objects which are now (by men in general) called real.' Plato reminds us that he is speaking in a figure. Cp. infra 519 A, vi. 490 A.

τά τε . . . εἴδωλα] He will see an image of the truth in words (Phaedo 100 A) before he rises to the contemplation of the highest ideas. The gradations that follow are not to be pressed beyond the general meaning; but there are degrees of glory in the heaven of ideas. Cp. note on vi. 511 A. One is tempted however to suppose that 'the moon and stars' may symbolize the ideas of Being, Truth, Sameness, Difference, &c., which although divine are of a lower order than the Good and are studied apart from it.

τῶν ἀνθρώπων] The knowledge of man is the starting-point, as in all Socratic philosophy.

B **τελευταῖον δή . . . οἷός ἐστιν**] The fulness of expression, the

antithesis and the thrice repeated pronoun give effect to the climax. *Republic VII.* 516

ὅτι αὐτός, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. vi. 509 B. *οὗτος*, the reading of Π, is equally good Greek, but **αὐτός** has a solemn emphasis. B

σφεῖς] 'He and his fellow-prisoners.'

τρόπον τινά] Inasmuch as the *σκευαστά* were images of real objects, and the 'fire' was borrowed from the sun. C

τῷ ὀξύτατα . . . (D) ἥξειν] We may apply Plato's words to the vain shadow of a philosophy, whether ancient or modern, in which facts are divorced from principles, and about which there arises a mighty controversy having no basis or foundation of truth.

τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου] quoted in iii. 386 C. D

σφόδρα] emphasizes the quotation,—'would indeed wish.'

*__ἄν__] before **ἀνάπλεως** is not found in any MS. In this and many similar places it may be doubted whether *ἄν* was omitted by the author to avoid cacophony, or by the scribe as an apparent dittographia. E

ἐκ τοῦ ἡλίου ;] 'out of the sun,' i.e. the sunshine. *ἥλιος* = 'sunlight' occurs also in Phaedo 116 E *ἔτι ἥλιον εἶναι ἐπὶ τοῖς ὄρεσιν*: infra 532 B: cp. also Soph. Phil. 17 *ἡλίου διπλῆ πάρεστιν ἐνθάκησις*.

τὰς δὲ δὴ σκιάς, κ.τ.λ.] Plato is never weary of contrasting in all the fanciful forms that his imagination suggests, the real and seeming; the life of the philosopher, martyr, king, 'who is not of this world,' and the life of the politician, lawyer, sophist (vi. 492 A), who is the impersonation of the world. The contact of philosophy with common opinions and life affords one of those curious points of view in which appearance is opposed to true knowledge: either the philosopher is conceived to be made ridiculous by tumbling into wells, mocked at by Thracian women, mazed and puzzled in the justice-room, blinking at 'a world unrealized,' laughed at by mankind, but also laughing at them, or the ambitious Sophist is imagined, more truly ridiculous in his impotent attempts after first principles, dressing himself up in names and words, to be compared only to a bald little blacksmith's apprentice, who washes the dirt from his face, and marries his master's daughter, which is the Lady Philosophy. Cp. Theaet. 174 ff., Polit. 299.

Republic VII. 516 E **γνωματεύοντα**] A *ἅπαξ λεγόμενον* in classical Greek, and therefore of uncertain meaning: either 'reasoning from signs' (*γνῶμα*, 'a sign') or 'measuring the shadows' (*γνῶμα*, 'a measuring rod'). It is used in the latter sense by Themistius, but the more general sense of 'forming a judgement of' is more in accordance with the context here. It is perhaps used with some degree of contempt, as contrasted with contemplation of the idea. *γνωμονεύοντα* is quoted by Timaeus in his lexicon to Plato: cp. the *γνώμων* of the sun-dial.

517 A **τῆς συνηθείας**] is added to correct the vagueness of **οὗτος**: sc. *τοῦ καταστῆναι τὰ ὄμματα.*

ἀποκτιννύναι ἄν;] as though *οὐκ οἴει* had preceded, which words really occur a long way off in supra 516 C.

517 B-518 B *In the foregoing allegory the cave is the phenomenal world, the fire is the power of the sun: the way upwards and the vision of the things above is the elevation of the soul into the intellectual region, whereof the idea of good is the crown or summit. This, once beheld, is known to be the cause of all that is admirable, both in the higher and in the lower sphere. And he who has risen to this contemplation will not be eager to take part in human affairs. [And if compelled to do so he will stumble and be confused at first, like one who comes suddenly out of the daylight into a darkened room.]*

517 B **τῆς γ' ἐμῆς ἐλπίδος**] *ἐλπίς*, like *ἐλπίζω*, is used in the sense of 'surmise' or 'idea,' cp. v. 451 A *ἐλπίζω γὰρ οὖν* ('for I suspect') *ἔλαττον ἁμάρτημα ἀκουσίως τινὸς φονέα γενέσθαι*, Laws vii. 817 B *ὡς ἡ παρ' ἡμῶν ἐστὶν ἐλπίς* ('as I suspect').

ἐπειδὴ . . . ἀκούειν] See vi. 506 D *μὴ πρὸς Διός . . . ἀποστῇς.*

ἐν τῷ γνωστῷ, κ.τ.λ.] is an explanation of **οὕτω**: **ἰδέα** is in apposition with the nominative to **φαίνεται**, which has to be supplied with **ὁρᾶσθαι** and **εἶναι**: **συλλογιστέα** is singular feminine:—'My opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all and is with difficulty seen.'

C **οἱ ἐνταῦθα ἐλθόντες**] 'Those who have attained to this.' Cp. Symp. 211 D **ἐνταῦθα** *τοῦ βίου . . . εἴ πέρ που ἄλλοθι, βιωτὸν ἀνθρώπῳ, θεωμένῳ αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν.*

D **εἴπερ αὖ . . . τοῦτ' ἔχει**] **αὖ** is to be taken closely with **τοῦτο**, the most emphatic word:—'in this particular as well as the rest.' The

point in the allegory to which this corresponds is to be found in 516 D: 'he would rather be a hireling than live and think like his old companions in the den.' *Republic VII.* 517 D

ἐν δικαστηρίοις] Cp. the description of the philosopher in Theaet. 173 C ff. *οὗτοι δέ που ἐκ νέων πρῶτον μὲν εἰς ἀγορὰν οὐκ ἴσασι τὴν ὁδόν, οὐδὲ ὅπου δικαστήριον, κ.τ.λ.*: especially pp. 174, 175.

ἀγαλμάτων] **ἀγάλματα** and **σκιαί** refer back to the Allegory, and if the meaning of them is asked may be represented as embodiments more or less imperfect of the idea of Justice. The *ἀγάλματα* may be conceived to be the enactments of Athenian Law; and *σκιαί* the sophistries of pleaders relating to them and the like. Similarly in iv. 443 C the principle of the division of labour is called *εἴδωλόν τι τῆς δικαιοσύνης.*

φανότερον . . . λαμπροτέρου] These words are neuter, not masculine with *βίου* supplied. For the omission of the article cp. Phaedo 89 B *ἐπὶ πολὺ ὑψηλοτέρου ἢ ἐγώ.* 518 A

ὑπὸ λαμπροτέρου μαρμαρυγῆς ἐμπέπλησται] 'is dazzled (**μαρμαρυγῆς ἐμπέπλησται**) by a more brilliant atmosphere.' Cp. supra 516 A *αὐγῆς ἂν ἔχοντα τὰ ὄμματα μεστά, κ.τ.λ.* B

καὶ οὕτω δή, κ.τ.λ. Cp. supra 516 C *ἀναμιμνησκόμενον . . . τῶν τότε ξυνδεσμωτῶν οὐκ ἂν οἴει αὑτὸν μὲν εὐδαιμονίζειν τῆς μεταβολῆς, τοὺς δὲ ἐλεεῖν;*

The returning captive is happy in having once seen the brighter day: the newly liberated one, on the other hand, is an object of pity to the inhabitants of the upper world, or if of laughter, there is more reason in this 'laughter of angels' than in the sounds which greet the other from the den. Cp. Soph. 254 A *ὁ μὲν ἀποδιδράσκων εἰς τὴν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος σκοτεινότητα, τριβῇ προσαπτόμενος αὐτῆς, διὰ τὸ σκοτεινὸν τοῦ τόπου κατανοῆσαι χαλεπός . . . ὁ δέ γε φιλόσοφος, τῇ τοῦ ὄντος ἀεὶ διὰ λογισμῶν προσκείμενος ἰδέᾳ, διὰ τὸ λαμπρὸν αὖ τῆς χώρας οὐδαμῶς εὐπετὴς ὀφθῆναι.*

It follows that education consists not in putting knowledge into the mind, but in fixing the organ of knowledge on its proper object by turning the whole soul from darkness to light. The mind of a clever rogue sees keenly, but is forced into the service of evil. The same power, when redeemed from degradation, and directed aright, would see the truth as clearly as now it perceives the mean purposes to which it ministers. It follows, too, that government should be *518 B–521 B*

Republic VII. 518 B–521 B *entrusted neither to men who are without training in philosophy nor to those who have passed all their life in it. The one sort do not see the end of life, the others are unwilling to engage in politics.*

518 C **σφεῖς**] sc. *οἱ σοφισταί*. Plato, like other religious teachers, has his doctrine of conversion—the change of nature as a whole, the upward turning of the eye to the light, the vision of the idea of good. This conversion of the soul he ironically compares (infra 521 c) to the spinning round of an oyster-shell.

Whether knowledge is more truly conceived as 'brought to the pupil' or as 'drawn out of him' is a controversy which has always prevailed among philosophers and their disciples. On this turns the opposition between Socrates, as represented by Plato, and the Sophists. It is partly the same with the controversy respecting the absoluteness or relativity of knowledge. It finds a solution in a recognition both of the objective and subjective elements of truth, of facts brought from without and a mind prepared in its own nature and by the knowledge of previous facts to receive them. One of the many aspects of this relation is expressed in the Theaetetus (149 ff.), where Socrates professes that he has nothing to impart, but can only bring to light the thoughts of others.

ταύτην τὴν ἐνοῦσαν . . . δύναμιν] The accusative is governed by **περιακτέον** infra. The eye of the mind cannot turn to the light without the whole mind: it is as if the bodily eye could not turn and look round unless the body turned with it.

D **τούτου . . . αὐτοῦ . . . διαμηχανήσασθαι**] **τούτου αὐτοῦ** is explained in **τῆς περιαγωγῆς**. The indirect interrogation **τίνα τρόπον** depends on some such notion as *ἥτις σκέψεται* implied in **τέχνη**. The words **οὐ τοῦ ἐμποιῆσαι . . . διαμηχανήσασθαι** like **τῆς περιαγωγῆς** are dependent on **τέχνη**.

μεταστραφήσεται] sc. *τὸ ὄργανον ᾧ καταμανθάνει ἕκαστος*.

αὐτῷ] sc. *τῷ ὀργάνῳ*.

αὐτό] sc. *τὸ ὁρᾶν*.

τοῦτο διαμηχανήσασθαι] sc. *ὅπως ὀρθῶς ἔσται τετραμμένον καὶ βλέψει οἷ δεῖ*.

αἱ μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλαι, κ.τ.λ.] The theory of habit is transferred from the body to the mind: they are the lower not the higher gifts

of the intellect ('memory, allied to sense,' attention, the link between the moral and intellectual qualities) rather than genius or originality, which are subject to the influence of habit. Yet these latter, though not acquired by habit, require to be trained and directed before any good use can be made of them. *Republic VII.* 518

καλούμεναι] They are 'virtues of soul' only in a lower sense. See note on supra 516 A.

παντὸς μᾶλλον] cp. infra 520 E. E

θειοτέρου τινὸς . . . οὖσα] sc. *ὀργάνου ἀρετή*: 'is the virtue of a more divine principle.'

δριμύ] 'Shrewdly.' The same word is applied to the narrow legal soul in the Theaetetus 175 D *τὸν σμικρὸν ἐκεῖνον τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ* **δριμὺν** *καὶ δικανικόν*: ib. 173 A *ἔντονοι καὶ* **δριμεῖς** *γίγνονται.* 519 A

ὥστε . . . ἐργαζόμενον] The infinitive *ἐργάζεσθαι*, which would naturally follow **ὥστε**, is 'attracted' into the participial construction (**ὡς . . . ἔχον . . . ἠναγκασμένον**).

τοῦτο μέντοι, κ.τ.λ.] **τοῦτο** is to be taken with **τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως**, which is a periphrasis for *ἡ τοιαύτη φύσις*, the nature so constituted. The hypothetical clause **εἰ ἐκ παιδὸς . . . μολυβδίδας**, having been expanded with **αἳ δὴ . . . ὄψιν**, is resumed and continued in the words **ὧν εἰ . . . τἀληθῆ**, and the apodosis begins with **καὶ ἐκεῖνα**.

τοιαύτης] sc. *οὕτω δριμείας ὁρᾶν.*

τὰς τῆς γενέσεως ξυγγενεῖς] The reading of the older editions *τὰ . . . ξυγγενῆ*, is not indefensible; the gender of the relative (**αἵ**) being in that case assimilated to that with which the antecedent is compared.

†**περὶ κάτω**] Madvig, followed by Cobet and Baiter, conjectures *περικάτω*. This could only mean 'upside down.' It is better to read simply *κάτω* with Hermann (cp. infra 529 B, ix. 586 A) or *περὶ τὰ κάτω* with some of the inferior MSS. B

μήτε . . . μήτε] The use of *μή* is occasioned by **ἀνάγκη** preceding.

Republic VII. 519 C–521 B *Our duty then as founders of the state is first to educate the chosen natures in 'the highest of studies,' and then to compel them to take part in the active conduct of affairs.*

'But will it not be a wrong to them,' says Glaucon, 'to drag them down from the realms of light into the darkness of the den?'

The answer is that in legislating (cp. iv. 419) *we must consult the welfare not of a part but of the whole state. It is also to be observed that our philosophers do not spring up of themselves as in other cities, but are the product of our institutions. They owe a debt therefore to the state and its founders, which they are bound to pay. When their education has been completed, they must descend by turns into the cave and accustom their eyes to the darkness. For when once habituated, they will see and judge of the shadows infinitely better than those who have always been captives. An incidental advantage of the plan will be that our citizens, coming from a brighter life, and being rich inwardly* (cp. iii sub fin.) *will take office as a duty, and not for the sake of gain.*

519 C **τῶν οἰκιστῶν**] is explanatory of **ἡμέτερον**.

ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν] vi. 504 E ff.

ἰδεῖν, κ.τ.λ.] In apposition to **ἀφικέσθαι . . . μέγιστον** and in construction with **ἀναγκάσαι.**

D **τὸ αὐτοῦ . . . καταμένειν**] A parallel to this description may be traced in the unwillingness of Christian saints and hermits to leave their cells and take part in the business of life, seeming sometimes, as Plato says, to be *ἐν μακάρων νήσοις* already.

εἴτε σπουδαιότεραι] sc. *εἰσίν.*

ἔπειτ', ἔφη, ἀδικήσομεν αὐτούς] An expression of surprise. 'And are we then to do them an injustice?'

ἄμεινον] sc. *ζῆν.*

E **ἐπελάθου . . . πάλιν**] iv. 419 ff.

τοῦτο μηχανᾶται ἐγγενέσθαι] sc. *ὁ νόμος τὴν εὐπραξίαν.*

520 A **αὐτὸς ἐμποιῶν . . . τῆς πόλεως**] **αὐτός** *bis* is emphatic: 'the law itself creating such men in the state, not in order to leave them to their own devices, but that it might itself have the full use of them for the binding together of the state,' or taking **ξύνδεσμον** in the more common sense of the word, 'so as to be the bond of the state.'

ὅτι οὐδ' ἀδικήσομεν] 'that we shall not be wronging them after all.' δέ in **οὐδέ** = 'in spite of what you say,' referring to ἀδικήσομεν supra 519 D. 520 A

δίκην δ' ἔχει . . . τροφεῖα] 'now it seems fair that the wild plant which owes culture to nobody should not be eager to pay the price of its culture to anybody.' The phrase **δίκην ἔχει** may be compared with *φύσιν ἔχει, λόγον ἔχει.* B

ὑμᾶς δ' ἡμεῖς] The sentence returns to the direct form.

ἐκείνων] sc. *τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι φιλοσόφων γιγνομένων.*

ἑκάστῳ] sc. *ὑμῶν.* C

ξυνεθιστέον] Not 'to be accustomed together with the prisoners in the den,' but simply 'to be accustomed,' as is seen by the use of the word in the following sentence.

ξυνεθιζόμενοι γάρ, κ.τ.λ.] The strength and weakness of the politician in his limitation: he can see and act powerfully on the immediate present or future, but on that only. In times of revolution he is apt to be at fault: he is neither capable of spanning the movement, nor of confining himself to the necessities of the hour. It is only the greatest genius that can use the legal, political, or ecclesiastical maxims of an age and country, and yet be above them, knowing their true value;—who is at once *φρόνιμος* and *σοφός*: able to follow *θεωρία* and *πολιτική*.

τὰ εἴδωλα] This word is not always strictly used for the images from which the shadows are thrown, as in 532 B *ἀπὸ τῶν σκιῶν ἐπὶ* **τὰ εἴδωλα**, but also more generally as in 516 A of reflections in water, and, as in this place, to include *σκιαί*. We have risen to a point of view from which the *σκευαστά* and the *σκιαί* are included under one notion as *εἴδωλα*: cp. vi. 511 A.

From this part of the Republic Lord Bacon borrowed his figure of 'idola specûs' and of the 'idols' generally.

σκιαμαχούντων . . . στασιαζόντων περὶ τοῦ ἄρχειν] These words refer to the disputes and ambitions of the prisoners in the den, and *στασιαζόντων* also reminds us of the quarrelling of the sailors about the helm (vi. 488 C).

ὄντος] sc. *τοῦ ἄρχειν.* D

τὸ δέ που ἀληθές, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. i. 342 D, 345 E. There is a slight change of construction from **ἐν πόλει** to **ταύτην, κ.τ.λ.**

Republic VII. 520 D **ἀπειθήσουσιν . . . ἐν τῷ καθαρῷ**] For **οἱ τρόφιμοι** cp. Laws vii. 804 A and Polit. 272 B, where the subjects of Cronos are so named. **τὸν δὲ πολὺν χρόνον** is added to avoid a one-sided statement: they have to toil, but still the greater part of their time is to be passed in the world above. For **ἐν τῷ καθαρῷ** cp. Theaet. 177 A *ἐκεῖνος . . . ὁ τῶν κακῶν καθαρὸς τόπος.*

E **εἰ μὲν βίον . . .** (521 A) **ἄρξειν**] That is, if you provide your future rulers with a life which is better than that of a ruler.

521 A **οἱ τῷ ὄντι πλούσιοι**] Cp. Phaedr. sub fin. *πλούσιον δὲ νομίζοιμι τὸν σοφόν.*

περιμάχητον γάρ, κ.τ.λ.] The subject, **ὁ τοιοῦτος πόλεμος**, is developed from **περιμάχητον . . . τὸ ἄρχειν γιγνόμενον**, which is left out of construction. Cp. Phaedo 69 B *χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως . . . ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετή.*

B **φρονιμώτατοι**] sc. *εἰσίν*, absorbed in **ἔχουσι** following.

521 C–526 C *By what methods then shall such rulers be created and brought up out of darkness into the light of reason? 'Gymnastic' is clearly incapable of doing this; and so is even 'music' as hitherto defined, seeing that the harmony and rhythm which it imparts are not evolved from within, but impressed by habit from without. And the 'arts' we have already rejected* (vi. 495 D) *as mechanical. The germ of something higher first appears in the perception of number. Arithmetic may help to educate the reason. For, every perception has this effect which brings with it the perception of an opposite. And not until sensation reports contrary attributes of the same object does the mind become aware of unity and diversity. This, however rudimentary, is an act of pure intelligence; and when aroused in us by the study of number, it becomes an instrument of essential value for the awakening of thought. Arithmetic therefore is the first step in the higher education. The incidental advantages of the study, especially for soldiers, are easily seen.*

521 C **ἐξ Ἅιδου . . . εἰς θεούς**] e. g. Herakles, Polydeukes, &c. Cp. Phaedo 82 B, C, where the soul is said only by the love of knowledge to find her way into the company of the gods.

τοῦτο δή . . . φήσομεν εἶναι] 'this then would seem to be—not the turning over of an oyster-shell, but the conversion of a soul

Republic VII. 521 C

from a day which is as night to the true ascent, which leads towards being.' The text, as thus interpreted, is not free from objection: the meaning of **οὖσαν** drags, and **ἐπάνοδον** gives a feeble antithesis to **ἡμέρας**. It may however be argued that the addition of **οὖσαν** is in harmony with the emphatic and pleonastic expressions in which Plato describes being (cp. infra 529 D); and that **ἐπάνοδον** arises out of the connexion of the passage. The sense is clear, though the style is perhaps a little at fault. The first thing to be done is to turn the soul round to philosophy, which is not the light itself, but the real and true way up to the light. The *περιαγωγή* (supra 518 D) or *μεταστροφή* precedes the *ἐπάνοδος* (infra 532 B). This is quite in the Socratic and Platonic spirit. For **οὖσαν** some late copies have *ἰούσης* (*q*), which appears to be a feeble correction. Ξ omits **οὖσαν**. Iamblichus has preserved a reading, *οὖσα ἐπάνοδος*, which may possibly be right ('being the way upward to the "true day" of being'), and which may be supposed to have been lost owing to the copyists not understanding that *ἡμέραν* was to be supplied with **ἀληθινήν**. But according to this reading the distinction between the 'turning round' and the 'ascent' is not strictly maintained. With reference to Cobet's conjecture, *εἰς ἀληθινὴν τοῦ ὄντος οὐσίαν ἐπάνοδος*, it may be questioned whether Plato would have used the expression 'the existence of being,' although the phrase *οὐσίαν ὄντος οὐδὲ μὴ ὄντος* occurs in Soph. 262 C in a different connexion.

For **ὀστράκου** cp. Phaedr. 241 B *ὁ πρὶν ἐραστής*, **ὀστράκου** *μεταπεσόντος, ἵεται φυγῇ μεταβαλών*. **ὀστράκου περιστροφή** is an allusion to the game *ὀστρακίνδα*, in which a potsherd white on one side and black on the other was twirled upon a line, and accordingly as the black or white turned up, one party fled and the other pursued. Such at least is the explanation of the game which may be gathered from these two passages, of which only that in the Phaedrus is referred to by Pollux, ix. 111.

τόδε δ' ἐννοῶ . . . νέους ὄντας;] 'Now this occurs to me as I speak: were we not saying that they must in the days of their youth be trained warriors?' Cp. iii. 403 E **ἀθληταὶ** *μὲν γὰρ οἱ ἄνδρες τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγῶνος*: viii. 543 B *ὥσπερ δὲ* **ἀθλητάς** *τε* **πολέμου** *καὶ φύλακας*. D

δεῖ ἄρα . . . ἐκείνῳ] 'The study which we are searching for must have this in addition to the other;' i.e. military use as well as a philosophical value. **τοῦτο** refers to what precedes, and is explained in what follows.

Republic VII. 521 D **προσέχειν**] The etymological use, for *ἔχειν πρός*, 'to have in addition,' is remarkable. Cp. Soph. O. T. 175 *ἄλλον δ' ἂν ἄλλῳ προσίδοις, κ.τ.λ.* The singularity has probably led to the various readings *προσεχῶς* (r), *πῶς ἔχειν* (*q*), *παρέχειν* (Ξ).

522 A **ὅσην τὸ πρότερον διήλθομεν**] ii. 376 E ff. There is a sense in which philosophy is also *μουσική*, cp. vi. 499 D *αὕτη ἡ Μοῦσα*, Phaedo 61 A *ὡς φιλοσοφίας . . . οὔσης μεγίστης μουσικῆς.*

ἀλλ' ἦν ἐκείνη γ', ἔφη, κ.τ.λ.] For the repetition of *ἔφη* infra (**τούτων ἀδελφά, ἔφη**), cp. viii. 557 C, where *ἦν δ' ἐγώ* is similarly repeated.

ἀντίστροφος τῆς γυμναστικῆς] This is said in the spirit of the preceding remark (518 D) that all the virtues except wisdom are not far removed from bodily habit.

ἀγαθόν] is to be taken with **τοιοῦτον** and not with **μάθημα**:— **μάθημα δὲ πρὸς τοιοῦτον, κ.τ.λ.**, refers to supra 521 D *μάθημα ψυχῆς ὁλκὸν . . . ἐπὶ τὸ ὄν*, and **οἷον σὺ νῦν ζητεῖς** probably to *μάθημα*: cp. supra 521 E *ὃ ζητοῦμεν μάθημα.* The v. r. *ἄγον* Π mg. deserves to be considered.

B **αἵ τε γὰρ τέχναι**] The corresponding *καί* is superseded by the speech of Glaucon, **καὶ μήν, κ.τ.λ.**

ἔδοξαν] viz. supra vi. 495 D *ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν τε καὶ δημιουργιῶν ὥσπερ τὰ σώματα λελώβηνται, οὕτω καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ξυγκεκλασμένοι τε καὶ ἀποτεθρυμμένοι διὰ τὰς βαναυσίας τυγχάνουσιν.*

τῶν ἐπὶ πάντα τεινόντων, κ.τ.λ.] 'Let us take something of universal application.' Cp. Laws v. 747 A, B *πρός τε γὰρ οἰκονομίαν καὶ πρὸς πολιτείαν καὶ πρὸς τὰς τέχνας πάσας ἓν οὐδὲν οὕτω δύναμιν ἔχει παίδειον μάθημα μεγάλην, ὡς ἡ περὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς διατριβή· τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, ὅτι τὸν νυστάζοντα καὶ ἀμαθῆ φύσει, ἐγείρει καὶ εὐμαθῆ καὶ μνήμονα καὶ ἀγχίνουν ἀπεργάζεται, παρὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν ἐπιδιδόντα θείᾳ τέχνῃ*: and for the use of arithmetic and geometry, and their relation to the other sciences, cp. Philebus 56, 57.

C **κοινόν**] = *ἐπὶ πάντα τεῖνον*: cp. Theaet. 185 E *αὐτὴ δι' αὑτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ* **τὰ κοινά** *μοι φαίνεται περὶ πάντων ἐπισκοπεῖν*, where among *τὰ κοινά* is mentioned number (*ἕν τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον ἀριθμόν*).

διάνοιαι] *διάνοια* is perhaps here used according to the definition in vi. 511 C, D for mathematical reasoning.

τὸ φαῦλον τοῦτο] For this ironical use of *φαῦλος* cp. iv. 423 c, 435 c. *Republic VII.* 522

παγγέλοιον γοῦν . . . ἀποφαίνει] The three extant tragedians all wrote plays on the subject of Palamedes. Agamemnon is addressed in an extant fragment of the Palamedes of Euripides (584 Nauck). Aeschylus also attributes the invention of number to Prometheus (P. V. 459). C

ἀναριθμήτων ὄντων] sc. *τῶν τε νεῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων.* D

καὶ λογίζεσθαί τε] **καί**, which is supported by Par. A, and is certainly more likely to have been altered than retained, though maintained by some editors to be a corruption of *ἤ* (which gives a poor sense), is the right reading. 'Shall we hesitate to set down as a study necessary to a warrior also an ability to reckon and count?' For **ἄλλο τι οὖν** cp. note on i. 337 c. E

καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἔσεσθαι] cp. Tim. 39 B *ἵνα . . . μετάσχοι . . . ἀριθμοῦ τὰ ζῷα, ὅσοις ἦν προσῆκον, μαθόντα παρὰ τῆς ταὐτοῦ καὶ ὁμοίου περιφορᾶς.* Also Phaedr. 249 B for difference between the souls of men and animals.

ὧν ζητοῦμεν] supra 521 D. 523

χρῆσθαι δ' οὐδεὶς αὐτῷ ὀρθῶς] **οὐδείς**, sc. *κινδυνεύει.* Plato means that persons study arithmetic for convenience only, and not as a training of the mind. In modern education, mathematics, besides their more particular application as the expression of physics, would generally be regarded as having four uses: (1) they fix the attention; (2) they give accuracy; (3) they impart a perception of symmetry and order, and a power of construction; (4) they are also said to strengthen the rational powers generally. The last use must be admitted with reservation, considering that reasoning in general, whether in science or life, is for the most part concrete and not abstract. The highest of human faculties, the judgement, is little cultivated by mathematical studies. Plato seems to have valued mathematics as a general training of the mind (infra 526 c): not without an anticipation of the enormous power gained by it in the interpretation of nature. A

τό γ' ἐμοὶ δοκοῦν δηλῶσαι] For a similar hesitating manner of speaking cp. Theaet. 164 D *πειράσομαι δηλῶσαι περὶ αὐτῶν ὅ γε δὴ νοῶ.*

οἳ λέγομεν] sc. *πρὸς οὐσίαν.*

Republic VII. **καὶ τοῦτο**] sc. *τὴν ἀριθμητικήν.*

523 A **τὰ μὲν . . . (B) οὐ παρακαλοῦντα . . . τὰ δὲ παντάπασι διακελευόμενα**] The participial construction follows **δείκνυμι** as a verb implying perception.

B **παρακαλοῦντα . . . εἰς ἐπίσκεψιν**] i.e. calling in reason to examine the intimations of sense.

ἐκείνην] sc. *τὴν νόησιν*, emphatically opposed to **τῆς αἰσθήσεως** following.

οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ποιούσης] 'is behaving in an untrustworthy manner.' Cp. Soph. 232 A *ὅταν ἐπιστήμων τις πολλῶν φαίνηται . . . τὸ φάντασμα τοῦτο ὡς* **οὐκ ἔσθ' ὑγιές**, *κ.τ.λ.*

τὰ πόρρωθεν . . . τὰ ἐσκιαγραφημένα] Cp. x. 602 D *ᾧ δὴ ἡμῶν τῷ παθήματι τῆς φύσεως ἡ* **σκιαγραφία** *ἐπιθεμένη γοητείας οὐδὲν ἀπολείπει.* Socrates proceeds to explain that he is referring not to the effect of distance or of artificial illusion, but to the confusion caused by contradictory impressions of natural objects close at hand.

οὐ πάνυ . . . ἔτυχες οὗ λέγω] (1) 'you have not quite hit my meaning,' said ironically rather than (2) 'you have altogether missed it.' **οὐ πάνυ** varies in meaning according to the context. It is sometimes 'not altogether' and sometimes 'not at all.'

τὰ μὲν οὐ παρακαλοῦντα, κ.τ.λ.] Some sensations excite thought, others do not. Take the case of a finger: a finger as a finger does not give rise to contradictory impressions. But as possessed of qualities it does, e.g. a finger as far as visibility is concerned is at once both great and small; as far as the touch is concerned, at once hard and soft, thick and thin. This contradiction in the 'mere sensation' excites thought to separate the two elements given in sensation and to go on to consider what the elements are in themselves—i.e. what is the great and what is the small, &c.

C **ἐναντίαν αἴσθησιν**] e.g. 'hard as well as soft,' 'rough as well as smooth.' *αἴσθησις* here and supra A (**τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν**) is not the faculty (either generally, or as one of the five), but the act of sensation. In supra B (**τῆς αἰσθήσεως οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ποιούσης**), infra 524 A (*ἡ ἐπὶ τῷ σκληρῷ τεταγμένη αἴσθησις . . . τί ποτε σημαίνει αὕτη ἡ αἴσθησις*), the word has its more ordinary meaning.

D **ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ . . . ἐπερέσθαι**] 'the ordinary mind is not driven to ask any question.' **ἐν πᾶσι . . . τούτοις**, sc. *τοῖς οὕτω φαινομένοις* (**ἐάν τε**

ἐν μέσῳ, κ.τ.λ.). He goes on to show that another faculty is called in when contradictions arise which sense cannot explain. *Republic VII.*

τὸ μέγεθος αὐτῶν, κ.τ.λ.] The interrogation **ἆρα** gives a strong emphasis which is continued through the following clause. 523 E

ὧδε ποιεῖ] 'behaves in the following way.'

ἡ ἐπὶ τῷ σκληρῷ τεταγμένη αἴσθησις] sc. *ἡ ἁφή.* 524 A

αὖ] 'In contradistinction to the former case in which the soul was not perplexed:' 523 C ff.

ἡ τοῦ κούφου καὶ . . . βαρέος] What is here mentioned without a name in Plato seems to be the same which modern philosophers call the sense of resistance. For these antinomies of sense cp. v. 479 B, Theaet. 152 D, Phil. 14.

πρῶτον μέν, κ.τ.λ.] The apodosis comes in with **οὐκοῦν . . . αὖ** (c) which takes the place of *δέ*, because of the development of the first clause which has intervened. B

οὐκοῦν ἐὰν δύο φαίνηται, κ.τ.λ.] The sense, while thought is latent, perceives a sort of chaos only, of great and small, afterwards the mind is awakened and distinguishes the great from the small.

διὰ δὲ τὴν τούτου σαφήνειαν . . . ἢ 'κείνη] 'But with a view to clearing up this chaos of sense' (**τούτου**, sc. *τοῦ συγκεχυμένου*) 'the thinking mind is compelled to reverse the process, and look at small and great as distinct and not confused.' For **διὰ . . . σαφήνειαν** cp. Polit. 262 C *σαφηνείας ἕνεκα.* **τοὐναντίον** is an adverbial accusative, i.e. *τοὐναντίον*, sc. *ποιοῦσα.* **'κείνη** = *ἡ ὄψις.* C

The difficulty of this passage is to understand how the operation of sense is separated from that of the mind. The theory of vision may offer an illustration of Plato's meaning. Our first impression, as common language seems to imply, is that surrounding objects are seen by us in their true forms and at their proper distances by the sole use of the eye. Experiment shows that much which is apparently part of the act of sight is really an unconscious influence of the mind which habit has confused with the pure sensation, arising from the observation of shadow, colour, or the use of the two eyes in connexion with each other. The mere eye without the mind may be said in Plato's language to perceive *οὐ διωρισμένα ἀλλὰ συγκεχυμένα.*

Republic VII. 524 C The error of Plato is that he describes the act of vision as having two successive stages, one in which the sense, another in which the mind is active: we ourselves should regard these two processes as one and simultaneous in the concrete, although in thought we can analyze an act of vision into them. The world opening on the half-awakened eyes of a new-born child is perhaps the nearest image of Plato's conception of the material of sense.

D **ταῦτα τοίνυν, κ.τ.λ.**] When the same objects suggest the idea of opposites, e.g. of great and small, the mind is 'irritated' into the consideration of the nature of great and small, of which the impressions have hitherto been confused.

ποτέρων] This, although only an early correction in Par. A seems on the whole more probable than *πότερον*. Cp. infra 525 A, B: Theaet. 186 A.

E **εἰ δ' ἀεί, κ.τ.λ.**] The 'one and many' here spoken of seems still to be the Zenonian puzzle which is said in the Philebus (14 D) to have been superseded by the deeper oppositions amongst the ideas themselves.

525 A **περὶ τὸ αὐτό**] There is a various reading *περὶ αὐτό*, sc. *περὶ τὸ ἕν*. **τὸ αὐτό** is retained, not as inherently more probable, but as the reading of the best MSS.

οὐκοῦν εἴπερ, κ.τ.λ.] If this happens in the case of unity it must happen to all number, since number proceeds from unity. Cp. Parm. 144 A.

ξύμπας ἀριθμός] 'All number' collectively. Cp. Theaet. 147 E *τὸν ἀριθμὸν πάντα δίχα διελάβομεν*: Phaedo 104 A *ὁ ἥμισυς τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἅπας*. For **τούτῳ** some MSS. have *τοῦτο*, others omit the word.

B **ταῦτα δέ γε . . . πρὸς ἀλήθειαν**] This may be illustrated from modern philosophy, which equally recognizes contradiction as a motive of thought. The being which is also not-being, that is to say, the privation or abstraction of individual or particular being: the one which is many: the same which is diverse: the motion which is and is not in the same place: the moment which is and is not in the same time: the continuous which is also discrete: the finite which is infinity: the beginning which begins not,—the negation which is only relation, together with the higher contradictions which arise in the sphere of theology or moral philosophy—

would have been regarded by Plato no less than by Kant and Hegel as highly suggestive difficulties to the student of dialectic. In the later stage of his philosophy, beginning with the Parmenides, he is increasingly disposed to dwell on such modes of thought. *Republic VII.* 525 B

φιλοσόφῳ δέ, κ.τ.λ.] 'while the philosopher must study arithmetic because without emerging from the sea of generation and laying hold of true being he can never become an arithmetician.' The 'philosopher' = the philosophic student, he that would be a philosopher. Else there is some want of point in the termination of the sentence, because the study of arithmetic is a preliminary to philosophy and not the result of it. Davis and Vaughan render **λογιστικῷ**, 'skilful reasoner,' but this is pointless, and hardly possible when the word is used in two other passages within ten lines in the sense of calculation (515 A, C). For **ἢ μηδέποτε . . . γενέσθαι** cp. iii. 401 B *ἢ μὴ παρ' ἡμῖν ποιεῖν.*

γενέσεως ἐξαναδύντι] Cp. Phaedr. 247 D where the soul has risen to the inner heaven 'in the revolution she beholds Justice and Temperance and Knowledge absolute not in the form of generation' (*οὐχ ᾗ γένεσις πρόσεστιν*).

προσῆκον δὴ τὸ μάθημα, κ.τ.λ.] *μάθημα* (or *αὐτό*) is to be repeated in the accusative after **νομοθετῆσαι** and **πείθειν ἐπὶ λογιστικὴν ἰέναι.** Cp. supra 519 D *ἰδεῖν τε τὸ ἀγαθόν, κ.τ.λ.*

ἕνεκα πολέμου τε . . . καὶ οὐσίαν] By the insertion of *τε* after **ῥᾳστώνης** from Par. A, the awkward agglomeration of three genitive cases is avoided. The warlike use of arithmetic is admitted here; but when Glaucon follows up this line of argument afterwards, he is reproved by Socrates. This change of front is one of the expedients which Plato employs to keep attention alive. C

ἐννοῶ ῥηθέντος] Socrates professes to have discovered what has long been familiar to him: this also is one of the artifices by which he quickens the interest of his hearers. Cp. a similar form of expression in ii. 370 A *ἐννοῶ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς εἰπόντος σοῦ.*

ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦ καπηλεύειν] Cp. supra C **ὡς ἐμπόρους ἢ καπήλους**: i. 345 C, D *ὥσπερ χρηματιστὴν ἀλλ' οὐ ποιμένα.* D

οἶσθα γάρ που . . . πολλαπλασιοῦσιν] 'If you go about to divide the unit they multiply it.' In teaching arithmetic, the unit was represented by a line ⊢—⊣. If the pupil by a natural mistake assumed the magnitude of this line to be significant, and proposed to divide it, the teacher would show him that for arithmetical purposes

Republic VII. 525 D it was a matter of indifference whether the line ├──┤ was divided into four parts ├1┼2┼3┼4┤ or multiplied by four ├─1─┼─2─┼─3─┼─4─┤, since a magnitude, however great or small, might equally be taken to represent the abstract unit. 'One,' so conceived, is without parts: if it is imagined as divided, every part is equal to the whole. The same distinction between the popular and scientific study of arithmetic is clearly stated in Phil. 56 E *οἱ μὲν γάρ που . . . τις θήσει.*

526 A **ἕκαστον**] Apposition of a part to the whole.—Plato is endeavouring to show the purely abstract and intellectual nature of the science of number. The proof of this is, that while bodies or objects of sense have parts, the unit is said by arithmetical theorists to be incapable of division: which shows that, if questioned, they would at once acknowledge that number of a purely intellectual or abstract sort is the subject of their operations.

ὧν] by attraction for *ἅ*.

ὁρᾷς οὖν . . . (B) **τὴν ἀλήθειαν;**] 'then do you see, my friend, I said, that this science may be fairly thought necessary to us, since we find that it necessitates the soul to use the pure intelligence for the attainment of pure truth?' A slight play of words seems to be intended, as infra 527 A and elsewhere, on **ἀναγκαῖον** and **προσαναγκάζον.** **ἡμῖν**, 'for our purpose' (i.e. for us as lawgivers).

B **οἵ τε βραδεῖς . . . ἐπιδιδόασιν**] Compare again Laws v. 747.

C **καὶ μὴν . . . ὡς τοῦτο**] 'And, indeed, you will not easily find anything that is more laborious to the student; nor will you find many that are equally so.' **οὐδὲ πολλά**, sc. *ἃ πόνον οὕτω μέγαν παρέχεται.* Hence in continuing the sentence, *ἤ* which should have followed **μείζω** is changed to **ὡς**.

526 C–527 C *Geometry, no less than arithmetic, is indispensable to the profession of arms, and if followed far enough, it may also serve as a stage in higher education. For, however this has been obscured by the employment of terms implying a practical application, its real purpose is to obtain abstract, universal, and it may even be said, eternal results. Moreover, experience shows that as arithmetic quickens so geometry clears the mind.*

526 D **ὅσα δὴ ἄλλα**] such as the hollow square (*πλαίσιον*). For the form of the sentence cp. Lach. 182 C *προσθήσομεν δ' αὐτῷ οὐ σμικρὰν*

προσθήκην, ὅτι πάντα ἄνδρα ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ θαρραλεώτερον καὶ ἀνδρειότερον ἂν ποιήσειεν αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ οὐκ ὀλίγῳ αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη. And for the phrase **γεωμετρικὸς καὶ μὴ ὤν** cp. infra 527 C *ἡμμένος τε γεωμετρίας καὶ μή.* *Republic VII.*

τὸ εὐδαιμονέστατον τοῦ ὄντος] The blessedness of the soul that apprehends the good is attributed to the good itself. Phaedr. 250 C *εὐδαίμονα φάσματα . . . ἐποπτεύοντες.* 526 E

πᾶν τοὐναντίον] is adverbial. 527 A

λέγουσι μέν που . . . ἀναγκαίως] 'They talk in a very ridiculous and meagre fashion.' **ἀναγκαίως** = with merely practical needs in view. For this meaning cp. ii. 369 D *ἀναγκαιοτάτη πόλις*: Tim. 69 D: Thuc. v. 8 *ὅπλισιν ἀναγκαίαν.* There is however a facetious allusion to geometrical necessity, for which cp. v. 458 D *οὐ γεωμετρικαῖς γε . . . ἀλλ' ἐρωτικαῖς ἀνάγκαις*: 'they have only practical necessities in view, not the necessities of geometry.'

τετραγωνίζειν] = to construct a square equal to a given area. The use of the same word in Theaet. 148 A is slightly different, viz. 'to form when squared,' said of the line which represents a square root.

παρατείνειν] (1) 'to produce a straight line' [or, (2) as in Meno 87 A, to extend a plane figure, L. C.]

προστιθέναι] 'to apply,' viz. a plane figure to a line.

ὡς τοῦ ἀεὶ ὄντος γνώσεως, κ.τ.λ.] The words **διομολογητέον** and **ἕνεκα** are repeated from the previous sentences: **τι** is to be joined with **γιγνομένου**, 'becoming this or that.' B

ὁλκὸν ἄρα . . . ἔχομεν] **ὦ γενναῖε**, like *ὦ θαυμάσιε, ὦ ἥδιστε* expresses the feeling of the speaker about the noble thought which has just arisen in his mind.

πρὸς τὸ ἄνω . . . ἔχομεν] 'with a view to (**πρός**) our directing upwards what now wrongly we direct downwards.'

ἅ] sc. *τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμματα.* Perhaps *ὅ* should be read.

ἐν τῇ καλλιπόλει σοι] 'in your model state': used as a term of endearment; cp. ii. 370 D *τοῦ πολιχνίου.* **αὐτοῦ**, i.e. 'geometry,' for the incidental advantages of the science are not small. C

Astronomy is approved by Glaucon as conveying information that is of use for generalship. Socrates rallies him on his zeal for useful knowledge, which, as he insinuates, is due to the fear of popular *527 D–528 E*

Republic VII. 527 D–528 E *opinion. He reminds him that the main purpose of education is to brighten the eye of reason. Now there is a much-neglected science which should on this account have been taken first. Geometry was understood to mean plane geometry. But the geometry of solids should come before astronomy which is the science of the motion of solids. Although yet in its infancy, the intermediate science may yet some day be developed. For, difficult as it is, if only encouraged, it would work its way through the fascination which it infallibly exercises on superior minds.*

527 D **ἔμοιγ' οὖν, ἔφη**] Socrates seems to think that too much is being made of the military uses of the sciences. He himself first drew attention to the point in the case of arithmetic (521 D): but when Glaucon, following, as he imagines, the lead of Socrates, praises geometry for the same reason, he observes that even a little of it suffices for the commander, and lays stress upon its higher use in purifying the eye of the soul. Here where Glaucon again makes the same point, he laughs at his utilitarianism and fear of popular opinion. When astronomy again comes up for consideration (528 E), Glaucon, mindful of the remonstrance of Socrates, praises it for making the soul look upward: but Socrates objects to having his metaphor understood so literally: and insists that the truth to which the soul should look up is not visible to the eye but to the mind only.

τὸ δ' ἔστιν . . . ὅτι] 'whereas it is a high truth although believed by few, that,' &c. **τό** is the subject of **ἔστιν** and is explained by the clause introduced by **ὅτι**.

ἑκάστου ὄργανόν τι ψυχῆς] 'a faculty in the soul of every man.'

ἐκκαθαίρεται . . . ἀναζωπυρεῖται] 'is polished' (like a soiled mirror) 'and lighted up' (like a fading torch) cp. infra 533 D *ἐν βορβόρῳ . . . τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα κατορωρυγμένον.*

E **σκόπει οὖν . . .** (528 A) **ὄνασθαι**] i.e. 'will you argue with the philosophers or with the utilitarians, or will you carry on the argument independently and chiefly for your own satisfaction?' A similar turn of thought occurs in Protag. 331 C *οὐδὲν γὰρ δέομαι τὸ* **εἰ βούλει** *τοῦτο καὶ* **εἴ σοι δοκεῖ** *ἐλέγχεσθαι ἀλλ' ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ.* The argument is sometimes conceived of in Plato as a disputation between two persons, or again, as the mind talking to itself, or once more, as

independent of the mind and having a distinct power and reality of its own. Republic VII.

Cobet's conjecture (ἢ οὐδὲ πρὸς ἑτέρους) is neat and plausible, and preferable to Madvig's (ἢ εἰ πρὸς οὐδετέρους), but is not really required. The double negative is merely emphatic. 527 E

ἄναγε . . . αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ λαβεῖν] 'then take a step backward,' I said: 'for the truth is that we mistook the science which should follow next after geometry.' 'How was that?' said he—(sc. πῶς λαβόντες οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐλάβομεν;)—'The error was in placing solids in motion before solids at rest.' According to Plato's own statement (528 D) the mention of solid geometry in its natural place was purposely omitted because of its backwardness: the omission may also be a trick of style intended to give variety and dramatic effect. If astronomy had not been mentioned twice, Socrates would not have had the two opportunities for laughing at Glaucon, first for his utilitarianism, secondly for his sentimentalism. Cp. iv. 430 D where it is proposed to pass on to Justice without considering Temperance: and Symp. 185 D where the order of the speakers Aristophanes and Eryximachus is transposed. 528 A

νῦν δή] These words in the sense of 'just now,' 'a little while ago,' are not divided by **γάρ**, but express a single notion: cp. καὶ δή.

ἤδη] is to be joined with **ἐν περιφορᾷ ὄν.**

τοῦτο] sc. τρίτη αὔξη. B

μεγαλοφρονούμενοι] 'in their great conceit of themselves:' a word not found elsewhere except in the active voice, but not for that reason to be changed into μεγαλαυχούμενοι (Cobet). It is not surprising that Plato should have introduced the middle voice of a verb signifying a mental state. Compare the word φιλοφρονεῖσθαι, which occurs six times in the Laws and nowhere else in the genuine writings of Plato. C

ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν . . . (D) φανῆναι] The plan of the sentence seems to have changed in the process of construction. **ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ζητούντων** may depend on some general idea of disadvantage, e. g. κωλυόμενα understood from the previous clause. (Vögelin cuts the knot of the difficulty by cancelling **δέ**: this suggests another interpretation, taking **ὑπὸ τῶν ζητούντων** with **αὐξάνεται,** 'still by the efforts of their votaries they grow perforce,' but this is also very improbable.) Plato means to say that these mathematicians were ignorant of

Republic VII. the educational value of their own study. His own love of the regular solids may be remarked in the Timaeus (54, 55).

528 D **αὐτὰ φανῆναι**] = εἰ φανείη.

σπεύδων, κ.τ.λ.] Plato elsewhere alludes to the backwardness of such studies in Greece as compared with Egypt: a fact which the Athenian interlocutor in the Laws (vii. 819 D) says had struck him late in life (*καὶ αὐτὸς ἀκούσας ὀψέ ποτε τὸ περὶ ταῦτα ἡμῶν πάθος ἐθαύμασα*): when he found that among the Egyptians mathematical problems were an amusement of childhood, the ignorance of the Greeks seemed to him absolutely 'swinish' (*οὐκ ἀνθρώπινον ἀλλὰ ὑηνῶν τινῶν . . . θρεμμάτων*).

γελοίως] 'In a way that is ridiculous,' and so 'miserable,' or 'contemptible'—a favourite application of the word in Plato: cp. especially iv. 429 E *ἔκπλυτα καὶ* **γελοῖα**.

528 E–530 C *Having corrected this omission, we proceed in order to Astronomy. Glaucon praises the contemplation of the starry heavens, not now as a useful, but as an elevating pursuit. Socrates replies, that the eye may look upwards, but that the mind looks down, if it is contented with mere observation and does not rise to universal truths. The sky is only a great moving diagram, and Astronomy, like Geometry, must leave poring over phenomena, and proceed to determine the general principles of solids in motion, if this science also is to help us onward and upward, as we advance from what is visible towards the intellectual and invisible. The astronomer must let the heavens alone and make use of problems* (*i.e. study abstract theorems*).

528 E **ἐὰν αὐτὴν πόλις μετίῃ**] The expression is elliptical: sc. *ἴσμεν γὰρ ὑπάρξουσαν, ἐάν, κ.τ.λ.* Cp. supra 522 D *εἴπερ . . . μὴ ἠπίστατο.*

ὅ γε νῦν δή μοι . . . ἐπέπληξας] 'acting on the principle of your rebuke': supra 527 D. There is great humour in the way in which Glaucon is driven from the utilitarian to the sentimental view of knowledge, only to receive a more severe rebuff from Socrates.

The antecedent to **ὅ** is an accusative *ἐκεῖνο* in apposition to the following clause.

529 A **οἱ εἰς φιλοσοφίαν ἀνάγοντες**] has been translated (1) 'who embark' or 'set sail on the sea of philosophy': a metaphorical use of *ἀνάγειν* which, although it receives some colour from Phaedr.

272 D οὐδ' ἀνάγειν ἄνω μακρὰν περιβαλλομένους, seems to require more help from the surrounding imagery; or (2) 'who raise astronomy to the rank of a science.' For this use of ἀνάγειν cp. Tim. 19 A τοὺς ἀξίους πάλιν ἀνάγειν δεῖν, 'the worthy are to be raised from a lower to a higher class.' It is also possible (3) that ἀνάγειν simply means 'to refer,' 'those who refer it' (sc. astronomy) 'to philosophy.' φιλοσοφία is here used in the popular sense of any higher kind of knowledge, as in Tim. 88 C μουσικῇ καὶ πάσῃ **φιλοσοφίᾳ** προσχρώμενον. 529 A

οὐκ ἀγεννῶς, κ.τ.λ.] This and what follows is of course ironical, as Glaucon very clearly sees (δίκην, ἔφη, ἔχω infra c). Those who have conceived thus 'nobly' of the things above, are said in the Timaeus (91 D) to be destined hereafter to enter on another life in the form of birds.

νομίσαι . . . ποιοῦν] For the participle instead of the infinitive after νομίζω, which here avoids a treble infinitive (**νομίσαι ποιεῖν βλέπειν**) cp. Xen. Anab. vi. 6, § 24 νόμιζε . . . ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν ἀποκτενῶν. B

οὔτε μαθεῖν, κ.τ.λ.] As often in an illustration, the construction is resumed with an asyndeton.

νέων ἐν γῇ ἢ ἐν θαλάττῃ] For this piece of extravagance cp. iii. 388 A πλωΐζοντα and note. A similar, but more pointed, metaphorical use of **ἐξ ὑπτίας νεῖν** occurs in Phaedr. 264 A ἐξ ὑπτίας ἀνάπαλιν διανεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖ τὸν λόγον. **νέων** is absent from some MSS. but is required by **ἐν θαλάττῃ**. C

τῶν τοιούτων] sc. τῶν ὁρωμένων. D

τῶν δὲ ἀληθινῶν] sc. φορῶν, as the following clauses show. That swiftness and slowness are themselves causes which move and contain all moving objects, is a mode of speaking due to a philosophy which attributes an excessive importance to abstract ideas. As afterwards in the Timaeus, though in a somewhat different manner, the world is doubled—the true swiftness and slowness convey the real heavenly bodies which are invisible, as the apparent velocities of the bodies that appear are the visible copies of them.

πᾶσι . . . σχήμασι] Plato seems to mean that every mathematical figure is, or ought to be, exemplified in the revolution of the heavens.

οὐκοῦν, εἶπον, κ.τ.λ.] The works of creation are imperfect, like all other works of art. Let us imagine that some Daedalus had

Republic VII. 529 D drawn mathematical figures: no one would measure these figures with the view of learning the true nature of proportion. Nor will any one gather the true nature of astronomy from measuring the proportions of days and weeks and months and years.

ὥσπερ ἂν . . . (E) διαγράμμασιν] sc. *χρήσαιτο αὐτοῖς.*

530 A **νομιεῖν μέν**] is a resumption of **ταὐτὸν πείσεσθαι**, 'that is to say, he will think.'

συστήσασθαι] is of course active in meaning.

αὐτόν] sc. *τὸν οὐρανόν.*

τὴν δὲ νυκτὸς . . . πρὸς ἄλληλα] The sentence is slightly altered in the process of construction, and the general meaning of these words is resumed in **ταῦτα** infra. For **παραλλάττειν** cp. Tim. 22 C *τὸ δ' ἀληθές ἐστι τῶν περὶ γῆν καὶ κατ' οὐρανὸν ἰόντων παράλλαξις* (deviation).

B **ζητεῖν**] depends on **νομίζοντα** with the common ellipse of *δεῖν.*

προβλήμασιν ἄρα . . . μέτιμεν] 'Astronomy, then, like geometry, we shall pursue by the help of problems.' It is obvious that pure mathematics do not give the slightest knowledge of physics. No abstract study of *βάθους φορά* would explain the motions of the heavenly bodies. But when a ground of fact has been obtained, mathematical science is the great lever of our knowledge of the universe.

Though Plato was mistaken in identifying the science which treats of solids in motion with astronomy, he was probably before his age in the idea that a theory of matter in motion might form a separate branch of mathematics.

The same desire to make physics a pure science resting on the *ἀγαθόν* appears in Phaedo 97 D, E, where Socrates describes himself as turning away dissatisfied from Anaxagoras, because he was unable to demonstrate the rational necessity of physics. A similar tendency is observable in the Timaeus, where Timaeus, although professing that the knowledge of physics which is attainable by man is only probable, nevertheless seeks to construct the elements out of triangles. In Laws vii. 821, 822, there is a complaint of the empirical state of astronomy, which led men to 'blasphemous' notions of wandering stars and contrarious orbits. Plato seems to imply, perhaps drawn to this by a sound instinct,

that if there were a true science of astronomy, we should find nothing irregular in the motions of the stars. *Republic VII.*

πολλαπλάσιον . . . ἢ ὡς νῦν ἀστρονομεῖται] For ἢ after an implied comparison cp. i. 335 A *προσθεῖναι τῷ δικαίῳ ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ἐλέγομεν.* 530 C

The theory of music (a Pythagorean subject which is not at once obvious to Glaucon) must also be raised not only above the wrangling disputes of practical musicians, but also above the limitations of Pythagorean theory, which is still based upon the 'harmonies which are heard.' Our pupils must rise to the universal contemplation of harmonic ratios in themselves. *530 C–531 C*

ἀλλὰ γάρ τι, κ.τ.λ.] **γάρ** connects with **τἆλλα**,—'but (seeing that there are other studies) have you any of the suitable studies to suggest?' For **τῶν προσηκόντων** cp. supra 521 D. 530 C

τὰ μὲν οὖν πάντα, κ.τ.λ.] Such professions of ignorance or imperfect knowledge are characteristic of Plato: cp. supra iii. 400 C, D *εἰς Δάμωνα ἀναβεβλήσθω.* Plato is suggesting that many phenomena besides those of astronomy and harmony may be scientifically brought under **φορά**. All change might be described as a kind of motion. Cp. Theaet. 152 D, 156 C, D, where vision is described as the result of certain motions, and Laws x. 893, 894, where ten kinds of motion are enumerated; among them *σύγκρισις* and *διάκρισις*, *αὔξη* and *φθίσις*. D

ὡς πρὸς ἀστρονομίαν . . . παγῆναι] Cp. Tim. 47 B, C *θεὸν ἡμῖν ἀνευρεῖν δωρήσασθαί τε ὄψιν, ἵνα τὰς ἐν οὐρανῷ κατιδόντες τοῦ νοῦ περιόδους χρησαίμεθα ἐπὶ τὰς περιφορὰς τὰς τῆς παρ' ἡμῖν διανοήσεως, ξυγγενεῖς ἐκείναις οὔσας, ἀταράκτοις τεταραγμένας, ἐκμαθόντες δὲ καὶ λογισμῶν κατὰ φύσιν ὀρθότητος μετασχόντες, μιμούμενοι τὰς τοῦ θεοῦ πάντως ἀπλανεῖς οὔσας, τὰς ἐν ἡμῖν πεπλανημένας καταστησαίμεθα.*—The whole passage should be read.

ὡς οἵ τε Πυθαγόρειοί φασι, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. iv. 424 C *ὥς φησί τε Δάμων καὶ ἐγὼ πείθομαι*: Symp. 186 C, see also Tim. 80 B for an analysis of 'harmony.'

ἐκείνων] viz. the Pythagoreans, who had given special attention to harmonics. E

καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο πρὸς τούτοις] This seems to imply that other applications of *βάθους φορά* are possible besides astronomy and harmonics. Cp. supra D *τὰ μὲν οὖν πάντα, κ.τ.λ.*

Republic VII. 530 E **παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα**] 'throughout this course of education:' cp. iii. 412 D *παρὰ πάντα τὸν βίον.*

ἄρτι] supra 529.

ἢ οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι, κ.τ.λ.] There were two parties in the musical world of Athens: one the scientific, which rested on the old Pythagorean doctrines and generally denied the appeal to sense into which however they were sometimes betrayed (they were headed in later times by Aristoxenus the pupil of Aristotle): the other, the empirical, who are referred to in the words which follow. Plato intimates in the words *ἀλλ' ἐκείνους* (531 B) that he appeals to the scientific and not to the empirical party. But he adds that even the former are not wholly right.

531 A **ποιοῦσι**] The subject is to be gathered from the context, viz. *οἱ περὶ τὰς ἁρμονίας.* Socrates means the Pythagoreans, but Glaucon understands him to speak of the empirics or ordinary musicians. This is corrected in what follows (infra B, C).

νὴ τοὺς θεούς, κ.τ.λ.] Plato gives a comic description of the empiric musicians experimenting either with voice, flute, or lyre. A tone and a quarter-tone are sounded successively, while the men lean forward to listen, whereupon some of them declare that they perceive no difference, while others say they recognize a distinct interval, and that this ought to be made the unit of harmony and employed as the basis of the scale: **ἐν μέσῳ τινὰ ἠχήν** is a slightly inaccurate but idiomatic expression for *μέσον τι τῶν ἠχῶν*, 'a difference of tone.'

The introduction (in flute-playing) of a quarter-note (*πυκνόν*) between the middle notes of the enharmonic scale, is recognized as a comparative novelty even by Plutarch (De Musica, c. xi), and was treated as an obscure point by Aristoxenus, who says of it, *τελευταίῳ αὐτῷ καὶ μόλις μετὰ πολλοῦ πόνου συνεθίζεται ἡ αἴσθησις.* See Westphal's *Harmonik*, 2nd ed., p. 128. Aristoxenus (Elem. Harm. i. 24) defines *πύκνωμα* as *τὸ ἐκ δύο διαστημάτων συνεστηκός, ἃ συντεθέντα ἔλαττον διάστημα περιέξει τοῦ λειπομένου διαστήματος ἐν τῷ διὰ τεσσάρων.* For example *a δ b* (*c*) *d* when the two intervals *a δ*, *δ b*, are together less than the interval *b d* (*c* being omitted). **φθεγγομένων** (viz. *τῶν χορδῶν*). Ven. Ξ Vat. m read *φθεγγόμενον*: 'others contending that the note is now identical.'

οἷον ἐκ γειτόνων φωνὴν θηρευόμενοι] 'as if catching a sound from a neighbour's house.' The exact metaphor is obscure.

σὺ μέν] The order of words as rendered in the translation is (1) περὶ κατηγορίας ἐξαρνήσεως, κ.τ.λ. The words **πράγματα . . . στρεβλοῦντας** suggest other imagery derived from the law-courts. 'They have a controversy with the strings and torture them: they accuse them of refusing to speak or of speaking too much.' Socrates is contented with hinting at this grotesque conception. According to another way of taking the words (2) κατηγορίας, κ.τ.λ., may be rendered 'concerning accusation of the strings and their denial of it and exaggeration,' the latter words describing the behaviour of the strings under trial. The *musicien enragé* is imagined as scolding the strings: the strings as denying his accusations and braving him. *Republic VII.* 531 B

For the weakness of empiricism in music cp. Phil. 56 A τὸ μέτρον ἑκάστης χορδῆς τῷ στοχάζεσθαι φερομένης θηρεύουσα.

ταὐτὸν γὰρ ποιοῦσι, κ.τ.λ.] Plato as we may retort has fallen into the same error about harmony as about astronomy. For harmony no less than astronomy rests ultimately on a fact, which is that certain successions or combinations of sound are agreeable to the human ear. The simplicity of this fact, which is found to agree with certain ratios of number, has naturally led in either case to the substitution of numerical laws for the phenomena of which they are the expression.

οὐκ εἰς προβλήματα ἀνίασιν] 'They do not rise to problems,' i.e. to abstract questions which are independent of facts. C

χρήσιμον . . . ἄχρηστον] **καλοῦ** is here added because music seems especially to suggest the identity of the beautiful and the good. **ἄλλως**, i.e. μὴ πρὸς τὴν καλοῦ τε καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ζήτησιν. The subject of **ἄχρηστον** is τὸ περὶ ἁρμονίας.

Furthermore, the sciences thus purged from empiricism must be carried upwards to the stage where they are seen in mutual correlation. Then they may really become the prelude (they can never be more) of Dialectic, the study of pure abstractions by pure thought. By this alone the mind gets beyond 'hypotheses' and dispenses with them, although employing the arts or so-called sciences concerned with them, in the preliminary stage, which for want of a better word has been termed in the previous survey (vi. *sub fin.*) διάνοια. *Nor is the dialectician perfect until he has realized a complete conception not only of Being but of the Good.* *531 C–534 E*

Republic VII. 531 C **οἶμαι δέ γε . . . (D) ἀνόνητα**] The affinity of astronomy and music is not at first sight obvious. To the Pythagoreans and Plato (see Tim. 47) the music of the spheres afforded a link of connexion between them, which to us appears fanciful.

But Plato sees also a real connexion, inasmuch as he supposes them both to be based upon number and proportion, which he regards as the common element of all the preparatory sciences. When reduced to this mathematical form they are the prelude to the science of the Good.

For the application of this remark cp. infra 537 C.

D **τοῦ προοιμίου**] sc. *τὸ ἔργον*. The genitive is continued in **τίνος** by a sort of attraction.

πάντα ταῦτα προοίμιά ἐστιν] The figure of the *προοίμιον* and *νόμος* with a play on the word *νόμος*, is one of the leading features in the structure of the Laws. (Laws iii. 700 B, iv. 722 D.)

E **ὧν . . . ἐντετύχηκα**] *ὧν = ἐκείνων οἷς.*

ἀλλὰ ἤδη . . . εἰδέναι;] 'But do you imagine that persons who are as yet unable to give and accept a reason will ever know anything of the things which we say they ought to know?' Badham's conjecture *οἱ δὴ . . . τινός* is partly anticipated ($\binom{\text{οἱ A}^2}{\text{ἤδη}}$) by a corrector of Par. A, where *οἱ μή* is written, but with two dots over *οἱ*. But the text is sound. **ἤδη** is to be connected with **μὴ δυνατοί τινες ὄντες**. With **εἴσεσθαι**, *δοκοῦσι* has to be supplied from **οὐ γάρ που δοκοῦσί γέ σοι** supra.

οὐδ' αὖ . . . τοῦτό γε] sc. *δοκεῖ*. 'Nor again is that my view,' i.e. while I deny that mathematicians are dialecticians, I will not affirm that any but dialecticians can have the knowledge required.

532 A **ἐλέγομεν**] supra 516 A ff.

οὕτω καὶ ὅταν . . . τοῦ ὁρατοῦ] The reading of the MSS. is followed in the text. Various alterations have been suggested: (1) the insertion of *ἄν* (or *ἐάν*) before **ἄνευ**; (2) *ἐπιχειρῶν* for **ἐπιχειρῇ**; (3) *ὁρμᾶν* for **ὁρμᾷ**; (4) *κἂν μή* for **καὶ μή**, with a comma after **ὁρμᾷ** (then supposed to be in the indicative mood). It is better to follow the MSS. without attempting to get over the asyndeton which is not without parallel in Plato—the clause **ἄνευ . . . ἀποστῇ** being explanatory of **οὕτω . . . ἐπιχειρῇ**.

ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον] Until he reach the Good, he will still find himself among specific *εἴδη*. Cp. vi. 484 D and note.

ἐκεῖνος τότε] sc. *ὁ τῇ τῆς ὄψεως δυνάμει χρώμενος* supra A: **τότε** like **ἐλέγομεν** refers to supra 516 A ff. 532 B

ἡ δέ γε . . . (c) **ἀποσκιαζομένας**] 'But the release of the prisoners from their chains and the turning of them from the shadows towards the images and the light, and the ascent from the underground den into the day (supra 516 E), and their vainly endeavouring when there to look on the animals and plants, and the light of the sun, whereas they can only look on the divinely made reflections and the shadows of real things (not shadows of images cast by the light of a fire, which is itself a shadow compared with the sun).' In what follows the construction is changed and the nominatives are resumed in **ταύτην . . . τὴν δύναμιν**. For the confusing double use of the demonstrative *οὗτος* cp. iii. 405 B, C.

The conjecture of Nägelsbach *ἔτι ἀδυναμία βλέπειν* (a reading found also in Iamblichus) is plausible and in keeping with the previous nominatives feminine. But on the other hand it may be said that *ἀδυναμία βλέπειν* (for *τοῦ βλέπειν*) is a questionable construction without a verb preceding; and that the infinitive **βλέπειν** follows the preceding verbal nouns as if **ἡ ἐπάνοδος** had been *τὸ ἐπανελθεῖν αὐτούς*, while the preposition **ἐπί** may be used as in Sophocles (El. 108, Ant. 759, O. C. 1554), in which passages the sense of *condition* appears to have passed into the *manner*. So here, 'to look powerlessly,' i.e. to be without power to see. In **πρὸς δέ, κ.τ.λ.**, the negative notion in **ἐπ᾽ ἀδυναμίᾳ** disappears.

θεῖα] This word has been needlessly suspected. In Soph. 266 B, C, D Plato speaks of a divine as well as a human *μιμητική*. The epithet here contrasts the reflections in water, &c., due to the light of the sun, with the shadows of the *σκευαστά* cast by the fire-light. The phantasmagoria in the den and the **σκιαί** of real objects are distinct, as in the passage which this resumes, 516 A ff. For the position of **θεῖα** as a 'dragging predicate' cp. ix. 573 A *τῶν ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις συνουσίαις ἡδονῶν* **ἀνειμένων**. C

τῶν ὄντων] is emphatic = the visible realities which in the allegory correspond to the ideas.

δι᾽ ἑτέρου τοιούτου] **τοιούτου** refers to **εἰδώλων**.

ὥσπερ τότε] sc. *ἦν ἐπαναγωγή*: supra 516 B ff.

Republic VII. 532 D **χαλεπά, κ.τ.λ.**] It is difficult to accept, being difficult to understand: it is difficult not to accept it, because when understood, it appears self-evident.

E **τίνες αὖ ὁδοί**] sc. *τῆς διαλεκτικῆς εἰσιν.* One MS. (r) has **αἱ** *ὁδοί.*

πρὸς αὐτό] The pronoun is emphatic. Cp. v. 473 C *ἐπ'* **αὐτὸ** *δὴ . . . εἶμι ὃ τῷ μεγίστῳ προσεικάζομεν κύματι.*

533 A **οὐκέτ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κ.τ.λ.**] Cp. Symp. 209 E *τὰ δὲ τέλεα καὶ ἐποπτικὰ* (*μυηθῆναι*) *. . . οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ οἷός τ' ἂν εἴης. ἐρῶ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἐγὼ καὶ προθυμίας οὐδὲν ἀπολείψω· πειρῶ δὲ ἕπεσθαι, ἂν οἷός τε ᾖς.*

ὅ γε δή μοι φαίνεται] For the moderation of statement cp. Phaedo 114 C, D *τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διϊσχυρίσασθαι οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς ἐγὼ διελήλυθα, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν ἔχοντι ἀνδρί, κ.τ.λ.*

ὅτι μὲν *δεῖ] This reading is supported by the version of Ficinus and partially by the reading of Φ (*ὅτι δεῖ μέν*): 'What we must insist on is that our pupils ought to behold the vision which we thus indicate.' The reading of Par. A, &c., *ὅτι μὲν δή, κ.τ.λ.*, 'That in appearance (**ἰδεῖν**) it is something like this,'—is better authenticated but seems less in point.

B **τόδε γοῦν . . . ὡς**] follows **ἀμφισβητήσει** (not **λέγουσιν**).

ὁδῷ] 'Systematically,' 'methodically': cp. Phaedr. 263 B **ὁδῷ** *διῃρῆσθαι.*

αἱ μὲν ἄλλαι πᾶσαι τέχναι, κ.τ.λ.] The division of the arts into *κολακική* (*πρὸς δόξας ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἐπιθυμίας*), *ποιητική* (*πρὸς γενέσεις τε καὶ συνθέσεις*) and *ἐπιμελητική* (*πρὸς θεραπείαν*) may remind us of similar divisions in the Gorgias (463 ff., 501, 502), Sophist (222 E, 265 ff.), and Politicus (261–275 E): *γένεσις*, i.e. *γεωργία*: *συνθέσις*, e.g. *ὑφαντική, τεκτονική*, &c. **τετράφαται** from *τρέπω* = *τετραμμέναι εἰσί.*

γεωμετρίας . . . ἑπομένας] The accusative, by attraction to **ἅς**, is also in construction with **ὁρῶμεν**. The plural, also partly due to attraction, has a depreciatory effect.

Mathematics are not a science in Plato's sense of the term, because they do not inquire into the nature of their own conceptions. They start with certain assumptions: they have a scientific basis only when connected with the idea of good, which is at once the beginning and end of them, the final cause to which they all tend and the foundation on which they rest. Such a connexion is of course an illusion, the nature of which was not understood in the

beginnings of philosophy. The acknowledgement that the 'reality' of mathematics is not metaphysics but physics would have been an entire inversion of the Platonic order of ideas. *Republic VII.* 533 B

ᾧ γὰρ ἀρχὴ μὲν ὃ μὴ οἶδε, κ.τ.λ.] The nature of our ideas of number and figure may be summed up under a few heads: (1) Mathematical, like other abstractions, have been gradually separated from the concrete: the process by which the abstract idea of *one* is obtained is not different from that which gives the abstract idea of *man*. (2) But in such abstractions the individual being perfectly vacant of any separate content is identical with the universal: hence they admit of endless construction, and every construction has absolute necessity and certainty. (3) They are affected like our other ideas by use and association: the incessant recurrence of them, the power of constructing them; also the verification of their truth in the concrete, as well as by algebra and trigonometry and the various processes of arithmetic,—greatly strengthen our conceptions of them. (4) The mode in which they have been gradually attained and developed by a series of inquirers from Pythagoras to Newton and Laplace, must be clearly separated (as in the case of all our ideas) from the accidental way in which they are acquired by the individual, (*a*) unconsciously through the medium of language, (*β*) as the result of education and study. In any other sense, the origin of our ideas of number and figure, as of all our other ideas, is only their history. C

οὐκοῦν . . . (D) αἷς διήλθομεν τέχναις] 'then dialectic and dialectic alone pursues this method: doing away with hypotheses and going to the very first principle so as to have certainty; and gently drawing and leading upward the eye of the soul, which is actually buried in some barbarian bog' (βαρβαρικῷ is chosen partly for the sound), 'using as handmaids in the work of conversion the arts which we have discussed.'

ἀναιροῦσα] has been compared to the Hegelian *aufheben* ('the hypotheses which in the sphere of mathematics were absolute become relative to each other and to the Good'). But the analogy is hardly so close. ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχήν is governed chiefly by πορεύεται, and ἀναιροῦσα means 'taking out of the way.' The hypotheses are done away with; that is, when seen in their relation to the good they cease to be hypotheses, cp. vi. 511 B *τὰς ὑποθέσεις ποιούμενος οὐκ ἀρχάς, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ὑποθέσεις, οἷον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὁρμάς*, κ.τ.λ. : and Symp. 211 C *ὥσπερ ἐπαναβαθμοῖς χρώμενον.* A simpler

Republic VII. conception of *διαλεκτική* as the 'science of sciences' occurs in Phil. 58 A *τὴν γὰρ περὶ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ὄντως καὶ τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἀεὶ πεφυκός.*

533 D **διὰ τὸ ἔθος**] Cp. Theaet. 157 B, Soph. 267 D, Cratyl. 434 E.

ἔν γε τῷ πρόσθεν που] vi. 511 D.

E **ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν μόνον . . . ὃ λέγει ἐν ψυχῇ**] These words are omitted in Ven. Ξ, and their genuineness has been doubted, partly on the ground, which is not very strong, that in Plato's language assent in the negative form (**οὐ γὰρ οὖν**) is not usually accompanied by any further elucidation. There is considerable variety in the readings: the weight of manuscript authority being in favour of that which is retained in the text. The various reading *λέξιν* for **ἕξιν** *q* need not be rejected on the ground of tautology. Cp. viii. 543 C *τοὺς λόγους ἐποίου λέγων.* Another reading is *ἃ λέγεις*, 'what you mean to express'—this appears as a correction of Par. A. The words in the text are very possibly genuine and may be rendered—'we only require' (the verb is gathered from **οὐ περὶ ὀνόματος ἀμφισβήτησις**) 'an expression which may indicate with a clearness proportioned to the mental condition, that of which it speaks as existing in the mind.' For example, *διάνοια* may not be a very clear or definite expression, but the state of mind which it expresses is also far from clear. Of many suggested emendations that of Professor Bywater deserves most consideration, *ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν μόνον δηλοῖ τὴν ἕξιν, πῶς ἔχει σαφηνείας ἃ λέγεις ἐν ψυχῇ.* For the whole expression cp. ix. 581 A *ὥστε τι ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς* **δηλοῦν**, *ὁπότε τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ μέρος* **λέγοιμεν**. It deserves notice that the whole sentence **ἀλλ' ὃ . . . ψυχῇ** being omitted in Ξ is accordingly absent from the editions of Aldus and Stephanus.

534 A **τὴν δ' ἐφ' οἷς ταῦτα, κ.τ.λ.**] 'The exact proportion to each other of the things to which these terms apply, and the division of the spheres of opinion and reason severally.' The line (vi. 509 D, E) was proportionately divided. Plato seems to hint that the proportionate division of the line and of each of the subdivisions was not a mere arbitrary fancy.

πολλαπλασίων . . . ἤ] Cp. supra 530 C *πολλαπλάσιον . . . ἢ ὡς νῦν ἀστρονομεῖται.*

ὅσων] (1) sc. *ὅσων λόγων οἱ παρεληλυθότες λόγοι ἡμᾶς ἐνέπλησαν* [B. J.], or (2) for *τῶν ὅσοι* by a somewhat unusual attraction as if *ἤ* had not preceded.

ἦ καὶ διαλεκτικὸν . . . οὐσίας;] 'Do you call by the name "dialectician" one who has a conception of the essence of each thing?'—The words **πῶς γὰρ ἂν . . . φαίην;** in the answer, refer only to the latter part of the question. *Republic VII.* 534 B

διὰ πάντων ἐλέγχων διεξιών] 'running the gauntlet of all questionings.' Under the figure of a battle Plato describes a logical pursuit. C

ἀπτῶτι τῷ λόγῳ] 'without the argument coming to a fall.'

εἴ ποτε ἔργῳ τρέφοις] Cp. iii. 389 D *ἐάν γε . . . ἐπί γε λόγῳ ἔργα τελῆται*: and for **μετά γε σοῦ**, ib. A *εἰ σὺ . . . βούλει ἐμὸν τιθέναι.* D

ἀλόγους ὄντας ὥσπερ γραμμάς] (1) 'incapable of reason, like irrational lines' (i. e. surds in mathematics) [so Schneider]. It must be admitted that such a punning allusion belongs rather to Plato's later manner. (Cp. Polit. 257 A, 266 B.) But it gives the most plausible meaning to this place, and may be illustrated from Theaet. 146 A (addressed to Theodorus the mathematician) *προθυμούμενος ἡμᾶς ποιῆσαι διαλέγεσθαι καὶ φίλους τε καὶ* **προσηγόρους** *ἀλλήλοις γίγνεσθαι.* Cp. also the number of the tyrant in ix. 589 ff. which is little more than an elaborate jest. For the idiom in which the qualifying epithet is omitted with the thing compared cp. Soph. O. T. 922 and 923 *ἐκπεπληγμένον . . . ὡς κυβερνήτην νεώς.* Another interpretation (2) is suggested by Theaet. 202 B, where the elements of thought are said *ἄλογα καὶ ἄγνωστα εἶναι, αἰσθητὰ δέ*—being compared to letters, which have no significance until combined in syllables. 'Insignificant and meaningless, like mere lines.' (3) The only other possible explanation is that of Ast, 'incapable of speech like mere lines or written characters.' Cp. Phaedrus 274, where he dwells on the superiority of speech over writing.

Who are to be counted worthy of this training, and how shall it be ordered? Those who are to be our rulers must be chosen young, not as in our first selection (iii. 412). *And besides the steadiness and firmness which were then required, their intellectual quickness and perseverance, and their love of truth, will have to be thoroughly tested and approved. Philosophy will not then be disgraced, as she is now. In early life intellectual training should be given through amusements, but at twenty when compulsory gymnastic comes to an end, our selected pupils must begin a ten years' course of mental discipline, in which the scattered elements of knowledge previously* *535 A–537 D*

Republic VII. 535 A–537 D *acquired must be combined in a whole according to their natural relationship to one another and to true being. Comprehensiveness is the great test of dialectical talent. At thirty a further selection should be made, and those finally sifted out by the help of dialectic for the select class may be promoted to still higher honours.*

535 A **τούς τε γὰρ βεβαιοτάτους, κ.τ.λ.**] vi. 503.

B **βλοσυροὺς τὰ ἤθη**] 'Of a sturdy moral nature.'

ἀλλὰ καὶ . . . αὐτοῖς] 'but also they must have the natural gifts which are suitable to *this* education'—i.e. the higher education of which he is now treating.

ποῖα . . . διαστέλλει;] 'Which do you determine these to be?' For the middle voice cp. Aristot. Pol. ii. 8, § 17 *ἐπειδὴ πεποιήμεθα μνείαν, ἔτι μικρὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ* **διαστείλασθαι** *βέλτιον.*

δριμύτητα . . . μανθάνειν] **μανθάνειν**, which takes the place of a subject of **ὑπάρχειν** answering to **δριμύτητα**, is attracted into construction with **δεῖ**.

οἰκειότερος . . . ὁ πόνος] 'The toil more properly belongs to the mind, being confined to it and not shared by the body.' For **ἀποδειλιᾶν** cp. vi. 504 A.

C **καὶ μνήμονα . . . ζητητέον**] 'Therefore the man whom we seek must also be endowed with memory; he must be a solid man who is a lover of all kinds of labour.'

ἄρρατον] from *α* and *ῥαίω*, a word said to have existed as a various reading for *ἄρρηκτον* in Il. xiv. 56 *ἄρρατον νηῶν τε καὶ αὐτῶν εἶλαρ ἔσεσθαι.* The only other place where it is now found is Cratyl. 407 D, where it is said to mean *σκληρόν τε καὶ ἀμετάστροφον*: compare the French word *inébranlable.*

τίνι τρόπῳ] sc. *ἄλλῳ.*

τά τε τοῦ σώματος, κ.τ.λ.] As in iii. 403 D, bodily exercise is subordinated to the training of the mind.

ὃ καὶ πρότερον εἶπον] vi. 495 E.

D **χωλὸς δὲ . . . φιλοπονίαν**] 'And he too is lame, whose love of labour, instead of this, has taken the opposite turn.' See Tim. 87 C, D for a similar train of reflection.

οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, κ.τ.λ.] For the voluntary and involuntary lie cp. ii. 382. 535 D

Minds that hate falsehood in practice are often very impatient of scientific or historical truth. They may be unconscious of their defect: this unconsciousness, however, is no measure of the responsibility which attaches to them. Prejudice and stupidity cannot be altogether exempted from the guilt of the consequences which flow from them. The educated are apt to imagine that they are no more bound to inquire than the uneducated; and they sometimes think that their duty is rather to conceal than to express the result of their inquiries, when at variance with common belief. The truth is that the less the uneducated inquire, the more the educated are bound to inquire; and the stronger the impulse to concealment, the greater the duty to speak plainly. The sense of such a duty is not easily aroused when at variance with interest or custom, at the point where science and religion, virtue and truth, temporarily seem to diverge, or where the inquirer has to stand against the general opinion of mankind. Intellectual cowardice or common-placeness, or want of faith, are fatal to all true philosophy. He who has such a 'maimed soul' may perhaps escape without injury to himself: but, if a man of ability, he cannot fail to leave an evil mark on others, in our day especially, when more than in ancient times the world needs to be reminded that the love of truth is the first of intellectual virtues.

ἀμαθαίνουσα] The termination is expressive—'to indulge in ignorance': cp. ἀκολασταίνω. E

πρὸς ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι τούτων] **τούτων** refers to **τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μέρη**, which has been already resumed in **τὰ τοιαῦτα**, and the subject of **τύχωσι** is the same with that of **λανθάνουσι**. 'They fail to see that they are making use of people who are lame and bastard with respect to the qualities for which they happen to make use of them.' 536 A

τοσαύτην] supra 535 C. B

ἀλλοίους . . . καταντλήσομεν] **πράξομεν** is intransitive, **καὶ . . . καί** = 'not only,' 'but.' *καταντλεῖν* and *καταχεῖν* are favourite metaphors in Plato. Cp. Laws vii. 800 D *πᾶσαν βλασφημίαν τῶν ἱερῶν* **καταχέουσι**, and Rep. i. 344 D *ὥσπερ βαλανεὺς ἡμῶν* **καταντλήσας** *κατὰ τῶν ὤτων ἀθρόον καὶ πολὺν τὸν λόγον*.

Republic VII. 536 B **γελοῖον δ' ἔγωγε . . . παθεῖν**] 'My present error is, if not disgraceful, yet ridiculous enough.' It is observable that although Plato maintains the verisimilitude of the fiction that he is an actual legislator by all sorts of minute touches, he sometimes for the sake of variety, as in the present passage, allows the illusion to be broken through: cp. iii. 389 D *ἐάν γε, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐπί γε λόγῳ ἔργα τελῆται*: supra 534 D *οὓς τῷ λόγῳ τρέφεις . . . εἴ ποτε ἔργῳ τρέφοις*: vi. 510 E.

C **τοῖς αἰτίοις**] For the strong feeling which these words convey cp. Phaedo 116 C *οὐκ ἐμοὶ χαλεπαίνεις, γιγνώσκεις γὰρ* **τοὺς αἰτίους**, *ἀλλ' ἐκείνοις*.

οὐ μὰ τὸν . . . ῥήτορι] Briefly the meaning is, G. 'You do not in my judgement, who am the listener;' S. 'But I do in my own, who am the speaker.'

Σόλωνι γὰρ οὐ πειστέον] Alluding to the famous line of Solon (Fragment 20, Bergk) *γηράσκω δ' αἰεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος*, quoted also in Lach. 189 A. In the first selection of rulers or officers, older men were chosen, because no man is to enter on an office, till he has reached a certain age. But in providing for the future the rulers designate must be chosen young, because they have so much to learn.

D **οὐχ ὡς ἐπάναγκες, κ.τ.λ.**] 'Not making the plan of our instruction such that learning should be compulsory.'

E **χεῖρον οὐδέν**] But see above vi. 495 D.

ψυχῇ δὲ . . . μάθημα] 'Knowledge which is acquired under compulsion obtains no hold on the mind.'—Why do we remember some things and not others?—memory is (1) most retentive and impressible in childhood; (2) most suggestive and associative in later life; (3) generally strongest of words and events which are seen by the light of emotion or interest, or under new circumstances. The healthy memory is that of observation, which freely receives from the external world. The memory of study, when not merely verbal or mechanical, is proportioned to the degree of attention or interest which the mind is capable of giving. Memory seems also to flourish at the expense of the other faculties, and may receive by an exclusive training a monstrous and disproportioned growth. On the other hand, memory is greatly impaired and disturbed by excess of imagination, which tends to confuse the

recollection of the past; or of reflection which draws away the mind from the external world and is only willing to receive facts connected with theories or principles. Probably even intensity of feeling, while preserving some facts with a preternatural clearness and light tends to impair the ordinary operation of memory about facts in general: the concentration of the intellectual faculties is generally inconsistent with their diffusion. Many persons have observed that a growth of mind has compensated the loss of memory: in such cases the change may be regarded as a sort of adjustment of the intellectual faculties. The true art of remembering is also an art of forgetting: better to forget most things than to remember all. Lastly, memory appears to be allied to sense and to depend on health: the reason of the common decay of the faculty in old age is partly physical, partly due also to the fading interest in the surrounding world. 536 E

ἵνα καί] **καί** = besides making the knowledge permanent. 537 A

ἔφαμεν] v. 467 E.

ἐν πᾶσι . . . ἐγκριτέον] 'And whoever appears to be always most ready at all these things—labours, lessons, dangers, will have to be enrolled in a select number.'

οὗτος γὰρ . . . πρᾶξαι] 'This time of life,' viz. that devoted to compulsory gymnastic: cp. infra 539 E, where twice the time is estimated at five years as the mean between 4 and 6. The time meant is between 17 and 20. B

ἀδύνατός τι ἄλλο πρᾶξαι] 'is one in which it is impossible to do anything else.' The inability which is really inherent in the persons is transferred to the age.

τίς ἕκαστος, κ.τ.λ.] **τίς** = *ποῖός τις*: cp. viii. 558 C *ἄθρει δή, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,* **τίς** *ὁ τοιοῦτος ἰδίᾳ*: Thuc. iii. 12, § 1 **τίς** *οὖν αὕτη ἡ φιλία ἐγίγνετο ἢ ἐλευθερία πιστή*: Soph. O. T. 151 **τίς** *ποτε τᾶς πολυχρύσου, κ.τ.λ.*: O. C. 775 **τίς** *αὕτη τέρψις, ἄκοντας φιλεῖν;*

μετὰ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον, κ.τ.λ.] Education in the higher sense of the term is concerned not only with practical subjects of knowledge, but with the method or connexion of knowledge in general.

That science which adjusts other sciences in relation to each other, which begins where they end, and examines the conceptions

Republic VII. 537 B which they receive and use; which separates the progress or movement or history of human thought from the course of events; which regards the body in relation to the mind, and both in relation to God and the world, perceiving amid abstractions and imperfect points of view, the higher or united nature of all, is called by Plato dialectic, and may be accepted by ourselves as the description of metaphysic. But to Plato such a science is almost imaginary, extending only to the connexion of the mathematical sciences: among ourselves it is very imperfect; in idea a 'novum et antiquum organum' of all knowledge; in fact, scarcely advancing beyond discussions respecting the origin of human ideas, and the correlation of the sciences.

C **τά τε χύδην μαθήματα . . . γενόμενα**] The imperfect construction of the article and noun with the adverb, for which cp. viii. 564 A *ἡ . . . ἄγαν ἐλευθερία*: Laws i. 630 D *εἰς τοὺς πόρρω νομοθέτας*: Aesch. Ag. 165 *τὸ μάταν . . . ἄχθος*, is supplemented by the participle.

τούτοις] sc. *τοῖς ἐκ τῶν εἰκοσιετῶν προκριθεῖσιν.*

εἰς σύνοψιν . . . φύσεως] The genitives **ἀλλήλων, καὶ τῆς . . . φύσεως**, both depend on **οἰκειότητος . . . τῶν μαθημάτων.**

ἐν οἷς ἂν ἐγγένηται] Cp. Theaet. 186 C *τὰ δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀναλογίσματα πρός τε οὐσίαν καὶ ὠφέλειαν μόγις καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων καὶ παιδείας παραγίγνεται* **οἷς ἂν καὶ παραγίγνηται.**

ὁ μὲν γὰρ συνοπτικὸς διαλεκτικός] Cp. especially Phaedr. 265 D, Soph. 253 D, Tim. 83 C *τις ὢν δυνατὸς εἰς πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἀνόμοια βλέπειν, ὁρᾶν δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς ἓν γένος ἐνὸν ἄξιον ἐπωνυμίας πᾶσι.*

537 D–539 D *Great caution has to be exercised in admitting young men to the study of dialectic. As things now are, dialectic is another word for eristic, which may be described as a sort of revolutionary scepticism. As a supposititious child, who after a time discovers that his supposed parents are not his real parents, ceases to honour them: so the young man ceases to honour the principles of justice and virtue in which he has been brought up, when he hears them refuted by the eristics. By postponing the study of dialectic to the age of thirty we have provided one security. But there is still need of caution.*

537 D **οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, κ.τ.λ.**] Compare the evil name of philosophy in vi. 495.

ἐμπίπλανται] The first hand of Par. A agrees with Ven. Π in reading *ἐμπίπλαται*, a corrector has changed this to *ἐμπίμπλανται*, and **ἐμπίπλανται** is the reading of M. If *ἐμπίπλαται* were read, the subject would be *τὸ διαλέγεσθαι*, and *αὐτούς* in what follows would get its antecedent from the general context. But the expression *τὸ διαλέγεσθαι παρανομίας ἐμπίπλαται* has a sound unlike Plato, who would speak of *κακοὺς περὶ τὸ διαλέγεσθαι*, but hardly of *τὸ διαλέγεσθαι* as *ἐμπιπλάμενον κακίας*. 537 E

ἐμπίπλανται gets a subject, *οἱ διαλεκτικοί*, from the preceding words, **τὸ διαλέγεσθαι**, and this subject is the antecedent to **αὐτούς**.

τὰ μεγάλα] 'in important matters.' 538 B

ἀπαρακαλύπτως] Cp. the democratic youth in viii. 560 C *πάλιν τε εἰς ἐκείνους τοὺς Λωτοφάγους ἐλθὼν* **φανερῶς** *κατοικεῖ*. C

τῶν ἄλλων ποιουμένων οἰκείων] 'the rest of his reputed kindred.' This meaning of *ποιεῖσθαι* (passive) is supported by vi. 498 A *οἱ φιλοσοφώτατοι ποιούμενοι*—(where see note), ix. 573 B *δόξας . . . ποιουμένας χρηστάς*, 574 D *δόξας . . . τὰς δικαίας ποιουμένας*. It is therefore unnecessary to take the word in the middle sense of 'adopting,' i. e. 'laying claim to him.'

ἔστι που . . . αὐτά] The contrast of knowledge and opinion, or of speculative truth and popular belief, is the source of a real difficulty in education. The maxims in which the young are brought up, and which have a kind of parental influence on them (**ὥσπερ ὑπὸ γονεῦσι**) are sometimes narrow or partially untrue or perhaps represent the traditions of a former generation. False or imperfect conceptions of the truth necessarily precede higher and more perfect ones. There is a time at which the young man grows out of them, and falls under the influence of other ideas or meets the tide of the world. With active minds the element of authority is always receding within narrower limits. But when 'the human spirits on a day' begin to ask what are the real foundations, *τί τὸ καλόν, δίκαιον*, &c., there comes the danger that the youth in his iconoclasm, or destruction of shams, may lose his sense of reverence for the first principles of truth and right.

Emerson says, 'when the Gods come, the half-gods go': but the half-gods sometimes go first, and leave an empty room. The candles are out, and the sun has not yet risen.

Republic VII. **ἤκουεν**] 'he used to hear,' viz. in the days before doubt came to him. For the imperfect cp. supra 515 D *ἑώρα* bis.

538 E **μὴ εὑρίσκῃ**] **τε . . . μή** are substituted for a second *μήτε* for the sake of emphasis or variety.

539 A **τὸν κολακεύοντα**] 'the life that is flattering him:' i.e. the life of pleasure which has been described, supra 538 D.

δόξει γεγονέναι] 'He will have become.' The expression is idiomatic, and the force of *δοκεῖν* is not to be pressed. Cp. iii. 403 B and note.

τὸ πάθος] 'their condition,' that which happens to them. Cp. **τὸ πάθος** *τῶν ἐπιεικεστάτων* vi. 488 A.

ὃ ἄρτι ἔλεγον] supra 537 E *οὐ ξυγγιγνώσκεις, κ.τ.λ.*

ἁπτέον] sc. *αὐτούς*, i.e. *εὐλαβουμένῳ σοι δεῖ αὐτοὺς ἅπτεσθαι τῶν λόγων.* 'You must exercise every sort of care about the manner in which they are to apply themselves to dialectic.'

B **μία . . . συχνή**] 'Is not this one great precaution—that they should not taste dialectic when young?'

αὐτῶν] sc. *τῶν λόγων.*

χαίροντες . . . τοὺς πλησίον ἀεί] For the manner in which a young gentleman who has these propensities may inflict himself not only on his neighbours, but on the domestic circle, see the ludicrous description in the Philebus, 15 D, and cp. Apol. 23 C *αὐτόματοι χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ἐξεταζομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται, εἶτα ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἄλλους ἐξετάζειν.*

ἕλκειν τε καὶ σπαράττειν] an amusing parallel to the language occurs in Boswell's life of Johnson: 'I found him extremely proud of his conversational prowess. "Sir, we had good talk last night." "Yes, Sir, you tossed and gored several people."'

C **τὸ ὅλον φιλοσοφίας πέρι**] 'the cause of philosophy altogether.'

ὁ δὲ δὴ πρεσβύτερος] It may be truly said that moderation is the lesson which is latest learnt in speculative philosophy. The intensity and isolation of mind which is necessary for the invention of a metaphysical system, depending on the force with which a single idea is seized rather than on the power of filling up details or of using the system in relation to what is beyond and outside of

it; and also the susceptibility in the disciple which is required for the reception of such a system,—are unfavourable to counsels of moderation. Such moderation, which may be only the 'via media' of expediency borrowing the language of philosophy, may also rest on a just appreciation of the many aspects and hindrances of human knowledge. The thought here is very similar to that put into the mouth of Protagoras in Theaet. 167 E ὅταν τις μὴ χωρὶς μὲν ὡς ἀγωνιζόμενος τὰς διατριβὰς ποιῆται, χωρὶς δὲ διαλεγόμενος, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ παίζῃ τε καὶ σφάλλῃ καθ' ὅσον ἂν δύνηται, ἐν δὲ τῷ διαλέγεσθαι σπουδάζῃ. *Republic VII.* 539 C

τὰ προειρημένα] vi. 485, 490 ff., 503, resumed supra 535. D

τούτου ἐπ' εὐλαβείᾳ] (1) i.e. ἐπὶ τῷ εὐλαβεῖσθαι τοῦτο. This seems better than (2) taking **τούτου** with **προειρημένα** (as in vi. 504 A τὸ προρρηθὲν αὐτῶν) because there is nothing sufficiently definite between pp. 535 and 539 for **τούτου** to refer to.

καὶ μὴ ὡς νῦν, κ.τ.λ.] As often in comparisons, the illustration takes the place of the thing illustrated, hence the construction changes from ἔρχεσθαι to **ἔρχεται**. Cp. x. 610 D.

The first course of dialectic, beginning at thirty, is to last five years. And at thirty-five, the trained dialectician is to come down to practical life and for fifteen years to exercise command in war, and other subordinate offices of state. At fifty, if deemed worthy of promotion, he is to renew the study of dialectic, and at last proceed to the contemplation of the Form of Good. Having seen the Good, he is to take his turn at intervals in the labour of government, legislation and education, still spending the greater part of his time in contemplation, until he pass to the islands of the blest. *539 D–540 C*

ἀρκεῖ δή, κ.τ.λ.] **ἀντιστρόφως . . . γυμνασίοις** is explanatory of **μηδὲν ἄλλο πράττοντι**, and **ἔτη διπλάσια ἢ τότε** refers to 537 B. 539 D

ἵνα μηδ' ἐμπειρίᾳ ὑστερῶσι] Cp. vi. 484 D. E

εἰ ἐμμενοῦσιν . . . (540 A) ἤ τι καὶ παρακινήσουσιν] Great intellect often exists without will, and is drawn hither and thither by the influence of circumstances; and sometimes may be apparently even increased by yielding to their influence. The power of mind which is shown at a particular moment is not always consistent with the self-command or patience which is necessary for continuous action. The bravery of the orator's words (e.g. Demosthenes') is no test of his ability as a commander, nor the speculative politics of the

Republic VII. 539 E philosopher (e.g. Bentham's) any evidence of capacity as a statesman. There is a narrower as well as a wider circle, of action as well as thought, which may be compared to the den, and which must not be confounded with the world of ideas, nor yet wholly cut off from them: into this the philosopher has to descend and apprentice himself to practical affairs. He who is the 'spectator of all time and of all existence' has to reconcile immutable principles with the jealousies, fears, passions, prejudices of the hour: in his own character he must unite the utmost readiness and power of adaptation with the greatest inflexibility.

540 A **ἤ τι καὶ παρακινήσουσιν**] 'or whether they will give way at all,' *παρακινεῖν* is here used intransitively: cp. the similar use of *ὑποκινεῖν* and other compounds of *κινέω*.

ἀνακλίναντας . . . παρέχον] 'directing the light of the soul upward to look at that which gives light to all.' The eye in the act of vision is here, as in Tim. 45, conceived of as emitting light.

C **ξυναναιρῇ**] 'give her consent;' cp. v. 461 E *ἐὰν ὁ κλῆρος ταύτῃ ξυμπίπτῃ καὶ ἡ Πυθία προσαναιρῇ.* The MSS. vary between *ξυναιρῇ* and **ξυναναιρῇ**. Par. A gives $\overset{\text{αν}}{\text{ξυναιρῇ}}$—*αν* perhaps by a later hand. But the use of *ξυναιρῇ* in the sense of 'consenting' is improbable.

ὥσπερ ἀνδριαντοποιός] Cp. ii. 361 D *ὡς ἐρρωμένως ἑκάτερον, ὥσπερ ἀνδριάντα, εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἐκκαθαίρεις τοῖν ἀνδροῖν.*

540 C–541 B *Such women as are found capable, are to take office with the men. But these things will not come to pass until the philosopher-king, or kings, arrive upon the scene, and have removed all the inhabitants who are more than ten years old. He or they will then set to work to educate the remainder in the manner which we have described. Here ends the account of the perfect state. And the perfect individual is like unto it.*

540 C **ὡς διήλθομεν**] v. 451 C ff.

D **εὐχὰς εἰρηκέναι**] v. 450 D *ὄκνος τις αὐτῶν ἅπτεσθαι, μὴ* **εὐχὴ** *δοκῇ εἶναι ὁ λόγος*: ib. 456 C, vi. 499 C.

E **ἀναγκαιότατον**] i.e. they will hold justice to be the highest necessity. In other words they will not allow any so-called political necessity ('the tyrant's plea') to stand in the way of what they know to be right. Cp. vi. 493 C.

διασκευωρήσωνται] 'when they shall have set to rights their own city.' The construction is continued from **ὅταν, κ.τ.λ.**, supra. *Republic VII.* 540 E

ὅσοι μὲν ἄν, κ.τ.λ.] The philosopher-statesmen will save a generation by sending the grown-up inhabitants into the country and taking possession of their children to educate them in the new plan. With **ἐκπέμψωσιν . . . θρέψωνται** ὅταν must be again supplied. The poet Gray was led by a curious misapprehension to suspect **δεκετῶν**. 'This is undoubtedly a false reading,' he says, 'for ἑξηκονταετῶν or ἑβδομηκονταετῶν, so that till some MSS. inform us better, we must remain in the dark as to the age when Plato would permit his statesmen to retire wholly from the world.' This is extravagant enough, but Plato has hardly considered how the provision, which he here abruptly introduces, is to be reconciled with what precedes. For how are the children to be taught music and gymnastic when all their elders have been sent away? From what other state, πόρρω που ἐκτὸς ὄντι τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐπόψεως (vi. 499 C), are the new teachers to be brought?

εὐδαιμονήσειν . . . ὀνήσειν] The dependent construction is continued from ξυγχωρεῖτε . . . εἰρηκέναι supra 540 D. The similarity of sound in **εὐδαιμονήσειν ὀνήσειν** is probably intentional as in Παυσανίου δὲ παυσαμένου (Symp. 185 C). 541 A

BOOK VIII.

Having determined the great questions of state communism and of the philosopher-king, we return to the point from which we digressed (vi. 499 A) *and proceed to describe the four principal false forms of political society. These are* (1) *the Cretan or Laconian* (**τιμαρχία**), (2) *oligarchy* (*a condition fraught with evils*), (3) *democracy, the reaction from this, and* (4) *the consummation of political evil, which is tyranny. Parallel to these are the corresponding perversions of individual character. The tyrant represents the ideal of evil, as the just man* (vii. 541 B) *embodies the ideal of good.* *Republic VIII.* 543 A–545 C

τῇ μελλούσῃ ἄκρως οἰκεῖν πόλει] 'in the state which is to be perfectly administered'—opposed to the imperfect states which follow: **οἰκεῖν**, as elsewhere, is used intransitively: cp. iv. 421 A καὶ αὖ τοῦ εὖ **οἰκεῖν** καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν μόνοι τὸν καιρὸν ἔχουσιν. 543 A

Republic VIII. 543 A **καὶ πᾶσαν . . . εἰρήνῃ**] The community referred to in these latter words includes the education and employment of women on the same lines with the men. The lowest class is here left out of sight.

B **οἵας προείπομεν**] iii. 415 E *στρατιωτικάς γε, ἀλλ' οὐ χρηματιστικάς, κ.τ.λ.*

ἀλλὰ μνημονεύω] 'certainly I have not forgotten' (referring to **εἰ μνημονεύεις**), 'that at all events we thought none of them ought to possess anything which other people possess.'

ὧν νῦν οἱ ἄλλοι] iv. 419 *οἷον ἄλλοι, κ.τ.λ.*

ἀθλητάς τε πολέμου καὶ φύλακας] iii. 404 A *κομψοτέρας . . . ἀσκήσεως δεῖ τοῖς πολεμικοῖς* **ἀθληταῖς**. In several other passages he harps upon the same figure of speech, iv. 422 C, vii. 521 D.

C **τὴν εἰς ταῦτα τροφήν**] sc. *εἰς τὸ στρατιώτας καὶ φύλακας εἶναι.*

ἀναμνησθῶμεν . . . ἴωμεν] 'let us recall the point at which we digressed, that we may return into the same pathway.' The accusative is cognate, sc. *ὁδόν.*

οὐ χαλεπόν, κ.τ.λ.] The words from **καὶ ταῦτα** refer to v. 449 A *Ἀγαθὴν μὲν τοίνυν τὴν τοιαύτην πόλιν τε καὶ πολιτείαν καὶ ὀρθὴν καλῶ, καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τοιοῦτον.* Socrates, having completed the first sketch of the state and of education at the end of Book iv, in order to supply an omission of which he is supposed to be guilty in the first part of Book v, begins the higher conception of both (*καλλίω ἔτι, κ.τ.λ.*), which is given by the addition of the philosopher-king at the end of Book v. The true idea of the philosopher-statesman is then separated from the false, and a second or higher education provided for him in books vi, vii.

Socrates now passes from the ideal commonwealth to various defective polities, which have a clear affinity to the ordinary Greek states: he afterwards returns to another ideal, not of this world, including a vision of a future life, which is faintly sketched in Book x.

The following lines of Wordsworth's Prelude describe a similar descent from the ideal to the actual:—

> Ere long, the lonely mountains left, I moved,
> Begirt from day to day with temporal shapes
> Of vice and folly thrust upon my view,
> Objects of sport, and ridicule and scorn,

Manners and characters discriminate, *Republic VIII.*
And little bustling passions that eclipse,
As well they might, the impersonated thought, 543 C
The idea or abstraction of the kind.

ἀλλ' οὖν δή] **ἀλλά** supplies the opposition to **μέν** (**ἀγαθὴν μὲν τὴν τοιαύτην**): **οὖν δή** marks the emphatic resumption of the train of thought preceding the digression **καὶ ταῦτα, κ.τ.λ.**: 'but, however this may be, you said.' D

ὧν καὶ πέρι, κ.τ.λ.] iv. 445 C. 544 A

αὐτούς] sc. *τοὺς ταῖς πέντε πολιτείαις ὁμοίους ἄνδρας.*

καὶ ἐμοῦ ἐρομένου, κ.τ.λ.] For the absolute use of **ὑπέλαβε** cp. Meno 74 C *εἰ . . . μετὰ ταῦτα* **ὑπέλαβεν** *ὁ ἐρωτῶν.* A summary of the previous discussion is ingeniously grafted upon the dialogue. Compare for a similar recapitulation the opening of the Timaeus.

ὥσπερ παλαιστής, τὴν αὐτὴν λαβὴν πάρεχε] 'like a wrestler, let me have the same grip of you,' i.e. let me resume my position. For this favourite metaphor cp. Phil. 13 E *τάχ' ἀνιόντες εἰς τὰς ὁμοίας* (sc. *λαβὰς*) *ἴσως ἂν πως ἀλλήλοις συγχωρήσαιμεν*: Phaedr. 236 B, Laws iii. 682 E. B

οὐ χαλεπῶς . . . Λακωνικὴ αὕτη] 'there will be no difficulty in answering your question: the forms of government of which I speak are those which also have distinct names, that which meets with general approbation, the well-known Cretan and Spartan constitution:' cp. infra D *ἥτις καὶ ἐν εἴδει διαφανεῖ τινὶ κεῖται*; For the connexion of the Cretan and Lacedemonian forms of government see especially Arist. Pol. ii. 10. C

ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν] 'by most people.'

ἡ . . . Λακωνικὴ αὕτη] i.e. the Spartan constitution with which we are so familiar. Cp. iii. 403 E *ἡ* **τῶνδε** *τῶν ἀσκητῶν ἕξις.*

καὶ δευτέρα, κ.τ.λ.] *ἡ ὀλιγαρχία* would naturally have followed **ἐπαινουμένη**, but the participle **καλουμένη** is added, and the expression is then accommodated to the participial phrase.

In the words **συχνῶν γέμουσα κακῶν πολιτεία** there is a trace of the same personal bitterness which makes the picture of oligarchy, infra 552, so full of scathing satire.

ταύτῃ διάφορος] 'at variance with this last'—being familiarly

Republic VIII. known as the watchword of the opposite faction—not merely 'different from this,' which would be *ταύτης διάφορος*.

544 C **καὶ ἡ γενναία δὴ τυραννίς, κ.τ.λ.**] **γενναία** is ironical as in v. 453 E **ἡ γενναία** . . . *ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης*.

The reading *διαφεύγουσα* for **διαφέρουσα** is found in Par. A and all the best MSS. (*διαφέρουσα* Ven. Ξ, Flor. x, Ang. *v*, Vind. E). Such a degree of unanimity in a singular reading might possibly justify a forced interpretation: 'and escaping' (or 'surviving') 'all these comes tyranny, the fourth and last disorder of a state.' This interpretation, however, clearly passes the limits of usage in language and is almost unmeaning, even though we take into account Plato's tendency to resolve words compounded with prepositions, and give them new senses (e.g. *προσέχειν* vii. 521 D). It may be further remarked that *διαφεύγειν* always governs the accusative.

The reading *διαφεύγουσα* may have arisen from the desire in a copyist to avoid the tautology of *διάφορος* which immediately precedes and may have been thought to derive some confirmation from ix. 587 C **φυγὼν** *νόμον τε καὶ λόγον*. It affords one of the few instances in the text of Plato, in which the requirements of the sense must prevail against the greater authority of the MSS.

D **ἥτις καὶ . . . κεῖται**] Cp. supra A *ὧν* **καὶ** *πέρι, κ.τ.λ.*, and note.

δυναστεῖαι . . . εἰσίν] 'for the family governments and sovereignties which are bought and sold and other constitutions like these are a sort of intermediates.' This sentence makes it clear that although Plato is idealizing he has an eye to historical facts. Aristotle does not mention the **ὠνηταὶ βασιλεῖαι.**

ἢ οἴει, κ.τ.λ.] An allusion to Od. xix. 163 *οὐ γὰρ* **ἀπὸ δρυός** *ἐσσι παλαιφάτου οὐδ'* **ἀπὸ πέτρης.**

The same allusion occurs in Apol. 34 D *ἐμοί, ὦ ἄριστε, εἰσὶ μέν πού τινες καὶ οἰκεῖοι· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου, οὐδ' ἐγὼ* **ἀπὸ δρυὸς** *οὐδ'* **ἀπὸ πέτρης** *πέφυκα*. For the relation of the state to the individual cp. especially iv. 435 E *τὰ αὐτὰ ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἔνεστιν ἡμῶν εἴδη τε καὶ ἤθη ἅπερ ἐν τῇ πόλει; οὐ γάρ που ἄλλοθεν ἐκεῖσε ἀφῖκται.*

E **αἱ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν κατασκευαί**] 'the formations of the individual character.'

545 A **κατὰ τὴν . . . πολιτείαν**] 'whose characters answer or correspond to' (lit. 'are ranked with') 'the Spartan constitution.'

καὶ τὸν τυραννικόν] The article is omitted with **ὀλιγαρχικόν** and **δημοκρατικόν** so as to reserve the emphasis for 'the tyrannical man.' *Republic VIII.* 545 A

ἵνα . . . ἡ σκέψις ᾖ] These words contain a reference to Books i and ii.

προφαινομένῳ] 'which is coming into view.' Cp. Charm. 173 A *ὅμως τό γε* **προφαινόμενον** *ἀναγκαῖον σκοπεῖν καὶ μὴ εἰκῇ παριέναι.* B

ὥσπερ ἠρξάμεθα, κ.τ.λ.] ii. 368 E *πρῶτον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι ζητήσωμεν, κ.τ.λ.* The allusion here, as in other places, to what has preceded, is part of what may be called the composition of the work. The drawing together of the various threads is the beginning of the end.

καὶ νῦν οὕτω . . . κλητέον] (1) 'first we have to consider the "ambitious" constitution: I say "ambitious," because there is no other name of it in common use. *Or* shall we call it timocracy or timarchy?' or (2) 'first we have to consider the "ambitious" constitution: I say "ambitious," because there is no other name in use. We must call it *either* timocracy or timarchy.' According to the last way of taking the words, which appears to be the best, the clause **ἢ τιμοκρατίαν, κ.τ.λ.**, is an asyndeton. Dr. W. H. Thompson ingeniously suggested *λεγόμενον*, **ἀλλ' ἤ**, *κ.τ.λ.*

The word *timocracy*, which in Plato and Xenophon means a government of which honour is the ruling principle, is used by Aristotle in the sense of *ἡ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων πολιτεία* (Eth. N. viii. 10, Pol. iv. 14; cp. Isocr. Antid. 259 E): a government based on a property qualification, which existed in Athens even before the time of the Solonian constitution, as in Corinth after the fall of the Cypselidae. In Plato the constitution *ἀπὸ τιμημάτων* is the characteristic of oligarchy: infra 550 C.

The succession of states has but a slender resemblance to the actual fact: and the succession of individuals is still more shadowy; for in the first place, admitting the Spartan and Cretan type as a fair representative of timocracy, which is the first declension from the perfect form, there is no example of this or any similar state passing into an oligarchy of wealth, while the common form of oligarchy, resting on distinctions of birth, is unnoticed in the Republic. Again, the transition from democracy to tyranny is not the order of history, except perhaps in the single instance of Dionysius the elder and the Sicilian despots (the thirty tyrants are imposed by a foreign power, and are not the natural outgrowth of

Republic VIII. 545 B the Athenian democracy, which had an end of another kind): tyranny, instead of being the end of democracy, is rather to be regarded as a stage in early Greek history which preceded democracy, and in which the vigour and ability of individuals asserted themselves with the help of the Demos against the rule of a class (the saying ἐκ προστατικῆς ῥίζης φύεται is thus far justified); or in later times as a phase of violence which is to be attributed not to an excess of democracy (this was the last bulwark against such a state), but to the general disorder and unsettlement of Greece. In the case of Euphron of Sicyon, democracy preceded tyranny, but was itself brought on by the influence of Euphron (cp. Arist. Pol. v. 12, § 7, who makes similar criticisms).

None of the descriptions of Plato are to be verified by history: the pictures of the oligarch, democrat, tyrant, are all caricatures. The latter is such a portrait as the Greeks in later times loved to draw of Phalaris or Dionysius the elder, being a great exaggeration of the truth, in which quite as much as in the lives of medieval saints or mythic heroes, the conduct and actions of one were attributed to another in order to fill up the outline. There was nothing that the Greek was not willing to believe of them (Clearchus apud Athenaeum ix. 396). The tyrant was the negation of government and law, whose assassination was glorious, for he ruled only for the good of himself and not of his subjects. The ideal image of Plato was therefore not far removed from the vulgar thought of the ordinary Greek.

In the succession of individuals Plato is also following an order of ideas, and not an order of facts. Here and there a trait may be found of Alcibiades or Themistocles or perhaps of Critias. But the transition of one type of character to another is wholly imaginary. The error of identifying the individual and the state is seen most strikingly in the further assumption that the succession of states implies a corresponding succession of individuals.

πρὸς δὲ ταύτην] 'In comparison with this.'

545 C–547 C *All change in states begins with a factious spirit arising within the governing class. But how should faction enter in amongst our philosophic rulers? It can only spring from some degeneracy, which must inevitably come sooner or later from some flaw in their arithmetic—since being human, they are not infallible—leading them to diverge, however slightly, from the true number which presides over*

human generation. Some inauspicious births, consequent on such an error will gradually deteriorate the breed, until men come to power, who know not the muse, and neglect the liberal element in education. And those so educated, when they succeed in turn, will fail to eliminate aright the iron and brass from the pure silver and gold, whence disproportion following will lead to contention; the brass and iron pulling one way, towards acquisition, the gold and silver towards wisdom and virtue; until a compromise is reached, whereby private property is established, the industrial class depressed, and the guardians become an army of occupation. *Republic VIII. 545 C–547 C*

ἁπλοῦν] 'True without distinction' of all governments. 545 D

ὅταν . . . ἐγγένηται] 'When division arises within the governing power itself.' Cp. Laws iii. 683 E *βασιλεία δὲ καταλύεται . . . ἤ καί τις ἀρχὴ πώποτε κατελύθη μῶν ὑπό τινων ἄλλων ἢ σφῶν αὐτῶν;*

κἂν πάνυ ὀλίγον ᾖ] Cp. iv. 423 A *ἕως ἂν ἡ πόλις σοι οἰκῇ σωφρόνως ὡς ἄρτι ἐτάχθη, μεγίστη ἔσται . . . καὶ ἐὰν μόνον ᾖ χιλίων τῶν προπολεμούντων.*

ἢ βούλει . . . (E) **λέγειν;**] 'Shall we after the manner of Homer pray to the Muses to tell us *how faction first was fired*? Shall we imagine them in tragic vein talking in mock earnest and lofty style, playing and jesting with us as with children.'

ὅπως δὴ πρῶτον στάσις ἔμπεσε] An allusion to Iliad xvi. 112 *ἔσπετε . . . μοι, Μοῦσαι . . .* **ὅππως δὴ** *πρῶτον πῦρ* **ἔμπεσε** *νηυσὶν Ἀχαιῶν.*

γενομένῳ παντὶ φθορά ἐστιν] Plato says here that all created things are liable to dissolution. In the Timaeus the same thought is expressed, but with a difference. They exist only under the form of time: and when time comes to an end, they will no longer exist. 546 A

ὅταν . . . συνάπτωσι] 'When their revolutions severally join their circumferences:' i.e. come round to the point where they began.

γένους δὲ ὑμετέρου] i.e. the human race, opposed by the Muses to their own or the divine.

λογισμῷ μετ' αἰσθήσεως] Cp. Phaed. 65 E *μήτε τινὰ ἄλλην αἴσθησιν ἐφέλκων μηδεμίαν μετὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ.* To Plato philosophy is abstract: when alloyed with sense, as in all human endeavours, it is doomed B

Republic VIII. to error and failure. Cp. Polit. 269 C, D and Tim. 28 A τὸ δ' αὖ δόξῃ μετ' αἰσθήσεως, κ.τ.λ.

546 B The change now to be contemplated is the greatest possible—from the perfect to the imperfect; and the causes of the transition are occult. It is precisely at such a critical moment that the reader of Plato may expect the occurrence of a myth—in which, while the style is adorned, verisimilitude is made to compensate for the absence of exact knowledge (ii. 382 D). And as the irruption of evil is supposed to spring from an error in the calculation of times and seasons, the myth is a mathematical one.

The danger of over-population is not here in question, as in iv. 423 B, v. 460 A; deterioration comes in with an alteration in the quality of the breed.

The list of interpreters who have tried to solve this famous riddle, which even in Cicero's time had become proverbial, is a very long one. Even of those who have contributed important hints, from Faber and Barocci in the fifteenth century to Gow and Adam in the nineteenth, it must suffice to name here, besides those just mentioned, K. F. Hermann, Schneider, Weber and Monro.

The last named critic, after a very full and clear discussion of the chief interpretations (*Journal of Philology*) appears to think, not that the key has been lost, but that there never was any one key, the passage being really nothing else than a series of tentative guesses disguised in intentionally vague language. Professor Jowett, on the other hand, believed that Plato meant something which contemporary Greeks would understand, but he thought that the exact meaning was irrecoverable, and probably also unimportant. He was by no means confident of the soundness of the explanation which he finally adopted, and it need not be repeated here. See *Translation of Dialogues*, ed. III. vol. iii. pp. cxxx–cxxxv.

Mathematical definition in Plato's time was tentative and uncertain, and the significance of terms consequently unfixed. He himself uses δύναμις in different senses, and it is by no means clear that his use of παρατείνειν is consistent with the terminology of the geometrical writers. (See note on vii. 527 A.) All that will be attempted here will be first to give approximately the most probable force of each expression, and then with great diffidence, chiefly by way of illustration, to put forth one amongst many partial solutions.

One or two general remarks may be prefixed. (1) That the answer to the riddle is probably much simpler than the tragic

language of the Muses has led some commentators to expect. This may be inferred from the words ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ, as well as from the language of the opening sentence, in which it is indicated that the elaborate terminology is not to be taken too seriously. This has to be considered in the interpretation of such words as δυναστευόμεναι, αὐξόντων, φθινόντων, &c. (2) That as Plato intends to puzzle his reader, it is quite possible that even if the mathematical methods of his time were clearly known to us, their employment in the solution of this riddle might be misapplied. (3) That the whole tenour of the passage would lead one to expect the introduction of some arbitrary assumption at some point or other. The difficulty turns on minimizing this, and finding where it comes in. Whether, for example, in the phrase τρὶς αὐξηθείς or in ἑκατὸν τοσαυτάκις?

λογισμῷ μετ' αἰσθήσεως] 'Through reasoning accompanied with sensation.' Notwithstanding their high training, they cannot absolutely attain to pure reason. The tincture of sense makes it impossible wholly to eliminate error.

θείῳ . . . γεννητῷ] For example the World of the Timaeus.

περίοδος] This is explained by the words ὅταν . . . συνάπτωσι: 'the time in which it comes round.'

ἀριθμὸς . . . τέλειος] The 'perfect number' which comprises the period in which a divine birth (i. e. the right moment for it) comes round, may or may not correspond to the definition 'a number equal to the sum of its divisions.' But Plato is probably thinking of some higher and more complex expression than any of the simpler terms of which this is true (6, 28, 496). This is implied in the expression βραχυβίοις μὲν βραχυπόρους, ἐναντίοις δὲ ἐναντίας: cp. Tim. 39 E.

ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ] 'In which first,' i. e. in the series of numbers;—the simplest that is resolvable into elements of which the following statement is true.

αὐξήσεις . . . ἀπέφηναν] Almost every word in this sentence has been disputed. It seems pretty clear that a series of four terms is meant,—having of course three intervals between them. That which has met with most favour is the continuous proportion 27 : 36 : 48 : 64, or the converse of this. The difficulty is to make this harmonize with the remaining expressions.

αὐξήσεις] Is it necessary that this should mean anything more than 'increments'? Some would restrict the word to powers (αὔξη

Republic VIII. 546 B δευτέρα, τρίτη, &c.): others to multiples generally. Granting this last, may it not extend to multiples of unity?

δυνάμεναί τε καὶ δυναστευόμεναι] The latter word does not occur elsewhere, and the explanations of it given by Greek arithmeticians are inconsistent. If *ἡ δυναμένη* (*εὐθεῖα*) is the side of a square, may not *τὸ δυναστευόμενον* (passive, sc. *ἐπίπεδον*) be the square itself? Thus if 3 is *ἡ δυναμένη*, 9 would be *τὸ δυναστευόμενον.* The series will then consist of root-numbers and their squares.

ὁμοιούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων] 'Consisting of numbers that make similar and dissimilar figures:' i.e. numbers odd and even. For the genitive with **ὅρους** cp. iv. 443 D *ὅρους τρεῖς ἁρμονίας . . . νεάτης τε καὶ ὑπάτης καὶ μέσης*—also the expression in what follows, infra C **ἑκατὸν μὲν ἀριθμῶν**, **κ.τ.λ.** This designation of the odd and even numbers turns upon a theorem to which Aristotle alludes in Phys. iii. 4 and which is in fact the geometrical expression for the formula $(a+b)^2 = a^2 + 2\,ab + b^2$.

Thus $CG = a + b$, and $CF = CG^2 = (a+b)^2$. CE is the square on a. Then DE, EG, are each severally equal to ab, and $EF = b^2$. Hence the square $CF = (a+b)^2 = a^2 + 2\ ab + b^2$. Take now the case in which $b = 1$. Then $CF = (a+1)^2 = a^2 + 2\,a + 1$. Now $2\,a + 1 =$ the gnomon DFG, and is clearly an odd number, which varies from 3 upwards according to the value of a, so that any such number equals $2\ a + 1$. Hence every odd number has the peculiar property that when added to the square of half-itself-minus-one (i.e. to a^2), it produces a square number:—



$$1 + 3 = 4$$
$$4 + 5 = 9$$
$$9 + 7 = 16$$
$$16 + 9 + 25,\ \text{and so forth.}$$

The odd numbers are in this way **ὁμοιοῦντες**, 'producing similar figures,' viz. squares; the even numbers (each $= 2\,a$) are **ἀνομοιοῦντες**, because when added to the same squares they produce oblongs, not squares, every such oblong being dissimilar from every othre:

$$a^2 + 2a = CE + DE + EG = CH.$$
$$1 + 2 = 3$$
$$4 + 4 = 8$$
$$9 + 6 = 15$$
$$16 + 8 = 24\ \&c.$$

Otherwise the words have been explained more generally, **ὁμοιοῦντες** = 'expressing similar figures,' e. g. 9 and 81; **ἀνομοιοῦντες**, 'expressing dissimilar figures': e. g. 3 and 9 or 27 and 81. *Republic VIII.* 546 B

καὶ αὐξόντων καὶ φθινόντων] Either **αὔξειν** here must be intransitive or **φθίνω** transitive, and there is no authority for either in classical Greek. As *αὔξω* is frequently intransitive in common Greek, such a meaning may possibly be admitted here. The terms are borrowed from the Pythagoreans, who may not have observed Attic purity. And in speaking of the numbers, to which so much of active force is attributed, the difference may have been hardly felt. Schneider tried to identify this distinction with that between *ὑπερτελεῖς ἀριθμοί* ('numbers exceeded by their factors') and *ἐνδεεῖς* ('exceeding them'): but there is no reason why it should not be understood more simply of a series of numbers alternately increasing and diminishing.

πάντα . . . ἀπέφηναν] I.e. the process is completed without having recourse to any irrational quantity, such as 'the diameter of the square of five.' This is implied in **ῥητά**: **προσήγορα** conveys something more, viz. a common measure: in this case unity. I. e. no use is made of fractions. C

At this point we pause to consider 'the number of the human period' which has been now described. The solution which has found most favour is 216, a number which has more integral factors than any previous number. It is the cube of 6 and may be divided into 27, 64, 125, the cubes of 3, 4, 5, which are the sides of the Pythagorean triangle. Anatolius, Theolog. Arithm. p. 40, ed. Ast (quoted by Schneider), asserts that the successive births of Pythagoras were said by Androcydes, Eubulides, Aristoxenus and others to have taken place at intervals of 216 years. But the very complexity of the number, which is its chief recommendation, also makes it difficult to say which of the many ways of forming it was selected by Plato's fancy. He is not satisfied with describing it simply as 6^3. In the Timaeus (35 B ff.) the soul of the world is formed by the interweaving of two numerical series starting severally from 2 and 3. Can it be that the four terms here intended are simply the combination of 2, 2^2 with 3, 3^2? Taking these in the order 2, 4, 3, 9, they are both odd and even, they increase and diminish, for $2 < 4 > 3 < 9$; and when multiplied together they make 216.

Republic VIII. 546 C **ὧν ἐπίτριτος πυθμήν, κ.τ.λ.**] The wonderful properties of the mysterious number are not yet exhausted. By skilful manipulation there can be developed out of it a complex geometrical expression which, taken in connexion with the number itself, contains the secret of prosperous generation. The terms of this expression are clearly indicated in the sequel, but the method of obtaining it is, as in the former case, extremely obscure.

ὧν ἐπίτριτος πυθμήν] 'The base whereof, in the proportion of four to three.' **πυθμήν** is the word used for the lowest term of any series: thus 3 is the *base* of the series 3 : 9 : 27 : 81. The phrase **ἐπίτριτος πυθμήν**, taken alone, could only mean the proportion of 4 to 3, as the lowest term of the series of ratios 4 : 3, 8 : 6, 12 : 9, 16 : 12, &c. See Nicomachus Gerasenus, Introd. Arithm. i. 19, who gives these examples of the *ἐπίτριτον εἶδος τοῦ ἐπιμορίου* (Schneider). But then what becomes of **ὧν**? The expression as a whole seems to suggest some process of which the *πυθμήν of the series in question* is the foundation. Supposing the first term of the series to be 2, as proposed in the preceding note, and still following the analogy of the passage in the Timaeus, may not the words be understood to mean, 'the base of the series,—viz. 2,—being (1) quadrupled, and (2) tripled'—so obtaining the two numbers 8 and 6, for the operation which follows?

πεμπάδι συζυγείς] 'In conjunction with the pentad,' i.e. the number 5 is also to be employed in the operation. The meaning of *συζεύγνυμι* is quite general; for example, in the passage of Nicomachus just referred to, *οἱ ἀπὸ τετράδος συνεχεῖς τετραπλάσιοι*, **συνεζευγμένοι** *τοῖς ἀπὸ τριάδος τριπλασίοις, ὁμοταγεῖς ὁμοταγέσιν*, it means simply that the numbers are to be arranged in pairs. So far then the manner in which 5 enters into the combination is left vague. It is rendered more precise, however, by the addition of **τρὶς αὐξηθείς**, which is paraphrased by Aristotle, Pol. v. 12, § 8, in the words *ὅταν ὁ τοῦ διαγράμματος ἀριθμὸς τούτου γένηται στερεός*. But when we ask what is meant by **ὁ ἀριθμὸς τοῦ διαγράμματος τούτου**, the only answer is **ὁ τῶν** (*πρόσθεν εἰρημένων*) **ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν πεμπάδι συζυγείς**. I. e. if we are right so far, some combination of the numbers 8 and 6 with the number 5.

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that having multiplied 8 and 6 severally by 5, producing 40 and 30, we multiply each of these

products, first by 10 ($=2\times 5$) and then by 25 ($=5^2$). The result is *Republic VIII.* 546 C

$$40 \times 10 \times 25 = 10{,}000,$$
$$30 \times 10 \times 25 = 7500.$$

Each of these, as the product of three factors, is a 'solid' number. And if they are to be added together (but this is uncertain) 17500 is also στερεός ($25 \times 25 \times 28$).

By this, or some other process, the number produces 'two harmonies,' **δύο ἁρμονίας παρέχεται.**

By **ἁρμονία** here is meant a solid number, resolvable into factors which have a certain recognized relation to each other, e. g. $10{,}000 = 10 \times 25 \times 40$, reducible to the simple arithmetical progression, 2, 5, 8; and $7500 = 15 \times 20 \times 25$, reducible to 3, 4, 5, the sides of the Pythagorean triangle.

ἴσην ἰσάκις, ἑκατὸν τοσαυτάκις] 'A square consisting of 100 multiplied into itself,' i. e. $10{,}000 = 100^2$. This explanation agrees best with the idiomatic use of τοσοῦτος.

ἰσομήκη μὲν τῇ] 'Equal to the former in one dimension,' i.e. having a side = 100.

προμήκη δέ] But oblong. Viz. $100 \times 75 = 7500$.

[Otherwise, supposing the plural **ὧν** supra to refer to the number 216 as including its factors—and so accounting for the plural—and taking **πυθμήν** = 6, as the first term of the series 6, 36, 216, the **ἐπίτριτος** or $\frac{4}{3}$ of this is 8. Multiply this as before by 5, 10, and 25 the result is 10,000 which divides into the two harmonies 2500 and 7500. The former may be described as **ἑκατὸν τοσαυτάκις**, '100 taken so many times.']

ἑκατὸν μὲν . . . τριάδος] 'Consisting of a hundred numbers formed (i. e. squared) upon rational diameters of the number 5, each wanting one (or if irrational then wanting two), and a hundred cubes of the number three.' In other words $\{(7^2 = 49) - 1\} = 48 \times 100 = 4800$; or $\{(7.0204)^2 = 50) - 2\} = 48 \times 100 = 4800$.

[The words **ἑκατὸν μὲν ἀριθμῶν . . . τριάδος** have generally been taken to be a more explicit account of the second harmony, as in the rendering just given. I. e. it is an oblong measuring 100 one way, and composed of two quantities, which are thus described. The sentence, so explained, has a natural rhythm. Mr. Gow on the other hand supposes this to be a repetition of the two previous

Republic VIII. 546 C clauses in the reverse order: 2700 being the regular *solid* figure of which one side is 100: and the oblong being 100 times the square of the diameter of 5 minus 2. Mr. Adam follows up this suggestion by multiplying these two quantities together

$$(4800 \times 2700 = 12{,}960{,}000 = 60^4).]$$

The διάμετρος ῥητὴ πεμπάδος is the diameter of the square of 5 ($=\sqrt{50}$) neglecting the fraction: i.e. since $\sqrt{50} = 7.0204$, and this is the διάμετρος ἄρρητος, the διάμετρος ῥητή is 7.

ξύμπας δὲ οὗτος ἀριθμὸς γεωμετρικός, τοιούτου κύριος, ἀμεινόνων τε καὶ χειρόνων γενέσεων] What is to be done with the two harmonies when obtained? Plato leaves this quite uncertain: and it does not appear as if he intended anything further. The ξύμπας ἀριθμὸς γεωμετρικός is the number 216 with all that is involved in it, viz. the production of the two 'harmonies' in the way above described. The knowledge of all this on the part of the rulers is essential to the preservation of the breed in its perfection.



This diagram has been drawn upon the margin of Par. A by an early hand. It seems to represent the Pythagorean triangle τρὶς αὐξηθείς, i.e. simply raised to terms of 3 and 9. The ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν πεμπάδι συζυγείς is understood to mean simply a combination of 3, 4, 5. But how the scholiast found in this a solution of the whole problem is not apparent. For the numbers 3, 4, 5; 9, 12, 15; 27, 36, 45, are as enigmatical as ever.

As to the symbolic significance of the number or numbers the Muses make no sign, and it is vain to cross-examine them. The following observations contain the more important amongst many suggestions which have been made.

(1) The word περίοδος is vague, and may cover anything from the minimum time of gestation (216 days—Adam) to such a cycle as that described in the Politicus, or the 'great year' of Tim. 39 E. (2) The number 5 was sometimes regarded as the type of justice, sometimes of marriage ($= 3+2$, the first *male* combined with the first *female* number): (3) duality enters into human generation as into all material things. (4) The proportion of 40 to 30 may be regarded as suitable for the marriageable ages of men and women (Gow). (5) The successive births of Pythagoras

are said to have taken place at intervals of 216 years (Schneider). (6) A grand cycle for the state might be rounded off with a century of human lives ranging between 100 and 75 years each $\left(\frac{17500}{2} = 8750\right)$. (7) The two harmonies have been supposed by some to signify mental and bodily excellence, by others virtue in the State and the individual, by others again perfection in man and woman. *Republic VIII.* 546 C

ὧν καταστήσονται] 'The men of the former age will appoint the best of them *to be their successors*.' So the middle voice may be rendered. The reading *καταστήσουσι*, which has slight manuscript authority, may, however, be the true one, as in the next sentence **καταστήσονται** is used passively. Cp. note on iv. 442 A. D

ὅμως δὲ . . . ἀμελεῖν] 'Nevertheless' [although the best available] 'when they in turn come into their fathers' power, they will in the first place begin to neglect us.'

φύλακες ὄντες] 'although guardians.' This is an aggravation, for music was to be the first care of the guardians: cp. iv. 424 C *τὸ δὴ φυλακτήριον . . . ἐνταῦθά που οἰκοδομητέον τοῖς φύλαξιν, ἐν μουσικῇ.*

παρ' ἔλαττον . . . μουσικῆς] said in explanation of **ἡμῶν ἀμελεῖν.**

δεύτερον δὲ τὰ γυμναστικῆς] the 'shadow' of a difficulty is found in these words. For the Spartan or Cretan constitution, which is the first stage in Plato's declining scale, was not negligent of gymnastic: cp. infra 547 D *γυμναστικῆς . . . ἐπιμελεῖσθαι.* Hence the suspicion which gave rise to Madvig's emendation *δεύτερά τε γυμναστικῆς.* Cp. infra 548 C *πρεσβυτέρως γυμναστικὴν μουσικῆς τετιμηκέναι*, and for *δεύτερα* Xen. Hellen. vii. 1, § 35 *ἐτιμᾶτο δεύτερος μετὰ τὸν Πελοπίδαν.* But the sense of the reading in the text although arrived at in a different way, is nearly the same. Socrates means to say that in the first place they neglect music: and in the second place, and therefore in a less degree, gymnastic. It is further observable that the first declension in the state is not from music to gymnastic, but from the philosophical to the military government, which no doubt retained gymnastic, but did not care for it in the spirit prescribed in Book iii. For the seeming want of point cp. v. 451 A *ὥστε εὖ με παραμυθεῖ*, and infra 547 E *ἁπλουστέρους.* Plato from a love of parallelism or for the sake of completeness, often presents the other side of an antithesis, though not in point. Cp. infra 559 C *ἆρ' οὖν . . . ὀλιγαρχικόν*, and ii. 358 A *ἀδικία δ' ἐπαινεῖται.*

Republic VIII. 546 D **πρὸς τὸ δοκιμάζειν . . . (E) γένη**] 'for the task of assaying the metal of your different races, which are the same as Hesiod's': (Op. et D. 109 ff.). To keep the race pure was a main function of the guardians. Socrates is alluding to the Phoenician tale at the end of Book iii. pp. 415, 416.

547 A **σιδηροῦ ἀργυρῷ**] sc. *γένους γένει*. This is the reading of Par. A. Other MSS. have *σιδήρου ἀργύρῳ* (the metals). Cp. the similar doubt as to the reading of iii. 415 C.

ταύτης τοι γενεᾶς] Iliad vi. 211, xx. 241.

B **εἱλκέτην . . . ἠγέτην**] What has been described as a possibility of the future is now assumed to be a 'fait accompli.' Hence the imperfect. **τὰς ψυχὰς . . . ἠγέτην**, in speaking of the gold and silver race is substituted for the harsher **εἱλκέτην**.

***τὼ δ' αὖ**] The slight change from *τό* to **τώ**, suggested by Schneider, is certainly an improvement, though, as he observes, not absolutely necessary.

κατανειμαμένους] sc. *τοὺς πολίτας*. Madvig's conjecture, *κατανειμάμενοι ἐξιδιώσασθαι*, is extremely plausible, but the change to the nominative **δουλωσάμενοι** may be occasioned by the feeling that this last is not merely an enactment but an act of the rulers.

C **τοὺς δὲ . . . ἐπιμελεῖσθαι**] The word **φυλακή** is used ironically in the new sense of guarding against them instead of guarding them. Cp. iii. 414 B *φύλακας παντελεῖς τῶν τε ἔξωθεν πολεμίων τῶν τε ἐντὸς φιλίων*, and for **φίλους τε καὶ τροφέας**, v. 463 B *τί δ' οὗτοι τὸν δῆμον* (*προσαγορεύουσι*); *Μισθοδότας τε καὶ* **τροφέας**.

περιοίκους τε καὶ οἰκέτας] are distinguished as subjects and household slaves, the former word conveying an obvious reference to Sparta.

547 C–548 D *The timocratic state will resemble our ideal aristocracy in debarring the ruling and fighting class from other occupations in devotion to military discipline and gymnastic, and in the practice of common meals. Its characteristics will be a certain jealousy of philosophers, a love of strategy, and a continual tendency to engage in war. On the other hand it will approach the oligarchic spirit in a fierce secret longing after gold and silver, and the illegal habit of keeping large private establishments.*

Honour is the ruling passion, leading to ambitious quarrels which are aggravated by the prevalence of extravagance among men whose

virtue has been compulsory and is not inspired by rational conviction. Such is the general outline.

547 D **τῆς τοῦ πολέμου ἀγωνίας**] 'For military exercises': cp. ii. 374 A ἡ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἀγωνία.

E **τῷ δέ γε φοβεῖσθαι, κ.τ.λ.**] The construction at the beginning of the sentence is continued from **τῷ μὲν τιμᾶν, κ.τ.λ.**, but resumed with a change to the accusative in **τὰ πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων**.

Various attempts have been made to correct **ἁπλουστέρους** which is the reading of the MSS. on the ground of inconsistency with **ἁπλοῦς** preceding. But (1) inconsistent tautology is not a strong ground of objection to an expression in Plato: (2) the apparent tautology is also an antithesis though feebly expressed; 'the state has no philosophers who are sincere and thorough-going, and therefore falls back on the simpler nature of the soldier.' (3) The want of a word is often found in writing to lead to the inappropriate repetition of a preceding word. For *ἁπλότης* meaning straightforwardness cp. Xen. Hellen. vi. 1, § 6 *κἀκεῖνος μέντοι ἐπαινέσας τὴν* **ἁπλότητα** *τῆς πόλεως ἀπῆλθε*, said of Polydamas of Thessaly after his conference with the authorities at Sparta.

548 A **ἐπιθυμηταὶ δέ γε, κ.τ.λ.**] The words *τὰ δὲ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν* (547 D) are here taken up.

C **μέμικται γάρ, κ.τ.λ.**] The description of Plato may be illustrated by the real declension of the Spartan state. There were divisions in Sparta between the partisans of the Ephors and Kings (**φιλονεικίαι**). According to Aristotle, no other state was equally corrupt (**ἐπιθυμηταὶ χρημάτων**): her greatest citizens, Pausanias, Astyochus, Lysander, were the reverse of simple and straightforward (**οὐχ ἁπλοῖ καὶ ἀτενεῖς**). The 'wild' love of money which existed in the Spartan character is the more remarkable, because unaccompanied by the enterprise which is necessary for the acquisition of wealth. The cruelty to slaves is also touched upon in the corresponding figure of the *τιμοκρατικὸς νεανίας* (infra 549 A).

οὐκοῦν . . . ἀπεργάσασθαι] It is observable that Plato implies that his succession of commonwealths is only a rough outline of a few of them, intended to show 'in large letters' the true portraits of the just and the unjust. Cp. supra 544 C, D and the similar suggestion of intermediates in the division of the soul in iv. 443 E *καὶ εἰ ἄλλα ἄττα μεταξὺ τυγχάνει ὄντα.* The attempt here declined by

Republic VIII. Plato was made so far as the constitutions of states were concerned by Aristotle or by his school in the Πολιτεῖαι.

548 E–549 B *'The Timocratic individual,' says Adeimantus, 'must be about as quarrelsome as Glaucon.' But he will be more obstinate and less inclined to liberal pursuits: although he likes listening to a song or speech. He is obedient to the rulers, but rough to slaves, while civil to his equals, and above all things, he is ambitious of honour in war, while athletics and hunting are his recreations. In youth he despises money, but in age he covets it, having no resources in himself.*

548 E **αὐθαδέστερον . . . οὐδαμῶς**] 'He should be made of harder stuff, I said, and somewhat less cultivated, yet a lover of the muses and a good listener, though nothing of a speaker.' In other words the timocrat is an unimpressionable man, with no original power, and yet poetry and oratory have a charm for him. The Spartan will never extract a verse out of 'his own pure brain,' is not in the habit of making long speeches, but will listen to the oratory of Alcibiades when he visits Sparta, or to the recitations of Homer and Tyrtaeus. For the hit at Glaucon, compare the description of him in Xen. Mem. iii. 6, § 1 Γλαύκωνα δὲ τὸν Ἀρίστωνος ὅτ' ἐπεχείρει δημηγορεῖν, ἐπιθυμῶν προστατεύειν τῆς πόλεως, οὐδέπω εἴκοσιν ἔτη γεγονώς, ὃν τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων τε καὶ φίλων οὐδεὶς ἠδύνατο παῦσαι, ἑλκόμενόν τε ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος καὶ καταγέλαστον ὄντα, κ.τ.λ.

ὑποαμουσότερον] The features of the Spartan character are sufficiently apparent in this description. Compare the account at the commencement of the greater Hippias, 285 E, which Hippias gives of the willingness of the Spartans to hear him tell of the genealogies of gods and heroes, and their unwillingness to receive instruction in the sciences. Again, for what follows, compare the statement of the Laws, Book i, that the Spartan and Cretan institutions were exclusively designed for war; also Protag. 343, where Plato adds another trait to the Lacedemonian character, their making brevity the soul of their primitive philosophy.

καὶ δούλοις μέν τις, κ.τ.λ.] This is still part of the character of the Spartan. See the beautiful passage of the Laws (vi. 777 A) in which the Athenian describes the behaviour of a just and noble person towards his slaves: he is not to be too familiar with them, he is to be more just to them than to his equals, herein showing that he loves justice for its own sake.

Republic VIII.

ἂν appears in only two MSS. of slight authority. But most MSS. have τισιν which is probably a corruption of τισαν.

549 A

ἔστι . . . πολιτείας] 'this type of character belongs to that form of government (timocracy).' The genitive is the predicate.

οὐκοῦν . . . καταφρονοῖ ἂν] 'and will not such an one while young be a despiser of riches?'

549 B–550 C

His origin may be thus conceived: a good man who avoids politics in an ill-conditioned state has a son who in boyhood hears his mother complain of 'the slights which she has to endure through the submissiveness of her husband,' and is told by the servants of the house that when grown up he must be a man indeed and reclaim what his father has let go. By and by he comes to know a little of the world as it is. Distracted by these diverse influences, while he admires his father's virtues, he is tempted to covetousness and ambition. And in the end the love of honour becomes his ruling passion.

549 C

πῇ δή . . . (D) γυναιξίν] The sentence **ὅταν, κ.τ.λ.**, is not in any exact construction: the most grammatical way of taking the words is after **πῇ δή . . . γίγνεται**; sc. γίγνεται ὅταν (cp. πῶς followed by ὅταν infra 553 A). But the imperfect construction is supplemented by the deferred apodosis at 550 A τότε δὴ ὁ νέος.

The legend of the wife of Caius Licinius Stolo in Livy, vi. 34, is a similar tale of feminine jealousy. Plato is perhaps thinking of Laconizing youth at Athens.

D

ἔπειτα ὁρώσης . . . (E) ὑμνεῖν] **αἰσθάνηται** reverts to the construction with **ὅταν**, although having the same subject with the participle **ὁρώσης**, which itself somewhat loosely follows **ἀκούῃ**. Mr. H. Richards proposes to cancel **αἰσθάνηται**.

ἰδίᾳ τε ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ δημοσίᾳ] 'privately in law courts, and publicly' (sc. in the assembly).

ἑαυτῷ μὲν τὸν νοῦν προσέχοντα] Cp. vi. 496 D ἀγαπᾷ, εἴ πῃ αὐτὸς καθαρὸς . . . βιώσεται.

E

καὶ οἱ οἰκέται, κ.τ.λ.] The picture would not be complete without the old servant who is zealous for the honour of the family.

550 A

καὶ ἐξιών, κ.τ.λ.] 'And when he goes abroad he hears and sees more of the same sort.' The reading of Par. A is ἀκούῃ, but this is hardly defensible, even on the ground of a supposed construction

Republic VIII. with **ὅταν** repeated from supra c. The words are too far off, with **οἶσθα οὖν, κ.τ.λ.**, intervening.

550 A **μὴ τὰ αὑτῶν**] (sc. *πράττοντας*) has the force of *τὰ μὴ αὑτῶν*. The order of words gives emphasis to the negative.

παρὰ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων] These words are to be taken with **ἐγγύθεν**, 'having a nearer view of his father's ways than of the ways of others,'—which may account for his father still retaining an influence over him.

ἑλκόμενος . . . (B) ἦλθε] The first **ἑλκόμενος** is resumed after the parentheses **τοῦ μὲν . . . κεχρῆσθαι.**

B **διὰ τὸ μὴ . . . φύσιν**] 'being the inheritor of no mean nature.' The father (supra 549 C) was a good man whose virtue was rendered inoperative by outward circumstances. For the idiomatic genitive cp. Soph. Trach. 1062 *θῆλυς οὖσα κοὐκ* **ἀνδρὸς** *φύσιν*.

550 C–551 B *Oligarchy is a form of constitution based on the valuation of rateable property. It is a government in which the wealthy rule and in which the poor have no share. The change to this from timarchy is occasioned by that secret hoard of which we spoke* (supra 548 B), *alluring them to spend on things forbidden. They vie with one another in accumulation, and in expenditure, until wealth becomes of more account than merit. The poor man is always rejected and the rich preferred, and at last a law is carried, either by intimidation or by force of arms, making money the qualification of citizenship.*

550 C **λέγωμεν . . . τεταγμένον**] The line is probably quoted from memory, and made up out of two lines in the Seven against Thebes, 451 *λέγ' ἄλλον ἄλλαις ἐν πύλαις εἰληχότα* and 570 *Ὁμολωΐσιν δὲ πρὸς πύλαις τεταγμένος*. The similarity of *πύλῃ* and **πόλει** was nearer in sound than in spelling.

κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν] supra 545 B.

τὴν ἀπὸ τιμημάτων . . . πολιτείαν] 'A government resting on the valuation of property I term oligarchy.'

It is to be observed that Plato here absolutely opposes timocracy to oligarchy. But as a fact in the history of Greece, so far as we can judge from somewhat meagre indications, there were many kinds of both, the element of wealth combining in various degrees

with that of birth: the right of the strongest, that is, of the heavy armed soldier or horseman, or of the well equipped pirate, or the leader of pirates, largely entering into all of them. *Republic VIII.* 550 C

ἐκεῖνο] supra 548 A. D

τοὺς νόμους . . . ἀπειθοῦντες] 'they wrest the laws to this end, disobeying the law,' i. e. they misinterpret the letter and violate the spirit of the constitution.

ἢ οὐχ οὕτω . . . ῥέποντε;] 'Is not this the sort of difference between riches and virtue? When they are placed in either scale of the balance, the one rises, as the other falls.' The text follows Madvig's correction; the manuscript reading κειμένου ἑκατέρου may however be explained by placing a comma after ἑκατέρου, 'the one ever rising as the other falls, as if each were placed in a scale of a balance.' E

ἢ καὶ πρὸ τούτου, κ.τ.λ.] As in the revolution of the Four Hundred at Athens: Thuc. viii. 66 ἀντέλεγέ τε οὐδεὶς ἔτι τῶν ἄλλων, δεδιὼς καὶ ὁρῶν πολὺ τὸ ξυνεστηκός. 551 B

Suppose a property qualification to be required of a pilot, what would become of navigation? To guide the helm of the state is more difficult and also more important than to steer the ship; the failure in the practice of it will therefore be more disastrous. The oligarchical city, moreover, is not one, but two at least, viz. the rich and the poor. (Cp. iv. 422 E.) *The government cannot go to war, for fear that the multitude may desert in battle and leave the few, who are also covetous, to support both the danger and the expense. Again, under this constitution the same person may have diverse callings; he may be warrior and trader in one. And, what is worst of all, he may reduce himself to beggary. He never was a real ruler, and now he is only a spendthrift and a drone in the hive. And of these wingless drones, unlike the winged ones, there are some with stings. In other words, wherever there are paupers there are also rogues.* *551 B-553 A*

ἔφαμεν] supra 544 C. 551 B

πρῶτον μέν . . . οἷός ἐστιν] The first error relates to the very principle of the constitution (supra A **ὅρον** πολιτείας ὀλιγαρχικῆς ταξάμενοι πλῆθος χρημάτων): **πρῶτον**, sc. ἁμάρτημά ἐστιν: for the turn of sentence cp. i. 331 C τοῦτο δ' αὐτό, τὴν δικαιοσύνην, πότερα τὴν ἀλήθειαν αὐτὸ φήσομεν εἶναι; and for the use of **ὅρος**, Laws i. 626 C C

Republic VIII. 551 C ὃν γὰρ **ὅρον** ἔθου τῆς εὖ πολιτευομένης πόλεως. The meaning of ὅρος in Plato is more general and less abstract than the logical term 'definition,' which is its signification in later Greek. A similar change takes place in the meaning of several words (εἶδος, ἰδέα, συλλογισμός, ὑπόθεσις, ὕλη), which in Plato retain more or less their popular senses,—but in Aristotle have already passed into the technical language of the schools.

ἄθρει γάρ, κ.τ.λ.] The interruption of Adeimantus prevents Socrates from completing the sentence, and the apodosis, ὁποιόν τι ἂν δοκεῖς συμβαίνειν or some such words, is wanting. The reply of Adeimantus, **πονηράν . . . ναυτίλλεσθαι**, is dependent on the omitted apodosis. The comparison of the ruler to the steersman was always with Socrates a favourite topic: i. 341 C, vi. 488 B; Polit. 297 E; Xen. Mem. i. 1, § 9. [Ast and H. Richards cj. εἰκός for **ἦ δ' ὅς.**]

οὐκοῦν . . . ἀρχῆς;] 'And is not this true about any government of anything?' Ast's emendation **ἧστινος** for ἤ τινος of the MSS., which is here adopted, gives the best meaning with the least alteration. The construction is elliptical, and put by attraction for ἀρχῆς, ἥ τις ἂν ᾖ. For the use of ὅς τις, cp. Hipp. Maj. 282 D ἢ ἄλλος δημιουργὸς ἀφ' **ἧστινος** τέχνης.

D **τί δέ; . . . ἀλλήλοις**] Cp. iv. 422 E, where Socrates strongly insists that other states are not one but many. There is a lively image of the change here described, which probably represents the condition of many Greek cities in the seventh and eighth centuries before Christ, in the poems of Theognis, who laments that the old oligarchical privileges have been superseded by an invasion of rich bad men. (Theogn. 1109 ff. ed. Bergk.)

ἀλλὰ μήν, κ.τ.λ.] Bekker was right in saying that **οὐδέ** is omitted in Par. A. The MS. reads 'Αλλὰ μὴν | **τόδε** but **τό** is written over an erasure and the word as at first written may have been οὐδε (sic). A later hand has replaced **οὐδέ** in the right hand margin after **ἀλλὰ μήν**, which comes at the end of the line. If **οὐδέ** were omitted, the sentence would receive an ironical turn (cp. iv. 426 A), but this is scarcely suitable to the directness of the reply **οὐ καλόν.**

ἴσως] 'in all likelihood.' [H. Richards cj. ἰσχυρῶς.]

διὰ τὸ ἀναγκάζεσθαι, κ.τ.λ.] As at Lesbos in the Peloponnesian war:—Thuc. iii. 27; Arist. Pol. vi. 7.

E **ὀλιγαρχικοὺς φανῆναι**] For this play of words cp. infra 555 A.

πάλαι] ii. 374 B.

γεωργοῦντας] like the *αὐτουργοί* of the Peloponnese; Thuc. i. 141, §§ 3–5. 551 E

χρηματιζομένους] Cp. Thuc. vi. 31, § 5.

ἦ δοκεῖ ὀρθῶς ἔχειν;] The position of the interrogative particle implies strong emphasis. 552 A

εἰς ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν;] viz. the functions mentioned in the words **μήτε χρηματιστὴν . . . μήτε ὁπλίτην** (supra A). B

αὐτῆς] sc. *τῆς πόλεως.*

οὕτως] 'The latter; he seemed to be a ruler but was only a spendthrift.'

αὐτόν] resumed in **καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον** to accentuate the parallelism. C

ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἀκέντρων] **ἐκ** points to the class from which they come without saying whether all become paupers or only some.

πτωχοὶ . . . τελευτῶσιν] sc. *εἰς τὸ πτωχοὶ εἶναι*, like *τυραννίδας . . . εἰς πτωχείας τελευτώσας* in x. 618 A. The words have also been translated, though with less point and less meaning in the preposition: 'who die in old age paupers' (Schneider).

πάντες, κ.τ.λ.] sc. *γίγνονται* implied in **τελευτῶσιν.** D

δῆλον ἄρα, κ.τ.λ.] In modern language, Where there is pauperism, there is crime:—this is at least true of every oppressive and unequal state of civilized society.

βαλλαντιατόμοι] The form is doubtful (see L. and S. s. v. *βαλλάντιον*), but is retained as given by the first hand of Par. A.

μὴ οὖν, κ.τ.λ.] 'May we suppose.' **μὴ οὖν** in this passage is equivalent to *μῶν*:—although the affirmative answer has already been implied in the previous argument, Socrates ironically proposes the question as one absolutely undetermined: so supra 552 A *ὅρα δὴ . . . εἰ τόδε . . . παραδέχεται*: Theaet. 145 A *ἦ καὶ ἀστρονομικός . . .*;

ἐπιμελείᾳ βίᾳ] The insertion of *καί* between these words is unnecessary: **βίᾳ** has passed into an adverb and lost the idea of a dative case. Cp. ii. 359 C *νόμῳ δὲ βίᾳ παράγεται, κ.τ.λ.*, infra 554 C *κατεχομένας βίᾳ ὑπὸ τῆς ἄλλης ἐπιμελείας.* E

ἴσως δὲ καὶ πλείω] These words betray the same feeling which appeared in the first mention of oligarchy supra 544 C *συχνῶν γέμουσα κακῶν πολιτεία.*

ἀπειργάσθω] 'Let this form of government too be deemed 553 A

Republic VIII. 553 A by us to be complete.' For the not uncommon use of the imperative cp. ix. 588 D *πεπλάσθω*.

γενόμενος] i. e. *ἐπεὰν γένηται*.

553 A–D *Let us now imagine the transition from the timocratic to the oligarchic man. The former has a son, who walks in his footsteps, until the father meets with some reverse in his ambitious career, and is either put to death or banished and his goods confiscated. The son, impoverished and disenchanted, flings away ambition, and by sparing habits and hard work scrapes a fortune together. Desire of wealth he elevates to the rank of king and lord, to whom the reasoning and aspiring elements are to be subservient. This revolution is as complete as it is swift.*

553 A **ἐκ τοῦ τιμοκρατικοῦ ἐκείνου**] supra 548 D ff.

ὅταν, κ.τ.λ.] This clause is partly the answer to **πῶς**, sc. *μεταβάλλει*, partly the protasis of a sentence of which *ἐπὶ κεφαλὴν ὠθεῖ, κ.τ.λ.*, is the deferred apodosis. Cp. supra 549 C *πῇ δή . . . γίγνεται; ὅταν, κ.τ.λ.*

B **ἐμπεσόντα . . . ὑπὸ συκοφαντῶν**] 'then brought into court, being damaged by informers.' It has been proposed to omit **βλαπτόμενον**, the insertion of which is attributed to some transcriber's ignorance that *ὑπό* after *ἐμπεσεῖν* was good Greek. But the word is very expressive of the harm which informers might do to a man's career (Lys. pro Polystr. § 12 *οὐ δίκαιος διὰ τοῦτο ἐστὶ βλάπτεσθαι*): and the imperfect tense, which is one ground of the objection, is quite appropriate as describing a continuous state and not like **ἐμπεσόντα**, &c., a momentary act, i. e. *ὑπὸ συκοφαντῶν ἐβλάπτετό τε καὶ ἐμπεσὼν εἰς δικαστήριον ἀπέθανεν*.

καὶ παθών] The son of course suffers in the exile of his father, or in the confiscation of his property.

δείσας] is to be taken closely with what follows: 'He is alarmed and straightway thrusts ambition and passion headforemost from his bosom's throne.'

C **τὸ θυμοειδὲς ἐκεῖνο**] supra 550 B.

τιάρας τε καὶ . . . ἀκινάκας] *περιτιθέντα* or the like word which is required for **τιάρας, κ.τ.λ.**, is altered to **παραζωννύντα** to suit **ἀκινάκας**. For the plural, which may be described as 'magnific,' cp. vi. 495 A

πλοῦτοί *τε καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη παρασκευή*, Symp. 218 A **Φαίδρους**, *Ἀγάθωνας*, *Ἐρυξιμάχους*. *Republic VIII.* 553 C

τὸ δέ γε, κ.τ.λ.] The change from **οὐδὲν ἄλλο** to **μηδὲν ἄλλο** is to be explained by the general notion of *ἀναγκάζει* in the second clause being understood from **οὐδὲν** . . . *ἐᾷ* in the first.

ἡ γοῦν . . . ὅμοιος ἂν εἴη] 'The change which produces him is from an individual who is similar to the state which produced oligarchy' (viz. timocracy). 'Let us consider then whether he be like oligarchy.' The assumed parallelism of states and individuals is presumptive evidence of the likeness which is now to be verified. **ἂν εἴη**, sc. *εἰ οὕτω μεταβάλοι*. E

In this conversion from ambition to avarice the individual follows the analogy of the state; he is a lover and getter of money, indulging only his necessary desires and keeping under restraint the extravagant ones: he is penurious, industrious, sordid, negligent of culture (he has deserted the muses for the blind god of wealth). Yet some of his passions are still strong within him because of his neglect of education: and being hungry and unsatisfied they are like the paupers and rogues in the city. In his ordinary dealings he represses them, because he is afraid of losing his character and his property: but when he has a safer opportunity of taking advantage, as when he is guardian of an orphan, he does not scruple to indulge them. The oligarchical man is thus divided against himself; and in the contest of ambition he proves a contemptible adversary, being niggardly of his means and distrusting his own nature, except that meagre portion of it which is absorbed in money-getting. *553 E–555 B*

μὴ παρεχόμενος] 'not affording or allowing himself:' a special use of the middle voice. The negative is **μή**, not *οὐ*, because **παρεχόμενος** is part of a 'causal expression' (**τῷ . . . εἶναι, κ.τ.λ.**). 554 A

αὐχμηρός γέ τις . . . ὤν, κ.τ.λ.] This sentence is in effect a participial clause attached to the preceding participles—'and this because he is a shabby fellow,' &c. The idiom is the same as in *εὖ γε σὺ ποιῶν* and the like expressions. Cp. Aristoph. Nub. 893 *λόγος—ἥττων γ' ὤν*.

οὓς δή, κ.τ.λ.] sc. *θησαυροποιούς*: for the plural referring to the singular cp. Thuc. vi. 12, 13 *νεωτέρῳ . . . οὓς ἐγώ, κ.τ.λ.*

τυφλὸν ἡγεμόνα] sc. Plutus. Cp. the Plutus of Aristophanes, the B

Republic VIII. plot of which turns upon the restoration of the god of wealth to sight.

554 B **καὶ *ἐτίμα μάλιστα**] **ἐτίμα** is an ingenious and almost certain emendation of Schneider's, which is confirmed by the expressions **τιμῶντες** *ἀγρίως . . . χρυσόν* 548 A, **τιμᾶν** *μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ πλοῦτον* 553 D, and **χρήματα . . . μάλιστα ἔντιμα . . . παρὰ τῷ τοιούτῳ** just above. The principal MSS. vary between *καὶ ἔτι μάλιστα εὖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τόδε δὲ σκόπει*, which has the greater weight of authority, and *καὶ ἔτι μάλα εὖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τόδε δὲ σκόπει*, either of which leaves the previous thought without assent or approval, and also has an unmeaning emphasis:—**μάλιστα** is at the end of a line in Par. A.

τόδε δὲ σκόπει] The quality in the individual which corresponds to oligarchy in the state is the love of money. The money-maker has a show of respectability, and his other passions are generally kept under by the main one of avarice. The truth is that he is one half beggar and the other half rogue; this however can only be discovered by watching him in secret places. If you would know his real character, see how he manages a trust, and whether he deals with other people's money as he does with his own.

C **κατεχομένας . . . ἐπιμελείας**;] 'kept down perforce by his general habit of carefulness.' **ἄλλης** is 'adverbial' contrasting **ἐπιμελείας** with **ἐπιθυμίας, κ.τ.λ.**

ἐπιεικεῖ τινὶ ἑαυτοῦ βίᾳ κατέχει] (1) 'By some virtuous element in himself he forcibly restrains': **βίᾳ** as supra c, 552 E (where see note on *ἐπιμελείᾳ βίᾳ*), is to be taken separately as an adverb. For **ἐπιεικεῖ τινὶ ἑαυτοῦ** cp. infra 555 A *ὀλίγοις τισὶν ἑαυτοῦ*. [(2) 'By some virtuous restraint which he puts upon himself.' B. J.]

ἄλλας] sc. the non-avaricious passions—here opposed to 'respectable' prudential motives. For **ἄλλας** opposing things different in kind cp. iii. 396 E *μιμήσεώς τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης διηγήσεως*.

D **εὑρήσεις**] Par. A gives *ἐν* above *ευρήσεις* (sic)—*ἐν* by the diorthotes. Schneider observes that, as the text now stands, the dative is too far from the preposition. Perhaps *ἐνευρήσεις* should be read.

τοῦ κηφῆνος ξυγγενεῖς] i. e. *κηφηνώδεις*:—'drone-like,' 'of the nature of the drone.'

οὐδὲ εἷς ἀλλὰ διπλοῦς τις] As the city was divided between

rich and poor, so the man is divided between meanness and respectability. *Republic VIII.*

ὁμονοητικῆς . . . τῆς ψυχῆς ἀληθὴς ἀρετή] 'the true virtue which arises when the soul is at unity and in harmony.' The expression is somewhat singular, but there is no sufficient reason for omitting the article. 554 E

ἤ τινος νίκης, κ.τ.λ.] For the genitives after **ἀνταγωνιστής** cp. ii. 374 D, Laws viii. 834 B. 555 A

χρήματά τε, κ.τ.λ.] **τε** connects the two parts of the sentence, of which the second, ending with **πλουτεῖ**, is loaded with participles: of these **δεδιώς** expresses the cause, and **πολεμῶν** the consequence, of **οὐκ ἐθέλων, κ.τ.λ.**

ὀλιγαρχικῶς] 'like the men in the oligarchy': supra 551 E.

Democracy comes next, and is brought about by a natural reaction against the ruling spirit of oligarchy, which is covetousness. The extravagance of young men is not properly controlled, because it is profitable to those in power, who lend them money at high interest and when it is spent seize their estates. Thus the class of stinging drones is multiplied, while the ruling class grow fat and soft, neglecting all martial exercises. The hour for revolution ripens; and the oligarchical government is easily overthrown. Some of its members are proscribed, some banished; the rest are admitted to an equal share of the power, which is now in the hands of the people. *555 B–557 A*

ποιόν τινα ἔχει] sc. *τρόπον*, in a slightly different sense of the word, which occurs again immediately below. *τρόπος* in **τρόπον τινὰ τοιόνδε** is again used in the first sense. 555 B

οὐκοῦν . . . γίγνεσθαι;] The words **δι' ἀπληστίαν** are a partial explanation of **τρόπον τινὰ τοιόνδε**. The pleonastic **δεῖν** resumes the notion of **προκειμένου**.

εἴργειν . . . μὴ ἐξεῖναι] **ἐξεῖναι** is pleonastic. C

νόμῳ] Cp. supra 552 A.

κάθηνται δή, κ.τ.λ.] 'there they sit doing nothing in the city.' **κάθηνται** implies that they are biding their time. D

οὐδὲ δοκοῦντες . . . ὁρᾶν] 'Making as if they saw them not.' See L. and S. s. v. *δοκέω*, i. 4. E

Republic VIII. 556 A **τοῦ πατρός**] For the imagery cp. vi. 507 A.

πολὺν τὸν κηφῆνα, κ.τ.λ.] The singular is collective.

A **οὔτε γ' ἐκείνῃ, κ.τ.λ.**] Two ways are suggested of correcting the evil: (1) a man may be prevented from doing what he likes with his own: (2) the protection of the law may be withdrawn from the creditor. The latter principle is laid down in Laws v. 742 C *μηδὲ δανείζειν ἐπὶ τόκῳ, ὡς ἐξὸν μὴ ἀποδιδόναι τὸ παράπαν τῷ δανεισαμένῳ μήτε τόκον μήτε κεφάλαιον*: viii. 849 E, xi. 915 D. It is also said to have been a law of Charondas (Stobaeus, Serm. 44, 21).

How far the law should interfere to protect the creditor, and whether no protection is not the best protection, is a question which may be regarded as still undecided. Although commerce can never be wholly without the pale of law, yet as time goes on, the interference or protection of the law seems to be confined within narrower limits, which may probably with advantage be still further restricted. So much in trade has been settled by the consent and common sense of traders. The law again is so powerless to enter into the minutiae of private transactions, where many interests combine against inquiry, as to suggest the thought that except in cases of direct fraud or theft, trade, like morality, is beyond the legal arm. Many contracts of the highest importance are matters of honour only. If legal protection were withdrawn from the creditor, the result would obviously be that no one but a man of established character could borrow money, for the borrower would be under no compulsion to pay except that of his own interest. It is equally obvious, that this would limit the operations of trade—whether advantageously or not, is a doubtful question.

ἐκείνῃ refers to the regulation which existed in the well constituted state, but was relaxed in the oligarchy (supra 552 A, 555 C), viz. that young men shall not be allowed to waste their fortunes.

ἐκκαόμενον] like *exardescere* in Latin: cp. Eupol. Fragm. Incert. lv *μάττει γὰρ ἤδη καὶ τὸ πῦρ ἐκκάεται.*

τις] 'any one,' i. e. 'the legislator,' 'the state,' 'we.'

B **νῦν δέ γ', ἔφην ἐγώ, κ.τ.λ.**] **τὰ τοιαῦτα** refers to the whole description from *ἅτε, οἶμαι* (555 C) onwards, **οὕτω** to the creation of the dangerous class among the poor (supra 555 D ff.).

σφᾶς δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς αὐτῶν, κ.τ.λ.] I. e. on the other hand they leave their sons to grow up in idleness and luxury, while they themselves are absorbed in making money. The sentence is

expanded and becomes two sentences, the condition of the youth being first described; then in **αὐτοὺς δέ, κ.τ.λ.**, that of the older generation: cp. the structure of supra 552 C *τοὺς δὲ πεζοὺς τούτους, κ.τ.λ.* Republic VIII. 556 B

οὕτω δὴ παρεσκευασμένοι, κ.τ.λ.] In this sentence the verb **καταφρονῶνται** is dependent on **ὅταν**. (1) An appearance of confusion is caused by the nominative **θεώμενοι** which seems to be connected with **παραβάλλωσιν**, but in reality is equivalent to *ὅταν θεῶνται* preceding **καταφρονῶνται.** Either *παραβάλλοντες . . . ἢ . . . θεώμενοι . . . καταφρονῶνται* or *παραβάλλωσιν . . . ἢ . . . θεῶνται καὶ καταφρονῶνται* would be the regular construction. Or (2) the words **θεώμενοι . . . καταφρονῶνται οἱ πένητες** may be regarded as an instance of the common apposition of whole and part. C

ὅταν παραβάλλωσιν] 'when they come along-side,' probably a nautical metaphor: cp. Lysis 203 E *οὐ παραβάλλεις;* For the sense cp. Phaedr. 239 C, D.

ἀλλοτρίας] 'which he has no right to': 'which does not properly belong to him.' He has grown great at other men's expense. Cp. Gorg. 518 D, Laws vii. 797 E. D

εἰσὶ *παρ' οὐδέν;] This is Baiter's correction of *εἰσὶ γὰρ οὐδέν* which is the reading of the best MSS. *εἰσὶν οὐδέν*, the reading of the old editions, though giving a more forcible meaning (cp. infra 562 D), is of inferior authority. E

εὖ οἶδα μὲν οὖν] **μὲν οὖν** corrects **οἴει.** 'Do you ask if I think they will do so? Nay, I know it for a fact that they do so.'

ἐκείνῳ] sc. *τῷ νοσώδει σώματι.* **κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐκείνῳ** = *νοσωδῶς.* For the comparison of sedition to disease cp. Soph. 228 A *νόσον ἴσως καὶ στάσιν οὐ ταὐτὸν νενόμικας, κ.τ.λ.*

καὶ ὡς τὸ πολὺ . . . γίγνονται] This feature of democracy is recalled in the companion picture of the individual infra 561 B, *ὥσπερ λαχούσῃ. γίγνωνται* is the reading of the best MSS.: the subjunctive is inexact, because any words dependent on **ὅταν** should describe a characteristic of the origin of democracy, not merely a characteristic of democracy. *γίγνωνται* may be an error of the copyists caused by the preceding subjunctives. 557 A

ἡ κατάστασις δημοκρατίας] The article goes with both words taken together as a single expression.

διὰ φόβον] *διὰ φόβων* (Par. A p. m. Ven. Π) is a natural error occasioned by the apparent parallelism of **δι' ὅπλων.**

Republic VIII. 557 A–558 C *Freedom is now the word and every man arranges his life just as he pleases. The city is like an embroidered robe, in which all modes of life, all forms of government, are represented. There is no one constitution, but samples of all. To take office, to obey authority, to make war or peace when others do so, are matters left to individual caprice. Men publicly condemned to death or banishment go out and in with acclamation of their friends. No training or qualification is required for office as in our state, save only the profession of popular sympathies. It is a city of delightful ease, 'exempt from awe, worship, degree' where all however unlike are 'equal' and 'unclassed, sceptreless, free, uncircumscribed.' — Delightful for the moment!*

557 B **δῆλον γάρ, κ.τ.λ.**] This is a reason for deferring the consideration of the democratic man, who appears infra 558 C.

ἂν . . . κατασκευάζοιτο] 'may be expected to arrange' (not 'is able to' as in the translation).

C **ὥσπερ ἱμάτιον, κ.τ.λ.**] As elsewhere in comparisons there is an asyndeton because the words are explanatory of the preceding clause.

καὶ ἴσως μέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ] The words *τί μήν; ἔφη* (following **φαίνοιτο**), which Bekker retained from earlier editions, are almost, if not entirely, without manuscript authority. The sentence which takes their place in the Munich MS. *q*—*φαίνοιτο γὰρ ἦ δ' ὅς, τοιαύτη τις*—betrays the same uneasiness at the repetition of *ἦν δ' ἐγώ*. But this, like the frequent insertion of *ἔφη λέγων* in reported narrative, is a natural way of calling attention to a fresh point. Cp. vii. 522 A, where fifteenth century scribes have tried to get rid of the second **ἔφη** by the clumsy expedient of reading *ἀδελφὰ* **ἔθη** *ἄττα ἔχουσα*.

D **διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν**] supra B *ἐξουσία ἐν αὐτῇ ποιεῖν ὅ τί τις βούλεται.*

κατοικίζειν] sc. *τὴν πόλιν.*

E **μηδὲ πολεμεῖν πολεμούντων**] Aristophanes indulges in a similar flight of fancy in the Acharnians 180 ff. where he makes Dicaeopolis conclude a private treaty with the Lacedemonians.

μηδὲ αὖ . . . μηδὲν ἧττον, κ.τ.λ.] There is a slight confusion arising out of the double negative, the words **μηδὲν ἧττον, κ.τ.λ.**, presupposing *ἐξεῖναι*, which is implied in **μηδεμίαν ἀνάγκην** supra. This slight difficulty may have led to the reading *ἄρχῃς*, for which

the first hand in Par. A and Ven. Π wrote ἀρχῆς. For **ἠπίη** cp. iii. 388 D εἰ καὶ **ἤπιοι** αὐτῷ τοιοῦτον ἢ λέγειν ἢ ποιεῖν: Phaedr. 264 B τὸ **ἤπιον** εἰρῆσθαι. *Republic VIII.*

ἴσως . . . ἔν γε τούτῳ] 'Perhaps so, for the moment': i.e. not permanently. 558 A

τί δέ; ἡ πραότης . . . οὐ κομψή] (1) 'And is there not something exquisite in her clemency towards some who have been condemned?' This involves a possibly allowable extension of the 'objective' use of the genitive: **ἐνίων** = πρὸς ἐνίους cp. ii. 359 A ξυνθήκας **αὐτῶν**. Laws iv. 717 A σκοπὸς μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν οὗτος οὗ δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι· βέλη δὲ **αὐτοῦ** (the darts which reach the mark) καὶ οἷον ἡ τοῖς βέλεσιν ἔφεσις, τὰ ποῖ' ἂν λεγόμενα ὀρθότατα φέροιτ' ἄν; This was Bekker's view. (2) The genitive **δικασθέντων** may be taken as of the subject, 'the meekness of some of the condemned': said ironically for their indifference or contempt of the laws:—Both explanations give a sufficiently good sense, but the latter is to be preferred. **περινοστεῖ ὥσπερ ἥρως** infra is in favour of this interpretation, and it is harsh to make **ἡ πραότης** without any qualification or hint from the context to mean 'the gentleness of democracy' or 'her gentleness.' Some propose to insert ἐπί, περί or κατά (Stephanus) before **ἐνίων**.

ἢ οὔπω εἶδες, κ.τ.λ.] The sentence is somewhat irregular, the genitive **μενόντων . . . ἐν μέσῳ** being substituted for the accusative after **εἶδες**, through attraction to **ἀνθρώπων**. The construction is softened through an association from the ordinary construction of the genitive with αἰσθάνομαι.

The subject of **περινοστεῖ** is to be gathered from **μενόντων, κ.τ.λ.**, 'The man marches about.' Late MSS. insert ὁ καταψηφισθείς. There is perhaps an implied allusion to the νόστοι. 'He is welcomed wherever he goes like one of the heroes returning from the siege of Troy.' [Madv. cj. καταψηφισθέντος: Schn. cj. αὐτοῦ μενόντων.]

ἡ δὲ συγγνώμη, κ.τ.λ.] The sentence breaks off and is completed by the answer of Adeimantus **πάνυ γ', ἔφη, γενναία**, in which **γενναία** may agree with πόλις (as in the translation) or rather with **συγγνώμη**, the force of the interrogative having been continued from a preceding sentence—'and what say you of her forgiving spirit, &c.? Yes, said he, that is glorious.' The relation of **ὡς μεγαλοπρεπῶς . . . πλήθει** to **καταφρόνησις . . . τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα** may be expressed as follows: 'her contempt for the things we spoke of . . . how grandly trampling them under foot she cares not at all,' &c.

Republic VIII. 558 B **ὧν ἡμεῖς ἐλέγομεν σεμνύνοντες**] **σεμνύνοντες**, sc. *αὐτά*. The reference is to iii. 401 A, 402 C, iv. 425 A.

ἅπαντ᾽ αὐτά] **αὐτά** is preferred to *ταῦτα* as the reading of Par. A and quite unobjectionable.

558 C–559 D *Before examining the democratical man it is advisable to define the necessary desires, which were above* (554 A) *distinguished from the unnecessary ones. Necessary desires are those which* (1) *are conducive to life,* (2) *impossible to extinguish. The desire of food, for example, is necessary, while that of savoury meats is unnecessary. And the drone of whom we spoke is the slave of unnecessary desires, but the oligarch only of the necessary.*

558 C **τίς ὁ τοιοῦτος ἰδίᾳ**] **τίς**, like 'what' in English, has occasionally the meaning 'what sort of' = *ποῖός τις*. Cp. vii. 537 B.

τοῦ φειδωλοῦ, κ.τ.λ.] 'Our penurious oligarchical man might have (I suppose) a son,' &c.

D **βίᾳ δὴ . . . κέκληνται**] This is said in continuation of the preceding sentence, the participle **ἄρχων** agreeing with the subject of **γένοιτ᾽ ἄν**. Socrates is proceeding to develop the genesis of the democratic man. A finite verb (e.g. *ἐγεύσατο κηφήνων μέλιτος*, cp. infra 559 D) would have followed, had not the apodosis been broken off or deferred in favour of the digression about the necessary desires. This is better (as is shown by **δή**) than to suppose the participle to be merely linked on to the preceding sentence as in 554 A *αὐχμηρός γέ τις . . . ὤν*.

βούλει οὖν, κ.τ.λ.] Socrates here makes a psychological digression, for the first time introducing the distinction which afterwards became the favourite one with Aristotle and the Epicureans, of pleasures which are and are not natural and necessary. The digression may be compared with the one in iv. 436–438 in which Socrates treats of relation and opposition. He returns to the distinction of natural and necessary pleasures in the next book (ix. 572 C ff.).

559 A **καὶ πρός**] **πρός** is taken adverbially, as often with *γε*, e.g. i. 328 A *καὶ πρός γε παννυχίδα ποιήσουσιν*, and sometimes without: as in Euthyd. 298 D *καὶ πρὸς ἄρα σοι πατήρ ἐστι καὶ κύων*: Laws iv. 709 C.

αἵ εἰσιν] Cp. vii. 529 A *τὴν περὶ τὰ ἄνω μάθησιν λαμβάνειν παρὰ σαυτῷ, ἥ ἐστι*: where *ἥ* = *οἵα*, as in this passage **αἵ** = *οἷαι*.

ἆρ' οὖν οὐχ . . . (B) **ἂν εἴη;**] 'will not the desire of eating within the limits of health and strength, and of simple food and condiments be necessary?' **αὐτοῦ σίτου τε καὶ ὄψου** is joined with **ἡ**, and completes the notion of **τοῦ φαγεῖν, κ.τ.λ.** **αὐτοῦ** is added to prepare for the antithesis **ἡ πέρα τούτων, κ.τ.λ.**, infra B. Cp. iv. 439 A *δίψος . . . αὐτὸ* . . . **αὐτοῦ** *πώματος*. The modern distinction between food and the pleasure of eating as the object of hunger, does not occur to Plato. *Republic VIII.* 559 A

ᾗ τε μὴ . . . δυνατή] 'and because a man cannot suppress it while he lives.' This reading of the Munich MS. *q* (not noticed by Bekker) is preferred to those of the chief MSS. on two grounds: (1) **κατ' ἀμφότερα** must refer to the twofold condition repeatedly mentioned in 558 D, E, 559 A, and again implied in **δυνατὴ δὲ κολαζομένη, κ.τ.λ.**, infra. This meaning cannot be got out of the reading *ᾗ τε παῦσαι ζῶντα δυνατή*: (2) **παῦσαι ζῶντα**, 'to make one cease from living,' would be a very strange expression for *ἀποκτιννύναι*. Just as **βλαβερά**, in what follows, is opposed to **ὠφέλιμος** here, so **δυνατὴ . . . ἀπαλλάττεσθαι** contains the opposite of the remaining clause **ᾗ τε μὴ . . . δυνατή**. B

For the idiomatic expression cp. vii. 537 B *ἀδύνατός τι ἄλλο πρᾶξαι*, where, if the subject of *πρᾶξαι* had been expressed, it would have been in the accusative (*τοὺς νέους*). So **ζῶντα** agrees with the subject of **παῦσαι** here. Negation is expressed through **μή** rather than *οὐ*—which Coraes suggested—because the sentence states a condition. The complete expression would be *ἀναγκαία* (*ἂν εἴη*) *ᾗ μὴ* (*ἐστὶ*) *δυνατή* (*τινι*) *παῦσαι ζῶντα*. Professor W. W. Goodwin, who approves of this interpretation, quotes Xen. Anab. iv. 1, § 24 *δυνατὴν . . . ὑποζυγίοις πορεύεσθαι ὁδόν*. For the transition from the dative to the accusative with an infinitive cp. iv. 422 B *οὐδ' εἰ ἐξείη* . . . **ὑποφεύγοντι . . . ἀναστρέφοντα** *κρούειν*. For the corruption of MSS. through dropping the negative, see Essay on Text, pp. 106–109. [L. C.]

τί δέ . . . ἀπαλλάττεσθαι] 'and the desire which goes beyond this, craving more elaborate dishes, of which, if controlled and trained in youth, most people may get rid': **καὶ ἀλλοίων, κ.τ.λ.**, answers to **καὶ αὐτοῦ σίτου** in what precedes. **ἀπαλλάττεσθαι** is passive: cp. supra A *ἃς . . . ἀπαλλάξειεν ἄν*.

χρηματιστικὰς διὰ τό, κ.τ.λ.] Plato seizes the word which comes nearest to his meaning, and justifies it by a false etymology not better than many in the Cratylus.

Republic VIII. 559 C **καὶ τῶν ἄλλων**] 'and the rest': sc. the other desires besides the desire of food.

ἐλέγομεν] supra 552 C ff.

559 D–562 A *Now suppose the oligarchical individual to have a son, who after a miserly education, falls amongst the drones and tastes their honey. His useless desires are re-inforced, until in turn his prudential inclinations are strengthened with admonition. There is civil war within him, till the democratic faction is turned out, and he returns to regular ways. But his father has no gift in education, and the ill weeds grow apace; and there is again a faction within that holds secret correspondence with strange pleasures, with whose aid at last they rush up and seize the Acropolis of the Soul. It has been swept clean of its true defenders (reason and virtue) and lies open to the assaults of vicious sophistry. The youth returns to the companionship of the drones, and when good counsel (accredited or not) seeks audience, the gates are barred. Perverted reason discards the old-fashioned virtues, and all vices of insolence and excess are openly installed under fair titles as manliness and liberality and freedom. This downward course may be arrested as youth wears off, and then the man gives way to every impulse in its turn, now drinking, now abstaining; now toiling at athletics, then again doing nothing at all; first all for war, then all for business; living not one life but taking a turn at many—an existence truly delightful as many persons think.*

559 D **πάλιν τοίνυν, κ.τ.λ.**] The analogy of the state and the individual, which in the previous stages was helped by real points of resemblance as well as by language, begins to fail more and more. For though the transition from the miserly father to the spendthrift son is natural enough and true to human life, the parallel transition from oligarchy to democracy is not substantiated by history and is fanciful and untrue. **πάλιν** marks the resumption from 558 D after the digression.

ὡς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν] supra 558 C. **αἴθωσι θηρσί**, sc. the drones.

αἴθωσι] = 'fiery,' a poetical word, in keeping with the rhetorical and grandiloquent character of this part of the Republic.

E **μεταβολῆς . . . δημοκρατικήν**] There is no difference of reading in this passage, but the words are difficult: either (1) **ὀλιγαρχικῆς**

(supply *πολιτείας* or *καταστάσεως*) is the genitive after **μεταβολῆς**, but the ellipse is harsh; or (2) **ὀλιγαρχικῆς** may be a corruption of *ὀλιγαρχίας*, which has led to the further corruption of *δημοκρατίαν* into **δημοκρατικήν**. For the double genitive cp. vii. 525 C *ῥᾳστώνης τε μεταστροφῆς, κ.τ.λ.* The addition of *ἐξ* after **μεταβολῆς** would certainly make the sentence clearer. 559 E

ξυμμαχίας] used here, as in Thuc. vi. 73 *ὅπως* **ξυμμαχία** . . . *παραγένηται* and elsewhere, in the concrete sense of 'an allied force.' So also **ξυμμαχία** below.

ἔξωθεν] viz. from the *κηφῆνες* with whom he associates. We may note that the quarrel is not between reason and desire, but between a thrifty parsimonious spirit and unsatisfied craving and discontent.

τῷ ἑτέρῳ τῶν παρ' ἐκείνῳ] the self-indulgent desires, as opposed to the necessary ones.

τῷ ἐν ἑαυτῷ] The reflexive pronoun can hardly be right with **ἐκείνῳ** preceding. Perhaps the two words have changed places in the MSS. from *τῶν παρ' ἑαυτῷ . . . τῷ ἐν ἐκείνῳ*.

ἤ ποθεν παρὰ τοῦ πατρός] 'it may be from his father': **πόθεν** expresses the uncertainty from what quarter the alliance will come.

αὖθις δέ . . . ἐγένοντο] For a time the democracy is partially suppressed by assistance from without, and the house is again swept and garnished. But new passions gather and grow to a head, and possess themselves of the undefended citadel: 'seven other devils' in the shape of opinions and sophisms 'enter in and dwell there': and they hold the gates of the palace against all comers, and suffer no other power to make an alliance, nor even individuals to parley. The inter-penetration of metaphor and fact, and the subtle manner in which the particulars of the life of the state are woven into the life of the individual, add greatly to the beauty and expressiveness of the passage. 560 A

τῶν ἐκπεσουσῶν . . . ξυγγενεῖς] 'Other desires, akin to those which were banished, growing up within him.'

δι' ἀνεπιστημοσύνην τροφῆς πατρός] (1) 'because he, their father, does not know how to educate them.' The man is regarded as the parent of his desires (cp. infra 561 B *ἐξ ἴσου τρέφων*). But the imagery is forced, and not consistent. For his duty towards these B

Republic VIII. 560 B desires was not to educate but to exterminate them. Rather (2) 'because his father had no skill in education.' The reference is to the 'oligarchical' father, who was said above (554 B, 559 D) to have given no attention to education, and to have brought up his son *ἀπαιδεύτως*. [L. C.]

λάθρᾳ ξυγγιγνόμεναι] sc. *ταῖς ἔξωθεν ἐπιθυμίαις*, implied in **τὰς αὐτὰς ὁμιλίας** which again refers to 559 E.

φρουροί τε καὶ φύλακες] **φρουροί** is added to sustain the image of a garrison. Cp. infra 561 B *τὸ φρούριον*.

C **καὶ πολύ γ', ἔφη**] sc. *ἄριστοι*.

τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον] sc. *τὴν ἀκρόπολιν*.

εἰς ἐκείνους τοὺς Λωτοφάγους] who make him forget his home, like the mariners of Odysseus, Od. ix. 81 ff. The reference is to the *κηφῆνες* mentioned supra 559 D.

φανερῶς] 'openly,' no longer *λάθρᾳ* supra B. Cp. vii. 538 C *ἀπαρακαλύπτως*. Before, he had hesitated and listened to both sides; now he has made up his mind, and will listen only to this one.

D **οὔτε πρέσβεις . . . εἰσδέχονται**] 'Nor do they receive the words of old men in a private capacity, which come as ambassadors.' The **λόγοι**, not the persons, form the embassy. The image is complicated and in some danger of being confused by the subordinate contrast between the authority of the family and the influence of friends. The former is described as the action of a league coming publicly in aid; the latter as a commission or embassy. The word **πρέσβεις**, which is suggested by the association of **πρεσβυτέρων**, is not necessarily inconsistent with **ἰδιωτῶν**. See Dem. 1121. 1, quoted by L. and S. s. v. *πρεσβευτής*, ii. The image, as not unfrequently happens in Greek, is crossed with the thing signified. The advice of private friends is imagined as that of individual commissioners accompanying an army, much as in Xen. Hellen. ii. 4, § 36, the public embassy from the Peiraeus is accompanied by individuals, *ἰδιῶται*, who are sent in a private capacity from a party in the city.

The emendation of Badham adopted by Cobet, *δι' ὤτων*, is unnecessary and feeble, and the personification of the *ἀλαζόνες λόγοι* who have *ὦτα*, extravagant.

ἰδιωτῶν] may be explained as having the force of *ἰδίᾳ*, opposed to **αὐτὴν τὴν ξυμμαχίαν**—'sage words, the ambassadors of elders,

who advise him on their own account,'—not as accredited on behalf of his friends (παρ' οἰκείων τις βοήθεια supra). *Republic VIII.* 560 D

καὶ τὴν μὲν αἰδῶ, κ.τ.λ.] For the inversion of ethical terms, cp. Thuc. iii. 83.

πείθοντες (sc. ὡς ἀγροικία καὶ ἀνελευθερία ἐστίν) is added to complete the expression.

καθήραντες] is of course ironical (cp. infra 567 c), and, like **τελουμένου**, alludes to the mysteries.

κατεχομένου] has a twofold association: (1) 'who is occupied like a conquered city,' or (2) 'possessed' by them, cp. Ion 533 E ἔνθεοι ὄντες καὶ κατεχόμενοι.

λαμπράς] 'with great *éclat*': cp. Soph. El. 685 εἰσῆλθε **λαμπρός**, πᾶσι τοῖς ἐκεῖ σέβας. E

ἆρ' οὐχ . . . ἄνεσιν] The accusative **ἐλευθέρωσιν, κ.τ.λ.**, expresses the effect of the change: cp. iv. 424 C εἶδος γὰρ καινὸν μουσικῆς μεταβάλλειν. **ἐκ τοῦ . . . τρεφομένου** may be either neuter = 'from a life that is nourished,' or masculine 'from one who is nurtured,' cp. supra 558 D υἱὸς ὑπὸ τῷ πατρὶ τεθραμμένος ἐν τοῖς ἐκείνου ἤθεσιν. 561 A

ἐὰν εὐτυχὴς ᾖ] Madvig conjectured ἐὰν εὐτυχήσῃ, partly with a view of harmonizing the tenses, and partly under the influence of a parallel passage ix. 578 C where Bekker reads ὃς ἂν . . . τυραννικὸς ὢν . . . δυστυχήσῃ, κ.τ.λ. But (1) there is no objection to the dissimilarity of tenses, which constantly recurs: (2) the present tense gives a better meaning, 'if he be fortunate,' referring to his whole state and character: (3) there is no reason if Plato wrote δυστυχήσῃ in one place, that he should have written εὐτυχήσῃ in another: (4) moreover δυστυχήσῃ is itself an unnecessary emendation of δυστυχὴς ᾖ, which in turn is a confirmation of εὐτυχὴς ᾖ.

ἀλλά τι καὶ πρεσβύτερος, κ.τ.λ.] The words **τι καί** are opposed to **μὴ πέρα ἐκβακχευθῇ** and modify what follows **μέρη τε . . . ἐνδῷ**: 'but as he grows older in some degree modifies his passions,' a meaning which is to be gathered from the remainder of the sentence.

τοῦ πολλοῦ θορύβου παρελθόντος] 'when the turmoil of passion has mostly passed by.' B

τοῖς ἐπεισελθοῦσι] supra 559 E.

εἰς ἴσον δή τι καταστήσας, κ.τ.λ.] The passions of the democratic man rule by chance, as in a democracy the magistrates are elected

Republic VIII. 561 B by lot. The freeman gives each of them their turn, and will not be the slave of any: but unfortunately he is equally impartial between good and evil. As he grows older, he learns to balance them with one another. He is the Alcibiades or Mirabeau of history: the rake who turns politician in common life—*πρεσβύτερος γενόμενος, κ.τ.λ.*

παραπιπτούσῃ . . . λαχούσῃ] 'the chance passion, which as it were obtains the lot.'

ἕως ἂν πληρωθῇ] sc. *ἡ παραπεσοῦσα ἡδονή*. *πληροῦν ἡδονήν* is said with a slight degree of inaccuracy for *πληροῦν ἐπιθυμίαν.*

C **σφόδρα γάρ**] This and other strong affirmations indicate that what Socrates asserts is corroborated by Adeimantus' own experience, cp. supra 556 E *εὖ οἶδα, κ.τ.λ.*

D **ὡς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ**] 'as if he were spending his time in philosophy': **ὡς** here = *quasi.*

E **παντάπασιν . . . ἀνδρός**] 'You have certainly described the life of a man who is a lover of equality.' The compound, meaning 'equality before the law,' is made to suggest indifferences as to this, that, or the other *rule of life.*

καὶ παντοδαπόν τε καὶ . . . μεστόν] sc. *βίον.*

τὸν καλόν τε καὶ ποικίλον] not the life but the man. The article in the predicate (**τὸν καλόν τε καὶ ποικίλον**) implies 'the man whom we are seeking.' 'And that the man of whom we are speaking is the fair and spangled one whom we are seeking, just as that city was.'

562 A–563 E *As wealth, the good of oligarchy, caused the reaction to democracy, so liberty leads from democracy to tyranny. The first stage however in this progress is from democracy to anarchy. Unscrupulous leaders, the evil cup-bearers, mix the draughts of liberty too strong, until the city is drunken. Then fathers fear their sons, and sons assume authority over their fathers. The citizen, the metic and the foreigner are all as one. The young vie with the old; and the old condescend to the young, lest they should be thought severe and morose. The difference between men and women disappears, and at last even the slaves assume the airs of free-men. Nay the very cattle in the public roads will jostle wayfarers, as having equal rights. The public mind becomes so restive as to be intolerant of the very shadow of authority.*

562 A

τίς τρόπος . . . γίγνεται;] i.e. *τίς τρόπος ἐστὶ τῆς γενέσεως αὐτοῦ;* 'What is the nature of the process in the case of tyranny.'

σχεδὸν δῆλον] This is assumed as a corollary from the succession of states. That it comes from oligarchy is clear. The question is *how* does it come?

['What is the character of tyranny? For it is clear that it arises out of democracy.' 'It is clear.' 'And does not tyranny arise from democracy in much the same sort of way as democracy from oligarchy?' Plato begins by speaking of the character of tyranny, just hinting that its origin is too well known to need discussion. But then, with a certain amount of inconsistency, he proceeds to treat the question at some length. B. J.]

τρόπον τινὰ τὸν αὐτόν] 'In somewhat the same way.' **τινά** is added because the process is only to a certain extent the same.

ὃ προὔθεντο, κ.τ.λ.] The construction of the sentence is interrupted by **ἦ γάρ**; and resumed in **ἡ πλούτου τοίνυν ἀπληστία. πλούτου** being substituted for *τούτου* after the digression. B

[ὑπερ]πλοῦτος] occurs elsewhere only as an adjective (supra 552 B, Aesch. Prom. 466). As a substantive it may be defended by the analogy of such words as *ὑπέρθεος, ὑπερσοφιστής, ὑπερθεμιστοκλῆς, ὑπέρδουλος*. [B. J.]

[But *ὑπερ* is probably a corruption of *που*, which occurs elsewhere in similar references: vi. 490 C, vii. 533 D, ix. 572 C, 582 D, 588 B. Other conjectural emendations are *ὑπὲρ πλούτου* (Madvig), *ὑπερπλουτεῖν*. L. C.]

ἐν δημοκρατουμένῃ πόλει] sc. *ὤν*.

ἔχει τε κάλλιστον] sc. *ἡ δημοκρατουμένη πόλις*,—(1) 'is the fairest of its fair attributes.' Cp. Theaet. 171 A *τοῦτ' ἔχει κομψότατον*. Or (2) 'it has this in the highest perfection,' i.e. better than any other state. C

λέγεται . . . ῥῆμα] 'Why, yes,' said he, 'that is continually said.' Cp. Gorg. 465 D *τὸ τοῦ 'Αναξαγόρου ἂν* **πολὺ** *ἦν*: Soph. O. C. 305 **πολὺ** *γὰρ . . . τὸ σὸν ὄνομα διήκει πάντας*.

ὅπερ ᾖα νῦν δὴ ἐρῶν] These words resume the thread that has been broken off by digressions. Socrates has reminded Adeimantus that wealth was the principle and excessive wealth the ruin of oligarchy, and that liberty was the principle of democracy. He

Republic VIII. now returns to his main purpose, which was to prove that excessive liberty is the ruin of democracy and prepares for tyranny.

562 E **τὴν ἀναρχίαν**] No longer liberty, but anarchy.

563 A **καὶ σμικρὰ τοιάδε**] **σμικρά** is used ironically as in i. 339 B *σμικρά γε ἴσως, ἔφη, προσθήκη.* Cp. iv. 423 C *καὶ φαῦλόν γ', ἔφη, κ.τ.λ.*, and note.

B **τὸ δέ γε . . . ἔσχατον, κ.τ.λ.**] is an exclamation, softened by the epexegesis in **ὅσον γίγνεται, κ.τ.λ.** See above, 558 B *ἡ δὲ συγγνώμη, κ.τ.λ.*, and note.

C **οὐκοῦν κατ' Αἰσχύλον, κ.τ.λ.**] From an unknown play of Aeschylus. Fr. 341 Nauck.

Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity are found to exist among men and women, slaves and freemen. The animals catch the infection.

This and some of the previous passages are translated by Cic. de Rep. i. chap. 43. He has not however been altogether able to 'carry the jest,' which is propounded by him seriously and without the delicate preparation of Plato. 'Ex quo fit ut etiam servi se liberius gerant: uxores eodem iure sint quo viri. Quia tanta libertate canes etiam et equi, aselli, denique liberi sint, sic incurrant, ut eis de via decedendum sit.' The most extravagant and comical ideas (**ὅ τι νῦν ἦλθ' ἐπὶ στόμα**;) often occur in the works of Plato. But the manner of saying them, which enhances the humour, does away with the feeling of bad taste and impropriety.

ἀτεχνῶς γάρ, κ.τ.λ.] 'The proverb is amply verified, "like lady, like lap-dog."' The proverb of course refers to assimilation of character;—Master Shallow's men 'by observing of him, do bear themselves like foolish justices; he, by conversing with them, is turned into a justice-like serving-man: their spirits are so married in conjunction with the participation of society, that they flock together in consent, like so many wild-geese' (Shakespeare, 2 *Henry IV*, v. 1). But Plato applies it in a new sense with reference to assumed equality. The spaniel disputes the sofa with her mistress.

γίγνονται, κ.τ.λ.] 'and there are horses and asses accustomed,' &c. [B. J.]

[After **γίγνονται** some general notion such as *ἐλεύθεροι* has to be supplied. Or (2) deleting the commas and construing **γίγνονται** with what precedes, we may suppose some word of similar ending, e. g. *σεμνύνονται*, to have dropped out before **τε δή, κ.τ.λ.** L. C.]

τὸ ἐμόν . . . πάσχω] Cp. Charm. 173 A ἄκουε δή, ἔφη, τὸ ἐμὸν ὄναρ, εἴτε διὰ κεράτων εἴτε δι' ἐλέφαντος ἐλήλυθεν. *Republic VIII.* 563 D

πάντων τούτων . . . ποιεῖ] 'You perceive how the accumulation of all these things renders sensitive the mind of the citizens.' The subject of **ποιεῖ** is to be supplied from the genitive absolute. **τὸ . . . κεφάλαιον** is in apposition with the sentence. 'As the upshot of all this when it has accumulated, how sensitive the soul of the citizens becomes': cp. Theaet. 182 B ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πρὸς ἄλληλα συγγιγνομένων τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀποτίκτοντα τὰ μὲν ποιά ἄττα γίγνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ αἰσθανόμενα.

προσφέρηται] Dr. W. H. Thompson conjectured προσφέρῃ.

καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, οἶδα] 'I know it only too well, he said.' The alacrity of the response to the description of democracy here and supra 558 C implies personal experience. E

νεανική] 'sprightly.' This epithet is specially applied to the exaggerated form of democracy in which liberty becomes license— supra 562 C ff.

The excess of liberty leads to the extreme of servitude, and the state passes from democracy through anarchy to tyranny. The immediate authors of the change are the class of idle spendthrifts whom we compared to drones. Of these there are two species, the stinging and the stingless: the former lead the way, the latter follow; while between them they have almost a monopoly of power. For the money-making class do but afford them pasturage, and the poor who have to work for their subsistence will not attend to politics unless they are paid. And the drones, taking money from the rich, will give the others just so much as may conduce to their own purposes. The rich, driven to self-defence, incur the suspicion of oligarchy, and power is thus given to the Protector of the people. For the populace have always some one favourite. Let the Protector once taste blood, and his destiny is fixed. By the law of self-preservation he must become a wolf, i.e. a tyrant. When the combination of his enemies becomes formidable, he asks for a body-guard which is readily granted him. When this takes place, then let the rich man fly. For the Protector will cast many down, and stand erect in the chariot of the state, a full-blown Tyrant. *563 E–566 D*

ταὐτὸν . . . τοῦτο] I. e. excess. Socrates raises expectation by drawing out the analogy in the disorders of the oligarchical and 563 E

Republic VIII. 563 E democratical state. To this the interlocutor, Adeimantus, gives several passive and uncertain answers. He does not see whither the generalities of Socrates are tending. Socrates refers to his half-expressed dissatisfaction in the words *ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτ', οἶμαι . . . ἠρώτας* infra 564 B. 'But this was not the point of your question': viz. supra 562 E *πῶς . . . τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγομεν;*

καὶ τῷ ὄντι . . . (564 A) **ἥκιστα**] **τῷ ὄντι** marks the fresh exemplification of a familiar truth: cp. vi. 497 D *τὰ καλὰ* **τῷ ὄντι** *χαλεπά.* So *ὡς ἀληθῶς, ἀτεχνῶς.*

564 A **καὶ δή**] is omitted in Par. A and some other MSS. Though not necessary, the words are Platonic and idiomatic.

εἰς ἄγαν δουλείαν] Like *σφόδρα φιλία* Laws iii. 698 C.

ἐξ οἶμαι, κ.τ.λ.] **οἶμαι** is inserted like a particle after the preposition.

B **δουλοῦται αὐτήν**] sc. *τὴν δημοκρατίαν*, or rather *τὴν δημοκρατουμένην πόλιν.*

ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις] i. e. that was what I meant.

ἐκεῖνο . . . ἀκέντροις] The pronoun refers to supra 552 C where the 'drones' are first mentioned.

ἐν πάσῃ πολιτείᾳ ἐγγιγνομένω] sc. *ἐν ᾗ ἂν ἐγγίγνησθον*, 'wherever found.' After **ταράττετον**, *τὴν πολιτείαν* must be supplied from **ἐν πάσῃ πολιτείᾳ**, 'make confusion in every state where they arise.'

φλέγμα τε καὶ χολή] According to Aristotle, Prob. i. 29, *χολή* is hot and *φλέγμα* cold. The hot humour answers to the stinging, the cold to the stingless drones.

C **μελιτουργόν**] 'maker of honey,' is the reading of the first hand of Par. A. The other reading *μελιττουργόν*, 'bee-master,' is the more common, if not the only form elsewhere, which may be regarded as a reason either for adopting or rejecting it. It is also more directly in point.

ἐκτετμήσεσθον] The rare fut. perf. is very expressive,—'that they be extirpated once for all.'

ὧδε τοίνυν . . . καὶ ἔχει] The object of **λάβωμεν**, sc. *τὸ πρᾶγμα*, is easily supplied. There is a tendency in Plato to omit the case after verbs which describe dialectical or mental processes, e. g. *ἀναλαβεῖν, διορίζεσθαι, ἀναγκάζειν.*

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τὸ τοιοῦτον γένος] sc. τὸ τῶν κηφήνων.

δι' ἐξουσίαν] Cp. supra 557 B, D. 564 D

ἐκτὸς ὀλίγων] Public offices with few exceptions are filled by this class of persons. What exceptions Plato had in his mind we can only guess. He may be referring to institutions like the Areopagus, or to individual statesmen like Pericles: cp. infra E χωρίς τινων ὀλίγων.

προσίζον βομβεῖ] 'settles and keeps up a constant hum.'

βλίττει] There is no reason why this verb should not be used intransitively, but it is rather confusing to have it so with **βλίσειεν** following in the active meaning, and Ruhnken (Tim. p. 63) was perhaps right in reading βλίττεται. E

καλοῦνται] implies that the rich are now a separate class.

αὐτουργοί] 'who work with their hands:' not, as the word elsewhere means, 'tilling their own land.' They are here opposed to the employers of labour. 565 A

καὶ ἀπράγμονες] 'and keep out of politics.'

ἔστι γάρ . . . μεταλαμβάνῃ] **θαμά** belongs to the whole sentence, not to **ποιεῖν** alone:—'are not often disposed to do so.'

One of the great problems of democracies has ever been how to make the mass of the people use their infinitesimal share of the government. The power which they have is so small that it is very partially exercised except in times of revolution and excitement. The Athenians solved the difficulty by giving the ecclesiasts as well as the dicasts 'a little honey.' Cp. Aristoph. Wasps 655–679, and Dem. Olynth. iii. 37, §§ 35, 36.

The history of Athens in the century after the Persian War, and especially of the oligarchical party,—hardly loyal in the time of Pericles and Ephialtes, and in the later years of the Peloponnesian War usurping the government, which they afterwards accepted from a foreign power in the name of the Thirty Tyrants, and the political reaction to which the remembrance of this tyranny as well as of the older one of Pisistratus gave rise, is the best commentary on this passage.

τὸ πλεῖστον αὐτοὶ ἔχειν] Cp. especially Thuc. iii. 38 and 42.

μεταλαμβάνει . . . οὕτως] 'Why, yes, to that extent the people B

Republic VIII. do share:' i.e. they have what their leaders are willing to leave them.

565 C **εἰσαγγελίαι**] 'impeachments,' viz. against the oligarchs for arbitrary conduct, leading to reprisals on their part.

D **ὡς ἄρα . . . λύκῳ γενέσθαι**] **ὁ γευσάμενος, κ.τ.λ.**, which is an anacoluthon, is resumed in **τούτῳ**.

ἑνός] sc. *σπλάγχνου ἀνθρωπίνου*.

The legend is told in Pausanias viii. 2 *Λυκάων δὲ ἐπὶ τὸν βωμὸν τοῦ Λυκαίου Διὸς βρέφος ἤνεγκεν ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἔθυσε τὸ βρέφος, καὶ ἔσπεισεν ἐπὶ τοῦ βωμοῦ τὸ αἷμα, καὶ αὐτὸν αὐτίκα ἐπὶ τῇ θυσίᾳ γενέσθαι λύκον φησὶν ἀντὶ ἀνθρώπου.*

E **ἐμφυλίου αἵματος**] His fellow-citizen is regarded as his kinsman. For an account of the wide prevalence of similar beliefs and various conjectures respecting their origin, see McLennan's article 'Lycanthropy,' in *Encycl. Brit.*, ed. ix.

γλώττῃ . . . ἀνοσίῳ] The tongue and lips which make the slanderous accusation are vividly imagined as actually tasting blood.

566 A **ὑποσημαίνῃ**] For *ὑποσημαίνειν* = 'to indicate or intimate a line of action,' cp. Thuc. i. 82, § 3 *ὁρῶντες ἡμῶν ἤδη τήν τε παρασκευὴν καὶ τοὺς λόγους αὐτῇ ὁμοῖα* **ὑποσημαίνοντας**. **εἵμαρται** adds solemnity. It is a law of Destiny.

οὗτος . . . γίγνεται, κ.τ.λ.] **οὗτος** is predicate. 'The leader of the faction against the rich becomes that person'—the man who is destined to turn wolf.

B **διαβάλλοντες τῇ πόλει**] 'by setting the citizens against him.' For the construction cp. Phaedo 67 E *διαβέβληνται μὲν πανταχῇ τῷ σώματι.*

τὸ δὴ τυραννικὸν αἴτημα, κ.τ.λ.] **αἰτεῖν** infra is the explanation of **αἴτημα**.

αὐτοῖς] sc. *τῷ δήμῳ* supplied from **τὸν δῆμον** supra, marks ironically the personal interest which the people take in their Protector. The simplicity or stupidity of the people, who are compared in vi. 488 A, B to the deaf and short-sighted ship-master, is a favourite theme of Plato in the Republic.

C **τὸν Κροίσῳ γενόμενον χρησμόν**] Herod. i. 55.

ὁ δὲ δὴ προστάτης, κ.τ.λ.] **αὐτός** contrasts the position of the tyrant with that of the adversaries whom he has overthrown. The passage recalls the description of the triumphal return of Pisistratus in Herod. i. 59, 60. The allusion to Homer, Iliad xvi. 776 **κεῖτο μέγας μεγαλωστὶ** *λελασμένος ἱπποσυνάων*, is evident. *Republic VIII.* 566 C

What sort of happiness has the tyrant and the city which is under a tyranny? In his early days, the tyrant is all smiles and promises and humbleness, making gifts of lands to all and sundry, but especially to those who serve him. But there comes a time when he must stir up wars, that the people may require his leadership and that he may drain the resources of the powerful and also expose his private enemies to danger. War brings unpopularity, and some of those who helped him to his throne find fault with him. He must put these out of the way, and gradually he is compelled to 'purge the commonwealth' of all high-minded, brave, and able men, leaving only the dregs of the populace. At the same time, to secure his power, he must increase his body-guard with mercenaries and emancipated slaves. These are 'the wise companions whose intercourse,' as the tragic poet says, 'makes the tyrant wise.'—And it is because they say such things that we refuse to admit the tragedians into our state and bid them go elsewhere. They will breathe most freely, where the form of government is worst!—But we wander from the subject. Thus installed, the tyrant will, as long as he can, support his armies by robbery of temples and confiscation: and when that source fails, he will tax the people. If they resist, he will disarm and strike them, though he will be striking his own father. *566 D–569 C*

βροτός] is a poetical word and is chosen to express abhorrence:—'such a creature.' The strain of irony mingles with contempt in such expressions as *κάλλιστος ἀνήρ, καλλίστη πολιτεία, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τοῦ ἀνδρός, κ.τ.λ.*, cp. supra 562 A, 563 E. 566 D

ταῖς μὲν πρώταις ἡμέραις, κ.τ.λ.] cp. Hotspur on Bolingbroke ('this king of smiles') in Shakespeare, 1 *Henry IV*, i. 3, 246.

ὅταν δέ γε . . . καταλλαγῇ] 'but when in his relations to enemies without he is reconciled to some and destroys others,' &c. The irregularity of the language is softened by the possible construction of **πρὸς ἐχθρούς** with **καταλλαγῇ**, and the resumption of **ἐχθρούς** in **ἐκείνων**. For **ἡσυχία ἐκείνων** cp. Herod. i. 45, § 4 *ἐπεί τε* **ἡσυχίη τῶν ἀνθρώπων** *ἐγένετο περὶ τὸ σῆμα*. E

Republic VIII. **οὐκοῦν . . . ἐπιβουλεύωσιν;**] cp. Arist. Pol. v. 11, § 8.

567 A **ταῦτα δὴ . . . (B) πολίταις;**] **ἕτοιμον**, sc. *ἐστίν*. *ἕτοιμος* is one of a class of words, *ἄξιος*, *δῆλος*, &c., with which this ellipse is common. In the following sentence **παρρησιάζεσθαι** is governed by *ἕτοιμόν ἐστιν*, or by a more general notion to be gathered from **ἀνάγκη** and **ἕτοιμον**.

B **οὐκοῦν καί τινας τῶν ξυγκαταστησάντων**] Cp. again Shakespeare, 1 *Henry IV*, Act iii. sc. 1, Act v. sc. 1 (Worcester's speeches).

ὑπεξαιρεῖν] 'to remove.' Par. A reads *ὑπεξαίρειν* by a frequent confusion. For **ὑπεξαιρεῖν** in this sense = 'to put out of the way,' cp. especially Thuc. viii. 70, § 2 (of the Four Hundred) *ἄνδρας τέ τινας ἀπέκτειναν οὐ πολλούς, οἳ ἐδόκουν ἐπιτήδειοι εἶναι* **ὑπεξαιρεθῆναι.**

C **ὡς ἔοικε γάρ**] sc. *εἶναι*. **ἀνάγκη** is the subject of **ἔοικε.**

εἴπερ ἄρξει] 'if he is to be master.'

D **μετὰ φαύλων τῶν πολλῶν**] not 'with the many bad' (as in the translation) but 'with companions most of whom are bad.' Cp. ix. 579 B *ὑπὸ πάντων πολεμίων*.

τὸν μισθόν] 'the necessary pay.' It is assumed that he can get no service voluntarily.

E **τί δέ;**] The early editions read *τοὺς δέ*, which is not indefensible though weakly supported by the MSS. 'And when he has guardsmen on the spot, will he not prefer to employ them?' Par. A and nearly all the other MSS. give *τίς δέ* ('but who would not wish to get them on the spot?') This meaning is forced and inconsistent with the **ἆρα** which is weak even if changed to *ἄρα*. The most probable variant is that of the Munich MS. *q* which was preferred by Stallbaum, and is adopted in the text:—' Well, but will he not choose to take retainers (*δορυφόρους ποιήσασθαι*) from the spot?' According to any way of taking the passage some general notion such as *λαβεῖν* or *ποιήσασθαι* must be supplied with **ἐθελήσειεν** from **μεταπέμψεται** in the previous sentence.

568 A **οἱ νέοι πολῖται**] viz. the foreign mercenaries. **ξύνεισιν**, sc. *αὐτῷ*.

πυκνῆς διανοίας ἐχόμενον] 'characteristic of a shrewd wit.' Cp. vi. 496 A *φρονήσεως . . . ἀληθινῆς ἐχόμενον*.

B **ὡς ἄρα . . : συνουσίᾳ**] The line **σοφοὶ τύραννοι τῶν σοφῶν συνουσίᾳ** is variously ascribed by the scholiasts to an unknown play of

Euripides, and also to the Ajax Locrus of Sophocles. See Nauck, Frag. Soph. 13. *Republic VIII.* 568 B

τούτους] (1) may refer to **οὗτοι οἱ ἑταῖροι** supra: 'these' (i.e. the associates Plato has mentioned) 'are manifestly the wise men meant by Euripides:' or (2) with a comma before **ξύνεστιν**, 'these are the wise,' viz. the people with whom the tyrant consorts.

καὶ ὡς ἰσόθεόν γ', ἔφη . . . ποιηταί] The line to which allusion is made is Eurip. Troad. 1169 *γάμων τε καὶ τῆς* **ἰσοθέου τυραννίδος**. See also Phoenissae 503–506.

τοιγάρτοι . . . (c) **κομψοί**] The poets, who are ironically supposed to be of a gentle nature, as the law has been already passed, 'do forgive us' for expelling them. Hence the present (**ξυγγιγνώσκουσιν**) as well as the future **παραδεξόμεθα**.

Euripides is said to have visited the court of Archilaus king of Macedonia; Pindar and Simonides, perhaps Aeschylus also, were familiar at that of Hiero. Was Plato himself the friend and intimate of Dionysius? The manner in which the relation is here spoken of is at variance with such a supposition, for which the spurious epistles are not a sufficient warrant; and which may, perhaps, like the meeting of Solon and Croesus in Herodotus, be a moral sentiment rather than an historical fact. Whether Plato 'was or was not a good citizen,' no one was ever more intensely penetrated with the Greek feeling against tyrants.

καλὰς φωνὰς . . . μισθωσάμενοι] viz. of those who are called the poets' *ὑπηρέται*, supra ii. 373 B *ῥαψῳδοί, ὑποκριταί, χορευταί*. C

ἐξέβημεν] 'In this we have been making a digression.' The reference to Tragedy beginning at supra A *οὐκ ἐτός* was a digression. D

τὰ τῶν ἀποδομένων] This cannot be right. Par. A reads $\overset{\lambda}{\text{ἀποδομένων}}$, the λ above the line being possibly by the first hand. The reading *ἀπολομένων* is also found in the Munich MS. *q*. Baiter reads *καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀπολομένων*, which has the merit of giving regularity to the syntax. But the deferred apodosis (for which cp. especially ix. 575 A *τὸν ἔχοντά τε* and note) offers no real difficulty, and the suspended construction, to be resumed again after **τί δ' ὅταν, κ.τ.λ.**, is more suitable here than a passing reference to the proscription, which was a *fait accompli* at 567 C (cp. also supra A *τοὺς προτέρους ἐκείνους ἀπολέσας*). Stephanus proposed *τὰ τῶν ἀποδιδομένων*. But

Republic VIII. even the present tense ἀποδίδοσθαι hardly occurs with passive
568 D meaning. The reading $\overset{\lambda}{\text{ἀποδομένων}}$ is very possibly a corruption of πωλουμένων. 'First he will make use of what sacred treasures there are in the city,—so far as the proceeds of what is thus exposed for sale suffice, reducing the contribution which he exacts from the people.' [L. C.]

E **ἐὰν δέ**] ἐάν τε, the reading of Par. A, &c., is difficult to explain, and is not satisfactorily accounted for by Schneider, who supposes it to answer to a suppressed ἐάν τε μή. It is better either to omit τε or to read **ἐὰν δέ**, as in the text, with two MSS.—M (the Cesena MS.) and *v* (Angelicus). The latter alternative seems further to involve the omission of **δέ** in **πῶς** [**δὲ**] **λέγεις**;—**πῶς λέγεις**; **εἶπον· ἐὰν δέ**. The apodosis is supplied by the answer **γνώσεταί γε, κ.τ.λ.** (infra).

569 A **κατέστησεν**] 'established,' sc. ὡς προστάτην τοῦ δήμου.

ἀπό] ὑπό is the reading of the MSS., but is clearly wrong.

καὶ νῦν . . . ἐξελαύνων;] It may be doubted whether (1) **καὶ νῦν κελεύει** is dependent on **ὅτι**, and the indirect form of καὶ νῦν κελεύω; or (2) the preceding construction has been forgotten and **καὶ νῦν κελεύει** is an independent clause. The former is more lively and every way more probable.

γνώσεταί γε . . . ἐξελαύνει] for **ηὖξε** cp. supra 565 C αὔξειν μέγαν.

B **καί, τὸ λεγόμενον, κ.τ.λ.**] 'And as the saying is, the people who would avoid enslavement to free-men, which is smoke, have fallen under the tyranny of slaves, which is fire.' For the proverbial phrase cp. Shakespeare, *As You Like It*, i. 2, 270 'Thus must I from the smoke into the smother; From tyrant Duke unto a tyrant brother.'

C **δούλων δουλείαν μεταμπισχόμενος**] i.e. they are enslaved by slaves (cp. supra 567 E), which is the most galling form of slavery.

BOOK IX.

The tyrannical individual alone remains. To know how he arises out of the democratical man, and whether he lives happily or not, we must examine into the nature of the desires. There are some of them which are active only in sleep, but in our dreams are capable of any amount of lawlessness. Now the democratical man, as we found, deliberately gave play to every impulse in its turn, and we imagine him in later life to have a son, whom he has brought up on the same principle of indiscriminate indulgence. But the son is led away by the temptations to which his father had yielded only in part, and after various oscillations between counter-influences, at length a master-passion is planted in his breast. *Republic IX. 571 A–573 B*

λοιπὸς γὰρ οὖν] **οὖν** adds emphasis which can hardly be expressed in English: 'why, yes, he said, he is indeed the only one remaining.' 571 A

τὸ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, κ.τ.λ.] The thread is taken up from viii. 558 D ff. where the distinction between the necessary and unnecessary pleasures is first clearly drawn. The unchaining of the lower nature, which had been arrested at a certain point (viii. 561 A) is now to be followed to its consummation, and the working of the desires must therefore be more minutely described.

οὐκοῦν . . . ἔτ' ἐν καλῷ;] 'Is not the inquiry still open to us?'— B
ἐν καλῷ as in Soph. Elect. 384 *νῦν γὰρ ἐν* **καλῷ** *φρονεῖν.*

αἳ κινδυνεύουσι . . . παντί] 'which appear to be innate in every man.'

ἐνίων μὲν ἀνθρώπων] 'in some persons.' The genitive follows *ἡδοναὶ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι* resumed from the beginning of the sentence, and is to be repeated with **ἀπαλλάττεσθαι.** The latter word is passive as in viii. 559 A, B.

τῶν δέ] 'but in the case of others,' answering to **ἐνίων μέν.**

λέγεις δὲ καὶ . . . ταύτας;] 'and further let me ask, which do you mean by these?' **καί** is expressive of the surprise and interest which arises about the new point. Cp. Soph. O. T. 1129 *ποῖον ἄνδρα* **καὶ** *λέγεις*; Herod. ix. 25, § 2. C

Republic IX. 571 C **ἐκείνου**] sc. *τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ*, to be gathered from what precedes, viz. *τὸ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν* supra A.

ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ] is the resumption of the previous sentence **ὅταν . . . ἦθη**, which in turn is the explanation of the clause **τὰς . . . ἐγειρομένας.**

μητρί τε γάρ, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Soph. O. T. 981:

> *πολλοὶ γὰρ ἤδη κἀν ὀνείρασιν βροτῶν*
> *μητρὶ ξυνευνάσθησαν.*

ἐπιχειρεῖν] From the irrational element of human nature we here pass insensibly to the person in whom it is active.

D **ὡς οἴεται**] 'in imagination.'

βρώματός τε ἀπέχεσθαι μηδενός] 'to indulge in any sort of food.' Plato is preparing for the mention of the tyrant, infra 574 E, who in x. 619 C is supposed to eat his own children. In the latter part of the sentence the negative form of expression **οὐδὲν ὀκνεῖ** is lost sight of, and the general sense of **τολμᾷ** supra is continued.

ὑγιεινῶς . . . αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ] **αὑτοῦ** is a genitive of relation, like *καλῶς ἔχειν αὐτοῦ*. The passage which follows is translated by Cicero, de Divin. i. 29.

εἰς σύννοιαν αὐτὸς αὑτῷ] 'having come to reflect upon himself.' *σύννοια* has the meaning of 'reflexion,' 'deep thought' (cp. Aesch. Prom. 437 **συννοίᾳ** *δὲ δάπτομαι κέαρ*).

E **ἐνδείᾳ δούς**] Cp. infra 574 C *πληγαῖς τε* **δοῦναι**: Phaedr. 254 E *ὀδύναις* **ἔδωκε.**

572 A **ἀλλ' ἐᾷ, κ.τ.λ.**] sc. *τὸ βέλτιστον*. Par. A p. m. has *ὀρέγεσθαι καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι*. Par. A corr. has **ὀρέγεσθαί του καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι**: the remaining MSS. have *ὀρέγεσθαι τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι*. If the reading **ὀρέγεσθαί του καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι** is sound, the meaning is 'it leaves the soul free from pains and lusts to pure contemplation, and to aspire further (**καί**) to perceive something which it knows not.' But the words **καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι** should perhaps be struck out and the accent restored to **του**. The rational principle is imagined as feeling after that in sleep which it may hope to comprehend in waking. Cp. x. 611 E *οἵων* **ἐφίεται** *ὁμιλιῶν*.

καθεύδῃ] is a resumption of **εἰς τὸν ὕπνον ἴῃ**, which is again

repeated in ἀναπαύηται: 'and does not go to sleep in a state of angry excitement because of a quarrel against some one.'

572 A

τῆς τ' ἀληθείας . . . ἅπτεται] These words are not to be taken generally, but with reference to the time of sleep. When he goes to rest with his passions calmed and his reason awakened he attains more truth than when he goes to rest in any other frame of mind.

ταῦτα μὲν . . . ἐστίν] 'In saying these things we have digressed further than we intended: but the point on which we wish to remark is this.' B

Cp. Arist. Eth. Nic. i. 13, §§ 12, 13 *ταύτης μὲν οὖν κοινή τις ἀρετὴ καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνη φαίνεται· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις ἐνεργεῖν μάλιστα τὸ μόριον τοῦτο καὶ ἡ δύναμις αὕτη, ὁ δ' ἀγαθὸς καὶ κακὸς ἥκιστα διάδηλοι καθ' ὕπνον (ὅθεν φασὶν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν τὸ ἥμισυ τοῦ βίου τοὺς εὐδαίμονας τῶν ἀθλίων· συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο εἰκότως· ἀργία γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ὕπνος τῆς ψυχῆς ᾗ λέγεται σπουδαία καὶ φαύλη), πλὴν εἰ μή κατὰ μικρὸν διϊκνοῦνταί τινες τῶν κινήσεων, καὶ ταύτῃ βελτίω γίγνεται τὰ φαντάσματα τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἢ τῶν τυχόντων.*

The truth seems to be, as Aristotle implies, that dreams have little or nothing of a moral nature; they are not the passions let loose from the control of reason, but physical imaginations of good and evil in which the will is almost, if not entirely, absent. Dreams are 'decaying sense'; they are the recollections of our waking life fancifully combined by associations which have no law; and sometimes the animal desires, but hardly ever the malignant ones, find an expression in them.

καὶ πάνυ . . . εἶναι] 'Even in some of us who unquestionably seem to be virtuous men.' καὶ πάνυ is to be joined with δοκοῦσιν. μετρίοις, 'not in excess,' and therefore, according to Greek notions, 'good and virtuous.'

ἦν] 'He arose, did he not (που), through being trained from his youth upward under a miserly parent?' (supra viii. 559 D). C

παιδιᾶς τε καὶ καλλωπισμοῦ ἕνεκα] 'Disregarding the unnecessary, which have for their object only amusement or ornament.'

εἰς . . . τὸ ἐκείνων εἶδος] 'To their fashions.' εἶδος is the plan or mode of life adopted by the men. Cp. Thuc. viii. 56 *τρέπεται ἐπὶ τοιόνδε* εἶδος. Ficinus gives *mores* (*ἦθος*?): cp. vi. 497 B.

Republic IX. **ἑκάστων**] sc. πάντων ὧν ἂν ἑκάστοτε ἀπολαύῃ (cp. viii. 561 B).

572 D **οὔτε ἀνελεύθερον οὔτε παράνομον**] i.e. in the mean between ὀλιγαρχία and ἀναρχία,—οὐδὲν μᾶλλον εἰς ἀναγκαίους ἢ μὴ ἀναγκαίους ἡδονὰς ἀναλίσκων (viii. 561 A), βίον ἰσονομικοῦ τινὸς ἀνδρός (ib. E).

θὲς τοίνυν . . . τίθει] The present tense is appropriately substituted for the aorist, because in what follows attention is drawn not merely to the fact of his education which is presupposed, but to his way of life which is represented as continuing.

E **ὀνομαζομένην δ'**] 'which however is termed.' Cp. Herod. vii. 155, § 2 ὑπὸ . . . τῶν σφετέρων δούλων, **καλεομένων δὲ** Κυλλυρίων.

ταῖς ἐν μέσῳ] Supra D κατέστη εἰς μέσον.

τοὺς δ' αὖ] sc. τοὺς διαφθείροντας, supra C.

τὰ ἕτοιμα διανεμομένων] 'which divide his means among them.' Cp. viii. 552 B τῶν ἑτοίμων ἀναλωτής.

573 A **τῶν τοιούτων**] 'of men like him,' in whom the lower nature is predominant.

573 A–C *The master passion, a great and winged drone, leads the swarm of other passions buzzing in his train. They feed and pamper him until his sting is grown, when he is surrounded with a body-guard of furious lusts, which kill or banish what remains in the man of prudential and conventional virtue. Has not Passion long been called the tyrant of the soul? Is not the drunken man a lord? And do not madmen fancy that they can rule over the Gods?*

573 A **περὶ αὐτόν . . . (B) ἐν αὐτῷ . . . παρ' αὐτοῦ**] **περὶ αὐτόν**, i.e. the monster winged drone. **ἐν αὐτῷ**, i.e. the man,—not ἐν αὑτῷ, 'in the drone,' for good opinions and desires could hardly be supposed to exist in him, and **οὗτος ὁ προστάτης τῆς ψυχῆς** must be the subject of **λάβῃ: παρ' αὐτοῦ**, i.e. the monster winged drone. The subject of **καθήρῃ** is the drone and the object is the man.

οἴνων] The rare plural may imply variety of wines (Xen. An. iv. 4, 9), but is rather simply 'magnific.' **ἀνειμένων** is a 'dragging predicate' implying a relative clause (cp. vii. 532 C) 'the pleasures found in such society, which are dissolute.'

ὑπὸ μανίας] A crowd of mad thoughts and fancies supply the place of the tyrant's body-guard—viii. 566 B. The manner in

which the metaphor is harmonized and sustained by the 'buzzing of the appetites,' and the 'sting of desire,' which is implanted in the monster drone, is very characteristic of Plato, in whom such continuous metaphors are used not merely as images but as links of connexion. In the same manner, by the use of the word *προστάτην* 572 E, continued in the **προστάτης τῆς ψυχῆς**, the master passion is gradually developed into the demagogue or leader of the people. *Republic IX.* 573 A

ποιουμένας χρηστάς] 'regarded as good.' **ποιουμένας** is one of those disparaging additions which Plato often employs, and here refers to the respectable ideas and motives which hold the desires in check when philosophy is absent. See above in the description of the oligarchical man (viii. 554 E) *εὐσχημονέστερος ἂν πολλῶν . . . εἴη*, and in the progress of his son (viii. 560 A) *αἰδοῦς τινὸς ἐγγενομένης ἐν τῇ τοῦ νέου ψυχῇ*. This use of the passive *ποιεῖσθαι*, although not supported by parallels from other writers, appears to be sufficiently established by the passages quoted on vi. 498 A. Another meaning suggested here is 'good opinions in process of formation.' But this use is no better authenticated, and it is out of keeping with the rest of the description to suppose any genuine tendencies to virtue springing up afresh at this stage of the downward career. B

καὶ μανίας] **καί**, although found in Par. A and several other MSS. is probably spurious.

καὶ μὴν . . . ἄρχειν] Cp. Soph. Aj. 116, where Ajax gives his orders to Athena. *ὑποκινεῖν* suggests mental *disturbance* or *excitement*, *παρακινεῖν* rather *alienation* or *derangement*. There is no reason why *ὑποκινεῖν* should not also be used intransitively. C

Plato, in introducing a new sense of **τυραννικός**, illustrates his meaning by metaphorical uses of the word in common parlance,—*τὰ φορτικὰ . . . προσφέροντες* (iv. 442 E).

ἀκριβῶς] = *τῷ ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ*: 'in the true sense of the word.'

***ἀνήρ**] This word is probably the subject and should be **ἁνήρ**, although the MSS., as usual in such cases, read *ἀνήρ*. The presence of the article is proved by the lengthening of the alpha in similar places of tragic dialogue.

The life of riot which ensues awakens clamorous wants, which are supplied through rapine, until he robs and beats his parents, whom *573 C–575 A*

Republic IX. 573 C–575 A *he makes subservient to the meanest object of his desires. Then he breaks into houses, and robs temples, while the newly enfranchised lusts, that were formerly chained down except in sleep, overpower his respectable 'democratic' prepossessions. The master-passion is now tyrant to the height, and leads the soul that is under his dominion into every excess of crime, being ministered to partly from without and partly from within.*

573 D **τὸ τῶν . . . ἐρεῖς**] 'As people say in jest, that is not my business to tell you, but yours to tell me.' **καί** is idiomatic, giving a sly emphasis:—'That is just what you have to tell *me*.'

παρ' αὐτοῖς] 'Amongst them,' viz. the man and his companions: cp. supra A *τῶν τοιούτων*, also infra 575 C. Such monstrosities 'never come single.'

ὧν ἂν Ἔρως] **ὧν** is governed by **Ἔρως**. 'Whatever things are objects of the tyrant Passion that lives within.'

παραβλαστάνουσιν] 'spring up beside' the master-passion. The image is that of young saplings shooting up at the side of a tree.

E **τῆς οὐσίας παραιρέσεις**] 'encroachments on his capital':—he parts with some of his estate.

ὅταν δὲ . . . βιασάμενον;] The passage is imitated by Longinus, de Sublim. xliv. 7, where a poetical image is converted into a rhetorical figure.

τοὺς δέ] Still referring to the tyrannical man and his comrades who resemble him:—supra *παρ' αὐτοῖς* and note. The alternative of sing. and plur. prepares for infra 575 A *καὶ ἂν μὲν . . . ὀλίγοι . . . ὦσι, κ.τ.λ.*

σφόδρα γ', ἔφη] sc. *ἀνάγκη*.

ἀναγκαῖον . . . φέρειν] 'he must get money from each and every source'—carrying on the notion of violence contained in **ἀφελέσθαι**.

574 B **οὐ πάνυ . . . τοιούτου**] 'I do not feel at all comfortable about the parents of such a gentleman as this.'

πρὸς Διός] here as elsewhere, like **ὦ θαυμάσιε** supra, indicates the rising excitement of the speaker. There is a play on the word *ἀναγκαῖος* in the two senses of *necessitas* and *necessitudo*,—'who is bound to him by the closest ties.' Cp. vii. 527 A *ἀναγκαίως* and note.

πληγαῖς τε δοῦναι, κ.τ.λ.] In these words Plato is preparing for the actual tyrant: cp. infra 575 D *ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἐπιτρέπῃ, κ.τ.λ.* 574 C

ἐπιλίπῃ] The reading is doubtful between **ἐπιλίπῃ**, 'fail,' and *ἐπιλείπῃ*, 'begin to fail.' D

νεωκορήσει] 'He will clean out,' i.e. plunder, 'a temple':—a playful litotes like 'convey' in Shakespeare. This point in the individual answers to viii. 568 D, E in the account of tyranny:—*ἐάν τε ἱερὰ χρήματα ᾖ, κ.τ.λ.*

τὰς δικαίας ποιουμένας] The reading **δικαίας** was restored in place of *δίκας* by Bekker from Par. A; in which, however, it is a correction, though apparently by the first hand. The phrase is a repetition of supra 573 B *ἐάν τινας ἐν αὐτῷ δόξας ἢ ἐπιθυμίας λάβῃ ποιουμένας χρηστάς*, where see the note. The reading of the other MSS., *τὰς δίκας ποιουμένας*, meaning, according to Stallbaum 'which gave judgement about things good and evil,' is equally doubtful in point of Greek and of sense. The 'opinions' are those imparted to him by his democratical father, who still respects, or fears, the law.

αἱ νεωστὶ . . . λελυμέναι] Cp. supra 571 B *κολαζόμεναι, κ.τ.λ.*, infra 575 A *τὸν δ' ἔνδοθεν . . . ἐλευθερωθέντα.* This point recalls viii. 567 E.

τυραννευθεὶς δὲ ὑπὸ Ἔρωτος] 'But now that he is under the dominion of the great Passion.'—The subject is changed from *αἱ νεωστὶ ἐκ δουλείας λελυμέναι* under the influence of the preceding clause **ὅτε ἦν αὐτός, κ.τ.λ.** E

βρώματος] supra 571 D and note.

τὸν ἔχοντά τε αὐτόν] The particle **τε** after **ἔχοντα** is probably genuine; but the construction is broken off and resumed in **ἂν μέν, κ.τ.λ.** which follows, the immediate consequences being thus distinguished from the ulterior result. Plato readily passes from the individual to the state, and plays with language in the transition from one to the other. 575 A

αὑτόν τε καὶ τὸν περὶ αὑτόν] The reflexive pronouns refer to **Ἔρως.**

τὸν . . . θόρυβον] The rabble-rout in attendance on the master-passion. The racket and turmoil (viii. 561 B) are poetically substituted for the crowd which makes them.

ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ] 'By those same dispositions

Republic IX. 575 A and by himself' (sc. τοῦ Ἔρωτος). The pronoun **τῶν αὐτῶν** refers to the preceding words—**τὸν μὲν ἔξωθεν, κ.τ.λ.** The master-passion, with the help of the alien lusts which are his bodyguard (*μανίας . . . ἐπακτοῦ* supra 573 B) sets free the servile lusts which have hitherto been held in subjection. The whole description is parallel to viii. 567 D, E.

575 A–576 B *Such is the tyrannical person in himself. What is he in relation to his city? When there are a few such men, and they are kept under, they go and serve some tyrant or become mercenaries, if there is war; otherwise they stay at home and do petty mischiefs, such as burglary and kidnapping, or find congenial occupation about the courts of law. But when they have multiplied, and become aware of their numerical strength, they pick out the man from among them who has the most tyrannical disposition and make him a tyrant. He is the most lustful, the most violent of them all; who, before 'his infant fortune comes to age,' is full of smiles and 'courtesies,' but when his end is gained, looks strangely on those that helped him to power. He never has a friend, nor gets a taste of freedom, but is ever faithless, ever unjust. We are now speaking of him as in a dream. But when the dream becomes reality, then is attained the very acmè of human evil.*

575 B **ἄλλον τινὰ . . . τύραννον**] *ἄλλος* refers to *τυραννικὸς ἀνήρ*: they who have the making of tyrants in them, or who are all but tyrants, i.e. *οἱ τυραννικοὶ ἄνδρες*, go and find another tyrant, in whose service they enlist.

ἐὰν . . . γένωνται] 'If such characters are bred when there is no war.' The antithesis is suggested by the casual phrase **ἐάν που πόλεμος ᾖ.**

C **σμικρὰ . . . βάλλει**] 'A small catalogue of evils,—(even) if there are only a few such men!' 'Why yes,' said I, 'for small is small in comparison with great; and all these things in the misery and mischief which they inflict upon a state don't come within a league of the tyrant, as the saying is.' Socrates' **σμικρά,**—'small in comparison with tyranny,' is ironically echoed by Adeimantus. The meaning, however, is taken up seriously in the next sentence. A similar play on the same word between the ironical and serious occurs elsewhere in Plato: cp. vi. 498 D Εἰς **μικρόν** γ', ἔφη, χρόνον εἴρηκας. Εἰς οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν, ἔφην, ὥς γε πρὸς τὸν ἅπαντα. For the catalogue of 'small evils' cp. i. 344 B ff.

πλεῖστον . . . τύραννον] 'Most of the tyrannical nature.' Cp. ii. 382 D **ποιητὴς . . .** *ψευδὴς ἐν θεῷ οὐκ ἔνι*,—viii. 554 D *τὰς τοῦ* **κηφῆνος** *ξυγγενεῖς . . . ἐπιθυμίας*. The expression here keeps up the personification of *Ἔρως, τύραννος ἔνδον οἰκῶν*, supra 573 D. 575 D

τυραννικώτατος] 'Most fit to be a tyrant.' Cp. *βασιλικός*.

ἐὰν . . . ὑπείκωσιν] For the suppressed apodosis cp. Protag. 325 D *καὶ ἐὰν μὲν ἑκὼν πείθηται· εἰ δὲ μή, κ.τ.λ.*

μητρίδα] like the English 'mother-country' for the German 'fatherland.'

θρέψει] has a sarcastic force. 'That is his way of supporting her!'

τοιοίδε] refers to what follows: 'they are always associating with their flatterers, cringing to those who have power to aid them, and neglecting their old friends.'—The plural again takes the place of the singular (**τοῦ τοιούτου ἀνδρός**). E

πρῶτον μὲν . . . ἀλλότριοι ;] 'In the first place, in their intercourse with others, they associate with their own flatterers or ready tools; or, if they want anything from anybody, they are equally ready to fall down before them:—there is no attitude of friendship into which they will not throw themselves:—and when they have gained their end, they know them no more.' This also is a point in which tyrannical men resemble the tyrant (viii. 566 E).

καὶ σφόδρα γε] sc. *τοιοῦτοι γίγνονται*. 576 A

κεφαλαιωσώμεθα . . . τοιοῦτος ᾖ] 'Let us, then, sum up in a word the character of the worst. He is the man who in reality is such as we imagined him in our dream.' B

The thought of **ὕπαρ** and **ὄναρ** may have been suggested by supra 571 C, D, but does not directly refer to the bad dreams there spoken of: the word **διήλθομεν** is inconsistent with this explanation:—not 'who is in reality the monster let loose in a dream,' but 'who is in fact the man whom we have described in words.' Plato's love of climax leads to this further step. And here, as in several other places, Socrates enlivens the thought by a transition from the imaginary to the real. Cp. iii. 389 D *ἐάν γε . . . ἐπί γε λόγῳ ἔργα τελῆται.* At this point the mock-heroic style passes into seriousness. Socrates, as Chaerephon says of him in the Gorgias, is profoundly in earnest:—*Ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὑπερφυῶς σπουδάζειν.*

Republic IX. 576 C–578 A *And is the acmè of evil the acmè of wretchedness? Let us compare them, Glaucon,—the five cities and the five men. The men will be as the cities.—For example, as the city under a tyranny is the most wretched of all, so is the life that is under the tyranny of desire. Such at least is the judgement of those who are able to look within. City and man are both seen to be enslaved under the rule of the worst. Both are poor and hungry. Both are full of lamentation and mourning and woe. But there is one being who is yet more wretched than the tyrannical man, and that is the tyrannical man who becomes a tyrant.*

576 C **τοιοῦτος**] *ἄθλιος*,—sc. *φανήσεται.*

τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς . . . δοκεῖ] 'But the many have likewise opinions many.' These words follow closely on **τῇ ἀληθείᾳ**. Truth is one; error is manifold. He *is* miserable, though opinions differ. Plato thus signifies his contempt for common opinion. For the turn of expression cp. vi. 500 D *διαβολὴ* **δ'** *ἐν πᾶσι πολλή.*

ἀνάγκη, κ.τ.λ.] 'that must certainly be as you say.' **γοῦν** implies 'whatever the many may think.'

ἄλλο τι . . . οὕτως;] 'And must not the tyrannical man be like the tyrannical city?' **ὁμοιότητι** is an explanation or illustration of **κατά**: cp. viii. 555 A *ἀπιστοῦμεν μὴ κατὰ τὴν ὀλιγαρχουμένην πόλιν* **ὁμοιότητι** . . . *τετάχθαι;*—'Must they not correspond in similitude?' The word in both places has been needlessly called in question. The dative is like *πονηρίᾳ τε καὶ ἀθλιότητι* supra 575 C. *ἀθλιότητι* would fit the context here. But Plato characteristically prepares for what follows by using a general expression and so affecting to keep the question open. Cp. infra 577 C *τὴν ὁμοιότητα ἀναμιμνησκόμενος.*

D **τί οὖν ἀρετῇ, κ.τ.λ.**] This reading, which is manifestly right, has been corrupted in all the MSS. to *τί οὖν ἆρα* (or *ἄρα*) *ἤ*, and has only been preserved as a various reading by the diorthotes on the margin of Par. A.

εὐδαιμονίας] For the use of the genitive cp. v. 470 A *τί δέ; γῆς τε τμήσεως τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς καὶ οἰκιῶν ἐμπρήσεως.* The same notion is resumed with greater distinctness infra 577 B *πῶς ἔχει* **εὐδαιμονίας**;

ἀλλ' ὡς χρή] sc. *θεασάμενοι ὡς χρή*, which is resumed in **καταδύντες . . . καὶ ἰδόντες**, 'having fairly looked at the whole city from within, we will then give our opinion.'

ἆρ' οὖν . . . διορᾷ;] 'And shall I be right in making the same challenge about the men, and in claiming to have as judge one whose mind can enter into the character of a man and look through him; not like a child who sees from the outside and is dazzled at the parade which the tyrannical nature assumes to those without;—but who has a clear insight?' *Republic IX.* 576 E

πρόστασις, like *προστασία*, *πρόσχημα*, here signifies 'outward show,' the externals of majesty. This meaning of the word, though not common, is defined by the clause which follows:—**ἣν πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω σχηματίζονται.** 577 A

εἰ οὖν οἰοίμην . . . (B) ταῦτα προκαλοῖο] The words **εἰ οὖν, κ.τ.λ.**, are a resumption of the previous sentence: the apodosis to them is the answer;—'If I were to suppose, as I am saying'— '. . . That, he replied, would like the former be a very right challenge.'

καὶ ταῦτα] refers to 576 E *ὀρθῶς . . . προκαλεῖ.* B

τῶν δυνατῶν ἄν, κ.τ.λ.] 'Of the number of those who would be able to judge': **ἂν** is to be taken with **δυνατῶν** = *δυναμένων.*

What follows is the answer to the question which was raised in the first Book,—'Whether the life of the just or unjust man is the happier?' The inquiry, which had already become 'ridiculous' in Book iv (445 A), is once more resumed, and the answer to what was at first an unanswerable paradox appears in the most complete and triumphant form.

καθ' ἕκαστον] sc. *πάθημα*, anticipating **τὰ παθήματα.** C

ἐν μέρει ἀθρῶν] sc. *ἑκάτερον,— τήν τε πόλιν καὶ τὸν ἄνδρα.*

ὡς πόλιν εἰπεῖν] 'To speak of the city as a city' [i.e. not merely as a number of individuals]. Cp. infra E *ὡς περὶ ὅλης εἰπεῖν ψυχῆς.*

ἀνήρ] See above, note on 573 C. D

σμικρὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ μοχθηρότατον] The ruling passion is here spoken of as a *small* part of the soul. The object of this, which is hardly consistent with the foregoing description, is to render the parallel between state and individual as complete as possible.

πολύ γε] sc. *ἥκιστα.*

καὶ ἡ τυραννουμένη ἄρα . . . μεστὴ ἔσται] 'Then the soul which is under tyranny (I am speaking of the soul taken as a whole) E

Republic IX. will do least of all what she wishes;—ever violently carried away by frenzy, she will be full of confusion and remorse.' Cp. Gorg. 467 ff

577 E The harmony of affections and faculties is a far higher conception of the powers of human nature than the isolated strength of any one of them under the name of will or passion; which has the appearance and perhaps the consciousness of strength, and is really weakness.

578 A **τήν τε τοιαύτην πόλιν, κ.τ.λ.**] The confusion of τε and γε in MSS. is so frequent, that there need be no hesitation in reading **τήν τε** here, although it has less of manuscript support than τήν γε.

ὀδυρμοὺς δέ] **δέ** here rests on the authority of Ven. Ξ:—Par. A having τε with the remaining MSS. Schneider, to account for the variation, suggested δέ γε. [τε should be adopted: there is no objection to an asyndeton. B. J.]

B **τήν τε πόλιν τῶν πόλεων**] Here the variant τήν γε might seem preferable. But cp. viii. 568 D and note.

οὔπω . . . μάλιστα] 'I do not think that our description has yet arrived at the extreme form of misery.' **οὗτος** = 'the man before us.' **τοιοῦτος** = ἄθλιος, sc. ὤν.

Plato is preparing a rhetorical surprise:—There is yet a worse than the worst.

C **δυστυχὴς ᾖ**] is better than δυστυχήσῃ, an emendation unnecessarily proposed by Bekker and Cobet. There is no valid objection to the variation of tense. The present here is more pathetic,—'But is an unfortunate man': cp. infra 580 A δυστυχεῖ εἶναι.

578 C–580 A *Consider first the position of the tyrant. He may be compared to the master of a household of slaves, who should be set down with them in a desert place out of reach of aid from his fellows. Nay more, we must suppose him to be surrounded by neighbours who are determined to abolish slavery. He cannot go abroad, or see what is worth seeing anywhere, but, starved in spirit, must abide like a woman in some inner chamber, cowering and unsatisfied.*

Now suppose the man in this position to have the tyrannical nature, such as we have described it. Must he not descend to be the slave of the meanest, the flatterer of the vilest,—becoming daily more avarice-bitten, more inquisitive, more envious, faithless and unjust? Godless and friendless, he is the entertainer and cherisher of all manner of evil,—unhappy and causing unhappiness.

Republic IX. 578 C

τεκμαίρομαι . . . σκοπεῖν] 'I should infer from what has preceded that what you say is true.' 'Yes,' said I; 'however, these are not matters about which to have an opinion, but of which one should endeavour to gain a clear conception (1) by the help of such a process of reasoning as we now employ': or possibly (2) 'Where the argument is of such a nature.' For the latter (2) cp. infra 579 C *τοῖς τοιούτοις κακοῖς* and note. The turn of conversation here resembles vi. 504 D *οὐχ ὑπογραφὴν δεῖ ὥσπερ νῦν θεάσασθαι, ἀλλὰ τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀπεργασίαν μὴ παριέναι.*

ὅσοι πλούσιοι] sc. *ὄντες*, which seems to be omitted in accordance with the idiomatic ellipse after *ὅσος*. D

διαφέρει . . . πλῆθος] 'But the number of the persons over whom he (the tyrant) rules is a point of difference.' Cp. Xen. Mem. iii. 4, § 12 *ἡ γὰρ τῶν ἰδίων ἐπιμέλεια πλήθει μόνον διαφέρει τῆς τῶν κοινῶν.*

οἶσθ' οὖν ὅτι, κ.τ.λ.] Socrates, wanting to draw attention to a familiar fact, treats it as a new and original observation.—'Did you ever remark' &c.? Cp. ii. 376 A *ἢ οὔπω τοῦτο ἐθαύμασας;*

τί γάρ . . .; οὐδέν, εἶπον] 'Why should they fear them?' 'Oh, for no reason.' The negative in this and similar places merely waives the point immediately in hand before calling attention to something else, which remains to be said, cp. esp. iv. 424 D *οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐργάζεται* and note. The familiar phrase in Protag. 310 B—*μή τι νεώτερον ἀγγέλλεις; Οὐδέν γ', ἦ δ' ὅς, εἰ μὴ ἀγαθά γε,*—is an example of the same conversational idiom. [L. C.]

ἐν ποίῳ . . . καὶ ὁπόσῳ] The indirect form following on the direct is partly occasioned here by the neighbourhood of **οἴει**. Some MSS. have *πόσῳ*,—but cp. Gorg. 500 A *ἐκλέξασθαι ποῖα ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων ἐστὶ καὶ ὁποῖα κακά.* E

ἐν παντί] sc. *φόβῳ*. 'In absolute terror.' Cp. Soph. 250 D *πάσῃ συνεσχόμεθα ἀπορίᾳ.*

The single master who has many slaves is safe only because all the masters unite for mutual protection. But suppose the family and their slaves to be carried off into the wilderness: the case of the individual owner is desperate. Or, again, surround the unfortunate man with neighbours who make the possession of slaves a crime,—and there is a worse than what seemed to be the worst position. Both these misfortunes have befallen the tyrant:—he is in a solitude, and has nevertheless all mankind for his enemies.

Republic IX. 579 A **οὐδὲν δεόμενος**] 'When he has no need to do so': i. e. being actuated by no ordinary motive, but by fear. Cp. Plut. Tib. Gracch. c. 21 (quoted by Schneider) *δείσασα περὶ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἡ βουλὴ ψηφίζεται* **μηδὲν δεομένη** *πέμπειν αὐτὸν ἐς Ἀσίαν.*

B **ἐν παντὶ κακοῦ**] Cp. Symp. 194 A *εὖ μάλ' ἂν φοβοῖο καὶ* **ἐν παντὶ** *εἴης*: Euthyd. 301 A.

ὑπὸ πάντων πολεμίων] 'By people who are all his enemies.' Cp. vi. 496 D *εἰς πᾶσιν ἀγρίοις ἀντέχειν*: viii. 567 D *μετὰ φαύλων τῶν πολλῶν οἰκεῖν.*

Resuming from 578 C Plato now returns to the tyrant and the tyrannical man.

λίχνῳ δὲ ὄντι, κ.τ.λ.] It is a characteristically Greek trait that the tyrannical nature has not only the lower desires in excess, but also unbounded curiosity, like Glaucon's *φιλοθεάμονες* in v. 475 D.

C **τοῖς τοιούτοις κακοῖς**] (1) A dative of circumstance, referring to the immediately preceding description of the tyrant's condition. Ast's conjecture *ἐν τοῖς τ. κ.* is not necessary. The tyrant's miseries are increased a hundred-fold when he is of the tyrannical nature. The extreme of wretchedness attending the combination of character and position is greater than the evil involved in either taken separately. Or (2) the dative may be explained as denoting the measure of excess—The description of the tyrannical tyrant began at 578 C: what followed was an illustration of his excess of misery over the tyrannical individual as such. The illustration is now applied. 'Do not such evils as these measure the excess of misery accruing to him whom you just now judged to be most wretched of all, when he is raised from a private station to despotical power?' **πλείω καρποῦται**, sc. *κακά.*

ὡς μὴ ἰδιώτης] The opposition of the following clause logically requires *μὴ ὡς*, which recent editors have accordingly accepted from Stobaeus and Vat. Θ. But the order of words is idiomatic.

D **ὁμοιότατά τε καὶ ἀληθέστατα λέγεις**] Cp. Soph. 252 C *κομιδῇ λέγεις* **ὅμοιόν** *τε καὶ ἀληθές.*

κἂν εἰ μή τῳ δοκεῖ] The conjunctive *δοκῇ*—see v. 11.—has the authority of all the MSS. but one. There are too many instances of *εἰ, ἐπεί*, &c., with the subjunctive to allow of confidence in rejecting it: e. g. Laws xii. 958 D *εἴτε τις ἄρρην εἴτε τις θῆλυς ᾖ.* [But? *ἦν.*] And **κἂν εἰ** appears sometimes to be treated as = *καὶ*

ἐάν. In Arist. Eth. Nic. vii. 7, § 1 the MSS. have κἂν εἰ ῥέπωσι. See also Pol. ii. 1, 1 with the note of Mr. W. L. Newman in his *Politics*, vol. ii. p. 227. *Republic IX.* 579 D

κόλαξ τῶν πονηροτάτων] cp. supra A κόλαξ . . . θεραπόντων.

καὶ ἃ τὸ πρότερον εἴπομεν] supra 576 A, B, viii. 567. 580 A

The case is now ripe for judgement, and Glaucon formally assigns to the five individuals their places in the order of virtue and happiness and the contraries of these. The most royal nature is the best and happiest; the most 'tyrannical' is the worst and wretchedest, while (1) *the oligarchical and* (2) *the democratical man come between.* *580 A–D*

ἴθι δή . . . τυραννικόν] 'Come now, said I, as the universal arbiter sets forth his sentence,' 'so do you also decide who in your opinion is the first, and who the second, and the remainder, being five in all, in order.' 580 B

The expression **ὁ διὰ πάντων κριτής** is obscure, and cannot be certainly explained. It has been compared to τὸν **διὰ πάντων** χορόν or ἀγῶνα, found in inscriptions:—Boeckh's *C. I. G.* vol. i. 425, 1586, 1719, 1720. The words may mean (1) the judge who decides the prizes of all the different kinds of contests; (2) or all the prizes, e.g. first, second, third, in the same contest; (3) the judge who gave the final decision in some musical pentathlon, such as appears to be referred to in the inscriptions. Cp. Herod. ii. 91, § 5 ἀγῶνα γυμνικὸν τιθεῖσι **διὰ πάσης** ἀγωνίης ἔχοντα, and Laws ii. 658 A τί ἄν, εἴ ποτέ τις οὕτως ἁπλῶς ἀγῶνα θείη ὁντινοῦν, μηδὲν ἀφορίσας μήτε γυμνικὸν μήτε μουσικὸν μήθ' ἱππικόν, ἀλλὰ πάντας συναγαγὼν τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει προείποι θεὶς νικητήρια τὸν βουλόμενον ἥκειν ἀγωνιούμενον ἡδονῆς πέρι μόνον: ib. xii. 949 A καὶ κριτὴν αὖ χορῶν καὶ **πάσης** μουσικῆς. The separate contests may have had separate experts to judge of them—**πέντε ὄντας** seems to convey an allusion to the pentathlon; and the words **ὥσπερ χοροὺς κρίνω** in Glaucon's reply are in favour of this line of interpretation, for which see also Xen. Mem. iii. 4, § 3 ὁσάκις κεχορήγηκε, **πᾶσι τοῖς χοροῖς** νενίκηκε. The image, however, is not consistent; for **διὰ πάντων** must have originally referred to all the kinds of performance, but is here applied to all the competitors.

πέντε ὄντας] of course refers to all the individuals and not to **τοὺς ἄλλους** with which it is verbally combined.

Republic IX. **καθάπερ . . . εἰσῆλθον . . . κρίνω**] 'I assign them their places in the order in which they came in.'

580 C **ὅτι ὁ Ἀρίστωνος υἱός, κ.τ.λ.**] 'That the son of Ariston' (i. e. Best) 'judged the best man to be the happiest': an obvious play on words. Cp. x. 614 B Ἀλκίνου . . . ἀλκίμου.

ἐάν τε λανθάνωσι, κ.τ.λ.] ii. 366 E. This is one of the threads by which Plato connects the end of the Republic with the beginning.

580 D–583 A *The judgement of Glaucon,—or of the enlightened observer* (supra 577 A) *is confirmed by that of the philosopher, who has the best right to judge. For there are three pleasures, corresponding to the three parts of the soul,—the pleasure of learning, the pleasure of honour or victory, and the pleasure of gain. The philosopher knows them all, but the lover of honour or of gain is acquainted only with one. He has this threefold experience; and in him Reason which is the faculty of judging is far superior: therefore he will be the most competent to decide. And his decision is that the pleasure of knowing and learning is by far the most worth having, while he assigns the second place to the pleasures of ambition.*

580 D **ἐάν τι δόξῃ**] 'If it at all approve itself,'—**τι** adverbial.

δέξεται . . . ἀπόδειξιν] τὸ λογιστικόν, which is found before **δέξεται** in Par. A and most MSS., seems to have arisen from a gloss on **τριχῇ**, enumerating the three parts of the soul. This is confirmed by the reading of Par. K λογιστικόν, ἐπιθυμητικόν, θυμικὸν δέξεται. K although a derivative of Π has some readings coming from an independent source. τό in Par. A is marked with two dots as questionable. For the impersonal use of **δέξεται**, sc. τὸ πρᾶγμα, cp. the use of δείξει, Phil. 45 D τάχα . . . οὐχ ἧττον δείξει, and the like expressions.

τὸ μέν, φαμέν, ἦν] The past tense refers to the previous discussion in iv. 439 ff.

E **τούτῳ ἐπωνομάσαμεν**] The dative is instrumental. 'We employed this to name it with.' This better corresponds with **ἑνὶ . . . ὀνόματι** supra than the various reading τοῦτο, which has very slight authority (Ang. *v*, Vat. m, Par. K corr.).

581 A **μάλιστ' ἂν . . . τῷ λόγῳ**] 'We should be most able to rest on a single comprehensive notion in speaking (**τῷ λόγῳ**).'

ὥστε . . . λέγοιμεν] 'So as to convey a clear meaning to ourselves, in speaking of this part of the soul.' 581 A

οὐ πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν, κ.τ.λ.] The passionate element resolves itself into the love of power and honour.

ἦ ἐμμελῶς ἂν ἔχοι;] *ἦ* like *ἆρα* sometimes anticipates an affirmative answer. B

τούτων] sc. *τῶν τριῶν εἰδῶν.* I. e. it cares less for gain than *θυμός* does, and less for power than *ἐπιθυμία.* The word, though pleonastic, is in accordance with the fulness and precision of Plato's style. W. H. Thompson's *πάντων*, on the other hand, is over-emphatic. The philosopher (infra 582 A) cares less for gain than for glory. [If rejected, the word must be attributed to an accidental doubling of *τούτωι.* L. C.]

κατὰ τρόπον ἂν καλοῖμεν] 'We should give the proper name.' Cp. *ἀπὸ τρόπου, πρὸς τρόπου.*

ἀνθρώπων . . . τὰ πρῶτα] sc. *γένη.* 'Three kinds in chief (or primarily).' For the limitation cp. iv. 443 E *καὶ εἰ ἄλλα ἄττα μεταξὺ τυγχάνει ὄντα* and note. C

ὑποκείμενον ἐν ἑκάστῳ τούτων] 'Corresponding severally to each of these'—i. e. in the order of classification. Cp. Protag. 349 B *ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων* **ὑπόκειταί** *τις ἴδιος οὐσία καὶ πρᾶγμα.* **ὑποκείμενον**, not = subject-matter, but simply denoting correspondence as in Protag. l. c.

τρεῖς τοιούτους] I. e. one of each kind.

τῶν βίων] Cp. Arist. Eth. Nic. i. 2.

ὅ τε χρηματιστικός] 'First the money-maker.' The second *τε* changes to *δέ* as the sentence becomes adversative. D

τὸν δὲ φιλόσοφον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ποιώμεθα, κ.τ.λ.] 'But may we suppose that the philosopher regards the other pleasures in regard to the pleasure of knowing the truth and in that pursuit abiding always, not so very far from the Heaven of pleasure, and that he calls the other pleasures necessary under the idea that if there were no necessity for them he would rather not have them.'

In this way of taking the passage the words **τῆς ἡδονῆς οὐ πάνυ πόρρω** have a slight irony, intended to express that the philosopher has in knowledge the true pleasure. For **ποιώμεθα** Gräser and Hermann read *τί οἰώμεθα,* which diminishes the harshness of the

Republic IX. 581 D expression **νομίζειν τὰς ἄλλας ἡδονὰς πρὸς τὴν τοῦ εἰδέναι τἀληθὲς ὅπῃ ἔχει.** With **καλεῖν**, *ἆρ' οὐκ οἰόμεθα* has to be supplied from **τί οἰώμεθα**, in which there is also considerable harshness. In the translation **τί οἰώμεθα** has been read not without hesitation, as it is difficult to account for the same error, however slight (*π* for *τι*) creeping into all the MSS. [B. J.]

τὸν δὲ φιλόσοφον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, *τί οἰώμεθα . . . (E) **εἰ μὴ ἀνάγκη ἦν;**] 'And what, are we to suppose, is the philosopher's estimate of other pleasures in comparison with that of knowing the truth as it is and being evermore engaged in such an intellectual pursuit? Must we not think that he accounts them far removed from true pleasure, and that he calls them necessary and nothing more, inasmuch as, apart from knowledge of the truth, he has no wants but what are absolutely necessary?' **τί οἰώμεθα** is Gräser's correction of *ποιώμεθα*, the manuscript reading, which may be strained to yield a possible meaning (—'may we suppose?') but is ill-suited to the immediate context, and to the reply—**εὖ . . . δεῖ εἰδέναι**, which exactly fits **οἰώμεθα**, cp. i. 341 A, B; viii. 556 D, E.

E In what follows, Madvig's conjecture *τὴν . . . ἡδονήν*; for which see v. rr., is occasioned by the apparent baldness of **τῆς ἡδονῆς** in the present connexion. But his reading, *πρὸς τὴν τοῦ εἰδέναι τἀληθὲς ὅπῃ ἔχει . . . ἡδονήν*, is ill-balanced, and the last phrase too abrupt. The word **ἡδονῆς**, which is marked with dots in Par. A, is very possibly corrupt, however, and may have grown out of **ἀληθινῆς** through an interlinear gloss, *τῆς* *ἀληθινῆς* (with *ἡδονῆς* written above). It might, indeed, be said that in the philosopher's view other pleasures, as compared with that of knowledge, were far from being pleasure at all. But the sudden introduction of this thought in a passage of such gravity is on the whole improbable. [L. C.]

οὐ πάνυ πόρρω] sc. *δεῖ οἴεσθαι νομίζειν αὐτόν.* The force of **οὐ** is continued with **καὶ καλεῖν, κ.τ.λ.**

582 B **πολύ, ἔφη, διαφέρει**] The philosopher is at a higher stage of experience than either of the two others: he has passed them, but they can never compete with him. In the world of the money-getter, where wealth is held in respect, something is known even of the pleasure of honour: but neither he nor the ambitious man can conceive of the pleasure which the philosopher finds in knowledge. Cp. 'He that is spiritual judgeth all things; Yet he himself is judged of none.'

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τῆς ἡδονῆς ταύτης] sc. τοῦ τὰ ὄντα, ὅπῃ πέφυκε, μανθάνειν.

τί δὲ τοῦ φιλοτίμου] sc. διαφέρει ὁ φιλόσοφος ἢ οὔ; 582 C

ἀλλὰ τιμὴ μέν] The best MSS., including Par. A, have ἀλλὰ τί μήν.

ὥστε ἀπό γε, κ.τ.λ.] The order is πάντες ἔμπειροι (εἰσὶ) τῆς γε ἀπὸ τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι ἡδονῆς, οἷόν ἐστι.

καὶ μὴν . . . φιλοσόφου] 'And he is the only one of them whose experience is accompanied by wisdom.—Certainly.—Further, the very instrument by which judgement is to be given is not the instrument of the covetous or ambitious man, but only of the philosopher.' D

διὰ λόγων που ἔφαμεν, κ.τ.λ.] supra A ἐμπειρίᾳ τε καὶ φρονήσει καὶ λόγῳ.

τούτου] τοῦ φιλοσόφου.

ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐμπειρίᾳ, κ.τ.λ.] sc. κρίνεται τὰ κρινόμενα. E

καὶ ἐν ᾧ . . . ἥδιστος] 'And he amongst us, in whom this is the ruling principle, has the pleasantest life.' 583 A

For a similar judgement of lives cp. Phil. 65 ff.

ὁ κριτής] The argument which began at 582 A is now complete, and the philosopher,—not Glaucon or one of ourselves,—is admitted to be the judge.

αὐτοῦ] sc. τοῦ κριτοῦ.

To add a third and crowning demonstration:—The pleasure of the philosopher is alone real. *583 B–587 B*

The satisfaction of desire and that of anger only appear pleasant through contrast with antecedent pain. Moreover the things of the body are less real than things of the mind; and therefore bodily pleasures, like the indulgence of appetite and anger, are more unreal than the pleasures of intellect. Most men are ignorant of this, and looking ever downwards prefer the shadow of delight. Whereas if the lower nature be subdued to the higher, even the lower pleasures partake somewhat of reality, because the whole life is standing in the light of truth.

ταῦτα . . . ἀκηκοέναι] The two victories already achieved are (1) the superior happiness of the just in Glaucon's judgement, after 583 B

Republic *IX.* 583 B comparing the individuals with the states: (2) the judgement of the philosopher, accredited by his superior knowledge of true pleasure. The third and last is the proved unreality of other pleasures in comparison with those of philosophy. For the favourite allusion to Zeus Soter cp. Charm. 167 A, B *πάλιν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ τρίτον τῷ Σωτῆρι, ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπισκοπώμεθα*: Phil. 66 D *ἴθι δὴ τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι, κ.τ.λ.* The association of the phrase with the Olympian contests occurs only here.

ἐσκιαγραφημένη] *σκιαγραφία* is a painting in light and shade, which owes its effect to contrast and is therefore a very appropriate figure of pleasure,—here affirmed to be purely relative. In Phaedo 69 B it is applied to courage and temperance, which are likewise said to be unreal when separated from knowledge. Cp. x. 602 D *ᾧ δὴ ἡμῶν τῷ παθήματι τῆς φύσεως ἡ* **σκιαγραφία** *ἐπιθεμένη γοητείας οὐδὲν ἀπολείπει*:—also vii. 523 B, Theaet. 208 E.

ὡς ἐγὼ δοκῶ] Compare the part of the Philebus in which the relativeness of pleasure is discussed, especially 44 C, where the opinion of those who deny the existence of pleasure is quoted.

Plato uses a similar anonymous formula in Lys. 215 C, probably referring to the Heracliteans; also in Phaedo 62 B, speaking of the Pythagoreans; in Theaet. 201 D, of the Megarians (?); and of certain anonymous physicists (friends of Democritus?) in Phil. 20. He is probably here alluding to these persons, whoever they may have been,—who maintained a doctrine not unlike that in the text, viz. that pleasure is only an escape from pain. It is not likely, as Stallbaum supposes, that Plato would have used this ironical formula of a doctrine for which he had made himself responsible. And the greater precision and fulness with which the subject of pleasure is treated in the Philebus is one of the reasons for supposing the date of that dialogue to be later than that of the Republic. Both speak of a neutral condition between pleasure and pain; in both the metaphor of health and sickness occurs; both describe pleasure as an enchantment,—*γοητεία*. But in the Republic the object of Plato is only to convict ordinary pleasure of unreality; in the Philebus there is an elaborate attempt to analyse pleasures, and to distinguish true from false kinds:—the higher pleasures are not only the intellectual, but extend also to those which are derived from beauty of form, colour, sound, smell (here only incidentally mentioned), and are unalloyed with pain. Here, again, it is simply assumed that all pleasures are *κινήσεις* (583 E) and *πληρώσεις*

(585 A, B);—in the Philebus, as in Aristotle's Ethics, the circumstance of some pleasures being *γενέσεις* and *πληρώσεις* is adduced as a ground for depreciating them. For the Platonic view of pleasure see introduction to Philebus, Eng. Trans. vol. iv. pp. 530 ff. *Republic IX.* 583 B

ὧδ' . . . ἅμα] 'I will make the matter clear in the following way, carrying on the inquiry while you answer me.' **ὧδε** points generally to what follows—the manner of which is further particularized by **σοῦ . . . ἅμα.** For **ζητῶν ἅμα** cp. v. 450 E.

From the relativeness of pleasure and pain Plato deduces their illusory and unsatisfying nature. There are two extremes, pleasure and pain, and an intermediate state which may be described as the absence of either. But it may also be conceived as pain or pleasure. Health and rest are all the pleasures that a man desires in sickness; and the cessation of enjoyment may be assumed in like manner to be often a pain.

This is an argument characteristic of ancient philosophy, which in modern times has no value. Pleasure is relative and contrasted, admitting of degrees, and associated with certain bodily sensations; also of a fleeting and transient nature when compared with the eternal idea, or the absoluteness of knowledge. But pleasure only partakes in this of the condition of our bodily state; that which is relative or admits of degrees is not the less really existing. Even the power of receiving intellectual pleasure is almost as transient as the enjoyments of sense; the permanence of objects of knowledge must not be confounded with the continuance of our capacity to be pleased by them. This is casually admitted in Symp. 207 E. But it is more clearly seen by us than by Plato and Aristotle, who were confused in their perception of the imperfectly abstract ideas of the 'limit' and the 'relative'; and to whom that which was incapable of being defined seemed also to be incapable of any true existence.

ὡς . . . ἄρα] 'as they find.' C

τοῦ τοιούτου] sc. *τοῦ λυπηροῦ*—the absence of pain. Cp. viii. 566 E *ὅταν . . . ἡσυχία ἐκείνων . . . γένηται.* D

ἡ ἡσυχία] sc. *φαίνεται*, resuming **τοῦτο.** 584 A

οὐδὲν ὑγιές] cp. vii. 523 B *ὡς τῆς αἰσθήσεως οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ποιούσης*, Soph. 232 A *ὅταν ἐπιστήμων τις πολλῶν φαίνηται . . . τὸ φάντασμα τοῦτο . . . οὐκ ἔσθ' ὑγιές.* And for **γοητεία**, Phil. 44 C *αὐτὸ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπαγωγὸν γοήτευμα οὐχ ἡδονὴν εἶναι.*

Republic IX. 584 B **ἔφην ἐγώ**] Between this and *ἦν δ' ἐγώ* the reading is uncertain. See v. rr.

πολλάκις] 'Perchance': cp. iv. 424 c, &c.

ποίας] sc. *τῶν ἡδονῶν*,—although pleasures and pains have both been mentioned. Cp. infra 586 c *ἑαυτῶν* and note.

τὰς περὶ τὰς ὀσμὰς ἡδονάς] Cp. Phil. 51 E: Arist. Eth. Nic. x. 3, § 7 *τοῦτο δ' οὐ περὶ πάσας συμβαίνει τὰς ἡδονάς· ἄλυποι γάρ εἰσιν αἵ τε μαθηματικαὶ καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις αἱ διὰ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως*: ib. vii. 13, § 2.

C **ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνουσαι**] Cp. Theaet. 186 c *ὅσα διὰ τοῦ σώματος παθήματα ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνει*, and the account of sensation in Phil. 38 D, Tim. 64.

καὶ λεγόμεναι] 'And are commonly called pleasures.' For this frequent formula, in contrasting common opinion with philosophic truth, cp. iv. 431 c *τῶν ἐλευθέρων* **λεγομένων.**

οὐκοῦν . . . ἔχουσιν;] 'Is this not also true of the anticipations of pleasure and pain which precede them?' **πρὸ μελλόντων** instead of *περὶ μελλόντων*, and **προησθήσεις** instead of *προαισθήσεις*, are required by the sense, and are the readings of Par. A and other MSS. The form of the word *προήσθησις* is singular, but is confirmed by the use of *ἥσθημα* in the sense of *pleasure* in the fragments of Eupolis' *Δῆμοι*.

D **τὸ μὲν ἄνω, τὸ δὲ κάτω**] The Timaeus, p. 62 c ff., shows a clear advance beyond the crudity of this distinction which is parallel to the point of view in Phaedo 109. [L. C.]

E **κάτω τ' ἂν οἴοιτο φέρεσθαι καὶ ἀληθῆ οἴοιτο**] As the man who has no true pleasure has, nevertheless, a true experience of pain.

585 A **σφόδρα μὲν . . . ἀπατῶνται;**] 'they firmly believe that they have reached the goal of satiety and pleasure, just as if they were looking at grey when contrasted with black in inexperience of white, and viewing pain in like manner contrasted with the absence of pain in their inexperience of pleasure, they are deceived.' So we may translate, omitting **δέ** after **ὥσπερ** with all the best MSS. The antithesis to **μέν** is to be gathered from the clause **καὶ . . . ἀπατῶνται** (= *ἀπατῶνται δέ*). This is a possible but not a probable way of taking the passage. A much better sense is obtained by the insertion of **δέ** after **ὥσπερ**, which is actually found in one MS. (Munich *q*), 'they firmly believe that they have reached the goal of

satiety and pleasure, but as a matter of fact they are deceived through viewing pain in contrast with the absence of pain in inexperience of pleasure, just as they would be deceived (sc. *ἀπατῷντο ἄν*) if they viewed (**ἀποσκοποῦντες** = *εἰ ἀποσκοποῖεν*) grey contrasted with black in inexperience of white.' *Republic IX.* 585 A

πρὸς τὸ ἄλυπον οὕτω λύπην] W. H. Thompson's conjectural emendation, *πρὸς λυπὴν οὕτω τὸ ἄλυπον*, is certainly more logical, but the '*chiasmus*' in the text is not impossible.

ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Theaet. 142 B *καὶ οὐδέν γ' ἄτοπον*, **ἀλλὰ πολὺ θαυμαστότερον**, *εἰ μὴ τοιοῦτος ἦν*.

· **οὐκοῦν . . . ἴσχων**] 'If this be so, he who takes food and he who gets hold of understanding' (*ἴσχω* a stronger form of *ἔχω*) 'will both be filled.' B

πότερα . . . (c) **ἀρετῆς ;**] 'Which classes of things are they which in your judgement have a greater share in true being?—those of which food and drink and condiments and all kinds of sustenance are examples, or the class which contains true opinion and knowledge and mind and in general all virtue?' Observe the transition from plural to singular in passing from sense to knowledge.

καὶ †ἀληθείας] The word is obelized because the abstract noun is oddly correlated to the adjectives preceding, where *καὶ ἀληθεῖς* might equally have been said. C

τὸ τοῦ μηδέποτε ὁμοίου] The article here was added by Ast, as below (***τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου**) by Madvig. Though not absolutely required in either place, it might easily have been dropped by a copyist.

εἰ δὲ ἀληθείας ἧττον, οὐ καὶ οὐσίας ;] Plato wishes to show that the unchangeable partakes of essence, knowledge and truth in equal degrees: or rather that essence, knowledge and truth go together. First he asks whether it has either of these qualities in a greater degree than the others, and elicits the answer that it has not. Then with the same object in view, he proceeds to inquire whether, 'if the unchangeable had less of truth, would it not also have less of essence?' For the sake of his argument it would have been sufficient to obtain the admission that truth and essence go together: that the pleasures of the body, being less true, are also less real.

For somewhat similar inversions cp. infra 587 E, supra 582 B, C.

Republic IX. It is therefore unnecessary with Madvig to suppose a lacuna before **εἰ**.

585 D **σῶμα δὲ αὐτὸ . . . οὕτως;**] sc. *ἧττον ἀληθείας τε καὶ οὐσίας μετέχειν.*

τὸ τῶν ἧττον ὄντων] sc. *πληρούμενον.*

τῶν φύσει προσηκόντων] 'with things naturally befitting;' i.e. things perishable for the body, things eternal for the mind.

E **ἀπιστοτέρας**] corresponds to **ἧττον . . . βεβαίως** in the previous clause.

586 A **μέχρι πάλιν . . . μεταξύ**] 'back again as far as the middle point'—but no farther upwards.

ταύτῃ] 'hereabout,' i.e. in the region below the middle. So **τοῦτο** in the next clause.

τὸ ἀληθῶς ἄνω] Cp. Phaedo 109, Phaedrus 247 C for the similar idea of an upper heaven into which the mind is elevated.

κεκυφότες, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. vii. 519 A *τὰς τῆς γενέσεως ξυγγενεῖς ὥσπερ μολυβδίδας, κ.τ.λ.* Note **χορταζόμενοι**, a word usually applied to animals (*ἐχόρταζες* ii. 372 D) and see Milton, *Comus*, sub init.

'Who knows not Circe,
The daughter of the Sun, whose charmed cup
Whoever tasted lost his upright shape
And downward fell into a grovelling swine?'

ἕνεκα . . . πλεονεξίας] For the origin of war in luxury cp. ii. 373 E and Phaedo 66 C *καὶ γὰρ πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας οὐδὲν ἄλλο παρέχει ἢ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἱ τούτου ἐπιθυμίαι.*

B **σιδηροῖς κέρασι**] Cp. Aesch. Agam. 1127 **μελαγκέρῳ** . . . *μηχανήματι | τύπτει.*

ὁπλαῖς] probably with a glance at *ὅπλοις.*

τὸ στέγον ἑαυτῶν] Cp. Gorg. 493 A, B *τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς οὗ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσί, τὸ ἀκόλαστον αὐτοῦ καὶ* **οὐ στεγανόν**, *ὡς τετρημένος εἴη πίθος, διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν ἀπεικάσας.*

παντελῶς . . . χρησμῳδεῖς βίον] 'Verily, Socrates, said Glaucon, you describe the life of the many like an oracle.'

ξυνεῖναι] sc. *τοὺς τοιούτους.*

ὑπὸ τῆς . . . ἀποχραινομέναις] 'Whose colour is gained by

juxtaposition.' ἀποχραίνειν (Laws vi. 769 A) seems to mean 'to give the last touches,' 'put in the high lights' in painting. *Republic IX.*

ἑαυτῶν] refers to **ἡδοναῖς** only, although **ἑκατέρας** resumes both **ἡδοναῖς** and **λύπαις**. 586 C

τοιοῦτόν τι αὐτὸ εἶναι] The life of the pleasure-seekers is like that of men fighting for a shadow. Cp. vii. 520 C, where there is a reference to the shadows on the wall of the den. For the form of the legend of Helen here referred to see especially the Helena of Euripides.

τί δέ; . . . οὐχ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα;] The satisfaction of anger also is a relief from pain.

αὐτὸ τοῦτο] sc. *τὸ τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς πρᾶγμα* understood from **τὸ θυμοειδές**. For the use of *διαπράττομαι* cp. Phaedr. 256 C *τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν μακαριστὴν αἵρεσιν εἱλέτην τε καὶ διεπράξαντο· καὶ* **διαπραξαμένω** *τὸ λοιπὸν ἤδη, κ.τ.λ.*, and for the dative, iii. 411 D **βίᾳ** . . . *πρὸς πάντα* **διαπράττεται**: Gorg. 451 D *τῶν* **λόγῳ** *τὰ πάντα* **διαπραττομένων**.

Observe the use of **θυμῷ** in the ordinary sense in the same passage with the more technical **θυμοειδές**.

περὶ τὸ φιλοκερδές, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. supra 580 E ff. D

εἴπερ τὸ βέλτιστον . . . οἰκειότατον;] Cp. Lys. 222 C *πότερον οὖν καὶ τἀγαθὸν οἰκεῖον θήσομεν παντί, τὸ δὲ κακὸν ἀλλότριον;* E

τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν καὶ δικαίῳ εἶναι] an allusion to the definition of Justice in Book iv.

καὶ εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν τὰς ἀληθεστάτας] 'the truest of which they are capable,'—since the pleasures of *θυμός* and *ἐπιθυμία* are less true than that of reason, cp. supra D *ὡς οἷόν τε αὐταῖς ἀληθεῖς λαβεῖν*.

ὁ δὲ ὀλίγιστον] 'but the other' (viz. the philosopher-king) 'is least removed from it.' 587 B

The conclusion just arrived at may now receive a mathematical expression. The shadow, which is a surface, may be represented arithmetically as $3 \times 3 = 9$, *the distance between king and oligarch being simply multiplied into that between oligarch and tyrant. But to fathom the depth of the declension, not* 9 *but the cube of* 9 *must serve to express the enormous interval. The square of* 9 *is* 81, *the cube is* 729, *a number not unsuitable to human life, for it is a number connected with days and nights and months and years. And if in pleasure the tyrant differs from the king so widely, how great must be the king's superiority in other ways!* *587 B–588 A*

Republic IX. 587 B τριῶν ἡδονῶν, κ.τ.λ.] Socrates, having discussed the different kinds of pleasure and the different forms of government and character in relation to pleasure and pain, proceeds to sum up these differences in an arithmetical formula, or rather in two numbers, 9 and 729. These numbers are obtained in the following manner. The oligarch is in the third remove from true pleasure; the king has the pleasure of wisdom, the timocrat that of honour, the oligarch that of wealth, which is an unreal shadow. But the tyrant is in the third remove from the oligarch, and his pleasure is the shadow of the shadow of a shadow—and this a shadow thrice removed from reality. According to the simplest computation, his life is thrice three times less sweet or his pleasure less true than that of the king. His shadow of enjoyment is therefore represented by the *superficial* number 9. (For the superficial nature of the εἴδωλον cp. x. 598 A, B.) But in order to gauge the *depth* of the tyrant's misery, or conversely to estimate the *solidity* of the king's happiness, it is necessary to cube the simple number 9. The number so obtained is 729.

C ὁ τύραννος] not ὁ τυραννικός, because we are thinking of the extreme case of the tyrannical individual made tyrant—supra 573 C, 580 C. By the force of antithesis we pass in what follows from the βασιλικός to the βασιλεύς, i. e. the philosophical individual who has authority in an ideal community (vi. 497 B, C).

φυγὼν νόμον τε καὶ λόγον] cp. supra A ἃ πλεῖστον . . . λόγου ἀφέστηκε.

δορυφόροις] 'armed' viz. with stings: supra 573 E, 575 A. They are the body-guard of the tyrant passion.

οὐδέ] is to be joined with εἰπεῖν—'not even to express it.'

ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ τρίτος . . . τρίτῳ εἰδώλῳ] Plato adopts the inclusive mode of reckoning (Oligarch 1, Democrat 2, Tyrant 3), and similarly from the oligarch to the king (Oligarch 1, Timarch 2, King 3). Then to obtain a value for the *shadow* of pleasure enjoyed by the tyrant, he multiplies together the numbers so obtained. But when he turns to consider the solidity of the king's pleasure he is not contented with the square number, but taking this as 'linear,' i. e. as a simple number, he squares and cubes it (9, 81, 729).

D ἐὰν εἰς ταὐτὸν . . . τιθῶμεν] In accordance with iv. 445 D, E.

Republic IX. 587 D

ἐπίπεδον . . . ἂν εἴη] 'The shadow of tyrannical pleasure, then, determined by the number of length will be a plain figure:' i. e. the number 9, which is the 'linear' expression of the interval, is also the expression of a surface, the square of 3.



τὸ εἴδωλον . . . ἡδονῆς τυραννικῆς] 'The shadow, of which the tyrant's pleasure consists.'

κατὰ τὸν τοῦ μήκους ἀριθμόν] sc. λογιζομένοις.

κατὰ δὲ δύναμιν καὶ τρίτην αὔξην] (1) 'But if we square and cube.' There is some doubt as to the exact process intended and even as to the precise meaning of δύναμις. The δύναμις of a number is properly its square,—τὸ ἐπίπεδον ὃ δύναται (Theaet. 148 A). Hence either 9 : 81 : 729, as above; or $3 \times 9 \times 27 = 729$. But in the passage of the Theaetetus just cited, δύναμις is 'the square-root,' and even 'an irrational square-root'—showing that in Plato the technical usage is not fixed. Here it may possibly mean (2) 'any higher power,' e. g. the cube: 'if we raise the number,' i. e. 9, 'say to the third power.'

ὅσην, κ.τ.λ.] sc. ὁ τύραννος τοῦ βασιλικοῦ.

μεταστρέψας] sc. τὸν λόγον. 'If you turn the argument the other way about': i. e. if you show not how far the tyrant is removed from the king in the untruth of his pleasure, but how far the king is removed from the tyrant in the truth of his pleasure.

E

τελειωθείσῃ τῇ πολλαπλασιώσει] I. e. when 9 is raised to the third power; [or when 3, 9, 27 are multiplied together]. It should be remembered that Plato is only playing with numbers and must not be taken too seriously. The number 729 besides being convenient for the measurement of days and nights, also included many numerical compounds, and was the expression of many geometrical figures which gave a seeming authority to it. If it is worth while to raise the question, we can hardly say that Plato is in earnest: but we may perhaps say that he was fascinated by finding a numerical expression of what he conceived to be the truth. He did not trouble himself about minor details, any more than in the number which he assigns in the Laws for the population of his city.

ἀμήχανον . . . τοῖν ἀνδροῖν] (1) 'You have brought to bear upon the two men' (viz. the king and the tyrant, although the tyrant is chiefly thought of) 'an overwhelming calculation of the difference

Republic IX. 587 E between them;' or (2) 'you have brought down upon us a wonderful calculation of the difference between the two men.' The image is that of a river coming down in flood and covering everything with debris. Cp. καταχώννυμι in Gorg. 512 B, Theaet. 177 B. In the former case (1) the genitive **τοῖν ἀνδροῖν** is governed by **κατά** in composition. [If the other reading, καταπεφώρακας (see v. rr.), were adopted, the genitives would follow **διαφορότητος** as in (2). But Plato is not likely to have used such a word as καταφωρᾶν without more point than can be found in it here. L. C.]

τοῦ τε δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου] In apposition to **τοῖν ἀνδροῖν**. The king is the ideal of justice, the tyrant of injustice.

588 A **ἀληθῆ**] 'The calculation is a true one and we may remark further,' &c. The mathematical accuracy of the calculation is made an argument for the truth of its application.

ἡμέραι καὶ νύκτες] The year is supposed to consist of *about* $364\frac{1}{2}$ days and $364\frac{1}{2}$ nights. For the approximate number cp. Laws vi. 771 C ὃς πάσας τὰς διανομὰς ἔχει μέχρι τῶν δώδεκα ἀπὸ μιᾶς ἀρξάμενος πλὴν ἑνδεκάδος· αὕτη δ' ἔχει σμικρότατον ἴαμα· ἐπὶ θάτερα γὰρ ὑγιὴς γίγνεται δυοῖν ἑστίαιν ἀπονεμηθείσαιν—said of the number 5040.

καὶ μῆνες] 12 months in a year: $30 + \frac{1}{3}$ days in a month:—$12 \times (30 + \frac{1}{3}) = 364$: $2 \times 364\frac{1}{2} = 729$.

588 B–592 A *To such a pass has the theory of the profitableness of injustice come! Let us try to bring this home to our adversary's imagination. 'Three natures,' we will say, 'are enclosed within the single form of man:—one human, one leonine, and one a many-headed beast. And we are told that it is for the man's interest to starve the human nature, and enslave it to the bestial! But the praise of Justice means that the man should set the human or divine element in charge over the other two, to prune the desires, and train the leonine element to help him in controlling them. That is the purpose for which laws are made and children held under authority, that licence may be kept in check, and the harmony of the soul preserved. And on this purpose every wise man will concentrate his efforts.'*

588 B **ἦν δέ που, κ.τ.λ.**] Socrates, not without an air of triumph, returns to the source of the discussion, which is finally disposed of,—the old argument of Thrasymachus, who, however, is nc

longer attacked by name, as peace was concluded between them at the end of Book i, and Socrates would not allow this to be disturbed in vi. 498 C *μὴ διάβαλλε, κ.τ.λ.* He is mentioned once more infra 590 D. The question had become ridiculous at the end of Book iv, but having proceeded so far, it was thought best to complete the discussion by describing the forms of evil (iv. 445 C). *Republic IX.* 588 B

αὐτῷ] sc. *τῷ ἐκεῖνα λέγοντι*—supplied from below and from **λεγόμενον** supra—rather than **τῷ . . . ἀδίκῳ** supra.

οἷα ἔλεγεν] 'What a preposterous statement he was guilty of.'

οἷαι μυθολογοῦνται, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Phaedr. 230 A *θηρίον . . . Τυφῶνος πολυπλοκώτερον.* C

Milton's description of Sin (*P. L.* ii. 650, 651) has some degree of similarity :—

> 'The one seemed woman to the waist, and fair:
> But ended foul in many a scaly fold,' &c.

See also the image of the charioteer and the two steeds in Phaedr. 246.

ἡμέρων δέ] If **δέ** is retained, against Madvig's *τε*, the fact that the many heads are some wild and some tame, is a fresh point in the description. **δέ** is not correlative to **μέν**.

δεινοῦ . . . (D) πεπλάσθω] 'The work implies marvellous power in the modeller: still, inasmuch as language is more easily moulded than wax or similar substances, let us suppose the model to have been made.'

τούτῳ . . . τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ] 'This human creature whom we have made,' referring to **ἄνθρωπον** immediately above, as distinguished from the man within. E

ὅτι οὐδέν . . . (589 A) ἄλληλα] It is hardly necessary to observe that (*a*) the multitudinous monster represents the desires: (*b*) the lion, anger; (*c*) the man within, reason. For the first cp. supra 580 D, E *τὸ δὲ τρίτον* **διὰ πολυειδίαν** *ἑνὶ οὐκ ἔσχομεν ὀνόματι προσειπεῖν ἰδίῳ αὐτοῦ.*

τὰ περὶ τὸν λέοντα] This phrase prepares for the serpentine element, which is afterwards (590 B) brought in to represent the meaner forms of anger.

ὅθεν . . . ἐγκρατέστατος] 'The genitive **τοῦ ἀνθρώπου** (1) may be 589 A

Republic IX. governed by **ἐγκρατέστατος**, or (2) may be taken partitively with **ὁ ἐντὸς ἄνθρωπος**.

589 B **ξύμμαχον . . . λέοντος φύσιν**] Cp. iv. 440 B *ὥσπερ δυοῖν στασιαζόντοιν ξύμμαχον τῷ λόγῳ γιγνόμενον τὸν θυμὸν τοῦ τοιούτου.*

C **πρός τε γὰρ . . . ψέγει**] 'For whether you consider pleasure, or reputation, or advantage, the eulogist of the righteous man speaks the truth; and he who attacks him has no sanity or knowledge in all his attacks;' **ὑγιές** is governed by *ψέγων λέγει*, which is to be gathered from the main drift of the sentence.

πείθωμεν, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Laws x. 888 A *λέγωμεν πράως σβέσαντες τὸν θυμὸν ὡς ἑνὶ διαλεγόμενοι τῶν τοιούτων· Ὦ παῖ, νέος εἶ, κ.τ.λ.*

οὐ γὰρ ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνει] Plato falls back on the Socratic notion of the involuntariness of error.

ὦ μακάριε . . . (D) φύσεως] 'May we not say that things customarily esteemed fair and foul have come into existence for some such reason as this, that the fair are those which subdue to the man or rather those which subdue to the divine the wild beast element of the nature: that foul are those which enslave the gentle element to the savage.' The words **τὰ μὲν καλά, κ.τ.λ.**, are an explanation of **διὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα**, the participle taking the place of the prepositional phrase—**ποιοῦντα** = *διὰ τὸ ποιεῖν*: 'for this reason, the good being those,' &c. With **τὰ μὲν καλὰ . . . αἰσχρὰ δέ** we must supply *φαῖμεν ἂν εἶναι* from **ἂν φαῖμεν γεγονέναι.**—**νόμιμα** nearly = *νομιζόμενα.*

D **λαμβάνων . . . μοχθηροτάτῳ**] This sentence is in apposition to **τοιόνδε**.

E **εἰς ἀγρίων . . . ἀνδρῶν**] sc. *οἰκίαν.*

590 A **ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ**] sc. *ἐν τῷ ἀκολασταίνειν.*

τὸ δεινόν, τὸ μέγα, κ.τ.λ.] **τὸ δεινόν** is used substantively, and **τὸ μέγα ἐκεῖνο, κ.τ.λ.**, added epexegetically: 'the dangerous thing, viz. that great beast.' The reading of the old editions, without the comma after **δεινόν**, is not so good.

B **τὸ . . . ὀφεῶδες**] The serpent element has not hitherto been mentioned [but cp. supra 588 E *τὰ περὶ τὸν λέοντα*, where something besides the lion is suggested. L. C.]. It is here added to account for the meaner forms of anger. The image grows under the artist's hand. So in the next sentence the lion when rabid with lust becomes a 'mad-headed ape.'

χαλάσει τε καὶ ἀνέσει] *ἄνεσις* is here 'relaxation,' not 'letting loose' as in *ἀνίεται* supra A. Since faculties are of opposites, *θυμός* is the seat of cowardice as well as of courage. *Republic IX.* 590 B

ὀχλώδει] At once 'multitudinous' and 'troublesome.'

ἐκείνου] *τοῦ ὀχλώδους θηρίου.*

θεραπεύειν] follows **ὥστε**: **δύνηται** is governed by **ὅταν**, the construction of the earlier part of the sentence being resumed. Cp. vi. 493 A, B, 495 D, E, and, for the imagery, vi. 493. C

ὁ τοιοῦτος] sc. *ὁ βάναυσος καὶ χειροτέχνης.*

ὥσπερ Θρασύμαχος ᾤετο] i. 343 B, C. D

καὶ ὀρθῶς γ᾽, ἔφη] sc. *φαμέν* supra C.

βούλεται] *βουλεύεται* is the reading of most MSS.; but **βούλεται** is the more idiomatic and probably the true one. See v. rr. E

καὶ ἡ τῶν . . . (591 A) ἀφίεμεν] Cp. supra iii. 402 A. This mention of the inward *πολιτεία* prepares for the highly wrought passage at the end of the book, infra 592 B. Cp. also v. 449 A *περὶ ἰδιωτῶν ψυχῆς τρόπου κατασκευήν.*

τῷ . . . τοιούτῳ] sc. *βελτίστῳ.* 591 A

πῇ δ᾽ ἀδικοῦντα λανθάνειν . . . λυσιτελεῖν;] sc. *φήσομεν.*

ἢ οὐχὶ ὁ μὲν . . . γίγνεται] Cp. Gorg. 509, where the noble paradox is maintained that the wicked are gainers by being punished. B

τιμιωτέραν ἕξιν λαμβάνει] 'attains a nobler state.'

εἰς τοῦτο ξυντείνας] viz. to assert the pre-eminence of the soul over the body. C

ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ . . . φαίνηται] 'But his aim will ever be that he may be found to preserve the harmony of the body for the sake of the symphony of the soul.' **ἀλλ᾽ ἀεί**, sc. *ζήσει πρὸς τοῦτο βλέπων.* For the change from the future to the subjunctive after *ὅπως* cp. Timaeus 18 E *ὅπως . . . ξυλλήξονται, καὶ μή τις . . . γίγνηται.* [The addition of **φαίνηται** can only be accounted for by an attraction into the *ὅπως* clause occasioned by the occurrence of *οὐχ ὅπως*. The preference of the subjunctive to the future appears to be similarly caused by the neighbourhood of *μέλλῃ*. But the sentence would certainly be more regular if *φαίνηται* were omitted. L. C.] D

Republic IX. 591 D **τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μουσικός**] Cp. iv. 443 D. But we have now risen to a still higher strain.

οὐκοῦν . . . ξυμφωνίαν ;] sc. *τῆς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἕνεκα ξυμφωνίας ἁρμοττόμενος ζήσει.*

τοῦ πλήθους] sc. *τῶν χρημάτων.* **οὐκ** with **αὐξήσει.**

E **μή τι . . . τῶν ἐκεῖ**] 'That none of his elements therein (*ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ*) give way.' For **παρακινεῖν**, 'to give,' cp. vii. 540 A.

καὶ τιμάς γε] The accusative looks forward to **φεύξεται**, but as the sentence is developed, the genitive **τῶν μέν** is required by **μεθέξει καὶ γεύσεται.**

592 A **ἃς δ' ἂν λύσειν**] sc. *ἡγῆται.* Cp. Shakespeare, *Macb.* ii. 1, 25–29

'*M.* If you shall cleave to my consent, when 'tis,
It shall make honour for you.
B. So I lose none,
In seeking to augment it, but still keep
My bosom franchised and allegiance clear,
I shall be counselled.'

592 A, B *The wise man, then, will not devote himself to politics, unless by some divine providence he has been born under the ideal constitution. But whether this be so or not, according to that ideal, and to no other, he will frame his life.*

592 A **νὴ τὸν κύνα**] Socrates excited by the misunderstanding of Glaucon, gives vent to his feelings in his favourite oath. 'By the dog of Egypt, he certainly will in his own city, not however perhaps in his native land.'

ἐὰν μὴ θεία τις ξυμβῇ τύχη] Cp. vi. 492 E *ὅ τί περ ἂν σωθῇ τε καὶ γένηται οἷον δεῖ ἐν τοιαύτῃ καταστάσει πολιτειῶν, θεοῦ μοῖραν αὐτὸ σῶσαι λέγων οὐ κακῶς ἐρεῖς*: ib. 499 C ff.

B **ἑαυτὸν κατοικίζειν**] sc. *ἐκεῖ.*

τὰ γὰρ ταύτης . . . οὐδεμιᾶς] 'He will live after the manner of that city, having naught to do with any other': i. e. he will live in the spirit of philosophy and take no part in politics, unless in a perfect state.

Plato is not thinking of the constitution of the state on earth corresponding to the movements of the heavenly bodies (as in vi.

500 c, Tim. 47 c). The heaven which he describes is an ideal one, answering to the individual rather than to the state. His 'Kingdom of Heaven' is within; and in this passage is exhibited to us as a life rather than as a system of government. For **παράδειγμα** cp. especially Theaet. 176 E. *Republic IX.* 592 B

BOOK X.

The tenth book of the Republic has two parts, the first containing a final settlement of the question of poetry, the second treating of the Immortality of the soul, which is proved and also revealed, the myth being the crown and completion of the previous argument respecting Immortality, as the allegory of the cave in Book vii is a figure of the stages of the mind in the processes of knowledge as described in Book vi. A preparation was made for the renewal of the first of the two subjects (which could be only partially treated in iii. 391–398) by the casual allusion in viii. 568 A–D; and the way to the second of them has been indicated in scattered hints such as are furnished by the concluding words of the last book, and vi. 498 D *εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν βίον, ὅταν αὖθις γενόμενοι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐντύχωσι λόγοις*: cp. also the words of Cephalus, i. 330 E. Plato does not base this life upon another: the empire of virtue is sufficient. But he believes another life to be the natural continuation of this, as is sufficiently apparent from the language of the Phaedo, Crito, Apology, Phaedrus, Gorgias, Politicus. And as in the Gorgias the subject of Justice seems naturally to lead up to a final judgement, so the end of Book x is also the fitting conclusion of the whole dialogue. *Republic X.* 595 A

The exclusion of poetry from our ideal state has been confirmed by our subsequent analysis, which shows how dangerous imitative art must be to those who have not fathomed its true nature. My love of Homer makes me unwilling to say this, yet it must be said. *595 A–598 D*

For what is imitation?

There are many beds, but one ideal bed which the craftsman seeks to imitate. The painter represents a bed or anything in Heaven or Earth with equal ease, because he makes not the ideal nor even the actual bed but only a superficial likeness of the latter. Thus he is in the third remove from truth. As are in like manner the whole tribe of imitators and the poet among them.

Republic X. 595 A **καὶ μήν, κ.τ.λ.**] In the third book Tragedy and Comedy were excluded from the state, but there was an intimation that possibly something more than this was intended: 394 D *ἴσως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἴσως δὲ καὶ πλείω ἔτι τούτων*: in other words, the fate of Homer was not finally determined. A hint was also given (392 C) that the nature of Justice must first be investigated, before the poets generally could be brought up for judgement. The attack on poetry is now repeated and receives a new direction. The poet is shown to be at a greater distance from truth than was originally supposed; he affects the feelings only, and not the reason. These new points of view are suggested by the divisions of the soul (iv. 435 ff.) and the doctrine of ideas: not so much however, by the higher view of the *ἰδέα* of Good. which appears in Book vi, as the lower view, which makes the ideas class-words, as at the end of Book v (cp. Meno, Phaedo, Cratylus): also by the distinction of higher and lower pleasures and desires in Book ix. **περὶ αὐτῆς**, sc. *περὶ τῆς ἐν λόγοις κειμένης πόλεως* (ix. 592 A).

ᾠκίζομεν] The imperfect tense refers to the Aorist in the preceding sentence *ἐν ᾗ νῦν διήλθομεν* **οἰκίζοντες** *πόλει* (at the end of Book ix).

B **λώβη, κ.τ.λ.**] Cp. Meno 91 C **οὗτοί** *γε φανερά ἐστι* **λώβη** *τε καὶ διαφθορὰ τῶν συγγιγνομένων.*

καίτοι . . . λέγειν] Cp. Soph. 217 E **αἰδώς** *τίς μ'* **ἔχει** *. . . μὴ κατὰ σμικρὸν . . . ποιεῖσθαι*: Arist. Eth. N. i. 6, § 1 *καίπερ προσάντους τῆς τοιαύτης ζητήσεως γινομένης διὰ τὸ φίλους ἄνδρας εἰσαγαγεῖν τὰ εἴδη. δόξειε δ' ἂν ἴσως βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ δεῖν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ γε τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἀναιρεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ φιλοσόφους ὄντας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντοιν φίλοιν ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.*

ἀποκωλύει] 'a feeling about Homer which has possessed me from a child makes me reluctant to speak.'

C **ἔοικε μὲν γάρ, κ.τ.λ.**] So below, 598 D, Homer is called *τραγῳδίας ἡγεμών*, 607 A *πρῶτον τῶν τραγῳδιοποιῶν*, and Theaet. 152 E *καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἑκατέρας· κωμῳδίας μέν,* Ἐπίχαρμος, *τραγῳδίας δέ,* Ὅμηρος. Cp. also Aristotle's Poetics, chap. 4 *ὁ γὰρ* Μαργίτης *ἀνάλογον ἔχει, ὥσπερ* Ἰλιὰς *καὶ ἡ* Ὀδυσσεία *πρὸς τὰς τραγῳδίας, οὕτω καὶ οὗτος πρὸς τὰς κωμῳδίας.*

τῶν καλῶν, κ.τ.λ.] 'who have such charms.' The epithet is ironical. Cp. iii. 398 A *προσκυνοῖμεν ἂν αὐτὸν ὡς ἱερὸν καὶ θαυμαστὸν καὶ ἡδύν.*

ὃ λέγω] 'as I say,' referring to **Ῥητέον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ**, supra. *Republic X.*

ὅλως] Imitation in general, as distinguished from poetry, which is a species of imitation. 595 C

ἦ που . . . (596 A) **πρότεροι εἶδον, κ.τ.λ.**] 'A likely thing then that I shall understand! There is no reason why you should not, for those who have the duller sight often see a thing quicker than those who have a keener one.' Cp. iv. 432 C *ἐάν μοι ἑπομένῳ χρῇ . . . πάνυ μοι μετρίως χρήσει.*

Socrates, instead of modestly declining the implied compliment of Glaucon, contrary to expectation adopts it with a kind of irony: at the same time leaving on the mind the impression, which cannot be effaced, of his own superiority. So in vii. 532 E *οὐκέτ' . . . ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, οἷός τ' ἔσει ἀκολουθεῖν*, Socrates, speaking as a master to the pupil, plainly acknowledges that Glaucon will not be able to follow him beyond a certain point.

οὐδ' ἂν προθυμηθῆναι οἷός τε εἴην] 'I could not muster courage.' 596 A

βούλει οὖν . . . ἐπιφέρομεν] 'Shall we begin our inquiry at this point—with our accustomed method? For, as you know, our custom has been to assume some one single idea in the case of the many individuals to which we apply the same name.' So in vi. 504 E he speaks of the *ἰδέα* of good as a common subject of speculation with him, *πάντως αὐτὸ οὐκ ὀλιγάκις ἀκήκοας*: v. 475 E ff.: Phaedo 100 B. See also Phileb. 16 B.

εἶδος and *ἰδέα* are used in many places indifferently. Both have the meaning of form or ideal. But *εἶδος* more than *ἰδέα* inclines to the notion of a logical universal, *ἓν ἐπὶ πολλῶν.*

τῶν πολλῶν] Here equivalent to *τῶν πολλῶν ὄντων ἑκάστων*: cp. vi. 490 A, B **τοῖς** *δοξαζομένοις εἶναι* **πολλοῖς** *ἑκάστοις.*

ἀλλ' ὅρα . . . (C) **τάχα μᾶλλον φήσεις**] 'But consider what name you give to the artificer whom I am about to mention. Who is that? One who is the maker of all things which are made by any and every craftsman. That must be a strange and marvellous man. Wait a little; there will be more reason for your saying so.' For **τάχα μᾶλλον φήσεις** cp. Cratyl. 410 E *Σ. πόρρω ἤδη, οἶμαι, φαίνομαι σοφίας ἐλαύνειν. Ε. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Σ.* **τάχα μᾶλλον φήσεις.** B

πάνυ θαυμαστόν, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Soph. 233, 234, where the 'wizard' C

Republic X. 596 C of a sophist is described as the maker of all things in play and not in earnest, imposing on the young by imitations which deceive them, like paintings seen at a distance. The 'wizard' here is the *μιμητής* (597 B), of which genus the painter and the poet are specific forms.

D **σοφιστήν**] The word is here used in the vernacular sense for 'the master of an art or mystery.'

In this passage Plato seems to return from the higher and more speculative theory of ideas which has been exhibited in the sixth and seventh books, to the cruder conception of the earlier dialogues. His aim, however, must be remembered: which is to represent the poet as being in the third remove from the truth. This could only be accomplished by separating the idea from the object, and the object from the shadow or reflection: cp. vi. 509 D. The same imagery is applied to the tyrant in ix. 587 C ff.

But is the poet or painter a mere imitator as Plato seems to imply? That is a question which he has himself answered in another passage, v. 472 D *οἴει ἂν οὖν ἧττόν τι ἀγαθὸν ζωγράφον εἶναι ὃς ἂν γράψας παράδειγμα οἷον ἂν εἴη ὁ κάλλιστος ἄνθρωπος καὶ πάντα εἰς τὸ γράμμα ἱκανῶς ἀποδοὺς μὴ ἔχῃ ἀποδεῖξαι ὡς καὶ δυνατὸν γενέσθαι τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα*; No theory can be more erroneous than that which degrades art into mere imitation,—which seeks for beauty in the parts and not in the whole, in colour and ornament rather than in proportion and design, in outward objects and not in the inspiring or informing mind. The requirement of composition in a work of art is alone an evidence that mere imitation is not art.

ποιητής] 'maker': the word is used in the most general sense, [though with a glance at the poet, L. C.].

οὐ χαλεπός . . . δημιουργούμενος] 'not a difficult way, I said, but one which is soon compassed and by various methods.' For *δημιουργούμενος* applied to the manner of the action and not to the thing, cp. Soph. 221 A *τὸ τῆς . . . πληγῆς . . .* **ἀνασπώμενον**.

ταχὺ μέν, κ.τ.λ.] There is an asyndeton here, as is not uncommon in explanatory clauses.

E **εἰς δέον ἔρχει τῷ λόγῳ**] 'You bring welcome aid to the argument,' i.e. you go to the point required: viz. to the distinction between *φαινόμενα* and *ὄντα*.

597 A **μέντοι**] recalls a previous statement which tends to modify what

has just been said: the picture is unreal, but is not the bed itself unreal too? *Republic X.*

Plato here uses the language of 'crude realism.' But the beginnings of logical technicality are discernible in the expressions *ὃ ἔστιν, ὅπερ ἔστιν*. 597 A

τελέως δὲ . . . ἀληθῆ λέγειν] The idiomatic use of the verb **κινδυνεύει** makes a change in the usual construction, which would be *εἴ τις φαίη . . . οὐκ ἂν λέγοι*. **κινδυνεύει** = 'he would seem,' i.e. may be presumed to be according to this theory. Cp. Theaet. 152 C *οἷα γὰρ αἰσθάνεται ἕκαστος, τοιαῦτα ἑκάστῳ καὶ* **κινδυνεύει** *εἶναι*.

ὥς γ' ἂν δόξειε, κ.τ.λ.] sc. *τοῖς διαλεκτικῆς ἐμπείροις*.

καὶ τοῦτο] sc. *τὸ τοῦ κλινουργοῦ ἔργον*. **καί**, the work of the maker of the actual bed,—as well as the painter's imitation of it.

πρὸς ἀλήθειαν] 'with respect to reality.' Cp. infra 600 B *γελοιότερος ἔτι* **πρὸς** *παιδείαν*.

βούλει οὖν . . . τίς ποτ' ἐστίν;] 'Suppose that we inquire into the nature of this imitator, basing our remarks upon this example.' B

For the use of **ἐπί** with reference to an example, cp. v. 475 A *εἰ βούλει, ἔφη,* **ἐπ'** *ἐμοῦ λέγειν περὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν*.

τὸν μιμητὴν τοῦτον] 'the imitator who is the subject of our inquiry.' Cp. supra 595 E *μίμησιν ὅλως . . . ὅ τί ποτ' ἐστίν;* infra E **τὸν** *μὲν δὴ* **μιμητὴν** *ὡμολογήκαμεν*. It is now sufficiently evident that the wonderful artificer described on p. 596 is the *μιμητής*. The accusative **τοῦτον** is confirmed by Par. A and the majority of MSS. Nor is the inexactness of the antecedent a sufficient reason for reading *τούτου*, which has the greater fault of being weak. The use of **αὗται** immediately below is similar to the use of **τοῦτον** in this passage.

μία μὲν . . . (c) **ὃ ἔστι κλίνη**] Plato in the Sophist separates *ποιητική* into two parts, one divine, the other human (Soph. 265 C). In what follows ib. 266, 267, he further divides human art into creative and imitative.

ἐν τῇ φύσει] 'in nature,' i.e. in the true order of nature. Cp. Phaedo 103 B *αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίον οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο, οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν, οὔτε τὸ* **ἐν τῇ φύσει**. In this passage Plato distinguishes the picture of the bed, the bed made by the carpenter, and the real bed which is ideal, essential, in the nature of things, in the C

Republic X. 597 C mind of God. It may be asked whether the third bed is the idea of a bed. We may reply that it is not distinguished from it, neither does Plato identify them. He uses many forms to express what in the popular language of philosophy is termed by us his doctrine of ideas. [The further relation of the ideal bed to the supramundane *ἰδέαι* is beyond the scope of this passage. L. C.]

ὅτι . . . οὐχ αἱ δύο] Compare a somewhat similar argument in the Sophist 243 D, E, in which the dualistic principles of some of the previous philosophers are reduced to 'being,' because existence is predicated of cold and hot. See also Parmenides 133 A, Tim. 31 A.

D **βούλει οὖν . . . πεποίηκεν**] 'Shall we then speak of him as the natural maker of this (i. e. the idea of the bed) or by some name of a similar kind? Yes, he replied; inasmuch as by the natural process of creation he has made this and all other things.'

φύσει] is the echo of **φυτουργόν** = 'by a natural process.'

ἀλλὰ τί . . . εἶναι;] 'but what of the bed will you call him?' **κλίνης** is governed by **τί**:—'if not the maker or artificer, what is his relation to the bed?' Cp. Symp. 204 D *τί τῶν καλῶν ἐστὶν ὁ Ἔρως;*

E **τὸν τοῦ τρίτου . . . γεννήματος**] sc. *δημιουργόν*. Cp. Dante, Inferno xi. 105 Sì che vostr' arte a Dio quasi è nipote: 'So that your art is as it were the grandchild of God.'

τοῦτ' ἄρα ἔσται καὶ ὁ τραγῳδιοποιός] 'The tragic poet then since he is an imitator will be like these (**καί**),' i.e. the painter and carpenter, 'in the third remove from the king and the truth.'

God (supra D) is here represented as a king. The word is borrowed from the language of the ninth book in which the imperfect shadow of the king is *δημοκρατικός, ὀλιγαρχικός*, as here of God the shadows are *ζωγράφος, κλινοποιός*, &c.

598 A **αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει ἕκαστον**] i. e. the several patterns of things as they exist in nature. Cp. again Phaedo 103 B.

B **πεποίηται**] Perfect middle = 'is wont to create her productions,'—the perfect being used like *τετεύτακε* of an habitual state. Cp. viii. 556 C *τῶν ἄλλων ἠμεληκότας, καὶ οὐδὲν πλείω ἐπιμέλειαν* **πεποιημένους** *ἀρετῆς, κ.τ.λ.* **πρὸς τὸ ὄν** follows **πεποίηται**, 'with a view to being.'

μιμήσασθαι] sc. *τὸ ὄν.* *Republic X.*

φαντάσματος . . . μίμησις;] a resumption of the previous question **πότερα . . . ὡς φαίνεται;** 598 B

πόρρω . . . εἴδωλον] **πόρρω** is a favourite Platonic expression: cp. ix. 581 E, Theaet. 151 C **πόρρω** *ὄντες τοῦ εἰδέναι*: Soph. 234 C *ἔτι* **πόρρω** *τῶν πραγμάτων τῆς ἀληθείας ἀφεστῶτας.* **εἴδωλον** refers to supra **φαντάσματος μίμησις.** **που** is the indefinite adverb of place, 'somewhere far off,' not = 'as I conceive'; cp. vi. 499 C, D **πόρρω που** *ἐκτὸς ὄντι τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐπόψεως.*

τοὺς ἄλλους δημιουργούς] 'or any other artist.' For the asyndeton cp. iv. 434 A *πάντα τἆλλα μεταλλαττόμενα.*

τῷ δοκεῖν] sc. *τὸ ἐζωγραφημένον.* C

ὑπολαμβάνειν δεῖ τῷ τοιούτῳ] 'We must understand by such a statement,' cp. ix. 578 C **τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγῳ** *σκοπεῖν* and note. The description of *φανταστική* in Soph. 238 D ff. recalls the present passage. D

ἄνθρωπος] Possibly *ἅνθρωπος*: see note on *ἀνήρ* ix. 573 C.

Homer, who is deemed to be an authority on the arts and virtues, is in the third remove from truth. Else he would have left laws and institutions and distinguished pupils behind him, and in his life-time would not have had to beg his bread. *598 D–601 B*

οὐκοῦν, κ.τ.λ.] In the Ion of Plato, the same argument is drawn out at length in answer to the Rhapsodist's assertion of Homer's omniscience (Ion 538 ff.—Homer is not a physician or a charioteer, or a general or a pilot, and yet he writes of all these subjects). 598 D

Why should Plato who is himself 'the last of the poets,' and the most poetical of prose writers, be also the enemy of poetry? For reasons partly fanciful and partly real:—

1. He is conscious of a deeply-seated opposition between poetry and philosophy, between the imagination and understanding, between the feelings and reason, between opinion or fiction and truth, between mythology and morality. Poetry is concerned with sense and not with abstractions or ideas, which are to Plato the food of a higher imagination. 2. The poet is from his point of view a mere imitator, who can do everything because he does nothing well; and he encourages the weaker or sentimental side of

Republic X. 598 D the human character. 3. He has not forgotten the old quarrel between philosophy and poetry, which is of longer standing and perhaps even deeper than that between the philosopher and the Sophist, just as the difference between Socrates and Aristophanes might be said to strike deeper than that between Socrates and Protagoras or Gorgias. 4. The ironical distinctions which the poet is to receive indicate the sense of his genius and of the beauty of his works; this, however, is not to supersede the sense of truth. 5. Plato's mission is to realize the abstract, and poetry is a picture, not an abstraction. Modern philosophy, in seeking to realize the abstract in the concrete, adopts a different attitude towards poetry and art. 6. He is probably influenced by the decline of poetry in his own age; what he calls in Laws iii. 701 A a 'theatrocracy' was taking possession of the field.

Yet after every allowance has been made, there remains some reason for surprise, (1) that he should not have acknowledged the moral greatness of Sophocles and Aeschylus, or (2) have noticed that he himself like the tragedians is an imitator, for that both have based the form of their writings on conversation.

599 A **τριττὰ ἀπέχοντα**] **τριττά** is adverbial, sc. *διαστήματα*, nearly equivalent to *τρίς*, 'three times.'

ἤ τι καὶ λέγουσι] 'or whether there is after all some meaning in what they say.' **καί** has a deliberative force.

οἴει οὖν . . . (B) **ἔχοντα;**] For the use of **ἀφεῖναι** to express self-abandonment to a pursuit, cp. ii. 373 D *ἐὰν καὶ ἐκεῖνοι* **ἀφῶσιν αὑτοὺς** *ἐπὶ χρημάτων κτῆσιν ἄπειρον* (**ἐπὶ τῇ**, **κ.τ.λ.**, is here to be construed with **σπουδάζειν**).

προστήσασθαι . . . βίου] 'To set in the forefront of his life.' Cp. viii. 565 C *ἕνα τινὰ ἀεὶ δῆμος εἴωθε . . . προΐστασθαι ἑαυτοῦ.*

B **καλὰ . . . μνημεῖα**] **ἑαυτοῦ** is to be joined with **μνημεῖα**.

ἡ ὠφελία] 'The benefit or usefulness' rather than 'the profit.'

τῶν μὲν τοίνυν . . . (D) **πυνθανομένους**] i.e. we will not ask whether Homer as a physician has effected any cures; a fairer question will be (**δίκαιόν που**) whether he is a general or a legislator, or an educator of mankind:—**ἐρωτῶντες** is connected with **τίνας ὑγιεῖς**, **κ.τ.λ.**, not with **εἰ ἰατρικός**, **κ.τ.λ.**, which merely expresses the supposition on which the question rests. Cp. the construction of infra D **ὦ φίλε Ὅμηρε**, **κ.τ.λ.**

ὦ φίλε . . . δεύτερος] **ἀρετῆς πέρι** resumes what is implied in **πολέμων . . . ἀνθρώπου. εἰδώλου δημιουργός** is an explanation of **τρίτος ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας.** *Republic X.* 599 D

ὃν δὴ . . . ὡρισάμεθα] **ὅν** is the predicate: 'which we defined the imitator to be.' Cp. vi. 499 E **οὕς** *λέγεις τοὺς φιλοσόφους*, ix. 576 B and note. The reference here is to supra 597 E, 598 B, C.

σὲ δὲ τίς, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Lach. 186 B *ἢ εἴ τις ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἑαυτῷ διδάσκαλον μὲν οὔ φησι γεγονέναι, ἀλλ' οὖν ἔργα αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ ἔχει εἰπεῖν, καὶ ἐπιδεῖξαι* **τίνες** *Ἀθηναίων ἢ τῶν ξένων, ἢ δοῦλοι ἢ ἐλεύθεροι, δι' ἐκεῖνον ὁμολογουμένως ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν;* E

The words which follow after **Σόλωνα**, viz. **σὲ . . . εἰπεῖν**, are read in the MSS. and earlier editions without interpunctuation. This great improvement in the text was introduced by Bekker.

ἀλλ' οἷα δὴ . . . λέγονται] **εἰς** before **τὰ ἔργα** was omitted by the first hand in Par. A. Whether the preposition is retained or rejected, the words **τὰ ἔργα** or **εἰς τὰ ἔργα** are to be connected with **σοφοῦ.** 600 A

ἐπὶ συνουσίᾳ] 'For companionship,' i.e. as a companion. **ἐπὶ τούτῳ** (B) refers to **ἐπὶ συνουσίᾳ**, 'on this ground.'

καὶ οἱ ὕστεροι . . . ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις;] The form of sentence is an expansion of the common idiom *αὐτός τε καί*, for which see iv. 427 C. B

In the confusion of early and later Pythagoreanism, the testimony of Plato to a Pythagorean way of life is not without importance.

οὐδ' αὖ, ἔφη, κ.τ.λ.] The meaning is that Homer could not have educated Creophylus, or judging by the examples of Pythagoras, Protagoras and others, that 'child of flesh' would never have left him to starve. There is no need of emendation, nor any difficulty in the text.

Κρεώφυλος] is mentioned in Strabo xiv. cc. 638, 639 as a Samian who entertained Homer and received from him the poem called *Οἰχαλίας ἅλωσις*, which, according to an epigram of Callimachus, was really the writing of Creophylus himself. He is mentioned by Pausanias iv. 2, 2 as the author of the Heraclea in which he spoke of Oechalia, probably the same work. Socrates similarly argues in Gorg. 516 against the statesmanship of Pericles and others from the ingratitude of the people towards them.

Republic X. 600 C **ἐπ' αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου**] as infra D. **ἐπ' ἐκείνου**, 'in his own day.' Of this the words **ὅτε ἔζη**, 'when he was alive,' are a further colloquial amplification. Plato seems to have supposed that the name **Κρεώφυλος** was derived from *κρέας* and *φυλή*: 'of the stock of flesh.'

ἀλλ' οἴει . . . οὐκ ἄρ' ἂν . . . ἀλλὰ Πρωταγόρας μὲν . . . (D) **Ὅμηρον δ' ἄρα . . . καὶ οὐχί, κ.τ.λ.**] The first part of this sentence has a regular protasis (**εἰ τῷ ὄντι . . . δυνάμενος**) and apodosis (**οὐκ ἄρ' ἂν πολλοὺς . . . ὑπ' αὐτῶν**): the second part has two subdivisions (1) **Πρωταγόρας μὲν ἄρα . . . οἱ ἑταῖροι**: (2) **Ὅμηρον δ' ἄρα . . . μεταλάβοιεν.** The connexion of the first and second part may be traced as follows: If Homer had been able to make men better, he would have been honoured: but as a matter of fact, while Protagoras was honoured (and therefore may be supposed to have done men good) Homer was not honoured (and therefore cannot be supposed to have done men good). For the interposition of **οἴει** near the beginning of the sentence cp. especially Meno 93 C *ἀλλ'*, **οἴει**, *οὐκ ἂν ἐβουλήθη;*

ἄρα . . . ἄρα . . . ἄρα] 'As we are expected to suppose.'

D **ἐὰν μὴ σφεῖς, κ.τ.λ.**] Cp. Protag. 318 B.

ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ σοφίᾳ] has an ironical reference to **ἐὰν μὴ . . . ἐπιστατήσωσιν**: i. e. a wisdom which has so high a claim.

***ὀνινάναι**] The reading of a majority of MSS. is *ὀνεῖναι* (A[1]Π &c.) or *ὀνίναι* (A[2]). As such forms are anomalous, several emendations have been suggested,—*ὀνῆναι* which rests on slight manuscript authority (Flor. x &c.), and *ὀνῆσαι* which is also found in a single MS. **ὀνινάναι**, however, which is not found in any MS. is more likely to have been the original of *ὀνίναι*, and the tense agrees better with the other verbs in the sentence.

καὶ οὐχί, κ.τ.λ.] The force of the negative **οὐχί**, demanding an affirmative answer, is continued to the end of the sentence.

E **αὐτοὶ ἂν ἐπαιδαγώγουν**] 'They would have chosen to attend or follow him.' From the more precise sense of watching or following about like a tutor, the word seems to acquire here and in I Alc. 135 D *οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅπως οὐ* **παιδαγωγήσω** *σε*, the more general meaning of following another, never leaving him out of sight. For the whole passage cp. Theag. 128 E.

μιμητὰς εἰδώλων] (1) 'forgers of semblances,' 'imitative makers

of shadows'—from *μιμεῖσθαι εἴδωλον*, 'to make a shadowy imitation' (*εἴδωλον* cognate accusative, cp. infra 602 B *τοῦτο μιμήσεται*) [L. C.]; (2) 'they copy images of virtue' [B. J. Trans.]. *Republic* *X.* 600 E

χρώματ' ἄττα ἑκάστων τῶν τεχνῶν] 'colours belonging to' ('taken from') 'the several arts.' 601 A

τοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ ῥήμασιν] The dative is either (1) governed by *ἐπί* in **ἐπιχρωματίζειν**, 'he dips his language in the colours of the arts': or (2) instrumental, 'he gives his work a superficial colouring of the arts by the language he employs.' The latter is the more natural mode of expression.

ἐπεὶ γυμνωθέντα γε, κ.τ.λ.] Poetry, it is argued, becomes bare and meagre if stripped of poetical diction and colouring. More than half the grace and bloom of a poem necessarily flies off in translation; the same ideas, when expressed in prose, are no longer the same. But the poet might reply that philosophy also would become unmeaning if deprived of a suitable vehicle of expression, nor can language ever wholly lose a musical and poetical element. B

αὐτὰ ἐφ' αὑτῶν λεγόμενα] I. e. when the matter or *λόγος* is stripped of the form of poetry (*λέξις, ἁρμονία, ῥυθμός*) and merely spoken. Cp. iii. 392 D ff.

τεθέασαι γάρ που] 'For you have seen I suppose, what they look like?' We may paraphrase 'you have seen the Logographer turning poetry into prose.'

Not the imitator, nor even the maker of things is the true authority, but he who uses them and directs them to their end. The imitator consults neither use nor reality (of which he is ignorant) but appearance only. *601 B–602 B*

μὴ τοίνυν . . . ἴδωμεν] 'Do not let us leave the subject half explained, but let us have a thorough understanding of it.' Cp. ii. 376 D *ἵνα μὴ ἐῶμεν ἱκανὸν λόγον*, Phaedo 77 C *φαίνεται γὰρ ὥσπερ ἥμισυ ἀποδεδεῖχθαι οὗ δεῖ.* **ἡμίσεως**, the genitive used adverbially (corrected to *ἡμίσεος* in Par. A), is the reading of most MSS.: *ἐφ' ἡμίσεως* (*q*) seems to be a conjectural reading: *ἡμισέως*, the conjecture of Stephanus, is an adverb formed on the analogy of *ταχέως, παχέως*, &c. 601 C

ἆρ' οὖν ἐπαΐει, κ.τ.λ.] A favourite idea in Plato:—Cratyl. 390 D

Republic X. 601 C *τίς δὲ τῷ τοῦ νομοθέτου ἔργῳ ἐπιστατήσειέ τ' ἂν κάλλιστα καὶ εἰργασμένον κρίνειε καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις; ἆρ' οὐχ ὅσπερ χρήσεται;*

ὁ γραφεύς] sc. *τῶν ἡνίων.* **ζωγράφος** is changed to **γραφεύς** for the sake of the paronomasia with **χαλκεύς** and **σκυτεύς**.

D **οἷα . . . ᾧ χρῆται**] 'What specimens of that which he (the user) employs, the maker makes that are good or bad in actual use.' The correlation of singular and plural here arises from the collocation of particular aud universal. The instrument (sing.) is *good in some cases bad in others* (plur.). [L. C.]

ἐξαγγέλλει (*bis*)] Some would read *ἐξαγγελεῖ.* But see note on infra 604 A *ἀντιτείνειν.*

οἳ ἂν ὑπηρετῶσιν] sc. *αὐλοί.* 'Which he finds serviceable:'—not merely 'which he makes use of.' Cp. Protag. 326 B *ἵνα τὰ σώματα βελτίω ἔχοντες* **ὑπηρετῶσι** *τῇ διανοίᾳ χρηστῇ οὔσῃ.* The occurrence of **ὑπηρετῶσιν** and **ὑπηρετήσει** in successive lines, but in a different connexion, is worthy of remark.

E **πίστιν ὀρθήν**] *πίστις* is here used in the sense of an opinion received from others:—not with the technical meaning which was given to it in vi. 511. The genitive, governed by **ποιητής**, is resumed with **κάλλους τε καὶ πονηρίας**.

602 A **διὰ τὸ . . . ἐπιτάττεσθαι**] 'because of having orders given him.' For the passive cp. i. 337 A *χαλεπαίνεσθαι.*

χαρίεις ἂν εἴη . . . ποιῇ] 'The imitator will be in a charming state of intelligence about his own inventions.' The asyndeton is used as elsewhere to express the persistent feeling with which Socrates (*ἐπέχων καὶ οὐκ ἀνιείς*) sends the argument home: cp. v. 462 E *ὥρα ἂν εἴη . . . ἐπανιέναι.* For the ironical use of **χαρίεις** and the reply cp. iv. 426 A *τόδε αὐτῶν οὐ χαρίεν* and the answer (B) *οὐ πάνυ χαρίεν.*

B **ἀλλ' οὖν δὴ ὅμως γε, κ.τ.λ.**] The particles emphasize the absurdity of such a proceeding, considering the nature of imitation: 'nevertheless he will do it.'

τοῦτο μιμήσεται] **τοῦτο** is a cognate accusative: not '*that* he will imitate' but 'such will be the mode of his imitation.'

καὶ ἐν ἔπεσι] Homer is still included among tragic poets: supra 595 C, infra 607 A, Theaet. 153 A.

Thus shallow and unreal itself, imitation works upon what is shallow and unreal in human nature, appealing as it does to the crude experience of sensation and not to the arts of measuring and weighing by which the illusions of sense are corrected. So painting deceives the eye, and poetry introduces similar confusion by her representation of complex and inconsistent emotions, appealing to the passions and not to reason. *Republic X. 602 B–605 C*

πρὸς Διός] The exclamation (cp. i. 332 C, ix. 574 B) is uttered in glad anticipation of a new argument, in which Plato having shown the unreality of dramatic performances, proceeds to consider them as injurious to the moral character: first, as illusive; secondly, as tending to imitate the feelings when excited and variable rather than when equable; thirdly, and more than all, as promoting the indulgence and expression of feelings which would otherwise be restrained. Before taking the new step he resumes what has preceded with **μέν** (**περὶ τρίτον μέν τί, κ.τ.λ.**). In the next sentence *ἐστίν* is to be supplied with **ἔχον**. 602 B

τοῦ ποίου τινὸς πέρι λέγεις;] 'what is the subject of your remark?' The interrogative pronoun is not a repetition of **ποῖόν τι** supra, but refers generally to the whole point in question, asking for an example or illustration of it. C

πᾶσά τις ταραχή] 'a kind of utter confusion' = *πάντως τις ταραχή*: *πᾶς* is used intensively and not extensively: cp. Soph. 250 D **πάσῃ** *συνεσχόμεθα ἀπορίᾳ*,—and for the use of **τις**, Gorg. 522 D *αὕτη γάρ* **τις** *βοήθεια ἑαυτῷ πολλάκις ἡμῖν ὡμολόγηται κρατίστη εἶναι.*

γοητείας οὐδὲν ἀπολείπει] (1) 'fails in no resource of magic art;' (2) 'has all the effect of magic' [B. J.]. Cp. vii. 533 A. D

ἆρ' οὖν οὐ τὸ μετρεῖν, κ.τ.λ.] The apparent variations of the senses are corrected by measure and number. This is the answer to the doctrine of the fallibility of our knowledge of sensible objects, whether suggested by Plato or by Berkeley. The variations are ascertainable or assignable to disturbing causes and afford no reason for doubting the general truthfulness of sense. For Plato's conception of the art of measuring, cp. Protag. 356 D, Philebus 55 E.

τούτῳ δὲ πολλάκις, κ.τ.λ.] The dative would naturally have been followed by some such word as *συμβαίνει*, 'it turns out,' &c. For this the expression **τἀναντία φαίνεται** is substituted. Or in other E

Republic X. 602 E words, the dative is in a loose construction with the whole sentence, like a genitive absolute, and is not to be taken with **φαίνεται**. It would not be in accordance with Plato's use of language, or with the context in what follows, to speak of the contradictions of sense as having anything to do with the rational element in the soul. For a similar change of construction, cp. viii. 566 E *πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω ἐχθρούς, κ.τ.λ.*, Theaet. 182 B *ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων . . . τὰ δὲ αἰσθανόμενα.*

οὐκοῦν ἔφαμεν . . . εἶναι;] He refers to iv. 436 A–C. The dative here as there is instrumental:—'with the same faculty to form opposite opinions at the same time.'

603 A **ἀλλὰ μήν, κ.τ.λ.**] Measure and number are among the leading ideas of the Platonic philosophy. There is a measure in words as in all other things (Polit. 285 A) and the *μέτρον* and *μέτριον* in the Philebus are in the highest region of good.

ἔλεγον] supra 597 E ff., 602 D.

ἡ γραφική . . . (B) ἀληθεῖ] The chief stress is on **πόρρω**, which has the first place in each clause and is repeated for the sake of emphasis.

B **ἐπ' οὐδενί, κ.τ.λ.**] The purpose for which their friendship is cemented is utterly unsound and untrue.

φαύλη . . . μιμητική] Cp. vi. 496 A *ποῖ' ἄττα οὖν εἰκὸς γεννᾶν τοὺς τοιούτους; οὐ νόθα καὶ φαῦλα;*

C **μή τι ἄλλο ᾖ παρὰ ταῦτα;**] *μή τι ἄλλο ἦν*, the conjecture of Ast, is certainly probable. The past tense would refer to iii. 399 A, B, where the true scope of **μιμητική** was described. But the interrogative use of the subjunctive with *μή* expecting a negative answer, is a sufficiently well-ascertained Platonic construction—see Goodwin, *M. and T.*, § 268. Cp. especially Parm. 163 D *τὸ δὲ γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι μή τι ἄλλο ᾖ, κ.τ.λ.*, where, however, Bekker reads *ἦν* with Heindorf.

D **κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν ἐστασίαζε**] sc. *ὁ ἄνθρωπος*: supra 602 C ff.

ἀναμιμνήσκομαι δέ . . . ἡμῶν] Socrates apparently refers to two discussions, one in iii. 387, where the brave man is described as bearing sorrow with fortitude,—the other in iv. 439, where opposite tendencies are spoken of as working together in the soul.

ἀνήρ . . . ἀπολέσας] The words **υἱὸν ἀπολέσας . . . ποιεῖται** are an explanation of **τοιᾶσδε τύχης μετασχών.** *Republic X.* 603 E

τότε] iii. 387 D, E.

οὕτω . . . ἀληθές] 'Rather the latter, said he, if we are to speak truly.' **τό γε ἀληθές** is an adverbial phrase = *re vera*. The reasonableness of this is noticeable. Plato sees that even the good man, who has his feelings most under control, cannot altogether overcome them.

τὸ δὲ . . . εἰπέ] 'But now tell me this about him.' There is no need of altering **τὸ δέ** to *τόδε* with Schneider and the inferior MSS. The neuter of the article is often used thus demonstratively in beginning a new sentence. 604 A

Socrates recalls the heads of the former discussion, to which he adds a new one, viz. the tendency of dramatic performances to relax the self-control which is natural in the presence of others.

μαχεῖσθαί τε καὶ ἀντιτείνειν] Cp. i. 342 A *σκεψομένης τε καὶ ἐκποριζούσης*, supra 601 D *ἐξαγγέλλει . . . καὶ ἐπιτάξει*:—**ἀντιτείνειν**, which is supported by the great majority of MSS., is probably genuine, notwithstanding the change of tense.

ἃ οὐκ ἂν δέξαιτό τινα ἰδεῖν δρῶντα] 'Which he would not choose to see another doing.' Cp. Soph. El. 1278 *ἢ κάρτα κἂν ἄλλοισι θυμοίμην* **ἰδών.** (Unless *ἕ* has dropped out—*ἃ οὐκ ἂν δέξαιτό τινά ἕ ἰδεῖν δρῶντα.*)

ἐναντίας . . . εἶναι] 'But when a man is drawn in two opposite directions in reference to the same object, we say that he has necessarily two distinct principles.' B

φαμέν may be understood parenthetically, and **ἀναγκαῖον** as = *ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν*. But **ἀναγκαῖον** is equally well explained by supplying *εἶναι*:—sc. *φαμὲν εἶναι ἀναγκαῖον δύο εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ.* Compare again the discussion in Book iv (436 ff.) in which the principle of contradiction is first stated.

The change of construction from **δήλου ὄντος** to **προβαῖνον** is caused by the transition to the impersonal verb. Cp. Euthyphr. 4 D *ὡς ἀνδροφόνου καὶ οὐδὲν ὂν πρᾶγμα.* The accusative, when once adopted, is continued.

οὔτε τι . . . σπουδῆς] The spirit of these words resembles that of many passages in the Laws; e. g. vii. 803 B, C *ἔστι δὴ τοίνυν τὰ* C

Republic X. 604 τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράγματα μεγάλης μὲν σπουδῆς οὐκ ἄξια, ἀναγκαῖόν γε μὴν σπουδάζειν· τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ εὐτυχές.

C **ἐν αὐτοῖς**] 'In the circumstances':—i. e. **ἐν ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς** (supra).

τίνι, ἦ δ' ὅς, λέγεις;] Cp. vii. 531 D, E.

ἀλλὰ μὴ προσπταίσαντας, κ.τ.λ.] For the image cp. Dem. Philipp. i. § 40 *ὥσπερ οἱ βάρβαροι πυκτεύουσιν, οὕτω πολεμεῖν Φιλίππῳ· καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνων ὁ πληγεὶς ἀεὶ τῆς πληγῆς ἔχεται, κἂν ἑτέρωσε πατάξῃς, ἐκεῖσ' εἰσὶν αἱ χεῖρες· προβάλλεσθαι δ' ἢ βλέπειν ἐναντίον οὔτ' οἶδεν οὔτ' ἐθέλει.*

γίγνεσθαι πρὸς τῷ ἰᾶσθαι] The dative appears elsewhere in similar expressions (ix. 585 A, Polit. 264 A, Laws vii. 799 C) and therefore *τῷ* (*q*) is to be preferred to *τό*, the reading of the older MSS., which, however, is not impossible after **γίγνεσθαι** ('to arrive at').

D **φαμέν**] 'As we are saying'—supra B.

δειλίας φίλον] Cp. iv. 439 D *πληρώσεών τινων καὶ ἡδονῶν* **ἑταῖρον** (neuter): supra 603 B.

E **ἔχει**] 'admits of.' Cp. Thuc. ii. 41, § 3 *ἀγανάκτησιν* **ἔχει.**

μιμούμενον] *μιμουμένου* (sc. *τινὸς αὐτό*), the reading of Π *q* and a few other MSS., has been preferred by some editors on the supposition that *μιμοῦμαι* is not used passively. As other tenses of the verb are taken in a passive sense (Laws ii. 668 B *τὸ μιμηθέν*: Cratyl. 425 D *γράμμασι καὶ συλλαβαῖς τὰ πράγματα μεμιμημένα*: supra 599 A *μιμηθησόμενον*) there is no sufficient reason for refusing such a sense to the present. But, as Schneider observes, **μιμούμενον** here may quite well be an accusative masculine,—'nor is it easy to understand one who tries to imitate this.' Ficinus ('si imitemur') perhaps read *μιμουμένων.*

πανηγύρει καὶ . . . ξυλλεγομένοις] **πανηγύρει** is dative of the occasion, while **ἀνθρώποις** depends on **εὐπετὲς καταμαθεῖν.** 'At a public gathering, and for men assembling,' &c.

605 A **οὐ . . . πέπηγεν**] **οὐ** negatives the whole sentence; hence **καί**, not *οὐδέ*. It follows that **τε**, not *γε*, is right, and *τε* was probably at first written in Par. A, in which *γε* is a correction. (The mark ÷ written over *γ* by the diorthotes, has been mistaken for *τ*.) For

πέπηγε cp. vii. 530 D ὡς πρὸς ἀστρονομίαν ὄμματα **πέπηγεν**, ὡς πρὸς ἐναρμόνιον φορὰν ὦτα παγῆναι. *Republic X.* 605 A

φαῦλα . . . πρὸς ἀλήθειαν] Cp. supra 597 A ἀμυδρόν τι . . . **πρὸς ἀλήθειαν**.

ἕτερον τοιοῦτον] sc. φαῦλον, to which **τοῦτο** before **ἐγείρει** also refers. B

ὥσπερ ἐν πόλει] 'As in the case of a city;' sc. the rational part is destroyed. The subject of comparison is resumed in ταὐτὸν καὶ τόν, κ.τ.λ., infra.

παραδιδῷ] sc. αὐτοῖς.

ταὐτόν] Accusative in apposition to **κακὴν . . . ἐμποιεῖν**, bringing out the antecedent to **ὥσπερ**.

πολιτείαν] The thought is similar to that in ix. 592 B: cp. infra 608 B περὶ τῆς ἐν αὑτῷ **πολιτείας** δεδιότι.

οὔτε τὰ μείζω οὔτε τὰ ἐλάττω] Cp. i. 343 A οὐδὲ πρόβατα οὐδὲ ποιμένα and note.

ἀλλὰ τὰ αὐτὰ . . . ἀφεστῶτα] There is great uncertainty about the text and construction of this passage. The reading εἰδωλοποιοῦντα, which refers to the poet, rests on insufficient manuscript authority (*q* corr.). Nor is the change from the dative to the accusative necessary, as the 'foolish part of the soul' may very well be called 'a maker of images.' There is, however, good authority for **ἀφεστῶτα**; and it may be argued that if either the dative or the accusative is read in one clause, it should be read in both. But **ἀφεστῶτα**,—'things remote from the truth,' may quite well be in agreement with **εἴδωλα**. On the other hand, ἀφεστῶτι, the reading of Ξ D corr., is also possible.—It may be argued further, on the one hand that εἰδωλοποιοῦντα agreeing with the subject of **ἐμποιεῖν** preserves better the balance of the sentence, on the other hand that it is too far removed from its context. C

The crowning offence of poetry is her corrupting not only bad or indifferent persons, but even the good. Our feelings are stirred when Homer or one of the tragedians represents some pitiful hero weeping or smiting his breast. But in our own sorrows we are expected to play the manly part. And we cannot be right in praising others for a weakness which would disgrace ourselves. The same rule applies to the excess of laughter excited by comedy, *605 C–607 A*

Republic X. *and still more to the awakening of lower feelings. Hymns in praise of God and god-like men are the only poems which we admit in our state.*

605 D **ᾄδοντάς τε καὶ κοπτομένους**] 'Chanting and beating their breasts.' The change from singular to plural marks the transition from the single speeches (*ῥήσεις*) of the characters in Epic poetry and tragedy to the combined song or plaint (*κομμός*) of the chorus and the persons on the stage. The conjectural reading *ἢ κλαίοντας* for **ἢ καὶ ᾄδοντας** is unnecessary.

E **μὴ ἀξιοῖ εἶναι**] **μή**, not *οὐ*, is used in putting the case.

οὐ μὰ . . . σκοποίης] *ναί* here expresses dissent from the negative preceding. 'That does not appear reasonable.' 'Yes, but it will, if you look at it in this way.' **εὔλογον** is used in slightly different senses in the two clauses. 'It looks very inconsistent,' said Glaucon, 'thus to praise the tragic poet.—Rather, it is easily explained, if you look at it in this way.'

606 A **πεπεινηκὸς τοῦ δακρῦσαι**] 'compelled to fast from tears:' i.e. which has been denied the satisfaction of weeping.

ἀνίησι . . . τούτου] 'relaxes its watch over this tearful part of our nature.' Cp. viii. 547 C *φυλακῆς αὐτῶν* and note.

B **ἑαυτῷ**] Plato passes from the rational part of the soul to the man himself. **ἅτε** like *ὡς* is construed with the accusative neuter participle of an impersonal verb.

λογίζεσθαι . . . εἰς τὰ οἰκεῖα] Cp. iii. 395 C *ἵνα μὴ ἐκ τῆς μιμήσεως τοῦ εἶναι ἀπολαύσωσιν.*

C **ἆρ' οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, κ.τ.λ.**] **περὶ τοῦ γελοίου** depends on **ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος**, and is to be continued with **ταὐτὸν ποιεῖς, κ.τ.λ.**, which is added in apposition to **ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος.**

ὅτι, *ἂν αὐτός, κ.τ.λ.] The text has been variously emended. Schneider's reading (**ἃν** for *ἂν*) has been adopted as involving the least change. Hermann's correction of **δέ** to *δή* is to some extent confirmed by the absence of *μέν* after **αὐτός.** Supposing this accepted, the simplest change is to add *ἃ* before **αὐτός** and *ἂν* after **αἰσχύνοιο**:—*ὅτι, ἂν* **ἃ** *αὐτὸς αἰσχύνοιο* **ἄν**, *κ.τ.λ.*, 'that, if jests, which you would be ashamed to make, sound delightful to your ear.' It is possible, however, that we have here a carelessly written

sentence, in which the differing moods *ἃ ἂν αἰσχύνοιο* and *ἃ ἂν χαρῇς* (= *ἐὰν ταῦτα χαρῇς*) are connected with *δέ*. *Republic X.* 606 C

αὖ] 'again,' as in the former case, supra A.

ἐκεῖ] 'On those occasions,' i.e. in hearing poetry, cp. v. 451 B.

ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις] In your private life and conversation (supra B).

καὶ περὶ ἀφροδισίων] *ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος* is to be supplied before **ὅτι**. D

Plato is an enemy to sentimentalism; all those influences which are represented to us by novels, plays, poems, are to be sternly repressed. He will not have the feelings excited by unreal sorrows, lest they should be unequal to the support of real ones. That the indulgence of the feelings even in virtuous or religious emotions may be carried to excess, is certainly true. Also, as Butler has remarked, passive impression is (or rather may be) in an inverse ratio to active habit. Still, one who cannot feel is almost as far removed from a rational being as one who cannot think: the sources of imagination and sympathy are dried up in him; and to quicken the feelings and imagination where they are deficient is quite as important a part of education as to moderate them where they are in excess.

Plato does not recognize that the indulgence of the feelings may also be a cultivation of them (*μίμησις . . . περαίνουσα δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν*). What would he have thought of a system which resolves the moral sentiments into sympathy? Much of the obscurity of this subject arises out of the strongly marked line of distinction which is drawn between reason and feeling, and from the neglect to observe that reason is often manifested in the form of feeling.

ἄξιος ἀναλαβόντι μανθάνειν] 'It is well worth while to take him up and learn him.' The reading **ἄξιος** has the authority of Par. A as well as of Π M, and is also more idiomatic than *ἄξιον*, which has been adopted by editors on the supposed authority of Par. A. E

ὅσον] owing to the omission of its antecedent *τοσοῦτον*, is in the accusative case; hence *ὕμνοι* by attraction to it becomes **ὕμνους**. 607 A

ἐγκώμια τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς] 'praises of the brave,' like Symp. 194 D *ἐγκωμίου τῷ Ἔρωτι*. The construction here follows that of the preceding words.

τοῦ κοινῇ . . . λόγου] Either (1) 'the reason which by common

Republic X. consent has always been held to be the highest,' or (2) 'that reason which from time to time appears best to the majority.' Cp. supra 604 B, C.

607 B–608 B *Such then is our defence for what may seem hard measure towards the poets who have charmed us. The truth is that there is an old quarrel between philosophy and poetry. But if the Muse, making her defence in turn, can prove that we are wrong, we are only too ready to listen to her. Yet until she or her friends can show that she is not only pleasant but useful to the state, we shall hear her under protest, using the foregoing argument as a counter-charm. For great is the issue at stake. And of the highest rewards of virtue we have not yet spoken.*

607 B **ταῦτα δή, ἔφην, κ.τ.λ.**] The reasons for **ἀπολελογήσθω**, 'let this be our defence,' and *ἀπολελογίσθω*, 'let this be our final reckoning' or 'summing up,' are very nearly balanced. In favour of the latter may be urged (1) the agreement of the two best MSS. Par. A and Ven. Π, (2) the old argument of the 'more difficult reading,' (3) the apparent anticipation of the defence of poetry in the word **ἀπολελογήσθω**, which may also have suggested the alteration to the mind of the copyist, (4) the tone of the preceding pages, which has not been that of apology but of accusation or judgement (supra 595 A, B, 604 D, E). On the other hand, **ἀπολελογήσθω** (1) has the consent of the remaining MSS., (2) is a more natural and appropriate expression; (3) towards Homer at least the attitude *has* been one of apology; (4) in the immediate context, the epexegesis **ὅτι εἰκότως ἄρα, κ.τ.λ.**, is more suitable to this idea, for which cp. also iv. 420 B, vi. 490 A; Phaedo 63, 69; (5) 'this is our defence; let poetry make hers if she can,'—is not by any means an illogical sequence.

ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἡμᾶς ᾕρει] The expression *ὁ λόγος αἱρεῖ* is not infrequent in the sense, 'reason constrains us.' In the present passage **ὁ λόγος** may mean either (1) 'the argument,' as in Laws ii. 663 D *ὡς καὶ νῦν αὐτὸ ᾕρηχ' ὁ λόγος ἔχειν*, or (2) 'reason' generally. The addition of **ἡμᾶς** which gives a touch of liveliness, is rather in favour of the former.

προσείπωμεν] 'let us say in addition,' cp. Soph. 250 B. The scribe of r, not understanding this, wrote *αὐτήν* instead of **αὐτῇ**.

καὶ γὰρ ἡ λακέρυζα, κ.τ.λ.] for the saying of 'the yelping hound barking at her lord' and 'one mighty in the vain talk of fools,' &c. The first of these two quotations is said by Plato (Laws xii. 967 C, D) to be applied by certain poets to the disciples of Anaxagoras, who though nameless, are sufficiently indicated by their doctrine *ὡς νοῦς εἴη ὁ διακεκοσμηκὼς πάνθ' ὅσα κατ' οὐρανόν*,—which doctrine of theirs however they ruined, and themselves with it, by also making earth and stones the universal causes. *Republic X.* 607 B

ὁ τῶν Δία σοφῶν ὄχλος κρατῶν] The best mode of construing this clause is to take **Δία** with **κρατῶν**, 'the crowd of philosophers overmastering Zeus.' Cp. Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, v. 1, 86–88 'A politician, . . . one that would circumvent God.' C

The order of the words may be possibly explained by the circumstance of their being a quotation from some lyric poet. In Plato himself, however, there occur examples of somewhat violent or affected transpositions, as in Laws vii. 824 A *θήρευσις . . . ἡ* **τῶν** *διαπαύματα* **πόνων** *ἔχουσα*. The Vulgate text before Bekker (still followed by some editors) had *διασόφων* in one word on the authority of some inferior manuscripts (which read *διασοφῶν*) according to the supposed analogy of *διάσεμνος*,—itself a word of doubtful authority.

σημεῖα] sc. *ἐστίν*, which gives the required verb.

ἡ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ποιητική] is opposed to the 'austere' poetry which is to be admitted: iii. 398 A *αὐτοὶ δ' ἂν τῷ αὐστηροτέρῳ καὶ ἀηδεστέρῳ ποιητῇ χρῴμεθα.*

ἀπολογησομένη] The reading *ἀπολογησαμένη*, which seems to have been that of A[1], is probably right. **οὕτω**, 'on this condition,' is explained by **ἀπολογησομένη . . . μέτρῳ.** D

τῶν καλῶν πολιτειῶν] said ironically, like *ἡ καλλίστη . . . πολιτεία* in viii. 562 A. E

† **αἰσθόμεθα**] is a word of doubtful genuineness. And even if it be changed to *αἰσθανόμεθα*, the expression is feeble. *'Ηισθόμεθα* and *ἠσθήμεθα* are not much better. *Εἰσόμεθα*, the reading of *q*, is probably conjectural. Madvig very ingeniously conjectured *ᾀσόμεθα*, continuing the idea of *ἐπᾴδοντες*. But (1) the participial clause **εὐλαβούμενοι . . . ἔρωτα** is hardly enough of a digression to justify the resumptive **δ' οὖν**: (2) the expression *ᾀσόμεθα ὡς, κ.τ.λ.*, is not quite natural or idiomatic: (3) there is nothing in the words **ὡς οὐ** 608 A

Republic X. **σπουδαστέον . . . περὶ ποιήσεως** to suggest the style of a chant or *ἐπῳδή*. Some verb with the meaning of *ἀφεξόμεθα* seems to be required. [L. C.]

608 B–D *One life is far too little to reward virtue, or to deserve the serious care of an immortal soul.—That the human soul is immortal is a strange thought to Glaucon. But Socrates undertakes to prove it.*

608 B **οὐδέ γε ποιητικῇ**] Poetry is emphasized as being the immediate subject of the previous discussion.

C **τί οὖν . . . (D) παντός ;**] 'and should a thing immortal be seriously interested about a period of time which is no more than this, rather than with eternity?' Cp. Phaedo 107 C *εἴπερ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος, ἐπιμελείας δὴ δεῖται οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρόνου τούτου μόνον, ἐν ᾧ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός*: also supra vi. 486 A, 498 D.

D **οἶμαι ἔγωγ', ἔφη**] sc. *δεῖν σπουδάζειν ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός*, referring not to the word **οἴει** in what precedes, but to the main drift of the question, and emphatically affirming the latter part of it. Cp. i. 336 E *μὴ γὰρ δὴ οἴου . . . ὑπείκειν ἀλλήλοις καὶ οὐ σπουδάζειν, κ.τ.λ.* . . . **οἴου γε σύ,** *ὦ φίλε*: where see note. Glaucon can only answer Socrates' question in one way, but he does not see the aim of it.

οὐκ ᾔσθησαι, κ.τ.λ.] That the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, which is asserted in the Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus, and referred to in the Apology, Timaeus, Politicus, Laws,—and also in Rep. vi. 498 D, should be here spoken of as a new revelation of which Glaucon hears for the first time, is remarkable.

εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ γ', ἔφην] 'I should think I ought, said I:' i. e. *δίκαιός εἰμι ἔχειν τοῦτο λέγειν*. So infra 612 D *ἢ οὐ μνημονεύεις*; **ἀδικοίην** *μέντ' ἄν, ἔφη, εἰ μή*.

608 D–611 A *That which perishes can be destroyed only by its own proper evil. Now the soul has an evil proper to it, namely vice. But vice does not destroy the soul. It would lose all it terrors if it did. For it would release the wicked man from evil. Instead of which it keeps him alive and wide awake. It follows that as the soul is capable of being destroyed by its own evil, the soul therefore must be imperishable and immortal.*

608 D **ἀγαθόν τι . . . καὶ κακὸν καλεῖς ;**] The argument is as follows:— The soul has a proper evil, which is vice. Now if vice has no

destroying power over the soul, no merely external evil can have any. *Republic X.*

κακόν τι] The best MSS. read *κακόν τε*, which is possibly right. 609 A

τοῦτο μέντοι . . . ἀπολλύον] 'An evil however whose destructive agency cannot cause its dissolution.' B

οὐκ ἦν ;] cp. iv. 436 B, C *εἰσόμεθα ὅτι οὐ ταὐτὸν ἦν ἀλλὰ πλείω*: and the note.

ἀλλ' ὧδε ποίει] 'But put the matter in this way.' C

ὥσπερ . . . (D) ἀφικνεῖται] The apodosis is deferred to make room for the question **οὐχ οὕτως ;** It is resumed in a new form in **ἴθι δή, κ.τ.λ.**, infra.

καὶ ἃ νῦν δή, κ.τ.λ.] **καί** must here mean 'and'—not 'also,' as in **καὶ** *ψυχήν* infra D, because the comparison is not between the body and corn, iron (supra A), &c., but between all these and the soul.

ἐκεῖνό γε] 'The other (and more remote) alternative,' referring to supra A. D

ὑπὸ τῆς . . . πονηρίας . . . ἐκείνων] 'by the evil which is proper to them alone,' i. e. in so far as it is an evil of food considered in itself. For example, mildew, the disease of corn, can destroy the ear of corn, but the mildewed ear of corn will not destroy the human body of itself, but only by introducing into it some disease of the body. E

***ὀρθότατα**] *ὀρθότατ' ἂν* is the reading of all the MSS. with two unimportant exceptions (*ὀρθώτατ' ἂν* Vind. F, *ὀρθότατ' ἄρ'* Vind. E), but is probably corrupt. Either **ὀρθότατα** as in the text, or *ὀρθότατά γ'*, should be read. 610 A

ἢ τοίνυν . . . (B) ἀνοσιωτέρα γίγνεται] Compare the first chapter of Butler's *Analogy*, Part i:—especially the curious observation, 'we have no way of determining by experience what is the certain bulk of the living being each man calls himself; and yet till it be determined that it is larger in bulk than the solid elementary particles of matter which there is no ground to think any natural power can dissolve, there is no sort of reason to think death to be the dissolution of it, of the living being, even though it should not be absolutely indiscerptible.' Here however Butler seems to imply that the soul may be a primary atom, and so indivisible. Plato argues that no disease

Republic X. of the body nor division of the particles however minute can affect the soul.

610 B For **εἴ τις ὅ τι σμικρότατα** we should perhaps read *εἴ τις εἷς ὅ τι σμικρότατα*: but cp. vi. 509 D *γραμμὴν δίχα τετμημένην . . .* **ἄνισα τμήματα.**

C **ὁμόσε τῷ λόγῳ τολμᾷ ἰέναι**] 'boldly closes' (1) 'with our argument,' or (2) 'with us in argument.' The latter may be supported by the absolute use of *ὁμόσε . . . χωρήσεται* in Theaet. 165 E, and for **τῷ λόγῳ** thus used cp. ii. 361 B *τὸν δίκαιον παρ' αὐτὸν ἱστῶμεν* **τῷ λόγῳ.** But the first explanation is perhaps simpler and more natural.

D **μάλιστα . . . ἧττον**] sc. *λαμβάνοντας αὐτό.*

ἀλλὰ μή, ὥσπερ νῦν . . . οἱ ἄδικοι] Cp. vii. 539 D *καὶ* **μὴ ὡς νῦν** *ὁ τυχὼν καὶ οὐδὲν προσήκων ἔρχεται ἐπ' αὐτό*—and the note there.

E **πρὸς . . . τῷ ζωτικῷ**] Cp. Theaet. 185 E *καλὸς γὰρ εἶ, ὦ Θεαίτητε* . . . **πρὸς δὲ τῷ καλῷ** *εὖ ἐποίησάς με.*

οὕτω πόρρω . . . εἶναι] 'So far is she removed from being deadly.' I. e. Injustice is far enough from being one of the things which cause death. Cp. Phaedo 107 C *εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ὁ θάνατος τοῦ παντὸς ἀπαλλαγή, ἕρμαιον ἂν ἦν τοῖς κακοῖς ἀποθανοῦσι τοῦ τε σώματος ἅμα ἀπηλλάχθαι καὶ τῆς αὑτῶν κακίας μετὰ τῆς ψυχῆς.* Yet at the end of Book i (351 ff.) Socrates uses an argument apparently inconsistent with this, which he applies both to the state and to the individual, viz. that evil is a principle of dissolution or annihilation, which subsists only through the latent presence of good.

For the figurative language cp. Polit. 284 E *πάνθ' ὁπόσα εἰς τὸ μέσον ἀπῳκίσθη τῶν ἐσχάτων.*

611 A–612 A *Now the number of souls, since they are immortal, must always be the same, neither less nor more; they cannot become less, because none of them can die: and they cannot increase, because they could only be increased if what is mortal became immortal, of which the result would be that all things would become immortal. Nor can their nature really be so complex as appears to us. The fact of immortality is proved. But the nature of the soul is beyond the limits of our knowledge. For she is plunged in the sea of mortality and encrusted with earth. Only the divine spark of philosophy within her gives an inkling of her pristine and true being.*

εἰ δ' ἔχει, κ.τ.λ.] Plato teaches that souls are eternal, and have a certain fixed number which is incapable of increase or diminution. Any process of change by which the mortal passes into the immortal must end after infinite ages in the immortality of all the mortal. That this is Plato's meaning, which is, however, obscurely expressed, appears from Phaedo 72 B; C *εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀεὶ ἀνταποδιδοίη τὰ ἕτερα τοῖς ἑτέροις γιγνόμενα, ὡσπερεὶ κύκλῳ περιιόντα, ἀλλ' εὐθεῖά τις εἴη ἡ γένεσις ἐκ τοῦ ἑτέρου μόνον εἰς τὸ καταντικρύ, καὶ μὴ ἀνακάμπτοι πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον μηδὲ καμπὴν ποιοῖτο, οἶσθ' ὅτι πάντα τελευτῶντα τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα ἂν σχοίη*: where an opposite turn is given to the same argument and it is urged that life must follow death as death follows life. One of the reasons given by Anselm in *Cur Deus Homo*, for the redemption of mankind, is 'the appointed number of the souls of the blessed.' *Republic X.* 611 A

τῇ ἀληθεστάτῃ φύσει] 'in her truest nature,' as distinguished from that phenomenal nature of the soul which is known to us in experience, and has parts and opposing desires as in Book iv. B

οὐ ῥᾴδιον, κ.τ.λ.] (1) 'that can hardly be eternal, as we have now discovered the soul to be, which is compounded of many elements, and is not perfectly compounded.' The words **σύνθετόν τε, κ.τ.λ.**, may be illustrated by ix. 588 ff. where the soul is said in a figure to be composed of a many-headed beast, a lion, and a man. Otherwise (2) the words **ὡς νῦν . . . ψυχή** may be taken closely with the clause immediately preceding and referred to the psychology of Books iv and ix. The position of the words in question is in favour of the latter explanation—'that can hardly be eternal which is imperfectly compounded of various elements, as in our present conversation the soul has appeared to be.' [L. C.] Cp. infra C *νῦν δὲ εἴπομεν, κ.τ.λ.*, 612 A *νῦν δὲ . . . διεληλύθαμεν.*

καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι] such as the reasonings in the Phaedo and Phaedrus.

ἀναγκάσειαν ἄν] 'would prove beyond doubt.'

εὑρήσει . . . διόψεται] The subject of these verbs is to be gathered from the preceding sentence: viz. *ὁ οὕτω διαθεώμενος.* C

δικαιοσύνας τε καὶ ἀδικίας] The plural signifies the concrete realization of the abstract notion:—Justice and Injustice in their various forms.

τεθεάμεθα μέντοι . . . τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν] The construction is

Republic *X.* 611 C altered to suit the expansion of the simile: and there is a resumption of **τεθεάμεθα . . . αὐτό** in infra D **οὕτω καὶ τὴν ψυχήν, κ.τ.λ.**

With the following image cp. Phaedrus 250 C *καθαροὶ ὄντες καὶ ἀσήμαντοι τούτου ὃ νῦν σῶμα περιφέροντες ὀνομάζομεν, ὀστρέου τρόπον δεδεσμευμένοι.*

E **ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ὁρμῆς**] sc. *τῆς τοῦ τῷ θείῳ ἐφέπεσθαι.*

612 A **γεηρὰ καὶ πετρώδη**] These words in the relative clause resume **πέτρας τε καὶ ὄστρεα** supra.

ὑπὸ . . . ἑστιάσεων] 'as the effects of what are called blissful banquets.' Cp. supra **γῆν ἑστιωμένη.**

612 A–613 E *We have found, as Glaucon and Adeimantus required, that apart from reputation and rewards, justice in her own nature is best for the soul in her own nature, even though a man could make himself invisible. Having answered this requirement, we may now, without offence, state the truth about the just man's reward. He does not escape the notice of the gods, and they love him and make him blessed. And though his justice may not soon appear to men, yet at the end of the race he wins the prize against those who started brilliantly with a splendid show. The unjust may elude detection for a while; but in their age they are exploded and despised; and suffer all those horrors which were formerly recounted as falling on the head of the just man who was misconstrued by mankind.*

612 A **οὐκοῦν, κ.τ.λ.**] The passage which follows is one of the many reminiscences of earlier portions of the work which occur in later ones, and which form an exquisite thread of connexion amid apparent disorder. The old allusion to the ring of Gyges is heightened and enriched by the reference to Iliad v. 844, 845

αὐτὰρ Ἀθήνη
δῦν' Ἄϊδος κυνέην, μή μιν ἴδοι ὄβριμος Ἄρης.

This very early piece of folk-lore is alluded to also in Hesiod. Scut. 227, Aristoph. Ach. 390, and in the legend of Perseus in Pherecydes. See Leaf's note on Iliad. l. c. He compares the Tarn-Kappe or Nebelkappe of northern mythology.

For the bearing of the words **τὸν Γύγου δακτύλιον** on the reading of ii. 359 C, see note in loco.

ἀπελυσάμεθα] 'we have cleared away in the argument the difficulties raised by Glaucon and Adeimantus.' To answer

accusations or clear away objections is a meaning constantly *Republic X.*
assigned to ἀπολύεσθαι. On the other hand there is no certain 612
instance of the use of the middle voice of this verb in the sense A
of 'paying a debt.' A various reading ἀπεδυσάμεθα is found in the Cesena MS. (M), in Ven. Ξ, and in Stobaeus: this may be connected with the passage (ii. 361 C γυμνωτέος δὴ πάντων πλὴν δικαιοσύνης, κ.τ.λ.) in which Glaucon and Adeimantus desire Socrates to 'strip' justice. The allusion, however, is too remote; the form is unusual in Attic prose, and the reading is not assisted by the immediate context.

ἐπηνέκαμεν] Par. A reads ἐπηινέγκαμεν (sic) with a dot over the γ, B
suggesting **ἐπηνέκαμεν**, and Par. K reads ἐπηνέσαμεν. This recalls the words of Adeimantus (which may however have suggested this reading to the scribe) ii. 363 A οὐκ αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην **ἐπαινοῦντες**, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῆς εὐδοκιμήσεις, ib. 367 D μισθοὺς δὲ καὶ δόξας πάρες ἄλλοις **ἐπαινεῖν**. But for **ἐπιφέρειν**, 'to bring to bear,' 'apply' (reading ἐπηνέγκαμεν), cp. Soph. 251 A λέγομεν ἄνθρωπον δή που πόλλ' ἄττα ἐπονομάζοντες, τά τε χρώματα **ἐπιφέροντες** αὐτῷ καὶ . . . κακίας καὶ ἀρετάς.—The word **ἐπηνέκαμεν** with the same variant ἐπηνέσαμεν occurs in Polit. 307 A.

ὑμεῖς γὰρ ἠγεῖσθε] ii. 361 A ff., 367 E. C

ᾐτεῖσθε, the reading of Par. A, which is supported by M (ἠτεῖσθε) is perhaps to be preferred to **ἠγεῖσθε**: it agrees better with **ἔδωκα** and **δοτέον**, and with **ἀπαιτῶ** in the following sentence. Cp. infra D, E. There is a slight pleonasm or anacoluthon in **δοτέον** following ᾐτεῖσθε, which however is not unplatonic.

ταῦτα λανθάνειν] 'That one should escape notice in this.' **ταῦτα**, cognate accusative.

δοκεῖσθαι] For the passive cp. vi. 490 A τοῖς . . . δοκουμένοις. D

εἰ μή τι ἀναγκαῖον, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Butler, *Analogy*, Part. i. chap. 2 613
'Why the author of nature does not make his creatures happy with- A
out the instrumentality of their own actions, and prevent their bringing any sufferings upon themselves, is another matter. Perhaps there may be some impossibilities in the nature of things which we are unacquainted with.'

ἐκ προτέρας ἁμαρτίας] The effect of one life on another is again referred to infra 620 A κατὰ συνήθειαν γὰρ τοῦ προτέρου βίου τὰ πολλὰ αἱρεῖσθαι.

οὐ γὰρ δή, κ.τ.λ.] cp. vi. 500 C, D θείῳ δὴ καὶ κοσμίῳ ὅ γε φιλόσοφος

Republic X. 613 A *ὁμιλῶν κόσμιός τε καὶ θεῖος εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ γίγνεται*: Apol. 41 C *καὶ ἕν τι τοῦτο διανοεῖσθαι ἀληθές, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι, οὐδὲ ἀμελεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν τὰ τούτου πράγματα.* Cp. also, for the *ὁμοίωσις θεῷ* Theaet. 176 B–E, Laws iv. 716 B, C.

Socrates is about to show that righteousness has the rewards both of this life and of another. He may be said to have partly begged the question of this life by imagining the existence of true happiness in a perfect state. Yet, as he has himself implied at the end of Book ix, the good man has also the power of constructing a 'Kingdom of God' within him, even when the world is against him. Nor is he so antagonistic to his fellow-creatures in fact as he is supposed to be in idea. The world comes round to him at last: appearances as well as realities must be at length restored to him: virtue in the long run is also happiness and good repute.

B **ἆρ' οὐχ ὧδε ἔχει . . .** (C) **ἀποτρέχοντες**] 'Is not the actual truth as follows? Are not those clever unjust men in the position of runners who run well from the lower end of the course to the upper, but not from the upper to the lower? They lead off at a great pace, but in the end come to look foolish, slinking away with their ears down on their shoulders, and without a crown.' The words **ἀπὸ τῶν κάτω . . . ἄνω** have been taken to mean 'from the lower and upper parts of their body,' i.e. their hips and shoulders; and Socrates is supposed to be describing those who have good legs and no chest. See Riddell's *Digest of Idioms*, § 111: also Madvig quoted by Baiter in his preface. But it seems more natural to apply the ambiguous words **ἄνω** and **κάτω** to the upper and lower end of the race-course than to the parts of the human body. The 'upper end' of the course is that farthest from the starting-place, and only a course up and down the stadium is contemplated. The second statement (**τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, κ.τ.λ.**) as in many similar passages is an expansion of the first. The race alluded to is of course the *δίαυλος*: cp. Aesch. Agam. 343, 344 *δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς οἴκους νοστίμου σωτηρίας | κάμψαι διαύλου θάτερον κῶλον πάλιν.* The new interpretation in which Riddell and Madvig concur rather takes from the point of the comparison, but the use of *ἀπό* which it implies is idiomatic: cp. Xen. Rep. Lac. v. 9 *ὁμοίως γὰρ* **ἀπό** *τε τῶν σκελῶν καὶ* **ἀπὸ** *χειρῶν καὶ* **ἀπὸ** *τραχήλου γυμνάζονται.*

C **ἅπερ αὐτὸς ἔλεγες**] ii. 361 D, E.—Another of the numerous links by which Plato connects the beginning with the end of his work.

γέροντες . . . προπηλακίζονται] (1) 'As they grow old they are miserably insulted' (**ἄθλιοι** predicative), rather than (2) 'becoming wretched old men they are insulted.' *Republic X.* 613 E

The words **εἶτα στρεβλώσονται καὶ ἐκκαυθήσονται**, though found in all MSS., are omitted by some editors and bracketed by others. There is no necessity for this. The addition of the word **εἶτα**, which improves the effect of them, sufficiently shows that they are not a gloss arising out of a reference to the words of Glaucon, ii. 361 E. They suggest the antecedent to **ἅ**, and may be sufficiently defended as a humorous epitome of the original to which Socrates briefly refers.

ὃ λέγω] supra c.

καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, κ.τ.λ.] **καὶ μάλα** (**καί** intensive) is to be taken closely with **καλά τε καὶ βέβαια**. 'They are indeed most fair and well assured.' 614 A

Yet greater far are the rewards of the just and the punishments of the unjust in another life. This is shown by the report which Er the Pamphylian brought from the other world. He was left for dead amongst the slain, and twelve days afterwards came to life upon the funeral pyre. His tale was as follows:—'When his soul left the body, he proceeded with a great company to a place where there were two chasms in the earth, near together; and directly above them two chasms in the sky. Judges sat there in the midst, and after judgement, some souls ascended through the chasm on the right, while others descended into the chasm on the left. He himself on approaching the judgement seat, was told that he was to observe what took place, and carry the report of it back to living men. Then he beheld how from the chasm on the right hand were coming up souls parched and dusty, while from the chasm upon the left came down another troop clean and bright. All gladly rested in the meadow after their long journey of a thousand years.' *614 A–E*

Plato ends the Republic with a myth: partly (1) because he is on the limits of human knowledge: imagination necessarily enters into any representation of another life: (2) also because he has the old garment of mythology still clinging to him: (3) that he may popularize moral truths by investing them with the charm of a religious tale: (4) since he is embodying in literature the Pythagorean and Orphic feelings of the age. Like religious

Republic X. 614 A paintings, the myths of Plato have also some traditional elements which lend them verisimilitude and help to bring them into harmony with contemporary ideas. Plato is accepting the old forms and trying to breathe a moral and intellectual life into them. His myth consequently, instead of being a mere fiction or fairy tale, is supported by the strength of traditional belief. The attempts of Numenius, Proclus and others to connect this myth with those in Gorg., Phaed., Phaedr., Tim. so as to get a complete and consistent view of Plato's supra-mundane theories, only show the futility of such a method.

τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου ὀφειλόμενα ἀκοῦσαι] 'The debt of description which the argument owes to them.' Supra 612 C *ἃ ἐδανείσασθε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ.* The repetition of **ἀκοῦσαι** has been suspected by Stephanus and Stallbaum, but the word is not without meaning if it be taken in the sense of 'to have related concerning them.' Cp. supra vi. 496 A, Lys. 207 A *οὐ τὸ καλὸς εἶναι μόνον ἄξιος* **ἀκοῦσαι.** The debt which has been incurred in words has to be paid in words.

λέγοις ἄν, κ.τ.λ.] 'As one who delights in listening to few things more.'

B **ἀλλ' ἀλκίμου μὲν ἀνδρός**] Socrates makes a pun on the name of Alcinous; as we might say, parodying the words: 'I will introduce you to a hero: not the well-known one of the *Pilgrim's Progress*:—yet this too is a Great-heart.' Cp. Symp. 185 C *Παυσανίου δὲ παυσαμένου.* There is perhaps an allusion to the descent among the shades (Odyssey xi) which forms a part of the tale of Ulysses to Alcinous. The epithet is appropriate to one who fell in battle.

τοῦ Ἀρμενίου] not 'the Armenian' but 'the son of Armenius' as in the quotation of Clement infra: his country is mentioned afterwards. Pamphylia is again referred to, infra 615 C.

Er, the son of Armenius, is declared by Clement of Alexandria (Stromat. v. 710, § 24) to be Zoroaster: *ὁ δ' αὐτὸς* (sc. *Πλάτων*) *ἐν τῷ δεκάτῳ τῆς Πολιτείας Ἠρὸς τοῦ Ἀρμενίου τὸ γένος Παμφύλου μέμνηται, ὅς ἐστι Ζοροάστρης· αὐτὸς γοῦν ὁ Ζοροάστρης γράφει· Τάδε ξυνέγραψε Ζοροάστρης Ἀρμενίου τὸ γένος Πάμφυλος ἐν πολέμῳ τελευτήσας ὅσα ἐν Ἅιδῃ γενόμενος ἐδάην παρὰ θεῶν.*

δεκαταίων . . . δωδεκαταῖος] This gives two days for the home-bringing and funeral preparations. The twelve days are not forgotten in the narrative. The sojourn of seven days is succeeded

by a journey of four days, and this by another journey of one day (616 B). *Republic X.* 614 B

ἐπειδή οὗ] The first hand in Par. A wrote *ἐπειδὴ οὗ* with Ven. Ξ: an early corrector changed this to *ἐπειδὴ οὖν*. The genitive goes with the noun: not 'when the soul left him,' but 'when his spirit went forth.' In what follows, the soul or spirit is spoken of as the man.

εἰς τόπον τινὰ δαιμόνιον] 'to a wonderful place.' C

δικαστὰς δὲ . . . ἔπραξαν] Cp. Phaedo 107 E *λέγεται δὲ οὕτως, ὡς ἄρα τελευτήσαντα ἕκαστον ὁ ἑκάστου δαίμων, ὅσπερ ζῶντα εἰλήχει, οὗτος ἄγειν ἐπιχειρεῖ εἰς δή τινα τόπον, οἷ δεῖ τοὺς ξυλλεγέντας διαδικασαμένους εἰς Ἅιδου πορεύεσθαι μετὰ ἡγεμόνος ἐκείνου ᾧ δὴ προστέτακται τοὺς ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε πορεῦσαι*: and Gorg. 524 ff.

τῶν δεδικασμένων] is neuter: cp. infra **σημεῖα πάντων ὧν ἔπραξαν.**

διακελεύοιντο] Oblique for *διακελευόμεθα*: 'The judges or their apparitors said, "You must be the messenger, and we exhort you to look and listen."' D

'The souls that came from heaven, pure and bright, and those that rose out of the ground, dusty and soiled, met and rested in the meadow, friends greeting friends and telling of what they had seen in their respective journeys. The one told of delights beyond compare; the other with lamentation and weeping recounted all that they had suffered and seen others suffer. Each sin was punished ten times over, once in every hundred years; and the rewarding of good deeds was in the same proportion. Newly born infants, too, were there, but of them there is not much to be said. The punishments of impiety and parricide were greater than of other sins. I heard a Pamphylian ask, "Where is Ardiaeus the Great?" "Not here," was the reply,—"nor will he ever come. The mouth of the chasm refused him with a terrific roar, and he was thrown down and flayed and dragged away over spikes of flint to be cast into the abyss." The same happened to other tyrants.' *614 E–616 A*

ὅσα τε καὶ οἷα πάθοιεν] 'Of all the dreadful things they had experienced.' 615 A

χιλιέτη] The form *χιλιετῆ* is supported by the Cesena MS., and by Par. DK which may be taken as representing Ven. Π, of which the concluding pages are wanting.

Republic X. 615 B

τοῦτο δ' εἶναι . . . ἀνθρωπίνου] 'that is to say, once in every hundred years, this being reckoned as the measure of the life of man.' Plato often deals in round numbers. See ix. 588 A *προσήκοντα . . . βίοις ἀριθμόν.* **τοῦτο** refers to **δίκην δεδωκέναι . . . δεκάκις.**

καὶ οἷον, κ.τ.λ.] The sentence breaks off with an illustration and is continued as if *ὅτι* had preceded: **καί**, which is found in all the MSS. is genuine, and the phrase may be explained as a colloquialism:—'And, for example, if there were any,' &c.

πολλῶν] This is the reading of Ven. Ξ, and may be a conjectural emendation of *πολλοί*, the reading of most MSS., which cannot be right. A corrector of Par. D has changed *πολλοί* to **πολλοῖς**,—certainly an idiomatic reading. Schneider is hardly justified in saying of it 'propter pluralem *θανάτων* ferri nequit.' Cp. Laws IX. 870 D. The words **ἢ πόλεις . . . ἐμβεβληκότες** explain **θανάτων . . . αἴτιοι.**

κομίσαιντο . . . κομίζοιντο] The aorist refers to the fact, the present to the general rule.

τῶν δὲ εὐθὺς γενομένων . . . πέρι] 'And of those (who died) as soon as they were born, or after living only a little while.' Since the dead alone are in question, the ellipse of *ἀποθανόντων* or *ἀπογενομένων* (conjectured by Cobet) can be endured, especially since it avoids the collision of two participles.—Plato also has a '*limbus infantum*,' at which he hints.

C **εἰς δὲ θεοὺς . . . διηγεῖτο**] 'and of piety and impiety to Gods and parents and of the murder of kindred (reading *αὐτόχειρος φόνου*), the retributions which he narrated were yet greater.'

The reading of all the MSS. is **αὐτόχειρας**, as in the text, of which, however, no grammatical account can be given. The conjecture of Ast, *αὐτόχειρος φόνου*, is extremely probable. *Αὐτόχειρ* is used, as often in tragedy, to imply violence to kindred: cp. Laws ix. 872 C *ξυγγενῶν αὐτόχειρας φόνους.* The sentence thus includes all acts of impiety, as involving a higher degree of crime.

'Αρδιαῖος ὁ μέγας] The tyrant of Books viii, ix, is still alive, and is having the reward of his crimes. The spirits amongst whom Er finds himself are his own countrymen. The questioner is obviously a Pamphylian, who, having passed his thousand years in Heaven, is still interested in the concerns of his native country. He asks of his friend who has come from Hell (cp. supra 614 E *ὅσαι γνώριμαι*) not without a certain degree of dread, how it has fared with the

contemporary tyrant, of whose greatness he still retains the impression. *Republic X.* 615 C

χιλιοστὸν ἔτος] Cp. supra A *εἶναι δὲ τὴν πορείαν χιλιέτη*. Plato would not have us forget that a thousand years have passed since these spirits were in the body.

ἀποκτείνας] = *ὃς ἀπέκτεινεν*, 'who in the course of his tyranny had slain.'

οὐδ' ἂν ἥξει] *ἂν* combined with the future indicative throws a shade of irony into the meaning: 'nor is he likely to be coming here.' See Goodwin, *M. and T.*, § 197. D

ἐθεασάμεθα, κ.τ.λ.] These are not the words of Er, but of the spirit whom he overhears. The narrative which follows is a confirmation of the words 'he is not likely to come.' Er begins again to speak in his own person at infra 616 B *καὶ τὰς μὲν δή*.

τοῦτο] refers both to what precedes and follows: 'for this' viz. the fate of Ardiaeus 'was one of the terrible sights which we' i.e. the spirits in the world below 'witnessed.' The partitive genitive here forms part of the predication.

καὶ τἆλλα πάντα πεπονθότες] 'and had suffered all that we told you.' These words, like **τῶν δεινῶν θεαμάτων** supra, refer to the conversation which the pilgrims from the lower world had held with the pilgrims from the upper respecting their experiences in the thousand years,—supra 614 E. **τἆλλα**, 'the rest,' i.e. all except the spectacle now to be described.

ἦσαν δὲ καὶ . . . ἡμαρτηκότων] It was not the position of the tyrant that had merited judgement, but the character of his life. Cp. Gorg. 524 F *ὁ Ῥαδάμανθυς . . . θεᾶται ἑκάστου τὴν ψυχήν, οὐκ εἰδὼς ὅτου ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως ἐπιλαβόμενος, κ.τ.λ.*

ἢ μὴ ἱκανῶς, κ.τ.λ.] Ardiaeus was incurable, but the attempt might be made prematurely by others whose term of punishment was only to be temporarily prolonged. E

ἐνταῦθα δή, κ.τ.λ.] The ministers of vengeance are represented as they might be in Dante or by one of the early Italian painters. They are waiting (**παρεστῶτες**) for the well-known signal.

τὸν δὲ Ἀρδιαῖον . . . (616 A) ἄγοιντο] The transposition of **ὅτι εἰς** to *εἰς ὅ τι* in Par. A led Hermann to conjecture that **τὸν Τάρταρον** as well

Republic X. 615 E as *ταῦτα ὑπομένοιεν* was an accretion. The latter words are probably a gloss: they are not found in A M. It is not possible, nor is it very important to determine accurately the reading of this passage: the general meaning is clear enough.

616 A **σφίσι**] 'to him and to his fellows' viz. the souls just ascended from beneath.

τοῦτον . . . ἀναβαίνοι] There is some confusion in the MSS. here. Par. K appears to read as in the text. Par. A omits **τὸν φόβον**: other MSS. retaining **τὸν φόβον** read *εἰ μυκήσαιτο τὸ στόμιον* instead of **μὴ γένοιτο . . . ἀναβαίνοι**. There can be little doubt that in these MSS. a gloss has taken the place of the true reading. But **τὸν φόβον** is probably genuine, although in the reading of Par. A it has been rejected as superfluous.

σιγήσαντος] sc. *τοῦ στομίου* supra 615 E. The aorist points to the moment of passing the aperture. Observe too, the difference between **ἀναβαίνοι**, 'tried to ascend,' and **ἀναβῆναι**, 'ascended.'

B **καὶ αὖ τὰς εὐεργεσίας**] *εὐεργεσία* seems to be used here for the rewards of merit, much as *ἀρετή* is used for 'reputation of virtue.'

616 B–617 D '*Now after seven days of rest in the meadow we set out upon our journey. And during the fourth day's journeying we saw far off a light, straight like a pillar, in colour like unto a rainbow. Another day of travel brought us to the light, and in the midst of it we saw the spindle of necessity depending from the fastenings of the sky. This spindle is the cause of all the celestial revolutions, and the ball or whorl of it is eight-fold, as there are eight concentric circles or orbits (fixed stars,* 1 *Saturn,* 2 *Jupiter,* 3 *Mars,* 4 *Venus,* 5 *Mercury,* 6 *Sun* 7 *and Moon* 8*), endued with appropriate motions, and each having its peculiar Siren tone. The three Fates sit round and set their hands to the revolutions of the spindle as it turns on the knees of their mother Necessity, where she sits enthroned. And they sing, to the music of the spheres, Lachesis of the past, Clotho of the present, Atropos of the future.*'

616 B **ἑκάστοις**] 'each company,' i.e. all those who had arrived on the same day.

δεῖν] is general, referring to all the souls: **ἀφικνεῖσθαι** refers to Er and his company in particular.

ὅθεν . . . φῶς εὐθύ] **ἄνωθεν** is to be taken with **τεταμένον.** *Republic X.* 616 B
'Whence they descried a line of light reaching from above.' It is worth observing as illustrating the difference between Greek and English on the subject of Tautology, that in this most finished passage Plato three times over uses the same word (**τεταμένον**) within ten lines. The phrase *διὰ παντὸς τεταμένον* is applied in the Timaeus, p. 40, to the axis of the universe (*πόλος*).

μάλιστα τῇ ἴριδι προσφερῆ] That is, not in shape, but in colour. It has been remarked by Boeckh, following Numenius and others, that the idea of the luminous column was suggested by the Milky Way. But this is hardly consistent with the distinct statement that the light was straight and vertical, or with the rainbow colours.

τὰ ἄκρα αὐτοῦ τῶν δεσμῶν] 'the extremities of the chains of Heaven' or 'of the Light.' **αὐτοῦ** is ambiguous, and may refer either to **οὐρανοῦ** or **φῶς**,—more naturally to the former. C

The Earth is imagined as an inner sphere, concentric with the outer sphere of the heaven, and connected with it by the column of light, in the midst of which are fastened the ends of the chains of Heaven. In the centre of the column and attached to the ends of these chains is the spindle which the Fates are turning upon the knees of Necessity. This together with the whorl which 'governs' it gives law to the movements of the heavenly bodies.

The Light is compared to the *ὑπόζωμα* of a trireme, which is variously explained as the undergirding rope (Acts xxvii. 17), or as a rope passing from stem to stern. See especially E. Warre in *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, v. 216 ('On the raft of Ulysses'): 'The hawser, called *ὑπόζωμα*, stretched from stem to stern, over crutches, kept up bow and stern and prevented "hogging." This is seen very clearly in the representation of an Egyptian ship given in Duemichen's *Fleet of an Egyptian Queen.* Possibly the difficulty about the *ὑπόζωμα*, Plat. Rep. Bk. x, finds its solution in this straight truss amidships. But the *ὑποζώματα* in the case of triremes seem generally to have been applied outside, stretching from stem to stern on both sides of the vessel. These hawsers, put on dry, would shrink when wet, and so tighten up the timbers of the lightly built vessel.' The thought of Plato seems to be that the whole circle of the Universe was held fast by the column, which, like the rope that fastened a trireme from stem to stern, passed through the midst of it. The words, **οἷον κίονα**, show that the position of

Republic X. 616 C the column was vertical from Er's point of view. The lower hemisphere is not considered, because everything is viewed from the upper surface of the Earth. The form of expression, **εἶναι γάρ, κ.τ.λ.**, shows that the figure of the *ὑπόζωμα* illustrates rather the function than the appearance of the pillar of light.

τὴν περιφοράν] 'the revolving sphere,'—not merely 'the revolution.'

Ἀνάγκης ἄτρακτον] The spindle of necessity is the pole or axis of the heaven and earth, which passes through the midst of the column of light.

τὴν . . . ἠλακάτην] Not here the distaff, but 'the shaft' of the spindle.

ἔκ τε τούτου καὶ ἄλλων γενῶν] Cp. the difference, in Tim. 41 D, between the Divine and Mundane elements of the Creation.

D **τὸ μὲν . . . ἐνθάδε**] 'In shape it (*ἡ τοῦ σφονδύλου φύσις*) resembled that (*ἡ* sc. *φύσις*) of a common whorl.'

νοῆσαι δὲ δεῖ, κ.τ.λ.] The whorl is fastened round the spindle like the body of a teetotum on its shaft, and is formed of eight whorls fitting one into the other like a number of boxes, and showing on the upper side a continuous surface. It is doubtful whether this whorl is in the form of a cylinder or of part of





a sphere. The circumstance that the upper surface only is said to be smooth is in favour of the latter supposition, which also agrees better with the image of the boxes fitting into one another. But on the other hand the shaft is driven home (*διαμπερὲς ἐλήλαται*) through the eighth or innermost, and each whorl appears to be driven through and through the one immediately outside it,—although **διαμπερὲς . . . ἁρμόττων** may be understood to mean merely that they fitted each other in every part.

E **τὸν μὲν οὖν πρῶτόν τε, κ.τ.λ.**] The passage which follows is to be explained (1) from the phenomena of the Heavens, as they

present themselves to the eye, or as they were accounted for by the crude astronomy of Plato's age: (2) from certain Pythagorean ratios or harmonies of number. The description of the heavenly bodies is still partly a work of fancy. This part of the Republic agrees with the Timaeus in general outline. (*a*) The order of the planets is the same in both: (*b*) there is an axis of the universe in both, which passes through the centre of the earth: (*c*) in both there is one motion of the whole, and a different motion of the seven inner circles. (*d*) In neither is there any distinct mention of a motion of the earth. The whole and the outermost circle are moving in one direction, the seven inner circles while partaking of this motion, ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ περιφερομένῳ, move also gently, ἠρέμα, in an opposite direction. This conception of a double movement seems intended to explain the difficulties of astronomy arising out of the apparent diurnal motion of the Heavens round the Earth and the distinct and apparently inconsistent movements of the Sun, Moon and Planets: cp. Tim. 38 E ff. The outer whorl, which is spotted, represents the fixed stars (which, as in the Timaeus, have only the 'motion of the same'); the seventh which is described as the brightest is the sun; the eighth shining with borrowed light, and having more of retrograde motion, is the moon; the second and fifth, which are of a yellower colour than the sun and moon, are Saturn and Mercury; the third and whitest of all is Jupiter; the next whitest or sixth is Venus; the fourth, which is reddish, is Mars. The whorl of the fixed stars is the widest; the others are enumerated according to their width; the breadth of the rims may be intended to signify the supposed distances of the orbits from each other; it may also rest merely on some notion of harmonical arrangement.

Republic X. 616 E

[It is difficult to reason about a description of the universe which is mythical and fanciful, and only has a faint basis in the astronomical notions of the ancients themselves. The following note on this subject has been contributed by Mr. W. A. Craigie, and deserves insertion here.

The order *of Plato's enumeration of the planets in* Rep. x. 616 E, ff.

Although the relative distance, brightness, &c. of the σφόνδυλοι, in this theory of the universe, correspond in the first instance to the real or supposed distance &c. of the planets denoted by these, there is a curious fact connected with Plato's order of arranging them

Republic X. 616 E that can hardly be accidental, and may account for his views regarding some of their properties. This is that each enumeration seems to be based on combinations which rest on the number 9. Thus to take first the 'breadth of the lips' of the σφόνδυλοι, which gives Plato's view of the distance of each planet from the other, we have the following series, the 1st σφόνδυλος being the outermost and the 8th the innermost of the set.

A. No. of σφόνδυλος	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th
Order of 'width'	1	8	7	3	6	2	5	4

By thus joining those σφόνδυλοι whose united numbers produce a sum of 9, we have a symmetrical figure with its centre between the 4th and 5th.

This appears even more clearly in the next enumeration, that of the respective colours, for here it comes out in the otherwise *arbitrary* way in which Plato springs from one to another instead of taking them in the order of some scheme of colour. Thus the 4th, which is reddish, is inserted between the 3rd and 6th, which are both white. Writing down the numbers then in Plato's order, we get

B. 1 7 8 2 = 5 3 4 6

which gives another set divided in the centre of the 8 rings, where it is indeed coupled by the remark that the 2nd and 5th nearly resemble each other.

The respective speed of the rings gives them in their natural order from 8 to 1 which of course produces a similar result

C. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | centre | 8 7 &c.

It may also be significant here that the three which move at the same rate (5, 6, 7) produce the sum of 18, or half that of the whole series.

Note.—Series A gives a still more elaborate figure if we invert the lines: thus

Order of width	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
No. of σφόνδυλος	1	6	4	8	7	5	3	2]

τὴν ἐναντίαν τῷ ὅλῳ ἠρέμα περιφέρεσθαι] I. e. while they partake of the diurnal revolution, the sun, moon and planets alter their position in the sky from day to day,—the moon most rapidly, then the sun with Venus and Mercury, and so on. The peculiar apparent motions of Mercury and Venus are noticed in the Timaeus (p. 38 D); but this point is too minute for Plato's purpose here. *Republic X.* 617 A

τρίτον δέ] *τὸν τρίτον* which is in all the MSS. except *q*, may possibly be defended: 'the third in order of reverse motion was the fourth':—but the ambiguity of this expression and the probability that *τόν* may have arisen out of **πέμπτον**, justify the rejection of the article. B

σφίσι] To Er and the other souls, who are thus kept in mind.

ἐπανακυκλούμενον] 'in the reverse or retrograde revolution,' which it shares with the other six inner circles. This word is to be closely joined with **φορᾷ ἰέναι**.

αὐτόν] sc. *τὸν ἄτρακτον*.

ἕνα τόνον] is the reading of the best MSS. and of Proclus: 'one sound and one note.' Another reading, of inferior authority, is *ἀνὰ τόνον*.

Μοίρας, κ.τ.λ.] The touches of the Fates regulating the motions of the inner and outer Heaven are obscurely symbolical. 'Lachesis, wise in past events, allots to each his life (she touches both motions); Clotho spins this in the present (touching the larger motion), Atropos (touching the inner circles) makes the destiny irreversible. Why does Clotho touch the outer circle? Is it because the present, as the moment of choice, alone from time to time lays hold upon eternity? Lachesis touches both alternately:—the past is unalterable but influences what is to come. Atropos, the future, not to be averted, is alone contingent, *ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν*.' So we may attempt to interpret Plato's symbolism. C

ὡσαύτως] 'In like manner,' i.e. at intervals, referring to **διαλείπουσαν χρόνον**.

'*As soon as we came thither we were taken before Lachesis, from whose lap an Interpreter took lots, and samples of lives. After some warning words he threw the lots to each of us, but I was forbidden to take up mine. Then he laid out the samples and bade* *617 D–619 B*

Republic X. 617 D–619 B *the souls in order of their lots make choice of the lives which they desired to lead on earth.'—Socrates observes by the way that of the whole of human existence this is the most critical moment. And in order to make the choice aright, not merely the life of good habits, but philosophy is required.*

617 D **πρὸς τὴν Λάχεσιν**] The allotment of lives is assigned to Lachesis, *ἀπὸ τοῦ λαγχάνειν.*

ἄλλης περιόδου θνητοῦ γένους] 'Another period of belonging to the race of mortals.' **θανατηφόρου** agrees with **περιόδου**,—'leading to death.'

E **πρῶτος δ' ὁ λαχὼν . . . βίον**] 'Let him who draws the foremost lot, first choose a life.' The order of words seems intended to produce the effect of tragedy.

ἀρετὴ δὲ ἀδέσποτον] 'Virtue is free to all' or 'is not the exclusive property of any.' In such allegorical fashion does Plato assert the freedom of the human will in a previous existence, as determining the condition of this. Cp. Tim. 42 D *διαθεσμοθετήσας δὲ πάντα αὐτοῖς ταῦτα, ἵνα τῆς ἔπειτα εἴη κακίας ἑκάστων ἀναίτιος*:—also Laws x. 904, in which God is described as, after consideration of their nature, placing living beings, in whom the connexion of soul and body, though not eternal, is morally speaking indissoluble, in a state of probation, and making their future character and dwelling-place depend upon virtue and vice, of which one or other is to be chosen in an instant.

The allegory is not to be too closely pressed: for while it is said below that the life chosen determines the character of the soul during that life, this is followed by the exhortation that a man should study philosophy, so that *everywhere*, as far as possible, both here and hereafter, he may choose the best life with reference to his individual character. Compare the parallel passage of the Phaedrus, pp. 248, 249, where in the first instance the law of transmigration is called *θεσμὸς Ἀδραστείας*, and then in what follows the individual choice is mentioned incidentally:—Phaedr. 249 B *τῷ δὲ χιλιοστῷ (ἔτει) ἀμφότεραι ἀφικνούμεναι ἐπὶ κλήρωσίν τε καὶ* **αἵρεσιν** *τοῦ δευτέρου βίου,* **αἱροῦνται** *ὃν ἂν ἐθέλῃ ἑκάστη.*

ῥῖψαι ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς κλήρους] 'Threw the lots so as to reach them all.' **πάντας**, sc. *σφᾶς.*

ἓ δὲ οὐκ ἐᾶν] 'But him' (viz. Er) 'the minister did not permit to do so.' **οὐκ ἐᾶν**, sc. *τὸν προφήτην.*

ψυχῆς δὲ τάξιν, κ.τ.λ.] 'There was no definite character in the samples of their lives: because the character was given to the individual by the life which the soul had chosen.' **τάξιν** = *πῶς ἔχοι τάξεως*. Cp. supra 617 E *ὑμεῖς δαίμονα αἱρήσεσθε*: infra 621 D. *Republic X.* 618 B

τὰ δὲ καὶ μεσοῦν τούτων] I.e. 'some were in a mean state between health and sickness, riches and poverty.' So infra 619 A **τὸν μέσον** . . . *τῶν τοιούτων βίον*.

τίς αὐτόν, κ.τ.λ.] depends immediately on **ἐξευρεῖν**. The idea of seeking out the truth is developed into that of finding the true teacher, which has been suggested by the word **μαθητής**. C

τὰ νῦν δὴ ῥηθέντα] All the various circumstances of life included in the previous description (supra A) of the *βίων παραδείγματα*.

μετὰ ποίας τινὸς ψυχῆς ἕξεως] The whole of a man's present life is to be a preparation for his choice in the life to come. To this choice he is to bring with him a knowledge of the influence which circumstances exercise on character,—whether the circumstances in which nature places him, or in which he places himself. He must also know the nature of the soul, and how she may be made better or worse. D

ἐάσει] A return from the participle to the finite verb. Ven. Ξ reads *ἐᾶν*, Vat. r *ἐάσειν*. E

ἀδαμαντίνως] is a stronger word for *βεβαίως*.

πλούτων] The plural is used with a certain grandiloquence to express the various degrees and kinds of wealth, cp. vi. 495 A. For **ἀνέκπληκτος** cp. ix. 577 A *καὶ μὴ καθάπερ παῖς ἔξωθεν ὁρῶν* **ἐκπλήττεται** *ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν τυραννικῶν προστάσεως*. 619 A

καὶ ἐν παντὶ τῷ ἔπειτα] This truth is anticipated in the remark (vi. 498 D) half understood by Glaucon *πείρας γὰρ οὐδὲν ἀνήσομεν, κ.τ.λ.*

Er proceeds with his narrative.—'In bidding us choose, the Interpreter told us to use judgement; and if we did so, even the last comer need not despair. No sooner had he spoken than one of the souls came forward and chose the greatest tyranny; he was one of those who came from heaven, and had dwelt in a well-ordered city: but like others who were similarly overtaken, he had no philosophy. He lamented his choice when it was too late, but disregarding the word of the Interpreter, blamed everybody but *619 B–620 D*

Republic X. 619 B–620 D *himself. This was a typical instance of sudden reversal of destiny, due to chance and inexperience. The spectacle of the election was at once pathetic, ludicrous, and wonderful. Most of the souls chose the opposite of their former lives. The soul of Orpheus took the nature of a swan, disdaining to be born of a woman, because women had been his murderers. Those of Ajax and Agamemnon, in resentment of their wrongs, preferred the lives of a lion and an eagle severally to the life of man. Atalanta chose the life of an athlete, Epeius that of a woman cunning in the arts. Thersites who came late, put on the likeness of an ape; and the soul of Odysseus which came last of all, weary of travel and ambition, rejecting every other, chose the quiet life of a private man.'*

619 B **καὶ δὴ οὖν, κ.τ.λ.**] 'and according to the report of the messenger from the other world,'—viz. Er, supra 614 D,—'these were the very words of the prophet: "Even the last comer, if he chooses with understanding and lives earnestly, is destined to have an eligible life and one which is anything but bad. Let not him who chooses first be careless, nor let the last despair."'

We note the rhetorical art with which Plato first enunciates his 'whole duty of man,' and then confirms his precepts by recurring to the myth of Er.

εἰπόντος δέ] sc. *τοῦ προφήτου ταῦτα.*

ἔφη] sc. *ὁ Ἤρ.*

C **εἱμαρμένην . . . βρώσεις, κ.τ.λ.**] An apposition which may be compared with supra 616 D *κύκλους . . . τὰ χείλη φαίνοντας.*

τοῖς προρρηθεῖσιν] 'to the former speech'; supra 617 E *αἰτία ἑλομένου.*

ἐν τεταγμένῃ πολιτείᾳ . . . (D) ἀρετῆς μετειληφότα] Plato means to intimate that the life of mere habit is no safeguard of truth or virtue, under altered circumstances. Cp. Phaedo 81, 82, where those who have lived virtuously in a well-ordered community, though their condition is said to be comparatively blessed, are only permitted to attain some tolerable social state, whether of men or other political animals, such as ants or bees: their life is contrasted with that of the votaries of philosophy, who are meet to be the companions of Gods. See also vi. 506 C where he compares those who have right opinion without knowledge to blind men who manage to keep the straight path; also Meno 97.

ὡς δὲ καὶ εἰπεῖν] 'and as indeed one might say,' a qualification of the seeming paradox that quite as many of the souls who made a bad choice came from Heaven as from underground. For **καί**, which marks the bearing of the new remark on what precedes, cp. Gorg. 520 B *μόνοις δ' ἔγωγε* **καὶ** *ᾤμην τοῖς δημηγόροις τε καὶ σοφισταῖς οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖν, κ.τ.λ.* *Republic X.* 619 D

οὐκ ἐξ ἐπιδρομῆς] Cp. Herod. iii. 135, § 5 *οὔτι* **ἐπιδραμὼν** *πάντα τὰ διδόμενα ἐδέκετο.*

διὸ δὴ . . . τύχην] 'and because of this' (i.e. because of the experience of some and the inexperience of others) 'and also because of the chances of the lot, many of the souls exchanged a good destiny for an evil, or an evil for a good.' Innocence and happiness in his previous life are not sufficient to sustain a man in the choice for the future: a severer probation or discipline is required, which is that of philosophy. And, suppose a man to have had the discipline, even the journey from one life to the other is a heavenly pilgrimage: and the return hither, if he have only moderate fortune in his opportunity of choice, is not unblessed. But most men are under the dominion of habit, and few know how to profit by experience.

μίσει τοῦ γυναικείου γένους, κ.τ.λ.] The dative is to be taken closely with **οὐκ ἐθέλουσαν**:—'because of hatred of the sex who destroyed him, not choosing to be born of a woman.' 620 A

ὡσαύτως. εἰκοστὴν δέ] This reading is confirmed by the quotation of Plutarch. The reader naturally asks what some of the copyists (who read *εἰκός· τήν*, or who changed the reading into *ὡσαύτως, ὡς τὸ εἰκός· τήν*) perhaps asked themselves: 'Why should the soul of Ajax have been the twentieth?' Plutarch, who also raises this question (Symp. Quaest. lix. 5), says that Ajax is the twentieth soul who appears in Homer (Od. xi) to Ulysses,—that is to say after excepting Elpenor, who is not worth counting. The real answer is that no answer is needed. Ajax is twentieth and Agamemnon twenty-first for the same reason that Atalanta is in the middle and Ulysses at the end of the series: that is to say, in order to heighten the effect of the narrative by the appearance of exactness, and to illustrate the working of the element of chance. The copyists may have been merely misled by the letters *ως* at the end of **ὡσαύτως** suggesting the familiar phrase *ὡς εἰκός.* B

τὴν δ' ἐπὶ τούτῳ] sc. *λαχοῦσαν εἶναι ψυχήν.*

Republic X. 620 C **πόρρω δ᾽ ἐν ὑστάτοις ἰδεῖν**] 'and that he saw far away among the last.' **πόρρω** refers to the place assigned to Thersites by the number of his lot. He is luckless as well as despicable. Odysseus, on the other hand, is unfortunate but superior to misfortune.

D **καὶ ἀσμένην ἑλέσθαι**] 'and took up the lot with joy.' **ἑλέσθαι** is co-ordinate with **εὑρεῖν . . . εἰπεῖν.**

τὰ μὲν ἄδικα, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. Phaedo 82 A *τοὺς δέ γε ἀδικίας τε καὶ τυραννίδας καὶ ἁρπαγὰς προτετιμηκότας εἰς τὰ τῶν λύκων τε καὶ ἱεράκων καὶ ἰκτίνων γένη, κ.τ.λ.* For **δίκαια** as an attribute of *θηρία* cp. vi. 496 D.

620 D–621 D '*When all had chosen, they went each in order to Lachesis, and received from her the Genius who was to be the guardian of their lives. This Genius led them for confirmation beneath the hands of Clotho and of Atropos successively. Then all passed under the throne of Necessity; and when we had passed through the midst of it we came into the arid plain of Oblivion, and encamped beside the waters of Forgetfulness, whereof each soul was compelled to drink a certain measure, but some drank to excess. I, however, was not permitted to drink of it. But when, at midnight, it had thundered, and the Earth had quaked, and the souls had shot upwards like stars to their places of birth, I, without knowing how I returned to the body, opened my eyes at dawn, and found myself lying on the pyre.*'

'*And so,*' *adds Socrates,* '*this Vision of Judgement vanished not, but was preserved for our instruction. By taking to heart its lessons, we may secure true happiness here and hereafter.*'

620 D **ὃν εἵλετο δαίμονα**] Supra 617 E. **δαίμων** here = 'the genius,' or 'guardian angel,' or 'the double' of a man, as in Phaedo 107 C *ὁ ἑκάστου* **δαίμων**, *ὅσπερ ζῶντα εἰλήχει*: elsewhere one of the race of demi-gods or sons of God who are supposed to have governed and to govern mankind: cp. Polit. 271 D *καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ ζῶα κατὰ γένη καὶ ἀγέλας οἷον νομεῖς θεῖοι διειλήφεσαν* **δαίμονες**: Laws iv. 713 D *ταὐτὸν δὴ καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἄρα καὶ φιλάνθρωπος ὢν τὸ γένος ἄμεινον ἡμῶν ἐφίστη τὸ τῶν* **δαιμόνων**. In the Timaeus, 90 A, the *δαίμων* of each one is spoken of as the rational principle, *κυριώτατον τῆς ψυχῆς εἶδος*, which God had given them.

E **κυροῦντα**] 'Ratifying' (participle of *κυρόω*), agreeing with **δαίμονα**.

λαχών] is masculine instead of feminine: the person for the soul. The same gender is continued in ἐφαψάμενον and διεξελθόντα, which are more naturally referred to the person than to the Genius, who, however, is the subject of κυροῦντα, ἄγειν, ποιοῦντα. *Republic* X. 620 E

ἀμεταστρεπτί] follows up ἀμετάστροφα, and helps to mark the solemn moment when, their destiny having been made irreversible, they pass singly beneath the throne of Necessity. The words ἐπειδὴ . . . διῆλθον imply that they pass one by one. Each, when he has passed through, has to wait for the rest.

διεξελθόντα] The subject has changed insensibly from δαίμονα 621 A
with which the previous participles agree, to the spirit, or the man himself. Cp. οἱ ἄλλοι.

διὰ καύματος . . . δεινοῦ] They are passing through the midst of the pillar of light.

καὶ γὰρ . . . φύει] The plain of Oblivion is appropriately described as a barren wilderness, having nothing to remind us of this world.

σφᾶς] Er, in continuing his narrative, now includes himself in the company of souls. From 617 E, ἐ δὲ οὐκ ἐᾶν, he has been only a spectator.

οὗ τὸ ὕδωρ . . . στέγειν] Another suggestive image of forgetfulness. These words metaphorically describe the failure of memory to retain the things which have happened to men in a former state of existence. No vessel, such as the human soul, can hold the stream of recollection after it has drunk of the water.

τοὺς δὲ φρονήσει . . . μέτρου] The eagerness of the soul to forget past cares is the source of temptation here. The soul that drinks too deeply of forgetfulness is 'defiled,' infra C: cp. vii. 535 E ἢ ἂν . . . ἀμαθίᾳ μολύνηται. The wise seek to retain, if possible, some recollection of a former state of existence. For the forgetfulness of a former state cp. Phaedrus 250 A. This is the only allusion which occurs in the Republic to the doctrine of ἀνάμνησις, which, moreover, is rarely spoken of elsewhere—and chiefly in the earlier writings of Plato (Meno 81 ff., Phaedo 73–76, Phaedrus 250, 275).

πιόντα . . . ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι] The aorist denotes each several act of drinking: the continuous, or general tense, answering to ἀεί, describes the uniform result.

Republic X. 621 B **αὐτὸς . . . ἰδεῖν . . . αὐτόν**] The grammar reflects the strangeness of the situation, in which the disembodied spirit returns, and the man suddenly finds himself lying on the funeral pyre.

ἤδη κείμενον] The MSS. are a good deal divided between the omission and insertion of **ἤδη**. It may be explained as referring back to the beginning of the narrative (supra 614 B) where the dead are described as being taken up for burial on the tenth day, two days before Er's coming to life upon the pyre.

καὶ οὕτως, κ.τ.λ.] 'And so' (by Er's coming back to Earth) 'the tale, Glaucon, was saved and has not perished, and may be our salvation, if we are obedient to it.' **οὕτως** is the reading of Par. A, the Cesena MS. (M), Ven. Ξ and several other MSS., *οὗτος* of Par. D K (the representatives of Ven. Π), the Munich MS. *q*, &c. Both readings seem to require the article before *μῦθος*, which appears only in Par. K. The reason of its omission may be the familiarity of the proverbial phrase *μῦθος ἀπώλετο*. (Theaet. 164 D, Phil. 14 A, Laws i. 645 B.)

C **πάντα . . . ἀνέχεσθαι**] Supra 610 B.

πάντα δὲ ἀγαθά] After **ἀγαθά** some more general word like *δέχεσθαι* has to be understood from **ἀνέχεσθαι**.

τῆς ἄνω ὁδοῦ . . . ἐπιτηδεύσομεν] Cp. Theaet. 176 B *πειρᾶσθαι χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε φεύγειν . . . δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι.*

ἵνα καὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς, κ.τ.λ.] Cp. i. 351 E–352 B.

D **ὥσπερ . . . περιαγειρόμενοι**] 'Like the victors at the games, who go round to collect gifts.'

The words **καὶ ἐνθάδε . . . πορείᾳ**, which are pleonastic, resume what has been said of the rewards of virtue both in this life and in the life to come (614 E ff.); and the continuous tense in **κομιζώμεθα** corresponds to the long period over which the recompense is spread.

ἣν διεληλύθαμεν] 'Which we have gone through,' i.e. described; but with a playful suggestion of our having made the pilgrimage ourselves.

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